Political Realism and Political Philosophy in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 

*Social Contract*

by

Haozhe Wang

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy 

in Political Science

in the 

Graduate Division 

of the 

University of California, Berkeley


Committee in charge: 

Professor Wendy Brown, Chair 

Professor David Bates 

Professor Kinch Hoekstra

Spring 2013
Abstract

Political Realism and Political Philosophy in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s

*Social Contract*

by

Haozhe Wang

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Wendy Brown, Chair

This thesis places Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the “realist” or *raison d’état* tradition of political thought. While highly critical of the conceptualization of political sovereignty among earlier social contract theorists such as Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes and also very condemnatory of the popular eighteen-century discourse of reason of state, Rousseau preserves some of the most important insights in the theory of state and political sovereignty of earlier authors, in particular the value, status, and justification of political life. This thesis thus looks at both the continuity and the disruption or corrections that Rousseau represents in the tradition of political realism.

The first part of the dissertation looks at Rousseau’s reflections on international politics, political economy, and the role of government. It examines Rousseau’s criticism of the seemingly triumphant theory and practice of realpolitik and mercantilism in the eighteenth-century and how this criticism derives from his overriding concern with political equality and liberty in the *Social Contract*.

The second part of the dissertation details the necessary link between Rousseau’s conceptualization of the political and his epistemology and linguistic anthropology. Rousseau’s linguistics accounts for both his emphasis on equality as the condition of the political and his anxiety over the fragility of the political. Rousseau must confront a gap between the concept of the political as a just and equitable form of civil association and the utter impossibility of the literality of the political condition. Rousseau’s theory of government and his resentment of mercantile administration must be read in light of this gap between the concept and literality of the political.
Introduction

Rousseau’s political realism
This thesis will read Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a political realist. There are several aspects to this political realism that intersect each other in Rousseau’s writings. Political scientists most commonly understand realism as a principle that governs the treacherous and mutually suspicious relationships between states. Thanks to some fine works by Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffman, and others, we now accept that Rousseau indeed has something meaningful to say on international politics. Realism is also frequently associated with Thomas Hobbes and a certain notion of sovereignty that is absolutist and overwhelmingly concerned with (collective and individual) self-interest and self-preservation that justifies and legitimates the political state. Rousseau’s own Hobbism is well noted not only for the use of the fiction of state of nature but for the domestic analogy of man and state, which according to some authors may have been an inspiration for the political ideas found in the Social Contract. Above all, I argue that Rousseau’s realism lies in a certain understanding of the political that, as with Machiavelli and Carl Schmitt, asserts its reality and autonomy as well as skepticism of metaphysical, moral, cultural, religious norms that claim their conceptual anteriority. Rousseau’s political realism encompasses all these elements: a privileged ontic status of the political, an absolutist notion of sovereign authority, and a quintessentially pluralistic international politics. They are welded together in original ways in Rousseau.

In calling Rousseau a realist I want to show that he culminated a development in early modern political thought that started to uphold the meaning and essence of political life as legitimate exercise of collective self-preservation and defense of security and unity of the body politic and emphasize the primacy and autonomy of this political logic. But I want to address also what I hold to be important corrections to the realist tradition that Rousseau’s political theory, especially his theory of government, entails. The two tasks are inseparable because accounting for Rousseau’s theory of political sovereignty necessitates a critical engagement with aspects in the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and Hobbes as well as the economic, fiscal, and foreign policies of the leading European states of their time that modern scholarship often calls “realist” but which Rousseau deems incompatible with the principle of popular sovereignty and the essence of political life. To put Rousseau in that tradition, to expound the continuity as well as the disruption or (self-)correction of the tradition in Rousseau’s political thought, yields a concept of political sovereignty that I think will be more satisfactory than previously understood in the realist or raison d’état tradition.

In his critique of the conquest rights that Grotius, Hobbes, and Samuel von Pufendorf all cited in explaining the origin of the political, we first see the simultaneous disruption and continuity that Rousseau presents in the realist tradition. Rousseau appreciates the bold theoretical innovation of conquest rights in hypothesizing an origin of the political that does not depend on any assumption of natural or commercial sociability of humankind or any ethical and judicial principles. Rousseau’s critique of conquest rights is not a dissent from this realist concept of the political that has proclaimed its radical conceptual autonomy in the Grotian or Hobbesian contract; rather, Rousseau’s complaint is that the fact of conquest cannot establish an absolute and perpetual sovereign authority
and that the true political condition – in which individuals join the contract to form a constituted whole in order to live in the peace and security of the whole – never takes hold in a state founded on conquest. In Rousseau, collective security is only possible if we join as free and equal members. The political condition is thus innately emancipatory because all subjects surrender themselves equally to the rule of law and thus save themselves from any other forms of dependency. For Rousseau, dominion acquired through temporary advantage in force injects an element of instability to political life that contradicts the very idea of sovereignty, which is supposed to perpetuate and preserve itself against threats of foreign and civil wars. It is precisely this realist or absolutist conception of political sovereignty that must guarantee moral autonomy, equality, and justice to the citizens. Without this emancipatory dimension, political sovereignty is never complete or self-sustaining.

Moreover, Rousseau inherits but also expands Grotius and Hobbes’s understanding of the relationship between sovereignty and government. For the two natural law theorists, the inquiry into the nature of the political is separate and superior to matters of statecraft and administration that in previous centuries had obstructed any scientific, abstract, and universal understanding of the nature of political power and sovereign authority. Rousseau, too, insists that the government is merely the minister of the sovereign and that the relativity and particularity of the science of government must not obscure the universal validity and truth of the principles of the social contract. Writing in the age of mature absolutism, however, Rousseau also vehemently castigates the statecraft of the ancien régime. Rousseau observes that the eighteenth century practice of realpolitik was part of a mercantile governmental reason that was purported to create not only a European balance of power but also a pattern of economic production, circulation, and extraction that was unjust and unequal. The skewed understanding of national interests and security not only gave rise to a set of economic and fiscal policies that were tyrannical and caused inequalities between the city and the country and between social classes but also threatened the sovereignty and unity of the state. The mercantile reason of state thus conflates the appearance of an absolutist, undivided government with the majesty of unified sovereignty; it is usurpation and despotism. Rousseau wants to at once uphold the emancipatory and egalitarian promise of the political and to purge absolute sovereignty of its unsavory association with despotism and the mercantile competition between states by proposing a science of government that can maintain the security, rigor, and health of the state and above all must prevent its own degeneration into corruption, centralization, and tyranny.

Far from being a utopian ideal, Rousseau’s concept of legitimate sovereignty and his attack on tyranny entails a theory of political administration and public economy that must embody and materialize what is otherwise an abstract doctrine of popular sovereignty and must substitute for the mercantilist governmental reason. Whereas the principle of liberty and equality is everywhere the same and the general will has the quality of predictable simplicity, Rousseau knows that states must assume different forms of government contingent upon the climate of the land, fertility of the soil, and customs and temperaments of the people. For Rousseau, only a theory of government that is predicated on the national characters and physiognomy of land and people could counteract the ill effects of a slavishly imitative mercantilist art of government that everywhere favored absolutist regimes and military and economic centralization. Of
course, the *Social Contract* makes clear that the question of government is always distinct from and secondary to the question of sovereignty, but I argue that in Rousseau this distinction makes a theory of government all the more indispensable for the sovereign because the withering or devolution of government invariably results in the government of one and ultimately the usurpation of absolute sovereignty by an absolute government. This argument sets Rousseau’s political philosophy at odds with the natural law theories of Grotius and Hobbes whose conceptualization of a supreme and absolute power and pure political reason was only possible after separating the juridical analysis from theories of statecraft (and whose disdain for statecraft and theory of government marks for Michel Foucault the discontinuity of the discourse of sovereignty and public law and the discourse of *raison d’état* and government). Rousseau is adamant about the government’s subservient role to the sovereign but also insists that a good government that suits a nation’s unique geography and physiognomy is the only safeguard against usurpation and tyranny.

This Rousseau, I think, has already proposed a solution to a problem very relevant to a contemporary world and contemporary discourse in which the demand for collective security is often seen as conflictual with liberty and justice. Rousseau’s is a solution that can keep realism relevant to the new political realities of war and security, but it has until now largely been ignored by realists and Rousseau students alike. This solution is found in Rousseau’s absorption, critique, and transformation of the reason of state and contractualist thought up to the eighteenth century, which allows him to formulate a realist concept of the political. Filtered through this realist perspective, Rousseau’s *Social Contract* can be important to contemporary political theory as an interesting and intense intervention in the debate about the status of political sovereignty and the object and nature of political government.

*Raison d’État, social contract theory, and Rousseau*

I call Rousseau a political realist because the conceptual content of the general will is, in the final analysis, a concept of a supreme and autonomous political realm and also because Rousseau continued the work of earlier realists, who also wanted to define and justify an undivided, absolute political authority and discover the autonomy of state and autonomy of the political reason of state, even as he quarreled with them. To assess Rousseau’s realism as well as the reason of his quarrel with earlier realists, it is helpful to narrate the development of modern European theory of sovereignty and of *raison d’état*, a narrative that is actually quite familiar in political theory. We often take Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty as one of the early and most influential analyses of an absolute, supreme political authority in modern political and juridical thought, and we interpret Bodin’s theory of sovereignty as an intellectual response to the deteriorating domestic situation of a France that often descended into civil wars, where traditional institutions could not easily be altered by the king and where royal power had to share authority with other seats of power. Bodin’s envisioning of a single, undivided, supreme power was meant to overcome the medieval constitutionalism that curtailed royal power with several countervailing forces.

The natural law theory of Grotius and Hobbes pushed Bodin’s theory of sovereignty further, although in his history of *raison d’état* Frederick Meinecke regards their return to the traditional natural law jurisprudence as a curious interruption of the intellectual
progression of the *raison d’état* doctrine and an approach quite different from earlier authors who expounded on the best (“concrete”) interests of the state (e.g., Henri de Dohan and Gabriel Naudé). But the natural law theorists’ contribution is still recognized by Meinecke: they intended to uncover the dictate of pure political reason that is universally valid, inalterable, and eternal. Despite the natural law rhetoric, the contract theorists believe the political state has its rational objective – the state always strives for its best interests, that is, its own defense and preservation – and thus how the state and its institutions must be built can also be rationalized in strict accordance with the objective. The methodological opposition between the natural law theory and the writings of statecraft notwithstanding, the contractualists were still among those who were trying to uncover the true nature of political reason.8

For Hobbes as well as the social contract theorists who came after him, recourse to natural law has the vital advantage of permitting them to return to the state of nature to find the justification for the first political society and a source of legitimation for political power. The contractualists’ inquiry into the purpose and essence of political association and political life is also decidedly indifferent to the various forms that governments take across time and space. Meinecke is aware, then, that Hobbes’s preference for monarchism was superficial and strictly utilitarian: the *Leviathan* was not a propagandist piece meant to defend one specific form of government.9 That Hobbes’s work was not monarchist was a transparent fact to the English royalists as well.10 The first political act that would create a lasting social tie among individuals who had never known political life and install a legitimate political authority among them would have to be the social covenant. This could happen between a conqueror and his conquered, which need not result in a monarchic government, or between individuals who voluntarily come together to constitute themselves as a political people, which need not result in a democratic government. Either through institution or as a result of conquest, the incipient political moment is one when the individuals join a political union to better preserve themselves. The nature, the initial impetus, for political life is collective security, the unity and defense of this new common life.

From Bodin’s first conceptualization of a supreme, indivisible political authority to the contractualists’ imagination of the state of nature and the initial emergence of the political, the question of sovereignty became separated from specific considerations of government, institutions, and statecraft. The “realist” tradition privileges above anything else the supremacy and unity of sovereign power and its ability to make decisions and judgments in relation to the security and survival of the body politic; the question of what specific forms the government, military, and religious or economic life of the state must take is secondary and technical. It may concern the ministers of the sovereign but never the sovereign body itself. We may thus speak of “the achievement of natural-law theory [as]...first and foremost, the separation of the question of the political from the contingent appearance of actual state regimes.”11 Issues about how to institute the government of a particular state, how to organize its economy, its defense, and security, all presume an abstract political reason of the state and the imperative to defend its continuing existence in a specifically political and sovereign form.

In the thesis I wish to underscore both the continuity of the “realist” conception of the political in Rousseau and his disagreements with the earlier contractualists. Rousseau shares with Grotius and Hobbes a firm view on the priority of the political over
government and statecraft. Yet, Rousseau’s sharpest criticism of Hobbes is about whether a covenant is possible between the conqueror and the conquered, that is to say, whether a political relationship is at all possible between unequal parties. In opening the *Social Contract*, Rousseau argues that the conquered cannot trade permanent servitude for their spared lives and it is sheer sophism to say otherwise. Conquest and slavery do not amount to real political bonds because they contain seeds of a state of war. Unequal relationships cannot survive the political founding, which must restore liberty and independence to each subject by setting up the rule of law and creating the subjects’ equal submission to law and equal right among themselves. But at the very close of the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau also alludes to a civil war between the rich and poor and a type of tyranny built on drastic social and economic inequalities. Whereas economic and material inequalities must certainly exist in a Grotian or Hobbesian state founded on conquest, the two natural law theorists also make clear that the political inequality between the conqueror and the conquered is not a mirror of the economic inequality between the contracting parties. But if the *Social Contract* indeed continues from the ending of the *Second Discourse*, then Rousseau might intend to offer his readers an equivocal reading of the state of war: the political founding may be an anthropological evolution in which humankind overcomes its natural asociability but may also be a revolution of a “good” contract against the bad contract that the rich and powerful had imposed on the poor. This equivocation does not diminish the moral force of the concept of the political, but it now links the political to the moderation of social and economic injustices, even as Rousseau simultaneously stresses the conceptual distinction between political equality and economic equality.

Rousseau offers some important corrections and modifications to the realist tradition in order to both maintain the autonomy and priority of the concept of sovereignty and to address the question of inequality and the civil rift inequality would cause. Later chapters of the *Social Contract* cope with the setup of government and economic and fiscal administration. These chapters are concerned with the corporeal and embodied form that the general will takes in a state. While the lessons of statecraft vary from text to text, I will argue that what philosophically unifies texts as divergent as the transcription of Abbé Saint-Pierre’s peace proposal and the Corsican constitution is Rousseau’s consistent critique of the governmental practice of mercantilism. In these texts, Rousseau is less worried by the prospect of a violent destruction of a state in the scenario of a foreign conquest than by the slow death of the body politic caused by bad government, its corruption and decline in face of rising inequalities. Rousseau argues that the mercantile state’s domestic consolidation of economic and military powers and its international pursuit of realpolitik objectives not only tend towards an absolute government but also give rise to a tyrannical usurpation of sovereignty by the government. Rousseau’s critique of natural law theorists of sovereignty thus converges with his critique of mercantile government. The latter represents such an excess in government’s force and in economic inequality between the city and the country and the urban and the rural that the government destroys the very unity and meaning of the sovereign state and fuels a civil war between the rich and poor.

In his critique of the *ancien régime* and its administrative policies, Rousseau thus raises a question that other contractualists chose to ignore: is a thin, realist concept of political sovereignty truly self-sufficient when the governmental reason threatens to slowly but surely displace the sovereign? Whereas Rousseau, too, espouses a universal,
abstract understanding of the political and distinguishes the infallibility of the sovereign will and the practical need to implement the will, he believes the form of government must reflect the geography of the nation and the physiognomy of its people and must be kept to a proper size and force in relation to both the sovereign and the people in order to maintain the political cohesion as well as the liberty of the people. The mercantile form of government that European states were widely imitating was bound to divide the state and abrogate the freedom of the citizenry and must no longer be considered just another form of government but rather a tyrannical form of sovereignty and the political death of the people. In turning their back on statecraft and the question of the best form of government, Grotius and Hobbes signaled an important rupture and advancement in conceptualizing the political and an absolute form of political power – I want to construe Rousseau’s return to the question of government as a break from the natural law theories of political sovereignty as well as something that can greatly enrich the realist conception of the political: despite the monadic simplicity of the political will of a constituted people, the study of political economy and art of government is necessary to create a government that can both realize the principle of equality and justice of the general will and remain forever its servant. In the end, Rousseau shows us that the distinction between sovereignty and government, a distinction that quickly vanishes in the imitation and adoption of mercantile government, can only be sustained by a rigorous science of government. Insofar as inequality and the threat of class war attend every moment of our political life, a realist doctrine of sovereignty that favors the appearance of a unified political authority through mercantile economic and fiscal consolidation but ignores the deadly effect of inequality and class war caused by the mercantile governmental reason is neither adequate nor self-sustaining.

Rousseau on government: politics, nation, and culture
Construing Rousseau’s theory of government and political economy through realism alters how his theory of government is usually interpreted. Traditional scholarship turns it into either a modern take on the separation of powers or a cultural determinism and relativism that let the content of political life be dictated by the forces of culture, climate, and geography. But neither is compatible with a realist interpretation of the Social Contract: not only are the functions of the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers vaguely defined and demarcated in Rousseau, but Rousseau does not allow that vagueness to eclipse the fact that political sovereignty remains a completely unified structure, and while cultural and geographic factors must be reckoned with in configuring the government’s form and size, Rousseau is also firm in his view that the political is fundamentally revolutionary in its ability to create a just and equitable life for subjects in disregard of prepolitical forces. His realism does not even consist in a “pragmatic” compromise between ideals and reality. Rather, it consists in the governmental operations that preserve the political cohesion of the sovereign people in face of a lasting risk of civil war and preserve national independence in a pluralistic international system of states.

How can we square Rousseau’s Montesquieu-esque sensitivity to comparative studies of nations, peoples, terrains, and climates with a “doctrinaire, unhistorical, and universally subversive declaration that every state not strictly in accord with the almost impossibly demanding principles of the Social Contract is illegitimate”?

In the Social Contract, Rousseau gives no answer as to which type of government is the best, saying
only that the best government is specific to individual states and relative to their national character and geography. This relativism does not diminish the vital importance of the government in Rousseau’s political theory: while his political theory “rules out any normative prescription for an ideal regime, it does not indicate...an ethical vacuum.”

Still, some authors have seized on his view that government is servant to the sovereign; for those authors, the question of government is one of checks and balances, of the threat posed by an active government to an inactive sovereign, of a government that must be restrained and subdued. For others, this relativism relegates Rousseau’s thinking about government to theoretical insignificance because it merely presents a problem of applying a universal principle of political right and justice to the particulars of nations and peoples, in which case Rousseau did not say anything that Montesquieu had not already said – only more systematically – in the *Spirit of Law*. Rousseau’s theory of government is also interpreted as a compromise of the principles found in the first book of the *Social Contract* and a retreat from impractical ideas and from utopianism.

The focus on the structural separation of powers, on the distinction of government and sovereignty, and on the executive and the legislative powers may certainly endear Rousseau to moderns. I have already mentioned that the distinction between government and sovereignty, between what constitutes the political and what makes up for policies and statecraft, was accentuated from the start of the social contract tradition. This distinction is a crucial matter of political right and refers to the different juridical statuses of the sovereign and its officers. A government that usurps sovereign power is despotic, and the usurpers of sovereign power would trigger a civil war. All this still does not make up the content of Rousseau’s theory of government. Rousseau’s is a positive theory meant to help us figure out how to construct a good government. Here we may contrast Rousseau’s approach with that of Pufendorf, John Locke, and Hobbes: for Hobbes, the majesty of the sovereign must not be tarnished by the ineptitude of his ministers; in Locke, the popular sovereignty can remain intact even in case of a despotic government and a rebellion against the government. In other words, their theories of sovereignty are not truly vested in the art of government other than in devising a way to shield the sovereign from the subjects’ discontent with the actual rulers of the state and their failures. Rousseau also insists on the infallibility and indestructibility of the sovereign will even when the government becomes corrupt or when the constituents become corrupted (the corrupt citizen “does not extinguish the general will within himself, he only evades it”), and in this he still differentiates carefully the legitimacy of the actions of government and the legitimacy and righteousness of the sovereign. But for Rousseau, the defense of political unity and sovereignty also depends on the success of administration and on the justice of public economy. (Rousseau may say that it is absurd to hope to shield the sovereign from a bad government: one sign of the corruption of government is the enormous fiscal and military forces the government concentrates in its own hands: what forces can resist a terminally corrupt government?) The study of government takes on a significance and seriousness in Rousseau that cannot be reduced to the simple doctrine of separation of executive and legislative powers.

In the first three chapters of the dissertation I will show that Rousseau’s relativism regarding the form of government is actually his solution to the justice and liberty of the subjects as well as the safety of the republic. In the *Social Contract* as well as the Poland and Corsica essays, Rousseau opposes this relativism to an imitative, cosmopolitan art of
government. While all states struggle for security and self-preservation, Rousseau points out to Poles and Corsicans that there are more prudent ways to preserve their sovereignty than mindlessly copying the diplomacy and military institutions of the big, mercantile states. Rather than raising a standing army to pursue the same strategic objectives of aggrandizement and balance as Russia and France, Rousseau recommends a strictly defensive strategy in the form of partisan warfare. The partisan is a man of patriotic devotion and political virtue, and Rousseau reminds the Poles and Corsicans that patriotism and civic virtue can only exist if they are constantly fostered through traditions and ceremonies native to the land. This patriotism cannot be fealty to an abstract idea of the state. It is defined as an emotional bond to the soil and terrain of the land – in other words, a telluric patriotism - one that is only possible with people who work the soil and live close to it. Thus the citizenry’s special attachment to the patrie must be further cemented by an agrarian economy. In other words, this patriotism must be engineered through reforms of political economy and public administration that restore the ideal of agrarian democracy. Rousseau thus argues that a form of government specific to national geography and physiognomy can not only promise security through partisan warfare and deterrence but also remove the heavy yoke of high taxes and save the people from crushing rural poverty that is the inevitable consequence of mercantilism.

Rousseau’s theory of government is therefore a comprehensive critique of the mercantile governmental reason: a free people must not only substitute guerrilla warfare for the military policies of the mercantile state but also shun the cosmopolitan taste for luxury that ruins national character and depresses rural economy. Rousseau’s concept of government, I argue, consists in the continuous cultural and economic regeneration of the citizen-partisan, in the permanent economico-political institutions, and in national security gained through a free citizen-militia fighting a guerrilla war against the occupying force of a great power. Inasmuch as mercantile governmental reason is hopelessly imitative and cosmopolitan, one may argue that Rousseau does not embrace the relativism of government just to study the merit of each type of regime (as Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and many political scientists have done) but to make the point that the soundness of government and indeed the equality and liberty of the citizenry rests on that relativism itself. In Rousseau’s political writings, the relativity of institutional forms and governmental actions becomes an important wedge against the degeneration of government. Relativity of government’s form is theoretically important for Rousseau not because it was an interesting historical or scientific fact that deserved an explanation (the bits and pieces of which were indeed offered in the Social Contract but not completely forthcoming) but because it was needed as a blunt weapon against the assimilating influence of mercantilist statecraft and the threat of despotism that Rousseau sees lurking behind mercantilism and realpolitik. Here Rousseau artfully dissolves the tension between the security of the state and the liberty and justice of the subjects, a tension that long existed in realist thinking: Rousseau’s relativistic theory of government, his tireless appeal to preserve nations’ unique characters and physiognomy and to derive a set of military, cultural, and economic policies from each nation’s unique physiognomy, shows how the promises of security and liberty of the political life can be fulfilled together.

It must also be stressed that Rousseau does not see any contradiction between his apparent cultural conservatism and the revolutionary implications of his concept of the political. Even those too kind to call Rousseau a proto-nationalist or an inspiration of the
worst excesses of nineteenth and twentieth century nationalist movements may nonetheless hold the opinion that Rousseau’s obsession with national character seems to make culture “the real engine of history” and privilege traditional cultural and national identities above all else in political life. In this line of interpretation, people need first be educated before they can be political; some kind of education, enlightenment, acculturation, homogenization need to take place before they can be political, and such a homogeneous cultural or racial identity predetermines the political. But Rousseau’s interest in preserving the physiognomic features of each nation does not reflect a blind reverence towards existing cultural and economic practices. Cultural and economic orders are not prepolitical entities that the political must simply accept and affirm at the moment of founding and must subsequently defend by employing the name and force of public law. This fearful scenario of law being put at the service of preexisting economic injustice and inequality is precisely what Rousseau attacked at the end of the Second Discourse. On their own, unsupervised and uncorrected by a political purpose, Rousseau does not believe that prevailing cultural and economic orders are capable of remedying their own injustices. After condemning the “bad” contract in the Discourse, the Social Contract defines the political as radical hope of liberation from any cultural and economic norms that are unequal and unjust. Historically the human race may have known culture and economic life before it formed the first political societies, but the realist in Rousseau still insists on the judicial and ontic priority of the political. Cultural traditions can help a people resist the allure of cosmopolitan taste and mercantilist economics, but in Rousseau they must serve the political purpose of maintaining the liberty and sovereignty of the people – and new customs, festivities, and rites can be created to emphasize the uniqueness of each nation and each people if necessary. Jeffrey Smith, for instance, criticized those who overstate Rousseau’s “estimation of the prepolitical character of a given nation and the feeling of unity to which it can give rise” and points out that “Rousseau considers nationalism to be not only manipulable but also wholly devisable, and perhaps even of secondary importance”. The relativism of Rousseau’s theory of government is not a deferential gesture towards traditional values, and this relativism has a strictly political utility of sustaining the theoretical distance between government and sovereignty. The subjects become free in becoming political and sovereign, not in adhering to relative or conservative social values. Rousseau’s is still an emancipatory political theory of culture and not a conservative sociological or cultural theory of politics. In the end, his theory of government only affirms the value and priority of the political.

On sovereignty: its theory and practice
In lieu of reviewing the vast extant scholarly literature on Rousseau’s political philosophy, I want to put the realist Rousseau in the cross-examination between two of last century’s leading social theorists who happened to have nearly opposite, if equally condemning, opinions on the meaning and status of the political in Rousseau’s political economy. In On Revolution Hannah Arendt faults Rousseau and the 1789 Revolution for introducing the issue of economic welfare into the sphere of public law; the consequence was that the social question eventually overwhelmed the political which ought to be the realm of public freedom and action. By contrast, Foucault says that on the divide between two types of political discourses – one of the classical, judicial discourse of public law and
sovereignty and the other of governmental rationality – Rousseau eventually retreated into the classical discourse instead of confronting the problem of government. I think neither Arendt nor Foucault has done justice to Rousseau – in taking turns to refute both, I think a realist account of Rousseau’s reflection on government and on the relationship between sovereignty and government will take hold that can still demonstrate the vital importance of political sovereignty and the possibility for a people to organize itself politically and as a sovereign body.

“Rousseau’s approach,” says Foucault, “does not start from government and its necessary limitation, but from law in its classical form. That is to say, it tries to define the natural or original rights that belong to every individual, and then to define under what conditions, for what reason, and according to what ideal or historical procedures a limitation or exchange of rights was accepted.” As such, Rousseau’s approach, as well as the approach subsequently of the French Revolution, “consists in taking up the problem of public law that the jurists had constantly opposed to the raison d’état of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” I believe the realist perspective can be positioned against Arendt’s and Foucault’s understanding and criticisms of the relation between sovereignty and political economy in Rousseau. My thesis will portray Rousseau as a perceptive mind who grasped the crucial developments at the dawn of political modernity such as the security competition that created the pressure and impetus for the birth of nation states, the increasingly salient role of commerce and manufacture in social and international intercourses, and new techniques of government, but this thesis ultimately sets out to argue that in Rousseau the idea of political sovereignty and individual liberty and equality can still be salvaged in spite of all these developments – that in Rousseau, the political sovereign effects and maintains itself through political economy and government but never exhausts or loses its politicalness in the middle of the modern evolutions of political economy, of regimes of security, and of international politics and commerce.

The accusations Arendt and Foucault make of Rousseau evidently run against each other. Foucault himself notes that Rousseau’s conception of political economy is meant as a survey not only of economy and public finance but of the totality of governmental actions and their bounds. I will argue in the third chapter that despite the moral tone in his attack on luxury and call for agrarian revival, Rousseau’s agriculturalism takes aim at an acute circulatory problem – especially salient in big states like France and Poland but a lesson equally valid for small states like Corsica – that was caused by the outflow of specie from the countryside and which in turn caused economic depression there. Rousseau scholars believe that Rousseau was in fact fluent in some of the liberal economic theories of the time and perhaps even with some theories of police. In chapter three I will be arguing that Rousseau’s political economy can indeed be compared closely with some physiocratic writings of his time, and both the similarities and differences are striking.

It is the differences that are relevant to Arendt’s judgment of Rousseau. A central theme in On Revolution and perhaps in Arendt’s entire œuvre is that the political needs to be sequestered from the demand of economic well-being of the citizenry. Rousseau is worried, however, that extreme material inequality is harmful to the political cohesion of the state because the desperately poor may be tempted to sell themselves and the eminently rich may be tempted to buy their servitude. But even for Arendt, the
sequestration of the public from the private is only accomplished through slave- and house-holding in the ancient polis; because slavery is the constitutive condition of political life, it must also be excluded and banished from the political. Similarly, in my reading, Rousseau’s political economy also remains a political theory that ultimately establishes the exteriority of the economic to the political. Rousseau advocates passionately for an agrarian revival that could stem the rising income inequality between the country and the city but at the same time makes clear that that redistributive justice does not become the objective of political life. Although Rousseau adopts the agriculturalist view of the physiocrats, he does not base sovereignty on their corporatist vision of a harmonized community of interests between different classes like physiocrats do. In the Second Discourse Rousseau in fact expresses his concern that radical measures that redistribute wealth would abrogate the rule of law and can only be the result of political despotism. Rousseau’s interest in the material welfare for the impoverished peasants therefore does not represent one step towards “the social question” devouring the political.31 The equality that Rousseau’s political philosophy calls for is a formal, legislative kind, which is different from material equality but is to some degree tethered to it in that no sovereignty can survive extreme social and material inequality. Rousseau’s notion of political equality maintains its conceptual autonomy from the social question but is also potentially jeopardized by extreme social inequality. This brings Rousseau’s thinking on the relation between political and economic equality close to classical philosophers from Aristotle to Machiavelli.32 We can save Rousseau from Arendt’s criticism, therefore, by saying that even though he has admitted that the unity of a political state can be sustained only if economic inequality can be moderated and regulated, ultimately for Rousseau economic equality neither produces political equality nor exhausts the meaning of it.

For Arendt, the public realm is one of speech and action: the citizens are equal because they are equally subjects of political speech. The relationship between speech and politics is more paradoxical in Rousseau, however. While his anthropology accounts the decisive role that humans’ evolving linguistic abilities play in forming a durable and equitable political bond among themselves, Rousseau warns that our capability for language and perfectibility is also a cause for inequality and is eventually an agitating, divisive force for the sovereign community we form. Paul de Man would later argue that in Rousseau the linguistic foundation of the political society is unreliable and the idea of the political equality can never find an adequate, literal reality that corresponds to the idea. The body politic, therefore, is constantly being undermined at its roots by the very linguistic force that first gives birth to it. The sovereign body cannot effect its sovereignty because its constitutive elements tend to militate against its unity and sovereignty. If equality among men is an error of metaphor, this error is both constitutive and subversive of the sovereign.

In chapter five I attempt a more optimistic assessment than that of de Man. First, to the extent that the error of metaphor is constitutive of the body politic, the error can neither be excised from the political life nor truly remedied or corrected. Second, to the extent that the literary metaphor brings a perpetual risk of class war and is a mortal threat to the unity and sovereignty of the state, Rousseau must suggest political economy as a way to compensate for the metaphoricity of the political founding and the innate risk of class war and disunity that this metaphoricity implies. Therefore, I will argue that
Rousseau’s political economy is less about creating wealth equality than about creating civil peace by manipulating the political geography of a nation and balancing the demographic and economic forces of different classes. Lastly, because the error of metaphor is really a constituent error and the gap between the concept and literality of the political actually occurs wholly within the concept itself, I want to argue that this political economy must also be internal to the concept of the political. Thus, the issue of how sovereignty maintains itself does not depend solely on the strength and validity of the general will; it is at once a practical issue of political government, political economy, and political geography.

