

*Yundong:*  
**Mass Movements in  
Chinese Communist  
Leadership**

**A publication of the  
Center for Chinese Studies  
University of California,  
Berkeley, California 94720**

**Cover Colophon by Shih-hsiang Chen**

Although the Center for Chinese Studies is responsible for the selection and acceptance of monographs in this series, responsibility for the opinions expressed in them and for the accuracy of statements contained in them rests with their authors.

© 1976 by the Regents of the University of California  
ISBN 0-912966-15-7  
Library of Congress Catalog Number 75-620060  
Printed in the United States of America  
\$4.50

Center for Chinese Studies • CHINA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

N U M B E R     T W E L V E

---

*YUNDONG:*  
MASS CAMPAIGNS IN  
CHINESE COMMUNIST  
LEADERSHIP

---

GORDON BENNETT

---



陳世驥題



# Contents

List of Abbreviations .....	8
Foreword .....	9
Preface .....	11
<i>Pinyin</i> Romanization of Familiar Names .....	14
INTRODUCTION .....	15
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT .....	19
Background Factors .....	19
Immediate Factors .....	28
Development after 1949 .....	32
II. HOW TO RUN A MOVEMENT: THE GENERAL	
PATTERN .....	38
Organizing a Campaign .....	39
Running a Campaign in a Single Unit .....	41
Summing Up .....	44
III. <i>YUNDONG</i> IN ACTION: A TYPOLOGY .....	46
Implementing Existing Policy .....	47
Emulating Advanced Experience .....	49
Introducing and Popularizing a New Policy .....	55
Correcting Deviations from Important Public Norms .....	58

Rectifying Leadership Malpractices among Responsible Cadres and Organizations .....	60
Purging from Office Individuals Whose Political Opposition Is Excessive .....	63
Effecting Enduring Changes in Individual Attitudes and Social Institutions that Will Contribute to the Growth of a Collective Spirit and Support the Construction of Socialism .....	66
IV. DEBATES OVER THE CONTINUING VALUE OF <i>YUNDONG</i> .....	75
Rebutting the Critics: Arguments in Support of Campaign Leadership .....	80
V. RESPONSES BY NONELITES: THE QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE .....	86
VI. CONCLUSION .....	92
APPENDIX: The Land Reform Campaign— Manchuria, 1946-47 .....	101
Selected Annotated Bibliography .....	122
Glossary .....	125
Index .....	131

*Wave After Wave*

by Rewi Alley

With white foam  
waves break  
and dash eagerly  
up the strand  
lapping around  
the children  
who play and laugh  
making the long beach  
a live thing in  
its changing beauty.

Watching these  
and the sturdy fishermen  
hauling boats ashore  
one thinks over  
the wave after wave  
of people's movements  
that have pounded  
the shores of privilege  
then after dumping  
flotsam, have returned  
gaily to mother sea  
again.

August 20, 1968

Beidaihe

(from *Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement*,  
Hongkong, September 26, 1968)

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT AND NOTES

<i>CB</i>	<i>Current Background</i> , U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
JPRS	Joint Publications Research Service
NCNA	New China News Agency, Beijing
PLA	People's Liberation Army
<i>SCMM</i>	<i>Selections from China Mainland Magazines</i> , U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong
<i>SCMP</i>	<i>Survey of China Mainland Press</i> , U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong

# Foreword

One of the most frequently encountered metaphors in the writings of Mao Zedong likens the course of revolution to the movement of waves. The movement of a revolutionary cause, Mao tells us, is by no means always a forward one; revolutions move through ebbs and flows, advances and retreats. The revolutionary is often depicted as battling waves in his attempt to make forward progress. Whether this metaphor derives from the experience of the Chinese Communist Party in guerrilla warfare during its formative years or from the concepts of the dialect itself, it is a particularly important idea that has determined the course of post-Liberation Chinese politics, and which is thus indispensable to an understanding of that course.

The most important manifestation of this idea in contemporary Chinese political life is the *yundong*, or mobilizational campaign. So important is it, indeed, that the “campaign style” has given a distinctive character to the Chinese political system, as compared with nonsocialist or even other socialist political systems. Despite its importance, however, neither the Chinese themselves nor outside observers of China have devoted sustained attention to the idea of the campaign or to the history of its implementation in post-Liberation China.

Gordon Bennett is particularly well qualified to correct this omission. Along with a handful of others, Professor Bennett combines a thorough knowledge of the documentary sources on contemporary Chinese politics with a highly developed ability to interview former residents of the People's Republic. Using the information and viewpoints garnered from these two disparate sources, he is able to produce a synthetic work of considerably greater reliability than those that derive from a single type of source material. This ability was manifested first in the book, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Siao-ai*, the story of a Red Guard, which Professor Bennett wrote in collaboration with Ronald Montaperto. It is clearly manifested as well in the present work.

Professor Bennett has written *Yundong* with two audiences in mind. His book synthesizes in a new way primary source material on the mobilizational campaign, a subject that has not been separately treated previously except in article form. As a result, this work will be of considerable interest and importance to the specialist in contemporary

Chinese politics. But the book has also been addressed to the student who is just beginning his or her study of contemporary China. Because the campaigns in retrospect provide not only a key to understanding Chinese political style, but also a means of periodizing contemporary Chinese political history, it is clear that this work will find an important place in the classroom as well.

During several periods of residence at the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley, Professor Bennett has contributed substantially to the Center's intellectual vitality. His long association with the Center makes it particularly fitting that this book be published as one of the China Research Monographs.

JOHN BRYAN STARR, *Vice-Chairman*  
*Center for Chinese Studies*

*Berkeley, California*  
*May 1975*

# Preface

The literature on China's modern day political culture abounds with case studies of individual mass campaigns, but no general and comprehensive discussion on the subject is anywhere to be found. In spite of abundant documentary evidence that mass movements are a critical component of Chinese Communist leadership, they are barely mentioned per se in comprehensive works such as John Lewis's *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, 1963), Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1966), James Townsend's *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1968), or *China's Developmental Experience*, edited by Michel Oksenberg (New York, 1973). Moreover, despite the obvious fact that mass campaigns continue to flourish, prominent reports by recent visitors to China mention them only briefly, if at all. Masanori Tabata's account of his China trip (*Japan Times*, August 25, 1975) is the exception that proves the rule.

One possible explanation for this development is overfamiliarity. One can scarcely peruse a single issue of *Peking Review* or *People's Daily* without reading about some campaign or other, big or small, countrywide or local; thus, many observers have come to regard the technique as commonplace, and the ordinary rarely recommends itself for analysis. A second possible explanation is universality. Especially since the early 1940s, the history of communism in China has been filled with literally hundreds of mass movements; the task of writing about them seems hopelessly intertwined with an analysis of the entire history of the period. How can bounds be placed around such a fluid subject that so easily permeates other sectors of society?

Issues raised by members of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) suggest a third explanation. According to the CCAS-inspired argument, the liberal-democratic ideological commitment of most Western scholars predisposes them to disregard the political institutions characteristic of nonliberal, mobilizational democracy. Such an intellectual posture causes them to focus on political institutions exclusively as instruments of leadership rather than inquiring as well into their benefits to lower reaches of society. The failure of *China! Inside the People's Republic*, a collective report by the first CCAS friendship delegation to the People's Republic, itself to discuss mass campaigns seems to

weaken this argument; at the same time, a CCAS-oriented sociologist, Charles Cell, has prepared the first full-length empirical study of campaigns.

Yet a fourth possible explanation asserts the essential nonexistence of the topic. The Chinese lend the term "campaign" to a variety of events much too diverse, some would argue, for just one category. A small campaign to pay agricultural taxes on time in Zunhua *xian*, Hebei province, for example, is inappropriately thrown together with a nationwide campaign for all circles to repudiate the allegedly anti-Party works of the writer Hu Feng. The two appear different enough in both scope and process to justify completely separate handling.

Methodologically, taking "mass campaigns" as a single institutional unit of analysis is appealing. Unlike "policies," which come and go in response to only partly knowable stimuli; "decision-making," which takes place largely behind closed doors; "elites" with complements only partly visible to researchers; or "informal groupings" such as factions, which have relentlessly defied almost every effort to obtain empirical glimpses, Chinese mass movements are bathed in publicity. As a consequence, there are some excellent monographic studies by Western writers on such subjects as land reform in Longbow village, the suppression of the Yi Guan Dao (name of a secret society) in Tianjin, the Five Oppositions to capitalists in Shanghai, the construction of water conservancy projects before the Great Leap Forward, the Four Cleanups in rural villages a few years later, and many more. Policies, decisions, elites, and factions do have their advantages as analytical units, and it is not my intention to deny their value, especially for short-run purposes. However, for the general purpose of taking a longer view of politics and society and, in particular, for trying to identify secular effects of the Chinese revolution on Chinese political culture, institutional units easily hold their own with the others. In fact, when institutional data are measurably superior to other data, then examination of an important unit such as the mass campaign can yield superior insights.

Mass campaigns are by no means a familiar institution to students newly undertaking the study of Chinese political behavior. Campaign leadership is often portrayed as unusual and incomprehensible. Especially in popular literature, movements are easily painted as erratic, destructive, and coercive appurtenances to a generally bizarre "mass line" political style. One objective of this monograph is to demonstrate that campaigns have a considerably more elaborate and positive role to play, especially during the present stage of China's struggle for development away from poverty and old-style politics. Students of modern Chinese society should not be required to labor under preconceived, untested fixations about the worth of mass movements; rather their energies should be applied to genuine interpretive issues. (1) Do mass



campaigns merely marshall the Chinese population behind highly circumscribed opportunities for political participation? Or do meaningful elements of democracy also appear in the practice of mobilizational democracy? (2) Does extensive reliance on campaign leadership promote political and economic development? Or does it retard development that might otherwise be possible? (3) Has campaign leadership acquired a substantial political following in China? That is, will successors to Beijing's aging revolutionary elite continue to find advocacy of mass movements instrumental to career advancement in the future?

Here I should record a brief note about the romanization of Chinese names and terms. Recently a new level of consensus has been forming within the Chinese studies profession toward extensive adoption of a "phonetic spelling" system (*pinyin*) introduced by Chinese linguists in the 1950s. In the West the new system has been slow to take hold because no major dictionary has employed it, because people antagonistic to the Communist government have not been willing to use it, and not least of all, because official Chinese publications themselves have employed a mixture of three systems. English-language Chinese magazines over the years have contained romanizations of place names like Sinkiang (Xinjiang in *pinyin*) using the old British Post Office system, people's names like Chiang Ching (Jiang Qing in *pinyin*) using the popular Wade-Giles system modified by omitting all aspiration marks (standard Wade-Giles spelling is Chiang Ch'ing), and terms like *yundong* using *pinyin* (standard Wade-Giles spelling is *yun-tung*). Only in the spring of 1975 did the Chinese government announce that soon they would shift to pure *pinyin*. The existence of several systems for romanizing Chinese has produced needless confusion for students of modern China, especially those who do not read Chinese; thus in my view, the move toward uniform adoption of *pinyin* is welcome. Throughout the text I use *pinyin* consistently, even though many familiar names and places may look unfamiliar with their new spellings; a few examples are listed below. Only for the word China (Zhongguo in *pinyin*), for names of places such as Hongkong (Xianggang), which are outside the Peoples Republic, and for footnotes and bibliographic citations, where I have preserved all original spellings for readers' convenience in reference, have I made exceptions. Even in quoted material, unless copyrighted, I have changed original romanizations to their *pinyin* equivalents for uniformity.

I would like to acknowledge the kind interest and encouragement to complete this project which I received from Chalmers Johnson and Joyce Kallgren at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. While enjoying the hospitality and intellectual stimulation of the Center at Berkeley during two separate summers, I located and incorporated much of the documentary source material for

the study. Jim Townsend, Fred Wakeman, Ken Lieberthal, Marty Whyte, and Chuck Cell were generous with their criticisms and suggestions. Greta Morgan contributed creative typing and a practiced eye for sentences “that didn’t look right.” Susan Alitto brought clarity to a turgid draft with her many and able editorial suggestions.

As always, Carol sustained me emotionally, while cheerfully pointing to economic fallacies that threatened to find their way into my argument.

### *PINYIN* ROMANIZATION OF FAMILIAR NAMES

Beijing	Peking
Deng Xiaoping	Teng Hsiao-p’ing
Guangdong	Kwangtung
Guangzhou	Canton (Kwangchow)
Guomindang	Kuomintang
Jiang Jieshi	Chiang Kai-Shek (Chiang Chieh-shih)
Liu Shaoqi	Liu Shao-ch’i
Mao Zedong	Mao Tse-tung
Peng Dehuai	Peng Teh-huai (P’eng Te-huai)
Shanxi	Shansi
Shaanxi	Shensi
Sichuan	Szechwan
Tianjin	Tientsin
Yanan	Yenan
Zhou Enlai	Chou En-lai

# Introduction

Sheer numbers are first to impress an observer of China's mass movements. There are little movements to conserve coal and big ones to clean up corrupt management of communes. There are local movements to harvest perishable crops in good time and national ones to make "every man a soldier." There are social movements to discourage childbearing, and political ones to rectify the Communist Party's work-style. So widespread and pervasive have these campaigns become in Chinese political life that attempts at enumeration prove nearly impossible. Trying to tally up a total would be roughly analogous to attempting a full count of elections held over the past two decades in the United States, including every election for national, state, and local public office as well as every choice of officers by labor unions, trade associations, community organizations, school classes, church groups, and clubs. Campaigns in China, much like elections in America, are a fundamental political institution.

This brief study of China's mass movements reaches three broad conclusions about their role and importance. First, for a significantly wide range of issues they afford Chinese citizens an effective vehicle for *political participation*. Second, in balance they contribute more to *economic growth* than they take away. And third, they will *continue to thrive* in Chinese politics following the leadership succession to Chairman Mao Zedong and the present generation of revolutionary cadres. All three points have given rise to considerable scholarly controversy, and impressive evidence can be marshalled against them. I can neither completely prove the positions I find most persuasive, nor flatly reject alternatives; but I believe that the available qualitative data supports the probable veracity of all three of my conclusions.

More important, however, than determining the correctness or incorrectness of these hypotheses is the calling of attention to the interpretive issues they raise. Three basic oversimplifications of mass campaign leadership—each tending to disguise underlying issues—have appeared with regularity in the literature on modern Chinese politics. One portrays a slave-driving Communist leadership whipping a reluctant populace into doing its bidding. Always the unstated implication is that the public generally perceives campaigns as more of a burdensome im-

position than a welcome opportunity. "The mass campaigns are used to stir up public emotions . . . [and] the slogans, the production drives, the rallies and demonstrations consist in large part of emotional appeals." From this description of the essential nature of a movement, it is a short step to such conclusions as "continuous stimulation may produce emotional fatigue" and "the effort to arouse the masses, therefore, may be met with diminishing returns."<sup>1</sup> There is some truth to such an analysis, of course, but it forces one to puzzle over the source of the colossal energy that propelled the Cultural Revolution forward seventeen "wearying" years after the CCP had assumed the mantle of power.

A second oversimplification lifts mass movements entirely out of the arena of elite-level political combat by describing them merely as a technique wielded by "the government," "the Party," or "the leadership." From this characterization, it is only one step to the conclusion that some collectively rational "they" will eventually decide to replace primitive and disruptive mass campaigns with routinized, more "modern" organizational forms reflected in law. No room is left to ask who supports, and who opposes, the mass campaign style of leadership; whose interests might be advanced by its preservation, and whose interests might be undermined?

A third oversimplification is to analyze Chinese society as a lump without distinguishing "progressive," "backward," and middling sectors. According to one estimate, allegedly by Chairman Mao himself, roughly 30 percent of the population fall in the first category ("activists"), 30 percent in the second category ("pessimists" and others), and 40 percent in between ("followers of the main stream," *sui da liu*).<sup>2</sup>

Running a mass campaign properly is a relatively complex undertaking for a productive (or administrative, service, educational, or military) unit, and without some political sophistication already acquired by the unit's members, the effort may achieve crude success at best. In other words, the visible effect of any movement is a function not only of the tasks and timing of the movement itself, but also of the political level of the responding unit. For many (though surely not all) interpretive purposes, the critical datum is the measure of success achieved in progressive units, since failure in other units may reflect more than simply a weakness of the movement. Again drawing an analogy with our own democracy, as long as politically active elites in the United States remain committed to liberal views on civil rights questions, irrespective of the greater conservatism and even intolerance evident among the less

---

<sup>1</sup>Theodore H.E. Chen, *The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and Commentary* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 11-12.

<sup>2</sup>Mao Zedong, speech at Lushan prior to the opening of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee (Aug. 2, 1959), in *The Case of Peng Teh-huai* [Peng Dehuai], 1959-1968 (Hongkong: Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 406.

active population, the civil rights cause will continue to advance. So it is in China. On many questions, as long as progressive units like Dazhai Brigade move forward (say, with a new incentive system), it hardly matters that backward units elsewhere still limp along behind (with piece rates). Were Dazhai and other model brigades to return to piece rates, then and only then would it be fair to argue that reaction had set in.

My essay has twin purposes. The first is to call attention to the institution of *yundong*<sup>3</sup> under Chinese Communist leadership, describe how the campaigns work, discuss their historical origins, and show how widely used they are.<sup>4</sup> The second is to discuss my three hypotheses on the importance of mass movements in Chinese politics, but with care to avoid the various conceptual oversimplifications that have predetermined the results of some analyses. I will, therefore: (1) suggest explanations for the origin of *yundong* and for their unique proliferation in China; (2) isolate elements that characterize all *yundong* in order to abstract a general analytical pattern; (3) typologize literally hundreds of *yundong* already implemented to emphasize the great variety of problems they are employed to address; (4) explore intra-elite controversy over the continuing value of *yundong*; and (5) examine the shifting responses of non-elites to campaign leadership (the "compliance" question).

A Chinese Communist dictionary vaguely defines *yundong* as "an organized and purposeful mass activity,"<sup>5</sup> giving the word a meaning in China today roughly comparable to what its translation means elsewhere. Proceeding from the concrete sense of "motion" or "physical exercise" (a stadium is an "exercise field" or *yundong chang*), it has acquired, in recent decades, the additional meaning of "exercise of influence" or "agitation" (as in the labor movement, or the movement to

---

<sup>3</sup> *Yundong* is pronounced "yundung" with the "u" in "put" and stress on the first syllable. The standard rendering in English is "campaign" or "movement." Singular and plural are identical. The full form "mass movement" in Chinese is *chunzhong yundong* or *chunzhong xing yundong*.

<sup>4</sup> At present only two short articles and one recent dissertation focus on campaigns in general. See Frederick Yu, "With Banners and Drums: The Mass Campaign in China's Drive for Development," *Current Scene* (Hongkong) 4.9 (May 1, 1966); Frederick T.C. Yu, "Campaigns, Communications and Development in Communist China," in Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, eds., *Communications and Change in the Developing Countries* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), pp. 195-215; and Charles P. Cell, "Making the Revolution Work: Mass Mobilization Campaigns in the People's Republic of China" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1973). Two other short works that deal with more than case studies but are still narrow in scope are: Wen-hui C. Chen, chief contributor, *Wartime "Mass" Campaigns in Communist China: Official Country-wide "Mass Movements" in Professed Support of the Korean War*, Research Memorandum no. 43 (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Research and Development Command, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, 1955); and Vincent V.S. King, *Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1966). King's study was also sponsored by the Air Force.

<sup>5</sup> "You zuzhi you mudi di chunzhong xing huodong." See *Xin cedian* (New dictionary) (Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 1968).

propagate scientific ideas). This definition gives a false impression that a campaign in China closely parallels an American fund-raising campaign, or, on a larger scale, the American feminist movement. It suggests the equally false idea that in both countries the term is used merely to impart a single identity to various groups sharing broad social or political goals.

Actually, when most people in China contemplate mass movements, they have in mind far more elaborate and concrete images. They may think of reading newspaper articles and wall posters announcing new tasks; attending study sessions and meetings to plan local implementation; recruiting "activists"; and making public self-criticisms of their own shortcomings. They may also think of conducting investigations to discover persons who oppose the tasks of the movement, or even launching "struggle" sessions against those persons. They may recall as well long meetings, regular work set aside, fatigue, a heightened awareness of political priorities, and the occasional propensity for mistakes and thoughtlessness that occurs in the heat of passion. Some may recall how their personal thoughts were absorbed by coming-of-the-movement thoughts, such as how they should behave in public meetings, how strong a self-criticism they should make, how active they should be, and how far they should go in criticizing their friends and colleagues. Many may remember experiencing tension as a movement picked up momentum, followed by a feeling of relaxation as the wave subsided. They may reflect upon how frequently all this has occurred, and how ritualistic the exercise has become in some circumstances.

When people speak of democracy in China they do not think of voting rules, parliamentary parties, and a multiplicity of private groups openly striving to patch minority groups together into temporary majority coalitions; nor do they express concern for strong institutional defenses of limited government. In short, they do not conceive of "liberal democracy," which for them implies a system that wealthy capitalists can easily exploit for private gain. In its place they think of democratic political activity properly taking place in the public sphere, free from influence by private concentrations of power. The single party has its basis not in a legislature, but in its mass membership (28 million in 1973), through whom party decision-makers are supposed to mobilize their countrymen behind unified policy, as well as tap the public's response to their work. This Chinese variant we might term "mobilizational democracy"; one institution critical to its success is the *yundong*. Distinctly different from its nominal counterparts in the West, therefore, a Chinese *yundong* is a government-sponsored effort to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but vulnerable barriers to the progress of socialism through intensive mass mobilization of active personal commitment.

# I

## Origins and Development

Writers seeking to account for the unique growth of *yundong* in contemporary China have cast their nets widely. One group mainly calls attention to background factors (antecedent causes, or independent variables). Retreating back from the immediate context of twentieth-century Chinese history, their standpoint recalls a pleasant quatrain by Ogden Nash: "A primal termite knocked on wood, and tasted it and found it good; and that is why your cousin May fell through the parlor floor today."<sup>1</sup> A second group more emphatically looks to immediate factors (proximate causes, or intervening variables). Authors of this persuasion expect to find answers in the CCP's Soviet experience during the 1930s and 1940s in Jiangxi and Yanan.

### Background Factors

Perspectives in this category include the general rise of popular participation in modern politics, unique styles of rule flowing from the mass-oriented Marxist-Leninist tradition, and the legacy of an *ancien régime* upon the revolutionary order that has overthrown it.

**Trend toward citizenship.** Representative of the first perspective, a prominent striving among Western scholars has been to unearth roots of the growing numbers of regimes in recent years variously characterized as "totalitarian" or as "modernizing autocracies." J. H. Talmon, for example, in seeking the "origins of totalitarian democracy" in eighteenth-century French thought, gives the following interpretation to the "general will" concept of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778):

The general will becomes ultimately a question of enlightenment and morality. Although it should be the achievement of the general will to create harmony and unanimity, the whole aim of political life is really to educate and prepare men to will the general will without any sense of constraint. Human egotism must be rooted out and human nature changed.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>*Poetry for Pleasure* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960).

<sup>2</sup>Jacob Talmon, *Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952), p. 42.

Rousseau, writes Talmon, appealed to government to attempt a moral consensus in society through active measures of enlightenment, an idea that closely parallels the self-defined mission of latter-day “vanguard” political parties. But Rousseau’s *Social Contract* was discovered by Chinese intellectual circles only around the turn of the twentieth century, and Mao’s familiarity with it was limited to several re-readings of a short interpretive article by Liang Qichao in *The New People Magazine* (*Xinmin Congbao*)—an interpretation that shifted Rousseau’s meaning to emphasize collective realization of human sovereignty as a possible path to greater national strength for China in an era of imperialist domination.<sup>3</sup>

Another writer, Robert Tucker, has conceived of a new political genus he calls “the revolutionary mass movement regime under single-party auspices,” a category designed to improve social scientists’ ability to deal theoretically with Russian communism by abstracting from the total Russian revolutionary experience a few key elements common to other twentieth-century revolutions. Although there may be nothing uniquely modern about revolutionary regimes per se, he argues, the “revolutionary mass-movement regime is a relatively novel phenomenon.” As a progenitor of the phenomenon, Tucker pointed to Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), an ardent nationalist who had sought through his “Rome of the People” to lay down intellectual grounds for achieving popular unity among the small Italian states then ruled by hostile feudal aristocrats.<sup>4</sup> I am aware of no evidence that Chinese nationalists in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries were aware either of Mazzini or of other European national movements. Nevertheless, several nationalist currents were quite strong in precommunist China, providing evidence that this factor was more directly active in the Chinese case than the philosophy of Rousseau. Conspiratorial anti-imperialism found adherents among Chinese intellectual youth as Western commercial, cultural, and diplomatic presences grew more visible (and oppressive) in coastal and riparian treaty port cities; and Chinese students in Japan devoured and discussed Japanese nationalistic and even proimperialist thought.<sup>5</sup>

These two lines of thought gradually combined with older Chinese feelings against the alien Qing Dynasty (1644-1912, established by Manchu invaders from the Northeast) to fuel a rather strong Chinese nationalistic movement. The movement attained a symbolic highpoint on

---

<sup>3</sup>This citation as well as an elaboration of the argument can be found in Frederic Wakeman’s fascinating study of the creation of a Chinese ideology, *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung’s Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), esp. pp. 58-59.

<sup>4</sup>Robert Tucker, “Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes,” *American Political Science Review* 55.2 (June 1961): 283-284.

<sup>5</sup>See Harold Z. Schiffman, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).



May 4, 1919 (after diplomats at the Versailles Conference, including the great democrat Woodrow Wilson, had agreed to cede former German territorial holdings in China to Japan), when a demonstration by some three thousand students against the Versailles Treaty erupted into violence against prominent members of the Beijing government. Subsequently, an entire era of mass-oriented cultural reform (such as writing literature in the vernacular instead of the *wenyan* or “literary” style understood only by a highly educated elite) became known as the May Fourth Movement, and the day that gave the era its name is still celebrated in China today.<sup>6</sup> Mao Zedong, himself thoroughly caught up in the spirit of the times (he was twenty-five), founded and edited in his native Hunan province a political magazine called the *Xiang River Review* (*Xiangjiang pinglun*), which went through five issues between July 14 and August 11, 1919, before the local warlord, Zhang Jingyao, closed it down. Warlord Zhang had apparently felt threatened by Mao’s article, “The Great Union of the Popular Masses,” in which the future Chairman had posited a populist thesis that strength lies in numbers.<sup>7</sup>

**Unique politics of Marxist-Leninists.** Other scholars, representative of the second background perspective, have searched for the origins of mass-participation politics in the peculiar tenets of Marxist activists and writers. Prominent in this school are the writings of Chalmers Johnson, who argues that, to Marxist rulers, “social mobilization” is both an instrumental value and an end in itself.

A Communist party in power adopts a transfer culture, which it expounds and defends as moving society toward a utopian goal culture but which in fact has as its first two priorities the preservation of the party’s power monopoly and the maintenance of the social system. Third in priority, but still of decisive importance, are schemes thought to be necessary for achieving the goal culture—a classless society, the defeat of “imperialism,” socialist construction, the “new socialist man,” etc. It is the particular contents and precedents of the Marxist-Leninist goal culture that distinguish Communist from other revolutionary movements. All three goals of the transfer culture demand societal mobilization.<sup>8</sup>

The progress of Chinese political thought bears out this argument to a degree, especially if we examine the appearance of the twin concepts “mobilization” and “struggle” in Chinese ideology. By the 1920s China

---

<sup>6</sup>See Chow Tse-Tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

<sup>7</sup>See Stuart Schram’s translation of this article as well as Schram’s article, “From the ‘Great Union of the Popular Masses’ to the ‘Great Alliance,’” *China Quarterly*, no. 49 (January-March 1972), pp. 88-105.

<sup>8</sup>Chalmers Johnson, “Comparing Communist Nations,” in Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 25.

had already experienced primitive mobilization in the form of peasant rebellions, treaty-port boycotts, and the May Fourth demonstrations, but almost every instance had been a desperate anomic act in response to some immediate crisis or threat. It was not until Marxism took hold among rebellious Chinese intellectuals, and a fledgling Chinese Communist Party formed with Comintern assistance, that a more systematic and enduring recruitment of a revolutionary coalition became possible. Even after the CCP's tactical disputes with Stalin and an effective organizational break with the Moscow-centered Comintern, Mao's ragged bandit-guerrillas, driven deep into mountainous Jiangxi province, still retained their Marxist theoretical beacon and their identity as a Communist party.

The concept of struggle (*douzheng*) emerges in a similar way. Early reform-minded leaders fell into the mold of Kang Youwei, the author of the *Book of Great Harmony* (*Da tong shu*) and a thinker "who could hardly bear the notion of natural strife."<sup>9</sup> But Mao's belief in the universality of contending natural and societal forces, whatever its origin, developed apace with his study of Marxian "contradictions" with their basis in German dialectical thought. Whether science or sentiment, the divisive and dynamic dialectic has grown to become an orthodox worldview in Chinese Marxism, and struggle has become a fixture in the *yundong* process.

Since China is not the only country in some sense following Marxism-Leninism, it is appropriate to ask at this point whether institutions similar to *yundong* have developed elsewhere in the socialist bloc. A brief country-by-country survey reveals that they have, but not nearly to the same degree or to the same level of organizational complexity as in China. The Russian party, in its early days under Lenin, adopted various measures somewhat resembling the later Chinese approach, such as its campaign for workers to labor on the Sabbath in addition to the regular week and its experiments with reform of the old education system. However the relatively small band of Bolshevik conspirators, who first seized Petrograd and Moscow and then extended their power gradually by making necessary concessions to bourgeois specialists and Tsarist officers, were not really in a strong position to launch a social revolution; "for the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, there was only one determining priority—survival."<sup>10</sup> Lenin himself, reporting in 1922 to the Ele-

---

<sup>9</sup>Wakeman, *History and Will*, p. 236. For more on Kang, see also pp. 114-150.

<sup>10</sup>Merle Fainsod, "Transformations in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 48. "Once power was seized in Petrograd, it remained to be consolidated in the country, and this required years of unremitting effort. The Bolsheviks confronted formidable obstacles. After extricating themselves from the German war through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), which cost them dearly in territory and resources, they faced the onslaughts of the White

venth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), candidly queried his colleagues: "Suppose we take Moscow with its 4,700 responsible Communists, and suppose we take that huge bureaucratic machine, that huge pile—who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can truthfully be said that the Communists are directing the pile."<sup>11</sup>

Under Lenin's successors, the Soviet party was gradually transformed into a more personalistic and dictatorial bureaucracy, so that even Stalin's efforts to achieve "forced draft" industrialization by alternating periods of tension and relaxation also provide only limited precedent for the later Chinese mass participation approach. Subsequent trends moved the Soviet leadership farther yet from the campaign style; compared with Stalin's earlier "coercive mobilization," the Soviet party now relies more on "incentives, welfare benefits, and social pressure."<sup>12</sup> The reasons for this transformation in the Soviet Union are complex. But the Chinese wonder whether, at bottom, their system might not be similar enough to the Soviet regime under Stalin to compel a prediction that, after Mao, the CCP will follow the same developmental path as the CPSU; or whether their system is sufficiently different to sustain optimism that China's unique, high-participation mass-line style can be maintained through future decades?

The two other ruling Communist parties in Asia—the North Korean Workers Party (Chŏson Rodongdang) and the North Vietnamese Workers Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam)—have both given fuller play to the mass-movement style than the Russians; at the same time, both have cautiously refrained from completely following the Chinese model. North Korean *yundong*, initiated in the wake of Kim Il Sung's December 28, 1955, call to establish his so-called *juche* in ideological work, generally speaking have been closely tied to the limited realm of economic construction.<sup>13</sup> The Chullima movement (*Chullima undong*), first proclaimed in December 1956, emphasized workers' maximum efforts to increase production with minimum costs during the upcoming first

---

generals, the Allied intervention armies, the Poles, and rebellious anti-Bolshevik nationalist movements in the borderlands. Even though party membership more than quadrupled from 115,000 on January 1, 1921, it still represented less than half of one per cent of the population. It fell to this small minority to assume the reins of government in a war-ravaged nation, to recruit armies and to prod and lead them into battle, to feed and clothe them, and to supply them with weapons, to organize production and to extract grain from the peasants, to crush opposition and to mobilize support for the Communist cause.

"In retrospect it still remains something of a miracle that the Bolshevik regime was able to survive its first traumatic test." *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 65. The Chinese Communist literature does not contain debates over spontaneity as such, although the pressures are evident in struggles against "Left" lines. Mao is not simply a Leninist.

five-year plan.<sup>14</sup> In February 1959, however, this movement was extended outside the productive sector to include a call for Chullima work teams “to do political and ideological work among the people, to arm them with the ideas of collectivism and communism, to eliminate the old ideas still found among the masses, in order to revolutionize them and convert them into a fully conscious proletariat.”<sup>15</sup>

Kim Il Sung’s fifteen-day visit to the village of Chungsan-ri (Kangsu county, South Pyongan province) in February 1960 gave birth to the “Chungsan-ri spirit” and the “Chungsan-ri method,” both of which pertained to the role played by basic-level Party organs in directing North Korea’s rural economy.<sup>16</sup> In accordance with these new principles from the countryside, the *zungsan* (increase production) campaigns that had regularly accompanied the implementation of state economic plans were given new content for the urban industrial sector after Kim’s visit to the Daian Electric Appliances Factory during December 1961. The resulting “Daian work system,” stipulated that under the collective leadership of the local Party organization, each factory, workshop, and section would strive to learn or introduce “one or more new methods of production each month.”<sup>17</sup> Between January and June 1963, another campaign was

---

<sup>14</sup>As Kim put it, “by *Juche*, we mean abiding by the principle of solving all problems of the revolution and construction independently in accordance with the actual conditions of one’s own country and primarily by one’s own efforts. This implies creative application of the general truth of Marxism-Leninism and experience of the international revolutionary movement in keeping with the historic conditions and national peculiarities of one’s own country.” Baik Bong, *Kim Il Sung: Biography*, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1969-1970), III, 663.