This interpretation contradicts Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between sovereignty and government, which turns the question on its head of how the sovereign may effect itself. Steven Johnston gives a Foucauldian interpretation of how many of Rousseau’s “secondary” works may teach us about Rousseau’s theory of government and how, in Rousseau, the very priority of sovereignty over governmentality may just be reversed. Johnston argues that these texts on government (i.e., the essays on political economy, Poland, Corsica) “pursue fundamental questions of government; they do not promote the suzerainty of politics”, and we must give textual priority to these “secondary” texts, Johnston argues, because “sovereignty does not float in the clouds. It is structured into the tactics of governmentality” — because only in his discussion of the government of economy, security, and culture does Rousseau offer enough hints of how the unity of the people can be produced and continuously maintained. In its role in producing the very sovereignty that it is purported to serve, Johnston argues government “cannot be the minion of sovereignty in a Rousseauian universe. The art of government renders obsolete the master-servant relation Rousseau hopes to fashion between them.”

In essence, this argument portrays both political sovereignty and the subject’s political liberty as a function of governmental practices. As such, it rids the political of the radical egalitarian and emancipatory promise that Rousseau associates with it. For Foucault, sovereignty can be reduced to the joint result of domestic police (i.e., mercantilism or physiocracy) and international police (i.e., international relations that operate on the sacrosanct tenet of balance of power), and a supreme sovereign capable of free actions and decisions independent of the governmental practices is a fiction. Likewise, according to Foucault, if the subject indeed enjoys some degree of freedom in the political society, it is an economic freedom that is produced by governmental reason, and it is consumed as soon as it is produced; the entire process of the consumption and production of this particular freedom only fits in the overall scheme of the governmental practice. Since this practice is ubiquitous and creates the subject and conditions our
subjectivity and our liberty, we cannot expect Foucault to give an account of emancipation based on the principle of either collective or individual sovereignty. Johnston’s Foucauldian reading of Rousseau’s theory of government thus inevitably leads to the conclusion that in Rousseau republican liberty is nothing other than “reciprocal subjugation”.

Johnston’s argument implies that in overthrowing the traditional, realist conceptualization of state, Foucault aims to trivialize both collective and individual sovereignty and reduce them to mere effect of governmentality. Rousseau and Foucault’s quarrel on the question of government and its relationship to the sovereignty is thus a dispute on the essence of the political. For Foucault, sovereignty is a fictive terminology that obscures the actual working of governmental reason, and the latter envelopes the political in its entirety. For Rousseau, the theoretical space for analyzing the relationship between sovereignty and government only opens up because the subjects’ imagination of their sovereignty and equality is always disputed in the political community and consequently sovereignty carries within itself the risk of its own dissolution and death, a rhetorical risk that cannot be neutralized by stifling the dispute but only mitigated through political economy and political geography. Government plays a role, therefore, only in the sovereign’s self-interrogation and self-realization. In the end, Rousseau as a realist is not interested in the working of the state’s security apparatus and its smooth functioning as a war machine; rather, political realism consists in the sovereign’s defense and preservation of itself.

Today we have largely accepted Arendt and Foucault’s assumptions about the social forces and economic rationality overtaking the political. In Rousseau, however, we can uncover a different account of political sovereignty and political economy. It is an account that is perceptive of the crucial developments at the dawn of political modernity such as the competition for security that created the pressure and impetus for the birth of sovereign states, the increasingly salient role of commerce and manufacture in social and international intercourses, and new techniques of government, all the developments whose consequences we still cope with today. But this account ultimately leads us back to the question of the true worth and dignity of political life: for Rousseau, neither the pursuit of economic justice nor the development of a state’s security apparatus exhausts or even defines the meaning of our public life. Men find justice and security in joining together to form a sovereign political body, and it is with the conceptual incompleteness of a thin notion of sovereignty that cannot literalize itself and in the inherently uncertain and precarious quest for the constituted people to effect itself as a unified, sovereign body that Rousseau finds the analytical usefulness of a theory of government and political economy. Government bridges the gap between the concept of the political and its lack of literality and finally gives political sovereignty its self-sufficiency and reality.

Plan of the dissertation
This dissertation is divided into two parts that start, respectively, from the last and first chapters of the Social Contract. Starting with Rousseau’s unfulfilled promise of an account of external relations of the state in chapter one, I want to dispel several misreadings of Rousseau’s international thought. Rousseau’s notion of sovereignty is not compatible with an absolute, perpetual peace, nor can we find a theory of international jurisprudence in Rousseau. Rousseau’s interest in international politics is in the method
and tactics of war and not the state’s right to it. Rousseau’s interest, I argue, is in devising a new kind of security strategy and statecraft – in the form of partisan warfare – for nations that may still hope to remain sovereign and free.

The fuller account of what this statecraft or raison d’état, tailored just for nations that still enjoy liberty, really amounts to surfaces in Rousseau’s discussion of national physiognomy and his critique of cosmopolitan taste, luxury, and tyranny. In the second chapter, I construe Rousseau’s subaltern military policy as part of a systematic critique of the mercantile government that was proliferating in Europe and was everywhere the same, imitated copy. I will argue that Rousseau’s advocacy of building political institutions based on a nation’s unique physiognomy and mœurs is meant to create a theoretical space in which the role of government can be truly comprehended.

The third chapter takes a detailed look at Rousseau’s political economy. It focuses on both the similarities in economic analysis between Rousseau’s agriculturalism and contemporary liberal economic theories and the huge contrast in their political outlooks. I argue that Rousseau’s political economy ultimately doubles as a sort of political logistics or political geography that purports to create political and formal equality in the state and is not so much a plan of redistributive economic justice as a defense of political cohesion of a constituted people.

The second part of the thesis focuses on the first book of the Social Contract and on how political sovereignty first forms. Rousseau gives a compact argument in the first five chapters of the treatise against what he calls a sophistic logic in Hobbes and Grotius’s contract theory, and I unravel this argument by relating it to his speculative anthropology and linguistics. I argue that for Rousseau political founding is the linguistic effect of a verbal contract that only a rational subject can consent to.

In the fifth chapter, I borrow from Paul de Man’s analysis of Rousseau’s linguistics to examine how political equality may actually be realized in the Social Contract. Following de Man, I argue that there can never be a literal reality that corresponds to the equality that the general will ordains. I do not take this as a source of constant instability for the Rousseauean state, however. Rather, I argue that Rousseau always intends to separate the concept of equality as a linguistic construct at the moment of founding from the kind of equality that needs to be produced and sustained by government. Moreover, I argue that it is the conceptual incompleteness of “equality” from the very birth of the political sovereign that makes Rousseau’s theory of government very much integral and indeed internal to his theory of sovereignty.

The last chapter is more about reading realism through Rousseau than reading Rousseau through realism, and it is at once a critique and an apologia of political realism. I attempt a synthesis of realism’s different expressions in international politics, its implications for the concept and status of the political as well as its linguistic and metaphysical underpinnings. I argue that in Rousseau we find a very satisfying conceptualization of the political; this intellectual satisfaction derives from Rousseau’s insight that the completeness and self-sufficiency of the concept of sovereignty is linked to the sovereign’s ability to truly fulfill the revolutionary promise of the political, of justice, equality, and liberty for men.
Part I Rousseau on Government
Although he never carried out the plan to write *Political Institutions* and fulfill a promise in the end of the *Social Contract* to delineate “the right of nations, commerce, the right of war and conquests, public right, leagues, negotiations, treaties” in the state’s external relations, Rousseau has come to occupy an important place in twentieth century study of international politics, receiving intense interest from leading scholars of international relations like Martin Wight and Kenneth Waltz. Once regarded as a mere transcriber of the Abbé Saint-Pierre’s utopian peace plan, Rousseau now rivals Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Kant among major political philosophers in contribution to the field of international relations. Several book-length treatments on Rousseau’s international thought have sought to put together a coherent picture of his reflections on the question of war and peace and examine the philosophical link between his scattered writings on international politics and his more complete and celebrated political treatises.

Secondary works on Rousseau’s international theory usually make him out to be either a realist who believes that Rousseau believes sovereignty to be an insuperable obstacle to peace (Waltz is, of course, the most notable proponent of this view), a pacifist who adheres to St. Pierre’s peace plan or envisions a binding contract between states analogous to the social contract (e.g., in Grace Roosevelt’s book), or someone who acknowledges the legitimacy of national interests and the reality of war and interstate rivalry and seeks only to impose some limitation to the violence of the international system (we may call this the “Grotian” Rousseau, which is most notably represented by Stanley Hoffman).

None of these readings are truly satisfying. I think cosmopolitan pacifism is fundamentally incompatible with Rousseau’s insistence on the sovereignty and national interests of particular nations – and the implied injustice to foreign nations and denial of a global brand of justice. I also think Rousseau offers little in the way of inventing an international jurisprudence that can regulate warfare and moderate its bloodiness: he advances at best a *negative* view that a state lacks the right to kill vanquished members of the enemy state but not a positive theory of the rights of the civilians or prisoners of war – as awful as this may sound, he simply does not seem to care about the legal protection of civilians or prisoners divested of their political membership in a state. Unlike the pacifists, Rousseau does not adumbrate a right to peace and the means to achieve it; unlike Grotius, he says little about the right to war and the laws that govern it. Rousseau seems to be more interested in the actual tactics and strategies of war – and on such tactics and strategies he is also different from the eighteenth century practitioners of realpolitik, a difference that modern scholarship in international relations usually fails to grasp. Rousseau resents the eighteenth century practice of realpolitik, and for him there is no theoretical connection between the belief that a state has legitimate national interests that are unique to itself and that war is a legitimate instrument of these interests and the practice of the realpolitik, the balance of power diplomacy, and the single-minded pursuit of fiscal, urban, industrial, and military growth that characterized the behavior of European great powers. In the first half of the chapter, I will take turns to rebuke these three commonest interpretations of Rousseau’s international thought.
Any attempt to attribute one of these views to Rousseau fails because Rousseau does not have on his mind one system of international relations. Rousseau recognizes both the fundamental unfairness of the system, especially to small states where he admits the sole hope of realizing his political principles in the Social Contract resides, and the futility for the weak states to challenge an established international system operated and guarded by the great powers. The main strategy he recommends to the small states is to exit the system entirely; and the main tactical advice he gives is a citizen-militia and defensive guerrilla warfare that may deter – but need not match or balance against – the professional and offensive military forces of the leading European powers. In essence, Rousseau wants a two-tiered international system and a warcraft conceived entirely differently from the diplomatic and military doctrines of European equilibrium. I will thus expound in the second half of this chapter on Rousseau’s “subaltern” security strategy for states that are legitimately constituted and founded on the principles from the Social Contract. And I will argue in the next chapter that this “subaltern” warcraft is in fact a part of Rousseau’s systematic critique of the mercantile statecraft and governmental reason of the ancien régime.

The many promises of peace

Little agreement exists on how to interpret Rousseau’s intentions or objectives in his writings on international relations. Rousseau’s ideas are cited alternately as support for realism and cosmopolitanism, pragmatism and moralism. Of course, some modern commentaries may not have aimed to unearth a true Rousseau for us; Waltz’s book, Man, the State and War, for example, does not pretend to offer a comprehensive study of Rousseau and is only inspired by a single passage from the fragments on war. But even in Rousseau studies where authors tried to stay faithful to Rousseau’s true meanings, we have very divergent views on what Rousseau really said or would have said on the subject of international politics. Following her clever and instructive reconstruction of the fragments on war, which seems to hint at a possible parallel between the social contract of men and a confederation of states, Roosevelt goes on to argue that a general will of the human race is what would finally put an end to the state of war among states for Rousseau. By contrast, Stanley Hoffman and Christine Carter have presented a Rousseau that is more pessimistic about the prospect of perpetual peace and have argued with more direct support from the original texts that a defensive league of small states that is designed to withstand the threat of big powers as well as to leave intact the liberty of the states founded on the principles of social contract is the most radical change Rousseau was willing to recommend. The surging interest in Rousseau’s thinking on international relations in the past few decades thus leave us with some quite tentative, inconclusive, and sometimes contradictory positions. I argue that each is problematic in its own way.

In transcribing and making popular St. Pierre’s peace plan for Europe, Rousseau also lent his own name to be associated with the plan and with pacifism in the centuries since. Roosevelt’s book portrays a Rousseau with almost unreserved commitment to cosmopolitan peace. She suggests that Rousseau’s answer to the state of war is already intimated in his understanding of its political nature: “since war is a political institution, the achievement of peace requires deliberate political will”, and since it is only a matter of political will, we can achieve peace without resorting to preemptive wars or building
coalitions. The answer thus lies with a “general will of the human race” through political education. The crucial textual evidence Roosevelt offers is Rousseau’s unfinished pieces on war and the state of war. According to Roosevelt, Rousseau’s writings on war, which were drafted in the mid-1750s, provided the context for the larger development of his political thought that is evident in the difference between the second *Discourse*, which was published in 1755, and the *Social Contract*, which was published in 1762. Looked at in this way the reconstructed text gives strong support to the view that Rousseau’s reflections on relations among states helped to stimulate his reflections on relations within states.⁴⁵

If Rousseau knowingly mirrored his writings on the war between states and the writing of the *Social Contract*, we may argue that the general will that brings peace and cohesion to a body politic could also effect unity and tranquility for the international society – that is, if we could locate the general will for the human race. In Roosevelt’s opinion, it was indeed the contemplation of the possibility of the whole humankind coming together and willing peace that later spurred Rousseau to suggest that the general will must exist, on a smaller scale, for individual communities.⁴⁶

Roosevelt stands rather alone among modern commentators in attributing to Rousseau the belief in a general will of the human race that can form at all and also eradicate war. Uniting the human race with a single will of universal, perpetual peace appears to conflict with Rousseau’s own words. For example, he explicitly denies that there can be justice to foreigners,⁴⁷ and he also wonders aloud how a European could possibly extend good will towards people of other European states, let alone Asians.⁴⁸

A security alliance of states that can defeat and punish aggressors could certainly be formed without reducing the diversity of states and state interests into a single will and body politic, and that is what St. Pierre recommended. Rousseau’s summary and critique of the Abbé’s peace proposal was among the former’s most extensive and complete expositions of his views on international politics. One can see St. Pierre’s influence on Kant, who is known to have read St. Pierre, most likely through the edition that was heavily reduced and annotated by Rousseau; St. Pierre himself had borrowed the far more lustrous names of Henry IV and Sully for his peace proposal. The moral tenors and philosophical underpinnings of Henry and St. Pierre and Kant are vastly different, but the idea of the grand alliance remained. The question now is whether Rousseau, apparently a crucial link in the intellectual lineage of the idea of an overpowering alliance of major states, actually subscribed to this idea. The question in essence asks whether Rousseau was a sympathetic transcriber for the Abbé or whether he was more of a critical one. And modern scholarship increasingly sees Rousseau’s abridgement as separate from and critical of St. Pierre’s original.

St. Pierre shares with Roosevelt’s Rousseau one important aspect of the peace plan: both seem to favor what I would call a “hard” peace – the normative, legislated, enforced kind. With either the grand alliance of peace or the general will of the entire human species, war must not only cease but also be delegitimated and outlawed; aggression is not just to be stopped but penalized. This “hard” notion of peace brings St. Pierre and Roosevelt’s Rousseau very much in line with the spirit of the League of Nations and the United Nations. By contrast, other interpretations of Rousseau want to present only a “soft” notion of peace, one that is more flexible and acknowledges war as
Hoffman and Carter argue that Rousseau did not argue for (or was too pessimistic to hope for) a “hard” peace and that he instead looked for ways to manage international conflicts and make them more manageable through building alliances and drafting international laws that govern conducts of war.

To accept that peace may only ever be “soft” is to accept the inevitability of war. And at times Rousseau seemed to accept that inevitability. In “The State of War”, Rousseau pointed out the difference between states in an international anarchy and men in a state of nature: “the frailest man will be found to have more force for his self-preservation than the sturdiest State has for its own”, because the very artificiality of the state means its safety can only be found in relative strength. It is born with reason, and as such the artificial state is inherently prone to comparisons and calculations. Waltz has taken this as the point of departure for his famous third-image analysis of structural realism and argued that the artificiality Rousseau attributed to states makes the international system innately unstable and prone to endless competition.

If war is indeed inescapable for Rousseau, we have to confront some philosophical difficulties in Rousseau’s contractual theory. What does the social contract truly accomplish if civil states made by the contract are born instantly into military standoffs with other states? The effort to overcome domestic strife results invariably in international anarchy where the anthropological tendency towards violence has to be channeled. If this is the argument Rousseau had to advance, this would bring him dangerously close to Hobbes. This Hobbiest side of Rousseau is what Richard Tuck wants to bring out in The Rights of War and Peace. Tuck argues that the main concern for Rousseau is “whether any civil state at all could bring an end to the state of war”… and the consequence of ‘bodies politic’ remaining in the state of nature vis-à-vis one another was widespread international conflict. The internal conditions of the state are now intricately linked to its external conditions.

Rousseau’s belief in the inexorability of the state of war at least at some level of our political life contradicts any vision of hard peace, but this state of war is nonetheless not incompatible with a soft peace with which states strive to control the scale of conflict and prevent systemic clashes. Two elements in Rousseau’s international thought appear to confirm his vision for managed international conflicts rather than their total eradication. The first is the occasional Grotian streak in Rousseau, most obvious in “The State of War”, where he denounces violence on private individuals after the dissolution of the body politic. In this scenario, private individuals may still shun harm and find peace in their personal lives in spite of conflicts between states. In this interpretation, Rousseau favors codification of war instead of the absolute peace of an outright legal ban on hostility, and Hoffman and Carter both see the codification of war as an important component of Rousseau’s international thought. With this Rousseau seems to have anticipated the distinction between combatants and civilians that modern jurists and soldiers arduously try to draw, and Rousseau’s familiarity and admiration for Grotius in his early years suggests that Rousseau may have wanted only a strengthened international jurisprudence that would govern conducts of war.

In addition, Rousseau showed a lasting interest in the German model of a confederation of small states. Pooling their resources together, the German states found a way to resist military encroachment by their neighbors and the Empire. Again, Rousseau
here was realistic enough not to hope for absolute peace but rested his hope of security on balance of power strategies, though the confederation differs from the conventional balance of power principles because it decidedly favors the small states and concerns the restraints on big powers. As such, Rousseau was following the footsteps not of St. Pierre and his alliance of all major powers but rather of Montesquieu who recommended a league specifically for small states that is also modeled on the German situation. The difference between St. Pierre’s league of major powers and Montesquieu’s German model again brings into relief the contrast between the “soft” and “hard” peace interpretations of Rousseau’s vision of a good international order. For the very notion of hard peace enforced by such preponderant forces that St. Pierre desired would provoke a total, systemic war and is tantamount to an automatic and lethal threat to the softer sort of peace; Montesquieu – and, according to Tuck, indeed the entire humanist tradition that undertook to expound the virtue of war and preemptive war had to construe balance of power (and, implicitly and without irony, the perennial, localized conflicts that are only its necessary adjustments) as insurance against big wars and thus the guarantee of a long-term peace and stability of the international society. To the Poles, Rousseau further suggested an alliance with the Sultan to balance against the dominant Christian powers; this unlikely and bold suggestion seems to indicate an earnest interest in using the balance of power mechanism as an indispensable tool of security and peace.

Rousseau’s acceptance of the Montesquieu-esque notion of a league of small nations that can deter their neighbors, along with his unwillingness to envisage a universal will that is elevated above the general will of a particular society, seems to paint us a picture of an archetypical realist Rousseau: it is a realist vision of peace that presumes domestic unity of individual states, a unity that unfetters them from internal strife and permits them to pursue national interests, no matter how unjust, in an international anarchy where the only cardinal rule and key to systemic durability and peace is balance of power.

All these different elements of the realist doctrine are found in Rousseau’s writings, and taken together they significantly raise the theoretical stake in searching for a coherent international theory in Rousseau: if Rousseau concedes that there can be no justice in international politics and that anarchy is the dominant characteristic of the international system, then the unpleasant implication is that by virtue of its success every social contract only intensifies international conflict, and our anthropological predilection towards violence cannot exterminated but only channeled to another level and the state life only serves as a conduit for its members’ violent tendencies. In addition, big and territorially ambitious monarchic states and small, free republics would now gain complete moral parity. All these would contradict the essential purpose of Rousseau’s political discourse. I will argue below that, even though the vision of hard, cosmopolitan peace is not Rousseau’s ultimate goal, his criticism of the prevailing system of the eighteenth century is rooted in his vehement moral opposition to European despotism. Accordingly, his planned world system would be discriminating enough to afford special protection to the republics.

Tyranny and the international system of war
For St. Pierre, all that was needed to overcome the constant frictions between European powers and bring about perpetual peace was greater wisdom of the princes of Europe. Once the latter learn to better discern “real and apparent interests”, they would give
Europe a genuine, lasting peace even when they continue to act purely out of self-interest. For does the ruination of war not inflict as much harm on the triumphant as on the vanquished? And does each new conquest not make more enemies for the victor and make his eventual defeat more certain by enlarging the coalition opposing him? In St. Pierre’s opinion, only the lack of enlightenment of the princes lay between the state of war and the perpetual peace.

In the Judgment of St. Pierre’s proposal, Rousseau gave a much bleaker assessment of the chance of peace. And throughout his literary career he returned to the subject of international conflicts and European monarchism and portrayed the two as mutually reinforcing. Rationalism was no longer the remedy for war because in defining their self-interest the European monarchs and their courtiers had long substituted the domestic survival of the regime for actual diplomatic and military victories in the states’ external affairs:

War and conquest without, and the encroachments of despotism within, give each other mutual support; that money and men are habitually taken at pleasure from a people of slaves to bring others beneath the same yoke; and that, conversely, war furnishes a pretext for exactions of money, and another (no less plausible) for keeping large armies constantly on foot, to hold the people in awe. In a word, anyone can see that aggressive princes wage war at least as much on their subjects as on their enemies.

In the Social Contract, he further warns that foreign conflict usually offers the window of opportunity for the usurper of the state because it creates a moment of confusion, panic, and weakness among the citizenry. It is no longer possible to separate the matters of aggression and repression because the two now complete the Janus-faced beast that prosecutes war both at home and abroad. Indeed, it is as if the exercise in war on other countries offered only an opportunity for rehearsal for domestic suppression: intriguingly, Rousseau believes that the rulers of Europe used the notorious divide and rule doctrine not only to prevail over neighbors but chiefly to secure their powers over their subjects. The terminal stage of political corruption is usually accompanied by “mistrust and mutual hatred in different estates”, which is instigated mainly by the usurper of the state and serves only to increase his prestige and safety. For only the despot would “foment everything that can weaken assembled men by disuniting them; everything that can give society an air of apparent concord while sowing seeds of real division”.

The rulers of Europe thus learned the art of war in foreign conquests and quickly applied their divide-and-conquer tactics to subdue their subjects and reduce them to servitude. That Rousseau insists on a parallel development of civil war and foreign war and the mirroring of the tactics of the two kinds of wars is certainly a powerful rebuke of the realist premise that external aggression is the first and surest sign of domestic unity and is the necessary outlet of violence that is healthily negated at home.

More specifically, Rousseau argues that major institutions established ostensibly to wage wars abroad would ultimately be utilized by the rulers to shore up tyranny. A prince’s territorial ambitions make the initial encroachment upon domestic politics when he installs new taxes; “an appetite for conquests is one of the most perceptible and dangerous causes for such an increase [in public needs and expenditures].” Still more darkly, Rousseau remarks that the tax hike “is not always what it appears to be, and its genuine motive is not so much the apparent desire to aggrandize the nation as the hidden
desire to increase the chiefs’ domestic authority with the help of an increase in troops and under cover of the distractions which the objects of war cause in the minds of citizens”. He further warns in The Government of Poland that the standing army, a new invention just before his time, is as much a yoke on his people as a tool of territorial expansion for the monarch. But most pernicious among the deadly consequences of forming a professional army is the economic and demographic devastation on the king’s own subjects even before the troops are sent to ravage the king’s neighbors in that “in order to raise these armies, tillers had to be taken off the land, the shortage of them lowered the quality of the produce, and their upkeep introduced taxes which raised its price”. Bad tax again is the catalyst, and this goes on like a vicious cycle until it becomes obvious that “it will be no less necessary to depopulate the countryside in order to form armies and garrisons...one can only anticipate the early depopulation of Europe, and sooner or later the ruin of the peoples that inhabit it.”

The despot must make war on his people even before he makes war on his neighbors simply because he has to. In the final analysis, the ravage of war is not caused by swords and muskets; it comprises of a whole system, of various state apparatuses supporting the war, that causes the most baneful and lasting damages and on the conquering people itself.

Rousseau’s dim view of the kings’ rationalism does not yet measure the true gap between Rousseau and Abbé St. Pierre. Nor can a simple substitution of people for the kings as the principal agent of cosmopolitan peace close the gap, as Roosevelt has suggested. While she rightly points out that with Rousseau the insurmountable obstacle on the path to peace is the kings’ self-interests that are at variance with the people’s, closer scrutiny of St. Pierre’s proposal and the inspirations it had and the legacy it left behind should tell us that no amount of improvement could mask the deep conservatism of the proposal; St. Pierre’s peace plan was certainly not what Rousseau eventually opted to improve upon.

To begin with, St. Pierre took some ideas from Henry IV’s peace plan (which might have been penned by Henry’s leading minister, Sully, and spuriously attributed to Henry by the latter) in drafting up his own plan. St. Pierre’s is by far the more elaborate, and the Abbé was marvelously patient in laying out in great detail the bureaucracies and rules that must be installed for his plan to work. But the means of enforcement of peace is the same for St. Pierre and Henry; namely that universal peace has to be a product of a universal alliance so formidably powerful that no member dares to challenge or even leave it. Still, one crucial difference exists between the two plans: Henry’s plan is remarkable for its very harsh tone, and this harshness, especially when compared with the Abbé’s far more equitable spirit, can be attributed to the same factor that makes Henry’s plan such a short and sketchy one: one will find that it was little more than an ultimatum delivered to Henry’s main enemy, the Habsburgs, commanding the latter to dismember their vast domains, and the call for universal peace was thus a call for a big coalition to be built against the Habsburg power and destroy it. Suspicion can linger about how much of the idea attributed to Henry VI actually came from himself and how much of Sully’s memoir was sheer fabrication, but both men had occupied the very center of French high politics; more important is the fact that Henry VI’s plan was plainly the list of all of France’s most important geopolitical goals.

By the end of the Judgment Rousseau has made Henry’s plan his direct object of criticism. Neither Rousseau’s resentment of the existing system of equilibrium nor his
own distaste of the universal monarchy gives way to naïve belief in the virtue of a war to end all wars, and he sees in Henry’s plan only bribes to win allies and a design to impose peace on France’s enemy. In the last three pages of the Judgment, Rousseau exposes the peace plan for what it is: it is not peace if it is just France fulfilling its greatest strategic ambitions in defeating and supplanting Austrian power, and such an imposed peace could not be won but through the bloodiest means. Therefore, “while we admire so fair a project, let us console ourselves for its failure by the thought that it could only have been carried out by violent means from which humanity must needs shrink”; and “which of us would dare to say whether the league of Europe is a thing more to be desired or feared? It would perhaps do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages.” This was indeed what Rousseau dreaded about St. Pierre’s plan, and even though he had the good sense not to openly criticize a popular king, his tone was grossly misread by Roosevelt, who took it to mean that Rousseau was merely sarcastic and would somehow welcome “the war to end all wars.”

In addition to the murderous, imposed peace hidden behind the cosmopolitan rhetoric that Rousseau finds both unrealistic and frightening, St. Pierre’s peace plan inherits from Henry VI/Sully’s plan yet another unsavory trait. The latter already recognized that civil disturbances at the time tended to quickly spill over to international politics. But if Henry/Sully blamed mainly the Austrians, St. Pierre’s impartial attitude only prompted him to declare the protection of all monarchies a pillar of his peace plan. Article 2 of his proposal establishes that the definition of security of each power is not limited to territorial integrity of his realm but must expand to include the prince’s safety from his own subjects; Article 3 calls for armed intervention of all signatory powers to help the legitimate government to put down rebellions. With these articles, St. Pierre essentially turned his grand alliance of powers into a legitimist force: “will anyone ever be tempted to conspire against his sovereign in order that he may put a crown upon his head, if he sees that there are ten powerful neighboring sovereigns bound together for mutual defence?” The Abbé saw the link between international politics and domestic politics as clearly as Rousseau later would; he simply took a position that is contrary to Rousseau’s. Unlike Rousseau, “[The Abbé] believed that the use of the armed forces of the whole of Europe to put down insurrection would effectively do away with civil war…Saint-Pierre thus did not distinguish between domestic and foreign affairs when these were related to the problem of securing peace.” From Rousseau’s perspective, then, the fatal flaw of the Abbé’s plan is not any failure to see the link between European despotism and the international state of war; on the contrary, the Abbé’s mistake is to eagerly tie the hope of peace to the ugly twins of despotism and realpolitik. Not surprisingly, these articles were quietly suppressed in Rousseau’s abridgement (along with, interestingly and perhaps not coincidentally, the Abbé’s passionate call for commercial integration of Europe). The omission was first noted by Carl Friedrich who argued that a deep political disagreement existed between St. Pierre and his “editor” and “there are many other provisions of this type which show that the Abbé Saint-Pierre’s ideas were more nearly akin to the legitimist Holy Alliance than to either the League of Nations or the United Nations.” When modern scholars, armed with the benefit of hindsight, reread St. Pierre’s peace plan, they increasingly see the combination of grand alliance and monarchism in St. Pierre anticipate Metternich a mere century later.
Rousseau’s disagreement with the Abbé is thus not just about monarchism but about the double promise of the peace of monarchism: is civil tranquility the fruit of despotism? And in any case if monarchy appeared moderate in its foreign relations, could we put our hope of security and peace on the kings? In a deleted note from Book I of *Emile*, Rousseau poignantly remarks that “the wars of republics are crueller than those of monarchies. But if the war of kings is moderate, it is their peace which is terrible. It is better to be their enemy than their subject.” Rousseau’s aversion to despotism is too strong to accept a cosmopolitan peace enforced by a universal alliance of legitimist powers. Perkins also suggests that “Rousseau’s *Judgment* was affected at times by his attack on rulers and their ministers. This caused him to attribute to the *Projet* a ‘hopelessly utopian, idealistic side,’ which he liked to oppose to the viciousness of kings.” Therefore, Rousseau’s criticism of the utopianism of St. Pierre’s peace proposal should not be taken as his pragmatism or his tolerance of the state of international affairs at the time. Quite the contrary, in opposing the “peace” of despots he must also oppose the constant wars that underwrite the military and fiscal systems that are the elementary components of despotism. Fundamentally conservative and in support of the status quo that extends to both the defense of realpolitik and the defense of the monarchical form of government, St. Pierre actually deserves more acclaim for realistic and pragmatic thinking than his transcriber. In the end, Rousseau’s judgment of St. Pierre’s peace plan is not an assessment of its chance of success from a practical point of view; it is the sinister nexus of tyranny and war, clothed in the rhetoric of moderation and tranquility, that Rousseau finds unacceptable. Rousseau’s later thinking on international politics would take an entirely different direction from St. Pierre’s.

**Poland and Corsica: a subaltern security culture**

I argue that Rousseau’s international thought is consistent with his most vital contributions to political theory, and this consistency is most transparent in the Poland and Corsica essays. The ideals of a social contract could be approximated, if not completely realized, only in small states (of which Poland and Corsica were good examples), and Rousseau’s thinking on foreign policies presumably reflects a desire to protect these states — or more precisely, to shield from the typical eighteenth century diplomatic and military rivalries the wise and equitable principles of administration that adopt Rousseau’s advice of military strategies. The European system of diplomacy and warfare as Rousseau knew it supported the continent’s major monarchies and masked their domestic instability and injustice; it is natural that Rousseau’s international thought would constitute part of his critique of despotism, expanded to include the nexus of foreign conquests and domestic suppression: in adopting the citizen-militia as the main instrument of national security, Rousseau believes the small states can extricate themselves from the international system of war as well as restore political liberty to their own citizens. The failures of domestic politics in big powers are the cause of international instability, and the liberty of the smaller states depends on their rejection of the international system of equilibrium of great powers as well as the latter’s venerated military institutions.

The ideal Rousseauean international system cannot be a homogeneous order because fundamental differences exist between states that are well governed and states that cannot be. A state must be small to accept and live under the social contract well, so
small states and big states face very different types of security challenges in international politics. In particular, the world system must be designed to compensate for the vulnerability of small, social-contract states from the aggression of big, ill-governed states. Rousseau summarizes the central problem posed by international politics to his political theory thusly:

while examining the constitution of the states that make up Europe I saw that some were too big to be able to be governed well, the others too small to be able to maintain themselves in independence…I found that the connections which exist among all the powers would never leave any of them the time and the security necessary for recasting its constitution.  