<sup>15</sup>The Chullima movement is named after a legendary winged “1,000-ri horse,” which could carry those fortunate enough to mount her at great speed toward the land of happiness. See *ibid.*, also Dae-Sook Suh, “North Korea: Emergence of an Elite Group,” in Richard F. Staar, ed., *Aspects of Modern Communism* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 334.

<sup>16</sup>Kim Byong Sik, *Modern Korea: The Socialist North, Revolutionary Perspectives in the South, and Unification*, trans. Takeshi Haga and ed. Victor Perlo (New York: International Publishers, New World Paperback, 1970), p. 156. As of August 1961, more than two million workers were participating in this movement; 4958 work teams, comprising 125,028 persons, had the title Chullima Work Team; and 55 work teams, comprising 1,459 workers, had the title Double Chullima Work Team. By May 1968, when the second national conference of Chullima Work Team Riders was held, the number of teams had risen twenty-one-fold and the number of Double Chullima Riders twenty-three-fold since the first conference in August 1960. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>17</sup>Dae-Sook Suh, “North Korea,” p. 334. In Kim Il Sung’s description, the spirit and the method “signify an embodiment and development of the revolutionary mass line, which is a tradition of our Party, in conformity to the new realities of socialist construction. The essentials of the Chungsan-ri method are that the higher organ helps the lower, the superior assists his inferiors and always goes down to work places to have a good grasp of the actual conditions there and to find correct solutions to problems, and gives priority to political work or work with people in all activities to give full play to the conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative of the masses so as to ensure the fulfillment of the revolutionary tasks.” Baik Bong, *Kim Il Sung*, III, 668.

<sup>18</sup>Kim Il Sung, “On Further Developing the Daian Work System” (speech to an enlarged meeting of the Party committee of the Daian Electrical Appliance Factory, Nov. 9, 1962), *Selected Works* (English ed.), II, 375-92, cited in Suh, “North Korea,” p. 335.

mounted to counter the excessive drift of agricultural workers into already overcrowded cities. During the campaign, 267,000 young men were reported to have voluntarily moved from urban areas to farms; concurrently, factory and office workers as well as students were thrust into "fifteen-day battles" to help sow and transplant rice.<sup>18</sup>

In North Vietnam, mass campaigns have also been closely tied to economic construction, but, despite early Chinese assistance, they actually have borne less resemblance to mass movements in China than the Korean ones. Much Vietnamese coolness toward the *yundong* style undoubtedly stems from the bitter experiences the Viet-Minh suffered during their initial efforts at land reform between 1953 and 1956. The Vietnamese leaders chose to imitate closely the successful land equalization carried out not long before by the CCP, and Chinese advisers actually took direct (if behind-the-scenes) charge in many localities.<sup>19</sup> Inadequate preparation, however, caused an unfortunate rampage of "commandism." Arbitrary class designations laid down by local cadres were based on an excessively rigid and complex "Population Classification Decree" (March 2, 1953), and mechanical quotas of landlords and rich peasants were delivered by guided People's Agricultural Reform Tribunals. Nevertheless, the political indoctrination program that accompanied this land redistribution was called mass mobilization. By 1956 popular antagonism had risen to a dangerous level. On August 17, Ho Chi Minh stated publicly that "errors have been committed in the implementation of unity in the countryside" and promised that everyone subjected to wrongful judgment would be restored "in their rights and prerogatives and their honorable character."<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, on November 2, an angry peasant uprising in Nhè-An district ultimately necessitated suppression by a division-strength armed force. Ho responded to this unexpected tragedy by abolishing the land-reform tribunals (November 8), dismissing the minister of agriculture and the pro-Chinese secretary-general of the Party (Truong Chinh), and launching a counter-"Campaign for the Rectification of Errors."<sup>21</sup>

Like the Chinese, the Vietnamese followed up their land redistribution with moves toward collectivization, but this in no way reflected the contemporaneous Chinese Great Leap Forward or drive to establish people's communes. "After several false starts during the earlier and dis-

---

<sup>18</sup>Minju Choson (Democratic Korea), July 17, 1963, cited in Chong-sik Lee, "Korea: In Search of Stability," *Asian Survey* 4 (January 1964): 662.

<sup>19</sup>Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism* (New York: Praeger, Popular Library, 1964), pp. 171-225.

<sup>20</sup>Letter "To the Compatriots in the Country," quoted in Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 156.

<sup>21</sup>Fall, *Two Viet-Nams*, pp. 154-161. See also Fall's "Truong Chinh: Portrait of a Party Thinker," introduction to Truong Chinh, *Primer for Revolt* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

astrous land-reform 'waves,' the establishment of cooperatives began in earnest late in 1958." In 1962 a member of the State Planning Board told a visiting journalist that "we are still too unsophisticated politically and economically to be able to judge the merits of the communes policy."<sup>22</sup> So far the Vietnamese still have restricted the size of their collectives to correspond with villages, roughly equivalent to the Chinese advanced agricultural producers' cooperatives of 1955-1957. Le Duan, the Party's first secretary, wrote in 1965 that only 25 percent of the cooperatives were "good ones" and that as long as "our understanding of the subject is only based on experiences and not on theory, we cannot solve the ideological problem radically."<sup>23</sup> In 1966 the Party continued to place more emphasis upon the technological revolution in agriculture than upon the revolutions either in production relationships or in culture and ideology.<sup>24</sup>

Just as narrow an emphasis is evident in the North Vietnamese industrial sector. Their most widely publicized urban campaign has been the popularization of the Haiphong Duyen Hai Engineering Works' experience in meeting a planned tripling of their 1960 output target in 1961.<sup>25</sup> According to Lao Dong Party First Secretary Le Duan:

In 1961, there spread throughout North Vietnam a powerful mass movement in the shape of emulation campaigns known as the movement of Duyen Hai, Dai Phong, Ba Nhat ("Three Firsts"), Thanh Cong, Bac Ly, etc. Realizing their role of masters, our toiling people began to develop their creative initiative in production. Haiphong, which is a city of workers and enjoys a long standing revolutionary tradition, therefore has favourable conditions to be able to take the lead in the industrial emulation movement.<sup>26</sup>

Both the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese, who historically and culturally have been closer to the Chinese than to any other power and, for significant periods in the postwar world, politically closer to the Chinese People's Republic, have given more play to *yundong* than the Russians. But for one reason or another, the regimes in Pyongyang and Hanoi have been either unwilling or unable to follow the Chinese example *in extenso*.

In comparison with the Chinese, the Russians experimented only briefly with a thoroughgoing campaign style, and then gave it up. From

---

<sup>22</sup>Fall, *Two Viet-Nams*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>23</sup>Le Duan, *On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), II, 128.

<sup>24</sup>"To Satisfactorily Carry Out the Campaign to Improve Cooperative Management and Agricultural Techniques," *Hoc tap* (Study), October 1966, cited in Donald E. Weatherbee, "Discussion," in Saar, *Modern Communism*, p. 370.

<sup>25</sup>*Great Waves* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), pp. 103ff.

<sup>26</sup>Le Duan, *On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam*, II, 107.

the beginning, Lenin had been deeply suspicious of undisciplined worker spontaneity as a source of dreaded labor union “economism,” the seductive enemy of the revolutionary cause; in contrast, Mao preferred to glorify the “creativity of the masses.” Lenin in his day had also focused attention on the problems of creating and consolidating a professional party organization; a generation later, Mao felt greater concern over the problem of how to keep party bureaucrats from “divorcing themselves from the masses.” Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, not to mention three interregna of collective leadership in the Kremlin, all have consistently valued rapid economic growth and tight political control over extensive mass participation; hence the storehouse of Russian Marxism-Leninism has shown itself relevant, but still inadequate for explaining why *yundong* have thrived so vigorously in China.

**Effects of the *ancien régime* upon the revolutionary order.** Still other scholars, who represent this third background perspective, seek explanations for characteristics of a postrevolutionary regime in the socio-political structure of the old order and in the course of the revolution that overthrew it.

Revolutions are profoundly influenced by the character of ruling classes. The entrenched localism of gentry power made it inevitable that the Chinese Revolution, in contrast to the revolutions of France and Russia, would come from the outlying areas to the center rather than the reverse, and, moreover, that it would take a long time. The gentry was widely distributed throughout China, and could not be destroyed with one blow. The peculiar conditions of the social situation in China gave the Chinese Revolution a populist character, one which neither Trotsky nor Stalin understood. It retains that character to the present day.

No matter how liberal and reformist the old elite becomes, historical example suggests that revolutionary pressures will rise against it. Land reform may ease revolutionary pressures in the villages, but the presence of a discredited elite in the cities and in the structure of government creates revolutionary pressures in the cities. This would portend a revolution of the French or Russian type. On the other hand, if the elites rather surrender their hold on government than their grip on the land, a revolution of the Chinese type threatens. The Chinese Communists believe that this will be the pattern of revolution in the coming years.<sup>27</sup>

China’s revolution—in total contrast to the Russian revolution, which resembled an unanticipated conspiratorial coup in only two major cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg—involved a long civil war in which major urban centers were occupied only at the very end. By the time of the

---

<sup>27</sup>Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd ed., enl. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

CCP victory, the Chinese Communists had already accumulated nearly twenty years of experience in both governmental administration and ruling party politics. Policy initiatives and organizational forms, experimentally introduced and successfully used during the struggle for power, naturally remained attractive to activist leaders in the new regime who were eager to preserve the magic that had won for them. Consequently, our attention is properly directed toward factors peculiar to the Chinese Communists' revolutionary civil war.

### Immediate Factors

Typically found in this category are the elements in the CCP's history during the time the Party operated from two successive armed base areas in remote provincial border regions: southern Jiangxi province, first centered in the Jinggang Mountains next to Hunan (1928), but shortly afterwards (1929-1934) moved to the town of Ruijin near the Fujian border; and northern Shaanxi province (1935-1945), centered in the town of Yanan not far from the Gansu and Ningxia borders. The years 1940-1945—when the Yanan base area was tightly blockaded, and its one and one-half million inhabitants and its revolutionary government were forced to perfect a self-reliant organization in order to survive without surrendering—are considered a particularly formative period for the CCP's later leadership style.

One scholar finds many roots to the mass-line politics of later years in the Chinese Soviet Republic of 1931-1934. While based in this region—which may have been as large as three hundred *xian* (counties), including some thirty million people—the CCP first wrestled with the problems of making its unfamiliar rule popular. Such popularization was absolutely necessary if the base area was to be consolidated and the Central Soviet government extended to cover new *xian*. Not only did the CCP lay claim to nationalist sentiments by declaring war on the encroaching Japanese (on April 15, 1932), but it also made an appeal for mass support among lower social classes by adopting an anti-rich-peasant policy. One analyst of the period sees this class struggle as a “logical development and extension of the policy of mass mobilization,” most importantly into the “poor peasant corps” and the “farm labor union” (or “tenant farmers union”). These organizations emerged in mid-1932 as part of the “anti-rich-peasant struggle” (*fan funong douzheng*) selectively directed against any farmer who “rented his land to others, used others' labor power, earned profits on his rent, engaged in speculation, and exploited the people.” They became the key instrument for carrying out the Land Classification campaign (*cha tian yundong*) launched by Mao himself on June 1, 1933. As the movement developed,



the CCP leaders sought to involve not only the poor peasant corps but also the entire bureaucracy of the several soviet governments. Hence, more than simply desiring to redistribute land, they entertained “the broader basic goal of developing an effective mass mobilization strategy.”<sup>28</sup> Before such plans could grow and mature, however, the Communists were driven from their Jiangxi base.

When the survivors of the Soviet Republic finally made their way to Yanan by the fall of 1935, they encountered local partisans under Liu Zidan (Liu Zhidan) and Gao Gang who already had formed the Shaan-Gan-Ning Soviet (named for the three bordering provinces) and had completed a redistribution of land in approximately twenty *xian*, which had a combined population of over one million. Tactics of mass mobilization had been employed to achieve these progressive accomplishments, but for several reasons their momentum could not be continued: the newly arrived central Communist party leadership took over the reins of power in the local soviet; the Nationalist Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi began a sixth “extermination campaign” to destroy this last remaining Communist base area; Japanese advances into North China after 1935 stimulated a temporary CCP united front with the Guomindang (Nationalist) army; and the resulting moderation in the pace of reform contributed to a steady growth of bureaucracy in the border-region government.

The turning point came in 1941-42. That winter combined pressure from Japanese retaliation against the Communists for their successful Hundred Regiments offensive (in late 1940) and from a Guomindang blockade of the base area forced a new crisis of self-reliance upon the CCP. Their first response was a Rectification (*zheng feng*) campaign (1942-1944), designed to unify and strengthen the Party organization, followed by proliferation of new mass-line policies aimed at “revolutionizing the fabric of social and particularly economic life at the village level.” In the course of this rectification, Communist leaders worked out tension-building group psychological processes of study (the forerunner of *xuexi*, which was not elaborated until later), self-criticism, public acknowledgment of error, and struggle—later known as the method of “unity-criticism-unity” for resolving so-called nonantagonistic contradictions among the people. At the same time, numerous other campaigns gave Party leaders and cadres invaluable practical experience in

---

<sup>28</sup>See Ilpyong J. Kim, “Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republic,” in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 91-97. Kim also gives the following quote from a participant’s report to the Second National Soviet Congress: “the land classification campaigns were our most important techniques for conducting the continuous class struggle in the rural areas, and method of completely exterminating the remainder of the feudal forces.” *Ibid.*, p. 97 and nn. 36 and 40.

applying the many novel techniques. In his informative study *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China*, Mark Selden discusses six major mass movements of that period:

1. Campaign for crack troops and simpler administration, 1941-1943
2. Down to the villages campaign, 1941-1942
3. Campaign for reduction of rent and interest, 1941-1944
4. Cooperative movement, 1942-1944
5. Great production movement, 1943
  - a. Cadre participation in productive labor
  - b. Emulation of labor heroes
6. Mass education movement, 1944<sup>29</sup>

Not only the style and methods, but even the substantive targets in most of these early campaigns have persisted as part of the “Yanan way” tradition.

Thus, the two most persuasively upheld immediate factors are enforced self-reliance and the CCP’s felt need to build a popular army. One of the clearest formulations of the enforced self-reliance hypothesis is:

In the rise of the Chinese Communist Party there have been three periods of crippling defeat, each of them bringing the movement close to annihilation, and each leading to radical innovation in the Party’s approach to war and revolution. In all three instances Mao Tse-tung eventually emerged as the leading architect of the new line after fierce intra-Party strife. The Kuomintang’s anti-Communist coup of 1927 destroyed the first united front and paved the way for new overtures to the peasantry stressing a combination of guerrilla warfare and land revolution. The annihilation of the Kiangsi Soviet and other Communist bases in 1934 created conditions for abandoning agrarian revolution and armed insurrection in favor of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the New Democracy. Finally, out of the devastation and hardship wrought by Japanese offensives coupled with the Kuomintang blockade against Communist-led base areas during 1941-42, emerged a constellation of policies associated with the “mass line.”<sup>30</sup>

A confirming source, cited by Chalmers Johnson, recalls that in 1939:

Confronted by the blockade of the Kuomintang reactionaries, Comrade Mao Tse-tung asked the following question at a cadres’ meeting: “Are we going to starve to death or disband ourselves? Or are we going to do it ourselves?” He said: “Since no one wants to

---

<sup>29</sup>Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 188-210.

<sup>30</sup>Mark Selden, “The Yanan Legacy: The Mass Line,” in Barnett, *Chinese Communist Politics*, p. 99.

starve or disband, to do it ourselves is the answer.” He said: “We are convinced that we can solve the economic difficulties. Our answer to all problems in this connection is to do it ourselves.”

Johnson concludes that, with no sanctuaries or sources of foreign support, “the party had to live out the Japanese-Kuomintang blockade or go under.”<sup>31</sup>

This point leads to the second hypothesis about the need for a popular army. As early as 1928, after their crippling defeat in the 1927 Autumn Harvest uprising, Mao Zedong had issued an initial version of the “three main principles” and the “eight points for attention”—the “three-eight work style.” In December 1929, Mao clearly spelled out his thinking on how the military and political functions of the Red Army should be related:

Particularly in present-day China, the Red Army must not merely fight; besides fighting, it should also shoulder such important tasks as agitating among the masses, organizing them, arming them, and helping them to set up political power. When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting but exclusively to agitate among the masses, to organize them, to arm them, and to help them establish political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning, and the Red Army the reason for its existence.<sup>32</sup>

Johnson notes, in a separate study of revolution and the social system, that a guerrilla-type army actually depends on the population for its military effectiveness: tactical intelligence gathering, for example, is one task civilian noncombatants can perform quite well. Not surprisingly, therefore, Johnson offers the Chinese Communist experience as perhaps the best example of the category “militarized mass insurrection.”<sup>33</sup> For similar reasons, Eric Wolf regards the Chinese revolution as a prime example of “a kind of warfare which organizes the peasant population as it proceeds.”<sup>34</sup> Several striking similarities exist between the organization of a military campaign and the organization of a *yun-*

---

<sup>31</sup>Chalmers Johnson, “Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yen-an Period and the Socialist Education Campaign Period,” in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 422.

<sup>32</sup>“Resolution of the Ninth Conference of the Communist Party Organization of the Fourth Army of the Red Army” (Gutian Resolution), extracted in Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, rev. and enl. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 272. The current Beijing edition of Mao's *Selected Works*, 5 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), I, 106, omits the word “exclusively” from this passage.

<sup>33</sup>Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and Social System* (Stanford: Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace, 1964), pp. 57-68.

<sup>34</sup>Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 298.

*dong*, strongly suggesting that the Chinese Communists' mastery of politico-military tactics in wartime inspired their continued fascination with the *yundong* approach after peace was restored.<sup>35</sup>

## Development after 1949

The Chinese revolution was far from over when Mao Zedong proclaimed the existence of the People's Republic. Historic questions still faced the new government. How should they deal with powerful elites of the old regime? What sorts of people should they allow to rise to elite status in the new regime? How fast should they mobilize resources to further transform rural and urban society? Such questions continued to lead high-level debate. Some leaders wished to do less and to do it more slowly than others, but the "revolution" itself surged on. Awesome changes in Chinese social structure were wrought. Within ten short years no debt-ridden peasant gave up half his crop to a landlord as rent. No rapacious private armies exacted their own taxes and plunder. No ESSO station pumped gas; instead a domestic petroleum industry supplied all of China's needs. No other foreign enterprise hung out its shingle. No missionary preached; and church buildings became schoolrooms, Young Communist League offices, or new people's commune headquarters. Prostitutes and beggars vanished from city streets. Sweet puffs of opium smoke could be scented no longer. Inflation had ground to a halt. Fly swatters became useless museum pieces. The scourge of schistosomiasis was ended. Corvées of organized labor rebuilt deteriorated irrigation and flood control works and thrust themselves into new and bigger projects. Internationally, China's image as a giant ward—helpless and poverty-stricken—was pushed aside by its new image as a full-fledged and even threatening power. The paths to all these imposing social accomplishments were blazed with *yundong*.

At the same time, several trends began to affect profoundly the mass-

---

<sup>35</sup>Some colleagues have proposed that another inspiration for *yundong* might have come from traditional village cooperative organization to plow, seed, and harvest. Although this interpretation is plausible, it suffers from a lack of evidence. In contrast, military analogies are quite common in Chinese hortatory literature; for example, "we must grasp the principal contradictions and concentrate forces for fighting a battle of annihilation. In the early days of the battle, since the foundation of the petroleum industry was weak, manpower, material and financial resources from various petroleum plants, mines, institutions and schools in the whole country were concentrated on this main battlefield of Daqing so that this battle of annihilation could be fought to a successful conclusion . . .

"When a quick victory was won on the main battlefield, the whole situation was turned into an active situation, and a favorable prospect was opened up for the petroleum industry for the whole country. Just as the well-drilling workers said: 'strategically we must despise five thousand meters—we must dare to fight. Tactically we must respect one millimeter—we must be good at fighting.'" *Economic Research*, no. 4 (Apr. 20, 1966), in *SCMM*, no. 538, p. 17.

movement style of political leadership. First, the pace of structural change slowed, as it had to. Private farms could be collectivized only once. Private factories, banks, and stores could be nationalized only once. Thereafter, only lesser structural transformations were possible. In agriculture, the size of communes could be changed, or the distribution of functions and responsibilities among the three levels of ownership (commune, production brigade, and production team) rearranged, or new remuneration systems introduced. In the cities, the role of labor unions and neighborhoods could be altered, or rural-urban immigration reversed, or professional societies given new missions. But the great transformations were one-shot undertakings. Once the CCP had achieved what they termed "basic completion" of China's "three major transformations" (of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce), new issues arose. Would "one-man" Party leadership give way to "collective" leadership? Would reliance on "experts" give way to the "mass line"? Would emphasis on "material incentives" give way to the goal of "putting politics in command"? Would managerial systems of "control, restriction, and suppression" give way to "two participations, one reform, and three close cooperations"?

Accordingly, important shifts in mass campaign leadership have been observable in the 1960s and 1970s. One, the spearhead of *yundong* has been turned away from great transformations in the economic "base" toward changes in the organizational, intellectual, and cultural "superstructure." Two, the *yundong* have more intensively emphasized the need for constant vigilance against backsliding on accomplishments already registered. And three, *yundong* tasks more often have included calls for shifts in personal attitude and inner character, reminiscent of a centuries-old strain in Chinese thought which had divided "inner" from "outer" (*nei* from *wai*), "self-cultivation" from "pacification of the empire" (*xiushen* from *ping tianxia*), and "virtue" from "position" (*de* from *yi*). By the time of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, exhortations to "carry out revolution in the superstructure" had replaced calls for "socialist transformation of the economic base." The successor slogan implied a shift away from the reorganization of "feudal" and capitalistic socio-economic structure in the 1950s toward proportionately greater emphasis on organization, leadership, political study, education, journalism, literature and art, and personal outlook.

A second trend emerged when, after nearly a decade of experimenting with Soviet ways, the Chinese finally abandoned their close relationship with Moscow to pursue "self-reliance." Beijing's foreign trade sector, including its technological imports, was purposefully kept small for several years; then the direction of trade was shifted to the capitalistic West, including Japan and, after 1972, the United States. However, while Sino-Soviet cooperation still remained strong, during the period from the time

of Stalin's death (1953) to the opening of irreconcilable foreign policy differences between Beijing and Moscow (1960), some twelve thousand scientists and technicians from Russia and Eastern Europe spent time consulting in China. Twenty or so were assigned to smaller plants and universities, and very large complements were stationed at major complexes: one hundred at Wuhan Steel, three hundred at Anshan Iron and Steel, and five hundred in various Xinjiang oil fields. Some incompatibilities cropped up from the very start. For example, the Chinese were uncomfortable with Soviet one-man management practices; and the Chinese could not afford to build spacious factories on the Soviet blueprint—structures designed for the sprawling new industrial towns rising on the Siberian wasteland—because Chinese factory sites necessarily encroached on precious agricultural land surrounding existing cities. Still, not until the 1960s, after the break with Moscow, did Chinese students begin to study English instead of Russian, the number of textbooks simply translated from the Russian begin to decline, whole “turnkey” plant imports more often originate outside the Soviet bloc, and the native Chinese designing and engineering get promoted to the limit of available home-grown resources, talent, and experience.

A third trend was a rather surprising decline in institutionalization. Party congresses since 1958 have failed to meet on schedule, and the Ninth Party Congress, due for elections in 1961, was not chosen until 1969, eight years late. Every congress has fashioned a new CCP Constitution, the most recent of which (approved in 1969 and 1973) have shrunk from the sixty lengthy articles of the previous document (1956) to twelve brief articles. The authority of the leader has been elevated above the authority of the organization: Liu Shaoqi's Political Report to the 1956 Congress gave Chairman Mao Zedong only one muted mention, buried at the end; in the 1969 and 1973 Reports, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai spotlighted Chairman Mao as the leader who “illuminates our future path.” Formal plenary sessions of the CCP Central Committee were less frequent in the 1960s; to replace them, a large number of informally constituted “central working conferences” were held. During the Cultural Revolution, Party life as such as even suspended for a time.

Declining institutionalization has also been visible in government and administration. The Third National People's Congress (NPC) was last convened in January 1965; despite repeated public references to the coming of a new Fourth NPC, it was not actually held until early 1975. Moreover, no widely accepted mechanism yet exists to manage a smooth transition from either Party Central Committee Chairman Mao Zedong or State Council Premier Zhou Enlai to successor leadership. Reflecting this overall trend, the “General Program” of the newest Party Constitution (August 1973) contains a call for movements like the Cultural Revolution “to be carried out many times in the future.”<sup>36</sup>

A fourth trend was the appearance of ritualistic participation in campaigns. As ever greater numbers of *yundong* have accumulated, and people have become more accustomed to their demands and dangers, activists in some places have found it increasingly difficult to arouse fresh popular enthusiasm for each new mobilization. Chinese leaders are extremely sensitive to this problem. In Chinese press articles and radio broadcasts, no message is more commonly encountered than the hammering insistence that everyone must give full play to *yundong* and must guard against slacking off. Typical is the following passage from a 1970 Shanghai newspaper editorial:

Grasping revolution and promoting production constitute a law of socialist society. In grasping revolution it is necessary to grasp class struggle and revolutionary mass criticism, to give prominence to proletarian politics, and to revolutionize the people's thinking. All units should continue to develop in depth the mass movement for the living study and application of Chairman Mao's philosophic works and step up the struggle-criticism-transformation movement and the movement to strike at counterrevolutionaries and to oppose corruption and theft, oppose speculation, and oppose extravagance and waste. We must always grasp the struggle between the two classes, two roads, and two lines as the key link.

We must never relax our efforts to wage class struggle. The better the situation, the more sober we should keep our minds. We must remain vigilant against the handful of class enemies and prevent them from undermining our excellent situation in revolution and production. We should continue to deal forceful blows at the handful of counterrevolutionaries who are sabotaging socialist revolution and construction in a vain attempt to restore capitalism.

Some people have held that "it is the same old thing" to talk about class struggle and giving prominence to proletarian politics. These comrades have failed to understand. The heavier the tasks we carry out in production and the busier we are, the more necessary it becomes for us to give prominence to proletarian politics and to arm the masses with invincible Mao Zedong Thought so that they can understand the political significance of fulfilling the national economic plan.<sup>36</sup>

Western writers antagonistic to the Chinese style of mobilization politics, perhaps for the purpose of erecting a straw man, sometimes

---

<sup>36</sup>Parris H. Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party," *China Quarterly*, no. 44 (October-December 1970), pp. 169-194; and Gordon Bennett, *China's Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions and Central Committees: An Institutional Overview and Comparison*, University of Texas, Center for Asian Studies Occasional Paper Series no. 1 (Austin, Texas, 1974).

<sup>37</sup>Joint editorial in the *Wen hui bao* and *Jiefang ribao*, Nov. 18, 1970; broadcast over Shanghai City Service, Nov. 17, 1970, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Communist China* 4.226 (Nov. 20, 1970): C1-C2.

represent the force of campaigns in even less reserved terms than the Chinese themselves. Father L. La Dany writes that “during the past 25 years, China has been exposed to shock treatment after shock treatment (called political campaigns), and the whole Chinese way of life has undergone radical changes. The past 25 years in China have been a catena of stormy events, and of recurrent change.”<sup>38</sup> This view would be regarded as only a half truth in China; required to complete the picture would be the point that constant vigilance by the leadership is necessary to ward off the dampening of mass enthusiasm and sabotage from opposition elements. Also some clever people have devised self-protective strategies for participation in *yundong*, strategies of limited self-criticism designed to reveal their activism but not their mistakes. Chinese advocates of mass movements must devote enormous energy to keeping their technique lively.

Finally, debates over the continuing value of *yundong* have inevitably been drawn into the broader struggles between Mao’s coalition and the various combinations of opposition. Characteristic opposition strategies might be usefully periodized as follows:

1. Looking beyond Mao — in the early 1950s when it was widely accepted, especially in 1954, that the party chairman would soon have to relinquish his leadership.
2. Standing up to Mao — from the spring of 1956 to about 1958, when competitors sought to institutionalize a greater role for the Party organization.
3. Trying to prove Mao wrong — from early 1959 into the early 1960s, when oppositionists sought to use some of the more bizarre developments of the Great Leap Forward as evidence of weaknesses in the chairman’s approach.
4. Undermining the concept of Mao Zedong Thought itself — from 1963 into the Cultural Revolution period, when Mao’s antagonists publicly professed agreement with the chairman’s policies, but in practice worked to undermine them.
5. Looking beyond Mao again — from 1969 into the 1970s, when the advanced ages and lower activity levels of both Mao and Zhou Enlai (they were 77 and 72 respectively in 1970) once more induced aspirants to supremacy in the post-Mao era to begin to lay plans and organize. A signal opening shot was the Lin Biao Affair of 1971.

These trends are summarized graphically in Figure I.


---

<sup>38</sup>L. La Dany, “Shrinking Political Life,” *Problems of Communism* 23.5 (September-October 1974): 25.



Figure 1

# MASS-MOEMENT - RELATED TRENDS IN CHINA AFTER 1949



## II

# How to Run a Movement: The General Pattern

In setting out to describe a campaign pattern, we immediately encounter an important conceptual problem. Since small-scale mass campaigns lack a number of attributes common to large-scale ones, might we not dangerously confuse the problem by lumping them all together under the single rubric *yundong*? Might not people react very differently to small and large campaigns, leading us to disguise more than we reveal by failing to recognize significant categories of scale? Scale is indeed an important variable. Large movements have more encompassing goals, they involve wider areas and more people, they take longer to finish, and they generate more social tension.

The Chinese themselves, however, commonly employ the single term *yundong* to denote both large and small applications of the technique, and using the term in conversation with any Chinese from the People's Republic is likely to evoke images of both large and small examples. Beyond this simple linguistic observation, an argument occurs for trying to identify characteristic commonalities before looking at the distinctions. In fact, the first effort may even assist the second. The King of France, by the early eighteenth century, was called "Roi Soleil" and brought royal monarchy to its zenith; in contrast, the King of Laos in the 1960s reigned as a virtual model of passivity. Yet in spite of the vast differences between Louis XIV and Savang Vatthana, there still exists a highly useful literature on "kingship." So with *yundong*. Once having abstracted what there is of a general pattern—one that has something in common with all mass movements in China, but fails to conform in every particular with more than a few of them—quite meaningful categorizations can be made for further and more analytical intents.

The general pattern is presented here in the form of a series of stages or steps. Typically, large-scale movements such as the rural Socialist Education campaign (1962-1966) go through all the enumerated stages. Small-scale movements such as the early 1960s drive for peasants to compile their "Four Histories" (of family, village, brigade, and commune) ordinarily require only a few of the intermediate steps. Minor campaigns simply do not necessitate the same elaborate preparation and organization in the beginning, nor as much violent confrontation at the

end. Depending upon the magnitude of a movement's tasks, however, and also upon the extent of anticipated popular resistance to the change at issue, the full storehouse of organizational tactics is always on call.

## Organizing a Campaign

The initial organizing step—the designation of tasks—is not well understood in the West. In spite of significant advances evident in recent studies of the policy-making process,<sup>1</sup> it is still not possible to give an accurate and reliable description of just how new policy ideas are first conceived, then debated and bargained, and ultimately decided. All that can be said with certainty now is that experiments with competing policy proposals are often conducted for critical observation by responsible authorities, so that the slogans finally chosen express at least some distillation of concrete practical experience. The results are summed up, a tentative policy decision taken, and a draft set of points outlining the upcoming innovations produced and distributed to all concerned units. The line at this point is almost certainly subject to later revision once more concrete experience has been accumulated.

The next organizing step is the establishment of key points (*zhong dian*) for the twin purposes of popularizing the new policy and training personnel to implement it. A sampling of representative units (ones that have *dianxing yiyi*) is chosen. These units or key points embody all the important problems the new movement is designed to address and far outnumber the earlier experimental points. Under one key point system, provinces picked by the center select key point special districts, which in turn select key point *xian*. Finally the authorities in the chosen *xian* designate key point basic-level units. Next, province-, special district-, and county-level cadres named by the Party's Organization Department are temporarily detached and transferred (*chou diao*) from their normal duties to take on the work of the movement as a special assignment. The movement's tasks are given increasingly wide publicity and come to be called the "Party's central task" (*dang di zhongxin renwu*). The detached cadres report first to a key point site for intensive training in the special characteristics of the new movement; afterwards they themselves are assigned to establish new key points elsewhere as the experiences of the first key points are simultaneously popularized in nearby locales. The Chinese call this process of spreading the movement out to remaining units "expanding the point to the plane" (*yi dian dai mian*).

A unit's regular Party organization manages the great majority of *yun-*

---

<sup>1</sup>See Michel Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao Tse-tung, 1949-1958," *Comparative Politics* 3.3 (April 1971): 323-360; and Parris H. Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision."

*dong* (especially the smaller ones). In the few cases where detached outside cadres are temporarily transferred in to run a campaign, they come as “work teams” (*gongzuo dui*). Work-team members join with local Party leaders to set up an ad hoc leading group known as a “leadership nucleus” (*lingdao hexin*); the work teams took full command in only one recent instance—the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, June-July 1966. Since early in the campaign the work-team personnel is insufficient to operate in more than a few places at a time, movements involving work teams are usually run period-by-period, group-by-group (*fen qi fen pi*). One article of the Socialist Education campaign’s “Twenty-three Articles” (January 1965), for example, stipulated about half a year for completion of the movement in a single production brigade, and a year or more for an entire *xian*. Three years (from the end of 1964 to the end of 1967) was the amount of time designated for one third of China to complete the movement, and six or seven years for the whole country.<sup>2</sup>

Because full completion of a single campaign may require a relatively long period, it is not unusual for several to run concurrently. Provided that the respective campaign tasks are largely complementary, a single unit can sometimes have two or three in progress simultaneously. Occasionally integration of an older movement with a new one simplifies the process. The rural Socialist Education (*she jiao*) campaign merged with the urban Five-Anti (*wu fan*) campaign in January 1965, for example, to become the Four Cleanups (*si qing*). The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (*wuchan jieji wenhua da geming*; abbreviated as *wen ge*, 1965-1969) swallowed the Four Cleanups in December 1966, after more than a year of overlap. Sometimes, one grand over-arching movement, such as the Great Leap Forward (*da yue jin*, 1958) or Prepare for War (*bei zhan*, 1965-66), encompasses several more specific ones. Most recently, the Cultural Revolution spawned Destroy the Four Olds and Establish the Four News; Struggle, Criticism, Transformation; Grasp Revolution and Promote Production; Mass Criticism and Repudiation; Reform the Party Constitution; Clean Up the Class Ranks; Better Troops and Simpler Administration; and many more.<sup>3</sup> Each of the smaller campaigns focused on a particular problem related to the overall tasks of the Cultural Revolution as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1968), p. 124.

<sup>3</sup> During the campaign to Destroy the Four Olds and Establish the Four News (summer and fall 1966), Red Guards sought to uproot all “thought, culture, customs and habits” that were considered to be undesirable legacies of the old bourgeois society. During the Struggle, Criticism, Transformation campaign (throughout the Cultural Revolution) the people were exhorted to struggle against “those Party leaders in authority taking the capitalist road”; to criticize the “bourgeois reactionary academic ‘authorities’” and the “ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes”; and to transform “education, literature and the arts, and elements of the superstructure which do not correspond with

## Running a Campaign in One Unit

To actually begin a movement, the local leadership first gives emphasis to study and investigation. They must: (1) familiarize everyone in the unit with the campaign's general "tasks" (*renwu*); (2) recruit both "activist elements" (*jiji fenzi*) and "backbone elements" (*gugan fenzi*); and (3) with regard to each of the campaign's target problems, stimulate collection of relevant data on its specific history in that unit.

Familiarizing articles and study materials appear in every possible press outlet: lengthy, academic versions in specialized journals and the intellectual *Guangming Daily*; simple, pithy ones in local papers; and a cross between the two extremes in the *People's Daily*. The publications introduce and discuss goal-defining slogans and propagate salutary reports from progressive model units that have already had some success in implementing the movement. Occasionally supplementary materials (such as a content report from a group member who has heard a recording of a recent unpublished speech by a high-ranking leader) are also made available for intensive small-group study. After a time it is not uncommon for a compilation of the best published articles to be issued in book form. In the early 1960s, many Chinese (although this is least true of peasants) ordinarily spent about one hour each day in some sort of organized study activity; often the amount of time devoted to study increases as a *yundong* intensifies.

Activist elements and backbone elements, although recruited quite differently, play similar roles in the movement, and both are absolutely

---

the socialist economic base." The Grasp Revolution and Promote Productions campaign (also throughout the Cultural Revolution) was an effort to ensure that production would not be excessively disrupted in the course of carrying out the movement related political activities. All three campaigns are discussed in "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (Aug. 8, 1966; often referred to as the "Sixteen Points"), *Peking Review*, no. 33 (Aug. 12, 1966).

The Mass Criticism and Repudiation campaign (most emphatic after January 1967) was aimed at the "bourgeois reactionary line," which was described as a mirror image of the correct "proletarian revolutionary line." Study materials for this movement consisted of a series of *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) articles analyzing the "Struggle between the two lines" in education rural work, industry and commerce, journalism, management, foreign policy, and other areas. "China's Khrushchev" (Liu Shaoqi) symbolized the wrong line. The Reform the Party Constitution campaign (after April 1967) focused on objectionable elements in the old Constitution including membership, elections, discipline, and the absence of any reference to the Thought of Mao Zedong.

The Clean Up the Class Ranks campaign became nationwide after May 1968. As part of a drive to suppress factionalism among recently formed Cultural Revolution mass organizations, investigation groups scrutinized personal histories of recalcitrant factional leaders in search of ideologically vulnerable aspects of their backgrounds. The Better Troops and Simpler Administration campaign got underway after March 1968. The slogan, which dates from the Yanan period, means that bureaucratic units with overlapping responsibilities should be combined, and that redundant office staff should be reassigned to the basic level ("sent down to the front line of production").

vital to its success. Activist elements are those who have demonstrated their zeal by eagerly outperforming their comrades both in political work (often previous movements) and in regular business work during the immediately preceding period. Except in the higher reaches of officialdom, they are elected (*pingxuan*) by their “study small group” (*xuexi xiaozu*), which roughly corresponds to their workplace colleagues, and their choice is officially regarded as an honor or “spiritual reward” (*jingshen jiangli*). After each campaign a new selection of activists is made.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast to the method for selecting the activists, backbone elements are co-opted. Whoever runs the movement in each unit pays careful attention to the quality of the cadres there, and as early as possible singles out roughly one third of them to be cultivated (*peiyang*) as “backbones.” With rare exception, all are Party or Communist Youth League members.<sup>5</sup> These are the people the leadership will depend upon most heavily to stimulate activism among the masses, to provide intelligence on the progress of the movement, and to take on ad hoc responsibilities (such as leading an investigation group).

Relevant data collection is essential to provide persuasive concrete examples from the unit showing how general goals of the movement relate to specific problems there. If the slogan calls for lowering production costs, each manufacturing unit must examine its own wasteful practices. If the slogan aims at reforming faulty grain silo management, each agricultural unit must seek to uncover its own deviations in managing local grain storage facilities and try to fix personal responsibility. The Patriotic Education movement (summer 1962), launched as the third Taiwan Straits crisis moved toward its climax, required each unit to consider how they had manifested the twin errors of “fearing America and worshipping America” (*kong Mei chong Mei*). A purge as intensive as that accompanying the Cultural Revolution necessitated an enormous amount of data gathering, much of it done by special case investigation groups (*zhuan an shencha xiaozu*). One Hongkong informant who had witnessed two public meetings to criticize (then) Guangdong Provincial Party First Secretary Zhao Ziyang—one in March 1967, the other in May—recalled that Zhao’s inquisitors were much better prepared the se-

---

<sup>4</sup>Many units similarly select activists in their normal work tasks as well. In addition, some choose an annual unit activist during a year-end general review and summing-up of work. See Richard Solomon, “On Activism and Activists: Maoist Conception of Motivation and Political Role Linking State to Society,” *China Quarterly*, no. 39 (July-September 1969), pp. 76-114.

<sup>5</sup>This concept also applies to regular work. In practice, backbones chosen for a movement differ only slightly, if at all, from those already designated for ongoing work. The difference is greatest for movements of larger scale which involve rectification or purging of existing leadership. At basic levels, Party and League members are spread more thinly, and consequently others may be recruited as backbones.

cond time, making it harder for him to answer effectively.<sup>6</sup>

After a time, the relatively mild stage of study and investigation advances to a second, more severe stage in which the emphasis is on public criticism and denunciation. Tension in interpersonal relations rises at this point as the generalities of the study phase are measured more directly against the actual performance of the unit's own personnel. Employing the uncomfortable technique of "self-criticism" (*ziwo piping*, or *jiantao*), each small-group member is called upon to "hand over" (*jiaodai*) his shortcomings for scrutiny and deserving criticism by the others. Furthermore, if Zhang is aware that Li is withholding more serious mistakes from public view and hoping to get by with a confession of more tolerable sins, then Zhang is supposed to denounce (*jianju*) Li's errors for him. But if someone decides to reveal a serious problem (*wen-ti*) that involves another person as well, he is encouraged to hand it over in private to one of the movement's leaders. This way, the other person can be investigated without being forewarned. Apparently such serious problems usually involve small cliques (*xiao jituan*) organized for some illicit purpose.

The behavior of the activists and backbones at this point is critical. Revealing one's personal affairs to a public meeting, not to mention betraying the confidences of a friend, can be extraordinarily painful. It would be hard to exaggerate, however, the key importance of generating real psychological pressure; if participants can escape discomfiture through practiced dissimulation, then the cutting edge of the *yundong* will be dulled, and thenceforth all meaningful conflict will be kept discretely under cover.<sup>7</sup> Only if a group of activists can start the ball rolling, making the others appear laggard and passive in contrast, can the sessions become highly effective.

If a movement advances to outright struggle against a few culpable individuals, it has reached its most climactic stage. Interpersonal tension again dramatically escalates as the personalization of the movement is now sharpened and focused. Armed with information produced earlier during the phases of investigation, criticism, and denunciation, the leadership is in a position to ask blunt, pointed questions about political loyalty (always phrased in the language of social class): (1) upon whom

---

<sup>6</sup>Interview with Yang Shizhang, 1968. Yang is a former cadre who, until 1968, headed one of the sections (*ke*) of the Guangdong Provincial People's Committee (now called the Revolutionary Committee) Finance-Trade Office.

<sup>7</sup>For an interesting account of criticism meetings, based upon interviews with Chinese prisoners captured during the Korean war, see Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), esp. chap. 5. Although systematic evidence on interpersonal relations during such meetings is lacking, readers should have little difficulty in imagining how the personalities of participants as well as the web of loyalties and grievances which abound in small groups everywhere affect the actual direction of the sessions. See also Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China* (New York: Norton, 1961).

should we rely (*yikao*)? (2) with whom should we unite or express solidarity (*tuanjie*)? (3) whom should we win over (*zhengqu*)? (4) whom should we struggle against? and (5) whom should we hit (*daji*)?<sup>8</sup> In simpler movements only the targets of struggle may be explicitly identified. Persons designated as struggle objects (*douzheng duixiang*) are vulnerable to severe social pressure as enemies of the people. They are liable to be socially isolated as former friends consider the risks of guilt by continued association with them; they are forbidden to hold office; they are repeatedly brought before public meetings, which often last several hours, to suffer through accusations, cross-questioning, and intensive criticism; they must formally confess their crimes, first orally and later in writing (and at least the first two or three drafts are often rejected as “insincere”); they may also be molested physically by beating or withholding of food. Their attackers as well are supposed to learn from this experience, for fully as important as unnerving the unfortunate victim of struggle is the wide and thorough repudiation of his crimes.<sup>9</sup>

## Summing Up

With a few exceptions dating back to the early 1950s, Chinese media sources do not give termination dates for *yundong*. Likewise, refugees report that they rarely think of a movement as over since its tasks continue. Nevertheless other movements soon come forward to nudge the older tasks from their place of priority, even though they may still remain formally in force. Hence the effective end of a campaign is the general summing up (*zong jie*), a final round of meetings designed to evaluate the movement’s accomplishments and failures and to reward its activists.

Taking the Cultural Revolution’s Red Guard movement, for example, student Red Guards have continued to attract the Chinese media’s limelight long after the autumn of 1968 when the coerced demise of their independent-minded mass organizations began. For these formerly active students and other youth, the movement as such is now gone; school classes are no longer postponed while determined factions of zealous young people take to the streets to humiliate or even incarcerate prominent members of the CCP hierarchy. Yet another task of the Red Guard movement has remained: to criticize and repudiate the elitist ideas of the “number one capitalist roader,” Liu Shaoqi. The ideas

---

<sup>8</sup>*Tuanjie* is frequently translated as consolidate, a loose rendering of its meaning. “Hitting” is an intensified form of struggle reserved for the most prominent (*tuchu*) cases.

<sup>9</sup>For Chairman Mao’s famous dictum on this point, see “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work,” *Selected Works*, III, 50. Mao counseled his followers to “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones” and to “cure the sickness to save the patient.”



credited to Liu dangerously undermined the “proletarian revolutionary” policies of Chairman Mao, which are designed, among other things, to induce China’s youth to labor in the all-important agricultural sector, to acquire a modicum of practical knowledge before undertaking formal higher education, and to replicate in some surrogate fashion the senior leaders’ experience of personally participating in revolution.

Should a movement’s local failures be stark, and concerned higher leaders be disappointed at some units’ lackluster response to its tasks, they may decide to repeat the entire process. This eventuality inspires many people to throw themselves into a campaign sincerely the first time around.

### III

## *Yundong* in Action: a Typology

For what ends have the Chinese deemed a “complete” *yundong* appropriate? When have they pressed only the middle steps into service? A descriptive typology of movements, according to task, can help make clear how the Chinese have applied the abstract pattern in practice. Such a typology will serve not only to emphasize the impressive variety of goals *yundong* have been called upon to advance, but also to simplify the discussion by factoring the campaign panorama into a few relatively homogeneous scenes. Hence we can say that movements are run to: (1) implement existing policy; (2) emulate advanced experience; (3) introduce and popularize a new policy; (4) correct deviations from important public norms; (5) rectify leadership malpractices among responsible cadres or organizations; (6) purge from office individuals whose political opposition is excessive; and (7) effect enduring changes in both individual attitudes and social institutions which will contribute to the growth of a collective spirit and support the construction of socialism.

Readers should keep in mind three points about this typology. First, like any good typology, it is custom designed. Charles Cell has adapted Frederick Yu’s quite different categorization (economic, ideological, and struggle) to analyze the short-run utility of campaigns through an involved measurement of their specific achievements and shortcomings. Alan Liu has devised a breakdown (according to two dimensions: whether a specific target group was designated as an “enemy”; and whether a campaign performed specific or diffuse functions) to analyze certain organizational desiderata of mass movements.<sup>1</sup> My typology is designed to highlight the range of tasks, from small to large, that the Chinese have brought under the scope of their *yundong*-style leadership.

Second, unlike the categories of Cell and Liu, mine are not of campaigns per se, but rather of campaign tasks. In both the Cell and Liu analyses, any given movement—for example, Combat the Four Evils of Rats, Flies, Mosquitos, and Sparrows; spring 1956—must fall into one airtight box or another. For Cell this campaign is “economic”; for Liu, “functionally specific with no targeted enemy.” From my perspective, this movement exhibited the three elements of implementing policy, in-

---

<sup>1</sup>See Cell, “Making the Revolution Work,” pp. 26 ff; and Alan P.L. Liu, *Communications and National Integration in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 87-92.

troducing new policy, and socialist transformation. Most importantly, my typology underscores the point that a single organizational effort by the Chinese leadership is often designed to simultaneously serve both short-term and long-term ends. Cell and Liu also make this point, but their typologies tend to attract attention away from it.

Third, instances certainly occur where one of my types appears instrumental to another, instead of as a discrete category of its own. The movement for “emulation” of the Dazhai Production Brigade, for example, could be viewed as a technique for “implementing” a policy of self-reliance or as a means for “introducing” a new incentive system. There are just as many instances, however, where that same type can unambiguously stand by itself, as in the “emulation” of a moral example like Lei Feng.

### Implementing Existing Policy

Many tasks are perennial, even routine, yet none seems too minor or mundane for *yundong*. Early in 1962 there was a mass movement to repair and manufacture small agricultural implements.<sup>2</sup> In line with the leadership’s post-Great Leap attention to agricultural development, the campaign was intended to increase the stock of tools in rural production brigades without diverting precious investment capital to that end. It was not a new policy, but part and parcel of ongoing efforts to raise productivity in farming and to speed recovery from the recent drop in agricultural output. Another familiar annual occurrence in many rural brigades is the Patriotic Grain (*aiguo liang*) movement. It is designed to extract promises from peasant producers to sell maximum amounts of grain to the state over and beyond the amounts required by tax and compulsory procurement programs, even though other outlets for surplus production might offer greater rates of return. This movement also seeks to inspire greater mass involvement and cooperation with an ongoing policy.

The Birth Control Education campaigns during 1956-1957 and again during 1962-1966 provide another interesting example of how movements can further the implementation of an existing policy. “Extol one, praise two, criticize three, and prevent four” was used to encourage young people to postpone their marriages and to popularize the idea of family planning among couples.<sup>3</sup> A 1960 law had set the minimum marriageable age for men at twenty and for women at eighteen, but quite aside from the law or coercive measures adopted to enforce it (such as

---

<sup>2</sup> *People’s Daily*, Jan. 19, 1962.

<sup>3</sup> See Huang Yu-chuan, “Birth Control Education Campaigns,” in *Population and Family Planning in the People’s Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: The Victor Bostrom Fund Committee and the Population Crisis Committee, 1971), pp. 25-28.

denying food rations to underage parents), *yundong* urged even stricter standards in practice. On the subject of early marriage, for example:

Chinese Communist publications recounted many stories of exemplary citizens who postponed marriage five or six times. One woman cadre, a local brigade leader who put off her own marriage six times, was cited as a model to the girls in her brigade. Many pledged to emulate her and not marry until they reached twenty-five.<sup>4</sup>

Individual approaches were most effective of all. After health workers, personnel cadres, street representatives, and women representatives in the city organizations and enterprises, and the commune cadres, Communist Youth League cadres, women representatives, and health workers in the rural areas, carried out large-scale propaganda:

They approached individually those parents with many children who were experiencing living difficulties, those about to get married and those mothers-in-law who would not let their daughters-in-law practice birth control. Because they work in the same unit, live together, and know one another well enough to talk without any reservation, such approaches, when repeatedly made, are difficult to resist.

The huge number of cadres sent down to the countryside in recent years has become a great force for propaganda on birth control . . . With their comparatively rich knowledge and work experience, they arrange for exhibitions and lectures to be held to give guidance and play a great role in pushing contraception work in rural areas.<sup>5</sup>

Other measures included mobilizing doctors to write articles and answer reader queries printed in the newspapers; and arranging to have both men and women on duty in drugstores so that no customer need suffer the embarrassment of buying a contraceptive from a clerk of the opposite sex.

Finally, and among the best researched episodes, is the example of the village-level mobilization in the spring of 1955 in response to a joint Party Central Committee and State Council "Directive on Intensified Reorganization of Planned Marketing of Grain."<sup>6</sup> A crisis arose when peasants, fearing an imminent grain shortage in late 1954, widely resisted further transfers of their scarce crop to the state. In one official response, county-level work teams were organized to go from village to village in

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 26-27.

<sup>6</sup>See Thomas P. Bernstein, "Cadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation: The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics*, esp. pp. 390-399.

regions that were not importers of grain to announce a sales quota for each one and explain why this amount was adequate for them.

The procedure began with the mobilization of the village leadership. The team would convene a Party branch conference (or some other meeting that included most of the village elite) for the purpose of studying the nation's grain policy, ascertaining and rectifying the attitudes of Party members, and analyzing the grain situation in the village. The first goal of the meeting was for every participant to gain a "correct" understanding of the supply crisis, so that everyone's state of mind would be changed from a passive and pessimistic to an active and optimistic state. Next came sessions of criticism and self-criticism, in which each local Party member would report on how he had behaved during the crisis. Those who had joined in with grain-short claims now confessed their error: "... I had enough [grain] to last till June, but when spring came, I too shouted 'grain shortage,' being afraid that [state] supply would run out ... I reported shortage early, influencing several households to do the same. This was wrong." Cadres who had violated CCP norms felt threatened by disciplinary sanctions and no doubt redoubled their efforts to cooperate in the drive to reorganize supply.<sup>7</sup>

Activist local cadres performed a pace-setting role at these village meetings by setting their own example (*dai tou*) for the others to follow. In this atmosphere, when meetings were later held for all families who had reported themselves grain-short, many effectively abandoned their supply request by not even attending. As always, the element of threatened coercion accompanied mobilizational aspects of the movement; considerable publicity was given to cases of arrest and sentencing meted out to class enemies allegedly instrumental in undermining the grain supply system.

### **Emulating Advanced Experience**

This second category might strike some readers as akin to a tomato plant in a cabbage row; often it fits less comfortably into a spectrum of tasks than into an array of means to accomplish those tasks. Emulation is commonly employed in connection with other *yundong*, and is often clearly instrumental to other goals. At the same time, one can find such numerous instances of emulation pursued as a value in its own right that a separate category seems justified. The progressive individual or unit that becomes an object of emulation may lead more backward comrades by successfully completing a movement, but they may also stand out from the crowd by scoring notable achievements in a quite separate

---

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 392-393.

undertaking (such as scoring a technical breakthrough).

The essence of emulation is friendly rivalry: one individual or unit studies the advanced experience (*xianjin jingyan*) of another and subsequently seeks to equal or even surpass the model's achievement. Ideally the flow of expertise is a two-way affair, with the model picking up a few tricks from the understudy in the process. The implied educational theory is a total rejection of the so-called jug-mug approach (wherein dry student "mugs" are judiciously filled from brimming teachers' "jugs") in favor of learning through doing and of seeking advice and instruction from those whose knowledge has been proven effective through successful practice. If *A* can do it, why cannot *B*?

One common objective of emulation campaigns is the diffusion of new technology, agricultural techniques in particular. By the spring of 1964, according to the *People's Daily*, southern Jiangsu province had a common saying: "a rice farmer must learn from Chen Yongkang, just as an opera singer learns from Mei Lanfang" (a late master performer of the Peking Opera).<sup>8</sup> Chen Yongkang was a rice farmer with an admirable bent toward experimentation; through careful selection of strong heavy stalks with plump grains for seed, he developed a high-yield strain known as "green in old age" (*lao lai qing*). Later he even caught the attention of agricultural scientists with his separation of the growth of late rice into three stages: tillering, booting (ears growing in the sheath), and heading. Chen's preferred method was to check the growth of both stems and leaves at the end of each stage by draining off the water and letting the field dry. This prevented top-heavy plants from falling down by stimulating the growth of roots. He called his method "three dark and three light greens" because the color of the leaves changed from dark to light green on each occasion. When county government workers learned in 1951 that Chen was able to harvest an average of over a thousand *jīn* (one-half kilogram) per *mu* (roughly one sixth acre) in an area where five hundred *jīn* had been normal, they acted not only to reward his achievement but also to popularize his techniques. He became one of the first peasants in all China to be elected a "national model farmer," and in 1952 he was invited to the National Day Celebrations in Peking where "he clinked glasses with Chairman Mao Zedong." When his village formed a cooperative in 1954, they elected Chen chairman and the new cooperative management committee set aside a demonstration and experimental plot for his use.

To popularize Chen's method among the farmers, the Jiangsu branch of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences last spring [1963] established experimental fields in Wuxian and Wuxi counties near

---

<sup>8</sup>Pao Chun-kang, "Chen Yongkang, Farmer and Scientist," *China Reconstructs* 13.5 (May 1964): 16-18.

Suzhou. Hundreds of people came every day on bicycle or on foot to look at their crops and discuss how they were grown. The knowledge soon spread over both counties and into neighboring areas.<sup>9</sup>

The movement for rice farmers to “learn from Chen Yongkang” typifies the Chinese Communist approach to diffusing and popularizing new and useful technology through socialist emulation campaigns.

Spreading technological innovations has not been the only goal of emulation campaigns; efforts to raise political consciousness have been pursued as well. In February 1964 a massive campaign was begun to Learn from the Experience of the PLA in Political Education and Ideological Work.<sup>10</sup> Over a year had gone by since the passing of the post-Great Leap Forward supply crisis, a period that had witnessed an extensive withdrawal of political themes from workaday life. Now certain leadership factions, determined to “continue the revolution” in Chinese society, felt an urgent need for ideological revival. Smaller scale efforts had been tried the year before, but with only limited success; proponents of continuing revolution argued that a bigger jolt was necessary. One example of a questionable earlier effort was the campaign to emulate “the heroic deeds of that hero of socialist construction, Lei Feng” (spring 1963), which seems to have met with considerable derision on the part of many incredulous youth. One skeptical participant opined that it was “the wildest, the silliest and the most unsuccessful campaign that the authorities had launched so far.” This participant reported that not even the most naive youngsters trusted Lei Feng propaganda. Lei “not only believed that the Party loved him when he was told to eat pig fodder [during the earlier food shortage], he thought that the fodder was delicious.” He became the butt of innumerable jokes.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, Lei Feng was only one of many heroic PLA personalities put forward as

---

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>See the editorial in the *People's Daily*, Feb. 1, 1964.

<sup>11</sup>Tung Chi-ping and Humphrey Evans, *The Thought Revolution* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1966), pp. 159-162. Tung and Evans went on to describe Lei Feng's many other admirable qualities: “Lei Feng was thrifty. For example, the toothbrush he used had been found on a trash heap; he merely boiled the brush and had trimmed the stained ends of the bristles to make it ‘good as new’ . . .

“Lei Feng was unbelievably generous. He was constantly taking the shirt off his back to wrap up a shivering child or to tear into bandages for an injured fellow worker. He invariably gave up his vacations to some deserving comrade. He frequently washed and mended the underwear and socks of his companions. And Lei Feng was honest to a fault. We had the feeling that every payday he was inadvertently overpaid, a mistake that he would discover only when he was miles away through the worst possible weather; nevertheless he invariably made his way back to return the few cents that belonged to the people and not to him.

“And finally, Lei Feng was always helpful. During a bus ride, for example, he would begin by scrubbing the floor of the bus and cleaning it up generally. Next, he would read

worthy objects of emulation during 1963-64; publicity about the exemplary attitudes and achievements of Wang Jie, Ouyang Hai, and soldiers of the Good Eighth Company of Nanjing Road followed in short order.

Before the momentum from the Study the Liberation Army campaign was exhausted, demobilized PLA officers were posted in civilian Party organizations and administrative agencies.<sup>12</sup> The purpose was for the ex-soldiers to replicate army-style political departments in the civilian sector to help others imitate the army's commissar system and "put politics in command." Far from stimulating a process of technology diffusion, the transfer was part of a broad new drive against untrammelled professionalism (and also, one might speculate, against the influence of civilian Party leaders). A revival of the active civilian role for soldiers in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution took the form of *ex officio* military representation on the newly created governing revolutionary committees.

In terms of sheer scope, one emulation campaign stands in a class by itself. The Central Committee's Tenth Plenum call (in September 1962) for all economic units to overcome the ill effects of the supply crisis by "increasing production and practicing economy" (*zengchan jiejue*) prompted a nationwide movement to Compare Oneself with the Advanced, Learn from the Advanced, Catch Up with the Advanced, and Help those Lagging Behind (*bi xue gan bang*). As the movement unfolded in 1963-64, it involved literally thousands of kindred enterprises studying one another's skills, techniques, and secrets. The center of activity was Shanghai, doubtlessly because that city's numerous commercial and industrial enterprises had the most experience to share with producers from elsewhere.

"Learn from and catch up with Shanghai!" has been a slogan long current in people's China . . . Practically all branches of industry are represented in Shanghai and technological levels are relatively high. There is a greater concentration of skilled workers, engineers and technicians here than elsewhere. Most of its products are of high quality, some enjoying an international reputation. Production costs are low . . .

In 1963 production study groups came to Shanghai from 25 provinces and autonomous regions as well as Beijing. Headed by responsible personnel from local industrial organizations . . . they are like sponges absorbing everything of use to them. On returning

---

the newspaper aloud to his fellow passengers. Thereafter he would lead a lively ideological discussion to raise the political level of the passengers. He would end with stories concerning the glorious leadership of Chairman Mao. For the rest of the trip he would tend babies or nurse the ill or aged." Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>See Chalmers Johnson, "Lin Piao's Army and Its Role in Chinese Society," *Current Scene* 4.13-14 (July 1 and July 15, 1966); and Ralph L. Powell, "Commissars in the Economy: 'Learn from the PLA' Movement in China," *Asian Survey* 5.3 (March 1965).



home they transmitted what they had learned to their fellows. Thus, in some 12 months, workers in other industrial centres acquired the staggering total of 40,000 work methods from Shanghai.

The out-of-towners went to the most advanced enterprises, which appointed experienced staff as guides and tutors. When differences in dialects made understanding difficult, the hosts wrote out the explanation [written Chinese, unlike the spoken language, being the same everywhere]. Master workmen handed to their guests cherished notebooks filled with data on time-tested methods and useful jottings. They took machines apart to show every detail of their operation. Local plant directors and engineers called on the visitors to find out exactly what kind of help they were seeking. Workers invited them to stay in their homes so that there would be time enough for every question to be answered. Engineers and technicians often spent their rest hours making drawings and explanatory sketches.<sup>13</sup>

Once their level had been surpassed elsewhere, Shanghai factories themselves were hardly allowed to rest on their laurels. During the second half of 1963 alone, seven hundred Shanghai factories sent 6,400 people to other cities to learn better work methods devised there as well as to pass along their own skills.

Fully five years later, “an atmosphere of catching-up with and learning from the advanced” still continued to pervade the Anshan Iron and Steel Company. During the early months of 1968 the company “ran more than 1,700 short-term study courses in Mao Zedong’s thought, with a total enrollment of 150,000 workers.”

An atmosphere of catching-up with and learning from the advanced has swept the whole company. Filled with revolutionary

---

<sup>13</sup>Ho Chang-hua and Chou Yung-kang, “Shanghai Teaches and Learns,” *China Reconstructs* 13.5 (May 1964): 10-11. One prominent feature of nearly every Chinese emulation story is the display of an almost unimaginable degree of altruism. In the article on Shanghai, for example: “one of the Canton workers, Cai Yefeng, was assigned to the heat-treatment shop of the mill. On the eve of his ‘graduation,’ when he was to be tested on his practical experience, Cai was on the night shift. The shop foreman, Huang, was at home in bed when he suddenly recalled that Cai faced an examination. Worried that the young man might not have mastered everything, he got up and went to the mill even though it was raining. From midnight until daybreak Huang went over the major problems Cai had met in his work. Early in the morning, before the shift ended, the engineers and master workmen arrived. They posed ten questions. Cai answered every one of them and received full marks.” Ibid.

No Western scholar has yet directed serious research efforts at the probable effects of this publicity technique. We still assume that all such altruistic claims are nothing but false and silly propaganda. As far as it goes, this conclusion might be fairly accurate, but in comparative perspective, it leaves much unsaid. If we apply equally strict standards to treasured American myths, we would also have to dismiss many as mindless propaganda. We would have to scorn, for example, the legend that George Washington’s honesty made him a great man, or that capitalist catechism that any hard-working man like John Jacob Astor could pull himself up by his boot straps. In my estimation, the Chinese stories deserve less ridicule and more analysis as cultural symbols.

enthusiasm, the workers at the No. 9 Open-Hearth Furnace in the first steel plant are leading the new leap forward in production. In the first ten days of March, they set the record of three heats of steel a day. Continuing their upward progress they recently broke their own record and turned out four heats a day . . .

When the workers at the No. 18 Open-Hearth Furnace in the Second Steel Plant learned of this progress, they got together to study Chairman Mao's instructions and the advanced experience. They then broke the high record set by the No. 9 Open-Hearth Furnace.

Determined to make further progress in production the workers at the first steel plant studied this teaching of Chairman Mao's: "Modesty helps one to go forward, whereas conceit makes one lag behind." Their record shot up still higher and the smelting time was further shortened . . .

In recognition of their contributions to the new leap in production, more than 60 outstanding groups and a large number of individual workers at the Anshan Iron and Steel Company were recently cited at a meeting which was attended by thirty thousand people.<sup>14</sup>

Sometimes more was at stake than simple emulation of technical skill, as the amusing incident concerning the Mickey Mouse cream caramels illustrates. The A.B.C. Confectionery of Shanghai, obviously a pre-1949 foreign venture, was the manufacturer of a popular sweet known as Three Happiness Mickey Mouse Candy (*San xi Mi laoshu tang*). Even after 1949, to protect their competitive position, A.B.C. had successfully fended off attempts by other confectioners to learn their recipe. "In a secluded place away from the plant, the owner and one apprentice prepared the syrup and delivered it daily in a covered, four-wheeled cart." But the *bi xue gan bang* movement finally induced the old owner to unveil his secret. Capitulation must have been agonizing for him; the technicians and veteran workers who came to undertake socialist emulation at A.B.C. (which he tactfully renamed Love the People, Aimin) were from none other than his local rival of twenty years, the Tianming Confectionery. Once the secret was out, confectioners from as far as Beijing, Jilin, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Guangxi "were freely given all the technical data."<sup>15</sup> In the short run, this data sharing was important to the extent it contributed a marginal increment of consumer satisfaction to sweet-toothed Chinese throughout the country. In the longer run, a light blow was also struck for socialist transformation by ending a cultural carryover from the pre-Communist past and by destroying a

---

<sup>14</sup>"Output Increased in China's Leading Steel Center," *NCNA-English*, Anshan, Apr. 27, 1968, in *SCMP*, no. 4168, pp. 26-27.

<sup>15</sup>See Ho Chang-hua and Chou Yung-kang, "Shanghai Teaches and Learns," pp. 10-11; and "Learn from the Whole Country, Catch Up with the Advanced," *Workers Daily*, Mar. 6, 1964, in *CB*, no. 731, p. 29.

“capitalistic” monopoly.

The incentives for participants in socialist emulation are largely of the spiritual reward variety and any material gain is secondary, if present at all.<sup>16</sup> “Advanced producers” (*xianjin shengchan zhe*) in the Chinese system are workers who surpass a set performance standard. “Models” (*biaobing*) are a more select group selected from among the consistently best advanced producers. The highest individual honor, “hero” (*ying-xiong*), is usually reserved for those whose accomplishments are truly unique and not easily duplicated. Chairman Mao has indicated the importance of these distinctions by identifying three roles for model persons: “the role of a pioneer, the role of a hard core [sic], and the role of a bridge.” Model persons not only are representatives of the masses, “they have prestige and influence with the masses.”<sup>17</sup>

### Introducing and Popularizing a New Policy

Introducing a new policy decision—whether it involves bringing unfamiliar routines into people’s lives, changing accepted rules, throwing out old ways and substituting new ones, or whatever—is a task one notch more complex than implementing existing policy or emulating advanced experience. As Eric Hoffer recalls in his essay *The Ordeal of Change*, even the simplest habits can be uncomfortable to alter.