The same contradiction between small states that live by virtue and big states that are hopelessly corrupt and the international security predicament caused by it already bothered Montesquieu. Defending both their virtues and their independence becomes nearly incompatible objectives for small nations caught in the struggles between the major powers. The most famous example from the century of a nation that tragically failed to retain its freedom in a game of ruthless realpolitik and balancing among the major powers is Poland, and Rousseau’s treatise on the Polish government offers us the most complete guide to Rousseau’s international thought in his late writings.

The first advice Rousseau offers to the Poles (and later also to the Corsicans) is to regain their ancient virtues instead of aspiring to transform themselves into the French or Russians - partly because no amount of reform can help the Poles, a latecomer to this game, catch up with the leading powers in their financial, industrial and military prowess, but more crucially because Poles would have already enslaved themselves and sunk into despotism with the form of tax and army needed to let Poland rival the might of Russia. The nation would be left with horrible degeneracy of its morals and still lack the means to resist its neighbors. And Rousseau makes the same argument to convince the Corsicans not to choose glory and power over virtue.

But if there is no hope of Poland ever gaining military parity with Russia, Rousseau argues that virtue of its people may yet be the key to safeguarding their independence from its giant and avaricious neighbor. In searching for national security in international competition, Rousseau finds the solution in qualities of a people that make it receptive of the social contract in the first place. And it is these qualities he speaks most highly about: I see only one way of giving it the stability it lacks: to infuse, so to speak, the soul of its confederates into the entire nation, to establish the republic in the hearts of the Poles so thoroughly that it endures there in spite of all of its oppressors’ efforts…Poland was in Russia’s chains, but the Poles remained free…You may not be able to keep them from swallowing you, do at least see to it that they cannot digest you. No matter what is done, Poland will have been overwhelmed by its enemies a hundred times before it can be given everything it needs in order to be in a position to resist them. The virtue of Citizens, their patriotic zeal, the distinctive form which its national institutions may give their soul, this is the only rampart that will stand ever ready to defend it, and which no army could subdue by force. Here the call for virtue and patriotism is fused with the talk of a military doctrine distinct from France’s or Russia’s. He elaborates later that “I should like [Poland] to devise its own distinctive tactics…to train primarily for speed and lightness…to excel in what is known as guerilla warfare, all the maneuvers appropriate to light troops, the art of
sweeping over a country like a torrent, to strike everywhere without ever being struck". The small states cannot duplicate the military system of the big monarchic states, but their liberty spawns a unique military discipline that serves the limited, defensive goals they embrace.

This thus calls for the formation of the citizen militia. Like Machiavelli, Rousseau ties the militia system of the Swiss to the great political liberty they were able to enjoy. And the independence of the Swiss validated the superiority of the militia system of a free people over the modern army of a rich prince. Only when they separated military success from civic virtues and started to vendor their military skills to foreigners did the Swiss finally succumb to the French who had previously failed to subjugate the Swiss. Rousseau thus reminds us that martial valor is only the fruition and manifestation of political health of the republic: “Among a new people where the common interest is still in all its vigor, all citizens are soldiers during times of war and there are no longer any soldiers during times of peace. This is one of the best signs of the youth and vigor of a nation.” And conversely, to sustain the dedication to public life the citizenry must have, it is even necessary to penalize those who refuse to bear arms for the state.

The militia and its guerrilla tactics have their inherent deficiency in that they hardly lend themselves to any adventurous war of aggrandizement. The lack of any offensive capabilities means they cannot get any territorial gains, compensations or other entitlements of a recognized power. In a word, a free republic does not make a great power. But using the strength inherent and unique to itself, it can now choose to withdraw from European diplomacy completely. The conventional instruments of diplomacy can be of no assistance when it comes to a war of national resistance against bigger neighbors. “No one who depends on others, and lacks resources of his own, can ever be free”, Rousseau warns, and he calls the republics to “leave negotiations, then, to the powers, and depend on yourselves only.” A unique military system and tactics and disengagement from a European system of balances and equilibrium thus constitute the central components of Rousseau’s international system that relies not on coalitions and parity of forces but rather the unbending spirit and valor of a free citizenry.

What we have is thus a two-tiered system in which big states and small states uneasily coexist while being organized along two opposite political principles, military doctrines, and diplomatic strategies. The big monarchies would continue their rivalries and maintain their equilibrium whereas small states must exempt themselves from such rivalries and balancing and seek safety through the deterrence effect of national resistance. What Rousseau bequeaths on the small states is thus a security culture entirely distinct from that of the leading European powers and is one that affords a particular kind of protection to the states founded on the social contract.

In conclusion, what Rousseau delineates for us is a completely subaltern culture of war and security unknown to the major powers and most likely belonging only to states and peoples that have gone “rogue”. The philosophical weight that Rousseau has given for disengaging the normal conventions of war and of power politics has certainly resonated with the twentieth century discourses on “small wars” and guerrillas that have persisted till this century.

Beyond pacifism and realism
To say that Rousseau’s international thought is important to his overall political theory is to concede that his political theory very much determines the purpose and limit of his intellectual outreach to international relations. I have argued that, in spite of modern use of Rousseau in both the realist and cosmopolitan traditions of international studies, his theoretical preoccupation with the political health and independence of the small, well-governed states is incompatible with the realist or pacifist readings of Rousseau. He chooses to shun realpolitik and cosmopolitan rights as solutions to the survival of the small republics. In linking the survival of a civil state to the political virtues and passions of its free citizens Rousseau offers a powerful and refreshing critique of realism and cosmopolitanism alike.

In Rousseau’s time, the equilibrium of Europe was a concept well understood and committed to by its leading statesmen. Its practice was carefully draped in a discourse of the obligations and entitlements of nations. But the small states were permanently shortchanged in this system because they lacked the public rights and entitlements of major states and were not considered essential to the equilibrium and also because for states that craved neither prestige nor power but only their own independence the diplomatic instruments and maneuvers in the system could offer them no reliable alliances.

Rousseau was especially dismissive of foreign treaties as insurance of peace. No prospect exists for a social contract state of aligning with powerful monarchies to protect itself from others because they were all treacherous backstabbers. Plenty of evidence supports Rousseau’s deep suspicion of the powers: notoriously Britain made a habit of abandoning allies before the end of a war, and this was generally true of Prussia, Austria, France, and Russia as well. Such frequent betrayal was not a mark of hypocrisy but embodied the operating principle of equilibrium. Balancing against any hegemonic power and cutting it down to size, even if that means resorting to pre-emptive war, was regarded as the Christian thing to do, even if it meant backing out of an alliance that saw one’s own ally gaining too much through that alliance. It was not unchristian and unfaithful then to abandon one’s coalition partner; rather, such backstabbing was honorable and in fact reinforced that sense of European family of states. But it could certainly be disastrous for small states and jeopardize their very survival. States founded on the principles of liberty and justice must spurn the notion of this European family of states and all its diplomatic instruments for protection; that Rousseau would except an alliance with the Turks from this rule was precisely the proof of how far Rousseau wanted the republics to distance themselves from the practice of realpolitik and diplomatic conventions of Europe. It was certainly not the equilibrist in Rousseau who encouraged Poles to seek Ottoman help.

The diplomatic system that constantly mistreated and harmed the small states was actually reflective of the basic inequality of power and rights of European states. Small states occupied a dubious place in European equilibrium because they were at once denied any important role in influencing diplomacy and needed as rewards or compensations for major powers. The younger William Pitt thus commented that small states could not have any geopolitical weight – and existence – of their own and should be sacrificed for the sake of the balance and sacrosanct peace between the major powers, and he was perhaps only echoing Burke’s opinion in this regard. On the famous Polish case, Schroeder thus wrote that for Poland to protect its independence at
the time it would have to initiate internal reforms and model itself after the leading nations just to gain a seat at the diplomatic table, and only then could Poland earn itself any reliable “friends”. Rousseau warned of a serious flaw in the plan of reform that would make it effectively self-defeating; namely, any budding reform to make itself a credible and formidable power would immediately incur Russia’s jealousy and accelerate its encroachment of Poland.

Without depending on alliances and transforming Poland into a state that could match Russia or Prussia’s military might while losing its political liberty, Rousseau’s prescription for Poland’s safety comes to require a differentiation of offensive and defensive warfare. For a state that is committed to the equilibrium, there can be no difference between an offensive war and a defensive war. It wanted to expand its territory because it had to match the gains of its rivals, so such a war of expansion was also defensive; the pain of losing territory was mainly felt as augmentation of the enemy and the shifting of the balance of power, so even a war fought on one’s own terrain stemmed from the same ideological (and even eschatological) commitment to the equilibrium. The kings of Europe fervently built up standing armies because only those armies could be put into use of wars of balancing. With Rousseau’s call for patriotism and national resistance, however, we start to see the political as well as the military differentiation between offense and defense. Only a free republic can completely separate offensive and defensive capabilities – the former based on the professionalism of a modern army and the latter on the citizen-soldiers’ fierce, telluric attachment to the fatherland – whereas in realpolitik such a distinction cannot exist. In the equilibrium of big powers an arms race will always spiral out of control exactly because all national defenses become means of offense and a source of potential harm to neighbors. This distinction between offense and defense may well be Rousseau’s most neglected contribution to modern international relations theory.

Self-exiled from the system of international treaties and European public rights, the Rousseauean state is peaceable not because it is legally bounded but because it is not built to be a war machine and lacks any offensive capabilities. The social contract does not guarantee that the state will carry itself in equitable and fair manners vis-à-vis other states in its external affairs but that it is culturally and institutionally weak in this aspect, a weakness that nevertheless does not render it an easy prey.

In addition to deterrence, the German model of many small states forming a confederation to defend their rights against the Empire and other threats was suggested by Rousseau (and earlier by Montesquieu) as a paradigm for small, well-governed states to emulate. Montesquieu, too, spoke of differentiating the security imperatives of small states and big states and saw in the German example a smart compromise between the virtues of small republics and the safety of big monarchies: “it is very likely that ultimately men would have been obliged to live forever under the government of one alone if they had not devised a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of republican government and the external force of monarchy. I speak of the federal republic.” The German model used the collective effort of small states to uphold the democratic form of government in each state. This league of small states could forever stay true to its founding principle: it would be limited to defense and deterrence and unable to pursue glory and power. An offensive war and any gains resulting from it would naturally dissolve the alliance very quickly. For both Montesquieu and Rousseau,
the defensive posture small states usually take means that international law would only be needed to regulate offensive force. Consequently, we can see how different Rousseau and Montesquieu’s approach to the law of nations is from modern cosmopolitans: the two believe that these rational laws only govern offensive wars and balance of power behaviors, whereas defensive leagues are necessary to protect the weak on the defensive side (and in Rousseau’s case, the methods of national resistance obviously must not be restricted by the conventions of war so favored by the “moderate” big monarchies).

Insofar as peace is a result of small states’ ability to deter any aggression and their lack of any significant power to fight a war away from their native soil, Rousseau does not need to propose a comprehensive set of laws of the nations or cosmopolitan rights to displace the concept of realpolitik. In fact, it is highly doubtful that the hope of peace can depend on any sense of international justice even with states that embrace the principles of justice and political right. Political justice and equality in the state gives it immeasurable strength in resisting an invasion, but Rousseau also points out that the general will of its people is not necessarily just and righteous in their dealing with strangers. A vigorous exercise of the general will shields the small states from the vicious wars of realpolitik, but it also rules out the absolute, “hard” peace of cosmopolitanism.

A few fragments from 1750s on war and the state of war are usually held to be proof that Rousseau also contributed to the modern development of laws of the nations. But such a contribution, if real, was meager compared to the more noted international jurists of his time. It was not due to the lack of intellectual acuity or interest in matters of international politics, however. Rather, I contend that Rousseau does not desire a comprehensive set of rights and only wants a small number of laws that can be derived directly from the social contract theory (that is, essentially, that the war ends when the political state is terminated and further killing cannot be justified as part of the political war). Even for international laws that can be safely deduced from his theories of domestic associations, he intends to limit of the scope of its applicability and does not expect it to evolve into an all-encompassing theory of war rights that remotely resembles modern legislation of war crimes and crimes against humanity; no rational, universal law could flow from his social contract theory.

In the Social Contract Rousseau already mentions the geographical, demographic and economic limits to the state if it is going to be governed according to the principle of political right and equality. The limit on its size is the most unyielding obstacle to a universal general will of peace and any cosmopolitan rights associated with it. Friedrich thus says of Rousseau that “only the smallest communities are likely to possess such a general will. This approach seems to bar completely the idea of a universal order under law such as Kant envisaged.” The German model Rousseau extols is exceptional precisely because it preserves the particularity and diversity of member states. For the league to be anything else, it would have to consolidate politically into a tighter unit, with the necessary change of form of government and administration and organization of taxes and militaries. The innovativeness of the German confederation was exactly that the aggregation of the states’ strength can happen without sacrificing their political liberty and replacing their government with a repugnant, despotic form.
A global state, founded on a universal will of peace, is more questionable still. In the seventh of the “Letters Written from the Mountain”, Rousseau divides the state’s internal and external affairs between its legislative and executive powers:

From the principles established in the *Social Contract*, one sees that, in spite of common opinion, alliances of State to State, declarations of War, and treaties of peace are not acts of sovereignty but of Government... The external exercise of Power does not suit the People at all; the great maxims of State are not within its reach; on these it ought to rely on its ... What matters essentially to each Citizen is the observation of the Laws inside, the property of belongings, the safety of private individuals. As long as everything goes well on these three points, let the Councils negotiate and treat with foreign affairs.\(^{109}\)

The inevitable conclusion from this passage is that if peace is made an object of the general will, war and peace become a legislative matter; not executive power but rather the legislative power must be convoked to regulate peace. The general will of peace, now consisting of the entire human race and already stretched by the vastness and diversity of its constituency, would be forced to appropriate both the judiciary and the executive powers and regularly summoned to police and arbitrate every dispute and quarrel and would therefore exhaust itself, slacken and deteriorate and eventually give away to the rule of one or a few men.

**Conclusion**

Rousseau’s international theory is integral to his political philosophy: his audacity in imagining a new international system matches his ambition in reforming political institutions of the *ancien régime* and proposing the social contract. In making this connection between his political thought and international theory, I argue that Rousseau must be placed in neither realist nor pacifist traditions. His preoccupation with the political vigor of the state means that peace is a positive but secondary good for Rousseau. Unlike the social contract that heals the wound of barbarism and civil war among men and citizens, the state cannot and need not live with absolute security. A modicum of insecurity is the best small states can hope for and in fact constantly regenerates their political life. Nonetheless, that does not mean what Rousseau has to offer to the study of international relations today is less than interesting and instructive. In recommending changes to the international system, Rousseau provocatively gives the highest priority to the deterrence of great powers and protection of small states, and his solutions are correspondingly bold and progressive and almost prescient in light of twentieth and twenty-first century developments.

In Rousseau’s international thought we find no certain, absolute prospect of peace. If Rousseau failed to promise perpetual and universal peace, it was only because of his nobler ambition to establish the true principles of political right and justice. Over time, Rousseau rejected all the expedient, obvious solutions because of the intolerable political risks they could pose to the security and well-being of a free people governed justly by the ideals of the social contract. On the one hand, in the prevailing practice of European equilibrium, he saw only a heinous combination of despotism and its apparatus of war that only added to the weight of the yoke of slavery on the despot’s subjects. Therefore, to seek protection through diplomacy and parity of power ineluctably subverts liberty and equality in the republics. On the other hand, in the fanciful picture of perpetual peace...
painted by cosmopolitans, tranquility and cosmopolitanism can only be accomplished by subsuming the general will of particular societies when it is precisely the diversity and peculiarities of nations and peoples that uphold the political integrity – and national security – of the small states.

In recommending patriotism and guerilla warfare as the true pillars of the freedom and independence of the true republics, Rousseau denies the states power and prestige, and for all the sacrifices and dedication he extracts from the citizens he could deliver only a very imperfect sort of security. But the individual’s need for absolute peace is not necessarily duplicated by the state which can live with a certain degree of insecurity, and the political life that the citizen lives finds no corresponding conceptual construct in a man’s private life. In patriotic zeal and national resistance Rousseau sees the precious possibility of the regeneration of the political health and vigor of a free people, and only in light of this lofty moral objective can his idiosyncratic international theory be evaluated and appreciated.

Chapter 2
Government: The Telluric Elements in Rousseau’s Theory of Administration and Raison d’État

In a quarrel with David Hume about the Social Contract, Turgot, Louis XVI's minister, wrote that “this book boils down to the precise difference between sovereignty and government.” Modern Rousseau scholarship says little about the significance of this difference other than acknowledging that making this difference allows Rousseau to place sovereignty in the hands of the people even when there is variation in the forms of government. This chapter, however, will read Rousseau’s theory of government as part of Rousseau’s polemic against the ancien régime and realpolitik. In my reading, Rousseau’s becomes a muscular and expansive account of the role of government. For Rousseau, the sovereign will is simplistic and has even a monadic character and must embody itself through government; I argue that Rousseau is emphatic about the difference between government and sovereignty as this theoretical difference is threatened by absolutism and tyranny and by the popular discourse of raison d’état. In response to the alarming marriage of cosmopolitanism and mercantile statecraft, Rousseau proposes rather that the sanctity and security of the sovereign be protected through a form of government that is predicated on national physiognomy and a people’s telluric attachment to their native land.

Rousseau's own language needs first to be clarified. Rousseau's iteration of the classical taxonomy of monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic governments in the Social Contract may conceal the true scope of his theory of government. But in the opening paragraph of the Discourse on Political Economy he makes clear that this discourse is also a treatise of government: Rousseau wants to equate political economy with the general government of the state, for “economy...originally means the wise and legitimate government of the household, for the common good of the entire family. The meaning of the term was subsequently extended to the government of the large family which is the state.” Political economy thus concerns not just public finance but the equitable and just relations between the private or corporate bodies that make up the body politic at
large. So when Rousseau speaks of political economy, he always speaks of political
government - and vice versa: when he speaks of government or political administration,
he always speaks of the fiscal and economic restraints that each state faces when
searching for a suitable type of government for itself. Economic surplus a nation may
have needs to match the fiscal burden a particular type of government may place on it,
and different types of government can only be supported by different countries.
Rousseau’s use of these terms – public economy, government, or political administration
– is often equivalent, and he seems to switch between these terms only to suit the
perspectives of an argument.

Rousseau’s meaning behind the term “government” poses another obstacle for us
when we try to gain further insight into his administrative theory. Classical taxonomy in
political science concerns the number of people in government, but Rousseau’s aspiration
is to understand what government is and what relationship it has to his conceptualization
of sovereignty. To carve out a theory of government from this new theory of sovereignty,
Rousseau opposes government to sovereignty the way one would oppose physics to
ethics: “every free action has two causes which concur in producing it, one moral, namely
the will which determines it, the other physical, namely the power which executes it...The
body politic has the same motive causes; here, too, a distinction is drawn between force
and will: the latter being called legislative power, the former executive power”; 113 one,
that is, speaking in the voice of generality and the sovereign will, and the other dealing
exclusively in particularity and administrative affairs. Therefore, while the social contract
only asks that the force of all private individuals now be combined into a public force and
be placed under the command of the general will, the way the forces of private members
can be combined and organized varies and tests the wisdom of the institutor of
government in a particular nation. Further, since “a body politic can be measured in two
ways, by the extent of its territory and by the number of its people, and an appropriate
ratio has to obtain between these two measures for the state to be given its genuine
size”, 114 the magnitude of force varies from one people to another and from one state to
another. With this variance of population and territorial sizes in mind, Rousseau finally
zeroes in on the definition of government: it is “the intermediate forces whose relations
constitute the relation of the whole to the whole, or of the sovereign to the state”, 115
which is to say government is the mediated relationship of the people as a constituted
political entity to the people as a concrete demographic and geographic reality. Rousseau
cautions that this relationship is always going to be a product unique to each nation and
“there is also no more than one good government possible in any one state.” 116 And
subsequent chapters in the Social Contract focus on the pivotal question of the size of
territory and population.

This definition of government is a significant deviation from the classical taxonomy
(because the number of people in the government is now a secondary question) and links
Rousseau’s theory of government essentially and conceptually to national
physiognomies 117 – the mœurs, temperament, religion, and tradition of a people and the
climate, terrain, and fertility of its native land. All nations, no matter how different their
physiognomies are, can become a unified political community through a covenant. It is
up to the government to take into account their unique physiognomies and establish the
right institutions and implement the right economic and military policies to ensure their
continuing survival as a political people. Rousseau’s theory of government is thus always

32
telluric in nature in double sense of the word: while most commentators recognize that Rousseau strongly prefers an agrarian economy to an industrial and commercial one and prefers partisan militias to professional armies, the telluric government is not just about the efficacy of an agrarian economy or partisan tactics in a war but about the very possibility of creating the theoretical space for political administration or government that operates with the restraints and advantages of the land, even when the sovereign will remains independent from these restraints and is constant and universally valid. Every well-organized, legitimate government is telluric. In this chapter I will show that it is in Rousseau’s discussion of international politics that the telluric government becomes a sharp critique of the economic and military programs of the tyrannical regimes.

* Due in part to his extolling of national differences, Rousseau is often condemned as one of the earliest political philosophers to fuel the virulent nationalism of later ages.\textsuperscript{118} Blending ethnicity, culture and often civil religion, Rousseau’s emphasis on national characters is considered an unwelcome distraction from constitutional politics and introducing elements alien to politics that imperils principles of liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{119} But Rousseau incorporated national physiognomies in a very systematic critique of despotism and the state of war that existed between European powers that had shaped their military, demographic and economic policies by the early eighteenth century. The general will, a central idea in Rousseau’s political thinking, is not meant to be an abstract principle; it depends on the unique national character of a people to not only regenerate the political health of the state but also institute the necessary forms of government and administration to ensure its survival and safety under the long shadow of war.

Rousseau insists that a just and free political state must spurn the common diplomatic and military strategies in the tradition of realpolitik. Geographic and demographic limitations force a small but well-governed state to disengage from the European system of power politics. Rousseau promises that the same handicaps in territorial and population size offer a unique advantage: in his opinion, a small, virtuous population emotionally attached to its land and deeply familiar with the terrain could make a formidable foe to the likes of France and Russia in guerilla warfare. Despite modern interpretations of Rousseau as a realist or pacifist, deterrence via partisan warfare remains for Rousseau the surest and most valid means of political independence for the small but well-governed states.

Rousseau’s prescription that a small state must find its political independence and war capacity in its national physiognomy can be interpreted as part of his polemic against \textit{raison d’état}. The firm rejection of both realism and cosmopolitanism in Rousseau’s international theory results from his suspicion that the two shared their political origin and motivation in the dogmas of reason of state. Rousseau contrasts the salutary effects of a unique physiognomy to the ills produced by imitative cosmopolitanism – to which the big monarchical states fervently adhered and which Rousseau advised the small states to eschew. The intense rivalry and jealousy between big states that sought military and economic parity created the need for this cosmopolitanism. The latter was reduced to mere statecraft. Thus, for Rousseau, cosmopolitanism and realism became two sides of the same coin, both in service of reason of state. The marriage between realism and cosmopolitanism reflected the nature of the imitative competition that characterized the relations between major powers and was mirrored by their relentlessly mercantilist
policies of war and trade. The idea of national physiognomy serves as the mercantilist reason of state’s necessary foil.

The sculpting of a national physiognomy determines many aspects of political administration. According to Rousseau, economic, fiscal and population policies that stress the telluric elements of civil life need to have long been in place for the guerrilla strategy to be effective in a war. War is the unspoken priority of good political administration whose objective is to permanently put in place an economic and administrative order that can support partisan tactics in a time of actual conflict. War must be undertaken at the level of political administration and political economy, and to prepare for partisan warfare the government must be designed to be telluric.

Being cut off from the telluric elements is a sign of the administration’s terminal decline and corruption, and out of desperation it has to rely increasingly on the doctrine of reason of state and the practice of mercantilism. As such, mercantilist policies take on a profoundly ambivalent meaning in Rousseau’s political theory: mercantilism is sometimes construed as an unhealthy administrative policy that is unfortunately necessary in a time of war or crisis, but it is more often deemed the very demise of political administration – namely, the concentration of financial and military power in the hands of so few that it contradicts not only the prudent doctrines of public economy but the principle of popular sovereignty. In offering the telluric as an unorthodox type of statecraft, Rousseau is making a distinction crucial to his political philosophy between statecraft as an administrative doctrine and reason of state as a political doctrine.

I argue that Rousseau introduces the concept of a telluric war to manage and contain the theoretic impact of war as a strictly administrative problem. Neither the sovereign, which always wills its security and survival, nor the political, which is but the manifestation of the sovereign will, is ever called into question when a state makes war and makes war policies. Rousseau makes it abundantly clear that the political is not evoked in formulating governmental policies because the sovereign need not be summoned in the state’s conducting economic, demographic and even war and foreign policies. By contrast, the popular discourse of raison d’état does not consider the birth of professional armies and the rise of big capitals as mere instruments of state interests; rather, the prestige and preponderant power of modern armies and capital cities are used to underscore the emergence of a new logic of the political: the political life must be restricted to the practice of realpolitik, and only mercantilist policies give the sovereign the unfettered freedom to engage in politics. The entire notion of administration has to be suppressed in reason of state thinking in that the telluric nature of political administration entangles war and diplomacy in a web of geographic, economic, cultural or religious relations. Monarchism in particular is seen as the most convenient way to obscure the administrative realm. That is to say, monarchism is no longer a form of government but a form of sovereignty. Rousseau is well aware that mercantilists’ preference of standing armies and big capitals is not so much a matter of public policy as usurpation of the sovereign authority by rulers of the state.

Many view Rousseau’s later political writings, including those on Poland and Corsica, as signs that Rousseau gradually developed a more (proto-)sociological, Montesquieu-esque perspective in deviation from his early, “abstract” style. But in the Social Contract Rousseau already sensed an urgent need for a theory of administration that takes into account the geographic and ethnographic physiognomy of nations.
Rousseau realizes that without a good government we would have in its stead not a bad government but an illegitimate principle of sovereignty. For only in dismantling the telluric administration does the tyrant arrogate the sovereign authority to himself. In other words, tyranny collapses the theoretical distinction between political sovereign and public administration. For that reason Rousseau’s theory of social contract and his critique of despotism were always going to be something more than a theory of political sovereignty.

Telluric war and physiognomic government as statecraft

Ethnography was not new to political science, and the influence of climate and terrain on politics and peoples was studied by Machiavelli and Montesquieu, two authors Rousseau was very familiar with. That the fertility of the soil, size of the territory, and climate of the land are all correlated with the right form of government that a people can live with is not Rousseau’s discovery, and his findings were not different from Montesquieu’s. The provocative part was Rousseau’s use of physiognomy as a blunt weapon of reason of state for the small republics in their struggle for independence in an international system dominated by big states and by endless wars of aggrandizement, equilibrium, compensation, and sheer grandezza.

Rousseau strongly advises the republics against imitating the mercantilist policies of big monarchies. Emulating the mercantilist policies diminishes the distinctive mœurs and cultures of small nations, and it is dangerous to do so because imitation of the big powers would quickly incur the latter’s jealousy. Only the big monarchies could duplicate the industrial and trade policies of each other, and when adopting these cosmopolitan policies the major powers have actually trapped themselves in an unceasing military and strategic rivalry. The jealous imitation and fierce competition are the essence of reason of state, and Rousseau’s critique of imitators and his praise of nations that retain their own characters serve as an alternative to the seemingly triumphant discourse and practice of reason of state of the eighteenth century. Statecraft for the Rousseauean states must be physiognomic and would consist of partisan warfare and agrarian political economy. The art of government that Rousseau can recommend thus draws from a rich discussion of the sociological and geographic conditions of nations, and it must be seen first and foremost as a polemic against the imitateness and cosmopolitanism implied by European realpolitik and statecraft at the time.

Rousseau’s physiognomic politics

The study of government has to be comparative – this is what Rousseau preached in the final pages of *Emile*. Hence the need for traveling before the young man’s education can finally be completed. A Frenchman, Rousseau says, looks for artists when traveling to another country; an Englishman looks for antiques; and a German looks for letters and sciences; but a Spaniard studies the country’s morals and government, which according to Rousseau are the only useful knowledge a traveler can bring back home. He adds that political science must pay close attention to the terrain of the land and the temperament of the people that are shaped by topography and weather.

The goodness of government consists in ensuring the survival of national physiognomy. Corsica, which Rousseau considers to be the “one country left in Europe capable of receiving legislation”, derives its strength from its national character. He
eagerly offers his political advice to Corsicans and argues that the point of departure for any good government for the insular nation is its unique national character:

The first rule to be followed is the principle of national character; for each people has, or ought to have, a national character; if it did not, we should have to start by giving it one. Islanders above all, being less mixed, less merged with other peoples, ordinarily have one that is especially marked. The Corsicans in particular are naturally endowed with very distinct characteristics; and if this character, disfigured by slavery and tyranny, has become hard to recognize, it is also, on the other hand, because of their isolated position, easy to re-establish and preserve. 

Likewise, in advising the Poles, Rousseau cites the wisdom of Moses in creating a distinctive national character for a small nation that was about to be overwhelmed by neighbors:

[Moses] gave it morals and practices which could not be blended with those of the other nations; he weighted it down with distinctive rites and ceremonies; he constrained it in a thousand ways in order to keep it constantly alert and to make it forever a stranger among other men, and all the bonds of fraternity he introduced among the members of his republic were as many barriers which kept it separated from its neighbors and prevented it from mingling with them.

And in “A History of the Valais”, he also compliments the people for their difference from other Europeans, especially those of the biggest nations, who all but resembled each other in culture and in government. In short, a distinctive, unadulterated culture is the centerpiece of Rousseau’s political counsel for establishing a government in a true, free republic.

The native land of a nation nourishes its character, and only with a strong attachment to the soil can a people hope to preserve its unique character. Rousseau notes that “when a country is not peopled by colonists, it is the nature of the soil that gives rise to the original character of the inhabitants.” Accordingly, Rousseau wants to stress the importance of agrarian economy to both Poles and Corsicans. Rousseau’s resentment of polite, urban life is well-known, and later in his life he stubbornly took up residence in the countryside.

In telling the story of Emile’s life after the completion of his education, Rousseau laments that the decision to move to the city was the most fatal one in Emile’s life that destroyed his wife’s virtue and his own happiness. In his political philosophy, Rousseau argues that only the rural life is compatible with the civic requirement of patriotic zeal and virtuous austerity: “Peasants are much more attached to their soil than are townsmen to their cities. The equality and simplicity of rural life have…an attraction which leaves them with no desire to change it…hence the love of country which attaches him to its constitution.” These words were not a romantic’s attraction to the idyllic way of life. For Rousseau, the telluric sentiment is a political sentiment that he would employ in constructing a good government and eventually deploy in a guerilla war of national resistance.

Therefore, national physiognomy needs to be entrenched in all aspects of civil life, including an emphasis on agriculture as the primary occupation for citizens and even regulation of cultural productions such as music and theater. His quarrel with Jean-Phillipe Rameau concerning the status of French music had at least something to do with the question of physiognomy. And in the “Letter to D’Alembert” he argues that “the general effect of the Theater is to strengthen the national character, to augment the
natural inclinations, and to give a new energy to all the passions…its effect being limited to intensifying and not changing, the established morals.” The focus on the economic and cultural aspects of a community in Rousseau’s later writing is not meant to divert readers from the philosophical principles established in the Social Contract. Rather, physiognomy has an explicit political purpose for Rousseau, and the political health and freedom of a nation depends on its unique physiognomy.

Elsewhere in Europe, national differences were rapidly disappearing: “as the original character of a people fades from day to day…one sees the gradual disappearance of those national differences.” Such is the mutual dependence between the peoples and their native lands that the topography of the terrain that a people inhabits is usually lost along with the race’s own physiognomy. The ancients had “regarded themselves as autochthonous or native to their own country”, but moderns, in mixing with other races and getting rid of their unique features and temperaments, also transformed their native lands through civilization and progress. Europe had become more homogeneous and literally flatter.

The loss of unique national physiognomy is indicative of moral and political decadency of Europe: when we can no longer distinguish a Gaul from a Germans or Spaniard, they all become “nothing but Scythians who have degenerated in various ways in their looks and still more in their morals.” Nations lose their distinctive features because cultures “are perhaps being daily bastardized by the general European tendency to adopt the tastes and morals of the French.” Calling the assimilation of all European nations “deceptive appeals to empty precepts”, Rousseau was concerned that the allure of cosmopolitanism would drain the political vitality of European peoples. Ultimately, to follow the metropolitan fashion of the French, an originally agrarian economy would have to substitute industries and manufacturing for agriculture and change its sumptuary laws and tax regimes. So only a cosmopolitan in aesthetics and ethics opts to be a cosmopolitan in commerce and politics. Cosmopolitanism poses a threat not only to the simple passions and morals of some Polish farmers but also to the entire system of a telluric political economy and public administration.