Back in 1936 I spent a good part of the year picking peas. I started out early in January in the Imperial Valley and drifted northward, picking peas as they ripened, until I picked the last peas of the season, in June, around Tracy. Then I shifted all the way to Lake County, where for the first time I was going to pick string beans. And I still remember how hesitant I was that first morning as I was about to address myself to the string bean vines. Would I be able to pick string beans? Even the change from peas to string beans had in it elements of fear.<sup>18</sup>

Established personal relationships grow moss as well, and vested interests can add further weight to the momentum of the present. Most importantly, the “ordeal of change” that people go through when break-

---

<sup>16</sup>One Hongkong informant, referring to the late 1950s and early 1960s, told me that the most common material incentives (*wuzhi jiangli*) were small items such as cigarettes and extra ration tickets for scarce cloth or shoes. Charles Hoffman, in his *Work Incentive Practices and Policies in the People’s Republic of China, 1953-1965* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967), pp. 62-65, additionally lists occupational promotion and monetary rewards.

<sup>17</sup>Li P’ing, “Labor Models Must Stand in the Forefront of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” *Red Flag*, no. 2 (January 1967), in *SCMM*, no. 561, pp. 19-20.

<sup>18</sup>Eric Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), p. 3.

ing existing life patterns can generate even more than ordinary friction if newness is forced along at a rapid pace. The lubricant in China, from the introduction of new information to the enforcement of action, has been the *yundong*.

The most vivid example of this type of movement is the radical yet relatively smooth (nonviolent) reorganization of agriculture that occurred during the Great Leap Forward. The movement to institute people's communes in 1958 effected the transformation of smaller agricultural producers' cooperatives averaging either 54 households (lower-level co-ops) or 170 households (higher-level co-ops) into giant people's communes with memberships ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 households.<sup>19</sup> Experimental points and key points had been set up from late 1957 in Weixing Commune in Henan, Dongfeng Commune in Sichuan, and Changshi Commune in Guangdong. The work of "expanding the point to the plane" was begun in August 1958, after the Politburo gave its formal approval to the new rural organization.<sup>20</sup> The striking fact that 125 million peasant households were reorganized into communes during only a few months (September through December) provides impressive evidence that intense salesmanship must have accompanied outright pressure upon rural households to make the change.

Not every movement to introduce new policy, however, meets with this much salesmanship success—an outcome that usually leads to later repetition when circumstances are more favorable. The history of the campaign to popularize the new Marriage Law of 1950, for example, presents a sharp contrast to the formation of people's communes. Many parents who continue to value traditional means of courtship and betrothal for their children, not to mention significant numbers of tradition-minded rural Party cadres, fiercely resisted the new law and actively persecuted individuals who tried to take advantage of rights duly afforded them under the reforms. In a few extreme instances, aroused villagers even murdered unfortunate work-team members sent to lead the campaign. Enforcement of women's rights to choose their own marriage partners, seek divorce, and inherit property finally had to wait on the strengthening and consolidation of rural Party leadership. Reruns of this campaign in subsequent years have slowly made deeper inroads into the traditionalist opposition.<sup>21</sup>

When the Chinese government intervened in the Korean War in

---

<sup>19</sup>Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp. 43ff.

<sup>20</sup>See Gargi Dutt, *Rural Communes of China: Organizational Problems* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967), pp. 32ff; Cheng Chu-yuan, *The People's Communes* (Hongkong: The Union Press, 1959), pp. 1-14; and Parris H. Chang, "Struggle Between the Two Roads in China's Countryside," *Current Scene* (Feb. 15, 1968). For a rebuttal to the tidal wave of critical commentary written about the commune movement, see Anna Louise Strong, *The Rise of the People's Communes in China* (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1960).

October-November 1950, they were immediately faced with a similar need to persuade their reluctant populace to make voluntary sacrifices for the war effort. An early Anti-Imperialist campaign to scorn the imposing atom bomb-building Americans was augmented in late summer 1950 with a more concentrated campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea (*kang Mei yuan Chao*). This was extended in November to include gathering signatures on “patriotic pacts.” By June 1951 small groups in schools, stores, offices, and factories (and even families) were mobilized to sign pacts pledging support for: Chairman Mao; the Chinese Communist Party; the Central People’s Government; the People’s Liberation Army; the Common Program; the Chinese volunteers in Korea; and the Korean People’s Army. They also pledged resolute opposition to: U.S. aggression in Korea; U.S. intrigues to rearm Japan and sign a peace treaty with the Japanese; U.S. invasion of Taiwan; and the aggressive force and influence of U.S. imperialism in Shanghai!

Often these pacts included pledges of money to buy needed planes, tanks, cannon, antiaircraft artillery, and other arms; in recognition of popular donations, planes were given such names as Wuhan Women, Wuhan Medical Workers, or Qingdao Harbor. Simultaneously a separate campaign was mounted to organize relief and aid for military personnel and their families; various kinds of help were arranged for approximately 1,600,000 servicemen’s families, most of which were farm families that had been left shorthanded by the absence of their male members. Distinguished soldiers were publicly honored in their home towns or districts.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time these movements focused on international affairs across the Korean border, the home front buzzed with activity too. On June 14, 1950, just eleven days before the outbreak of the fighting in Korea, Liu Shaoqi promulgated the Land Reform campaign, in which land and equipment owned by designated landlords and rich peasants would be redistributed to poorer peasants. Such substantial transfers of title to prized agricultural land have ranked among the most difficult programs to initiate and sustain anywhere in the world in recent history, and China was certainly no exception. One detailed account of the land reform campaign as it unfolded in Xindeng county, Zhejiang, calls attention to an interesting link between this task and other contemporaneous tasks prompted by the Korean War. “Landlords tried to conceal their property. They spread rumors that the U. S. Army has crossed the Yalu!

---

<sup>21</sup>For more detail, see Helen Foster Snow, *Women in Modern China* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1967), pp. 23, 54ff, and 65-66; and C.K. Yang, *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 31-39.

<sup>22</sup>Wen-hui C. Chen, *Wartime “Mass” Campaigns*, pp. 1-73.

Jiang Jieshi will soon be back!”<sup>23</sup> Thus, fully as significant as the main task in the Resist America Aid Korea movement—that of rallying support behind China’s resistance to MacArthur’s forces in Korea—was its secondary task of bolstering nervous peasants’ confidence that Red power would indeed be permanent, and that landowning elites would not be able to rise again in the future to exact revenge upon those who now claimed their property. This case is an excellent illustration of how a mass movement can serve diverse ends.

## Correcting Deviations from Important Public Norms

Once the decision process finally reaches a conclusion, and a new policy is laid down and popularized, the Chinese media typically will move to give it wider political meaning by referring to its provisions as the single “correct line” on that issue. From then on all other opinions are regarded as mistaken, and persons holding deviant opinions seen as undertaking illicit opposition to the line. The tasks of *yundong* in the correcting-deviations category are to draw such deviations into the open, raise popular awareness of the political implications of indulging in the deviant practices, and finally, try to stamp them out. Because these tasks may bring some individuals’ political orthodoxy under direct public examination, the potential for creating tension is a level above that of the movement types already discussed.

Often the announced deviations superficially appear to be mere symptoms, and *yundong* run to suppress them seem to toy with the symptoms alone instead of squarely addressing the basic causes. An attempt to expose and contain peasants’ “spontaneous tendencies toward capitalism” does not strike one as likely to relieve shortages on rural commodity markets or to remove the attractions for peasant producers in trading their goods outside the state-controlled price structure. In the Chinese view, “although an affair may be small, it still can have great significance” (*shi xiao yi yi da*); if an otherwise minor matter can be tied to an important political line, then, with an assist from human consciousness and determined effort, at least the severity of a problem can be reduced, even while the adverse objective conditions fueling the problem persist. In rough terms, Chinese analysis attributes any outcome to both internal (political) and external (environmental) causes; therefore, when making a political mountain out of a molehill, Chinese leaders believe they are confronting one actual root of a problem.

The Shenyang Municipal Party Committee, acting in the spring of 1961 to meet a shortage of commodities affecting the city’s retail

---

<sup>23</sup>Jack Chen, *New Earth* (Peking: New World Press, 1957), p. 41. This book was republished in 1972 by the Southern Illinois University Press.

markets, organized its commercial, financial, banking, and industrial departments to jointly undertake a Three Inventories and One Improvement (*san qing yi gai*) campaign to clean out warehouses and storerooms and to bring “dead” goods to “life.” Inventories were first taken by factories alone, second by both factories and the commercial organs to whom they sold their products, and third (as a final check) by the city government’s economic committee (*shi jing wei*). Their ultimate goal was to improve the flow of available goods and thereby alleviate shortages.<sup>24</sup>

The Majiang People’s Commune (Zhaoping *xian*, eastern Guangxi) in 1964 struck at a more perplexing set of deviations during their New Five Oppositions (*xin wu fan*) campaign: (1) using public property without permission; (2) spreading rumors about peasant opposition to and riots against government policy in other *xian*; (3) escaping (*toudu*), presumably to Hongkong; (4) worshipping the West, tuning in American radio broadcasts, listening to Western music, and talking about life in the West; and (5) neglecting regular participation in commune work to develop private plots.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, a stationery store described in *Da Gong Bao* found its business in the first half of 1974 dwindling seriously; fearing they would be caught with too many goods on hand, the staff reacted resignedly by cutting back its items in current stock from 667 in January to 557 at the end of June. Later in the year, however, by running a small Self-Education movement to criticize the mistaken idea that “it would do to have a few varieties,” they increased the items carried to 798 and thereby attracted more customers.<sup>26</sup> In 1965, such lackadaisical attitudes among retail traders generalized by then as the “purely professional viewpoint,” became the object of an even more penetrating campaign to correct deviations. The various examples of wrong thinking were:

1. About enough has been done in bringing politics to the fore . . . the purely professional viewpoint doesn’t have much influence.
2. We voice opposition against the purely professional viewpoint three to five times a year. Does the purely professional viewpoint wield such a wide influence?
3. Formerly some comrades held that bringing politics to the fore meant bringing political cadres to the fore. As a result, some factory managers and department directors used to seek the advice of Party committee secretaries and political instructors on all matters big and

---

<sup>24</sup>*Da gong bao*, Sept. 5, 1961, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup>Union Research Institute interview protocol no. 1-8 (1964) from Majiang Gongshe, Zhaoping *xian*, Guangxi, pp. 4-5

<sup>26</sup>Li Yu-hsing, “It Takes Man’s Activism to Stock a Complete Range of Goods,” *Da gong bao*, May 30, 1965, in *CB*, no. 772 (Sept. 30, 1965), p. 8.

small, because they dared not assume responsibilities boldly. Others thought that now was the time for bringing politics to the fore, so that it would not matter much whether the plans were fulfilled or not. Still others interpreted the need for political cadres to understand business operations as a need for them to take charge of administrative affairs.

4. When four hours of business time were first set aside for the study of Chairman Mao's works, did not some comrades still complain about lack of time? Later, when the importance of the study of Chairman Mao's works was duly pointed out to them, they felt an indispensable need to study them, and then they were able to manage to find the time.<sup>27</sup>

The remedy was a mass campaign to "examine, evaluate, compare, and sum up political work" managed by the PLA-modeled political departments that had been formed a few months before in finance-trade units. Exulted one responsible comrade from the Food Bureau's political department:

The present examination . . . has cleaned my mind of grease and grime and made my head sober. Formerly I always thought a good job had been done. But now I know that our work has not been realistic. Only a dozen of the thirty-two food stations have brought politics to the fore. The majority are in a middling state. Four of them are not even welcomed by the masses. It now seems that much remains to be done, and we must work doubly hard in the future.<sup>28</sup>

### **Rectifying Leadership Malpractices among Responsible Cadres or Organizations**

"Rectification" (*zheng* or *zhengli*) implies to the Chinese a special kind of deviation correction in which the deviation is faulty ideology, organization, or work-style found among leading cadres. *zheng she* means to "make adjustments in communes"; *zheng dang* means to "consolidate Party organs"; and a *zhengfeng yundong* is a "movement to rectify attitudes." The single thread that strings them all together is the task of keeping leading cadres both responsive to political priorities and effective in their work. This type of campaign can climb another level in intensity above those aimed at simple deviation correction precisely because its focus is leadership cores instead of the public at large. Mobilizational democracy, lacking the built-in checks and balances of

---

<sup>27</sup>*Da gong bao*, Jan. 12, 1966, in *SCMP*, no. 3626, pp. 1-7.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 7.



liberal democracy, depends very heavily upon the quality of both central and local leadership to insure the successful operation of the mass line. Hence, the success or failure of a rectification can strongly predetermine the success or failure of much else.

The prototype rectification campaign began back in the Yanan base area in February 1942 and lasted more than two years. At the outset of the campaign, CCP membership had reached over 800,000, a striking twenty-fold increase since the outbreak of war against Japan in 1937. This dramatic growth as well as other external factors produced two major political cleavages in the base area. One stemmed from the fact that some new blood had been recruited to the Party from places controlled by the increasingly bureaucratic Border Region government, while other new blood came from partisans who had been participating in far-flung, decentralized guerrilla resistance against the Japanese. The other was a division between, on the one hand, local activists—mostly from lower social classes—whose own armed struggle and self-made land reform had predated the arrival of Chairman Mao and the Jiangxi organization; and, on the other hand, the incoming students and intellectuals, as well as some local elites who were attracted by the second United Front and the stable administration. Knowledge of Marxism and revolutionary ideology was spotty among almost all Party cadres, and a firm ideological basis for political unity to span these cleavages had yet to be established. Nevertheless, it still required a crisis—the isolation of the border region due to a combination of Guomindang and Japanese encirclement, with consequent supply shortages and spiraling tax burdens on poor and middle peasants—to finally stimulate a *yundong* to put the situation right. Mao's models for action were: first, the Gutian Conference of 1929, where the problem had been to impart some semblance of political consciousness and discipline to the diverse, irregular elements that then comprised the small Red Army; and second, a smaller-scale study movement piloted among four thousand students and cadres from the immediate Yanan area during 1939-1940. A Conference of Senior Cadres (October 19, 1942-January 14, 1943) brought together 267 top leaders of the Communist movement for three full months of campaign activity, out of which evolved an official commitment to the mass-line style of leadership.<sup>29</sup>

During 1952-1953, shortly after the completion of land reform, extensive rectification of lower-echelon Party organs in the countryside was carried out. But the next really large-scale campaign was not projected until 1956, when plans were made for a major Party rectification to begin

---

<sup>29</sup>Considerably more detail on these episodes can be found in Selden, *The Yanan Way*, pp. 188-202. See also Boyd Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966). Boyd has prefaced his documentary collection with an interpretive essay.

in about two years. As in 1942, many problems derived from undisciplined behavior by a rapidly growing, undertrained Party bureaucracy; in just seven short years Party membership had more than doubled from 4,488,000 (October 1, 1949) to 10,734,000 (Eighth Party Congress, 1956). Also, as in 1942, a crisis provided the final impetus to get the movement underway; under pressure from rapidly unfolding events domestically and in the Communist bloc, the original date was precipitously moved forward. A call went out in late April 1957 for a new *yundong* in which “personages outside the Party help to rectify the Party” (*dang wai renshi bangzhu dang zheng feng*). The 1957 errors of subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism were nearly identical to the 1942 errors of subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotypic Party writing. Moreover, like the earlier model, the 1957 movement was finally carried down to mass levels after a relatively intensive phase at the top. As Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping reported:

The rectification campaign which began in May this year and the struggle against the rightists had, up to August, been carried out mainly in organizations of the Party and the government at and above provincial and city levels; in institutions of higher learning, democratic parties, and press and publishing, scientific and technological, literary and art, and medical circles. Since then, the movement has gradually spread to the workers and peasants, to industrial and commercial circles, and to primary and secondary school teachers and staff. At the same time, the armed forces also launched the movement. Now the campaign is being broadened to embrace the whole nation.<sup>30</sup>

Although the Rectification campaign continued in the same form after the Central Committee's Third Plenum (September-October 1957), its substance was redirected toward overcoming resistance to new ambitious efforts to expand local production.<sup>31</sup>

A microcosmic study of an East China *xian* reveals an annual Small Party Rectification campaign (*xiao zheng dang yundong*) held each year after the fall harvest as part of an ongoing Commune and Party Rectification (*zeng she zheng dang*) process.

---

<sup>30</sup>Teng Hsiao-p'ing, *Report on the Rectification Campaign* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), p. 5. For one excellent account of this movement, see Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Praeger, 1960). An important critique is Edward Friedman's "The Revolution in Hungary and the Hundred Flowers Period in China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 25.1 (November 1965): 119-122. See also Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 268-329; and Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 188-190, 221-224.

<sup>31</sup>Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, pp. 221-224.

In this annual checkup, every commune Party committee and brigade-branch held nightly meetings during a period of ten days or more; often at least one cadre was sent by the County Party Committee to sit in on some of these meetings as an observer. While this was going on, the Commune Management Committee generally held similar meetings in the afternoons. The purpose of both the Party and commune meetings was to examine the state of the organization of every unit, to evaluate the work of every one of its members, to criticize any evidence of shortcomings, and generally to tighten up discipline.<sup>32</sup>

And in late 1964 the Guangdong Province Finance-Trade Staff Office carried out the Four Cleanups campaign to correct “impurities” among the cadre in politics, organization, economics, and thought. According to one report from a cadre who participated in this movement in Guangzhou, these deviations were considered important above all because their influence undermined the effectiveness of work teams (composed of those same finance-trade cadres) sent to guide the simultaneous Socialist Education movement in the countryside. Specific cadre malpractices uncovered include: failing to serve the people diligently, discussing appearances, seeking pleasure, divorcing themselves from the masses, practicing corruption, departing from proletarian thought, and improperly appropriating public funds for private use. In contrast with the next campaign type (purge), the outcome was mild; though many mistakes were confessed, no one was punished. The leading cadres my informant reported on were found to be relatively “pure” and not “rightist.”<sup>33</sup>

### **Purging from Office Individuals Whose Political Opposition Is Excessive**

If rectification fails to solve a pressing political problem, then purge may be unavoidable. Chairman Mao issued his now famous rectification instruction “cure the sickness to save the patient” (*zhi bing jiu ren*) in 1942, and ever since all rectification campaigns have been aimed at improving the work-style of existing personnel rather than at replacing them with new blood. Even the Cultural Revolution fell substantially into this category; many severely criticized Party leaders afterward resumed their old posts or other equivalent ones.<sup>34</sup> Sometimes, though, incumbent per-

---

<sup>32</sup>A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 168.

<sup>33</sup>Yang Shizhang, “Guangdong sheng caimao bangong shi ‘Siqing’ yundong di yixie qingkuang” (Some conditions of the ‘Four Cleanups’ movement in the Kwangtung Province Finance-Trade Staff Office) (MS. given to me by the author, 1968), pp. 1-8.

<sup>34</sup>For one argument to this effect, see S.J. Noumoff, “China’s Cultural Revolution as a Rectification Movement,” *Pacific Affairs* 40.3-4 (Fall and Winter 1967-1968): 221-234.

sonnel are not easily swayed from a path they regard either as correct or as politically less risky in the long run, and outright purge is the dominant coalition's only alternative to conceding the issue.

Purges in China take several shapes and are not always accomplished through mass campaigns.<sup>35</sup> The mildest form, called "downward transfer" (*xiafang*), occurs when redundant staff in urban administrative organs are reassigned to rural production brigades or other stations at the "front line of production." For some, this transfer has been temporary; for others, permanent. A second form results when unyielding individuals are removed from their jobs or positions of authority, but are allowed to remain on the Party roster and to retain their freedom of action. This apparently is done for one of two reasons: the coalition undertaking the purge is simply not strong enough to obtain the more permanent sanction of withdrawing CCP membership; or from the beginning, the purging coalition does not wish to impose a permanent sanction, but prefers instead to leave the door open for later reform and reinstatement. Marshall Peng Dehuai, for example, was allowed to retain his membership on the Central Committee and ruling Politburo in 1959, even after he was removed from his top leadership positions as Minister of National Defense and de facto head of the Party's Military Affairs Commission.

A third form involves arrest and detention, and for Party members, expulsion. Mild offenders are sent to a special camp for labor re-education (*laodong jiaoyang*); more serious offenders go to one of a different system of camps for labor reform (*laodong gaizao*).<sup>36</sup> The final form, and the worst from the purgee's point of view, ends with his or her designation as an "enemy of the people," usually as a "landlord," "rich peasant," "counterrevolutionary," "bad element," or "rightist." In prominent cases, such as that of former head of state Liu Shaoqi (who was severely criticized during the Cultural Revolution and was formally purged from the Party late in 1968), special labels may be devised to hasten the utter disgrace of the purgee (in Liu's case, "traitor, renegade, and scab"). "Enemies of the people" in China are subject to relentless abuse and dis-

---

<sup>35</sup>For a short but comprehensive discussion of the ninety-seven Party members known to have been purged during the first ten years of the regime before the Peng Dehuai affair, see *Communist China 1949-59*, 3 vols., Communist China Problem Research Series, no. EC25 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1961), I, 34-38. For further details on the provincial purges preceding Mao's victory on commune policy, see Frederick Teiwes, "The Purge of Provincial Leaders, 1957-58," *China Quarterly*, no. 27 (July-September 1966). Teiwes is currently preparing a longer study of Chinese purges.

<sup>36</sup>For more on the Chinese approach to penal institutions and reform of behavior, see Martin King Whyte, "Corrective Labor Camps in China," *Asian Survey* 13.3 (March 1973): 253-269. See also Victor H. Li, "Law and Penology: Systems of Reform and Correction," in Michel Oksenberg, ed., *China's Developmental Experience* (New York: Academy of Political Science Columbia University, 1973), pp. 144-156.

crimination, and upward mobility for them or their children is made nearly impossible.<sup>37</sup>

When purges are conducted in the *yundong* style, they become public affairs in which the lessons of the purge are given equal billing with the purge itself. No predawn knocks on the door by feared secret police, mocking show trials, sudden disappearances with stony official silence, or tiger cage-type incarceration occur. In *yundong*-style purges, co-workers, and sometimes others, criticize and “struggle against” targeted individuals, and other units may subject personal associates of purgees to parallel treatment. Both actions become focal points for broader political participation among the mass public. The writer Hu Feng fell in 1954-55 amid a countrywide campaign of criticism of the liberal ideas he had come to symbolize. “Hu Feng-ism” was rooted out in scientific circles as well. Faculty, students, and writers throughout the city of Guangzhou leveled attacks at Zhu Guhuai, a middle school teacher who had the misfortune of knowing Hu Feng personally. Provincial Party secretaries were removed in 1957-58 in the course of a widespread movement against superstition and conservative antagonism to new economic policies that required mass mobilization on a hitherto unheard-of scale. The careers of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, Chief-of-Staff Huang Kecheng and others were cut short in 1959 in conjunction with a campaign to Oppose the Right Deviation (*fan youqing*). Eminent philosopher Yang Xianzhen fell in 1964 at a time when a nationwide effort to re-emphasize social class distinctions and class struggle was progressing, an effort to which his amicable theory that “two combines into one” was a threat.

The most extensive integration of a purge with other *yundong* was the removal of Liu Shaoqi in conjunction with specific campaigns of the Cultural Revolution: (1) establishing a three-in-one revolutionary committee; (2) carrying out mass criticism and repudiation; (3) purifying the class ranks; (4) consolidating Party organization; and (5) simplifying the administrative structure, changing irrational rules and regulations, and sending office workers to the workshops.<sup>38</sup> Beginning in April 1967, a rather incredible range of charges were laid at the doorstep of former (State) Chairman Liu:

He is the person who applauded the capitalists for their exploitation and praised the rich peasant economy. He is the person who opposed the socialist transformation advanced by Chairman Mao of agriculture, handicrafts, and of capitalist industry and commerce, and recklessly advocated the four freedoms (freedom of usury, hir-

<sup>37</sup>Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, p. 136.

<sup>38</sup>Lin Piao, “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” *Peking Review*, no. 18 (Apr. 30, 1969), pp. 16-35; reprinted in Richard Baum, ed., *China in Ferment* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 182.

ing labour, land sale, and private enterprise). He is the person who advertised the theory of the dying out of class struggle, and called for class conciliation. He is the person who opposed the Party's general line for socialist construction, the People's Communes, and the Great Leap Forward, who went all out in advocating the doing away with struggle in our relations with imperialism, the reactionaries and modern revisionism, and cutting down our assistance and support to the revolutionary struggles of other peoples, and who called for the extension of plots for private use and of free markets, the increase of small enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profits or losses, the fixing of output quotas based on the household. He is the person who pushed forward an opportunist line which is 'left' in form and right in essence in the socialist education movement.<sup>39</sup>

The authorities probably sought, by taking this step, to personify and simplify a skein of issues much too intricate for the public to comprehend easily; perhaps no other method could have as effectively familiarized the people with the movement's goals. Liu's own "confessions" before Red Guard rallies were given wide distribution and became featured documents in the movement.

### **Effecting Enduring Changes in Individual Attitudes and Social Institutions that Will Contribute to the Growth of a Collective Spirit and Support the Construction of Socialism**

This last task is both more ambitious and more oriented toward the future than the others. As a target for *yundong*, it is also more difficult to isolate. Since its pursuit has become pervasive in Chinese political life, it broadly overlaps other mobilizational activities. Nearly every demand the Chinese Communist regime issues for a new undertaking or a new popular sacrifice is prefaced with a simultaneous call for rededication to the general line, to socialist construction, and to Mao Zedong Thought. Often generalized passivity appears as the major obstacle to be overcome:

At the beginning of 1965, there was controversy and struggle among the cadres as regards whether it was necessary to hold high the red banner of the general line, whether it was necessary for enterprises to make revolution, to aim high, or to rest content with the *status-quo*. Because some cadres lacked full knowledge of past experience, on being informed that it was necessary to make revolution, they shook their heads. They feared that revolution would lead to chaos and affect safe production. They said: "We

---

<sup>39</sup>*People's Daily*, Apr. 8, 1967; cited in "The Cultural Revolution: Act III, The Maoists Against Liu Shao-ch'i," *Current Scene* 5.6 (Apr. 15, 1967): 6.

have just done something to insure safe operation, and have no desire to get rid of such records by revolution.”<sup>40</sup>

Socialist transformation is emphasized in *yundong* for precisely the same reason that ideological tenets are inculcated at all times—to impart a sense of common political direction. Without a social vision, neither cadres nor populace could renew and sustain an intense level of commitment to revolutionary experiments. People who knew life in pre-Communist China had learned to judge good and evil, gauge their life chances, develop a sense of the possible, and perfect strategies for insuring their survival and security—in short, to frame an entire personal view of the surrounding world—by the rules of either primitive capitalism or some form of regional political economy. Learning how to get along and ahead under the unfamiliar rules of collective socialism, much less calculating how one personally stood to gain or lose from the new system, often required staggering shifts in attitudes. As Chinese publications repeatedly assert, genuine socialist transformation occurs both externally in the physical environment and internally in the minds of individuals. It is “a revolutionary movement of our people for developing socialist construction and transforming the objective world. It is also a revolutionary movement for transforming our subjective world and raising our ideological consciousness.”<sup>41</sup>

Mass campaigns most explicitly aimed at external, objective socialist transformation were organized during the early 1950s, shortly after the new government assumed power. First to feel the pressure were rural elites—landlords and rich peasants. Among the most poignant accounts of rural land reform are Zhou Libo’s (Chou Li-po) novel, *The Hurricane*, and William Hinton’s documentary, *Fanshen*. Both stories are placed in North China where the CCP had gained control long before 1949. Zhou’s work imparts an artist’s sensitivity to the reactions of one group of villagers to the arrival of Party land-reform workers in July 1946:

“Whose house is that?” Team Leader Xiao asked the carter.

Looking round cautiously and seeing nobody nearby, Old Sun answered: “Who else could have a house like that? Look at those watchtowers. How imposing!”

“Is it Han Number Six’s [the biggest landlord’s] house?”

“Yes,” answered Old Sun. But more than that he would not say.

The advent of a cartload of land reform workers disturbed Han’s household and broke the monotony of the life of the villagers. A

---

<sup>40</sup>“With Class Struggle as the Keel, March Forward by the ‘One Divides into Two’ Method—Two Years Spent by T’angshan Power Plant in Learning from Tach’ing,” *Water Conservations and Electric Power—Electric Power Edition*, no. 8 (Apr. 25, 1966), in *SCMM*, no. 562, pp. 33-34.

<sup>41</sup>*CB*, no. 731.

ripple of excitement ran through the tiled-roof houses and thatched huts. Ragged men and women hurried to the side of the road to stare curiously at the smiling arrivals on the cart. Naked children ran after the cart, and when it stopped so did they. One little boy, sucking his left fist, cocked his head to watch the men in uniform and their guns with a smile. Then, all of a sudden, he darted towards a tumbledown shack, shouting as he ran: "Ma, the Eighth Route Army has come back!"<sup>42</sup>

Hinton's work, written from his personal observation of a land reform movement inspection team operating in Long Bow village (Lucheng *xian*, Shanxi province) in 1948, gives, among its many splendid details, a statistical summary of the effect of the land redistribution upon each social class (see Figure 2). In China as a whole, the land reform failed to change the mean size of agricultural holdings, and in this sense, the degree of economic restructuring was not great. But socially and politically, a significant leveling did occur; from the limited evidence available, it seems to have occurred throughout China to about the same extent as in the microcosm of Lucheng *xian*. Landlords as a class were virtually eliminated. The rich peasants—although they generally survived as a class and continued to exercise considerable influence in local rural affairs—suffered severe diminution of their landholdings.<sup>43</sup>

This initial land redistribution had a conservative aspect as well. When rich peasant opposition to programs of agricultural collectivization later grew intense, socialist transformation in the countryside was delayed until this segment of the local rural elite could be more tightly controlled. Moreover, many of the "new middle peasants" were themselves slow to see the advantages in further pooling, much less socializing, their assets.<sup>44</sup>

Next to feel the pressure were urban elites—compradors (Chinese agents of foreign firms), big capitalists, and Nationalist officials. Early socialist transformation in the cities took the form of a Five Oppositions (also called "Five Anti") campaign directed against industrialists and businessmen in the first half of 1952. In 1949, the Chinese Communist leadership lacked mass support in the eastern cities, and the Party was forced to rely heavily on the skills of industrialists and businessmen who often occupied a dominant position in the urban areas. In order to win their support, Party leaders made a number of very moderate policy statements. In Shanghai, that most commercial of all Chinese cities:

---

<sup>42</sup>Chou Li-po, *The Hurricane* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), pp. 7-8.


<sup>43</sup>Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, pp. 437-438. Schurmann cites Liu Shaoqi's report to the Eighth Party Congress on the point about economic restructuring.

<sup>44</sup>Other interesting accounts of the land-reform campaign can be found in Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, pp. 95ff.; and Jack Chen, *New Earth*, pp. 28-45. Both works relate land-reform experiences from 1950 and later.



Figure 2

# CHANGES IN LANDHOLDING BY CLASS, LUCHENG XIAN, SHANXI, 1944 - 1948



Source: adapted from William Hinton, *Fanshen* (New York: Vintage Book, 1968), p. 592

Such statements appear to have caused many “capitalists” to assume that they would not be subjected, at least for the foreseeable future, to strict controls; consequently, they persisted in a variety of corrupt business practices which frequently involved the connivance of Party and government cadres who succumbed willingly to the “sugar-coated bullets” of the bourgeoisie. The leadership, fearing that revolutionary “purity” in the ranks was in danger, purged the Party and bureaucracy of “corrupt elements,” and, in order to deal with this problem “at the source,” as it were, initiated a mass campaign directed against the bourgeoisie, the class allegedly responsible for all the corruption to be found.<sup>45</sup>

Employers all were required to join the Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce, which, on January 17, 1952, set up its own Five-opposition committee. The effect of this effort to stimulate “self-examination” within the business community was admittedly limited, but cases of tax evasion and other corrupt practices were uncovered, and the resistance of the bourgeoisie slightly circumscribed. Among workers, teams organized by the Shanghai unions marched into selected factories owned by notorious capitalists (“tigers”) whose cases were expected to have high “educational value.” Ceremoniously displaying banners and beating on kettle drums, the teams entered the “tigers dens” to stimulate workers there to investigate, expose, and denounce exploitative excesses and corruption on the part of the bosses and owners.<sup>46</sup> This phase of the movement went a long way toward breaking the back of capitalists psychologically, and hence it satisfied a necessary condition for the regime to introduce further controls over private commerce and industry without arousing determined resistance from the bourgeoisie.

Meanwhile in the countryside, socialist transformation continued through step-by-step collectivization of agricultural production with the aid of *yundong* leadership at each step. Although there are regional variations, the progressive stages of socialist reorganization got underway most intensively at about the following times:

Seasonal mutual aid teams  
Permanent mutual aid teams

Winter 1950-51  
Winter 1951 to fall 1952

---

<sup>45</sup>John Gardner, “The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control,” in Barnett, *Chinese Communist Politics*, pp. 478-479. Other interesting accounts of urban transformations are: Heath B. Chamberlain, “Transition and Consolidation in Urban China: A Study of Leaders and Organizations in Three Cities, 1949-53,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 245-301; and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Mao vs. Liu? Policy Toward Industry and Commerce, 1946-49,” *China Quarterly*, no. 47 (July-September 1971), pp. 494-520. The five capitalist crimes were: bribery, tax evasion, stealing state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing classified government economic data.

<sup>46</sup>Gardner, “Wu-fan in Shanghai,” p. 522.

Lower-level agricultural producers' cooperatives	Spring 1952 to fall 1954
Higher-level agricultural producers' cooperatives	Winter 1954-55 to fall 1956
Communes	Fall 1958
Reorganization of communes	Summer 1960 to fall 1962

Every new step (except the last) brought larger collective units; greater abandonment of private ownership of land, animals, and tools; and greater provision of free social services to members of the collective. Every step also rendered the task of socialist transformation progressively more difficult since the number of farmers who could perceive how they would stand to gain from further reorganization of production and sacrifice of private property was smaller each time.

Corresponding measures in the cities, after the initial thrust of the Five Oppositions movement, encountered equally serious problems. As businessmen watched the government gradually tighten its control over commerce and banking—through measures such as state management of large manufacturing and wholesaling, joint state-private management of smaller concerns, government contracts for essential goods, and determined efforts to administer prices—they sometimes decided either to resist control by avoiding the law and operating on the black market, or to throw in the towel by withholding new investment or closing their doors altogether. All such responses were unwelcome to the government.

In Guangzhou, to help allay the business community's fears and to point out to them the anticipated advantages of socialist reform, five thousand of the city's largest businessmen were organized into a study program beginning in early 1954; ten thousand more attended similar sessions held by the five main city districts, and thousands more (mainly smaller) traders did the same in the fifty-four neighborhood offices of the municipal administration. By late 1957, 99 percent of the value of industrial output and 96 percent of trade turnover was under state, joint state-private, or cooperative ownership.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, in May 1958, a new "general line for socialist construction" ("to build socialism by exerting our utmost efforts, and pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical results") was announced to replace the previous "general line for the period of transition to socialism" ("simultaneous development of socialist revolution and socialist construction") dating from 1952.<sup>48</sup> But all this was restricted to the external objective aspect of socialist transformation.

<sup>47</sup>Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, pp. 156-174.

<sup>48</sup>John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 258.

Subsequently, emphasis upon the external aspect gave way to emphasis upon the internal subjective aspect involving individual attitudes. In his preface to an important intra-Party document elaborating problems of the rural Socialist Education campaign in May 1963, Mao wrote that "the one and only purpose of the proletariat in knowing the world is to change it. Often, a correct idea can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and then back to matter, that is, leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice."<sup>49</sup> Similarly, Point One of the famous Sixteen-Point Decision, which, in August 1966, publicly set out the tasks of the Cultural Revolution, specified that:

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution now unfolding is a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage . . . At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all the other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.<sup>50</sup>

*Yundong* now were being called upon to maximize popular support for China's already existing socialist institutions. The Cultural Revolution's "capitalist roaders" were criticized for having placed more importance on external problems than internal ones.<sup>51</sup> And "vivid examples" of mental transformation, such as that of a veteran cadre from the Beijing Instrument Plant, soon would be more widely reported as significant outcomes of the Cultural Revolution struggle.<sup>52</sup> Even though earlier campaigns were also intended to enhance individual political consciousness, a shift in the mid-1960s toward giving greater emphasis to personal knowledge and awareness is clear.

Some readers will feel, with considerable justification, that I am speeding past this important point much too quickly (in the Chinese

---

<sup>49</sup>"Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Some Problems in Current Rural Work" (May 20, 1963); trans. in Baum and Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing*, p. 59.

<sup>50</sup>"Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (Aug. 8, 1966), *Peking Review*, no. 33 (Aug. 12, 1966), p. 6. See also Baum, *China in Ferment*, p. 99.

<sup>51</sup>For example, see Canton Heavy-Duty Machine Works Committee of Kung-ko-hui, "Down With Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Yeh Hsiu-ch'ing," *Chih-tao Chung-nan* (Canton; July 21, 1968), in *SCMP*, no. 4369, p. 8.

idiom, “admiring flowers from horseback”). The shift from external to internal priorities—that is, from an emphasis upon reordering social relations, economic institutions, and political structures to an emphasis upon remolding beliefs, attitudes, and commitments—was a natural development in the new regime’s second decade. After all, once agricultural land was redistributed and collectivized, and socialist ownership substituted for capitalist ownership in industry and commerce, there was little more in “the relations of production” that was desirable, even if possible, to change. Thus, beginning in the 1960s (especially after the open break with Moscow), Chinese publications displayed a shift in emphasis toward analyzing “production forces” instead.<sup>53</sup> The Cultural Revolution itself resulted in few outright structural changes—most notable are the substitution of somewhat more broadly based Revolutionary Committees for the earlier People’s Committees, and the selective reductions in manpower in a number of administrative agencies—and hence it is appropriately labeled in the Chinese press as a “socialist revolution in the superstructure” (culture) instead of revolution further transforming the economic “base.”<sup>54</sup>

In this section I have listed seven discernible tasks—from the small, routine, and uncomplicated to the large, tense, and complex—for which *yundong* style leadership has been deemed appropriate. My purpose has been to emphasize the striking breadth in this range of tasks, not to find

<sup>53</sup>“Be a Vanguard in Continuing the Revolution: How a Veteran Cadre Underwent a Change in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” *Peking Review*, no. 45 (Nov. 7, 1969), pp. 5-9. “Comrade Chen Ching-wen is an old member of the Communist Party . . . In 1957 she became secretary of the Party committee of the Beijing Instrument Plant . . .

“Though she had stood the test of the democratic revolution, Chen Ching-wen was not mentally prepared for the socialist revolution. She lost her bearings in the complex class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and committed errors of line. She failed to see that there still existed struggles between the two classes and the two roads in socialist society or understand the necessity of continuing the revolution under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the danger of a capitalist restoration if things were not properly handled . . .

“As she lacked a high consciousness of the struggle between the two lines and a deep understanding of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution initiated by Chairman Mao, Chen Ching-wen failed at that crucial point to take a clear-cut stand and side with the masses in waging struggles against Liu Shaoqi and the handful of other capitalist roaders in power. She became a stumbling block to the mass movement, and this made the masses more vehement than ever in criticizing her mistakes.

“The revolutionary mass movement helped Chen Ching-wen to a gradual awakening. It was, however, a fairly long process for her to really recognize her mistakes. It was a process in which she made revolution in her innermost being with the deepening of the movement and through sustained revolutionary mass criticism and being educated and helped by the revolutionary masses. It was a process in which a revolutionary succeeded in ridding herself of all political dirt amidst the great storm of revolution and a process in which a veteran Party member armed herself with Mao Zedong Thought and regained political youthfulness.” Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>John Wong, *Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Institutional Transformation in Agriculture* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 202.

a classificatory scheme that would allow each historical campaign to be placed squarely in one category in preference to another. With such a typology, it has also been possible, as a secondary purpose, to emphasize the diffuse, multitask orientation that often characterizes a Chinese mass movement.

---

<sup>54</sup>"New Year Message: 1974 New Year's Day editorial by 'Renmin Ribao' [People's Daily], 'Hongqi' [Red Flag] and 'Jiefangjun Bao' [Liberation Army Daily]," *Peking Review*, no. 1 (Jan. 4, 1974), p. 7.

## IV

# Debates Over the Continuing Value of *Yundong*

Mass campaigns have stimulated bitter political controversy among China's own elites as well as among Western scholarly observers. But, although public criticism within China itself has mostly been limited to relatively detailed, sophisticated, and reasoned objections to specific aspects of *yundong*, attacks from the outside have often been raised to the level of sweeping broadsides. For example:

To most of his exasperated followers . . . Mao's call for 100 years of struggle and sacrifice, for creating a nation of supermen, for abolishing specialization, seems like the madness of a senile old man. They have seen the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1959-1961; they are tired of ideological campaigns and mass mobilization; they want an end to the Permanent Revolution and the creation of bureaucratic normalcy.

What Mao did not understand—and what any Western political scientist might have told him—is that all revolutions in the modern era are made by the ideologues but devoured by the bureaucrats and the pragmatists.

By waging war against the bureaucrats and technocrats, Mao is fighting a vain, rear-guard action against all Chinese society's natural tendencies to settle down and concentrate on rice rather than revolution—to move toward stability, order, and economic rationality.<sup>1</sup>

Another critic concludes that China “is still obsessed” with trying to perpetuate its revolution.<sup>2</sup> A third writer, commenting on the January 1964 Support Panama campaign, limits his appreciation to the view that this *yundong* at least was not too harmful: “Since campaigns pertaining to international events rarely last longer than one week, the regime can afford to let people off from work to take part in parades, to walk and shout in the street for a few days.”<sup>3</sup> Authors of this persuasion routinely fail to evaluate more enduring effects of political forces characteristically released by revolutions (witness the bifurcated political culture in

---

<sup>1</sup>Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle* (New York: Pegasus, 1967), pp. 64-66.

<sup>2</sup>Frederick Yu, “With Banners and Drums,” p. 12.

<sup>3</sup>King, *Propaganda Campaigns*, pp. 42-43.

present-day France, almost two centuries after the great upheaval against the *ancien régime* there); they also tend to underrate the special constraints of China's poverty. In contrast, the one general and more comprehensive work we have on Chinese Communist society and institutions concludes that elements of the *yundong* style of leadership are quite predictable from China's recent historical experience.<sup>4</sup>

The favorite whipping boy of nearly everyone hostile to *yundong*, Chinese or foreign, has been the Great Leap Forward of 1958. To be sure, leadership by mass campaign had come under earlier public criticism, most notably at the Eighth National CCP Congress in September 1956. For example, a speech given there by Dong Biwu (ninth-ranked Politburo member and head of the recently established Central Control Commission), who had been chosen to report on judicial work, contained the following animadversion pointed at *yundong*.

In the first few years after liberation we carried out a succession of mass movements, and the results achieved in all these movements exceeded even our expectations. But as mass revolutionary movements do not depend entirely on law, they are likely to bring a by-product—encouragement of an indiscriminate disregard for all legal systems. This is another factor that has increased the difficulty of the Party and the state in overcoming this sort of public attitude [of disregard and nonobservance of the state legal system].<sup>5</sup>

The more diffuse opposition that formed against Chairman Mao's coalition in the early 1960s occasionally dwelt upon the difficulties of *yundong* as well. Still the Great Leap Forward remained the most celebrated single episode in the debate. As a period of China's most frenetic pace of induced social and political change, the exuberant Great Leap turned out to be a tumbling kaleidoscope of innovations for which the country was inadequately prepared. In the years that followed, many institutions, newly created in 1958 (notably, elements of the people's communes), were partially dismantled, and headstrong Great Leap promises were quietly forgotten.<sup>6</sup>

After pointing to the disastrous "failure" of the "utopian" Great Leap Forward, *yundong*'s detractors argue by analogy that the Great Leap exemplifies the destructive potential inherent in any mass movement.

---

<sup>4</sup>Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, esp. pp. 1-16. Mass movements as such, however, merit little attention in this book. For another view, see Richard Baum, "Ideology Redivivus," in Baum, *China in Ferment*, pp. 67-77.

<sup>5</sup>"Speech by Comrade Tung Pi-wu," *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 3 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), II, 92.

<sup>6</sup>Given the central importance of this episode, it is striking that only one article and one largely neglected book have been written about it. See Kang Chao, "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China," *Asian Survey* 4.5 (May 1964): 851-858; and Joseph Peterson, *The Great Leap—China* (Bombay: B.I. Publications, 1966).



But like any crude resort to analogy, this statement fails to draw attention to significant peculiarities of the overall situation in 1958. In industry, some “leaps” in productive capacity were probably due to the simple fact that in 1958 some first five-year plans (1953-1957) investments first came into production. In rural areas, recently formed higher-level agricultural producers’ cooperatives had, by 1957, shown themselves to be an unstable level of collectivization; all parties realized it would be necessary either to expand them or to allow them to revert to the earlier lower-level form. Politically, suppression of the Right deviation during 1957 had naturally led people to believe, in 1958, that they would be safer erring on the “Left” side; the consequent speed with which many “Left”-appearing Great Leap programs were initially implemented by cautious local officials must have surprised even some of the leadership. Later, Mao himself would acquiesce in much of the “readjustment.” Rarest of all in Western scholarship is the suggestion that selected aspects of the Great Leap might actually have been beneficial, or that some of the shortcomings might actually have been rooted in atavistic carry-overs from previous policies, notably from emulation of Soviet practice.<sup>7</sup>

Within China itself, a powerful opposition also took shape around the criticism of Great Leap Forward policies. In July and August 1959, the widening cleavage between supporters and detractors of the Great Leap was manifested as an overt confrontation between Party Chairman Mao Zedong and Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai at a key meeting of the CCP Central Committee.<sup>8</sup> Even though Peng was soon purged from his defense post (in September), he lost neither his Party membership nor his freedom of action, a degree of leniency that seems to have signaled to antagonists of the Great Leap throughout the country that their position was now strong enough to make public criticism worth the risk.

In Guangzhou, for example, a special Enterprise Management Investigation Group appointed by opposition leaders included the following points in its detailed indictment of the *yundong* style: (1) There is a

---

<sup>7</sup>One notable exception is Carl Riskin, “Small Industry and the Chinese Model of Development,” *China Quarterly*, no. 46 (April-June 1971), pp. 245-273. Riskin argues that some of the Great Leap’s difficulties were brought about by going *too slowly*, that is by continuing to rely upon some old policies which were out of date in the new context: (1) excessive preoccupation with heavy industry, as in the first five-year plan, instead of concentrating on locally owned small and medium enterprises; (2) overreliance on market price incentives, which would lead a commune to ignore tool and fertilizer production, for example, in favor of the more profitable manufacture of fire bricks; and (3) financing expansion by annexation of assets of local industry and handicrafts (“primitive socialist accumulation”) instead of relying heavily upon “waste, scrap, surplus and other types of material without opportunity cost.”

<sup>8</sup>For speeches and reports by Mao and Peng, see *The Case of Peng Teh-huai*, esp. pp. 1-38.

lack of long-range planning; quarterly plans are late in coming to the lower levels and are constantly being changed. (2) Leadership organs give direction blindly everywhere. (3) The leadership often demands the lower levels to “launch satellites” and make “presents” to the State, a practice that encourages gross exaggeration, brings about unbalanced development of production, and upsets the interrelations of production and its overall planning. (4) The system of *yi zhang* (one chief) is attacked, and all rules and regulations are slashed. Reliance on the personal presence of leading cadres for direction of production results in a stalling of production when a leading cadre is not present. (5) The abolition of piecework wages and all other systems of awards greatly dampens the enthusiasm of workers. (6) The abolition of fixed work quotas and the failure to balance all links in the production process are important causes of blind direction in business. After making these initial points, the Investigation Group’s report zeroed in on *yundong* directly:

There are too many central movements and they are not coordinated with the practical production of the [Guangzhou Heavy-Duty Machine] works. The leadership and cadres often have to devote much energy to various movements, thus slackening their concrete leadership over production. How should mass movements be conducted in a big way in a modern factory? The important thing is that movements must be correlated with the practical circumstances of the factory and must revolve around the fulfillment of State production plans. The masses are quite clear about it and their understanding of the movements is deep, but they rise quickly and subside as quickly, just like a gust of wind. The truth is that these are not mass movements but moving the masses. Large amounts of manpower and material resources are spent without doing any good to production. A similar state of affairs also exists in political movements. They come one after another but are not coordinated with production. The leadership spend their energy on these movements and cadres move with them; very few of them really devote themselves to the improvement of production.<sup>9</sup>

As a consequence, the report concluded, there was too little democracy within the Party, targets were too high, and “pressure too great.”

Mao, for his part, did not deny such mistakes; his only appeal was to put them in context: “suppose one production brigade has one mistake. Over 700,000 production brigades would have over 700,000 mistakes . . . If you publish 700,000 articles, only about bad things, it would not be a proletarian but a bourgeois country.”<sup>10</sup> To best evaluate the overall strong

---

<sup>9</sup>“Down with Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Yeh Hsiu-ch’ing,” pp. 8-9.

<sup>10</sup>Speech by Mao Zedong to the Lushan meetings of the CCP (probably July 23, 1959), in *The Case of Peng Teh-huai*, p. 21. See also Jack Gray, “The Two Roads: Alternative Strategies of Social Change and Economic Growth in China,” in Stuart R. Schram, ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 136-139.

and weak points of the *yundong* style of leadership, it will be helpful for a moment to agree with Mao on this point and look beyond critiques of the single exceptional case of the Great Leap Forward.

One more general criticism is that *yundong* can be effective as a leadership strategy only temporarily under conditions of great stress. Invented by guerrilla fighters whose special skills allowed them to direct a peasant army to victory in a revolutionary civil war, they are totally unsuited to the more bureaucratic politics of a modernizing state. Mass campaigns, according to this view, are a relatively primitive style of leadership most appropriate for the conditions of the 1930s and 1940s when the CCP and Red Army were blockaded in a mountainous rural base; in those days, mobilizing the base area population for struggle and sacrifice was the Communists' only alternative to capitulation. Proponents of this view sometimes concede that the early structural socialist transformations—collectivization of agriculture, and the democratic reorganization of industry and commerce—were appropriate targets for movements. Later, however, they argue that, as external pressures on the regime declined in intensity after the Korean War and the Chinese people generally came to feel less threatened, necessary conditions for the successful application of *yundong* were removed, and the Party's continued calls to action increasingly and inevitably fell on deaf ears.<sup>11</sup>

A second general criticism is that mass movements are incompatible with China's growing advanced industrial sector. Since a technologically complex economy requires elaborate training and greater specialization, so the argument goes, then China must arrange for bigger doses of formal education and expanded professionalization of its work force. Mass campaigns are antithetical to these needs; they lay down political priorities that all too often overrule the best judgment of technical authorities, and they indiscriminately scorn the elitism that flows naturally from professionalism. "Politics" stands in the way of productive "work." As former Foreign Minister Chen Yi told an audience of Beijing college students in August 1961, the time had come for a shift in emphasis toward more specialized studies, and away from political indoctrination.

In the period after liberation, the Party and Government in their educational work emphasized political study; this was completely necessary. These last few years, under the correct leadership of the Party, our institutes of higher learning have registered many imposing achievements in the field of political instruction. The broad masses of youth have undergone several years of education by the Party and repeated socialist political movements and thus have a

---

<sup>11</sup>The best statement of this argument is Chalmers Johnson's "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response," pp. 397-437.

definite socialist consciousness; an absolute majority of them support the Communist Party and socialism. Today it is necessary to emphasize professional studies (*zhuan ye xuexi*) and cultivate large groups of experts (*zhuan jia*) to facilitate the construction of our country into a great socialist state having modern industry, modern agriculture, and a modern scientific culture. So-called modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern scientific culture are all expressions of socialist politics. They are our greatest political duties.<sup>12</sup>

In subsequent years many different versions of this view gained currency in China, such as the suggestion put forth at the model Daqing Oilfield that "letting the students carry out the Cultural Revolution and the workers make a success of production is revolutionary division of work and the best way to grasp the revolution and to promote production."<sup>13</sup>

A third general criticism is more antagonistic toward excessive reliance upon *yundong* than toward the fact they continue to occur; critics in this school find a continuing relevance for mass campaigns only if their role could be strictly limited. In 1962 the deputy director of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department (Zhou Yang) was heard to say that it would be "impossible to build socialism by relying only on mass movements."<sup>14</sup> An American political scientist agrees: "what appears to be particularly critical today in China's bureaucratic system is the regime's excessive emphasis on political priorities and hostility toward bureaucratic authority and professionalism. A more balanced system which pays equal attention to political leadership and to professional authority is probably what China needs most in its quest for modernization."<sup>15</sup> Specific suggestions to this end have included cutting down on the number of campaigns, running movements only during slack periods at work, and muting the hostility of *yundong* toward professionalism.

### **Rebutting the Critics: Arguments in Support of Campaign Leadership**

One reply to skeptics has been to argue that mass campaigns make more sense for a poor country than for a rich one. Not many years ago, China

---

<sup>12</sup>Chen Yi, "Speech to Recent Graduates of Institutes of Higher Learning in Peking," *Chinese Youth*, no. 17 (1961), pp. 2-4.

<sup>13</sup>Ts'ui Chung-ch'eng, Li Hsi-wen, and Wang Ho-chun, "We Swear to Follow Chairman Mao to Make Revolution until We Die," *Red Flag*, no. 1 (Jan. 1, 1967), in *SCMM*, no. 560, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup>*People's Daily*, July 30 and Aug. 7, 1966, quoted in Chalmers Johnson, "Communist China's Political Turmoil," *SAIS Review* 12.2 (Winter 1968): 19.

<sup>15</sup>Ying-mao Kau, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-65," in Barnett, *Chinese Communist Politics*, p. 264.

was a land of widespread poverty and suffering, where economic surplus was routinely siphoned off by politically well-connected upper classes and by foreign interests. Once the new Communist government was installed in Beijing, China finally embarked on the road to development—growing steadily since, though it proceeded from a small base. But even with impressive economic progress after the CCP took control (the average annual rate of growth since 1950 has been about 5 percent in real terms) still its absolute national income or G.N.P. is only about one tenth that of the United States; and with four times the population, the annual income per capita is only about one thirty-fifth that of America. Thus, in China, people and organization have had to stand in for capital.

Admittedly, this statistical comparison borders on the meaningless for many purposes (comparing individual standards of living for example); but to highlight the relatively limited financial resources China has had to invest in public works, welfare programs, national defense (especially on top of the nuclear budget), and other programs, the numbers have an important story to tell. Lacking the capacity to pay for a large-scale network of national highways or for needed irrigation and flood control construction, mass mobilization of labor power to build these and similar projects has been China's only feasible substitute. Lacking funds to create a system of modern medical education, mass movements to revive and make limited use of traditional cures (like acupuncture) and to train paramedical "barefoot doctors" to work where trained physicians are not available have been the only alternatives open in the health care area. And lacking tens of billions of *yuan* (one *yuan* equals about fifty U.S. cents) to spend on national defense, a mass campaign in 1958 to make "everyone a soldier" prepared a popular, if amateur, militia force to supplement military capacity attained through expensive modern weapons procurement.

A second reply to skeptics has been to posit a necessary relationship between *yundong* politics and the spirit of self-reliance (*zili gengsheng*). The very origins of *yundong* as a leadership style can be traced to the barren hills of the blockaded Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region in the early 1940s, where self-reliant organization spelled survival. In the early 1960s, therefore, when self-reliance once again was proclaimed as a national goal following the collapse of Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, it came as no surprise that the leadership also revived its emphasis on mass movements. To solve the problem of oil supply shortages that arose after Soviet petroleum imports declined, for example, China mobilized to develop home industries for extraction and refining. "In the early days of the battle, since the foundation of the petroleum industry was weak, manpower, material and financial resources from various petroleum plants, mines, institutions and schools in the whole country were concentrated on this main battlefield of Daqing so that this battle of an-

nihilation could be fought to a successful conclusion.” Thus early achievements were wrought by “turning the relative inferiority of the whole situation into an absolute superiority in a partial situation.”<sup>16</sup>

For some historically conscious Chinese, their government’s initial dependence on foreigners, resulting in betrayal and even blackmail, must have borne an unwelcome resemblance to the familiar imperialist pattern of the nineteenth century. Some late-Qing reformers had advocated a policy of self-strengthening (*zi qiang*) to give China the wherewithal to resist the imperialist powers; others had proposed the cultural compromise, “Chinese learning for essential principles, Western learning for practical application” (*Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong*), in a vain attempt to preserve the imperial monarchy and the Confucian bureaucratic establishment against the onslaught of European technology and capitalism. In the recent case involving the Russians, the dilemma arose in 1954, because after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe supplied ten to twelve thousand managerial and technical advisers to China to help launch the first and second five-year plans (1953-1957 and 1958-1962); in the summer of 1960, following the political rupture between Chinese and Russian Communist party leaders, these personnel were abruptly withdrawn, blueprints and all. As a consequence, hypothesizes one political scientist, the Chinese Communists have come to see the separation of professional elites from “politics” as promoting the excessive or “slavish” imitation of foreign style and technology; they feel, moreover, that the cumulative effects of such imitations will be to reinforce China’s position of technological inferiority vis-à-vis the industrially advanced countries.<sup>17</sup> This is confirmed by subsequent campaigns to emulate Daqing’s success as a “Chinese-style enterprise.”<sup>18</sup> To a significant degree *yundong* politics came to be associated with Chinese-style politics.

A third reply to skeptics has been to point out that mass movements ideally are not continuous but rhythmic. That is even a strong advocate of *yundong*-style leadership would see them as waves, surging and receding, rather than as a relentlessly eroding river. As Chairman Mao put it in his 1959 work, “On Dialectics”:

Where there is tension, there is relaxation. It is no good to have tension all the time and there should be tension as well as relaxation. Becoming too tired is no good either. It was a very good thing for

---

<sup>16</sup>Hsu Chin-ch’iang, “Hold High the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, Further Deepen the Revolutionization of Enterprises,” *Economic Research*, no. 4 (Apr. 20, 1966), in *SCMM*, no. 538, p. 17.

<sup>17</sup>Rensselaer W. Lee III, “The Politics of Technology in Communist China,” *Comparative Politics* 5.2 (January 1973): 239.

<sup>18</sup>See for example, Sian Radio, Mar. 13, 1966 (summary), in *News from Provincial Radio Stations*, no. 149, p. 63.

the people in Henan and Hebei to concentrate on setting up red and expert schools. But they overtaxed themselves and fell asleep in classrooms. We must have both tension and relaxation. We just cannot work under tension all the time without relaxation, nor can we relax without doing any work whether we are engaged in manual labor or mental work.<sup>19</sup>

Proponents of this view maintain that temporary outpourings of human energy, followed by rest periods, add up to considerably more over a period of time than the energy extractable over the same period of time with routine, more evenly applied incentives. Before the Cultural Revolution, there existed in Shanghai's Number Seventeen Cotton Mill "a long list of rules and regulations to bind the worker masses hand and foot." But the new leading group that seized power in the mill in January 1967 "followed the mass line in a thoroughgoing way and vigorously launched mass movements":

Like a locomotive, the great cultural revolution is leading production forward in high gear. The working class is now the master of the state and the workers are bringing their wisdom into full play. In the past two years and more, the mill has introduced 135 major innovations and solved many key technical problems which had long remained unsolved before the great cultural revolution. These enabled the mill to set record outputs of cotton yarn and cloth. Workers of this mill recently set new speed records in spinning and weaving, surpassing by far those achieved in capitalist countries.<sup>20</sup>

The critics of this style are fond of referring to the economic and administrative disruption sometimes caused by mass campaigns, and of concluding on this basis that mobilization leadership has been able to survive only because more even heads have temporarily prevailed and picked up the pieces between radical "waves." In response, the proponents simply turn the case around: only by repeatedly smashing bottlenecks rooted in established cliques, privilege, and administrative routine is it possible for development to proceed at a rapid pace; and only, in turn, through mass campaigns can these bottlenecks be effectively unclogged.

A fourth reply, flowing from the third, has been to go on the offensive and raise challenges to the development possibilities claimed for certain alternatives to the *yundong* approach. Questioning the assertion that mass movements are a primitive technique, anachronistic in modern industrial society, proponents of this argument have been quick to call at-

---

<sup>19</sup>Chairman Mao's Selected Writings," in *JPRS*, no. 50792 (June 23, 1970), p. 33.

<sup>20</sup>"Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill—'Red Bulwark' of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Shanghai,'" *Peking Review*, no. 27 (July 4, 1969), p. 15.

tention to the disadvantages in more professional and bureaucratic management of the economy. For example, Shanghai's Number Seventeen Cotton Mill had:

More than 120 kinds of rules and regulations at the mill level alone, running to 200,000 Chinese characters. Even such trifles as the location of towels and teacups were a subject of red tape. The workers had to obtain the approval of the chief engineer himself before they could punch even a small hole on the machine in the process of technical innovation. Any suggestion for technical innovation had to pass through several departments for approval.<sup>21</sup>

Numerous articles in the Chinese press defending mass campaigns emanate from enterprises in the modern sector, such as the contribution by Feng Ke, secretary of the Party Committee of the Beijing Automobile Plant, who argues that "it is necessary to set the masses in motion through movements" because "existing problems cannot be solved in the ordinary way."<sup>22</sup> From a Western perspective, an American economist has proposed several lines of inquiry for examining whether "Maoist economic development" (with its reliance on *yundong* among other things) might not surpass "capitalist economic development" as a successful model for progress in China and elsewhere.<sup>23</sup> Certainly in the West, where the transformation of traditional agricultural economies through capitalism was the dominant facet of modernization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, no political body ever considered various alternatives and then rationally proceeded to choose the capitalist path on its merits. Rather, the relatively independent bourgs and towns that emerged from feudal Europe brought power to wealthy middle classes, and those classes, as might be expected, favored the rise of a liberal democratic politics that favored their prosperity and social position. But there is absolutely no reason to believe that these few countries' historical experience in achieving capitalist economic growth is the only successful path imaginable. To the contrary, concludes a prominent Japanese economist:

[Tentatively speaking] as long as the present policy lines of relying on "human initiatives" are carefully enforced with due accompanying emphasis on conventional factors, the long-term trend lines will be raised beyond the present level of a 4-6 percent growth rate and the amplitudes of short-term fluctuations will be reduced well

---

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Feng K'o, "Important Aspects of Ideological and Political Work," *People's Daily*, May 12, 1964, in *SCMP*, no. 3230, pp. 3-5.

<sup>23</sup>John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., *America's Asia* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 324-356.



below the present ones. The final test would be whether or not China will succeed in institutionalizing the reliance on "human initiatives."<sup>24</sup>

Continued reliance upon such "human initiatives" most likely will be achieved through *yundong*.

To summarize, some Chinese Party leaders have been bitterly critical of *yundong* or have even attempted to sabotage them, and detractors of mass campaigns on both sides of the Pacific tend to dwell on the more bizarre aspects of the Great Leap Forward. The critics emphasize that *yundong* can be effective as a leadership strategy only temporarily under conditions of stress, that *yundong* are incompatible with an expanding advanced industrial society, and that *yundong* enthusiasts typically are reluctant to tolerate some kind of balance between campaign leadership and regular leadership. Supporters of mass campaigns stress, to the contrary, that campaign leadership is more rational for a poor country than for a wealthy one, that campaigns are tied to China's chosen long-term direction of self-reliance, and that campaigns ideally should not be overplayed but rather introduced rhythmically in cycles of tension and relaxation.

<sup>24</sup>Shigeru Ishikawa, "Prospects of the Chinese Economy: Trends and Cycles," *Pacific Community* 4.2 (January 1973): 264.

## V

# Responses by Nonelites The Question of Compliance

The final issue is whether the spearhead of *yundong* has become blunted over time. After many years of experience with campaigns, have the Chinese people learned how to behave self-protectively under the stress of a movement? Have they learned how to perform self-criticism as a ritual, pretending to be genuinely touched and changed, but really giving a calculated response that is carefully limited to a practiced exterior? Have they become expert actors in a form of political theater? If so, have *yundong* lost their punch as a leadership instrument?

Several Western observers have found evidence indicating a secular decline in *yundong* effectiveness. One assessment is based on interviews with former cadres, including one from a central ministry in Beijing.

Campaigns are still important today, but over time, especially since the late 1950s, in a slow and subtle way the regime has found it increasingly difficult to mobilize the cadres and inject a high level of tension into the system. Repeated campaigns have tended to inure many cadres to them, and some cadres appear to have gradually built up certain defense mechanisms, with the result that while they may go through the same motions as in the past they are sometimes able to avoid the same degree of psychological involvement.<sup>1</sup>

Another assessment is based upon examination of an extraordinary meeting of the Party's Military Affairs Committee from September 14 to October 20, 1960, the now famous forum at which former Defense Minister Lin Biao proposed an ideological breakthrough in PLA ranks through implementation of his "four firsts." Lin's new formulation, according to this analysis, was "an attempt to overcome the weakness that had characterized previous political campaigns—the tendency for the content of political education to become stereotyped, and for its application to become a formal ritual with only a superficial impact upon military thinking."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power*, p. 70.

A third pessimistic assessment proceeds from an overall evaluation of Chinese politics on the eve of the Cultural Revolution:

The key factor enabling Chinese to develop life plans was the routinization of campaigns and small group activities. The Chinese populace, unaccustomed to the scope and intensity of these control techniques, did not know how to handle them in the early and mid 1950's. But since campaigns were conducted in similar ways, the populace learned to anticipate the steps of a campaign, and took appropriate countermeasures. Further, while Party bureaucrats initially appreciated the campaign for the increased power it gave them [they] gradually came to dislike the campaign for the disruptions and increased pressures it brought to their lives. Especially as a result of the Great Leap Forward campaign and its disastrous aftermath, through a variety of techniques, these bureaucrats attempted to subvert and delay campaign efforts. The Socialist Education Campaign of 1963-4 can be viewed as an effort by Mao and his associates to reinvigorate society and polity through another campaign, only to find that this technique had lost its effectiveness. People had planned their lives to include the mobilization phase and the temporary reversals it might bring; moreover they had learned to keep these reversals to a minimum. (From this perspective, then, the Cultural Revolution can be seen as Mao's attempt to design a new organizational weapon to replace the no longer effective regular campaign.)<sup>3</sup>

My own interviews with Chinese refugees in Hongkong during 1967-1969 and 1975 confirm this conclusion up to a point; but they also suggest important qualifications to it. Although my informants usually could recall people they had known who were rather adept at dissimulation, they also insisted that to succeed in this risky deceit a person must be extremely skillful; according to them, it was always a dangerous tactic. In calculated fashion, pretenders could select a few noncritical points where they personally fell short of a movement's stated ideals and tasks, engage in measured self-criticism that would appear deep felt and real but not be too personally damaging, and finally "negotiate the pass" (*guo guan*) without incurring undue suspicion or punishment. Genuine activists, however, were ever on the lookout for such opportunists.

---

<sup>2</sup>John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 245. The Four Firsts are: (1) the "human factor" should come first in the relationship between weapons and men; (2) politics should come first in the relationship between political work and other kinds of military work; (3) ideology should come first in the relationship between routine and ideological political education; and (4) "living thought" should come first in the relationship between book learning and its practical application.

<sup>3</sup>Michel Oksenberg, "Getting Ahead and Along in Communist China: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed. *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 345.