The perverted cosmopolitanism, the perverted peace: the imitativeness and jealousy of raison d’état
Rousseau’s fiery rhetoric about national physiognomy gives modern readers the unmistakable impression that he was a nationalist who rejected the more enlightened sentiments of cosmopolitanism. It is no doubt true that for Rousseau “man’s highest duties and deepest loyalties should be bound up with his role as a citizen of his fatherland” and that he has made many “unfavorable [references] to the suprapolitical man, the cosmopolitan in the true sense”; another author notes that in Rousseau “such cosmopolitanism is not a mark of progress, but of degeneracy, since it denotes the absence of love for one’s country, one’s fellow citizens”. Yet, few commentators have made the connection between his criticism of cosmopolitanism and his derision of contemporary discourses of reason of state.

Already in his commentary on the Abbé St. Pierre, Rousseau rejected St. Pierre’s brand of cosmopolitanism because he believed a cosmopolitan was just a realist who doublespeaks. Rousseau dismissed the Abbé’s pacifism not because it was a hollow moral slogan. St Pierre’s plan was in fact extremely elaborate, and he understood well
that the hope of perpetual peace had to rest on the cultural, religious and commercial ties of European peoples. Part of the Abbé’s plan was to strengthen the sense of historical and religious community comprising all European states, but the identity of commercial interests was the most important pillar of his peace proposal. This means the prospect of peace ultimately depends on a set of industrial, economic and population policies uniformly applicable to and adopted by all European powers. St. Pierre spared no detail in drafting these policies. St. Pierre’s call for growing industry and commerce, for rapid urbanization and tax reforms, and for developing lines of communication within the state all shows a man with a very modern perspective who advocated a universal principle of statecraft that he believes could lead to perpetual peace. At any rate, St. Pierre expected commercial states to easily balance against an ascendant military power because the major powers all had the same military training and discipline. The state’s increasing ability to learn from the technological and tactical improvements of other states’ militaries and their tendency to balance against each other is yet another way to ensure peace.

In his own writings, Rousseau denounced these policies and in particular rejected the notion of the uniformity and universality. St. Pierre’s policies were the political fashion of his century, but more fashionable still was the very idea that the most successful policies of one state must be copied by all others. This idea firmly took hold among politicians and political thinkers in the eighteenth century. The cosmopolitanism that Rousseau so resolutely opposed was not just a few commercial and industrial policies that may incite an average citizen’s cosmopolitan spirit and taste – it reflected a strategic imperative for statesmen to duplicate and match the success of trade and economic policies in other nations. Failure to be cosmopolitan in morals and tastes could mean a depressed demand for one nation’s manufactures, for example, and thus amounts to an economic and strategic disadvantage for the nation. The eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism was inherently competitive and realist.

This sort of cosmopolitanism in which a state’s desire to imitate cosmopolitan and progressive morals and policies is rooted in its strategic anxiety about its power and prestige certainly found eloquent expression in the works of David Hume and Adam Smith. Hume sees jealousy, prudence and the defense of European equilibrium all as the same thing because the envy of an ascendant power and the desire to balance against is “founded on true politics and prudence”; he quickly adds the imitative spirit as the only way to help oneself and to balance against their powers. As long as global trade and continuous progress of arts and sciences provide the surest path to a nation’s prosperity, cosmopolitanism is the best strategy for realpolitik. Therefore, for Hume “jealous emulation” becomes the foundation for European balance of power and peace. Smith, too, argues that emulation stems from a state’s deep anxiety about its power and prestige and its jealousy of those of its neighbors. Istvan Hont observes that in eighteenth century political discourses it is impossible to separate the imitative spirit of progress and cosmopolitanism and the vicious security competition of leading states, all of which fear the accomplishments of others. Both the imitativene ss and the competitiveness are encoded into the logic of cosmopolitanism and realism. As such, emulation “expressed a jealous and tireless zeal to obtain glory and honor. It was a vehicle of grandezza, a quest for national preeminence.” When a realist like Kenneth Waltz said states must
“emulate the successful policies of others”, he was only echoing the two-century old opinion.

Rousseau understands the paradoxical nature of this cosmopolitanism. Citing Russians and Peter I as an example, Rousseau expresses his fear of Russia’s success in transforming itself into a geopolitical power but also laments the huge price this transformation has taken on the Russian national character:

Peter’s genius was imitative…He wanted from the first to make Germans, Englishmen, whereas he should have begun by making Russians; he prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they could be by persuading them that they are what they are not…The Russian Empire will try to subjugate Europe, and will itself be subjugated.

And years later when addressing the Poles, Rousseau warns them to “take care to do precisely the opposite of what this widely praised Tsar did.” A Rousseauean state rejects the urge to be cosmopolitan and to be imitative, and this means it also rejects the temptation to grow military and economic muscle and rejects all the prestige and status that comes with it.

In fact, Rousseau’s obsession with national physiognomy and his opposition to imitation are so emphatic and uncompromising that he seems to turn the idea of democratic peace on its head. While democratic peace was later made a very influential idea by Kant, we can see a very articulate expression of it at least a century earlier in François Fénelon, whom Rousseau rates highly. Fénelon suggests that the best peace terms are the political reform of the delinquent aggressor. Fénelon’s idea that the purpose of cosmopolitan peace is better served by endowing the vanquished enemy with a good constitution than by imposing a vindictive victor’s justice by diminishing its power and dismembering its territory (in the manner of, say, the Versailles Treaty) heralds the modern pacifist thesis that propagation of liberal democratic ideals is the best way to stem violent conflicts between states. And in Fénelon’s imagination, the defeated people are all the more grateful to the victors for receiving a just, republican form of government. Rousseau, however, turns this thesis on its head, remarking ruefully that the objective of conquest is sometimes no more than the reformation of the constitution of the state in that to allow one’s constitution to be changed by the enemies is the greatest humiliation; it was indeed the maxim of the Greeks “to foster among their enemies and to banish from among themselves the effeminate and the sedentary arts that enervate and soften men.” The forced acceptance of cosmopolitan morals and the loss of one’s own distinctive culture and manner signify the most complete political defeat for a nation. That Rousseau refuses to settle for cosmopolitan peace of any kind, even to the point of challenging the admired Fénelon, is telling evidence that, if peace and security are possible, Rousseau is determined to find them in national physiognomy, which also preserves nations’ moral purity and political legitimacy.

Rousseau’s statecraft: partisan war and telluric administration
In the Social Contract Rousseau hinted that he considered countries like Corsica and Poland the most fertile ground where a legitimate polity may yet take root and where the people can still accept just laws. Later he was courted by Poles and Corsicans to give them laws and institutions, and the result was two treatises that address both the general principles of political right and the complexities of the international, social and economic
conditions of the two nations. “The Government of Poland” and “Constitutional Project for Corsica” are thus crucial to our understanding of Rousseau’s theory of administration and why it must be founded on national physiognomy. Further, external threats to Poland’s and Corsica’s independence are constantly mentioned by Rousseau to justify the physiognomic features of the administration. War is an important objective of administration, and the physiognomic administration is Rousseau’s critique of and proposed alternative to the deceptive doctrine of eighteenth-century statecraft.

While the principles of political right are universal, Rousseau insists that public administration must adapt to national conditions and must be telluric. To the Poles Rousseau ceaselessly calls for reviving – or just inventing – rites and ceremonies that are unique to them. A Polish culture, thus protected and fortified, must also influence the setup of their political economy: the right economic system needs to be consistent with “the simple customs and wholesome tastes” of the people; more specifically, an economy that preserves these customs tend to be agrarian economy. The same advice was given to Corsicans. Policies that favor manufacture and commerce, two trades that tend to depopulate the countryside and force peasants to seek employment in the cities, not to mention the ill effects of importing cosmopolitan tastes incompatible with national morals, are vehemently denounced.

All this discussion of national character and the agrarian economy that underlies and reinforces it culminates in Rousseau’s recommendation of the militia system and the option of partisan war as means of national independence. To begin with, Rousseau notes that an agrarian economy, abundant in its produce but meager in the tax money it generates, cannot support regular troops. Consequently, a Rousseauean state must defend itself with an irregular force, basically a citizen-militia, and fill its rank with zealous patriots drafted from its citizenry. Peasants’ telluric attachment to their land can replace money as the sinew of war. The simplicity of the rural population’s virtue and customs actually becomes a component of raison d’état: “Agriculture is the only means of maintaining the external independence of a state…Commerce produces wealth, but agriculture ensures freedom.” Rousseau further notes that the form of government suitable to preside over an agrarian economy is democracy, both because of the poverty (because there is no species of money to circulate in the economy and because the population tends to be widely dispersed when no big city dominates the nation) and the fierce love of freedom, which makes the people invincible in a battle. Thus we can see the perfect continuity in Rousseau’s cultural, economic, fiscal and military policies, which now make up a coherent and comprehensive doctrine of national security.

Rousseau’s principle of national defense is thus that small states can be shielded from the turbulence of international politics only by turning themselves into a difficult prey. That is to say, partisan warfare must be used primarily as a means of deterrence:

I should not like [Poland] slavishly to imitate the tactics of other nations. I should like it to devise its own distinctive tactics, which would develop and perfect its natural and national dispositions, to train primarily for speed and lightness…to excel in what is known as guerilla warfare, all the maneuvers appropriate to light troops, the art of sweeping over a country like a torrent, to strike everywhere without ever being struck.

With partisan warfare, “you will never succeed in making it difficult for your neighbors to enter your territory; but you can succeed in making it difficult for them to leave it with
impunity.” Here the telluric elements are not only reflective of civic virtues of the people but cited as a mode of war and instrument of statecraft for a well-governed republic; non-military aspects of public administration – cultural, economic, demographic, etc. – are also designed to be telluric and conducive to this war strategy.

Rousseau was actually amused that the great powers failed to see that the efforts they made to harm their small neighbors were usually beneficial to the latter. Their adherence to mercantilist policies that favor industry and commerce could explain why they despised the telluric form of administration. For the policy makers in major European capitals all believed reason of state entailed the mercantilist economic and military policies, and a telluric administration that would not imitate the mercantilist policies then in vogue in Europe and instead derive its features from a people’s physiognomy does not incite jealousy. So the Genoese foolishly prohibited trade in Corsica, not knowing that forcing Corsicans to take up agriculture was laying the foundation of their political liberty. And Russians would laugh at a Polish plan to disband its army and dispense with money because the imitative Russians would not be able to understand agriculture and partisan warfare as a source of strength and security.

Poland and Corsica both had a foreign oppressor whose policies, made in ignorance of the fatal consequences of reason of state thinking and purported to keep their neighbors in weakness, could inadvertently do a great deal of good for the small states, which need not subscribe to the ruthless and shortsighted logic of reason of state. After renouncing the imitativoisness and the cosmopolitan ethos, the mode of war known to the small, free republics and their political rationality are diametrically opposed to the big powers’.

Discourses of war and statecraft
War does not disappear from among even the most just and equitable peoples, and in Rousseau’s opinion a people’s injustice to strangers is often a sign not of corruption but rather vibrancy of the general will of the people. We measure the health and vigor of a political society from the way it makes war. For Rousseau, war is political: by definition only the political death of one people ends the war. While this sounds like a mundane thesis among early modern political theorists, I want to argue that only with Rousseau is war discussed as an object of administration. Fundamental differences exist in their approach to the question of war between Rousseau and the two authors he often picks as his interlocutors, Grotius and Hobbes. These differences are reflected in the places these thinkers occupy in the intellectual tradition of reason of state. Statecraft did not make an appearance in Grotius’s and Hobbes’s writings, and yet both have a very prominent place in Meinecke’s book on Staatsräson and in all scholarly works on the subject since Meinecke. By contrast, Rousseau’s unusual proposal of envisaging a kind of statecraft specific to small states has largely been ignored. This contrast of posthumous receptions of Rousseau and Grotius and Hobbes in the reason of state literature sheds light on how the question of war is allowed to enter the discourse of reason of state. For Hobbes and Grotius, the rights of war and conquest are most elaborately theorized and are used to underscore a new logic of the political and sovereignty, and Meinecke seizes upon this new logic as the two thinkers’ most important philosophical contribution to the doctrine of reason of state. With Rousseau, however, war is an administrative function, and war policies need to be formulated against the backdrop of an expansive concept of public administration or political economy that evokes the historical and ethnographic
complexities of different communities and encompasses the economic and social relations within them. For Rousseau the resilience of political life of the state must be found in the telluric character of its economy and war.

_The political, unfettered_

Exactly how much does Grotius or Hobbes have to say about reason of state? In the prolegomena of _The Rights of War and Peace_ Grotius states flatly that “I have forborne meddling with those things that are of a quite different subject, as the giving rules about what it may be profitable or advantageous for us to do: for they properly belong to the art of politicks.”168 Hobbes, too, fails to make any direct use of the idea of reason of state.169 Of course, if compared to Grotius’s writings, Hobbes’s include a far more developed contractualist theory and a far less substantial section on international relations. His study of Thucydides and international politics taught him only that states cannot have the same moral standards as individuals and “the sovereign in embodying the state was acting in the same amoral environment as man in nature.”170

The lack of reference to the reason of state in the two’s philosophy of state can be excused, Meinecke argues, because the rich content of the theory of statecraft could not be accommodated in the high abstraction of state theories – statecraft was just too “practical” for Hobbes and Grotius.171 And in any case both would happily concede that no limit can be placed on the state when it has to act out of convenience in a time of necessity. For instance, Grotius argues that, while the kings may not be completely entitled to their domain, “when reasons of state require to levy new subsidies, [kings] may, upon such an occasion, mortgage any part of the publick patrimony.”172 And reason of state must seem to Hobbes to be an unnecessary piece in his theory of state because he already “succeeded in freeing the holder of State authority from all duties and restrictions arising out of any contract; he succeeded in furnishing this executive with almost unlimited resources of power.”173 The notion of reason of state is clearly presumed, albeit not mentioned very often, in Hobbes and Grotius. The omission of reason of state in their theories is an indication not of statecraft’s insignificance but rather that “all the power-measures, cunning ruses and underhand tricks of Machiavellism are permissible.”174

But the decisive contribution they made to the maturation of reason of state thinking in the age of absolutism is the new political rationality found in their discourse of war rights. For Grotius, there is a pressing need to define the distinctiveness of the political realm in his jurisprudence of war because every conquest must be a political conquest and not a robbery: only the discovery of the political can render operable his important judicial thesis that members of a society can be enslaved and lose their political sovereignty even when they retain their personal liberty.175 One can argue that the solemnity of public war is also used by Grotius to emphasize this political logic previously unknown to pirates and others who took part in private wars, which had economic or religious purposes that were incompatible with the strictly political nature of public war. The whole discourse of conquest rights depends on the distinctiveness of the political logic. Hobbes is a still more articulate voice than Grotius on the new political rationality that is created in a social contract and during the state’s founding – and the best hope of articulating the political again rests on sovereignty established through war and conquest.176
It is during the post-bellum negotiations of rights between the victors and the vanquished that we get to witness the momentous birth of the political reason. Theory of reason of state is best nurtured by the jurisprudence of conquest rights; art of war or art of government becomes irrelevant. Unsurprisingly, Meinecke argues it was at the hands of two state theorists who are largely reticent about statecraft that “the action of state authority thus appears to be freed of all fetters, and the idea of *raison d’état* to have reached its zenith.” Similarly, in *No Virtue Like Necessity*, a recent study that in many aspects updates Meinecke’s *Machiavellism*, everything about subsequent developments of modern diplomacy and geopolitics was labeled “Hobbist”, an adjective the author used with alarming abandon, even though Hobbes had said very little about them. For ultimately the reason of state doctrine concerns itself with the emergence of a new rationalism or rationality and not some pitiful recipe-books of statecraft. To the degree that Hobbes is the powerful and eloquent advocate of the rationality of state and its ability to carry out its rational planning completely unimpeded by other considerations, he remains a figure of enormous importance even when he is reticent about practical policies of government.

Furthermore, throughout Meinecke’s book he assumes that monarchism is most closely identified with the principle of reason of state. Of course, this preference for monarchism can be expressed without royalist sentimentality and bias. Hobbes, for one, apparently favors monarchism as well, if only because he believes the new political reason can more easily be defined and operate with a monarchy than with a democracy (at any rate, the Hobbesian sovereignty is always absolute and even in a democratic form must promptly generate a political rationality in order to preserve itself). To Meinecke and Hobbes monarchism represented the most convenient form of political reason and the most convenient way for the state to pursue its interest. And externally realpolitik becomes a token of the increasing autonomy of the political in modern Europe and is the singularly eminent dimension and application of the (now emancipated and purified) logic of the political. It is thus the ascendancy of the political and reason of state that precipitates the convergence of realpolitik and the absolute reign of one. We will see below how Rousseau’s notion of telluric war overthrows this intellectual edifice of reason of state.

*Rousseau’s war: the resilience of the telluric*

Rights of war and conquest lay the foundation for the state theories of Grotius and Hobbes. Rousseau, on the other hand, offers no comparable theory of war rights. Modern commentaries on Rousseau’s international thoughts have mostly settled on the opinion that Rousseau wanted to add clauses to international laws that could protect civilians and prisoners of war but did not believe in the utility of a more expansive set of cosmopolitan laws that can be used to adjudicate the disputes between states or the justice of the causes of war. In other words, Rousseau preferred *jus in bello to jus ad bellum*: he did not hope to eradicate interstate violence through the notion of just war but did believe the violence could become tolerable and manageable when the conduct of war is institutionalized and regulated. In this interpretation, Rousseau is made out to be a visionary whose ideas were subsequently vindicated by twentieth-century development in international law.
Textual proof of his rejection of *jus ad bellum* is plentiful, while the evidence cited of his support of *jus in bello* usually consists of “The State of War” and “Fragments of War”. But Hoffman already notes that *jus in bello* cannot be easily reconciled to Rousseau’s intense interest in the use of patriotic zeal and guerilla tactics against foreign occupation, which inevitably breaks down the combatant-civilian distinction long enshrined in modern international laws. That too often Rousseau was taken as a proponent of that distinction is only a result of the flawed reading of Rousseau’s two short texts on war.

“The State of War” is to great extent a restatement of the definition of war as a political phenomenon: “I call war between one power and another… the effect of a mutual, steady and manifest disposition to destroy the enemy State”, and so “there is war only between moral beings”. Insofar as all wars are political, there can be no doubt that the political distinction between man and citizen must hold for interstate conflicts. The destruction of the state strips all its members of citizenship and reverts them back to private individuals whose killing cannot be an object of war: “Remove the public convention, straightway the state is destroyed… What, then, is it to wage war on a sovereign? It is to attack the public convention and all that results from it… *If the social contract could be severed with a single stroke, the state would be killed, without a single man dying.*” The last sentence most likely gives the impression that Rousseau was having a Grotian moment. But this is unlikely: Rousseau did not believe there could be a set of war rights that would cover the safety and rights of private individuals in their nakedness. His argument was simply that the slaughter of prisoners of war or civilians no longer constitutes acts of war and cannot be justified within the conceptual frame of war as a political institution. So this passage does not imply a demand that the private persons must not be killed, and the example Rousseau added in the next line in the text of the Helot slaves and the ephors of Sparta was to prove this point: the *end* of the war marks an unfortunate but inevitable return to the state of barbarism. Rousseau argued that it was “superfluous” for the ephors to declare war – for this is not a war between states; the war has ended – and what ensued was acts of barbarity for which Rousseau has little theoretical insight to offer. The private individuals of a vanquished state are not “protected” in the sense that they have a right not to be molested by a rampaging army. There is no right accorded them in Rousseau; it is only that the conquerors also lack the contrary right to harm them.

That Rousseau’s manuscript ended abruptly after the brief mention of the Spartan example is perhaps instructive. One must bear in mind that it is precisely this juncture of war – when the properly political relations are destroyed and need to be rebuilt between victorious and the defeated – that Grotius’s and Hobbes’s theories of war rights center on. Their theories of war rights are concerned primarily with the individual rights that are either bargained away, alienated, or retained in the subsequent pact with the conquerors. This is where Grotius’s and Hobbes’s theories are at their most polished and exquisite – and also where Rousseau is bound to keep his silence. He offers no modern notion of protection of private individuals in the consequence of a war. Upon the death of the state, we find that Rousseau’s powerful mind suddenly runs short of political imagination (apart from the probably only half-serious remark that victors can cannibalize their prisoners).
But Rousseau never intended to assume a place next to Grotius as a jurist of the law of nations. If Rousseau’s contractual theory consists of such lacunae of theorization of post-bellum individual rights, he regains his eloquence and imagination in a most fecund discussion of the strategies and administrative infrastructure of war.

The contrast between the principles of reason of state that big, monarchic states followed and the items of statecraft that Rousseau prescribed for the well-constituted, well-governed states indicates that political life now takes a different meaning in Rousseauian small republics and in absolutist states, and the two opposing doctrines of reason of state should result in very different political fate for big and small states in a war. In big states, political life must assume a highly distilled form of rationality and the necessary and regular exercise of that rationality in realpolitik – in equilibrium, comparison, and preemption. In small states, high politics is eclipsed by the strategically pressing need to cultivate an ethnic, cultural, political cohesion of the people that cannot be as easily eroded as in big states, and telluric character of the war of national resistance is predicated on the belief that political passions in the state become more excited and stirred exactly when its borders are violated. Of course, Rousseau’s insistence that war must be political and must cease when a politically organized body no longer exists is still valid, but it does not mean the scope of violence needs to be limited with the judicial differentiation between civilians and combatants (and Rousseau’s advice of partisan warfare and his adherence to the Machiavellian notion of a citizen-militia have clearly ruined the neatness of this division).

Invasion of well-governed states can meet a more violent resistance by a patriotic and determined population in a protracted, partisan war. The telluric war is a plausible strategy for a Rousseauian state only because a telluric administration manages its economy and population well. The telluric administration has always been a war economy: with a dispersed population and agrarian economy the loss of a few towns would not imperil the political cohesion and vigor of the general will of the community. The resilience of political life in the republic can be imputed to the design of its public economy wisely founded in its national physiognomy. The telluric partisans have no capitals to yield, and their constitutions, living only in their customs and traditions, are indestructible. By contrast, the capture of its army or a capital city spells quick doom for a big state; the depletion of the king’s coffers would also accelerate its end. Hence a profound predicament for the big states and their mercantilist rulers: the standing army and the industrial and fiscal systems that support it are both the great accomplishments of the new political rationality and the cause of irreparable fragility of political life of the state.

In Rousseau as well as Grotius and Hobbes, the discourse of war rights and the discourse of war tactics and war economy seem to invariably displace one another. Traditionally the raison d’état thinking has extracted from the discourse of conquest rights a notion of pure political reason that is unencumbered by economy, culture, morals, and religion. Mercantilist policies are the favorite for the doctrine of reason of state because placing a standing army at an absolute monarch’s command and enlarging his coffers expand the scope of freedom of the emancipated political reason. A universally imitable template of the mercantilist state may thus be used to salvage a pure political rationality from historical complexities of a nation’s economic and cultural orders. However, in trimming away all the telluric elements of administration, raison d’état
exposes its own weakness and fragility when the state is tested by war. Rousseau’s partisan is also political, and in his fierce defense of his native land he gives an unrivaled resilience and vivacity to the political. That resilience derives from the physiognomic nature of public war and public economy.

Administrative theory as critique of tyranny

The Rousseauean state is as much a product of political reason as the leviathan is. A potent political will of the sovereign to preserve itself is found in almost every modern contractualist theory of state. Thus a political state lives in permanent animosity with other political states. For Rousseau, however, the general will of self-preservation and the constant pressure of war do not justify the doctrine of reason of state. Rather, he harshly criticizes reason of state as a cheap substitute when the sovereign will is too weakened and when the voice of duty has died in citizens’ hearts, “there is a natural incompatibility between what are called maxims of State and justice and Laws.”

This damning judgment on raison d’état, I argue, can be attributed to Rousseau’s persistent suspicion that its doctrine is employed less often as the means of self-preservation of the political sovereignty as the method of its usurpation. I further argue that in the Social Contract the risk of usurpation and despotism is closely associated with the degradation of government. It is unusual among contractual theorists that Rousseau would examine the functions of government at such great length. It is still more extraordinary that Rousseau insists the merit of good administration is its telluric nature. The corruption of government is marked by the deterioration and loss of its physiognomic features, and a mercantilist government ineluctably rises in place of a telluric administration. Whereas the Rousseauean state must create an administrative space in which policies of war and political economy can be conducted by the executive power, the threat posed by mercantilism is the conflation of the political and the administrative.

Political crisis: mute sovereign and active government in Rousseau’s political philosophy

Rousseau defines government as the intermediate body charged with executing the political will of the sovereign. The government is the minister of the sovereign, and those who rule and administer are but commissioned officers of the people. Since “besides the maxims common to all, there is within each people some cause which orders these maxims in a particular manner and makes its legislation suited to itself alone”, the central concern of political administration is to mediate the local peculiarities and the immutable requirements of justice and equality. By its nature the government has to be predicated on national physiognomy:

- general aims of every good institution must be adapted in each country to the relations that arise as much from local conditions as from the character of the inhabitants, and it is on the basis of these relations that each people has to be assigned a particular system of institutions which is the best, not, perhaps, in itself, but for the state for which it is intended.

Rousseau thus compares the relation of a telluric government that takes into account the particular customs and morals of a people and a sovereign will that is committed to the universal principles of political rights to that of the physical laws that govern bodily movements and the moral laws that give purposes to these movements. Since the
government is the latter, its science is a strictly physical, mechanical one. Rousseau’s theory of administration thus gains a flavor of mechanical science.

To use forces to serve the public good, forces that are not so naturally inclined, is the purpose of government. The quintessential administrative question in the Social Contract is the aggregation and direction of force. The design of the state’s administration is meant to produce the best, nimblest aggregation and direction of force. And the physiognomic features of the state – its terrain, its size, its population, etc. – dictate the design of the administration and the type of government for a state. A small nation that lives on barren land is most suited for democracy because it does not require a very active government to be well governed, and every citizen can be invited to take part in government, which dilutes its force. And the poverty of the state is such that no other forms of government can be financially supported. In a big state, the government of one is preferred because “administration grows more difficult at great distances just as a weight grows heavier at the end of a larger lever.” Fertility of its land may also underwrite the costs of supporting a monarchy. In short, small, poor states do not require a big government (and can thus have many of its citizens as magistrates, which diminishes the activeness of government and reduces the repressive force it can assert on the ruled), whereas a big, rich state needs high concentration of force and usually resorts to monarchy to keep up the vitality of government.

According to Rousseau, the discretion regarding changing the form of government does not belong to the sovereign: it is statecraft, “not a rule of right”, and “the state is no more bound to leave the civil authority to its current chiefs, than it is to leave the military authority to its current generals.” The form of administration permits changes and variations, and several forms can be compatible with the public good, that is, the sovereign will.

Rousseau’s theory of administration grows in significance precisely when the general will falls silent. While the general will is indestructible, Rousseau cautions that making it visible is difficult in that the people can be led astray by their selfishness or by the selfishness of just a few who happen to be skilled in persuasion. Therefore, there is no guarantee that an assembly of the entire constituency could help the administrators of the state better gauge the authentic will of the sovereign. Indeed, Rousseau sets many rigid conditions in the Social Contract that must strike constituents in a modern democracy as absurd. At a minimum, Rousseau expects voters to be informed, to place common interest above private interest in their hearts, to renounce factionalism and to withdraw from communication with other constituents. Such are the numerous challenges if we want the general will to be expressed in ballot booths and want the will of all to be the true equivalent of the general will.

Despite the inactivity of the general will and the political risks involved in asking it to articulate itself, a government can still be run smoothly, and the approval of the constituents can just be “presumed from universal silence”. The executive power can be exercised daily without the need to regularly convene the general assembly of citizens – the rulers need not await the deliberation of the whole people because the rulers ought to make policies that they know to be in the interests of the public. In other words, the administrative power does not have to divine the political will.

The state of exception is our finest witness to the astounding constancy of the general will and its increasingly muted role in Rousseau’s political philosophy. Rousseau insists that even in a political crisis “the general will is not in doubt, it is obvious that the
people’s foremost intention is that the state not perish.” The general will remains predictable and always the same in a crisis, and only administrative form of the state needs to change in response to the crisis. To handle a crisis, Rousseau suggests, “it suffices to increase the activity of the government, then it gets concentrated in one or two of its members.” The state of exception becomes a strictly administrative question and requires only a change in governmental form and magnitude of its force. The very same must be said of war as well, which again concerns only the executive power of the state and never the political will of the sovereign. War and crisis reveal the political will as an exceedingly simple, almost monadic entity.

The monadic nature of the political will is entailed by the indivisibility of sovereignty: “our politicians, unable to divide sovereignty in its principle, divide it in its object; they divide it into force and will, into legislative and executive power, into rights of taxation, justice and war, into domestic administration and the power to conduct foreign affairs.” So the power to make war is just part of “what were emanations from this [sovereign] authority” and not the authority itself. The sovereign is so simple and monadic in its makeup and will that it is absurd to divide it. The simplicity and indivisibility of the sovereign will, combined with the paradoxical difficulty in articulating the sovereign will correctly, probably mean we can quickly close the book on the political question and turn our attention to the administrative one. In its simplicity the sovereign knows only one universal principle, that of its own preservation; in its adaptability the government must be diverse in its objects and methods and thus becomes ever more telluric.

The flexibility of the administrative form of the state thus compensates for the immutability of the sovereign will. In a time of violence and crisis, the political state depends on a different, more compact and more concentrated, form of administration to survive. In a very mechanical metaphor, Rousseau suggests that to arrest the slow decline of government “what has to be done…is to rewind and tighten the spring in proportion as it gives way”; this precise sense of proportionality and ratio is what we encounter often in Rousseau’s discussion of government. Commenting on the Abbé Saint-Pierre’s “Polysynody”, Rousseau also observes that “the execution of [St. Pierre’s] plan would not be equally advantageous at all times, and that there are moments of crisis and trouble when extraordinary commissions must be substituted for permanent councils.” The administration thereby created to cope with a crisis is not a better, more sovereign or more political form than normal administration. Mechanics of governmental forces and levers account for the difference between the necessary administrative forms of the state during a time of normalcy and a time of crisis. Even a dictatorship created during war or crisis must be commissarial in nature. The discussion of the political existence of the state is therefore carefully enclosed by lengthy exegesis of the functions of its administrative apparatuses in the Social Contract. In permanently sealing off the political question, Rousseau also gives the administrative power its most emphatic limit that it must never exceed: to rule is to govern, to administer, not to occupy the seat of sovereignty and supplant the general will with a private or corporate will of the rulers.

Usurpation, tyranny, and atrophy of public administration
The state of exception is an ambivalent moment in the political life of the state that may yet turn transgressive. On the one hand, monarchy or vizierate must be recommended in a
time of crisis, and Rousseau insists that it is foolhardy to attempt another type of government:

Just as Democracy naturally tends to Aristocracy, and Aristocracy to Monarchy, so the Polysynody tends to the demi-vizierate, and the demi-vizierate to the vizierate. This progression of the public force toward a slackening, which requires the strengthening the springs, slows down or speeds up in proportion to how well or badly constituted all the parts of the state are; and, since despotism and the vizierate are reached only when all the other mechanisms are exhausted, to pretend to give up that form in order to take one of the proceeding ones is, in my opinion, a badly conceived project. 204

So Rousseau’s tolerance of vizierate must be read in the light of his recognition that the rule of one man, or vizierate, represents the best mechanical design of government that may still keep up its activity after a long process of decay.

On the other hand, the time of crisis also presents an opportunity for tyrants. War and sedition can bring down a state, and public administration is usually retooled and put in the hands of a monarch or a vizier to save the state, but the profound predicament for Rousseau is that often “it is those governments themselves that destroy the state. Usurpers invariably bring about such times of trouble or choose them and, taking advantage of the public panic, get destructive laws passed which the people would never adopt when calm.” 205 In a crisis, we entrust the entire force of the government to the vizier and allows him great secrecy in his operation, but the secrecy quickly engenders the risk that it is used only to serve his private interests: “a vizier who knows how to use the obscurity of Chambers to keep state secrets hidden from all eyes, always flatters himself that no one can distinguish what he appears to be doing for the public interest from what he really is doing for his own.” 206 The subversion of the public good gives us the first glimpse of a truly political crisis. The constitutional crisis takes place not when the administrative form of the state is changed and not until the ruler imposes a sovereign question on the people. In this case, “the prince no longer administers the state according to the laws, and usurps the sovereign power…the moment the government usurps the sovereignty, the social pact is broken.” 207 The vizier becomes a tyrant at precisely this point and in the purely technical sense of the terminology. 208 The response to a state of crisis is always administrative, but the administrative response itself may provoke a transcendental, political crisis.