The proposition that *yundong* in the 1960s retained their capacity to create real social tension has further supporting evidence. A former cadre testifies that he and his colleagues were quite ill-at-ease toward the end of 1964 when the Socialist Education campaign was extended to their province-level agency. None feared serious trouble for themselves from the movement because leading cadres in their field (commerce) were examined regularly (*pingshi shencha*). Most of those found to be “unclean” were guilty of using public property or monies for private purposes, and none were punished. Nevertheless, all tried to steer as clear as possible of Socialist Education. When cadres were temporarily transferred to staff Socialist Education work teams in the countryside, for example, one felt quite content to be passed over, even though it meant working harder at one’s regular duties to fill the void left by those who were tapped (*you shei bu yuan duo gan gongzuo shao canjia yundong ne!*).<sup>4</sup>

Other interviews reveal that an anticipatory effect remained strong in the mid-1960s: expectations of future campaigns continued to affect present behavior. A scholar who talked in depth with former officials reports: “ex-cadres assert that even in periods of relaxation, all cadres consciously or unconsciously anticipate the recurrence of political campaigns in the future.”<sup>5</sup> A writer on public security work concurs:

The campaign is in keeping with Chinese Communist tradition of using [demonstration] cases as a form of public education, extolling morality, and warning against undesirable thought and conduct. Campaigns do have a powerful effect in deterring citizens from causing trouble even during lulls between campaigns. The citizenry can correctly assume that officials will be keeping notes, recording instances of incorrect thought and behavior. When the officials discover such instances in the lull between campaigns they do not necessarily act on them. The instance is noted and kept on file for possible use later. The citizen, unable to differentiate those things for which he may be punished from those for which he will not be punished, behaves with due caution.<sup>6</sup>

Normally, therefore, where *yundong* are well run, their influence lingers invisibly beyond the general summing up.

Evidence pointing in the other direction, toward routinization and blunting of *yundong*, typically stems from cases where a movement has not been well run, or where the actual conception of the movement itself was divisive, or both. Movement failures may not be rooted in compliance problems alone, but rather in a combination of visible com-

---

<sup>4</sup>Yang Shizhang, “The ‘Four Cleanups’ in the Guangdong Finance-Trade Office,” pp. 11-12, 16.

<sup>5</sup>Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power*, p. 34.

<sup>6</sup>Ezra F. Vogel, “Preserving Order in the Cities,” in John Wilson Lewis, ed., *The City in Communist China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 82.

pliance shortcomings and less-visible cleavages within the leadership. The intra-Party opposition that crystallized against the Great Leap Forward coalition and against Chairman Mao's leadership in the early 1960s—an opposition that included several leaders who favored reducing the scope and role of *yundong*—was insufficiently strong to realize its full program. Thus it turned to the tactic of “subverting Mao's policies” (1963-1969), professing loyalty but practicing resistance. The most clearly documented instance of this tactic and its outcome is the rural Socialist Education campaign, in the course of which no less than four separate sets of guiding articles were put out, each one giving its own reassessment of the movement's problems and reformulation of the targets. The order of appearance of these documents and the reputed author of each are summarized in Table 1.

During the Cultural Revolution, Party Deputy Chairman Liu Shaoqi was purged and Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping was extensively criticized for deceitful opposition to Chairman Mao's conception of the campaign (among other things). In July 1968, the *People's Daily* published a broad attack on Liu's allegedly unmitigated antagonism to and sabotage of mass campaigns throughout the history of the Chinese Communist revolution. Liu's ideas were even scurrilously equated in

TABLE 1  
GUIDING DOCUMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST  
EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

Date	Document	Reputed Author
May 1963	First Ten Points	Mao Zedong
May 1964	Later Ten Points	Deng Xiaoping
September 1964	Revised Later Ten Points	Liu Shaoqi
January 1965	Twenty-three Points	Mao Zedong

Source: Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966* (Berkeley: University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1968); and Richard Baum, “Revolution and Reaction in Rural China: The ‘Struggle Between Two Roads’ During the Socialist Education Movement (1962-1966) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1968)” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1970), pp. 52 and 100. Part of Baum's dissertation is now published as *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962-1966* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

this article to the writings of Germany's notorious enemy of democracy, Friedrich Nietzsche.<sup>7</sup>

Many other episodes of campaign sabotage have been detailed in the Chinese press. In the leading agricultural model production unit, Dazhai Brigade, Liu Shaoqi is said to have twice "brought disturbances in order to restore capitalism": first, during 1959-1961 he allegedly supported the extension of plots for private use and of free markets, the increase of small enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profits and losses, and the fixing of output quotas based on the household (*san zi yi bao*); and second, during 1964-1965 he is said to have "mercilessly attacked the brigade's cadres and poor and lower-middle peasants" under the guise of implementing the Socialist Education campaign.<sup>8</sup> In the corresponding industrial model production unit, Daqing Oilfield, supporters of the widely acclaimed "bootstrap" exercise in self-reliance were charged with actually having diverted substantial sums from the central budget to guarantee its success, a practice which led to the favoring of Daqing workers with allowances, special benefits, and other individual incentives.<sup>9</sup> One writer cautioned in the theoretical journal *Red Flag* early in 1967 that some labor models had been "hoodwinked and made use of by the small handful of intra-Party power-holders who follow the capitalist road and the very few die-hards who cling to the bourgeois reactionary line"; there were even a few "false labor models fostered or bought by the intra-Party power-holders who follow the capitalist road."<sup>10</sup>

Specific ways in which Liu Shaoqi was charged with having sabotaged the Socialist Education campaign include sending out large numbers of work teams and promoting "human sea" tactics (in one cited instance, a production team of forty-nine persons was asked to accept a work team of more than thirty members, which was disruptive even to the point of creating a food supply problem); "taking root" and conducting secret investigations over a long period (instead of immediately holding public forums as Mao advocated); and, in general, preferring strong work-team authority over prompting the masses to "educate and liberate them-

---

<sup>7</sup>"China's Khrushchev Accused of Sabotaging Mass Movements," *NCNA* (English, Peking, July 27, 1968), in *SCMP*, no. 4230, pp. 14-20. The original article entitled "The Revolutionary Mass Movement Is the Locomotive of History," notes the following instances when Liu tried to sabotage mass movements: in 1927 in urging the Wuhan pickets to capitulate; during the 1947 land reform; during the 1955 agricultural cooperation; during the 1963 Socialist Education campaign; and during the Cultural Revolution in 1966. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup>"Mao Tsetung Thought Is the Source of Strength," *Peking Review*, no. 50 (Dec. 12, 1969), p. 13.

<sup>9</sup>"China's Taching Oilfield: Eclipse of an Industrial Model," *Current Scene* 6.16 (Sept. 17, 1968): 8-9.

<sup>10</sup>Li Ping, "Labor Models Must Stand in the Forefront of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *Red Flag*, no. 2 (January 1967), in *SCMM*, no. 561, p. 21.

selves.”<sup>11</sup> Focusing on yet another distortion, Chairman Mao in his “Twenty-three Points” exhorted finance-trade personnel not to take advantage of units that had successfully completed the Four Cleanups (Socialist Education campaign) to press for collection of outstanding debts.<sup>12</sup> As the Four Cleanups were melded into the Cultural Revolution, the spearhead of that movement was said to have been similarly diverted:

The handful of absolutely unrepentant capitalist roaders in the former Shanghai Municipal Party Committee stirred up the evil wind of counter-revolutionary economism in a vain attempt to avert their doom. They raised wages and increased welfare funds arbitrarily, using money as a bribe to incite some of the workers to leave their production posts. Their criminal aim was to undermine the great cultural revolution by sabotaging production, transport and communications, and finance and banking.<sup>13</sup>

In each case, elite-level cleavage over how to properly conceive and implement a movement created opportunities for people at lower levels to practice dissimulation tactics; the result was to lower mass “compliance.”

---

<sup>11</sup>“Selected Edition on Liu Shao-ch’i’s Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Crimes,” pamphlet published by the Liaison Station “Pledging to Fight a Bloody Battle with Liu-Teng-T’ao to the End” attached to August 18 Red Rebel Regiment of Nank’ai University (April 1967), in *SCMM*, no. 652, pp. 36-37.

<sup>12</sup>Point no. 13, trans. and quoted in Baum and Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch’ing*, pp. 124-125.

<sup>13</sup>“Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill,” p. 13.

## VI

# Conclusion

What do all the arguments—some negative, some affirmative—add up to in balance? Which side in each issue can claim the greater weight of evidence? Posing the question this baldly is like asking what tomorrow's weather will be, and forces a probabilistic answer—bright developmental sky for a while, clouding over with agricultural crisis in the late 1970s, and 30 percent chance of revisionist showers by 1985, unless a new Maoist cold front blows through. Such an analytical style may be interesting to picnickers and policy-makers, but for meteorologists and social scientists, it is more important to discern the underlying patterns. We can study the evidence to determine what pressures favor and what pressures undermine *yundong*, but only the most prescient politician could feel confident in hazarding a guess on precisely what role the mass-campaign style of leadership will play in years to come. I have introduced evidence throughout this volume to support my three broad hypotheses on the role and importance of China's mass movements (that they afford Chinese citizens an effective vehicle for political participation in a significantly wide range of issues; that, in balance, they contribute more to economic growth than they take away; and that they will continue to thrive in Chinese politics following the leadership succession to Mao Zedong), but none of the evidence is conclusive.

Like the Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a watershed in the history of Chinese Communist politics. During both movements, an important qualitative shift occurred in the very nature of political participation itself, not only for elite interaction and coalition formation at the top, but for popular participation in *yundong* and other outlets at the lower levels as well. An early, ritualistic phase of each movement gave way to a later exuberant phase as Party authority at local levels crumbled under the pressure of the campaign mounted against ranking opposition leaders and their policies. My own interviews with a Red Guard faction leader in Guangzhou, Dai Xiaoi, reveal the shift vividly. During the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, Dai's friends did not regard it as significantly different from previous mass campaigns, with which such young middle-school students were thoroughly familiar. They looked to the official news media for initiatives, slogans, and tasks, and their small-group political study was organized around these publicized priorities. School authorities—the



principal, Party committee, and Youth League—took charge of the movement locally. Established categories of “bad” persons (those explicitly labeled as antagonistic to communism because of their upper-class backgrounds were again brought out as targets for criticism—by this time something of a routine during *yundong*. Reflecting on this last point (two labeled teachers were singled out in his school), Dai succeeded in capsulizing his attitude toward Party authority during the ritual phase:

Most of us felt that these two teachers were good in their work and were extremely surprised when they were accused of their crimes. We found it difficult to believe that they could have done such things; I was disillusioned.

However, we never once doubted their guilt. We trusted the Party and did not feel it could have made a mistake. While we respected them before, our feelings changed to hatred as soon as they were denounced as “monsters and ghosts.” We felt that this was our duty, and we showed them no mercy.

In the beginning, I had mixed emotions. I was particularly close to the literature teacher and had always thought that she was a good person and an excellent teacher. At first I was unwilling to criticize or to struggle against her, but my classmates accused me of being sentimental and warned me that I was becoming like her. They even told me that I was headed for trouble. I gradually realized that they were right. The Party could not be wrong and it was my duty to join in the struggle. I did so and eventually with enthusiasm.<sup>1</sup>

By September 1966, however, ritual behavior had subsided. Principal, Party committee, and the Youth League had themselves become targets of the movement, and newly established Red Guard student organizations had to decide on their own what authority to accept. This totally unfamiliar and temporarily uncomfortable feeling of being adrift produced several novel reactions: disorderly meetings, public debate on the general political line, and a search for some alternative source of political authority (a search the Guangzhou groups directed toward revolutionary mass factions in Beijing, and later, Shanghai). As this exuberant phase progressed, the search for new authority even included massive traveling from city to city to “link up” with like-minded groups and to “exchange revolutionary experiences.”

A kindred point is made in a recent study of residential neighborhoods in Chinese cities. The quality of political participation in urban communities shifted measurably during the Cultural Revolution. Before 1966, the numerous residents’ committees were able to draw upon only a

---

<sup>1</sup>Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Monaperto, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Siao-ai* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), p. 42.

minority of city dwellers to attend their meetings and contribute to their activities:

During the periods of political consolidation after the Great Leap Forward, the residents' committee leaders did not emphasize mass mobilization. Their channels of communication and leadership tasks were fixed routinely at the officer level, over the heads of the residents. As in other "old" organizations, the leaders had more of a commitment to the administrative structure of their organizations—the patterns of activities and statuses, their salaries or social rewards—than to the political goals of the organization. When the Cultural Revolution struck the neighborhoods with a new definition of political participation, most neighborhood cadres did not respond flexibly and found themselves under attack for putting survival of their organizations ahead of new political goals.<sup>2</sup>

As a direct outcome of the movement, three specific kinds of participation became common. First, residents were recruited to take a more active role in local administrative functions (welfare, nurseries, handicraft work for the otherwise unemployed, employment office, and services like homemaking, sewing, mending, and laundry). Second, small-group political study was greatly expanded between 1966 and 1969. These groups read and discussed political articles in the newspapers, openly discussed questions of political line which sharply divided people living on the street, and supervised local "bad elements" (labeled deviants or members of upper classes). Third, they were mobilized to actively assist with various public security tasks (such as checking households to identify illegal migrants and unregistered residents working in underground jobs, issuing rations, controlling prices charged by farmers or middlemen with farm produce) which had formerly been the preserve of police officers or security committees.

Red Guard exuberance may not have lasted very long, but more active popular participation in a narrow but significant range of local political matters did persist. In Samuel Huntington's terms, which equate "revolution" with an "explosion of political participation," the Cultural Revolution actually displays characteristics of a genuine revolution.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, my optimism that *yundong* have a bright future in China is based on the comparative study of revolution as much as on a case study of China. Generally speaking, the more intense a revolution, the more lasting its effects. If one takes a revolutionary party's seizure of power from an old regime as the minimum defining condition for the existence of a revolution, measures of intensity then include: (1) scope of social

---

<sup>2</sup>Janet Weitzner Salaff, "Urban Residential Communities in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution," in Lewis, *The City in Communist China*, p. 294.

<sup>3</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 266.

change in the period embracing the power seizure; (2) pace of change; (3) amount of violence accompanying the movement to seize power; (4) degree to which old elites are replaced by the new regime's people; (5) degree to which foreign intervention occurs, in support of either side; and (6) extent of mass participation. The more prominent these measures, in my conception, the more intensive the revolution.

Precisely how the intensity of a revolution leaves its imprint upon the political culture is not yet well studied. It is, nonetheless, tempting to assert an overall relationship on the basis of historical examples such as the great revolution in eighteenth-century France. Dorothy Pickles, a London writer on modern French history, suggests that repeated struggles to preserve what the first French republicans won during 1789-1793 remains one drive behind the preservation of "the Republican tradition" in France, vague though that tradition may have become after almost two centuries.

It is not easy to describe with any degree of completeness or precision what really constitutes the Republican tradition, because it is not a series of dogmas but rather a number of beliefs and emotions about the kind of relationship that ought to exist between State and citizen and between Government and legislature. These beliefs and emotions go very deep because Frenchmen have had to fight and die for them so often in their history, because memories of the most recent eclipse of democracy and Republicanism are still vivid, at least in the minds of all Frenchmen over thirty, and because some Frenchmen are still far from convinced that they will not have to fight for them again in the near future.

But exactly what they have fought for, or will fight for, is something that defies exact analysis, primarily for two reasons. First, not all Republicans are agreed on the meaning to be attached to the term; and second, the language in which the feelings are expressed has become a kind of political shorthand, summing up episodes of French history and attitudes to significant events or conflicts. Some of the language has by now become symbolic. It is difficult to sort out the relative importance of history and politics in phrases and words like "The Republic, one and indivisible," "the sacred right of insurrection," "the rights of man and the citizen," "popular sovereignty," "equal and secret ballots," "a secular, democratic, and social Republic." They are now symbols of a mystique.<sup>4</sup>

A more contemporary example of intensive revolution is the one in Cuban society which has come as close as any other to duplicating the Chinese goal of broad popular participation achieved through mass movements. According to one of the most fascinating analyses of Castro's guerrillas in power, the Campaign Against Illiteracy, conducted during Cuba's energetic Year of Education (1961):

---

<sup>4</sup>Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 14-15.

if not an overwhelming and unquestionable triumph from the scholastic point of view, was nevertheless seminally important in the evolution of the institutional life and political culture of the revolution.

In the first place, the campaign represented a mass mobilization of impressive proportions. Out of a total population of approximately seven million Cubans at the end of 1961, one and a quarter million had been drawn actively into the campaign as either students or teachers. Subtracting approximately two million Cubans from the total population as having been too young we are left with five million, of whom one out of four participated directly in literacy work. If we add the tens of thousands of others who contributed in some fashion through the mass organizations, and the hundreds of thousands who were linked emotionally to the effort because of family and friends, it is probably safe to say that the campaign affected in some real way the lives of most Cubans who by 1961 were old enough to have even minimal political awareness.

As the campaign progressed, it assumed a scope, duration, and intensity that are rare at any time or place except under conditions of war. It is not surprising, then, that the revolutionaries adopted a military metaphor to characterize both the organization of the movement (the literacy army) and the desired national psychology (crush the enemy). The public rhetoric and the symbolism of the campaign were permeated with the imagery of national emergency, battle, and triumphal march. Illiterates were told that in this, Cuba's hour of need, it was their patriotic duty to become literate.<sup>5</sup>

The French example suggests that intensive revolution may polarize a society's political culture for many generations, even though subsequent episodes in the country's history add new elements and further shape "the tradition." It is too early to draw a similar lesson from the Cuban example, but the Fidelistas have displayed mobilizational politics in the Chinese mold. Although Cuban and Chinese culture, economy, history, and doctrine all are substantially different, intensive revolution in both countries is apparently associated with thoroughgoing political reorientation (new ideology, new institutions, new forms of popular participation, and new structures of political cleavage).

Algeria, a case of contemporary revolution that was *not* very intensive, allows the same point to be made in reverse, Algerian revolutionaries, at the time their civil war against the French began in 1954, "were miserably equipped and barely organized. The leaders of the revolution hoped that through their desperate acts of violence on November 1, they

---

<sup>5</sup>Richard R. Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 55-56. Fagen adds, "Even those who were most cynical about the pedagogical achievements of the campaign would probably admit that the widespread cultural and psychological barriers inhibiting adult education in Cuba were broken during 1961, even if functional literacy was not achieved for very many of the so-called new literates." Ibid.

would quickly gain a mass following.”<sup>6</sup> The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) did attract a small army that was effective enough to confound a French force of a quarter million early in 1956, but successful suppressions by the larger French army later forced the FLN leadership into exile in Morocco and Tunisia. They also forced the FLN organization to expand to include former rivals, thus opening up internal cleavages.

At the time independence was achieved in July 1962, a seriously divided Algerian elite was headed by the military members of the revolutionary coalition, Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne. Since independence, the revolutionary government in Algiers has been threatened continuously by coup d'état, and has lacked the capacity to undertake more than minor social reform programs.<sup>7</sup> Algeria is a leading instance of nonintensive revolution which has produced non-thoroughgoing social and political reorientation.

No revolution in history, China's included, has resulted in a complete overthrow of the “defeated” regime. Most people who lived under the old order stay on to populate the new. Some groups figure they stand to gain from the revolutionaries' program, or at least parts of it, and the new government counts on their active support. Other groups, especially those most advantaged in the old days, regard the revolutionary program as a threat. Despite the revolutionary party's elaborate efforts to instill new attitudes and reform the people's political consciousness, no government can please everyone; many individuals will always feel more comfortable doing things the old way. This is equally true of succeeding generations. The success or failure of a revolution should never be measured against overly stringent criteria of whether lofty ideals are actually lived up to, but only against an evaluation of the extent to which the new government acquires a capacity for transformation not enjoyed by the old.<sup>8</sup> In no case does revolutionary success include a carte blanche for the new people in authority to do as they please forever; it will always be marked by constraints imposed by suspicious citizens whose old-style values induce them to withhold their approval, or even toleration, of demands for revolutionary change. For opposition leaders, these groups provide a significant reservoir of support. They remain forever tempted by arguments to the effect that specific visible failings by the dominant revolutionary coalition actually are symptomatic of more deep-seated inadequacies, and that the only real solution to allegedly cascading difficulties is another change of government.

---

<sup>6</sup>William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 93.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., passim.

<sup>8</sup>This theme is developed by Manfred Halpern, “A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation,” in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World* (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 14-47.

Thus, as exemplified by the experience in France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the secular outcome of great revolutions is not at all to vanquish one set of values and replace them en masse with another set, but to polarize political preferences and institutional arrangements around generalized (and increasingly symbolic) attitudes either favorable or antagonistic to a developing revolutionary tradition.

Some readers, while accepting without further argument the conclusion that ideologies and institutions of successful revolutionary movements endure in some form through subsequent generations, may still wish to ask if it is possible to predict what form these revolutionary legacies will take over time. How long will politics remain polarized around the main issue of support for the revolution? How quickly will this polarity become merely symbolic? For the Chinese case, we might pose what political scientist James Townsend highlights as “the real question” about the future of mass movements: Will they survive in the more participant style of the Yanan movements, Land Reform, and the Cultural Revolution; or in the more commandist style of the 1957-58 Rectification, the Commune movement, Learn from Lei Feng, and Socialist Education? The safest prediction is that both will survive. Just as the two prominent styles of Chinese Communist political leadership—mobilizational and nonmobilizational—have followed each other in a cyclical fashion since the early 1950s, so a pulling and tugging between both impulses should continue well into the future.

Given our present limited understanding of revolutions, it is not possible to predict with confidence either the timing of future cycles or the long-term political strength of each impulse. Nevertheless, we can look forward, with some certainty, to periods in the future in which proponents of each style will again advance their respective cases. Premier Zhou Enlai, quoting Chairman Mao, reported to the Tenth National Congress of the CCP (August 24-28, 1973): “probably another revolution will have to be carried out after several years.”<sup>9</sup> Premier Zhou’s words can be read not only as a prediction of the need for another Cultural Revolution-type movement in the not-too-distant future (because the commandist impulse will have grown stronger by then), but also as a forecast of the likelihood that ample political forces (charged with the participatory impulse) will exist at the time to carry it out.

So go my predictions for the future of Chinese political culture and the role of mass movements. Chinese politics should remain polarized on the great issue of “the revolution” (*geming*) long into the future. At one pole, active emotional support for mass campaigns should continue as a political reality.

---

<sup>9</sup>Special Supplement to *China Reconstructs* (November 1973), p. 12. Zhou identified the source as Mao’s speech to the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee on Apr. 28, 1969.

A cursory look through the first 1973 issue of *Peking Review* is sufficient to uncover four distinct *yundong* in progress: Criticize Revisionism and Rectify [Cadres'] Style of Work; In Industry, Learn from Daqing; In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai; and Foster Technical Innovations in Factories and Mines.<sup>10</sup> The second issue for 1973 contains a report on how the Party branch at a national model for agriculture (Shashiyou Production Brigade in Hebei province) "has made it a rule to carry out at least one campaign a year to rectify its style of work."<sup>11</sup> The third number carries a story about the multinational Xinhuang Panna Tai Autonomous Zhou in southern Yunnan province, where, in order to supplement the new medical services provided by nearby cities, "the local people have also launched many campaigns to clear away garbage heaps and cesspools."<sup>12</sup> An article in the fourth issue lauds the 300,000 graduates of Beijing middle schools who have been "mobilized" since December 1968 to accept jobs at people's communes in rural areas and border regions.<sup>13</sup> Subsequent issues contain detailed accounts of how "the three great revolutionary movements—class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experimentation—are being advanced with the thoroughgoing "proletarian revolution in education" at Beijing and Qinghua universities.<sup>14</sup>

Impressions brought back by recent travelers to China also confirm the vitality of *yundong*. One who visited the Shenyang Transformer Factory in 1972 observed a daily regimen of "study" (one hour to one hour and a half each day) similar to practices in progressive urban units before the Cultural Revolution:

Monday	Discussions on safety and accident prevention
Tuesday and Wednesday	Political study
Thursday	Cultural activities and studies
Friday	Party and Youth League meetings (for members only)
Saturday	Study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought

This observer also noted a political confidence among plant employees, which he perceived as a reflection of the intensity of the

<sup>10</sup>*Peking Review*, no. 1 (Jan. 5, 1973), pp. 9-11, 21.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, no. 2 (Jan. 12, 1973), p. 131.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, no. 3 (Jan. 19, 1973), p. 15.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, no. 4 (Jan. 26, 1973), p. 4. Of these, "3,200 have been admitted into the Communist Party in the last four years and 16,000 have joined the Communist Youth League. Nearly 10,000 have taken up posts of responsibility in communes, brigades and teams."

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, no. 5 (Feb. 2, 1973), pp. 20-22; no. 8 (Feb. 23, 1973); pp. 10-13; and no. 9 (Mar. 2, 1973), pp. 15-18.

Cultural Revolution conflict over important mass-line issues surrounding cadre-worker relations which had taken place at that factory.

The workers we met seemed strong and sophisticated; we were filled with a sense of their personal and political competence, their knowledgeability and involvement in world affairs, Chinese society, and their own productive enterprise. These impressions came home to us in a number of forms; one of these was simply the warmth and assurance with which workers acted as our hosts in "their" factory.<sup>15</sup>

Another traveler came away with a parallel impression and emphasized particularly his observations on the open-door rectification (whereby Party behavior is made accountable to non-Party members), the renewed reform of the educational system, the May 7 Cadre Schools (wherein officials from cities and towns spend six months or longer personally engaged in full-time commune organization and farming), and the realization of direct class representation on revolutionary committees at various levels.<sup>16</sup>

These citations from the Chinese media and reports from American visitors to China in the early 1970s show that *yundong* are a thriving institution. Other press citations and visitor reports could illustrate strong contemporary tendencies in the opposite direction—toward order, growing CCP authority, and restraints on self-reliance—in short, tendencies antagonistic to the atmosphere in which *yundong* are given fullest play. These two tendencies are admittedly contradictory; my argument is that such polarization is natural in a revolutionary society after the initial seizure of power (which took place between 1946 and 1949 in China). Looking ahead, the *yundong* impulse evident in the Cultural Revolution can be expected to subside further, and the level of political vigor evident in the early 1970s to decline proportionately. Looking beyond the present decade, however, I predict that, in one form or another, the mass-movement style of leadership will enjoy another revival. Moreover, I predict that this revival will be largely independent of the outcome of the inevitable succession crisis following Chairman Mao's departure.

---

<sup>15</sup>Mitch Meisner, "The Shenyang Transformer Factory—A Profile," *China Quarterly*, no. 52 (October-December 1972), pp. 735-736.

<sup>16</sup>Richard M. Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution," *China Quarterly*, no. 52 (October-December 1972), pp. 635-653. In this article Pfeffer takes issue with Western analysts who "begin with a preconceived scepticism of the capacity of mass movements to effect radical social change." *Ibid.*, p. 636. n. 35.



## APPENDIX

### THE LAND REFORM CAMPAIGN, MANCHURIA, 1946-47

Zhou Libo and fellow government workers from the city of Harbin in Northeast China temporarily left their urban posts during the winter of 1946-47 to join work teams in the countryside to help lead the land reform movement that had begun on a big scale in the area after the departure of the Japanese. Zhou was active for about six months in the campaign in a district of Shangzhi county in Heilongjiang province. Upon returning to Harbin, he drew upon his experiences “to describe how our Party, for more than twenty years, had been leading the people in the great and bitter struggle against imperialism and feudalism, and to depict the peasants’ happiness and sorrows during this period, so as to educate and inspire the revolutionary masses as a whole.” The resulting work, *The Hurricane*, is fiction, but the characters and events Zhou writes about are modeled on real persons and based on real episodes.

The story begins in July 1946 with the arrival of a land reform work team in the village of Yuanmao, east of Harbin. The Red Army’s exploits were already well known to the villagers; nevertheless, since the Communist forces had moved southward to engage Jiang Jieshi’s Guomindang forces, people in Yuanmao could only guess whose rule would finally prevail locally. Yuanmao’s biggest landlord, the fifty-year-old Han Fengqi (known behind his back as Han Number Six or Han Big Stick because of the imposing stick he always carried and often used to strike menacing blows), was also the person who most dominated the village. After the Japanese surrender, Han had been appointed administrative head of Yuanmao by the commander of Jiang Jieshi’s Central Vanguard, and in that capacity, Han had proceeded to set up a military unit. Before a month had passed, however, the 359th Brigade of the Communist Eighth Route Army had driven the Central Vanguard from the area. Han, therefore, had been reduced to waiting out the storm on the optimistic supposition that “a pack of poor men” could not last long. The arrival of the land reform work team caused a redistribution of power in the village and the ensuing bitter struggle against Han became a plausible means for consolidating Communist organization and policy in the locality.

The selections from *The Hurricane* excerpted here are interesting on several counts. They show how the landlord Han has been wielding his power in the village with the assistance, sometimes overt and sometimes clandestine, of different kinds of supporters. Within his family Han enjoys the backing of his older brother—a Guomindang agent, his younger brother—a bandit leader, and his nephew—Long-neck Han. Outside the family he is able to call upon subervient tenants and hirelings such as Li Zhenjiang and White Goatee. The tactics the coterie adopts to divert and defuse the movement are clever, though ultimately unsuccessful. Other privileged individuals in the village harbor grievances against Han, the other landlords, and the old government, but at the same time they wonder whether, once the case against Han is disposed of, the wrath of the CCP might turn in their direction next. The dilemmas of people in this category are highlighted by Li Deshan, a well-to-do middle peasant who calculatingly thrusts himself into cooperation with the Communists’ land reform work, but never succeeds in convincing the Party activists of his sincerity.

The Party activists include “professionals” like Xiao Xiang, an experienced organizer raised in rural China but still an outsider in the village of Yuanmao. Xiao chooses to take the role of the instigator but not the manager of the local

movement, and when novel situations involving an important decision arise, he communicates with the county government by telephone. Resident leaders of the local Peasant's Association, such as Zhao Yulin and Guo Quanhai, display obvious amateurishness in their new roles as leaders. Liu Sheng, a "petty bourgeois intellectual" who had come from Harbin to join the land reform work team, is clearly the author's autobiographical reflection and, consequently, one of the most interesting characters in the story. Finally, at the mass level there are such personalities as the peasants Old Tian and Bai Yushan and blacksmith Big Li. All are plagued with doubts (can they stand up against the authority they have known all their lives?); fears (will there be retribution if they fail?); and administrative difficulties (how can Han's mare be given to a poor peasant who lacks the wherewithal to feed and care for it?). Unsure of how the movement will develop in the future, and of whether Guomindang forces will retake the area and exact revenge upon the Communists, they need to be coaxed into activism; according to the popular saying: "exposed rafters are the first to rot."

The story brings out more than just Han's cruelty and arbitrariness. It also reveals Han's collaboration, in the years after 1937, with the Japanese occupation authority, and his privileged access to the local law court (where Bai Yushan had lodged a complaint against him) during the period before the Guomindang forces had been driven from the region. As for the CCP, the author successfully shows the intimidating political effect of their organized and public displays of force (including the execution of Han by the people's tribunal) involving the active, if hesitant, participation of poor and middle peasants and others at the bottom of the village class ladder.

Details of many episodes in *The Hurricane*, of course, are peculiar to the setting of the novel in a rural Manchurian village in the late 1940s. More general characteristics of this early land reform campaign, however—such as the importance of mass activists, the ambivalence of the middle peasants, and the closeness of links between village politics and higher levels of government—have continued to be typical of subsequent campaigns. By imparting a feeling for the emotions and sensitivities of the various participants in the struggle in Yuanmao, Zhou's novel can help us to comprehend the roles people actually play when confronted with a *yundong* and give us the flavor of a *yundong* in progress at the basic level.

Selections from Chou Li-po, *The Hurricane*, trans. Hsu Meng-hsiung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), pt. I, chaps. 8, 12, and 17.

PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS  
(Original Romanization Changed to *Pinyin*)

TEAM LEADER XIAO (Xiao Xiang)—leader of the land reform work team

LITTLE WANG —members of the land reform work team

LIU SHENG

WAN (Wan Jian)—Team Leader Xiao's orderly

HAN or HAN NUMBER SIX (Han Fengqi)—big landlord in Yuanmao and object of the first struggle campaign

GOODMAN DU (Du Shanfa)—Other big landlords in Yuanmao

SNATCHER TANG (Tang Tian)

LONG-NECK HAN (Han Shicai)—Han's nephew and hireling

HAN NUMBER SEVEN—Han's younger brother, a bandit chief

HAN NUMBER FIVE—Han's elder brother, a Guomindang agent

LI ZHENJIANG—Han's tenant and hireling

WHITE GOATEE—Han's hireling

LI QINGSHAN—Han's bodyguard

LIU DESHAN—a well-to-do peasant

OLD SUN—a carter

ZHAO (Zhao Yulin)—a poor peasant, chairman of the Peasants' Association

MRS. ZHAO—Zhao's wife

OLD TIAN (Tian Wanshun)—Han's tenant, officer of the Peasants' Association

GUO (Guo Quanhai)—a farmhand, vice-chairman and later chairman of the Peasants' Association

BAI (Bai Yushan)—a poor peasant, head of the village militia

MRS. TIAN—Old Tian's blind wife

MRS. BAI—Bai's wife

BIG LI (Li Changyou)—a blacksmith, officer of the Peasants' Association

HUA (Hua Yongxi)—an old bachelor

MRS. ZHANG—a widow who later marries Hua

WU (Wu Jiafu)—a little swineherd, forced to tend Han's pigs and severely beaten by Han

OLD CHU (Chu Fulin)—a farmhand, officer of the Peasants' Association

ZHANG JINGXIANG—a landless peasant, officer of the Peasants' Association who later joins the army

. . . . .