That the state of crisis is such a profoundly equivocal moment in political theory also accounts for Rousseau’s ambivalent attitude towards the secrecy of government. The secretive ways in which a vizierate operates, Rousseau concedes, are a necessary part of the remedy for a feeble and diseased administration. 209 Moreover, in the Social Contract, Rousseau argues that

“the wise who would speak to the vulgar in their own rather than in the vulgar language will not be understood by them. Yet there are a thousand kinds of ideas which it is impossible to translate into the language of the people…each individual, appreciating no other scheme of government than that which bears directly on his particular interest, has difficulty perceiving the advantage he is supposed to derive from the constant privations required by good laws.” 210

Since “the sublime reason rises beyond the reach of vulgar men”, average citizens must not partake in government, and here Rousseau assigns to statecraft an esoteric quality.
Arcana imperii does not seem to be a vexing problem. However, secrecy of the vizierate is used to confound the public and ultimately mask the coup d’état of the vizier and the substitution of the sovereignty of one for sovereignty of the people. As such, arcana imperii is no longer a policy of government but starts to be an important component of tyranny and usurpation. Forcing the mask off the vizier or monarch, we will find that the sovereign authority is usurped: “press the partisans of this maxim [raison d’état] to explain more fully what they understand by the body of the state, and you will see that they will finally reduce it to a small number of men who are not the people but the people’s officers.” Secrecy as reason of state is perturbing only when it is a product of a political crisis. The seemingly conflicting statements about secrecy only demonstrate the necessity of keeping the administrative question and the political question apart in the discourse of reason of state.

Rousseau often worries that the conflation of government and sovereignty is how he is most likely to be misread. When Rousseau says aristocracy is “the worst of sovereignties”, he remarks darkly that “a thousand people will again find here a contradiction with the Social Contract. That proves that there are even more readers who should learn to read, than authors who should learn to be consistent.” There can be only one legitimate form of political sovereignty – that which derives from the general will – and only its administrative form is subject to change. Therefore, “every legitimate government is republican”, and in a footnote Rousseau adds that “by this word I understand not only an aristocracy or a democracy, but in general any government guided by the general will, which is the law. To be legitimate, the Government must not be confused with the Sovereign, but be its minister: Then monarchy itself is a republic.” This is how we must understand Rousseau’s judgment of European monarchies: his opposition is always to monarchism as a doctrine of sovereignty and not monarchy as a form of government. Monarchism as a doctrine of sovereignty threatens the very distinction between the political will of self-preservation and the political administration that matches the state’s unique physiognomy and ensures its survival in a war.

Of course, war can never be banished from the life of the state – and Rousseau’s theory of administration is essentially a war economy with its focus on taking advantage of the nation’s physiognomy – but at the same time it has to be subsumed in the administrative functions of government. For Rousseau the political sphere is one of contest between sovereign states for their own security and independence. In Rousseau’s political metaphysics, the sovereign will is indeed potent but it is also incorporeal thanks to its innate simplicity and constancy. Only in its embodied, administrative form can we speak of statecraft and policies that are conducive to the safety and survival of the state. Moreover, in the state’s corporeal form, all the telluric elements of the nation are intricately related, and war, economy, culture, religion, and geography all make up part of the state’s security policies. Despite his notion of the political that is essentially conflictual and security-conscious, Rousseau wants for the well-governed state only a strictly defensive military strategy. In addition, this military strategy is only one aspect of the administration and one part of its security policies and can be meaningful and efficacious only if incorporated with other telluric policies (of tax, economy, population, even theater and religion). That is to say, the question of war and statecraft is always immanent to the administrative realm.
The Discourse on Political Economy can be construed as a sweeping narrative of how public administration becomes atrophied under the weight of tyranny – and how war as an institution becomes perverted in tyranny. Rousseau argues that the tyrant is always at war: the tyrant agitates for conquest and equilibrium abroad and civil war at home. Elevated above the rest of the executive functions of the state, war causes all other aspects of public economy to wither. The military gains the highest precedence in public affairs, and the professional army is used not only as an instrument of diplomacy but a repressive apparatus for the monarch. The immediate victim is the taxation system of the state where the subjects are forced to yield a higher tax and pay it in species.214 This in turn discourages agriculture and encourages manufacture and commerce, which ultimately alters the taste and morals of the people and depopulates the country as well. The tyrant’s spirit is inevitably of the cosmopolitan and mercantilist kind.

The substitutions of mercenaries for citizen-militias, species for real goods, and public treasury for public domain completely cut the administration off from the telluric life of the people. Tyranny should no longer be considered merely another form of government; nor mercantilism another sort of administrative policies. They mark the very demise of public administration and public economy because the government as an intermediary body no longer exists: the administrator is finally identified with the body politic itself, that is, the tyrant. In uniting the administrative functions and the political will, the reason of state thinking now presents war as an object – and the only one – of the sovereign will. The fiscal, economic and military reforms signify the monarch’s independence and complete freedom of action, and by inference, the emancipation of the political reason. The rationality (and absoluteness) of a monarchical state must now be measured by its commitment to realpolitik and the success of its mercantilist or cameralist policies. But herein also lies the fallacy of raison d’état: in stripping the citizens of the honor of defending the nation, in turning the people against the common cause, we will have destroyed the very notion of the common cause and killed off the political state.215 In its most physiognomic moment, public administration fences off the political question; with the decay of the telluric government the fundamental relationship between the rulers and the ruled is altered and the sovereign power is usurped.

Conclusion: The Partisan against Tyranny
Rousseau’s obsession with national physiognomy often frustrates modern readers’ attempt to extract a coherent picture of Rousseau’s international theory because his proposal of partisan warfare derails any discussion of the use of international law to rein in the violence and excesses of war. The telluric politics also seems to tarnish Rousseau’s contribution to liberal or democratic theories because the telluric appears to be an odd appendage to the political question addressed in Rousseau’s contractual theory, not to mention the implied demand of a degree of racial or cultural homogeneity that seems unhealthy in modern liberal politics.

But the more relevant point of contention between Rousseau and his modern, liberal critics is not on the question of ethnic homogeneity but rather their very different understanding of the function of public administration and political economy and indeed the very need for a theory of administration. On the exact same question of political administration, I have argued, also rests the bulk of the philosophical weight of
Rousseau’s critique of the nexus of tyranny and war that had long driven the ancien régime’s military, population, commercial and fiscal policies.

In the last three books of the Social Contract, Rousseau seems to consistently obscure the activity of the general will. The administrative and institutional theory takes a more salient role in later chapters, and he argues that all good governments must be physiognomic. The political consists of only the sovereign’s immutable will of its self-preservation. Since there is not a higher, more political being that must be summoned or awakened in a war and intervene in the administrative functioning of the state, the military-diplomatic aspect of state life must be taken as a purely administrative object and is blended with other essential aspects of public economy and administration. The security of the republic does not depend on suppressing all aspects of civil life and reducing it to the act of war.

Given the unquestionable constancy of the political will, the discourse of reason of state must take up a completely different subject from what Meinecke ascribes to it. The political rationality is always present and potent in a legitimate, free republic, even if it does not express itself regularly. The reason of state discourse need not concern itself with shielding the political reason from the diverse telluric forces that are thought to encroach upon it. Rousseau’s patience in laying out detailed administrative blueprints for the state does not undercut the political will of its own survival – it presumes it. According to Rousseau, all these telluric forces pertain to the administrative realm; they are not the impediment of the political reason and are always at its service. The notion that somehow the political reason needs to be unchained from economic or moral considerations is a misguided one and bespeaks rather a fundamental misunderstanding of the relation of the political and its embodied, administrative form.

It is owing to the perverse view that the contest of political wills must be expressed in terms of a contest of military forces that raison d’état needlessly tries to give substance to and then delimit the meaning of the political. The social contract is something more than political theory because politics cannot take war as an object and an administrative theory is needed to enclose the political theory. In defining the political life of the state as a military-diplomatic competition with other states, reason of state suppresses all other administrative functions of the government, and in severing war’s organic relations with other aspects of the administration, raison d’état must strip war of its telluric character as well. Governments were uniformly mercantilist and least telluric in big monarchic states, and the cause of the uniformity was the pressure of war. Ironically, only in trimming all telluric elements of public administration do we start to detect the fragility of the political in times of war.

Therefore, the doctrine of reason of state and the mercantilist military and economic policies it entails are not just bad administration but lay bare the danger of collapsing the important theoretical space between the political and the administrative questions. The preference of standing armies and public treasuries uproots the telluric foundation of public administration. But when we do away with the administrative question entirely, the disproportionate concentration of governmental force in the hands of the administrator amounts to the subversion of the social contract and usurpation of the sovereign authority of the people. For this reason, Rousseau qualifies his criticism of monarchism. Monarchy as a form of government may well suit the physiognomic features of some countries, but he opposes the idea of using royalism as a vehicle for
reason of state purported to reduce the very complexities of historical and geographical conditions of a nation. In the latter case, the relation between the ruler and the ruled is transmuted, and the ruler is no longer an officer of the people but their master. A constitutional crisis immediately follows the death of administration.

In the final analysis, Rousseau’s critique of reason of state is precisely that the mercantilist regime of war and economy is not a victory for a supreme political reason. While the political will of the state is always self-preservation, an administrative body must be created to work out particular policies that serve that paramount will. The question of war is thus immanent to the question of administration, and the strategy of telluric warfare must be continuous with the government’s telluric economic or cultural policies. It is by a sleight of hand that mercantilists and tyrants try to separate war from the rest of the administrative functions of government and use it to justify the complete devolution of public administration and a despotic form of sovereignty. Rousseau’s impassioned embrace of national physiognomy creates the very analytical space for a theory of public administration, and this space constitutes the invaluable barrier to shield the political and the quarantine against civil war and tyranny.

Chapter 3
The Politics of Rousseau’s Political Economy

Rousseau’s attack on luxury in the First Discourse brought the author his earliest literary fame and controversies. Scholarly readings of Rousseau’s political economy have usually been cast in terms of the dramatic contrast Rousseau posits between modern luxury and ancient austerity and between an urban life swallowed up by fashion and extravagance and a rustic life that is at once simple and virtuous. In his Rousseau study, Transparency and Obstruction, Jean Starobinski cites one lesson given to Emile about the quality of wines: the adulteration of wines supplied by merchants when compared to the purity and natural sweetness of home-made beverages strips all economic agents involved in the wines’ marketing, transportation and consumption of the valued transparency in their moral life. The moral decay associated with commerce and luxury has prompted many commentators to conclude that the political message embedded in Rousseau’s economic analysis is a call to return to ancient virtue or even natural liberty. In effect, many authors have collectively argued that what Rousseau offers is not so much a theory of economics as a theory of morals. In this chapter I will argue that, while Rousseau sets a strong moral and republican tone for his economics, this moralistic and utopian interpretation of Rousseau’s political economy is inadequate. Part of the purpose of the chapter is thus to document contemporary influence of anti-mercantilism and physiocracy on Rousseau’s economic theories.

However, Rousseau also exceeds physiocrats in terms of the scope of political ambition in his political economy. It is significant that Rousseau’s Encyclopédie entry on political economy subsumes government and public administration under the concept. Michel Foucault notes that Rousseau gives eighteenth century political economy its broadest meaning as “a sort of general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of powers in a society.” The generality in conceptualizing political economy affords Rousseau the chance to examine the suitable setup of government and the very
purpose of government when discussing economics. Rousseau would have none of the
physiocrats’ espousal of legal despotism or a superior, more rational form of *raison d’état*;
rather, his economic analysis addresses the inequality created by tyrannical
administration. Nor is this inequality a mere deviation from a set of natural and rational
laws governing economic relations of modern society as physiocrats imagined. Inequality
for Rousseau must be seen as destructive of a political body because it spawns a class war
of one part of the body upon another. The political economy of a state, which reflects the
geological, geographical, and demographical realities of a nation under the right
government, amounts to a delicate mechanism that produces political justice and equality
and ultimately ensures the cohesion and survival of the sovereign.

In this chapter I will first seek to give an overview of Rousseau’s positions on luxury,
commerce, agriculture, as well as the urban-rural divide in *ancien régime*. He holds the
mercantilist policies of the *ancien régime* accountable for the rise of luxury and
agricultural decay, and his political economy contains explicit criticism of the circulatory
problem caused by the *ancien régime*’s military policies as well. In addition, these
criticisms would have placed Rousseau among his contemporary intellectual opposition
to mercantilist policies on industry, commerce, and taxes (an oppositional movement that
was not always coherent and over the decades included in its fold Christian agrarians and
physiocrats). Placing Rousseau’s economic principles next to these figures can diminish
the appearance of novelty of Rousseau’s economic principles, for there are enough
echoes between Rousseau’s economic thinking and that of many eighteenth century anti-
mercantilists and physiocrats for us to say that Rousseau learned from and only adopted
anti-luxury or agriculturalist positions from others. Accordingly, we may argue that,
while his commitment to civic virtues and republican ideals need not be denied, Rousseau
did not substitute romantic attachment to political antiquity for sound economic analysis
of modern industry and commerce. On the contrary, his adoption of the agriculturalist
position of François Fénelon and perhaps the physiocrats’ theory of monetary circulation
and tax revenues is ample proof that Rousseau was familiar with important developments
in the field of political economy. This is also to say that we need not consider
Rousseau’s attack on luxury and economic progress or his call to return to agrarian life
all that idiosyncratic – after all, these positions were hardly original.

But if Rousseau endorses the economic policies prescribed by Fénelon and rehearses
the analysis of tax revenues of the *économistes*, he also weds the economic program to a
unique political program that is thoroughly Rousseauean. My argument is that Rousseau
eventually offers a *spatial* account of economic and political relations that attempts a
delicate balance between numbers and geographical space and physical distance in order
to maintain civil peace within the body politic and prevent class war. It is thus also a
political geography or geometry, one very different in character from the popular talk of
political statistics propounded by William Petty and Charles Davenant in the previous
century as well as the physiocrats but very similar in spirit, I argue, to Aristotle’s
apprehension of political equality in the *Politics*. Here I will go back chronologically
from the modern economists to Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and ultimately to
Aristotle to uncover a political geography that serves similar purpose of the defense of
civic unity. I argue that it is these classical political authors, more than Rousseau’s own
contemporary economic theorists, who offer the best clues to understand the original
impetus and purpose in Rousseau’s political economy. Like Aristotle, Rousseau wants
the physical expanse of a nation’s realm to be re-imagined as an economic and political space whose shape and circuits can be manipulated to create political equality and to preserve the constitution and unity of the state. As such, Rousseau’s economics must be construed primarily as an urgent defense of his theory of sovereignty. Only then could we attempt to assess the full weight of the political dimension of Rousseau’s economics.

Rousseau and eighteenth century political economy

Rousseau’s fiery rhetoric about the degeneration of morals and corruption of taste sets the moral tenor of his political economy. He also believes that public economy will have a central place in reanimating ancient virtues that were lost in the encomium of modernity and progress. Yet, in intellectual debates of the eighteenth century, “the critique of luxury was by no means the monopoly of austere republican enthusiasts”.

Liberal economists, in particular, blame luxury for the obstructed circulation of species and thus stunned economic productivity of the countryside, and this cogent critique also comes through in Rousseau’s economic writings. It is this problem of circulation and spatial distribution of species and wealth that many authors overlooked in studying Rousseau’s political economy. Some of Rousseau’s angry criticisms of the corruption of morals are familiar to all Rousseau students, whereas other portions of his economic analysis have a level of sophistication and modern perspective that becomes evident only when we juxtapose them to other celebrated economic works from the eighteenth century. Although his economic principles were not intended to win approval from kings and their ministers and to be actually adopted by rulers and administrators, these principles were not utopian in the sense that they were designed to take mankind back to a savage state of hunting and gathering and individual self-sufficiency and freedom. Emphasis on the morality of Rousseau’s political economy should not lead us to ignore the larger context of contemporary debate on political economy or ignore the obviously strong economic education Rousseau received.

The radicalism of Rousseau’s economic program is immediately evident. He advises that taxes ought to be paid in kind, and services to the state ought to be performed by one’s arms. Neither need be measured in gold. And the result is a citizenry more virtuous and more loyal. It is truly the peasants who are attached to the land that they toil on who can serve as the most patriotic soldiers for the state. In writing to the Corsicans, for example, Rousseau advises the abolition of the entire monetary and financial system of government. In support of this measure, he evokes the example of the Swiss who disavowed a modern finance system. The Swiss paid their taxes not in species but in kind, and their public officials were likewise paid in kind for their stipend. Further, to avoid the abuse of tax collection or tax farming, Rousseau argues that in place of a tax system that breeds corruption the state should use corvees. The Swiss are again cited as example to Poles because the Swiss were wise enough to cultivate patriotism and civic virtue by enlisting citizens to fulfill their duties towards the state through physical labor. So Rousseau never hesitates to make the connection between agrarianism and a restoration of ancient value and liberty: “Commerce produces wealth, but agriculture ensures freedom. You may say that it would be better to have both; but they are incompatible.”

And at each turn he condemns cities and city life: the intoxication of luxury, the effeminacy of character, and so on. In Emile, Rousseau speaks of the beneficiary effects of taking residence in the countryside, which improve a person’s morals, bodily health,
and even his speech. Evil multiplies, it seems, when the size of the city increases, and a capital city, above all, is “an abyss in which virtually the whole nation loses its morals, its laws, its courage and its freedom.” It is in rural life that citizens may recover their freedom and morals.

Insofar as agrarian economy is designed to prevent tyranny and immorality, Rousseau is aware of the damage his economic program can do to the ancien régime and plainly tells the Poles the political consequence of limiting themselves to agriculture is that Poland would forsake any hope of ever becoming an esteemed power in foreign relations. In other words, he sees clearly that the fiscal scheme of governments and their encouragement of industry and export are part of a militaristic plan – pretty much the same as their forts, standing armies, and their investment in science and technology – of those states that were trapped in a world of realpolitik. Therefore, his strong preference of an agrarian economy is necessarily anathema to governments that were bent on stimulating growth and export of domestic manufactures; his suggestion that all levies be substituted for by corvees aims explicitly at the destruction of the modern fiscal state. Agriculturalist policies were particularly suitable to Poles and Corsicans who had little hope of successfully emulating mercantilist policies of the major powers, for only small nations that choose to disengage from international politics and opt for security not through parity of power but through an almost subaltern military strategy of deterrence (i.e., guerrilla warfare) can live with an entirely agrarian economy.

The two texts on Poland and Corsica in fact contain Rousseau’s most extreme positions on commerce and taxation, sometimes going as far as categorically banning trade of even necessities among peasants themselves. Poland and Corsica, of course, had two of Europe’s most impoverished and isolated economies; in countries with more advanced economic and financial systems, the move to revive agrarian economy must reckon with the effect of a country’s existing monetary system instead of calling for its outright abolition. Beyond the Poland and Corsica tracts, Rousseau’s economic analysis usually shows a subtle understanding of the distinction between luxury trade and grain trade or the different effects on monetary circulation direct and indirect taxes have. His considered opinions on economic and fiscal matters in the Discourse on Political Economy and the Social Contract draw him close to other illustrious names of eighteenth century economics.

It is important to note that, while accusing luxury of perverting morality, Rousseau usually deems rural depopulation the most damning indictment of luxury. Thanks to the city’s infatuation with luxury, we would witness an exodus of peasants from the country and all swarm the cities to seek employment. To the apologists of luxury who argue that luxury in great states is both ineluctable and actually helps the poor because it provides employment to them in the city and stamps out idleness among citizenry, Rousseau nonetheless points to the poignant fact that luxury is in fact the root reason of poverty in large states. He concedes that manufacture indeed provides employment, but he counters that “all fortunes are made in one place and spent in another; which soon upsets the balance between production and consumption, and impoverishes much of the countryside to enrich a single town”, which is to say manufacturing jobs in the city is bleeding the countryside of labor and population. It is precisely because the wealthy city-dwellers spend money only on luxury items (and thus spend the money only in the city and perhaps even on imported goods) that farmers who stay in the countryside do not see
any income. Therefore, it is not luxury *per se* but the circulatory problem it poses that causes rural poverty – and large states are most vulnerable to this problem exactly because of their size.\textsuperscript{231} This line of reasoning illustrates the demographic and economic, and not just cultural, harm of luxury.\textsuperscript{232}

This idea of circularity of wealth and expenditure, of course, resembles *economistes*’ proto-Keynesian demand for the rich to spend their income on the farmers and is in fact the very premise of François Quesnay’s *Tableau economique*. The notion that the landlords must promptly spend income to generate more economic activity and keep the circular flow going is crucial to modern appraisal of physiocracy.\textsuperscript{233} When people in towns and cities “confin[e] themselves to the purchase of manufactures, it would be impossible for the farmer to sell the produce of his labors, and of course to pay his rent, the consequence of which must naturally be an almost total cessation of agriculture, the destruction of the landed interest.”\textsuperscript{234} Quesnay in turn may be said to have taken his lesson from Richard Cantillon and his *Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général* (Friden has speculated that Rousseau, too, read Cantillon).\textsuperscript{235} Cantillon’s argument that the same tract of land may support less people if they live a more luxurious lifestyle certainly foreshadows Rousseau’s argument about luxury and depopulation.\textsuperscript{236}

Rousseau also steps back from the radical proposal that all taxes be replaced by corvees. In the *Social Contract* he narrows his objection to tax collected in species to only indirect consumption tax placed on grains and *taille*. And we can again detect Cantillon and physiocrats’ influence on his thinking. Rousseau observes that an indirect tax would eventually fall upon the farmers, while the *taille* compels the peasants to make to sell their grains very quickly and at any price and thus shortchanges them on the market. Both taxes are injurious to agriculture and fundamentally unjust. He recommends property tax or a consumption tax that excludes grains (which makes it effectively a luxury tax) instead.\textsuperscript{237} Here we may have witnessed the influence of Montesquieu as well as the physiocrats. Like Montesquieu, Rousseau’s economic analysis is now discerning enough to separate luxury trade from “carrying trade” of subsistence goods.\textsuperscript{238}

In light of this analysis of the harm of a bad taxation system, Rousseau now argues that the economic disease of laziness must be considered “always a result of the abuse of that same society, which no longer gives labor the reward it has a right to expect”.\textsuperscript{239} Idleness is a result of a cruel fiscal policy that overtaxes and deincetivizes the farmers. As a result, Rousseau argues, we must view poverty of peasants as the root cause of the decline of agriculture and reject the false opinion that heavy head taxes drive the idle into work. This view clearly aligns Rousseau with physiocrats and against Richelieu and Hume.\textsuperscript{240}

Lastly, one could see how Rousseau’s economic analysis of rural depopulation even converges with his critique of the ascendancy of standing armies and military conquests. The ill effect of a standing army is not only how it directly aids a despot in the suppression of his own people but also how quickly it, too, can depopulate a nation and induce rural depression.\textsuperscript{241} A tyrant with territorial ambitions is doubly dangerous: he first alienates his subjects because he has to heavily tax them and at the same time replace citizens with mercenaries in his army, stripping the former of the honor of fighting for their *patrie*; but military adventures abroad are also alienating because revenue raised at home now has to be spent abroad, and the citizens who pay the taxes never see the money flow back to them. This analysis instantly reminds us of the attack on Louis XIV’s
foreign policies in *Telemachus*. An anonymous memoir from 1688 also partly attributed France’s rural depopulation to the king’s appetite for war of conquest, and again it is not really because the countryside must supply fresh troops to the king’s army but rather because, when French troops were posted on distant borders and on a foreign expedition, it became harder still to bring money back into the pocket of the farmer. Montesquieu, too, makes the argument in *The Spirit of the Laws* that a tyranny obsessed with military conquest necessarily chokes the normal economic circulation in the realm.

In summary, a careful reading should present to us a Rousseau who is erudite about eighteenth century political economy. His criticism of luxury goes beyond a simple moral verdict. A solid economic analysis paves the ground for his moral critique of the commercial and fiscal regime of eighteenth century governments. Still, one must not think that Rousseau concurs with most of physiocratic teachings, for his independence from the “sect” is quite obvious: Rousseau remains a staunch populationist, and his passion for restricting international and even domestic trade must repulse the liberals. Most importantly, their political agendas could not be more different, as I will demonstrate.

**Territory and government: from natural law to political economy**

Politically we can speak of two main features of the anti-mercantilist polemics. First, for physiocrats, their recommended economic measures were supposed to defeat the economic reason of state that mercantilists championed. The latter’s bullionism and excessive police and unjust taxation had utterly ruined rural France. The second important feature of the anti-mercantilism and the new political economy, at least from a political perspective, is political geography. Montesquieu in particular is known for this geographical determinism in his political sociology and drapes his typology of governments in a discussion of size, climate, and geography. Physiocrats also make clear that their economics is distinctly French. It is French because it is not Dutch: it simply cannot be modeled after the commercial success of a much smaller Holland.

For physiocrats, the critique of the old *raison d’état* and adventurous foreign policies and the new political geography can blend seamlessly. The new political geography would in effect be a new *raison d’état* – a better kind, an improvement and correction to the ills of mercantilism whose restrictions on trade and agricultural prices effected a weakening of French rural economy and in the long run deprived the monarchy of strong finance, strong army, and strong international standing.

I have argued that Rousseau, too, regards mercantilism both as an internal policy that props up absolute rule at home and as an external policy that is inexorably realpolitik. His critique of mercantilism is continuous with his critique of balance of power and wars of equilibrium. In addition, after absorbing economic lessons of other Enlightenment writers, Rousseau defines his theory of government to large extent in geographic and ethnographic terms as well. In the end, however, Rousseau rejects reason of state resolutely. More specifically, his call for distributive justice serves a political objective fundamentally different from the physiocrats’ and revives rather an Aristotelian concern for constitutionalism and political equality and ultimately the very viability of political sovereignty and unity. It is Rousseau’s politics that marks the ingenuity of his political geography and political economy during an Enlightenment that is already rich in revolutionary geographic and economic thoughts.
In terms of fiscal health, physiocrats maintain that a reckless tax placed on grains is ruinous to the peasantry and the landed classes, which leads to abandonment of arable land and long-term erosion of tax base for the state. In terms of military strength, physiocrats pointedly reverse the populationist principle of the mercantilists and stress that only well-to-do subjects who have been made wealthy by rural revival can make good and loyal soldiers to the king. The fact that the leading economists were often administrators of the state or in close proximity to royal power means France’s military and diplomatic prestige was a goal never far off their mind when they set out to advocate their liberal economic program. Since they were advertising physiocracy as an alternative to mercantilist policies that were thought to increase France’s power and prestige, physiocrats must promise even greater fiscal and military strength as the fruit of their reform.

This is how Fénelon and Rousseau explicated the iniquity of Colbertism: it is a twin-headed beast that uses balance of trade and balance of power to reinforce the primacy of French power and reinforce each other. France goes to war to correct an unbalanced trade relation, and a favorable balance of trade helps cement France’s status as the premier military power on the continent. Foucault and Lionel Rothkrug make the same observation: that the economic policies of mercantilism were combined from the beginning with the very condition of diversity and plurality of European states. After all, “the state only exists as states, in the plural.” Mercantilism finally laid to rest any ambition of empire on Charles V’s scale. Foucault even makes the highly intriguing, albeit highly problematic, argument that European equilibrium – a system of checks and balances, of espionage, of emulation and duplication of any successful domestic police or military techniques and tactics – could itself be characterized as a sort of international police.

It must be added that imitation of good police technique was a central part of a reason of state tradition that was already single-mindedly imitative. More than commercial competition or technological competition or military competition, the servile imitation of the success of other states is the copying of one thing, namely the techniques of police: “The police was the public good, for it was an end as well as a means, an ideal type as well as a method for achieving it, a political as much as administrative notion...States with a vicious or imperfect police perished quickly while those with a ‘good police’ endured.” The mercantilist instinct to compete and the cosmopolitan instinct to emulate both became but a corollary of police.

Therefore, a political economist must speak the language of politics as well and as often as the new language of economics. He must study the political life of the state, the life of the state as one among many, one among its peers – that is, realpolitik and reason of state. The predicament for physiocrats, however, is that they must denounce war as a preferred instrument of diplomacy while preserving the permanent state of war that existed among European states; they must strike off one head of the beast while feeding the other. So “[physiocrats’] famous emphasis on agriculture must be seen as at least partly aimed at restoring strategic primacy of France”, and in this regard they can be little different from the mercantilists because “[physiocrats] were locked in the same essentially nationalistic mind-set as the Colbertists and mercantilists whom they mostly combated.” Physiocrats’ endorsement of agrarian economy on the ground of raison
*d’état* would have bastardized Rousseau’s true intention in embracing agriculturalism and prescribing it to all social contract states.\(^{252}\)

Foucault speaks at length of this new *raison d’état* physiocracy wanted to weave out of threads of economic and monetary theories.\(^{253}\) Physiocracy asked for a radical territorial reorganization of the state in name of *raison d’état*. The geographical distribution of species, goods, and people as well as their circulation throughout the realm had to be regulated. Uneven distribution of wealth and population in different parts of the country was considered unwholesome and impolitic. What made for good circulation and what made for bad circulation had to be distinguished. Physiocracy as a new form of *raison d’état* was in need of a new political geography.

This new political geography does not start with any lofty philosophy of law or politics. Rather, it addresses the relatively mundane: “if the property owners who live in the country move to the cities far away from their land, horses must be fed for the transport of food into the city for both the owner and all the domestic servants, artisans and others...the more horses there are in a state, the less food will remain for the people.”\(^{254}\) Here Cantillon gives a simple, judicious lesson that the geographical distance between producers and consumers is economically (and politically) costly. The greater the distance, the greater the demographic cost and political harm. In Poland, Cantillon warns, the demographic crisis tended to be particularly acute, given the sheer distance of transport for imported western luxury. Polish nobility were committing national suicide by craving for French luxury that had to be traded over such great distance. Hont cites a similar argument against British imperialism: the ever growing colonial empire puts increasing distance between its border and its imperial center, inexorably driving up inflation and wages, which could only result in England’s loss of competitive edge to its enemies.\(^{255}\)

The conviction that meteorology and geography have effect on people’s health, procreation, diet, spirit, and laws becomes the first step in a rapid multiplication and proliferation of administrative knowledge. Political geography can equip the rulers “with a precise, continuous, clear and distinct knowledge of what is taking place in society, in the market, and in the economic circuits.”\(^{256}\) Regarding Quesnay’s economic theory, Foucault writes that “the existence of an Economic Table, which enables the circuits of production and the formation of rent to be followed very exactly, gives the sovereign the possibility of exact knowledge of everything taking place within his country, thus giving him the power to control economic processes.”\(^{257}\) Intellectual and economic historians have documented an extensive and scientific undertaking in gathering statistical and social information in the *ancien régime*. Statistics, science, information collection – all this confirms the original wisdom of political geography, which now tells us about climate, geology, the possible material causes of peoples’ mores and culture and accounts for the immutable rules of economics and physics that the sovereign cannot alter but must depend on and work with, forming what Foucault terms the “scientific rationality”.\(^{258}\)

Physiocrats’ political agenda could not be more different from Rousseau’s who takes no interest in advising the kings and princes of Europe on matters of conquest and military glory. In fact, Rousseau believes military success has nothing to do with the security and unity of a body politic. In relation to the question of sovereignty, the issue of political geography takes an inflected form that may not be recognized by physiocrats but may
have already figured in the tradition of social contract theories. While much less discussed, political geography is indispensable even to social contract philosophers who may have no interest in political economy or largely left out theory of statecraft. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes briefly voiced his opposition to the emergence of big cities:

Another infirmity of a commonwealth, is the immoderate greatness of a town, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit, the number, and expense of a great army: as also the great number of corporations; which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To which may be added, the liberty of disputing against absolute power, by pretenders to political prudence.\(^{259}\)

The concern is apparently that such a city may grow too powerful to obey the sovereign or, in the manner of the great commercial towns in Holland and Italy, may leave the orbit of royal powers altogether.

A still more intriguing aspect of Hobbes’s political geography may be buried in his discussion of the right to self-defense. On self-defense, Hobbes’s argument in *Leviathan* is that the power to punish criminals is given up by individuals and surrendered to the state at the moment of its birth. As such, upon detecting a crime, one’s legal obligation is to alert the authorities instead of taking the law into his own hands. But Hobbes also allows that a person may defend himself if the danger of bodily harm is imminent. The individual recovers his natural right of resistance in this type of situation, and yet it is not a full recovery of his natural liberty (unlike the situation in which he resists the state’s attempt to harm him). This partial recovery of natural liberty is actually tolerated by the state but has to be the result of the individual’s inability to communicate with the political reason of the sovereign.

Hobbes’s explication of the right to self-defense (as opposed to a theory of resistance) and Grotius’s differentiation of public and private war actually address the same geographic problem that is simply phrased in different ways, namely the center-periphery problem that the political sovereign must contend with. The actual division between public and private war made by Grotius becomes less clear-cut than it appears to be at first glance when Grotius grapples with the scenario in which a local magistrate may choose to fight a border war even before the sovereign gives its express permission. The magistrate’s recourse to violence cannot be easily categorized as a public or private war. The simple dichotomy does not work, and this perhaps illustrates the difficult and unique position that the local magistrate is in when he has to take up arms on his own authority. While Grotius agrees that a war is not made public if the magistrate makes a “bare conjecture of the sovereign will,” issues like distance to the capital and lack of time to ascertain the true intention of the sovereign may recommend the political usefulness of a “magistrate’s war.”\(^{260}\) The juridical eccentricity of the magistrate’s war seems to hint at a graduated scale of political reason and legality in the use of violence: between the rationality of the sovereign and the irrationality of the private individuals lies the magistrate’s power to conjecture, simulate, and approximate public reason. The magistrate is welcome to fill the vacuum of political reason because of the distance between the border and the capital, but his strategic calculations are nonetheless distinctly inferior to and cannot judicially replace the reason of state for the same geographic reasons.
The political geography in Hobbes and Grotius’s state philosophy does not approach the level of richness of the discussion of political administration in eighteenth century political geography, but that is because a theory of administration or sociology of spirit and governments of peoples is of little use to the two social contract theorists. In setting up the political government we need not deliberate about its most suitable form but must strive to allow ample room for political reason and strategic calculation to surface and be effectively communicated. This center-periphery issue never truly went away in eighteenth century political geography. Montesquieu revisits this issue and argues that a state must be medium in size so that communications and mobilization of troops can be easily organized.\textsuperscript{261} Rousseau, too, evokes the issue of communication in 	extit{Constitutional Project for Corsica} and remarks that the social contract state should set up its capital in such a way that “this capital must provide a means of communication between the various regions without attracting their inhabitants; all should communicate with it, but stay where they are.”\textsuperscript{262}

Therefore, there is already a spatial theory implicit in the natural law theory of an indivisible sovereignty. The sovereign’s relationship with its territory is complicated by the sovereign’s conflicting objectives – or rather the internal contradiction of a single objective. On the one hand, territory is the source of national strength, sustaining and feeding a population and potentially a large army, and territory itself has military value as buffer zones to absorb shocks or as geographic features or geological formations that are advantageous for garrisons or maneuvers of the troops; the sovereign desires more territory and construes it as greater security. On the other hand, the sovereign must always overcome the problems of communication of the political will and public reason posed by the expanse of its territory. That is to say, the sovereign must ensure the validity of an abstract political will, despite the physical extension of the nation’s territory. Political geography for Hobbes and Grotius is fundamentally a question of sovereignty and not that of administration: it is concerned with the creation of the sovereign will, its soundness, and the efficacy with which it makes itself known to all its constituent elements. In other words, it is concerned with the sovereign’s ability to survive and to hold itself together.

The interrogation of the relationship between territory and government has thus taken many different forms historically. If Hobbes, Grotius, Montesquieu, and Quesnay all approached political geography in different ways, it is because they were motivated by different political and intellectual interests. While the natural law theorists were deeply invested in the question of internal organization of the state, physiocrats set their eyes on an intensifying economic and military competition in eighteenth century international politics. But what can be said of the latter’s domestic political policies? Rothkrug and Keith Baker both speak of the political reform entailed in the economic reform as well as the severe limitation to the reform physiocrats dared to ask for. Again, their proximity to royal power as well as the guise of economic reform as essentially a new sort of 	extit{raison d’état} that was intended to benefit the state in its external relations circumscribes the audacity of the political reform that physiocrats wanted to carry out at home. In the end, physiocracy’s politics ruled out any serious political theory. It is doubtful physiocrats desired any political reform to the ancien régime except for creating a more effective and rational enforcer of their economic reform.\textsuperscript{263}
In this sense, physiocrats cannot be regarded as serious political theorists, and their politics is vulgar and superficial when compared to Hobbes or Grotius’s social contract theory: for physiocrats, political science need be tailored to a new economic science that knows only the usefulness of an enlightened monarch. Despite the genealogical affinity of Rousseau’s economic thought to the *economistes*’ and other political economists of the eighteenth century, in his economic writings Rousseau is closer to Hobbes and Grotius in purpose and – I will argue – closer still to Aristotle in both purpose and methodology.

Politics and its logistics: a political geography in service of justice, equality and peace

For an author who has borrowed so much from other economic doctrines of the eighteenth century, Rousseau’s political economy resists easy classification. Physiocrats forcefully advocate absolute property rights; one can add that they want to found an economic science on natural jurisprudence. Rousseau’s political economy will have nothing to do with either: on property rights, he offers a sophisticated yet qualified defense of private property; his economical doctrines are rooted in his interesting understanding and reinvention of a long tradition of political geography. Agrarianism in the hands of Rousseau is both liberated from its Christian, moral roots as it was handed down by Fénelon and Abbé Claude Fleury and also free of the liberal, Lockean, natural law flavor.

Foucault sees Rousseau’s definition of political economy as a very broad category that encompasses all knowledge of government (the *Discourse on Political Economy* is an inquiry into legitimacy of power and nature of public administration and the creation of government as opposed to the birth of sovereignty; the discourse hardly limits itself to the subject of economy and finance). But if for the *economistes* this expansive definition of political economy affords a chance to trumpet a novel security regime, Foucault quickly labels Rousseau’s political economy a regime of rights (which physiocracy could no longer be, even though ostensibly its proponents have fervently embraced absolute property rights and tirelessly talked about natural jurisprudence). According to Foucault, Rousseau’s approach...does not start from government and its necessary limitation, but from law in its classical form. That is to say, it tries to define the natural or original rights that belong to every individual, and then to define under what conditions, for what reason, and according to what ideal or historical procedures a limitation or exchange of rights was accepted.

But if Rousseau does not share the *economistes*’ interest in theorizing the security regime (much less the school’s single-minded attempt to attach a liberal economic program and fiscal reform to the grandiose dream of French power and supremacy in European politics), it is certainly very problematic to characterize Rousseau’s economics as founded on natural jurisprudence. His theory of public administration does not concern subjects who yearn to recover their natural rights. His discourse on political economy does not aim at settling claims that the state and the citizens or individuals make on each other because these mutual claims ought to have been settled in the act of covenant that first gave rise to the political community.

Once we move beyond the first book and the first five chapters of the second book of the *Social Contract*, we find that Rousseau is absorbed in the task of establishing a government that can exercise its power justly and equitably. Government does not concern the political promises of the social contract but their implementation and
fulfillment. Rousseau's primary concern – in the rest of the *Social Contract*, in the *Discourse on Political Economy*, in his tracts on Poland and Corsica – is in designing a public administration suitable to a particular nation. His interest is not sociological and does not aim at the discovery of a causal relationship between national physiognomy and form of government. Rather, since the size of government must always be commensurate with the economic surplus and territorial size of the country, Rousseau’s fear is that bad calculation on the part of the legislator could leave the polity maladjusted to the geographic reality of the nation and result in wrongful and tyrannical excess of government’s power. The danger of tyranny and a plunge into the state of war is always palpable in Rousseau’s political economy; needless to say, this fear of political fracture and state of war resonates throughout the history of political philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli and is no less manifest in political modernity and in the contractualists like Hobbes. Eric Nelson, for example, traces the likely influence of Greek and Roman “redistributionalism” on posterity, including Machiavelli and eighteenth century French thinkers; according to Nelson, this “redistributionalism” in both classical and modern philosophers is motivated primarily by the politically subversive effect of unlimited wealth accumulation, which potentially creates pernicious partisanship and tears apart a republic. While there is explicit textual support for Montesquieu’s influence by Greek thoughts on the relation between limiting economic disparity and maintaining political unity of the state, Nelson suggests that Rousseau is drawn to agrarianism for the same reason and indeed belongs to the same republican tradition that views some version or variation of Roman Agrarian Law and equalization of wealth and possessions as essential to democracy. Rousseau’s fear of factionalism and civil war can find strong echoes in this tradition of republican thought, and I will argue that his political economy in particular echoes Aristotle’s thoughts on economic and political equality.

If not evoked often by name in eighteenth century writings on political economy, some of Aristotle’s ideas on demographics, political economy and geography already foretoken the economic discourse of the time. In one argument against income inequality, Aristotle speaks of the evil effect luxury has on population of the polity. Even when the quality and amount of land does not change, increasing income inequality and the rise of luxury that inequality inevitably breeds depresses population level in the city: “While the territory could have supported 1500 horses and 30000 foot, the actual number was less than 1000. The history of the Spartans has shown that the effects of this arrangement have been bad for them. The city was unable to withstand a single blow and was ruined for want of men.” The mention of the demographic effect of luxury and the connection Aristotle makes of this with security and defense of the city can be considered very Cantillonian and physiocratic. In addition, the rather Grotian communication problem for the sovereign also finds its classical expression in the *Politics*:

“The ideal position of the central city should be determined by considerations of its being easy of access both by land and by sea. One requirement is that already mentioned: it should be a common center for the dispatch of aid to all points in the territory. Another is that it should also be a convenience center, for the transport of good supplies, or timber for building, and of raw materials for any other similar industry which the territory may possess.”

Aristotle’s typology of government apparently continued to inspire Enlightenment thinkers. Obviously *The Spirit of Law* is a huge enrichment over Aristotle’s in its
description of the causes, characteristics, and “spirit” of each type of government, and in his commentary on Montesquieu Raymond Aron suggests that the enrichment was done as Montesquieu’s conscious commentary and occasional criticism on Aristotle’s *Politics*.  

Unlike Montesquieu’s magnum opus, however, the *Social Contract* is not an investigation into the diversity of governments across time and space, and Rousseau uses the classical taxonomy without spending any intellectual energy in debating the merits or flaws of Aristotle’s classification. The purpose of the treatise is the very opposite: Rousseau wants to subsume that enormous diversity under a single principle of sovereignty and the sole legitimate manner in which the general will can come to be. The *Social Contract* differs from the political science of Aristotle, Machiavelli or Montesquieu in that it hardly concerns itself with doctrines and statecraft that can sustain different types of regime; rather, Rousseau argues the sovereign can survive changes in its form of government but it cannot survive the corruption of the two constitutive principles of political sovereignty: freedom and equality. To maintain equality (and not a particular government) is of paramount importance to a constituted people – and exceedingly difficult. Despite “the general will to equality”, it is only “a chimera of speculation which cannot exist in practice”; yet, Rousseau asks, even if equality is so hard to attain and inequality inevitable, “does it follow that it ought not at least be regulated? It is precisely because the force of things always tends to destroy equality, that the force of legislation ought always to tend to maintain it.” The sovereign will, once established through the covenant, is immediately under siege because of the precarious equality. This precariousness gives a great sense of urgency to Rousseau’s theory of government and political economy, which ought to maintain equality and moderate the perpetual threat of inequality. What brings Rousseau close to Aristotle is not a sociological science of governments and regimes but the shared concern of factionalism and a fragile civil peace that is easily upset by inequality. The passion for equality, we learn from Aristotle, is the foremost desire in our political life, and all classes strive for some measure of parity with other classes: “inferiors form factions in order to be equals, and equals in order to be superiors.” Aristotle sternly warns that a frustrated search for equality is the root cause of sectarian conflict in politics: “factional conflict is always the result of inequality...it is the passion for equality which is thus at the root of faction.” Like Rousseau, Aristotle considers class war the prelude to despotism.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle’s thinking is often governed by anxiety over political inequality and constitutional crisis as a result of it and is at the same time astoundingly creative in its solutions in producing a very artificial kind of equality. One may find that Rousseau’s theory of government and political economy serves a similar objective. One may thus speak of the Aristotelianism in Rousseau’s rather spatial theory of government because both Aristotle and Rousseau boldly probe the way political geography may be utilized and even engineered to create a just government and a condition of political equality. In their shared sense of vulnerability of civil peace, both appeal to a creative science of political geometry and geography to prevent factionalism and preserve the constitution and unity of the polity.

In their shared concern with factionalism and a fragile civil peace, Rousseau also tells a story of the birth of tyranny similar to Aristotle’s narrative. According to Aristotle, tyranny is not necessarily the rich positioning themselves above the poor but what this
class structure generates: with extreme inequality in the society, it takes only the ambitious few who will stir up the mass and cajole the latter into militating against the rich individually or as a class. Economic inequality gives rise to demagogy, and when resentment and jealousy of wealth becomes a common sentiment, the demagogues would garner enough popular support in instigating a civil war and at the same time turning themselves into despots. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau, too, expresses his fear of demagogy where the people arrogate the judiciary and executive powers to itself. The lesson from antiquity is that in blurring the distinction between the general power to reason and to make laws and the particular power to judge the people will bear their tyrannical powers against (most likely the wealthy) individuals. Therefore, we must be alarmed by the seed of distrust and disharmony sown by economic inequality: he who aspires to be the tyrant would “inspire mistrust and mutual hatred in the different estates by setting their rights and interests at odds, and so strengthen the power that contains them all.”

It is amid all the disorder and chaos that despotism is born. In Emile, Rousseau paradoxically calls private property a “debt”, and he wonders what to make of this “social debt”. It is not mere rhetoric designed to make the rich feel guilty; rather, the final trip Emile takes with his teacher shows him that private property is a defensible right only when we become good citizens and truly establish political relations with other citizens; property rights are conditional upon civil peace in the community. Still later, he would write to the elder Mirabeau: “what will happen to all your sacred rights of property in times of great danger, in extraordinary disasters when your available assets no longer suffice, and the [maxim] ‘Let the salvation of the people be the supreme law’ will be pronounced by the despot?”

This allusion to the political body at war and to the despotism that is the natural child of class war is an attack on the rather Lockean take on property rights by another physiocrat and associate of Quesnay, Mercier de la Rivière. Rousseau points to the danger of civil war, class conflict, and a metaphysical obsession with absolute property rights that are thought to be founded on natural laws but in disregard of the political instability they trigger. A despot does not even have to be the declared enemy of the people – he is just a warmonger and a political survivor and manipulates and stirs conflicts among his subjects to stay in power, and the issue of property rights and inequality can easily be made into an issue for his manipulation. Inequality is the deep wound of the political society, and the despot merely reopens it from time to time for his personal benefit.

However, to suggest that this apprehension about poisonous distrust and conflict between different classes of the same political society pervades Aristotle and Rousseau’s political thought is not to imply that other political economists have been blind to this political issue. As Clark points out, “how to render an essentially mistrustful and mutually suspicious people sufficiently unified was a durable problem throughout the seventeenth century and beyond.” While in the past students of history of economic thought emphasized too much “an inexorable acceptance of the legitimacy of individualist greed and self-interest as the basis of market life”, Clark argues that we can no longer ignore “the importance of social cohesion as a preoccupation of the commentators of the time.”

To generate the desired social cohesion as part of their economic programs, Colbert and the physiocrats took very different approaches. During Colbert’s time, the splendor and grandiosity of his master’s military successes functioned as a common bound of French society:
Glory is not only the chief preoccupation of the royal *metier*, it is also the glue that will hold together a fractious French community: every other activity that acquires the king’s stamp must reflect and contribute to that overriding need...to replace disunity with unity, Louis’ main strategies were the glory of war, administrative centralization and a court life that would both draw in and project out again all the “talents of his best subjects.”

More importantly, Colbert wanted to sweep aside political opposition by imposing uniformity in France. For instance, uniform standards and quality control of French manufactures were established during Colbert’s ministry, and mercantilists generally intended to break down tax barriers between provinces but reinforce international borders. The commonest thesis in historical studies of mercantilism is indeed the story of centralization and homogenization. Since Eli Heckscher’s work on mercantilism, mercantile commerce has always been understood in modern scholarship as part of the state building project.

The mercantilist state is, therefore, a flat, homogeneous space, and from physiocrats’ perspective the worst aspects of its tyranny is exactly exacerbated by the indiscriminate uniformity that disregards the differences in quality of soil or level of wealth across the realm, which accelerates depopulation and deepens economic inequality. Tyrannical public economy has the dullest imagination of space and geography.

By contrast, physiocracy’s political society features a heterogeneous and hierarchical structure that assigns functionalistic roles to different economic classes. The rigidity of class structure is a salient feature of physiocrats’ economics as well as their politics. Among the leading physiocrats, Mirabeau passionately advocates the notion of the “organic community”, and in modern terminology of political science, the organic community certainly sounds like a corporatist entity. Meanwhile, for Turgot, the economic reform clearly involved a fundamental redefinition of a revised system of taxation would ‘place the State in a perfect and visible community of interest with all the proprietors,’ realizing in a physiocratic manner the old dream of a situation in which the interest of the ruler would be so identified with that of the nation that maladministration would be almost impossible.

For physiocrats, therefore, what commands loyalty to the monarchy is not equality but the convergence of economic interests of all classes (cultivators, landlords, artisans) as well as the church and the state, which live on the revenues they draw from other classes but whose fiscal demands can nevertheless be made modest and reasonable and so ideally proportional to the *produit net* that the church and state’s fiscal needs would harm neither economic production nor the productive class. The administration of distributive justice is explained in such detail in the *Tableau économique* that each class must learn to take exactly what it deserves; each class will receive just the right amount to spend and consume, but if any class (particularly the proprietors and the state) is told not to demand or expect more than the just portion of consumption they are entitled to, it is going to be for its own good in the long run. In the final analysis, political harmony is but a miracle performed by the economic table.

Much like what Hobbes says about the contradistinction between the natural unison that a hive of bees or ants possess and the political covenant that reasoning but asocial creatures like human beings must make to overcome the state of nature, Rousseau’s
theory of government stands apart from the mercantilist centralization or the physiocratic corporatism because he does not want to fall back on natural social cohesion to create political unity. Admittedly, equality of rights and equality of economic wealth or natural strength are often intertwined in Rousseau: “equality of rights and authority could not long subsist,” Rousseau tells us, without “much equality of ranks and fortunes.”

Rousseau also imagines that the wealthy would be tempted to buy servitude of the poor, and lacking the money the poor may be tempted to sell. In the end, the moderation of influence only comes with moderation of goods; if the rich live in excessive luxury, they will crave excessive power as well, so a curb on excessive wealth and luxury is the precondition of political equality. But as much as the economic equality and political equality are often convoluted in his writings, Rousseau wants to keep the two concepts apart. Despite their criticism of economic inequality, neither Aristotle nor Rousseau envisions that political harmony depends on a drastic redistribution of wealth: Aristotle considers attack on the rich and confiscation of their assets a form of tyranny, and Rousseau’s argument about separation of powers may also be interpreted as a safeguard against this illegal seizure of private property; it is even less conceivable that either Aristotle or Rousseau wishes to ensure equality through the abolition of the most elementary fact of our economic life, the division of labor. In Aristotle and Rousseau, the equality that members of a political society could hope for is not absolute economic equality but equality of a distinctly political kind. Equality is the equal share of political power.

Comparing Aristotle and Montesquieu’s political theory, Aron argues that “in classical political philosophy, no one bothered to examine the relationship between the types of political superstructure and the social foundations.” The implied charge is perhaps that Aristotle lacks the knowledge or ambition to study the material or economic causes. But if Aristotle does not aspire to redefine citizens’ economic life, he certainly has a redistributive system in his mind: the state is given broad powers in levying taxes and fines and handing out monetary incentives in manipulating political participation of the citizenry. According to Aristotle, in an oligarchy the rule of the wealthy few is not achieved through any use of violence or suppression but through a system of financial rewards and penalties:

“As regards public offices, those who possess a property qualification are not allowed to decline office on oath, but the poor are allowed to do so. As regards the lawcourts, the rich are fined for non-attendance, but the poor may absent themselves with impunity; or, alternatively, the rich are heavily fined and the poor are only fined lightly...The poor are allowed not to have any arms, and the rich are fined for not having them. The poor are not fined if they absent themselves from physical training while the rich are; and so while the latter are induced to attend by the sanction of a fine, the former are left free to abstain in the absence of any deterrent.”

In a democracy the financial system offers the same financial incentives for political participation but this time rewards only the poor: “They give the poor payment for attendance at the assembly and the lawcourts; but they do not fine the rich if they fail to attend.” Rousseau offers the same advice to Corsicans. This kind of redistributive system must be noted for what it does not do: it has hardly anything to do with imposing economic equality. It is very limited in ambition and is simply a device to regulate participation in political life.
But in the end, political geography plays a bigger role in determining the political outcome than the redistributive system because it is geography that determines the access to political power by different classes. Peasants have to work the field far away from the city, and their participation in political processes in the political center is handicapped by the long trip they have to make to the city. As such, peasants tend to be moderate in their political goals. If the peasants come to dominate the political system, moderation and equity become the character of the whole constitution, despite the numerical advantage the peasants may have. Likewise, any individual of extraordinary talent or merit that makes him unequal to his peers must be banished from the city, and his removal from the center serves to dilute his influence and restore some measure of equity among fellow citizens. Aristotle repeatedly stresses that ostracism is a device of equality and justice (and certainly not a punitive system that penalizes the noble and meritorious).

The sheer logistical aspect of political participation eventually overshadows the factor of wealth: farmers may be as impoverished as artisans and peddlers and just as numerous, but farmers live in the countryside and thus lack the ambition to dominate political life in the city whereas the artisans and peddlers can easily overburden the political system inasmuch as they take up residence in the city and have the convenience and time to agitate for conspiracies and revolutions. Aristotle thus counts the farmers as the pillar of democracy and considers agrarian democracy the most stable type of government and at the same time condemns the urban poor as a dangerous element to political stability. By the same token, the logistic and geographic aspect of the state also dictates the kind of military services most needed in the state, which correspondingly give rise to different types of government.

While some of Aristotle’s comments about geometric equality may offend modern sensitivities, this is only a problem with small city-states where unequal birth and intellectual are a decisive factor in political affairs. Once a polity expands and takes land farther away from the city, however, the question of logistics and geography quickly eclipses his concerns about individual worth and merits. Since city-states now obtain territoriality through expansion and colonization and become proper territorial states, geographical and logistical factors are now introduced into our civic life. Consequently, theory of equality should shift its focus to one important question: how to leverage the logistical factors to mitigate the inequalities in numbers, wealth or merit. What makes Aristotle’s insight still relevant and valuable to the discussion of Rousseau’s theory of government is thus the way Aristotle interposes a kind of political logistics between natural (or social) inequality and the eventual realization of political justice. Aristotle’s “devices” of equality are always devices of equalization: that is, they all have to start from natural or economic inequality and must then generate an artificial political equality through a logistic, mediative process.

In the Social Contract, Rousseau carefully separates his administrative theory from his conceptualization of the general will and distinguishes the legislative power of the latter and the executive power of government. The art of government is for Rousseau an exact science of measuring the necessary strength of government in relation to the territorial and demographic size of the state as well as the economic surplus of the land. While Rousseau continues to use the classical categories of government, the legitimacy of a government is no longer tied to its form but whether an appropriate proportion is attained between its size and strength and the size of the state. Justice and equity in this
government’s use of force also depend on whether the size and makeup of the government permits it to still identify with the general will.

Rousseau argues that the more numerous magistrates there are in a specific government, the weaker the government as whole becomes. The government of one, by contrast, Rousseau considers to be the most powerful and active. In extreme cases, when the sovereign legislature meets – that is, when every citizen assumes magistracy in the government – the government is the weakest. However, insofar as government may also be construed as a corporate body comprising all its magistrates, the collective interest of a large number of magistrates (which is the corporate interest of the government) can approximate the true political interest of the whole republic. Theoretically the government’s corporate interest is completely identical to the general will if every citizen is recruited as a magistrate and joins the government. Conversely, to overcome the expanse of a large empire, we must accrue a huge force to the government by decreasing the number of magistrates in the government. The government of one, i.e. monarchy, is the strongest and most active form of government in this regard but the corporate interest of the government of one would be dangerously close to the private interest of one individual rather than the public interest.

Political equality is measured by “the ratio of Prince to subjects”. A lower ratio means a more politically equal form of administration, and this figure approaches one when every citizen is a magistrate and partakes of government. This low ratio depends not on equal wealth but simply that the constituents “remain constantly assembled to attend to public affairs.” If logistics permits, every citizen becomes a magistrate, and the interests of those in the government are most nearly identical with public interest (because most members of the public are in the government). This also reduces the need for a big officialdom and a big capital given the large number of magistrates and the ease of their public gathering and collective deliberation. The logistical convenience of participation in government significantly reduces the need of repressive force for the government to overcome the state’s territoriality.

Rousseau does not call for an economic revolution in order for the political revolution to happen. Rather, once the sovereign will for justice and equality is established, the geographic and logistic conditions of the state would be surveyed, and Rousseau tries to assess two things: geographically what is the size of government that can be supported by the fecundity of the land? And logistically what is the size of government that is required by the size of the land? Rousseau emphasizes that “the farther public contributions move from their source, the more burdensome they are. This burden should be measured not by the amount of taxes, but by how far they have to travel to return into the hands from which they came.” Existing social or class structures hardly penetrate Rousseau’s theory of administration: this political logistics may either alleviate or accentuate historical inequalities, and to guarantee political equality the state’s economic or tax policies need not be wholesale confiscation of assets from the rich and giving them to the poor (the government’s job is not to “[take] their treasures away from those who possess them”) but to disperse the population and creates equal convenience for access to political power. Rousseau recognizes the economic benefits that the dispersal of population and an even distribution of population in the realm bring to the state (as the physiocrats have tirelessly argued), but for Rousseau the most significant political benefit is a shortening of the “chain of command” in government – this shortened chain of
command reduces the “number of official categories” and the size of bureaucracy headed by the prince but no doubt expands the number of magistrates in the government and includes more citizens in it. The geographic reconfiguration of where people live and where political power is concentrated also gives the citizenry a physically more equal access to that power. Regardless of the envy of the rich, oppression of the poor, and violence between them prior to the social contract, the concept of political equality needs to be liberated from the requirement of economic equality; this is the theoretical accomplishment of Rousseau’s geographic and logistic theory of government.

It is political equality that mitigates the threat of class war. Without some inventive methods that substitute political equality for natural or economic equality, without such a political geometry that must function as a barrier between (some degree of) economic inequality and political equality, what prevents the rich from buying political influence outright with their wealth? This would soon reignite the resentment and jealousy felt by different classes, and Rousseau warns that the rich have as much to fear from this as the poor: a despot will rise to dissolve what remains of the bond between different estates and fuels their mutual hatred and jealousy and eventually install himself above them all. When raw resentment resurfaces and fills the gulf between rich and poor, public interest yields to demagogy, and it is the very sign of that demagogy that any effort to politically balance the many and the few and the wealthy and the poor is given away to a sanguinary program of radical economic parity. “Let the salvation of the people be the supreme law” – even for a liberal like Adam Smith robbing the rich to relieve the privation of the poor is sometimes just good sense, and for a physiocrat Turgot this doctrine is unjust but more than once during his tenure as contrôleur général he was compelled by crisis situations to do so; only Rousseau has the political acumen to declare that this maxim will forever be the slogan of a despot. If political economy and government is no longer about this logistical endeavor to create an equality of rights and political participation, then the purpose of governmental operation is stripped down to taxes on or even confiscation of property – most likely through the perversion and conflation of judiciary and executive power, which becomes the final proof of its corruption.

Geographic and logistical factors in Rousseau’s and Aristotle’s theories of public economy and government thus open up the very possibility of contemplating a purely political equality that does not mirror the differentiation in social or economic circumstances of different citizens and classes. We attain equality through the manipulation of access to political power, in a most physical and literal sense. Rousseau envisions lasting unity and peace through a political compact, but that peace could only be maintained at a political level. It is strictly a political peace and should silence any criticism that Rousseau’s embrace of agrarianism is a signal of radical repudiation of market and progress.

If we take Rousseau’s claim seriously that his political economy concerns not just fiscal needs of a government but its righteous organization and legitimate exercise of power, then Rousseau’s political economy differs from both mercantilism and physiocracy in its purpose. Rousseau’s political economy stipulates that a good government is not necessarily a powerful government (a mercantilist government’s extreme size and fiscal strength may just be a sign of its injustice and decadence); nor does its goodness stem from its accommodation of private or corporate interests that pre-
exist the political state, as physiocrats insist. If Rousseau espouses agrarianism and wants to stop peasants’ emigration into the city, it is because he is convinced that this geographic readjustment of our demography and economic life is conducive to a government that is less fiscal, less repressive and less deviant from the general will. It is a government of weaker force but greater and equal participation by its citizens.

From the moment it is born with the social compact, the sovereign contends with the threat of class war and factionalism – the sovereign also contends with a political geography or logistics unique to each state that either mitigates or exacerbates the social and economic antagonisms that have long existed. A political economist seeks to anchor a fragile political unity in an opportune arrangement of demographic, economic, and military geography, and the political economist searches for a kind of distributive justice and political equality that is largely artificed by that geography. Because it is not possible for political equality to rely on natural or social equality, a bad logistic and spatial organization of government that fails to produce political equality immediately threatens a constituted people with civil war and political death.

It is therefore not possible to argue (with Hobbes) that the leviathan can still nonchalantly dismiss the question of government as inconsequential or consider all forms of government equivalent and equally absolute. The political metaphysics of unified sovereignty is not self-sufficient: there does not exist a sovereign so absolute and secure that it can overlook the organization of government. A very delicate and unique design of public economy and administration is needed in each state to ensure the survival and cohesion of the sovereign body that otherwise faces certain threats of factionalism and civil war. A geographic theory of government and political economy must be considered internal to the logic of sovereignty. The unity and cohesion of the sovereign cannot be understood in the simple abstraction of the term; rather, it will have to be generated and concretized through skillful manipulation of political space and logistics. This also allows us to see the convergence of purposes of Rousseau’s contractual theory and his theory of government. The sovereign always generates a potent political will to self-preserve, but its perpetual vulnerability to factionalism and civil war can only be mitigated when we institute a government that can compensate for social injustice and inequality with political equality. Rousseau’s teaching is that we must draw upon political geography and logistics to establish and maintain that equality.

Conclusion
This chapter aimed to give an account of Rousseau’s agriculturalist economic principles and to simultaneously rescue Rousseau from the common portrayal as a utopian moralist who resolutely opposes cities, luxury, private property and even division of labor. We should not attribute Rousseau’s agrarianism exclusively to nostalgia because in between his expressions of admiration of ancient, republican values we can find very sound economic analysis that is unmistakably modern and belongs to a rapidly progressing economic science of his time.

Much of the development in economics and political economy in the eighteenth century comes in the form of anti-Colbertism and anti-mercantilism. It must be conceded, however, that while physiocrats and liberals militate against mercantilist policies, the concept of political usefulness (and ultimately, reason of state and European equilibrium) would be absorbed by the anti-mercantilists. After rejecting tyranny and war, Rousseau’s
criticism of luxury must also separate itself from anti-Colbertists’ acceptance of realpolitik and absolutism – luxury trade and industrialization were not the rational means in defense of a rational goal of a centralized state and great military power. Both the means and the end must be exposed as irrational and unpolitical. Rousseau could never share physiocrats and mercantilists’ common allegiance to the ancien régime. On the contrary, Rousseau’s political economy addresses primarily the concern of tyrannical government and the threat of civil war.

I have also argued that the polemics between mercantilists and physiocrats would also involve a different understanding of political geography as well, and Rousseau’s use of geography differs sharply from both. Territorial division of the realm and management is not a simple matter of providing adequate communication and cohesion to the state as a war making machine; more important than mere lines of communication that hold together the state as a compact, cohesive war machine, political logistics must be understood as a problem internal to the logic of sovereignty. At the same time, the political or intellectual interest in political economy need not beget a Foucauldian security apparatus that takes on a life of its own because the sovereign and its subjects only live in peace as long as they live by the original terms of the social contract and by the principles of political right, justice and equality.