These days, all the villagers in Yuanmao were in the grip of a strange sensation. Behind windowpanes, through cracks of paper windows, and maize and gaoliang plants, under willows, behind gourd trellises, on carts, they were eyeing the land reform workers curiously, wondering what would happen in the

village after their arrival. They adopted different attitudes towards the new order of things, according to their individual social status, property and disposition. Some people were happy, some worried, some suspicious, some inwardly anxious but outwardly jovial. But none were unconcerned or could keep aloof.

Scarcely had the sun risen above the flaming horizon and wisps of greyish smoke begun curling up from the kitchens of the four hundred households of the village, when rumours started flying about from one end of the village to the other, like big black crows flapping their wings, hovering over housetops and croaking:

"The team leader drank wine with Han Number Six last night."

"Who told you?"

"Li Zhenjiang saw them with his own eyes. He heard Team Leader Xiao say: 'We're strangers here, so we need your help.' and Han answered: 'Certainly, I'm at your service.'"

"Where was the shooting last night?"

"Yes, bang! eleven shots! I thought it was bandits raiding again."

"There, you see! I heard it was Han's younger brother, Han Number Seven, coming back from Daqing Mountain to rescue him."

"I heard too that Han Number Seven fired a round at the work team and shouted: 'Let my brother go!' When they didn't answer, he fired a second round. Soon Han Number Six himself appeared at the door waving his hand at his brother, saying: 'Don't fire! Team Leader Xiao and I have agreed to co-operate from now on. All's well, so you'd better go home! Then Han Number Seven apologized to Team Leader Xiao, saying: 'I'm sorry for this mistake,' and rode back to the mountain the same night."

Rumours multiplied and became more sensational as they passed from mouth to mouth. Some even said: "Team Leader Xiao and Han Number Six have kowtowed to each other and become sworn brothers." Others said: "Han is organizing a grand reception again, this time in honour of the work team."

After breakfast, Old Sun started sounding the brass gong again from one end of the village to the other and crying at the top of his voice:

"Come to the mass meeting at the schoolhouse! A meeting to accuse Han Number Six."

Zhao Yulin was among the first to arrive. He stepped into the classroom, slung the rifle off his shoulder, and leaned it against the wall.

Liu Sheng buttonholed Zhao to help set the stage for the accusation meeting. In the middle of the playground they rigged up a temporary platform out of six desks and twelve planks. On the trunks of two poplars by the platform they stuck up two slogans on white paper that Liu Sheng had written. One slogan read: "Peasants of Yuanmao Meet to Settle Scores!" The other: "Down with the Local Despot and Landlord Han Fengqi!"

Villagers began to stream in, all in straw hats, some stripped to the waist. Some stopped before the platform to watch Liu Sheng setting a desk and a few chairs in place. A big crowd clustered around a man who was telling a story about a bear pulling up maize: "He plucked two corn-cobs and stuck them under his left armpit. When he put out his paws to pick another two, the two he already had dropped to the ground. So he kept getting two corn-cobs and losing them at the same time. After a whole evening's work, he plodded off with two corn-cobs stuck under his armpit, no more and no less." The listeners were greatly amused. The story-teller, of course, was Old Sun.

There was Old Tian in a tattered straw hat, squatting beside a wall, apparently avoiding conversation with anybody. A group of children was perched

on the window-sills outside the classroom, peering through the glass panes at Han.

Nobody made any reference to the struggle against Han, but they were all in suspense, waiting eagerly for the meeting to come to order.

Han's family members, his kith and kin, grown-ups and children, sworn brothers and small-fry gangsters had come in force and filtered into the crowd. Though they said nothing, everybody knew and feared them, and in their presence the villagers did their best to hide their interest in this meeting. Li Zhenjiang squatted down beside Old Tian and engaged him in conversation.

"How about your beans?" he asked.

"Finished. The weeds are taller than the plants. The field is still under water," the old man answered dejectedly.

"And the maize?"

"Worse!" As he answered, he demonstrated with his hand. "The plants are no taller than this. A sow can eat them without lifting her forelegs." He was on the point of saying: "My land was ruined by the bandits," but he stopped short, remembering Li Zhenjiang was Han's henchman, and a relative of Han's bodyguard Li Qingshan, who was an agent of the bandits. So he swallowed his remark and heaved a sigh.

"Never mind, Old Tian," said Li Zhenjiang softly, with a quick glance round. "Don't you worry. Mr. Han says he won't ask you for any rent this year, and if you're short of grain now, you can go to his house for a few pecks. It's all right." Having said this he got up and disappeared into the crowd, where he tried to win sympathizers for the landlord.

Long-neck Han was moving about too, whispering to this man and patting that man on the shoulder, a crafty smile on his face.

Liu Sheng mounted the platform with a leap, and the gathering drew closer below. All turned and looked at the doorway through which Zhao was bringing out Han, who was not bound. He told him to go onto the platform. Team Leader Xiao had followed him out. He glanced around and sensed the lukewarm atmosphere. As he walked through the crowd he noticed Li Zhenjiang scurrying about, and told Wan to give him a warning. "If he goes on sneaking around, chuck him out."

Seeing Team Leader Xiao, Long-neck Han quickly hid himself in the thick of the crowd and kept quiet. The team leader saw him but did not know who he was. The villagers all knew him to be Han's lackey, but dared not inform against him.

Once on the platform, Han took in the situation. Down there in the arena were his family, relatives and friends. His nephew Long-neck Han and Li Zhenjiang were there too. The muscles in his ashy face contracted into a faint smile. He took out a packet of cigarettes, offered one to Liu Sheng and, after it was refused, lighted and smoked it himself. As he puffed, he deliberately sought conversation with Liu. When the latter sat down to rest his legs, Han sat down immediately in another chair beside him. He continued to emit ring after ring of bluish smoke, looking quite unruffled.

The crowd rippled with whispers.

"See! He's sitting side by side with the land reform worker!"

"Then it must be true that Team Leader Xiao clinked glasses with him last night." Seven or eight hundred people had come, but now some of them started leaving. Team Leader Xiao told Wan to go up and tell Liu Sheng not to sit together with Han, but to declare the meeting open at once. Liu Sheng stepped to the front of the platform and announced:

"Han Number Six is Public Enemy Number One of Yuanmao. Our work

team has heard many villagers accuse Han of oppressing and exploiting the people. So last night he was brought here, and now we shall reason with him, and settle accounts with him." After these brief remarks, he concluded: "Those of you who have been wronged can take revenge, those of you with grievances can speak out. Don't be afraid."

Li Zhenjiang spoke up from the crowd:

"That's right, don't be afraid!"

However, everybody kept silent. Little Wang looked at Zhao as much as to say: "Why don't you fire the first shot?"

Zhao pushed his way to the front. The sight of Han sitting there completely at his ease made him angry. He unbuttoned his green jacket, because the idea of speaking in public had made him break into a sweat. He pointed a finger at Han and boomed:

"You traitor!" You oppressed us more cruelly than the Japanese devils. In 1937, backed by that Japanese bastard Morita Taro, you conscripted me for forced labour before my turn. When I got back, my land had gone to seed, my daughter had died, and my wife and little boy had gone begging. The crop had failed, yet you insisted upon my paying you the rent. When I said I had nothing to give, you made me kneel on crocks till my blood spilled over the ground. Do you remember that? Folks!" He turned to the meeting: "Shall I get even with him, this old traitor?"

"Go ahead," responded several dozen men, among whom were a dozen youngsters. Standing near the platform, they could see the scars on Zhao's knees; they felt sorry for him and indignant. Mixed with the response was the hoarse voice of Old Tian.

"I've finished," said Zhao. "Those who have grievances, speak up!"

There was a stir. Han's coterie were eyeing and marking their neighbours, but no one paid any attention to them.

"Who else wants to speak?" asked Liu from the platform.

After a few men had accused the landlord, a young fellow stepped forward from the right corner. He was wearing a tattered straw hat and a vest which had been patched and repatched with rags of every colour and shape—red, grey, blue and checkered, till you could hardly tell what cloth the original vest was made of. This young man in the colourful vest stepped forward and said:

"Han, you relied on Japanese backing to have us poor folks savagely beaten. You were crueller than the Japanese devils! In 1938 you hired me as a farmhand. At the end of the year I asked for my wages, but you refused to pay me. When I asked why, you said, 'Because that's what I choose!' And the next day you told the Japanese clerk Miya to conscript me for forced labour. Now what have you got to say?"

"Down with big landlords! Down with traitors!" shouted Little Wang. These slogans were echoed by many, and a ripple of excitement ran through the crowd. Some cried: "Give him a trashing!" However, the platform was high and no one went up. Han had been sitting there with his legs crossed, cigarette in mouth, and motionless. Because he had been many hours without opium he kept giving great yawns. Now Zhao's indictment supported by Little Wang's slogans made him turn pale. He fidgeted and dared not remain seated, growing more and more restless.

A man with a white beard, standing beside Long-neck Han, rolled up his sleeves and elbowed his way to the front, muttering:

"I should like a hearing too."

All eyes were turned on him. This was White Goatee, who had thrown a monkey wrench into the proceedings of the last mass meeting. Now he too

pointed an accusing finger at Han and declared:

"During the puppet Manzhouguo time you lorded it over us. In 1938 I tethered a mare in your stable, and she kicked up a rumpus with a stallion of yours. Then you rushed out and, without finding out which was in the right, just laid into my mare with your whip. 'It was your horse that started,' I said. 'You're whipping the wrong horse.' You said: 'Your mare had no business in my stable. Rape your mother!' Now I ask you, why should you want to rape my mother? How would you like it if I said: 'I'll rape your mother'?"

"You're welcome," answered Han, whose mother had died ten years before. The crowd laughed, and this lessened the tension between the two opposing camps, for many people relaxed. A little colour came back to Han's face and he started smoking again. White Goatee went on:

"I ask you, Han, you've offended so many people, what are you going to do about it?"

"I'll do whatever you all say," answered Han, puffing away at his cigarette.

"Say yourself," White Goatee prompted, pretending to be indignant.

"If you ask me, my younger brother is to blame for what my neighbours have been referring to. But if I know I've done a wrong, I'll certainly put it right."

"Where is your younger brother then?" asked White Goatee, to divert the villagers' attention from Han.

"He's up in Daqing Mountain. If you good folk can get him back you'll be ridding our family too of a great menace. You can beat him, or shoot him, or send him to jail just as you please. I shall be only too grateful."

"Don't just talk about that bandit brother of yours. Let's hear more about yourself," shouted Zhao.

"What have I done wrong?" Point out my mistakes, if any, and I'll take punishment. I've a few *mou* of land more than most, but even before the work team arrived I'd thought of offering it to you all."

"How many *mou* are you willing to offer us?" White Goatee prompted.

"By the sweat of their brow my ancestors accumulated about seven hundred *mou* of land. I'm willing to part with five hundred *mou*. That is, if you good folks allow me to keep the remaining two hundred *mou*, considering that I've ten mouths to feed. We belong to the same village. I'm sure you don't want my family to starve to death."

Seeing that the once ferocious landlord had offered his land voluntarily, the villagers were in a melting mood. The weather was fine, and they had a lot to do in the fields. Han's family and sympathizers seized this psychological moment to come to his defense. They started speaking up for him among the crowd.

"Yes, the trouble with him is he has a few *mou* too many. Otherwise he's all right," said one of his sworn brothers.

"It was just chance that made him act as village head during the puppet regime; you can't blame him for that," another sympathizer observed.

"He's promised to behave better in future, so why not let it go at that?" another moralized.

"Five hundred *mou* to be distributed—that's good, but what about his horses? He has a lot; let him part with a few."

Hearing this, Han promptly offered:

"Very well then, I'll surrender five of them."

"See, he's even offering livestock!" exclaimed one of his relatives.

"The villagers haven't enough clothing, and you've plenty; why don't you offer some clothes as well, to round things off?" White Goatee suggested.

"All right, what you say goes. I'll give my blue silk cotton-padded coat, a pair

of blue cloth trousers, and my wife's blue gown."

"Team Leader," White Goatee went up to Xiao, clasping his hands in salute. "Han has offered land, horses, and clothes; it can't be easy for him. Won't you release him and leave him to us? If he does anything wrong again, you can easily bring him to book any time. What do you say, Team Leader?"

Team Leader Xiao said nothing. White Goatee had made his character sufficiently known to him. Some poor men began to leave the meeting, dissatisfied. Some saw through Han's tricks, but dared not call his bluff. Other honest souls were taken in by his offer of land, horses and clothes, and were ready to forgive him. Old Sun had gone. Old Tian was still sitting beside the wall, his head bent, silent. Liu Deshan, the middle peasant, edged up to Long-neck Han and said with a grin:

"Yes, who can deny it was just chance that made Han become village head? We know he was smart even under the puppet regime."

Zhao went up to Little Wang and said: "My hands are itching to get at him!"

"Him—who?" asked Little Wang.

"That old fool, White Goatee. He's Han's sworn brother."

Zhao said no more but walked off and squatted against the wall, standing the rifle between his knees.

It was already noon. Team Leader Xiao said to Wan: "Go up and tell Liu Sheng to close the meeting first, and then consider the next step to be taken." And he ordered Han released.

Han got off the platform and stalked out with his wife, concubine and the whole gang in tow. Little Wang was furious and protested to Team Leader Xiao, his neck swelling with indignation:

"Why must you let him go?"

"Well, I couldn't help it, could I?" Xiao answered. Seeing how angry his assistant was, he meant to explain it to him in detail, but just then he saw Old Tian making off, and hurried over to talk with him for a while. As the old man was leaving, the team leader said:

"I'll pay you a visit later."

After people had left, the playground looked forlorn with just an empty platform in the middle.

Later that afternoon Li Qingshan brought to the schoolhouse five horses and three pieces of clothing, and said:

"The five hundred *mou* of land offered by Han all lie outside the South and West Gates—they may be divided up and made over at any time."

The next morning Team Leader Xiao called to see Old Tian, but found him out. He saw a blind old woman sitting on the *kang*,\* who told him that her old man had gone to the fields. He came back to the schoolhouse and found Liu Sheng and Zhao discussing how to distribute Han's horses and clothes. After much deliberation, the animals and clothes were sent to a few of the most needy families, but very soon they were all sent back. Old Sun and three neighbours also declined a mare.

"Why don't you want it? Don't you dare to take it?" Team Leader Xiao asked him.

"Of course I dare," lied the old carter. "But with a mare, I should have to scythe the grass and get up and feed her in the night. I'm too old to do all that. Besides, my legs are bad; I couldn't look after her."

The horses and clothes were left in the schoolhouse. Somebody suggested

---

\*A built-in, raised platform that can be heated in the winter; used for sitting and sleeping.



that they should be kept for the time being, but Xiao said:

"What for? No, we'll send them back to Han."

When Zhao had gone home, Liu Sheng immediately started to roll up his bedding, wrapping it in a Japanese army blanket and taking a rope to tie it with.

"What are you doing?" asked Xiao.

"I'm quitting," he answered curtly, continuing to fumble with his bedding. He put a finger inside his glasses to wipe off—a bead of sweat or a tear?

"Where are you going to?"

"Back to Harbin. The thing has flopped again and again—it's more than I can stand. Why should I stay here to be frustrated? I didn't come to be frustrated, I came to do mass work."

Xiao burst out laughing.

"What will you do in Harbin? If we can't do our work well in the country, how can we hold Harbin? If we can't hold the city, where will you go?"

"Farther eastward and still farther till I get to the east bank of the River Wusuli [Ussuri]."

"You've got it all worked out quite smoothly," Team Leader Xiao answered. He would have liked to say: "You certainly know how to look out for yourself," but he was afraid of hurting Liu's feelings too much. He had met a good many petty-bourgeois intellectuals like Liu Sheng who had joined the revolution. They often had the best intentions but could easily get impulsive and pessimistic. They could win victories but did not know how to take reverses. If anything did not go smoothly, they would be upset and depressed and develop a wrong tendency. He, therefore, advised Liu Sheng in a serious and yet mild tone:

"No, Comrade. Your plan is entirely ill-considered. If you alone leave here to go to a safe place, do you mean you wouldn't care any more whether people here should fall into the clutches of Jiang Jieshi and the U.S. imperialists, who would usher in another puppet regime? In mass work, just as in any other revolutionary work, the secret of success lies in the ability to stick it out and to wait. The masses aren't like so many wisps of dry straw—put a match to it and you can start a fire. How many days have we been here? A mere four days and nights. But the peasantry has been ground down and deceived by the landlords for thousands of years—for thousands of years, mind you!" Xiao stopped short. He had a little weakness—he could easily be excited by his own words. Now his voice was rather choked. He hurried to change the subject.

"Well, think it over carefully. If you must go back to Harbin, we can't keep you here. In Harbin, unless you don't go in for any work, you'll still come across difficulties. Where there's work, there's difficulty. What's revolutionary work but a ceaseless overcoming of difficulties?"

Liu Sheng said nothing, but he did not go on with his packing.

Xiao suddenly realized that Little Wang was missing, and went out in search of him. Little Wang had slipped out, and sat down outside a shack to the east of the schoolhouse, leaning against a wheat rick. He was burning with anger against the masses, against White Goatee, against his leader too.

"Why he should have let go of Han is more than I can understand! He isn't going by the May Fourth Directives of the Party. Is he compromising with the landlords?" When he saw Team Leader Xiao coming, he quickly turned his head and looked the other way. "What are you doing here?" Team Leader Xiao sat down beside him.

"Team Leader!" Little Wang addressed Xiao by his official title instead of calling him "Old Xiao" or "Comrade Xiao" as usual. "What I don't understand

is why you let the man go free."

"Afraid of him," Xiao chuckled.

"The way we manage things here, we're not only afraid of him, we're surrendering to him altogether," Little Wang fumed. "If you're going to go on this way, I'm leaving tomorrow."

"Tomorrow? Why not today? Liu Sheng's leaving today—why don't you go with him?" Team Leader Xiao began jokingly, then stood up and continued in a serious tone: "I could easily have kept Han in custody—or even put a bullet through him. But the point is—have the masses risen? They must act of their own accord. If we can't work patiently on the masses so that they take their destiny into their own hands and level the feudalistic strongholds to the ground, we can't overthrow feudalism. We can kill one landlord Han, but there are other landlords."

"You let him go. Are you sure he won't escape?" Little Wang asked, looking up at Team Leader Xiao.

"I think not, he's very pleased with himself. He hopes that we'll leave. Even if he were to run away, we could get him back sooner or later. Once the people are really aroused, no matter if he were a spirit riding on wind and fire, he couldn't slip through the net spread by the people."

Little Wang was satisfied with Team Leader Xiao's words, which clearly reflected his confidence in victory. At once his annoyance with Xiao vanished. He got to his feet and sauntered out with his leader along the road, skirting a willow grove. Team Leader Xiao asked him:

"At the meeting today, did you notice a young man who spoke—he wore a vest patched in many different colours?"

"Zhao Yulin told me his name is Guo Quanhai, who used to work in Han's house. He's working as hired hand now for Li Zhenjiang."

"Well, he strikes me as a proper peasant. Suppose you go and have a chat with him tomorrow."

When they got back to the schoolhouse, supper was ready.

After supper, the Party branch of the work team held a meeting at which the erroneous ideas of Liu Sheng and Little Wang received severe criticism

In early autumn the wheat was ripening, dotting the far-stretching green fields with yellowish patches. In the pool on the east side of the village, the small yellow flowers of the water chestnut, lurking amid green reeds, looked from the distance like a sheet of gold. The southern hills beyond appeared like clouds of vapour hanging above the blue horizon. Swallows were catching insects, twittering and circling in the air. Some perched under the eaves and began preening their feathers. Lately there had been plenty of rain, and the vegetable patches needed no more watering. The sky had not cleared up completely yet, a few black or white clouds were still floating there. At noon, under the fiery rays of the sun, horses were snuffling from the heat, and dogs lolling their tongues. At night, the wind swept over the gaoliang and maize stalks and set the leaves shivering and rustling. The clouds gathered and blackened the sky and in another moment broke into a downpour, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The intermittent rain during the days past had turned the road into so many sloppy puddles and muddy pools, and the pedestrians, all barefoot, skirted the edge of the road.

Another struggle with Han was in the offing, a second mass meeting was to be called soon. Zhao, Guo, Bai, and Big Li were working day and night, mobilizing poor men for the struggle. The membership of the Peasants' Association had increased from about thirty people to over sixty. Liu Deshan also went out

on rainy days to contact poor villagers, and never missed an opportunity to report his results to Team Leader Xiao. Big Li did not think much of this man, who was evidently hawking his merits rather than putting his heart into the work. One day, on his way home from another visit to the work team, Liu ran into Long-neck Han. Since it was too late to avoid him, Liu greeted him with a smile. The lackey of the landlord asked him sneeringly:

"I hear you're an official now. What's the rank?"

"Oh, you know circumstances forced me to do it. I couldn't get out of it." Liu gave an embarrassed smile.

"They say another mass meeting will take place soon. Who's the target this time?" demanded Long-neck.

"I've no idea. I'm in charge of production matters only." Liu hated the Han family too, but dared not offend them openly. Neither would he help Long-neck with information. He knew quite well the struggle was against Han, but he would not say so, and after mumbling a few words made off.

Team Leader Xiao had had several intimate talks with Old Tian, who had told him how Han had seized his three rooms. Xiao had tried to encourage Tian to struggle against the landlord.

"I fear he's unbeatable," answered the simple, honest old man.

"If you don't retreat, we'll all see you through," Zhao told him.

"All right," the old man had agreed, half-heartedly.

The land reform workers and the activists met to discuss in private the coming mass meeting, and decided to make the case of Old Tian's daughter the chief indictment against Han. They agreed to arrest Han before the trial, and they did. This time he was not put in the school, but in a small shack, the window of which was sealed with a wire net. The work team assigned two guards with rifles, and Bai posted two men from the Peasants' Association with spears, who stood watch in turn.

The next day, after breakfast, the different groups of the Peasants' Association went out to call villagers to the mass meeting at the school. Zhao stood at the entrance to the schoolhouse, shouldering a rifle, barring the way to Han's relatives and supporters. Bai walked about on the alert, holding a spear in his right hand. Guo brought out a large table from the classroom and placed it in the middle of the playground. Seeing the table, Old Sun commented: "This is the 'people's tribunal!'"

The villagers straggled in in threes and fours. They formed a semi-circle before the table, some speaking in low voices, some looking continually towards the entrance. On a pillar and a wall of the school were posted slogans: "Down with Han Fengqi," "Poor Men, Arise!" "Landlords Owe Us Blood Debts," "Share Out Land and Houses and Claim Back Rents," "Settle Accounts with the Local Despot and Landlord—Han Fengqi."

As the militiamen walked Han onto the playground, Liu Sheng shouted the slogans and all the peasants shouted with him. By the time Han was standing beside the "people's tribunal," murmured comments ran through the crowd.

"This time, he'll be put in gaol."

"Look! His hands are tied."

"Is he going to die—or live? What do you say?"

"That depends on what his crimes are."

Some people were not particularly enthusiastic about the struggle, not because they were Han's relatives or sworn brothers, but because they owned land themselves and had had dealings with the Japanese. They were afraid that after Han had been dealt with it would be their turn. Others thought that Han's

son, who was with the Guomindang army, might one day stage a comeback and take reprisals. Still others thought Han deserved a trial, but did not intend to speak against him themselves. After all, exposed rafters are the first to rot. They decided to wait and see which way the wind blew. These three kinds of people kept silent.

Some of Han's agents were there, imagining people didn't know who they were. They acted like the keenest of the keen, shouting louder than anyone else.

Guo presided over the meeting. Little Wang and Liu Sheng were standing by the table. Team Leader Xiao, as usual, watched the proceedings from a distance, walking up and down where the crowd was thinnest.

Han stood beside the table, hanging his head. He was paler than last time. A number of children had swarmed round him to look curiously at the rope round his waist. One of the bolder children asked him to his face, "Mr. Han, why haven't you brought your big stick today?"

Stepping in front of the table, Guo did not know what to do with his hands—he put them on his hips, let them hang limp at his sides, then folded his arms. With a flushed face, he looked at the gathering of about one thousand men before him and saw nothing but a black sea of faces! Some were jeering at him, he thought. Now his wits had left him and, with them, his speech, which he had spent the whole morning preparing. Finally he said:

"Neighbours, we'll start our meeting." That was the first sentence of his speech, but he ended there, clean forgetting the rest of it. The villagers were holding their breath and waiting for him to go on. He simply had to improvise:

"You know me well—I've been a farmhand since I was a child. I can tend pigs and horses and till the soil, but I can't make a speech. I'm only good as a labourer. But our Peasants' Association is democratic; we can all speak out. Today we're fighting Han. He's our common enemy. We must speak out so that all wrongs be righted and all accounts settled. No need to be afraid. That's all."

Han raised his head. He could not see the landlords Goodman Du and Snatcher Tang, or any of his friends and relatives, and he felt more panic-stricken than before. Long-neck Han and Li Zhenjiang were there, but they dared not move or speak. The landlord decided to be meek, ready to agree to all their demands they might make. He must save his skin. So he stepped up to the table and addressed Guo meekly:

"Chairman Guo, may I say a few words first?"

"Don't let him speak!" interposed an angry voice from the crowd—Big Li.

"There's no harm letting him speak," said someone else.

"The Eighth Route Army is strong on democracy. How can you stop a fellow speaking?" The man who said this ducked behind the crowd as soon as he had spoken.

Guo rules: "All right, you speak." It was his first experience presiding at a meeting.

"I'm a bad egg," started Han, "a man with a feudal mentality. My mother died when I was a little boy. My father remarried and my stepmother beat me every other day."

"Stop this nonsense!" someone cursed.

"Don't let him drivel."

"As I was saying," Han went on. Guo stepped forward to stop him, but in vain. The chairman was not sure whether he had the right to beat him.

"As I was saying, my stepmother made it impossible for me to live in peace at home. So I ran away, and unfortunately fell among bad company. At eleven I went in for gambling. At sixteen I picked up women in the street."

"How many women have you slept with?" asked White Goatee who had

saved Han twice before.

"More than a dozen," answered the landlord with a snigger.

Again, this had the effect of changing the tenor of the struggle. Somebody said: "He's owned up to all his faults, he's sure to reform." Somebody else echoed: "He's all right except for his land holdings. And now he's given them up." There was a movement towards the door, and though no one had left yet, there was a relaxed feeling. Furious, Guo hastily pointed an accusing finger at Han's nose, and, with a flushed face, shouted at him:

"Don't let us hear any more such nonsense! Now tell us about your dirty work as chief of the interim Guomindang village administration. And you kept private armed guards, didn't you?"

"That's true," admitted Han. He was all smiles, concealing his hatred for his former farmhand. "But then I was acting in the interest of the village, to maintain public order."

"Didn't you collect money from the villagers for the purchase of twenty-six rifles? What for?"

Han smiled again complacently.

"For the purpose of protecting the village."

Guo raised his voice, his face crimsoning with fury:

"But you only kept the armed guards in your gun towers. When the bandits arrived, you treated them to a meal in your house and supplied their horses with fodder. Do you call that protecting the village?"

"Chairman Guo, that isn't true. I hope you'll investigate the matter and do me justice." While putting on a bold face, Han was feeling nervous.

At this moment, there was a stir in the crowd. Big Li rolled up his sleeves and, with his brawny arms, pushed his way up to the front, with a hoary old man behind him. He announced:

"Old Tian wants to speak."

Standing by the "people's tribunal," Old Tian took off his tattered straw hat and looked with hatred and fear at his oppressor. He was trembling with rage, and sweat was breaking out on his wrinkled sunburned forehead.

"Comrades, I want to say something—I want to have my wrong redressed." He looked at Liu Sheng, Little Wang and Guo, and said:

"I hope you comrades will see that justice is done me."

"State your case to the whole community. They'll decide what's right," Little Wang answered.

Old Tian turned round to look at the crowd, then addressed Han:

"In 1939, I came to this village and worked fifty *mou* of land as your tenant. I, my wife and my daughter, we three had only one and a half rooms to live in, dilapidated and leaky rooms. On rainy days they were just a pool. At times you would say to me: 'I'm short of rooms, you had better move out.' I said: 'Mr. Han, where could I find a place outside?' You lost your temper and said: 'Go wherever you like. What the hell has that got to do with me?' I said: 'Mr. Han, I would like to rig up a little place of my own, but where could I find the ground?' You suddenly became a kind man and said: 'Ground is no matter. There's some space by the stable where you can build if you like. I won't ask you for any rent. With two or three rooms, your family will feel quite settled.' I went back and told my wife: 'Thank heaven, we've such a good landlord.' That winter I hauled logs from the hills, and went back and forth with an old ox and old cart. It was a bitter winter with a heavy snowfall, so cold that my nose and head ached and my feet felt like ice. One day, when I was going downhill with a cartload of pine logs, the ox slipped over a stone, and, with a crash, ox and cart toppled down

into the gully. The wind was howling terribly. What a time I had trying to pull them out! I finally managed it though, with ten or so carters who stopped to give me a hand. The old ox had one horn broken."

Somebody flung in:

"Old Tian, make your story short."

"Who's that?" Guo snapped. "Old Tian, never mind. You just carry on."

"Your elder brother, who was then in charge of a timber company, commanded all my logs and sent them over to the Japanese military for firewood—those logs I had sweated so hard all winter to get! My old woman cried all night. The next winter I went again to the hills and hauled down cartloads of logs, and I also laid in dried reeds, earth and nails. The third winter I slowly built up three rooms—all complete except for a *kang* and two window frames. We three moved into the east room, but the next day you put three horses and an ass in our west room. You said: 'The animals are sick—the open stable is no good for them. Let them stay here for a time.'

"It had taken me three winters to build the place, and you must have it for your horses. My wife went down on her knees with tears in her eyes, and kowtowed to you and your son to have mercy on us and not make a stable of our new rooms. Once the animals were in, how could we live there? But your son only kicked and cursed her: 'You bitch! You forget whose land it is. Go on crying, and I'll throw you out of here!'"

Old Tian paused for breath and wiped his tears with his gnarled and withered hands.

"Three years to build a home, and you turned it into a stable. Your beasts with their droppings made such a stench, all the air in the house was foul and drew flies and mosquitoes. In the night the mosquitoes droned and attacked us till we were swollen all over from their bites. I resigned myself to fate and didn't complain, but you didn't stop there. One day, you came to look at that brown mare of yours, and when you saw our girl you talked a lot of nonsense. She was only sixteen and you were forty-three. You asked her to marry you and she refused. You dragged her off to the haystack and tore off her clothes, and when she bit you, you flew into a rage. You walked off, saying: 'Just wait!' Presently you came back with three men and declared you were going to tear down the house to take back the land, unless we gave you the girl instead. You and your men went in and dragged her away . . ."

Old Tian started crying bitterly, and some of the villagers shouted: "Down with the wicked landlord!" "Down with the local despot Han!" The audience surged forward. Old Tian continued:

"The four of you dragged her to the backyard and tied her to the tobacco rack with a straw rope. When she screamed, you rammed a handkerchief into her mouth. Then you yanked off her clothes and whipped her naked body with a willow switch. Her blood was coursing down her body, and then . . . and then . . ." Old Tian could not go on—he cried aloud. The crowd surged nearer. People shouted: "Beat him! Beat him!" A brick came flying up from somewhere and landed quite close to Han. His face turned pale, and he stood there trembling, knee knocking against knee.

"Strip him first!" shouted somebody.

"Kill him!" added somebody else.

A man came up and slapped Han across the face. Blood gushed from his nose.

"Good! A good blow! Give him another!" shouted somebody else.

However, the sight of blood melted the hearts of many, especially women, and silence fell. Who had dealt the blow? Han looked up, saw it was Li Zhen-

jiang, and understood. He bent his head lower to let the blood flow in big drops so that everybody could see. Most of the peasants were nonplussed at first to see Li Zhenjiang beating Han; later they understood, but didn't know what to do. Old Tian had stepped back a little in surprise, but Guo urged him:

"Go on, Old Tian."

"I've nothing more to say," he answered. The honest but timid old fellow was bewildered, and withdrew behind the table. Li Zhenjiang took his place in front, and White Goatee edged up in support. Pointing a finger at Han, Li trumpeted:

"Old Tian has been settling accounts with you. Being your tenant too, I want to accuse you likewise. I gave you a slap just now. Did you deserve it or not?"

"I deserved it," Han answered. Some admired Li Zhenjiang for his courage. Some let out a few more curses. But the majority, including Old Tian, kept silent, and gradually stepped aside. Li Zhenjiang continued:

"That year, when you were village head, the Japanese military wanted a supply of broken bowls, and you went round collecting them. I had no broken bowls in my house, but you insisted that I should pick some from the garbage piles. You said if I didn't do so, you would impose a fine on me. Do you admit it?"

"Yes, Brother Li," Han answered. He looked better, and was waxing more fluent too. "I'm a big bad egg. I've done lots of bad things because of this bad puppet-style brain of mine. It made me like to bully people. Now we've a democratic government, and the policy is lenient, I beg you to pardon me and save my unworthy life. I'll make amends, work for the Peasants' Association, obey Team Leader Xiao and all committee members and walk with them on the revolutionary road. If I fail to do so, you can shoot me."

"Don't wander so far from the point," said Li Zhenjiang. "Just tell us what you're going to do to pay for all the bad things you've done. Do you choose to be beaten, to be fined, to give up your property, or to sit behind the bars? What do you want?"

"Is the choice mine?" asked Han, and tried his best to hide a grin of satisfaction. "I'll do what people say I should. Anyway, I've been tried three times. I admit my mistakes and I'll accept punishment."

"Fine him one hundred thousand dollars," White Goatee proposed.

"Divide his remaining five hundred *mou* of land," Li Zhenjiang added.