I have argued so far that Aristotle’s agrarian democracy, which Aristotle considers the best guarantee of constitutional moderation, unity and stability, may have offered the original model for Rousseau’s agrarianism. Aristotle’s Politics surveys fiscal as well as logistical mechanisms that can create artificial equality between social classes that were not always equal. This begs the question: why is such artifice possible? What kind of measure of equality permits such artificiality? Aristotle is most innovative when it comes to creating equality that is artificial and disconnected from demand of economic equality, an artificial equality that is purely political. In the Politics, logistics gives birth to an elaborate system of compensation and equalization. This also means that we can create political equality not just in city-states: the artificial nature of political equality permits a wide variety in territorial sizes, in terrains, in populations, and in citizens’ professions in a state. Political logistics as a device of equality is essential to Aristotle’s constitutionalism and his handling of factionalism and class struggle. Rousseau shares Aristotle’s fear of vulnerability of a constituted sovereign and the menace of civil war. Overall, Aristotle and Rousseau’s vigilance over the survivability of the constitution and cohesion of the political constituency steers their political geography in a very different direction than that of Grotius’s, Montesquieu’s or physiocrats’. Rousseau finds the need to draw on geography in his theory of government to restrain its repressive force and ensure the legitimacy and justice in the executive organ of the state. The identification of the will of the prince and the general will depends on careful logistic and spatial design of the government.

Rousseau’s political economy thus entails neither the restoration of natural equality nor a revolutionary redistribution of wealth. Political equality and justice must be created ex nihilo in the absence of a foundation in natural equality or a material basis in absolute economic equality. Rather, it is equality and participation aided and made possible by a logistical mechanism of transport, circulation, distribution and access. What is needed above all is political mechanism that creates political equality out of geographic, logistic, economic differentiations of classes and population in the state.
Part II Rousseau’s Contract
Rousseau’s reflections on political government and public economy make up a big part of his political theory, and in this he differed markedly from other authors in the social contract tradition. I have argued that Rousseau’s thoughts on military and economic matters of government are a pointed critique of absolutist, mercantilist policies of the ancien régime. These policies – the obsession with trade, industrialization, fiscal extraction, and military conquest – give a false impression of security and strength, but Rousseau argues that while the strength of an absolutist government may be mistaken for the absoluteness of a legitimate sovereign, these policies are not true expression of an autonomous political reason and, in causing extreme inequalities, are actually most destructive of the body politic, of its unity and sovereignty. Accordingly, I have approached Rousseau’s theory of partisan warfare and agrarian economy not so much as methods to resuscitate moral values and civic virtues of a people as a way to create the analytical space to sustain the theory of government as a distinct inquiry from the theory of sovereignty. For Rousseau, a government that is predicated on the unique features of the land and soil and unique temperaments and customs of the people is most likely to resist its own corruption, deterioration, and eventually plunge into despotism, and only a despotic government substitutes the apparent strength of a prince for the absoluteness and security of the sovereign.

Rousseau still defines the role of government in the sternest language: the general will is sovereign, the government but its servant; the general will is constant and immutable, whereas the form of government varies and at any rate must adapt its organization to changing circumstances; the general will is incorruptible, whereas the government decays over time. If government has the sole purpose of ensuring political equality, it is only because it is so willed by the general will – the political contract entitles every citizen to equality. The distinction Rousseau stubbornly maintains between sovereignty and government means the abstract principles of equality and political right have an embodied, physiognomic form in each state, but the true meaning of these principles can be grasped only with a look at the contract itself. The government strives for only what is already provided for in the original contract.

While the third book of the Social Contract speaks primarily of the role of government, the first two focus the birth of the political sovereign and its nature, which will be the focus of the next two chapters. Already in the five preliminary chapters of the treatise (before he introduces the social pact in the sixth), Rousseau says in the most explicit term what must not be included in the contract. He makes a compelling argument against Hobbes and Grotius’s view that sovereign authority can be founded on the fact of conquest and an exchange of the conquered’s life and servitude. I argue that what Rousseau says in these chapters can be linked to his philosophy of language and his anthropology: for Rousseau, man’s rational and linguistic ability to generalize and conceptualize defines the social ties he can have. These social ties presume a high level of linguistic competence of the subject, in his role as a lover, a warrior, or as a proprietor, and when this linguistic subject doubles as a political subject, Rousseau asserts that he cannot rationally accept an exchange of perpetual slavery for his life; hence the fallacy and sophism of the argument of conquest rights. Our linguistic ability to equalize and generalize militates against unequal political relationships, and by necessity a genuine form of sovereignty, one that lasts, must stand for equality and justice for all.
The fourth chapter thus tracks the parallel evolutions in human linguistics and anthropology that for Rousseau culminates in the emergence of the political sovereignty. The linguistic and epistemological evolution affords us the ability to make laws for ourselves, laws that possess the essential quality of generality and equality, which in turn gives us the familiar Rousseauean concept of freedom: a person is free because he submits to no one when he subjects himself to the law. When a citizen has a share in the sovereign power that makes the law and he needs only to obey laws that he himself makes, then political liberty is synonymous with this equality before law. Ultimately, liberty and equality is what makes the political bond bearable for the subject and sustains his perpetual obedience to the sovereign.

But Rousseau’s anxiety about equality persists. All his writings on government and public economy demonstrate a perpetual sense of vulnerability of political equality and hence of the stability and survival of political sovereignty. The cause of the instability inheres in the elemental linguistic attribute of the contract: Paul de Man makes the case that in Rousseau’s anthropology and philosophy of language the concept of equality is figural and metaphoric in its origin. Therefore, there forever lacks a reality adequate to the concept of equality, and this opens a gap for Rousseau between the formal equality that the sovereign can will and legislate and the material equality that is forever impossible to attain. Whereas language first created the political union, in its permanent indetermination of reference to an adequate reality of equality language now plants the seeds of disunion.

Still, Rousseau is not fatalistic about the gap between formal requirement of equality and physical reality of inequality. Rousseau never took that formal equality as the end of his political philosophy, nor did he regard the verbal and rational commitment to political unity adequate guarantee against factionalism and civil war. I will argue in the fifth chapter that Rousseau’s solution to the subversive power of language is not more reason and perfectibility or greater enlightenment of the subject but rather an intricate setup of political economy and logistics that must function in Rousseau as the only safeguard against disunity and civil war.

Chapter 4
Instituting Sovereignty

This chapter will be a close examination of the Rousseauean contract and what Rousseau says of its most essential attributes. Since Rousseau’s state theory is part of the contractualist tradition, his arguments in *The Social Contract* build upon but also frequently assault the positions taken by earlier contractualists from Grotius to Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke. This intellectual lineage and frequent quarrel between Rousseau and his predecessors have been endlessly studied. It is rightly stressed in modern commentaries that Rousseau’s contract is a rejection of the Grotian and Hobbesian slave contract, which Rousseau considers oxymoronic in nature. Less discussed is how both Rousseau and Hobbes tie the contract to man’s linguistic and rational faculties. Rousseau relentlessly attacks conquest rights as established by Grotius and Hobbes, but even in Hobbes’s account conquest slowly started to lose its legal force to consent and the
linguistic and rational capacity of the subject. For the consent given by a man of evolved cognitive abilities serves as a far superior foundation for a lasting political union than the threat of force from the conqueror. Rousseau’s contract eliminates any remaining relevance of conquest rights and draws more forcefully on the power of reason and language in creating a political bond that is both equal and durable.

**Conquest rights: innovation and sophism**

Today we see the social contract tradition as one that started a search for a new source of legitimacy for the state while simultaneously and inevitably defining and presenting a new political subject. The radical break from the past that the contractualist tradition represented is best evidenced by the choice of opponents Rousseau picked for himself in the first few chapters of the *Social Contract*. The preoccupation with Grotius and Hobbes reflects no mere strong revulsion on Rousseau’s part for slavery. Aristotle’s endorsement of natural slavery was still dutifully repeated by early modern jurists. But slavery brought on through war and conquest, not natural servitude, draws Rousseau’s attention. Rousseau is dismissive of opinions of even those who actually share his consternation over slavery, and he borrows virtually nothing from, say, Locke’s rebuttal of paternal title to dominion. He chooses to focus his fire on Grotius and Hobbes and especially a line of reasoning that says the right of dominion is acquired by the conqueror in exchange for his pardoning the life of the captives. Grotius’s and Hobbes’s bold attempt to justify slavery and domination no longer in terms of natural slavery but to construe it as a compact between the conquerors and the conquered points to a crucial presumption they made that would be inherited by Rousseau: that given humankind’s original as sociability, the permanence and universality of political rights and obligations must be explained and not simply assumed as they were in traditional natural law jurisprudence and theory of state. Rousseau’s decision to engage Grotius and Hobbes shows just how badly universal or natural law jurisprudence that provided for some individuals to be masters and some to be natural slaves had been wounded by the contractualists’ strategic use of the narrative of the state of nature.

Moreover, Rousseau makes clear that the object of his criticism is not a crude realism that calls for the weak to yield to the force of the strong. Grotius’s and Hobbes’s justification of tyranny as conquest rights is much more: it is a “perpetuated” institution of slavery. Leaving behind the timelessness and universality of traditional natural law jurisprudence, contractualism must in its own way provide for the durability and stability of political association. For Hobbes and Grotius, if violence and conquest account for the origination of power, it is only because of a covenant and a trade between the conqueror and the conquered. The victors will spare the life of the captives, and in return the vanquished settle for permanent servitude. This logic that momentary force can and must be converted into some lasting form of right and obligation is central to some of the most peculiar arguments advanced in defense of slavery by Grotius, and the same logic has a still more important role to play in Hobbes. Conquest is the singularly important event that founds and *temporalizes* our political life and thereby gives legitimacy and stability to the state.

*The temporal dimension of absolute power*
The absolute sovereign either faces no opposition in its exercise of power or it must be able to prevail over such opposition. Individuals in the state of nature come together to form the leviathan in the sole hope of creating such a formidable and overpowering entity. The magnitude of its strength is the *prima facie* evidence of the absoluteness and authenticity of sovereign power. It is therefore intriguing to see Bodin furnish a second criterion of absolute power. According to Bodin, sovereignty must be perpetual, and short-term authority is always loaned from the real power-holder. This struck a Bodin authority like Julia Franklin as a puzzling logical oddity who saw this second criterion of sovereign power as an unnecessary appendage to Bodin’s definition of sovereignty (Franklin put the entire discussion on the requirement of perpetuity in a brief “appendix” to his book on Bodin) because speculating the perpetual power of a mortal person, even if he be king, was an “idle fantasy” with no practical meaning or political consequence especially because the Parlement’s objection to royal power was always about its scope, not its tenure. But Bodin insists that a non-permanent power is secondary, derivative and not authentic. The most prominent authority to directly challenge this Bodinesque idea of perpetuity as a key criterion of sovereignty is none other than Grotius, who argues that “the continuance of a thing alters not the nature of it,” thereby setting up a crucial contest by the two leading jurists of early modernity: does the perpetuity of power affect the current operation of it?

Between hereditary kingship and elective kingship, conspicuous differences exist regarding the appointment of the new king after the death of the current one, but more relevant for Bodin is the scope and nature of power granted to kings even before they die if they lack the power to pick their own successors. Grotius insists that a Roman Dictator elected for a fixed term of office has the full powers of the sovereign while in office, even if he could not – on his own authority – elect a successor or reelect himself. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes adopts the Bodinesque line that that elective kings are not real sovereigns. He insists that elective kings are limited and are but ministers of the sovereign, thus affirming Bodin’s criterion of perpetuity as a mark of true sovereign: sovereignty must be perpetual, so if the king cannot choose his successor, he is not even absolute before his term expires. Hobbes further argues that even if a king is elected for life, he is never sovereign for a moment in his life because whoever possesses the power to select the king’s successor already has the current ownership of sovereign power. In other words, if the king cannot pick his successor, then he is not sovereign even now. For “the disposing of the successor, is always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor”, a line that tightly binds the present exercise of power to its eternality. And we have reason to believe Hobbes in *Leviathan* has gone further than even Bodin in asserting the impossibility of any non-perpetual power to be legitimate and absolute at any given moment.

This should separate *Leviathan* from de factoism or a Thrasymachus doctrine of the rule of the strong. Hobbes is wary of being associated with “a crude ‘might-makes-right’ de factoism based purely upon conquest alone” and always wants to distance himself from other de factoists like Anthony Ascham. Part of wariness has to do with the political unsavoriness of being labeled a de factoist; a still bigger part of it, it may be argued, has to do with the severe limitations such a crude de factoism places on the legitimacy and stability of absolute power. De factoism that recognizes only the legitimacy of the prevailing faction in a civil war recognizes no legitimacy at all because
it is a call for constant agitation and insurrection. There is no present that is exempted from the temporal economy of absolute power. De factoism is hopelessly seditious because it is an admission of weakness, a very real weakness of the moment rather than a future one that is potentially down the road. If the leviathan is no more than the de facto power, then the leviathan becomes an oxymoronic term because it never possessed that awesome power. It would be tantamount to the intellectual bankruptcy of the contractualist tradition because it marks the utter failure of overcoming the state of war by creating an overwhelming, absolute power. The ingenuity of conquest rights is the conversion of a temporary military advantage into a permanent political bondage – and ultimately Rousseau’s rebuttal is precisely that this conversion is impossible.

The choice of Leviathan’s frontispiece also adds weight and a new twist to Hobbes’s eventual decision to reject the oxymoronic concept of elective but absolute kingship in favor of Bodin’s argument about the necessary perpetuity of authentic sovereignty. It is highly rewarding to read Noel Malcolm’s explanation of the iconographic meaning of Leviathan’s frontispiece who demonstrates that the original inspiration for the frontispiece came partly from the tradition of anamorphic art and a certain intriguing optical device designed by friar Jean-Francois Niceron. The functioning of the device stresses the importance of memory to making people to perceive and grasp the optical trick and significance of the device: “the people who ‘see’ the things depicted in such perspectival pictures ‘do not see or perceive, properly speaking, the pictures themselves’. To be a good judge of these pictures, therefore, it is necessary to possess not only a well-stocked memory of the appearances of objects…but also an imaginationem constantem”. 319 Inevitably, any single picture in itself tells a woefully incomplete story. Basically, “we bring to the interpretation of the image the similar images that we already possess” 320. The inference of Hobbes’s interest in this optical device and its curious effect is, I would suggest, that even the subjects – or especially the subjects – do not live in the present. They live in a continual state whereby they are asked to actively and repeatedly imagine up political power. The power that commands obedience is only real and absolute if it is imagined – actively and incessantly by the ruled. The absolute sovereign must cajole such active imagination from the ruled. No obedience is entirely of the moment; true obedience is not motivated exclusively by the present incentives but participation of a moral obligation that is supposed to be lasting and continuous. Without memory and the mental ability to project a continuous effect of power, the subject cannot even make sense of the present power relations. The temporalization of sovereign power thus signifies a triple binding: it binds sovereign and the subject respectively to a futurity and then through that futurity binds the sovereign and subject together, for without the subject’s imagination of that futurity the sovereign cannot even exist in the moment.

The rights of the conqueror – and the mother
Conquest rights are the most theoretically attractive and dependable basis of absolute sovereignty in a Grotius’s or Hobbes’s contract. While they allow that a political state can be founded through democratic means and through consent of the individuals, they leave no doubt that a state created through conquest has a much more solid foundation in two senses: first, it is more realistic to establish a state through force; second, acquisition by force grants the conqueror the most complete powers of a sovereign.
From Grotius to Hobbes we see repeated claims that sovereign rights are *fuller* in a state that is conquered than in one that is democratically founded. From Grotius we learn that the king who acquires a state with his own arms has “full right of property” regarding his kingdom while an elected head of the state has mere “usufructuary rights”. In democratic states, the people have political liberty while in conquered territories this liberty is denied and even personal liberty can be abrogated. Pufendorf, too, asserts that kings hold their kingdoms as a patrimony and “may therefore at their pleasure divide, alienate or transfer it to whom they will. This is particularly the case with kings who have acquired their kingdom by force of arms” but not those who are made kings by the people. In fact, Tuck argues that it was a commonly held opinion at the time that conquest results in more expansive sovereign power. Conquest is also the most plausible scenario that explains the initial formation of the state. While democratic voting can be the founding event of the state, a far more reliable and natural way of erecting a body politic is conquest. Kinch Hoekstra notes that in *Leviathan* “there are two ways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing by human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force” and Hobbes is clearly in favor of the second. Therefore, Hobbes “was unambivalent about the centrality of commonwealths by acquisition, which arise instead from conquest or parental dominion.”

Given the centrality of the conquest rights to their judicial and political philosophy, Grotius and Hobbes must argue that the rights of the conqueror can somehow survive the violence of war and the moment the war ends. Indeed, conquest, unlike natural servitude or dominion acquired through procreation, stubbornly poses the question of futurity. If conquest is a superior foundation of the state to timeless precepts like natural servitude or paternal authority, then it must prove itself to be able to create a permanent political bond. The contractualist solution is both self-evident and provocative. Grotius, Hobbes and later Pufendorf all place uttermost importance on the notion that the grant of life by the conqueror should be reciprocated with perpetual servitude, and this simple exchange of life and freedom, sealed by a compact, must be honored afterwards: in Pufendorf’s words, “if he had wished as victor to take advantage of the strict rights of war, he might simply have taken the lives of the vanquished,” and the consent to be enslaved is valid after the conquest. Grotius and Hobbes before him have used the exact same line of reasoning. It is all the more astonishing to see all three authors press this line of reasoning with regard to the rights of parents. According to Hobbes, generation does *not* infer dominion: The title to dominion over a child, proceedeth not from the generation, but from the preservation of it; and therefore in the estate of nature, the mother in whose power it is to save or destroy it, hath right thereto by that power...And if the mother shall think fit to abandon or expose her child to death, whatsoever man or woman shall find the child so exposed, shall have the same right which the mother had before; and for the same reason, namely for the power not of generating, but preserving. Here we have a spectacular example of the brutal honesty and consistency in Hobbes in applying the logic of the state of the nature and the conquest rights to parent-child relationships, and he is willing to discount even the rights of progenitors as the primary or even acceptable way to acquire lasting dominion. Hobbes places ever more emphasis on
the logic and political significance of conquest rights: even the infant and mother go through the state of nature and the process of conquest – the sparing of a life and permanent submission in return – in order to establish the dominion of the mother. And the logic has nothing to do with her tender and affectionate nature or her maternal or feminine elements; it is just that she is most likely the first to take care of or snuff her child.

Moreover, the conquest rights that the mother gains through leveraging her power to snuff her newborn is meant to last forever. It is a moral right, no longer a matter of convenience:

though the child thus preserved, do in time acquire strength, whereby he might pretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him, yet shall that pretense be thought unreasonable, both because his strength was the gift of him, against whom he pretendeth; and also because it is to be presumed, that he which giveth sustenance to another, whereby to strengthen him, hath received a promise of obedience in consideration thereof.  

Vulnerable children enter this form of dominion “in perpetuum”.

Hobbes’s logic of conquest rights of the mother defies even gender prejudice and conventional belief of paternal power, for Hobbes emphasizes that since the mother is most likely the first to gain the power to smother the child, the father may gain dominion over his child only if he already gains dominion over his wife.  

In fact, all conquerors gain dominion over the newborn through their dominion over mothers. Grotius argues that “whoever is born of a woman after she is a slave, is born a slave” on the ground that “if the captor had been pleased to have used his utmost power, he might have prevented their being born”.  

Pufendorf concurs: “the offspring of slave parents is itself of servile status…because that offspring would obviously not have been born if the master had exercised the right of war against the parent.”

The reason that children are born to slavery is identical to the reason that war prisoners must enter permanent servitude: their lives could have been terminated and their masters only choose not to destroy life because this could create a permanent chain. Conversely, Pufendorf does not forget to point out that children born before the capture of parents cannot be enslaved.  

The right of dominion of the conqueror and the right of dominion of the mother therefore become one and the same: the mother’s right over her young is established only by the right of conquest in the sense that it is her power to withhold basic care and nutrition and to expose and thus kill the baby that firmly establishes her lifelong sovereignty over the latter; similarly, one is only ever born into slavery if the mother happens to be captured and all her sovereign rights to the baby surrendered and transferred to the conqueror. The mother rules the baby like a conqueror; the conqueror rules the baby only through his rule of the mother. Natural law apologists of slavery who fail to see the absolute equivalence of the rights of the conqueror and the rights of the mother must invent categories like the rights of generation to justify parental dominion of the children (like Robert Filmer did); natural law opponents of slavery who fail to see this equivalence cannot adequately respond except by means of ridiculing the hypothesis of the state of nature between the mother and the child (like Locke did).  

Only in Rousseau do we see the first response to Grotius and Hobbes on their terms.

The problem of temporality exists for Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. It does not exist for royalists and de factoists, and it does not exist for Filmer or Locke. The problem
poses itself to the former because they (and, later, Rousseau\textsuperscript{336}) choose the state of the nature as their point of departure where perpetual power or political bond does not originally exist and has to be created through the contract. Conquest rights are the bold and innovative way in which Grotius and Hobbes explain the transition from the state of nature to the perpetual power of the sovereign. Even in rejecting conquest rights, Rousseau accepts its fundamental premise that a permanent political bond needed to be created where none had existed before.

\textit{The Hobbesian subject: moral consent and cynicism}

In the \textit{Elements of Law}, Hobbes speaks of the dominion over beasts and irrational creatures.\textsuperscript{337} Hoekstra notes that this sort of dominion has no correlative duty to obey on the part of the subject and is only meaningful when one takes this right to dominion over irrational beasts as “a right one has because of the \textit{absence} of any relations of obligation.”\textsuperscript{338} In the case of dominion over beasts, Hobbes divides animals to two categories: the docile type that can be saved and hoarded and slaughtered later; and those so ferocious and disobedient that one must “kill and destroy, with perpetual war”.\textsuperscript{339} The stability and viability of dominion over beasts and irrational creatures is purely a product of the beasts’ instinct and nature and has nothing to do with political reasoning. But for Hobbes, a very different type of dominion and rights must be acquired following a conquest. Legitimate and stable sovereign authority must entail a correlative duty to oblige, and in explaining the political authority acquired through conquest, Hobbes seems to have recognized the deep inadequacy of simply enumerating the titles and rights of the conqueror without also defining a new epistemic subject who is more than a docile beast and is capable of performing the duties owed to the conqueror. If there is any perpetuity to the political relationship that conquest is supposed to create, conquest itself must recede in importance and Hobbes eventually gives much of the theoretical weight to moral consent that has to be given by the conquered. The need to advocate a more absolute version of conqueror’s sovereignty, to stabilize it and add a temporal dimension to it, gradually nudges Hobbes to accept a very robust notion of moral consent. Temporalizing the power and rule of the conqueror eventually entails moralizing the consent to his rule he receives from the conquered.

One way to ensure the stability of the regime would be to argue that the de facto military power of the conqueror could not only compel immediate obedience but also produce obligations that are moral and not prudential, perpetual and not temporary. Hobbes would want to make alienation of rights permanent and make the transfer of rights from the subject to the leviathan as irreversible as possible, and the way to do so is to make the covenant morally binding. In \textit{De Cive}, Hobbes gives different definitions to contract and covenant. In a contract both parties must perform presently, and the contract ends as soon as both parties have performed. The covenant, however, does not end so quickly because a covenant involves one party that performs now and one party whose performance is expected in the future.\textsuperscript{340} A social compact, by its very nature, must be a covenant, which is a stronger version of agreement in which at least one party is trusted of future performance. Hobbes thereby rejects the weaker, cynical interpretation of covenaniting that it is only about immediate advantage. Rather, he says that as long as it is in one’s power, one should endeavor to do what one has promised even if in the future the task becomes difficult.\textsuperscript{341} We cannot make up as we go; cynics and renegades cannot
make up new contracts to extract themselves from old obligations. The sole exception is made for covenants that contradict civil law, which is to say that the only thing that can annul a contract is our duty towards the sovereign, but in allowing that exception Hobbes only reinforces the argument that our most important duties and performances, namely those expected from us by the sovereign, cannot be nullified at all. The social compact is not based on cynicism and must not be limited to the present. More so than all other covenants made by private individuals, the social covenant must be a moral one that is built on trust and genuine alienation of rights instead of expediency. The gap between political association and an expedient exchange is the futurity and temporality of the former.

The moral force of the compact comes from the consent the conquered gives to the conqueror, a kind of consent that Hobbes argues could be withheld. The free choice a person makes (between death and servitude) when he is captured is what gives Hobbesian conquest rights the moral force that is otherwise non-existent among de factoists. An earlier Hobbes had indeed endorsed a simpler account of conquest rights: “a man is released of his subjection by conquest; for when it cometh to pass, that the power of commonwealth is overthrown, and any particular man thereby, lying under the sword of his enemy yieldeth himself captive, he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his obligation to the former.” Hobbes would later argue, however, that those captured in the war do not immediately become servants. They are shackled and put in prison because of the lack of trust and continuing state of war between them and their captors, and once trust and consent are exchanged, the obligation of a servant to his lord no longer arises from a simple pardon of his life, “for all obligations derives from contract; but where is no trust, there can be no contract”. So we must “suppose him that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation”. We must assume, therefore, that Hobbes is aware of an interval of time in which, even having been spared his life, the prisoner is yet to be turned into a permanent slave because he has not given his consent. It is actually a continuation of the state of nature that only ends when the consent is finally given. Hobbes’s earlier interpretation of conquest and attendant rights in *The Elements of Law* is thus more de factoist than the later accounts in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, which put greater theoretical importance on moral consent in the process of conquest and submission.

The political benefit of soliciting a stronger version of consent is a stronger version of moral duty. The consenting slave is duty-bound to serve his master even if the master is subsequently overthrown. Compared to what *The Elements of Law* says of the immediate dissolution of one’s duty towards his sovereign if the latter is overthrown, Hobbes makes the argument in *Leviathan* that a subject’s duty towards his king must actually continue if the king is captured but yet to abdicate. Also, in terms of the right to desert in midst of a war, huge difference exists between a professional soldier and a civilian. While people may be born into a king’s dominion, professional soldiers accept his pay, and accepting payment from the king implies a stronger version of consent. Therefore, a soldier who is not conscripted but is a paid mercenary or professional is not allowed to be afraid and has the moral freedom of desertion taken away from him. The social contract thus must be seen as a moral contract and not one based on calculations of current profits. Indeed, “Hobbes’s understanding of obligation is that obligation is a moral, and not simply a prudential, matter.” Consent of the subject gives moral weight to the fact of conquest;
in the Leviathan, consent, perhaps more than the conquest itself, gives the conqueror the permanent insurance against subversion and the cynicism of the subject.

From The Elements of Law to Leviathan, we can thus see Hobbes’s changing positions on the perpetuity of sovereign power and on the moral force of consent. There is philosophical reason to believe that they are a parallel development and that both mirror and are entailed by Hobbes’s evolving view on the rational and epistemological capacities of man. The transformation in social relations from the arbitrariness and chaos of the state of nature to a permanent political union, a transformation precipitated by the conquest, must also coincide with a revolution in our rational and linguistic faculties. Hobbes stresses the impossibility to make covenants with brutes in that “not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right”. And so long as transfer of rights always denotes something about futurity, brutes have nothing to surrender because they live ever in the present and the immediate: the irrational and the bestial can only be vanquished, never conquered. While Hobbes consistently made the same difference between vanquishing and conquering in all his texts, it is notable that he did not again repeat his position in The Elements of Law that brutes can be conquered and enslaved. Animals were divided to two categories: the docile type that can be saved and hoarded and slaughtered later; and those so ferocious and disobedient that one must “kill and destroy, with perpetual war”. If Hobbes had reversed his position on the possibility to acquire dominion over irrational creatures in The Elements of Law, it is necessary for us to ask why. This reversal, I think, underscores the same point that Rousseau would later make in his criticism of Hobbes and conquest rights: if conquest lays the foundation of the first human societies, it must be at once a social revolution, in which the individuals come together to form and then submit to an absolute sovereign, and an epistemological revolution, which in the individuals allows them to comprehend the sovereign’s perpetual power and thus render their perpetual and genuine obedience and loyalty.

In light of this temporalization of sovereign power and the subject’s cognition of this temporality we may take another look at what is said about right to resist or self-defense in Leviathan. Despite the great care Hobbes has taken to establish a permanent, moral bond between the conquered and the conqueror, it is quite disturbing to read how easily the right to resist can be reclaimed by the conquered. If the leviathan is built on a moral contract, it must mean individual rights are alienated and surrendered to it at its birth. An alienation contract is the warranty of the longevity and stability of the Hobbesian state. But Hobbes deems the individual right to self-defense inalienable, which can be exercised even if the person is threatened by a rightful sovereign. Naturally Hobbes still seeks to attach strict qualifications to the right of self-defense: namely, that the injuries must be imminent and corporeal to justify insurrection or self-defense. That is to say, of course, the right of self-defense is reserved mostly for savages and beasts, because after all it is only brutes and animals that are most perceptive of imminent and bodily harms, and their intelligence, so different from ours, is meant to keep them in constant alert, give them merely light sleep and train them in envisaging the consequences of each of their actions. In the discourse of conquest rights, the conqueror is promised perpetual servitude of the conquered and aspires to change himself into a ruler; by contrast, the conquered is promised his life, and in jealously safeguarding only that which is promised to him he is suddenly reduced to this bestial existence and animalistic intelligence.
deal between the conqueror and conquered is structured so asymmetrically that consent, in the moral and rational sense that is requisite of a contract, does not appear to be possible: to keep what he is promised, the conqueror would indeed be eager to attach a great amount of honor and ethics to the social contract, whereas for the subject to keep what he is promised – his spared bare life – he undergoes an epistemic and moral devolution that limits him to the rationality and cynicism of a savage. In other words, the leviathan would represent an odd moment in man’s rational and epistemological evolution when he is pulled in opposite directions: he is asked both to alienate his rights as a profound verbal gesture and rational act and then to revert back to a brutish intelligence where he must be constantly watchful of his immediate, physical environment.

A still more perverse effect takes place when the reason of the brutes is combined with the rationality and sense of futurity of modern men: the subject reacts instinctively to an immediate and present danger, and yet his capacity of rational planning to counter any future danger means he is not a loyal subject even when the threat to his life is not imminent, so “the non-comic effect is that creatures as forward-looking and anxious as Hobbesian men cannot be supposed to wait until the knife is at their throat until they raise the question whether obedience is too unsafe.” In other words, the Hobbesian subject in fact watches the government more distrustfully than, say, even the Lockean subject. If the textual differences between The Elements of Law and Leviathan indicate a gradual effort by Hobbes to introduce elements of moral consent and linguistic anthropology to the discourse of conquest rights and to reconcile conquest with perpetual sovereignty and a linguistic and epistemic subject who can live under it, what he says about right to resist reflects rather a diminished but ultimately obstinate adherence to the notion that conquest and a swap of life and servitude create the first political bond.

One must question whether conquest rights, even in Hobbes’s mature expression in Leviathan, succeeded in providing a moral and not prudential account of why the subjects would covenant. Malcolm, for example, asks “It may still be wondered, however, whether Hobbes’s account needed to use a concept of contract at all…If the reasons for obeying covenants are to be found in a system of prudential rules, why has Hobbes not drawn up his whole theory of obedience in terms of long-term benefits and dispensed with the notion of a contract altogether?” Conquest rights fail to achieve a complete “alienation” covenant, and as a result the Hobbesian sovereign becomes “neither absolute nor permanent…the sovereign whom Hobbesian men can authorize is not Leviathan”. In fact, the threat of civil war itself is enough to throw the political community into a civil war in that it destroys any sense of moral duty and alerts the subject to be vigilant and cynic. The subjects are thus always prepared for the abuse of the sovereign and the resumption of the civil war, and must the preparation for war not itself be considered an act of war? The moral nature of the social compact requires genuine peace between the ruling and the ruled, the genuineness hinging on the perpetuity of the peace. Without a moral commitment to perpetual peace, the apparent harmony of the present is deceptive. The absence of a permanent, moral duty for a citizen means the leviathan is always a continuation of the state of nature. Despite its awesome power the leviathan is only a magnificent beast that dwells in the state of nature, the world of violence and immediacy.