The villagers started talking at once. Some suggested that he should be thrown out of his house. Some wanted him to be put in prison. Some said that he should be set free after he had paid the fine and given up his land. Others had different ideas, and still others, completely dumb, strayed off, looking for a chance to quit. Liu Deshan took the lead and went as far as the exit, and when Zhao questioned him he said: "Last night a relation came to see me and I had a bit too much to drink with him. Now my head's aching. I must go home to rest." Some more villagers followed him out, mostly on the pretext that they didn't feel well, though some said they had work to do.

Old Sun remained behind, but he didn't say anything, just squatted in a corner at the back. He rose to his feet when Team Leader Xiao came up and asked him:

"Why didn't you speak up?"

"They took all the words out of my mouth," answered the carter.

"What do you think made Li Zhenjiang hit Han?"

Old Sun smiled knowingly and answered:

"Well, a criminal landlord must be beaten."

"Was he really beating him?"

"Hard to say. The two of them are hand in glove, and they've both read the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*.\* I should say that box on the ear was skillfully given by a Zhou Yu and gladly taken by a Huang Gai."

Team Leader Xiao stepped forward and spoke first to the land reform workers and then to Guo, Bai and Zhao. After some discussion, Guo stepped back to the table and announced:

"We shall break up now. It's a fine day, and you people probably have work in the fields. Before you leave, you may suggest what we should do with Han."

"Keep him in custody," answered many voices in chorus.

"Let him pay the hundred thousand dollars' fine, and have someone guarantee him. Nothing less will do," somebody added.

"Do the majority agree?" asked Guo.

"That's right. Let him pay and go home," many concurred. As a matter of fact, they were eager to go home now themselves.

Guo turned to Old Tian and asked him:

"Old Tian, what do you say?"

Old Tian hung his head and was silent for a time, then he said:

"I've nothing to say. I agree."

. . . . .

The news of Han's recapture stirred the whole village. During the last fortnight, in their small group meetings the villagers had shed their former fears and acquired a new political consciousness and courage to carry on the struggle. More and more activists were appearing—they were like torches kindling fires everywhere. Han's cruelty to the little swineherd was merely another small installment in a long series of crimes, but, now that the masses had been awakened, it was enough to ignite a great fire of hatred and revenge.

The flames were blazing higher and higher, up to the skies, burning down the feudalism which had obstructed China's progress for thousands of years, giving birth to a new society. The wrongs which the peasantry had suffered from generation to generation were the fuel for the fire.

On the evening of Han's recapture, the work team and the Peasants' Association called a meeting of activists in Zhao's vegetable garden, under the gourd trellis, to prepare for the mass meeting. The little white gourd blossoms amid the green leaves were particularly beautiful in the setting sun. Team Leader Xiao prompted the activists to give their own ideas as to how the struggle should be organized.

Everybody put in a word and soon a lively discussion was on. Sometimes several people, or even several groups, tried to make themselves heard at the same time. There was a regular din.

Zhao Yulin, who was presiding over the meeting, called out: "Don't all speak at the same time! Take your turn."

"Han must be bound tight," Bai suggested. "If he's let loose, the villagers may wonder what we're up to again."

"Old Sun, it's your turn now," said Zhao to the carter.

"All the bitches in the Han family should be tied up too, and let our women tackle them. One meeting for the men, and one for the women."

"That's no good," said Zhang Jingxiang. "If you divide the masses, there will

---

\*A fourteenth-century novel based on events which took place in the third century A.D. Zhou Yu of the Kingdom of Wu had Huang Gai, another Wu general, cruelly beaten, and then sent him to the enemy camp in order to deceive the enemy.



be confusion. Let's fight Han first. After the big trunk's felled, the twigs and branches are easy to deal with."

"You must post plenty of guards, Old Bai," warned Guo. "It's no joking matter. We mustn't allow any disorder. We'll get everybody ill-treated by Han to go up in turn, to state his case, settle accounts and pour out his bitterness. A space must be left in front of Han, so that people can step up and accuse him."

"The accusations should be short," said Big Li. "We don't want people to run on and on. That way there'd be no end. It would take weeks to describe everything Han's done."

"You must be more careful too this time, Old Li," warned Bai. "Don't let Han's running dogs in again."

Old Chu added: "If any running dogs come to the meeting tomorrow, truss them up on the spot. If you can't do it alone, we'll all lend a hand."

After a pause, Bai asked: "Can we beat him?"

"Did he ever beat you?" Zhao countered.

"I'll say he did!"

"Well, then, why not pay him back in his own coin!" Zhao grinned.

Thereupon Bai addressed the whole assembly:

"Tomorrow let's each bring a big stick to the meeting, to accuse Big Stick Han. Pay him back in kind."

After a word with Team Leader Xiao, Zhao announced:

"The meeting is adjourned. Tomorrow we'll hold the trial. Have your breakfast early, and be at the meeting in good time."

"Why wait until tomorrow!" asked Zhang. "Why not have the mass meeting tonight?"

"When we go back now, we'll call another meeting of the discussion groups, so that the villagers will be well prepared. Tomorrow we've got to get Han down," Zhao answered. He turned to Team Leader Xiao and asked: "Have you anything to say to us, Team Leader?"

"You've all made good suggestions," said Xiao. "Now we'll go back and think them over again. I wonder if you should elect a presidium for tomorrow? Can't think of anything else."

After the meeting, the activists went back and hastily called their small groups together. Some of them broke up when it was dark. All the peasants prepared sticks. Some of the meetings went on till midnight. Due to the fact that they were organized and had a core of reliable workers, after discussion and preparation the poor villagers were no longer afraid. The biggest change was in Old Sun, who headed one group. He no longer said that he did not want to be an activist, and had rallied around him not only old carters like himself but also poor youngsters. He was as garrulous as ever and made a speech to his small group, using many of the new political terms.

"We're all activists," he said, "and activists are brave fellows who forge ahead through difficulties and never back out. How could we lead the masses otherwise? You tell me, is that right or not?"

"Right!" his men responded together.

"Are we or are we not travelling the revolutionary road? If we are, and the revolution's just going to succeed, how can we still be afraid of wolves in front and tigers behind? What ideology is that?"

Under his influence, all the men in his group prepared to speak out in the fourth struggle against Han Number Six the next day.

The next morning was a bright, late autumn day. The sky was a limpid blue, the wind had dried the ground, and the wind-blown fields presented a motley of colours. The gaoliang was yellow. The red stalks of buckwheat were topped with

little white blossoms as if sprinkled with snow or frost. A few crimson tassels still hung from old plants of maize that had ripened late, but most of the tassels in the ears of corn had withered. The thick bean leaves looked like so many yellow blotches from the distance. Before the windows and under the eaves of the peasants' huts hung strings of red chillies, clusters of sloes, red turnips, and ripe corncobs. The cottage eaves were as colourful as the fields.

The peasants were doubly happy at the prospect of a good harvest and the overthrow of Han.

At the crack of dawn, the villagers streamed in groups to the Han mansion, swinging sticks in their hands. By the time it was really light, the courtyard was filled to overflowing. People sat on the wall, on top of the gatehouse, on maize stacks, on window sills and on the roofs.

Women and children were singing a newly composed song, set to a folk tune:

*The wrongs, the hate of a thousand years,  
Can be avenged, now the Party's here!  
Han Number Six! Han Number Six!  
The people are out for your blood!*

At first only the women and children sang, then youngsters joined in. Soon more voices had swelled the chorus, and even Old Sun was singing. Then the village band struck up! Old Chu was beating a big drum and other men were sounding gongs and striking cymbals.

"He's coming! He's coming!" When this cry went up, all eyes turned to the gateway. People longed to go out and see, but no one could move for the crowd.

Four militiamen had brought Han from the shack to the mass meeting. The streets on the way were lined with militiamen. There were sentries even in the turrets of his mansion. He was overawed by this display of the people's power. Children skipped behind the landlord, while a few ran on ahead to the Han mansion to proclaim:

"Here he comes! Here he comes!"

With a rifle slung across his shoulder, Bai was patrolling the road. He told the men in the turrets to watch the fields around lest Long-neck Han and Li Qingshan bring Han's younger brother and his bandits to his rescue.

Bai had had so much work and anxiety lately, he had lost a lot of weight. He had changed his lazy ways too, and was always on the run. On the night before the mass meeting he came home in the small hours. When he lay down on the *kang*, his wife woke up and, rubbing her eyes, asked him:

"Some steamed bread in the pot. Do you want some?"

"No, I don't want any," he answered. "Han's going to be tried tomorrow. You go too." He was unable to keep his eyes open.

"What should a woman go for?" she asked.

"Don't you want to avenge Little Gouzi's death?" he said, then began snoring.

"I daren't speak at a big meeting. I should dry up after a few words."

But no answer came from the other side of the *kang*. Mrs. Bai fell to recalling the tragic death of her baby boy again. At sunrise she wakened Bai, and left for the meeting place after him. She didn't want to miss the excitement. She found many women standing together by the wall. She joined Mrs. Zhao and Old Tian's blind wife, and began chatting with them.

When Han reached the platform in the middle of the courtyard, shouts went up on all sides. Zhao blew his whistle and cried:

"Order, please! No small meetings now! Take your places properly. Today is our struggle against the traitor-landlord, Han Fengqi. Now's time for us poor

men to speak out and take vengeance. You can come up one by one to settle scores."

A young man with a spear in one hand and a stout stick in the other ran up to Han. He glared at the landlord, then turned to face the people. It was Zhang Jingxiang.

"Han Number Six is my mortal enemy. In 1941, he refused to pay my wages after I'd worked as his farmhand for a year. Instead, he had me sent for forced labour. When I ran away, he put my mother in prison, and there she died. Today I want to avenge my mother's death. Can I beat him?"

"Go ahead!"

"Beat him to death!"

From all sides the shouts thundered. The peasants raised the sticks and spears in their hands, and surged forward. The militiamen held their spears horizontally to stop them, but the crowd burst through. Han took in the situation, and the moment Zhang lifted his stick, he collapsed to the ground. Zhao saw through his trick, and shouted:

"You fraud! You fell down before the stick had touched you."

A whole forest of sticks were raised. The situation was getting out of hand. Some blows fell on the wrong heads and backs. Old Sun's tattered felt hat was knocked off and trampled underfoot. When he was stretching out his hand for it, he caught a blow on the arm.

An old woman was hit on the leg, but she said nothing. The villagers were so filled with hatred for Han they felt no resentment over blows received by mistake. Zhao boomed:

"Drag him up. Let someone else accuse him!"

The big head with bald temples was hoisted up from the ground. A middle-aged woman in a patched and repatched blue jacket came up and, brandishing a stick over Han's head, accused him:

"You—you killed my boy!"

The stick fell on Han's shoulder, but when she wanted to strike again, she had no strength in her arm. She dropped the stick, threw herself upon him and bit his shoulder and arm, not knowing how to vent her hate. When she mentioned her son she started weeping. Other women, especially the older ones, cried in sympathy, for they knew her to be Mrs. Zhang, a widow. In 1939, her only son had married. A month later Han saw the bride was pretty, and started paying them daily visits. The young husband saw red, and one day he grabbed a kitchen knife to have it out with him. But the landlord took to his heels, declaring: "Fine! Just wait!" That same night, the son was sent off to a labour camp, where he was strangled to death by the Japanese military at Han's request. Han then forced the young widow to live with him, and when he tired of her sold her to a brothel.

In grief and anger Mrs. Zhang shouted:

"Give back my boy!"

She rushed forward, and the others surged after her. The women wanted their husbands and sons. The men wanted their fathers and brothers. Sobs mingled with curses. Little Wang wiped his eyes with the back of his band. From time to time Team Leader Xiao told Liu Sheng:

"Put it on record—another murder by him."

One accusation followed another. Towards evening, the record in Liu Sheng's notebook showed seventeen murders including Guo's father frozen to death, Zhao's daughter starved to death, Bai's baby boy hurled to death, and Old Tian's daughter flogged to death. Then there were forty-three women who had been raped or carried off only to be sold when Han and his son tired of them.

When these figures were announced, there was no preventing the people from taking their revenge. A forest of sticks waved in the air, and came down on Han.

"Beat him to death! Beat him to death!" somebody shouted.

"Don't let him live another day!" roared another angry voice.

"Let him pay with his life!"

"Tear him to pieces or I won't be avenged!" cried Old Tian's wife in a quavering voice.

Mrs. Bai wanted to help the old woman squeeze to the front to beat Han, but it was no use. They were knocked down by the crowd. The younger woman quickly scrambled to her feet, hoisted up the older one, and steered her out of harm's way.

The accusations went on. Han Fengqi—traitor, local despot and feudal landlord—was now known to have killed seventeen persons, while there were many others whom he had murdered secretly. He had taken men from every poor family for unpaid labour in his house. He charged such high rent, all his tenants—except for running dogs like Li Zhenjiang—found themselves ruined at the end of the year, and had to give him free labour, fodder and seeds, and make over their horses to him to make up the rent. He never paid his farmhands. They were lucky if they worked for him for a year and got three or four catties of pork at New Year. Any he took a dislike to, he got rid of by asking Morita Taro, the Japanese gendarme officer who lived in his house, to send to labour camps. And very few who went ever came back. He had made his poor neighbours sink a well, but forbade them to take water from it unless they worked for him. He had imprisoned people whose pigs had strayed into his vegetable gardens and trampled one blade of grass. His land holdings amounted to over ten thousand *mou*, of which he had inherited one thousand—all the rest had been acquired by foul means.

The villagers were not interested in such accusations, however. "We know all that," they said. "He's never done a good thing in his life, but he's had a hand in everything bad." Then they shouted: "We won't break up, we won't go home, we won't have supper tonight, unless he dies today!"

Team Leader Xiao got a telephone message through to the county government and asked for instructions. Meanwhile, Liu Sheng gave the villagers some further information: In 1935 Han had killed nine members of the Anti-Japanese Amalgamated Armies at Xiaoshanzi. After the Japanese surrender, he was made chief of staff of the reactionary Guomintang troops under the command of the gangster Bei Lai and concurrently Guomintang secretary general and interim administrative head for Yuanmao. He had set up an armed force to fight against the United Democratic Army and killed another of its men."

"Ten more lives," said Tian. "That makes twenty-seven men he has murdered!"

"Wipe out the Guomintang bandits!" Down with Jiang Jieshi and his gang!" Little Wang shouted, raising his right arm, and over a thousand voices shouted with him.

Team Leader Xiao came back, stood before the platform, and announced:

"The county government agrees with the people of Yuanmao that a murderer should forfeit his own life."

"Hooray for the democratic government!" shouted Hua Yongxi, a bachelor from Shandong Province. "Hooray for the Communist work team!" Men, women, and children shouted and clapped.

The noise was like thunder.

Zhao and Bai, carrying their rifles, pushed Han out towards the East Gate of the village. Guo and Big Li followed behind with over a thousand people at their heels. They were shouting slogans, singing songs, blowing trumpets, beating gongs and drums. Old Mrs. Tian, who had lost the sight of both eyes, hobbled along with Mrs. Bai supporting her.

"I've been hoping and crying these three long years for a day like this," sobbed the old woman. "Thanks to Chairman Mao Zedong and the Communist Party, my daughter has been avenged!"

After the tree of feudalism in the Han household was felled, more and more peasants took an active part in village affairs.

# Selected Annotated Bibliography

This bibliography gives only a selection of the most thoroughly researched and richly interpretive studies of Chinese mass movements. To preserve the intent of this list as an introductory guide, I have omitted several works that would deserve inclusion on their merits alone. Readers more in need of a research bibliography will find abundant citations in some of the works listed, especially in Charles Cell's dissertation. Here I provide only a sample of the literature on different kinds of movements in different periods. With only two exceptions, entries are limited to items widely available in nonspecialist libraries.

Baum, Richard and Frederick C. Teiwes. *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966*. China Research Monograph no. 2. Berkeley; University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1968.

A notable feature of this work is the authors' translations of six important intra-Party documents that the Chinese government has never made public. The documents range from a report on the early *Si qing* (Ssu ch'ing; Four Cleanups) campaign, given at a *xian*-level cadres meeting in February 1963, to Mao Zedong's own evaluation of the movement's progress as of January 1965. Collectively they manifest several problems facing the advocates of mobilizational politics in the period just before the Cultural Revolution, an analysis ably amplified in the authors' accompanying essay.

Bennett, Gordon and Ronald Montaperto. *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Siao-ai*. New York: Doubleday, 1971.

Dai's rich autobiography (and not simply pride of authorship) leads me to recommend this volume as the best available account of a Red Guard's feelings about his own participation in the early Cultural Revolution as well as the deep influence the Cultural Revolution had on him.

Cell, Charles P. "Making the Revolution Work: Mass Mobilization Campaigns in the People's Republic of China." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973.

Cell divides thirty-six campaigns into three categories (economic, struggle, and ideological), and compares them on the basis of three quantitative variables (mobilization, achievements, and shortcomings). Among his several conclusions, Cell finds that "economic" campaigns show the highest "achievement" level and the fewest "shortcomings," an outcome lending firm support to the second general hypothesis considered in this volume. The dissertation also includes useful appendixes and a lengthy bibliography.

Chen, Wen-hui C., chief contributor. *Wartime "Mass" Campaigns in Communist China: Official Country-wide "Mass Movements" in Professed Support of the Korean War*. Research Memorandum no. 43. Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Research and Development Command, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, 1955.

Almost every conclusion in this documentary analysis is contrary to what I argue in the present monograph. Its authors assert that in China the general functions of movements include such politically narrow and suicidal goals as "to curtail individual freedom" and "to keep the people busy and exhausted." This piece exemplifies the tone and content of research on *yundong* a generation ago, when study of Communist "control" and "the pro-

paganda machine" was yet unleavened with inquiry into the meaning of political participation for different categories of Chinese citizens.

Gardner, John. "The *Wu-fan* Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control." In *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, edited by A. Doak Barnett, pp. 477-539. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969.

By early 1952, when Party leaders were finally ready to do battle with the big capitalists in the coastal and southern cities, their chosen instrument was the Five Oppositions (*Wu fan*) campaign against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic secrets. Gardner concludes from his detailed account of this movement in the commercial metropolis of Shanghai that "the implementation of policy by means of mass mobilization is one of the most distinctive features of the Chinese Communist political process."

Hinton, William. *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

From 1947 to 1953, Hinton was privileged to be on the scene in a village in North China (initially as a tractor technician for the United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA, but also as an English teacher and instructor on mechanized agricultural techniques). His experience enables him to tell the story of the arrival of the CCP in the village of Longbow after the Japanese surrender with a level of detail unique in modern Chinese studies. Hinton faithfully reports on the full range of the problems the new Party cadres encountered—the tasks of consolidating Communist strength in the area and building a party organization; the pressure they were under to win support for the ongoing civil war against Jiang Jieshi; and the need to undertake limited economic reform and land redistribution. *Yundong* were applied to all these efforts, and Hinton records the particular responses of both Party members and Longbow villagers to the early campaign initiatives.

Horn, Joshua S. *Away With All Pests: An English Surgeon in People's China, 1954-1969*. New York: Modern Reader, 1971.

Campaigns addressing public health and medical problems are the focus of this British physician's interesting participant-observer account. Horn includes stories on the conquest of venereal disease; the destruction of schistosomiasis-carrying snails; the provision of health care service to rural areas where they had not been available before; and the successful research in such areas as laboratory synthesis of Bovine insulin, workable methods for reattaching severed limbs, and the manifold present-day applications for the ancient techniques of acupuncture.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. "The Suppression of Secret Societies in Post-Liberation Tientsin." *China Quarterly*, no. 54 (April-June 1973), pp. 242-266.

This fascinating research reveals the CCP's *yundong* approach to the task of muscling in on the quasi-religious, quasi-criminal societies (such as the Yi Guan Dao), which had formerly dominated much of the working force in China's big cities (particularly among the transport and dock workers). Lieberthal reports that when the new Communist administration in Tientsin [Tianjin] set up two "service stations" to compete with the powerful illicit societies, "the ballyhoo accompanying their opening became a hallmark of the establishment of each new service station thereafter. This whole exercise

was intended, in the words of a CCP report, to 'obviously display the workers' powers of intimidation,' and it indicates the CCP recognition of the pivotal role of the psychology of power in the lives of the transport workers."

Munro, Donald J. "The Malleability of Man in Chinese Marxism." *China Quarterly*, no. 48 (October-December 1971), pp. 609-640.

Readers interested in Chinese intellectual formulations relating to whether *yundong* can really "touch people's souls" and genuinely lead to new men living in a new society should consult this article as well as Munro's other writings. Munro is a philosopher whose interest in education has led him to the study of both ancient and modern Chinese thought. For another excellent, and more expressly political, approach to Chinese intellectual history, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr. *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

Peterson, Joseph. *The Great Leap—China*. Bombay: B.I. Publications, 1966.

I include Peterson's book more because no other similar one is available than because I endorse its insights. It reads like a press clipping file assembled with scotch tape. Unfortunately, China's amazing Great Leap Forward of 1958-59 seems to be another subject that, incredibly, has not attracted much scholarly attention, at least beyond the single issue of the people's communes. Useful articles on the subject include: Ezra Vogel. "Utopianism: The Great Leap Forward, 1957-1960." In his *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968*, pp. 218-279. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969; and Kang Chao. "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China." *Asian Survey* 4.5 (May 1964): 851-858.

Selden, Mark. *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Selden's study of life and politics in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border area in the decade 1935-1945 best captures the many variables underlying the Yanan Rectification movement (1942-1944). Selden presents rich detail on the rectification itself and on other *yundong* associated with it. He concludes: "The basic guerrilla problem lay in coordinating agrarian revolution with military victory. In the absence of extended military success, the prerequisite for creating and preserving a stable base area, it was impossible to energize the peasantry to play an active role in land revolution and soviet military and political affairs. To attempt land redistribution prematurely merely invited severe reprisal. Yet concrete benefits were essential if the peasants were to support the military struggle." An important study which confirms this major point of Selden's but differs with his work on a number of other issues is: Chalmers Johnson. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.



# Glossary

Personal names have been omitted from this glossary. Important ones are cited in Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Bibliographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1929-1965* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971).

aiguo liang	爱国粮
aimin	爱民
bei zhan	备战
biaobing	标兵
bi xue gan bang	比学干帮
cha tian yundong	查田运动
Choson Rodongdang (Korean)	朝鮮劳动党
chou diao	抽调
Chullima undong (Korean)	千里马运动
chunzhong xing yundong	群众性运动
da ji	打击
<i>Da tong shu</i>	大同书
da yue jin	大跃进
dai tou	带头
dang di zhongxin renwu	党的中心任务
dang wai renshi bangzhu dang	党外人事帮助党整风
zheng feng	德
de	

dianxing yiyi	典型意义
douzheng	斗争
douzheng duixiang	斗争对象
fan funong douzheng	反富农斗争
fan youqing	反右倾
fen qi fen pi	分期分批
geming	革命
gongzuo dui	工作队
gugan fenzi	骨干分子
guo guan	过头
jianju	检举
jiantao	检讨
jiaodai	交代
jiji fenzi	积极分子
jin	介
jingshen jiangli	精神奖励
juche (Korean)	主体
kang Mei yuan Chao	抗美援朝
ke	科
kong Mei chong Mei	恐美崇美
laodong gaizao	劳动改造
laodong jiaoyang	劳动教养

lao lai qing	老来青
lingdao hexin	领导核心
mu (mou)	亩
nei	内
peiyang	培养
pingshi shencha	平时审查
ping tianxia	平天下
pingxuan	评选
pinyin	拼音
renwu	任务
ri (Korean)	里
san qing yi gai	三清一改
San xi Mi laoshu tang	三喜米老鼠糖
san zi yi bao	三自一包
she jiao	社教
shi jing wei	市经委
shi xiao yi yi da	事小意义大
si qing	四清
sui da liu	随大流
toudu	偷渡
tu chu	突出
tuanjie	团结

wai	外
wen ge	文革
wenti	问题
wenyan	文言
wuchan jieji wenhua da geming	无产阶级文化大革命
wu fan	五反
wuzhi jiangli	物质奖励
xiafang	下放
xian	县
<i>Xiangjiang pinglun</i>	湘江评论
xianjin jingyan	先进经验
xianjin shengchan zhe	先进生产者
xiao zheng dang yundong	小整党运动
xiao jituan	小集团
<i>Xinmin congbao</i>	新民丛报
xin wu fan	新五反
xiushen	修身
xuexi	学习
xuexi xiaozu	学习小组
yi	义
yi dian dai mian	以吴带面

yikao	依靠
Yi Guan Dao	一贯道
yingxiong	英雄
yi zhang	一長
you shei bu yuan duo gan gongzuo shao canjia yundong ne	有谁不愿多干工作少参加 运动呢
you zuzhi you mudi di chungzhong xing huoding	有组织有目的的群众性 活动
yuan	元
yundong	运动
yundong chang	运动场
zengchan jieyue	增产节约
zheng dang	整党
zheng feng	整风
zheng feng yundong	整风运动
zhengli	整理
zengqu	争取
zheng she	整社
zheng she zheng dang	整社整党
zhi bing jiu ren	治病救人
zhongdian	重点

Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong	中学为体 西学为用
zhuan an shencha xiaozu	专案审查小组
zhuanjia	专家
zhuan ye xuexi	专业学习
zili gengsheng	自力更生
zi qiang	自强
ziwo piping	自我批评
zong jie	总结
zungsan (Korean)	增产

# Index

Activist elements (*jiji fenzi*), 41-42, 43, 44, 49

Agriculture, 47, 50-51, 56, 70-71

Algeria, 96-97

Ancien regime, legacy of, 19, 27-28, 97-98

Army, 30-32

Backbone elements (*gugan fenzi*), 41-42, 43

Better Troops and Simpler Administration, 40, 41n.

Birth Control Education, 47-48

Business community, 68, 70, 71

Capitalist crimes, 70n.

Chinese Communist Party, 28-32, 34, 36, 37, 61-62, 87, 100

Chullima, 23-24

Chungsan-ri, 24-25

Class struggle, 28-29, 35, 43-44, 65, 69

Clean Up the Class Ranks, 40, 41n.

Commandism, 25, 98

Commodity supply, 48-49, 58-59, 81, 82

Commune and Party Rectification, 62-63

Communes. *See* Agriculture and Land reform

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22-23

Compare Oneself with the Advanced, 52-54

Compliance, 86-89, 91. *See also* Participation, political

Cuba, 95-96

Cultural Revolution, Great Proletarian, 33, 36, 37, 40-41n., 63, 65-66, 72, 73, 87, 92-94

Destroy the Four Olds and Establish the Four News, 40

Deviation, 58-60

Economic growth, 15, 81, 84-85, 92

Elites, 16, 17, 27, 68, 79-80, 88-91, 92. *See also* Nonelites

Emulation, 26, 49-55

Five Oppositions or Five Anti (*wu fan*) 40, 59, 68, 70, 71

Four Cleanups, 40, 63, 90-91

Four firsts, 86, 87n.

Four Histories, 38

France, 95, 96, 98

Grasp Revolution and Promote Production, 40, 41n.

Great Leap Forward, 36, 37, 40, 56, 75, 76-79, 85, 87, 89, 92, 94

Guomindang, 29, 30-31, 61

Ho Chi Minh, 25

Hu Feng-ism, 65

Imperialism, anti-, 20-21, 42, 57

Institutionalization, Party, 34, 36, 37

Japan, 20-21; war with, 28, 29, 30-31, 61  
Jiang Jieshi, 29, 57-58  
*Juche*, 23, 24n.

Kim Il Sung, 23-24  
Korean War, 37, 56-57

Land reform, 25-26, 28-29, 57-58, 67-68, 73  
Law and Mass movements, 76  
Leadership, campaign, 60-61, 79, 93-94  
Learn from the Experience of the PLA in Political Education and Ideological Work, 51-52  
Lei Feng, 51-52n.  
Lenin, Nikolai, 22-23, 27  
Lin Biao, 34, 36, 37, 86  
Liu Shaoqi, 34, 44-45, 57, 64, 65-66, 73n., 89-90

Mao Zedong, 15, 21, 30-31, 32, 34, 72, 100; ideology and policies of, 20, 22, 27, 31, 36-37, 44-45, 61, 63, 75, 78-79, 82-82; opposition to, 36-37, 76, 77  
Marriage law, 56  
Marxism-Leninism, 19, 21-27  
Mass Criticism and Repudiation, 40, 41n.  
Mass movements. *See Yundong*  
May Fourth Movement, 21, 22  
May Seventh Cadre Schools, 100  
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 20  
Mobilization, mass, 18, 21-22, 60-61, 81, 94, 96, 98

Nonelites, 17, 86-91  
North Korean Workers Party (Chŏson Rodongdang), 23-25, 26,  
North Vietnamese Workers Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam), 23, 25-26

Participation, political 15-17, 19-21, 23, 58, 92-95, 97-100  
Patriotic Education, 42  
Patriotic Grain, 47  
Peng Dehuai, 64, 77  
People's Liberation Army, 51-52  
Production, 24-25, 30, 77-78, 79-80, 82-83  
Professionalism, 59-60, 79-80, 82  
Poverty, 76, 80-81, 85  
Purges, 63-66

Rectification (*zheng feng*), 29, 60-63, 100. *See also* Leadership, campaign  
Red Guard, 44-45, 93, 94  
Reform the Party Constitution, 40, 41n.  
Resist America and Aid Korea (*kang Mei yuan Chao*), 57-58  
Revolution, Chinese, 27-32  
Revolutions, 20, 22-23, 27, 75, 94-98, 100  
Ritual behavior, 18, 35-37, 86-88, 91, 93  
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 19-20

Self-criticism (*ziwo piping* or *jiantao*), 18, 29, 36, 43-44, 87  
Self-reliance (*zili gengsheng*), 30-31, 33-34, 81-82, 85, 100



## OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES

### CHINA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS

(Available from the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720):

1. Townsend, James R. *The Revolutionization of Chinese Youth: A Study of Chung-Kuo Ch'ing Nien*. 1967 (\$3.00)
2. Baum, Richard and Frederick C. Teiwes. *Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966*. 1968 (out of print)
3. Rinden, Robert and Roxane Witke. *The Red Flag Waves: A Guide to the Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao Collection*. 1968 (\$4.50)
4. Mehnert, Klaus. *Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad*. 1969 (out of print)
5. Yu, George T. *China and Tanzania: A Study of Cooperative Interaction*. 1970 (\$4.00)
6. Barrett, David D. *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944*. 1970 (\$4.00)
7. Service, John S. *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations*. 1971 (\$4.00)
8. Lovelace, Daniel D. *China and "People's War" in Thailand, 1964-1969*. 1972 (\$3.50)
9. Porter, Jonathan. *Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy*. 1972 (\$5.00)
10. Waller, Derek J. *The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934*. 1973 (\$5.00)
11. Bisson, T. A. *Yen-an in June 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders*. 1973 (\$5.00)

### STUDIES IN CHINESE TERMINOLOGY

14. Chuang, H. C. *Evening Chats at Yenshan, or The Case of Teng T'o*. 1970 (\$2.00)
15. Mowry, Hua-yuan Li. *Yang-Pan Hsi--New Theater in China*. 1973 (\$2.50)
17. Silverman, Alan. *Handbook of Chinese for Mathematicians*. forthcoming

Shanghai, 52-54, 68-70  
 Sixteen Points, 40-41n., 72  
 Socialist Education, 37, 38, 40, 63, 72, 87-91  
 Socialist transformation, 54-55, 66-73, 79  
 Spontaneity 23n., 27  
 Stalin, Joseph, 23, 27  
 Struggle (*douzheng*), 18, 21-22, 29, 44, 93  
 Struggle, Criticism, Transformation, 35, 37, 40-41n.  
 Study (*xuexi*), 18, 29, 41-43, 61, 71, 92, 94, 99  
 Study the Liberation Army, 52  
  
 Technology, 34, 79-80, 81, 82, 84  
 Tension and relaxation, 18, 23, 29, 43-44, 82-83, 85, 88  
 Three Inventories and One Improvement (*san qing yi gai*), 58-59  
  
 U.S.S.R., 26-27, 33-34, 81-82. *See also* Communist Party of the Soviet Union and  
 Revolutions  
  
*Xiang River Review*, 24  
  
*Yundong*: Characteristics of, 15, 17-18, 38-39, 79, 80, 82-83, 85; future of, 15,  
 86-88, 92, 94, 98-100; purposes of, 15-16, 30, 46-74, 92; criticisms of, 15-17, 25,  
 32, 75-85; origins and development of, 19-37, 81-82; organization of, 39-40,  
 41-45  
  
 Zhou Enlai, 34, 36, 98

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS SPONSORED BY THE CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES

(Published by and available from the University of California Press):

Schurmann, Franz. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Rev. ed. 1969 (also in paperback)

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China*. 1966 (also in paperback)

Townsend, James R. *Political Participation in Communist China*. 1967 (also in paperback)

Schiffirin, Harold Z. *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution*. 1968 (also in paperback)

Van Ness, Peter. *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*. 1970 (also in paperback)

Larkin, Bruce D. *China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic*. 1971 (also in paperback)

Schneider, Laurence A. *Ku Chieh-kang and China's New History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions*. 1971

Chi, Wen-shun. *Readings in the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution*. 1971.

Rice, Edward E. *Mao's Way*. 1972.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*. 1973.

Moseley, George V., 3rd. *Consolidation of the South China Frontier*. 1973.

Dittmer, Lowell. *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism*. 1974 (also in paperback)

Kataoka, Tetsuya. *Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front*. 1974.

Kim, Ilpyong J. *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets*. 1974.

Watson James L. *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage: The Mans in Hong Kong and London*. 1974.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. and Carolyn Grant, eds. *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China*. 1975.

Esherick, Joseph W. *Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei*. forthcoming

Solinger, Dorothy J. *Regional Government and Political Integration: Southwest China, 1949-1954*. forthcoming

Pepper, Suzanne. *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949*. forthcoming

Chi, Wen-shun, comp. *Chinese-English Dictionary of Contemporary Usage*. forthcoming