Conceiving romance, war, and sovereignty
Rousseau readily accepted and expanded Hobbes’s account of the futurity of contract and perpetuity of political power as well as Hobbes’s evolving view of the role of human language and reason but denounced with all vehemence the validity of conquest rights and the very epistemological possibility of the exchange of freedom and life. In his speculative anthropology Rousseau traces man’s evolution from an amoral and ahistorical being into one capable of foresight and ultimately of generality and settled permanence in all his affairs. For Rousseau the defining quality of moral agency for civilized men is precisely the search for permanence in their moral relationships. This underlies what Rousseau says about war and property and also the contrast he draws between sex and love and between slavery and social contract as well as the analogy of romantic and political relations. Rousseau argues that primitive sexual drive that lead savages to look for random mates and the brute force that creates slavery both exist only in the physical world of immediacy and fleeting changes, whereas marriage, property, sovereignty – and even our ability to fight a war – must be founded on more durable moral forces. Rousseau thus defines the state of war quite differently from Hobbes and Grotius. His definition of war stems primarily from an anthropological analysis of man’s intelligence and the evolution of his cognitive and linguistic faculties: in nature exists the inevitable violence, but “war consists not in one or several unpremeditated fights…but in the steady, considered and manifest will to destroy one’s enemy because to judge that this enemy’s existence is incompatible with our well-being requires self-possession and reason, which produce a lasting resolve.” Stable political and proprietary relations are the precondition of war. Rousseau’s criticism of Grotius and Hobbes stems from Rousseau’s rejection of the two’s substitution of their expansive and “sophistic” interpretation of conquest rights for valid provenance of lasting power and political rights. The opening pages of the Social Contract can be seen as a very specific criticism of a peculiar moral and epistemological uncertainty inherent in the Grotian or Hobbesian version of conquest rights: among savages, even cannibalism is a more realistic outcome than slavery after a war; among men with evolved mental capabilities, the proposed exchange of life for freedom cheats their rational ability to search for a truly permanent form of human relationships.

As a contractualist, Rousseau accepts the premise of the natural unsociability of men. Political association is what humans come to discover and possess only in their epistemological and linguistic maturation in Rousseau’s anthropology, and this idea is already hinted at in Hobbes. Hobbes already offers a rich account of the growing role of human rationality in the state of nature and tells a vivid tale of how reason and language enable foresight and exaggerate man’s tendency of self-aggrandizement. Hobbes insists that the human condition can be made worse and better with the growing use of speech: “by speech man is not made better, but only given greater possibilities”; the leviathan is not justified by man’s natural malice alone. Even though man is compelled to satisfy his basest needs, the significance of human desires and greed is magnified and only begins to play a role in the birth of a political state when language and reason enable him to project his needs to the future. More than desires as such, human foresight and thus the insatiability of desires constitute the decisive step primitive humans took in discovering the need for an accord for common safety. And yet language endows men also with the capacity to regulate themselves by drawing general rules from the universal signification of names. Reason and language induce men into seeing the merit and necessity of setting
up the leviathan and obeying it. The speaking subject in Hobbes is capable of greater aggression than a werewolf but also greater ability to make peace.

With Rousseau we see the notion of temporality and stability more emphatically added to our understanding of moral freedom and political agency. For him, the most important category of political action that needs to be analyzed in relation to this question of temporality and legitimacy is perhaps war. Rousseau considers war uniquely and extraordinarily human. The state of war is therefore a highly moral state of being for humans, from which tyranny and its civil war must be excepted and distinguished. For Rousseau, war is clearly differentiated from natural violence but is readily accepted as part of the reality of international politics; rather than condemn the phenomenon of war, he constantly strives to give it very precise meaning and juridical framework. War stands on very firm moral and intellectual ground in Rousseau’s political philosophy. In Rousseau’s anthropology, the ability to war, very much like the ability to love, is an acquired one. War and romance are not possible without modern man’s evolved intelligence and capability of abstraction, rationalization and temporalization. The human race is led away from nature with these intelligence and rationalities, but Rousseau is not categorically averse to the denaturation: in place of random violence and promiscuous sex there are now institutionalized warfare and loyal love, and in place of laws of necessities we now have laws of ethics. More specifically, I argue that in Rousseau’s evolutionary tale durability and even permanence become a very functional criterion of legitimacy of our political actions. Rousseau thus points to some legitimate forms of war and politics consistent with humanity’s gains in our rational faculties in its evolutionary history. Much of what Rousseau proposes about the legitimate political state can only take place as a result of a cognitive revolution for the constituent members and a rigorous exercise of their rational faculties as defined in Rousseau’s epistemological anthropology.

The subject of human evolution gets its lengthiest treatment and two slightly conflicting accounts in Rousseau’s Second Discourse and the Essay on the Origin of Languages. Commenting on the Essay, Jean Starobinski says “for Rousseau, the evolution of language is clearly inseparable from the history of desire and sexuality; it is intimately associated with the process of socialization.” This idea - that linguistic and social evolutions are intertwined and mutually entailed – Starobinski traces to earlier philosophers and to Hobbes. Modern European languages that we know today obscure not only their own primitive origin but also the origin of society. Political philosophers before Rousseau who “have examined the foundations of society have all felt the necessity of going back as far as the state of Nature, but none of them has reached it,” and Rousseau is very much aware that their failure must partly be attributed to the ignorance of the evolutionary process of language. Some political philosophers keenly endorse tyranny by “first granting to the stronger authority over the weaker, had Government arise straightway, without giving thought to the time that must have elapsed before the language of authority and of government could have meaning among Men”. But civil associations and political bodies can only mature along with a lexicon that is also evolving and keeps cohesive those social bonds. The two 1754 texts speak to Rousseau’s resolve to clarify the importance of language to the social transformation of men and how we later come to conceive a true and proper form of war.

Rousseau’s interest in languages and reason exceeds the scope of Hobbes’s inquiry and goes beyond a descriptive account of prehistoric humankind. While the power of
naming, generalization and abstraction is a big part of Hobbes’s story of men’s socialization, Rousseau defines moral agency of the speaking subject by its generality and universality. A physical act falls into a moral category only when it obtains some measure of perpetuity. In comparison to a natural world of fleeting passions and quick decay of their effects, the moral world consists of actions that are meant to last in their impact and significance, and I contend that in the final analysis Rousseau’s notion of moral freedom and the distinctive traits of the human species is defined by the stability and perpetuity of men’s actions, and the construction of this moral world is the culmination of the development of men’s linguistic and epistemological faculties.

In particular, sexual passion and the occasional violence of primitive humans become acts of civility only when they are lifted out of a physical world of immediacy and basic impulses and transformed into moral deeds. Romance and proper acts of war must thus be distinguished from outbursts of primitive passions. One can even draw a parallel between the requirement of permanence of moral acts of romance and proper war and the requirement of permanence of sovereign power in modern state theories: moral or political validation of love and violence and political power come from the assumption of their permanence.

**Rousseau’s linguistic anthropology**

Rousseau’s evolutionary tale of humankind begins with individuals’ wanton aggression against each other in a state of nature and ends with a state of war between political communities in an apparently structured and methodical way. In delving into the state of nature Rousseau proposes not to prescribe laws for moral society that are modeled on natural human behavior; his intention is partly to show how different early and modern humans are. In excavating a primitive state of things still uncontaminated by civilization, Rousseau nevertheless resists the urge to shape the moral norms for moderns according to the unadulterated origin. He seems more interested in impressing his readers with the stark contrast between the behaviors of the brutish ancestors and the civilized moderns even in the most elementary aspects of human lives, in courtship of sexes and acts of aggression. Men and women met “fortuitously, according to chance encounters, opportunities, and desire”, and “they parted just as readily.”

Similarly, among savages “the subject of a dispute arises and disappears almost instantaneously, a quarrel begins and ends in a single day”. In Starobinski’s famous reading of Rousseau, much of the extolled transparency results from the immediacy of passions and sensations: “[man] lives in the immediate. If each sensation is new, the apparent discontinuity is merely a way of experiencing the continuity of the immediate. Nothing comes between man’s ‘limited desires’ and their object. Language is scarcely necessary.”

The brutish state of amoralty where people take and abandon mates quickly is one in which hardly anyone needs to speak.

In the *Second Discourse*, Rousseau declares natural men to be innately timid and shy whose first reaction to confrontation is to turn their back on the threat and run. One difficulty in reading the first few pages of Rousseau’s *Second Discourse*, however, is the way his later accounts of unwarranted aggression and viciousness of early humans conflict with the picture he paints in these pages. What survives such seemingly careless self-contradictions is precisely the idea that early humans cannot establish lasting social relations. Those who kill in a sudden rage or flee because of their temerity all find
a way to end the matter there and then. Among the savages, therefore, neither violence nor peace disrupts the fundamental tranquility and timelessness of their world. The most distinctive trait of the primitive humans is thus the instantaneity of their actions and not their temperaments and desires.

The progress from our brutish ancestry to modern civilization is driven by the use of language. Rousseau stresses the superfluity of speeches to our ancestors and to sex, parenthood, violence or even commerce in the primitive state of human beings. But the superfluity of language to primordial human life only goes on to show that when speech and reason did finally enter human life, it marked a significant degree of socialization. For adopting language helps humankind cover “the distance between pure sensations and the simplest knowledge”. At some point, general ideas must have entered the human mind. These mental skills have greatly extended humans’ desire and want and irrevocably altered their behavior.

The leap in man’s ability to conceive and comprehend abstract notions must have taken place slowly and gradually, but this evolution was accompanied by profound changes in patterns of human interactions: “it is impossible to conceive how a man could by his own strength alone, without the help of communication, and without the goad of necessity, have crossed so great a divide”. The development of the human tongue is most likely coeval with the evolution of socialization. Our linguistic and rational faculties thus started to reshape the basic aspects of human lives. Paternal affection, for instance, “is said to be a significant development, the result of socialization, and based on a rather abstract knowledge”. This level of abstraction, of course, takes place only with modern, civilized human beings. By the same token, “family cannot be said to exist in the precise sense until, having a fixed habitation, its members acquire ‘a union as intimate and permanent as among us’, and construction of permanence home-sites, too, should have been the result of longtime use of language and reason. Further, in his dispute with Condillac on language, Rousseau reminds us that even if we were to assume that language first surfaced between the father and the mother and the child, we cannot presuppose the permanence of their union; rather, language contributes decisively to the intimacy and stability of marriage and family. Language knits together the most basic social unit.

Language and reason have removed us from that world of immediacy and instant sensations and satisfactions. The new world is a phase of foresight, calculation, planning, and permanence. Equipped with such foresight, the speaking subject tends to more restless and greedy than the silent savage. Most importantly for Rousseau’s political science, reason and foresight would completely reshape our tendencies of violence and aggression. Savages may fall victim to all sorts of threats: “alone, idle, and always near danger, Savage man must like to sleep and be a light sleeper”. They are constantly alert, and yet the danger they are exposed to is not a perpetual one, but a continuity of the immediate. By contrast, modern men who live in organized societies are shielded from physical threats from their immediate environ but are exposed to the danger of war and live in (to borrow a twentieth century term) a “cold war” even when there is no “hot war”. Such is the meaning of the state of war, and nothing can be farther removed from the state of nature than the state of war, which is an artifice of the highest order, a distilled and cold sense of hostility, a disembodiment of any sensuous immediacy of human feelings. Savages have a physique that allows them to respond to the nearest threat, but
that robust physique comes at the expense of the developed faculties of civil men. The latter’s bodies may be feebler than their ancestors’ but have acquired powerful mental faculties to project their security needs so remote in geographical locations and future times that they have to calculate and possess such jealousy and hostility to fight and harm others that they now live in a permanent state of warfare. In a state of war we see the final and most conclusive proof of humankind’s transformation through our use of language and reason and our displacement from the fleeting world of timelessness and immediacy.

*Moral agency in Rousseau: the lover, the warrior, the proprietor, and the citizen*

I have argued that there was significant change in Hobbes’s thinking on two important theoretical issues: the absoluteness of power as measured by its own perpetuity and the distinction between the vanquished and conquered. Moreover, this major rethinking was paralleled or even propelled by his increasingly sophisticated view on linguistics and reason. What Hobbes says about language and temporality can help reconcile how he and Rousseau describe of the state of nature. Rousseau persistently denies that savages are ever capable of war, which is to say a lasting condition of enmity cannot exist among them. A closer examination of *Leviathan*, however, yields the discovery that Hobbes is equally emphatic about the intervention of temporality in the concept of war. Hobbes, too, stresses that “war, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war”. To those seventeenth or twentieth century critics who say Hobbes’s state of nature is fictional and unreal, it may be surprising to read that Hobbes says very much the same thing: “though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators”. So Tuck’s thesis – that the state of war among states in early modern international relations is what first inspired the trope of state of war among savages – seems valid, for despite the talk of men as werewolves assaulting each other in a state of nature, all along Hobbes may have been imagining well-organized political or military bodies fighting each other in a reasonably ordered and quite stable international system. What better examples there are of foresight and rationality than Europe’s kings and princes calculatingly maneuvering for maximum security and gains? And what better proof do we have of the artificiality of the state of war than the political states and the international system constructed on top of them? This ought to bring Hobbes and Rousseau to agreement: that war is always deliberate, an amazing product of a long and complex evolutionary process of humans’ rational and cognitive abilities. Individuals, however independent and naturally free, are unlikely to be in a state of war because it is a calculated state of lasting and permanent hostility. The difference between Hobbes and Rousseau is thus not the question of what constitutes an act of war.

By the same token, Rousseau does not dispute Hobbes’s assumption of natural asociability or the basic objective of the social contract in creating a lasting political union where no permanent social bond has existed before. He has no quarrel, for example, with the Hobbesian thesis that the mother and the child live in a state of nature. Rousseau proposes that a mother nurtures her child only “to relieve her own swollen breasts of
milk,” and at no time does he accept even an implicit moral duty to care for the child. Moreover, Rousseau gives not the slightest disapproval of sexual promiscuity in the state of nature, remarking simply that any woman can suit a man in the primitive world.

Fidelity to one’s spouse and support for one’s offspring have nevertheless become essential elements of our civilization. For modern men, Rousseau argues, the parent-child bond now becomes a basic need for our young, and monogamy becomes the only moral and desirable arrangement between sex mates. Civilized men have enlarged mental capacities when compared to savages, but Rousseau expects them to not only project and expand their needs but also to make critical moral judgments about their actions. Unlike savages, socialized beings ought to tell moral right from moral wrong. Rousseau thus proposes to distinguish the physical from the moral in our sexual life and perhaps in our entire ethical life as well: “the Physical is this general desire that moves one sex to unite with the other; the moral is what gives this desire its distinctive character and focuses it exclusively on a single object”.

It is obvious that this fidelity to one’s spouse is entirely artificial and “a factitious sentiment; born of social practice” because by the design of nature any woman can suit any man and vice versa. The gap between natural promiscuity of savages and faithfulness of married couples is owed entirely to the “abstract ideas of regularity and of proportion” that we now have – and the artificiality of the value of chastity by no means diminishes the moral force of chastity in Rousseau’s eyes. Rousseau hereby suggests an amazing union of ethics and epistemology. Only the speaking and reasoning subject in Rousseau’s philosophy is capable of moral agency, and by virtue of their power to speak and to reason, we will witness the intervention of temporality in all moral precepts in Rousseau. Moral constructs in the civilized world must all last. The search for ethical law and principles of right has to begin with the general and abstract concepts that our mental faculties now impose on us. The law of nature that savages observe without thinking can no longer be the basis upon which we construct our moral laws for civilized men. The civilized man does not live in the immediate; in fact, he must battle every urge that still ties him to the immediate: nothing he does is morally legitimate unless a moral structure can be imposed upon his action and understood to be valid forever. Here we have in Rousseau a very peculiar version of almost proto-Kantian ethics, according to which an act cannot be morally sanctioned unless it can be taken or imagined to generate or operate within a permanent social bond – especially if that bond is unfriendly.

For Rousseau, then, it is imperative to move our violent tendencies from the realm of impulses to the realm of ethics in the same way we have transformed our sexual drives. War is a permanent state which presupposes lasting relations, and such relations rarely obtain between man and man, where everything between one individual and another is in continual flux which constantly changes relations and interests. So that the subject of a dispute arises and disappears almost instantaneously, a quarrel begins and ends in a single day, and there may be fights and murders, but never or very rarely extended enmities and wars.

This argument is repeated in the Social Contract when he expresses the impossibility of private war. Again, war is a relationship predicated on something fundamentally stable and is itself a stable relationship. The defining feature of war is thus its permanence and lack of passion and the calm and cold-heartedness of the belligerent parties in that we only “call war between one power and another…the effect of a mutual, steady and
manifest disposition to destroy the enemy State”. So “there is war only between moral beings”. At last violence assumes a moral character in the act of war, but only insofar as we begin to see war as such an object of permanence as to be an epistemological wonder.

But what we find in Rousseau is not a simple analogy between war and romance because both have this temporal property. As it turns out, the warrior is the same person as the lover – that is, the property owner and also, in the end, the citizen. After all, it is only the stability of men’s moral relationship to their properties that gives rise to the stability of men’s moral relationship to each other in a state of war. Before Emile can marry Sophie, for example, he has to be sent on a long trip to start a long investigation of property rights and political science. The timing of the trip and the lessons learned during the trip are of tremendous importance, because whereas we must “choose between making a man or a citizen”, the trip makes it clear that there can be no choice between making a good lover and a good citizen. Nor can there be a choice between making a good property owner and a good citizen. Emile’s education on property rights must now be undertaken with great urgency in light of Emile’s impending marriage and adulthood, and the governor now poses questions that neatly and incontrovertibly tie up the issues of politics, romance and property: “In what corner of the earth will you be able to say, ‘Here I am master of myself and of the land which belongs to me?’ …where is the state where one is always permitted to be a decent man?” The notion of property rights as the essential (and liberal) way to shield one from arbitrary power and harm of the state is deflated here, for the question of property rights cannot be settled without settling first the political question of a legitimate government and civil rights. Furthermore, since the prospect of marriage depends on one’s prospect of fortune, citizens’ participation in and defense of legitimate politics are absolutely consequential for the sanctity of their family and romantic life.

True romance and legitimate proprietorship must find protection in just politics. Ultimately Rousseau does not envision a permanent and stable political life merely resembling the loyal and permanent romantic relationship; rather, legitimate politics and legitimate romantic relationships come to us as a result of the same rational and epistemological processes, and therefore the same stability and permanence must characterize our moral agency in family as well as political life. The political purpose of the social contract already infiltrates Rousseau’s discussion of romance.

**Rousseau’s criticism of conquest rights**

The fallacy of conquest rights is not the seemingly outrageous presumption that a state of nature exists and the mother should (threaten to) exercise the power to smother her baby just to establish her sovereign rights. To the contrary, Rousseau believes the sophism of conquest rights hides in the transformation of the fact of conquest into a political right. More specifically, Rousseau seems to question how it is possible for the very first state to be founded on the fact of conquest. If in contemporary European customary international law governs the entitlements of the conqueror, where did those entitlements come from at a time when no international or customary law existed? According to Locke, for example, we can take slaves in a just war; according to Grotius, it needs to be only a solemn war. Justice or solemnity of war presumes customs and the existence of states, and neither solves the mystery surrounding the founding political moment in human history – which
is precisely how Rousseau wants to frame this question. For Rousseau, the decisive advance for civilization comes when, instead of massacring all those he defeated, the conqueror opts to “put them all in chains, in order at least to have Slaves. This immediately changes the state of the question; and since it is no longer a question of destroying, the state of war is destroyed.” Rousseau insists that there must have been a revolutionary breakthrough in human socialization that bridges the state of nature and a civil state; can conquest rights – can that moment of bartering of life and freedom – bridge the natural and the civil states?

Classical philosophy has long recognized the distinction between slaveholding and the acquisition of slaves, two activities that at first glance seem naturally connected. “The art of acquiring slaves,” says Aristotle, “differs from both the art of the master and the art of slave, being a species of hunting or war”, hence the stress on the unique link between war and slavery; for while the art of the master and slave is a kind of house-holding that forms a lasting social bond, the act of capturing slaves is sheer violence and war. Rousseau, too, speculates that at some point of human’s social and linguistic evolution hunter-gathers would have become growers, but Aristotle here in a sleight of hands turns men from the practitioners of the art of hunting to the practitioners of the art of house-holding, from the free and violent to the sedentary and hierarchical, and Rousseau finds this difficult to swallow: for those who have prevailed over their enemies in the state of nature, would it not make much more sense to cannibalize the defeated? And how remote the idea of permanent slavery must have been to the minds of early human beings? For those vanquished, as long as they avoid the grim fate of death and cannibalism, would they not escape as soon as their captors fall asleep? What moral suasion could possibly make them stay with their captors? Rousseau suggests that ultimately the premise of the trade of life for freedom is so absurd – and the threat to kill the vanquished so empty – that the trade cannot take place. Robinson Crusoe’s dominion is secure enough, and he is the lone example of conquest rights at their fullest, for he alone resembles like a conqueror who has slaughtered all his enemies. It is not the security that even the most foul-tempered tyrants wish for. Tyranny differs from Crusoe’s sovereignty over his island in that none of the emperors and kings of the real world desire to slaughter their own subjects. Therefore, they cannot rightfully and legally use their empty threat of mass murder to justify their subsequent despotic rule.

Rousseau thus asks: why cannot we just run away from that menacing power when it is asleep? Or when it is weakened somewhat and somehow? If it is asleep, then the conqueror’s regime dissolves itself. If it is weakened, we have a permanent civil war in which individuals and factions of varying strength and changing fortunes will be at each other’s throat all the time and none will enjoy a moment of peace. For this reason, conquest can never produce a civil state, but only a modified right of war.

Rousseau’s attack on the sophistic logic of conquest rights is also echoed in his objections to property rights. Rousseau has given a passionate critique of the first birth of a “bad” kind of social contract that seeks to legitimate illegal gains of the rich and perpetuates the oppression of the poor at the end of the Second Discourse, which continues in the Discourse on Political Economy. The same sophistic logic that we associate with Grotian conquest rights is operative in the bad social contract, and the consequence for both the conqueror and the unjustly rich is also the same, namely civil war. The bad covenant has brought nascent societies to an end, but they merely turn
unlawful riches that would not have been acknowledged by savages as permanent gains into something legitimate and moral. The rich’s professed right to property is a “precarious and abusive right”, and with only crooked sophism is this covenant forged. This form of compact amounts to “the most horrible state of war” in which “everyone risked his life while only some also risked goods”. Conventional property rights must be understood to have derived from the same sophistic logic of conquest rights and bear the same bitter fruit of tyranny and civil war. A bad social compact that unjustly favors and affirms the temporary advantage of the powerful and the rich and give them tyrannical power over the people thus cannot survive the world of the temporary and instead binds us forever in the world of the present, of violence, of civil war.

What follows the moment of conquest is the renewal and continuation of the state of nature; the title of the conqueror and all his rights remain as insecure and contested as before. Conquest rights are thus utterly irrelevant to the discussion of the origin of politics. A flawed covenant that converts the momentary power to kill to a permanent power to dominate or to hold wealth is ineffective with savages who can neither comprehend perpetual power nor transfer any rights. Nor can this compact inspire the civilized and rational minds whose reason and perfectibility necessarily move them to transcend the state of nature and steer them towards a more stable form of political arrangement and a more universal principle of political right. A tyrant who tries to rule his subjects as conquered slaves can find no epistemic subjects who are able to recognize his rule, and he cannot make peace with either savages or civil men.

Grotius’s and Hobbes’s use of conquest rights to defend domination and slavery constituted an innovative solution to the vexing problem – one that the tradition of natural jurisprudence ignored – of how to manage the temporal economy of power and to relocate it from the realm of contest of raw force to the realm of proper politics and morals. Rousseau spots the same problem, but he comes to resolutely loathe their solution. The overriding concern to make our social bond and political duty legitimate (and not to destroy them altogether, as implied by a return to barbarism) sets the tone of Rousseau’s critique of Grotius, Hobbes and the contractual tradition before him: a bad social contract predicated on the sophism of the conqueror (as well as the conquered) fails to end the state of nature among men and is inherently unstable; a good social contract needs to replace it that establishes genuine political right as the foundation of the society and make members of society moral citizens.

In the end, the Grotian and Hobbesian versions of social contract are flawed because a tyrant cannot secure consent from either a savage or a man with evolved intellect, and his rule is inherently unstable and no morally binding obligations can be imposed on his subjects. The conqueror can never attain a durable victory over a savage whose mental capacities are too limited to even understand permanent servitude, and the conqueror can never offer a rational being a reasonable deal to strip him of his liberty. What truly stands capable of creating a genuine peace and permanent political bond among men is their linguistic faculty that gifts them with generality, equitability, perpetuity in our reasoning – in other words, a distinctive, political reason. Rousseau’s anthropology puts this political reason in sharp contrast with the sophistic, even bestial rationality of the tyrant and his conquered subjects. In short, Rousseau’s criticism of tyranny in Hobbes and Grotius takes aim at both the false rights of the conqueror and the cynicism of tyrants and
subjects. Rousseau’s own version is intended to cure the cynicism of both the sovereign and the subject.

The social contract as a social and rational revolution

The *Social Contract* carries a curt warning against the sophism and illusion of the bad contract: “they have made a convention; very well: but that convention, far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuation.” A bad social compact that gives the rich and powerful the right to rule over the poor and vanquished is bizarre in its effect: the rich and powerful cheat us in arguing that the fact of wealth or conquest is translatable to a perpetual right of property and power; they deceive themselves in believing this right brings them lasting safety from and peace with the poor and vanquished. Tearing apart this illusion, Rousseau shows that the state of nature persists and the cynicism and bellicosity of the ruling and the ruled thwarts previous attempts in the contractualist tradition to elevate men out of the state of nature. The sophism of the conqueror who wants to convert a temporary fact of conquest into a permanent political title to rule encourages and is repaid by the cynicism of the multitude that roundly rejects political representation through the social contract and continues to live in the state of nature instead.

Rousseau comes to the conclusion that it takes a radical redefinition of our moral agency to accomplish this goal. While Rousseau initially intends the social contract to appeal to self-interest, he soon changes his mind and insists that “the social contract must ‘lift’ its adherents to a new plane that transcends the calculation of interest. It aims to integrate the individual into a community, to change the perspective of ‘each’ to that of ‘us’”. While Hobbes expects a particular will distinct and independent from the general will even after we assent to the social compact, the failure of the pact to terminate the state of nature lies in the fact that the rational capacities and psychological traits Hobbes traces to the human nature are irrelevant to and very much incompatible with the goal of purpose of the Hobbesian covenant – the transcendent moral duty to search for and commit to a genuine social compact and perpetual peace is simply not found in the nature of the savage or the liberal agent. The *Geneva Manuscript* gives the clearest indication of the wedge Rousseau now drives between the naturalistic instincts of the savages and the moral agency of civil men:

> It is false that in the state of independence, reason, perceiving our self-interest, inclines us to contribute to the common good; far from there being an alliance between particular interest and the general good, they exclude one another in the natural order of things, and social laws are a yoke which everyone is willing to impose on others, but not to assume himself.

This should abort any further attempt to model principles of political right on the principles of natural right; “the gentle voice of nature is no longer an infallible guide for us, nor is the independence we received from it any longer a desirable state”. In fact, Rousseau is so apprehensive of the cynical agents asserting their natural and inalienable rights in face of a new political union and public laws that both the *Second Discourse* and the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* would finish on a coda of a very harsh and somewhat conspiratorial view of private wills and self-interest: Rousseau argues that only the tyrant would want to take advantage of such selfish perspectives of his subjects so as
to divide the citizenry. The multitude – divided, conquered and at war with itself – is nothing other than the effect of the machinations of the tyrant.

So the goal for Rousseau is not to fashion a civil society directly out of peaceable savages to be found in the state of nature. Indeed, “for Rousseau a well-ordered society cannot come into being through a natural process whereby men, relying only on their natural impulses and the laws of nature, may attain a political order. His investigation is carried out in a context which is far closer to the artificial than to the naturalistic model.” As a result, Rousseau asks for an alienation of natural rights more complete and absolute than Hobbes’s or even Grotius’s. The social covenant stipulates that although individuals retain rights that are not essential to the defense of the community, “the Sovereign is alone judge of that importance”. While Grotius and Hobbes would insist that the state’s power to judge on the grave matter of sacrificing or taking someone’s life is limited, Rousseau asserts the sovereign’s infallibility and complete lack of conditionalitity: one ought to die when ordered by the state to do so “since it is only on this condition that he has lived in security until then, and his life is no longer a bounty of nature, but a conditional gift of the State”.

For the sophist the gift of life is both exaggerated (since sparing another person’s life does not afford the conqueror the right to deny his freedom) and underestimated (because the baby disowns the mother and her past deeds as soon as he is exposed). In joining the civil society a true citizen commits himself to a moral purpose to transcend the state of nature and make genuine and perpetual peace with fellow citizens, and the sovereign can rightfully command him to sacrifice his life as long as the moral purpose of the first convention survives his sacrifice. The Rousseauian subject’s decision to join the social compact and his promise of obedience is not extracted from him by a threat of his death and therefore is not undone by the sovereign’s command for him to die.

Man, denatured and transformed into a citizen, will have experienced not only revolutionary change in his moral personhood but also his cognitive and epistemological abilities. Humanity’s first steps in the direction of enlightenment send men to only occasionally seek mutual help but do not enable them to forge permanent bonds. At this early stage of development, a person would “distinguish between the rare occasions when common interest should make him count on the help of his kind…and the even rarer occasions when competition should make him suspicious of them”. In case he needs other people’s help, the association nonetheless “obligated no one and lasted only as long as the transient need that had formed it”, and in case of competition, it is intense, vicious but also short-living. So neither cooperation nor competition gains any moral force or crystallizes into a general idea or permanent bond among men. Men understand only “the present and perceptible interest” because as of yet “foresight was nothing to them and, far from being concerned with a distant future, they did not even give thought to the next day”. The final step towards socialization and civility, however, causes Rousseau’s amazement. The Social Contract thus contains this most impassioned and ardent encomium of man’s intelligence and political reason:

this transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most remarkable change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and endowing his actions with the morality they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty succeeds physical impulsion and right succeeds appetite, does man, who until then had looked only to himself, see himself forced to act on other
principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations…his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas enlarged, his sentiments ennobled, his entire soul is elevated to such an extent, that…he should ceaselessly bless the happy moment which wrested him from it forever, and out of a stupid and bounded animal made an intelligent being and a man.411

The birth of the political consists in this drastic and wondrous expansion of the mental faculties to envision a durable security arrangement that lifts individuals out of the state of nature.

To truly put an end to the state of nature, every member must surrender all his freedom and force to the newly born body politic because any reservation, Rousseau argues, makes political unity and collective security impossible. In his criticism of conquest rights and slave contract Rousseau has pointed out that tyranny of one man or one class was the cause of instability of the state (because the slave may either be cannibalized or flee), so the social contract “guarantees [the subject] against all personal dependence.”412 This guarantee of freedom and equality marks the difference between the Rousseauean state and the Hobbesian Leviathan and is indeed the very condition of the stability and survival of the state, so the meaning of equality and freedom must be clarified. This freedom is, in Rousseau’s own words, a conventional freedom, not the natural freedom of savages.413 We come into possession of this artificial freedom through the contract insofar as “each, in giving himself to all, gives himself to no one” and recognizes no other citizens as superior to oneself.414 This freedom is thus synonymous with the concept of equality. This conceptual equivalence of political liberty and political equality is the very substance of the rule of law. For the contract comes as a veritable moment of self-legislation: all political constituents are free because they give laws to themselves and obey only those laws, and they are equal as long as they obey only the law and not other men.

Unlike a slave contract founded on conquest rights, the Rousseauean contract is reasonable and rational in its design because anyone who seeks an unfair advantage or uneven burden necessarily offends the sovereignty and the majesty of the legal state and abandons himself to a state of war against the sovereign. The merit of political equality, it would seem, is its systemic stability because even for the most cynical and selfish individuals there is no advantage to be had in conspiring against this equality. The laws are gifts and expression of our rational and linguistic capabilities and as such are characterized by equitability and generality (which is why Rousseau must insist that the sovereign not be allowed to pass judgment on the particular, even when we have a radical democracy and every subject partakes of sovereignty). Laws that burden members of the society unevenly could only be the result of tyranny and cause of division and insurrection. The rule of law in the social contract state, with its implied guarantee of political liberty and equality, holds out the only genuine hope of perpetual peace and lasting political bond.

If nothing else, the serial effort made by Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf to emphasize the centrality of conquest and conquest rights to the origin of political society is a powerful challenge to the notion that some form of traditional or natural justice may exist before the birth of the political society and the latter must be justified by the former. I have argued that the success of the challenge is partly reflected in Rousseau’s criticism of
conquest rights. Unlike Locke, Rousseau never trivializes the Hobbesian thesis of an originary state of nature and immediacy. The choice of Grotius and Hobbes as the main antagonists in his political philosophy reveals the strategic objective of Rousseau’s social compact: the discovery or foundation of a polity capable of the moral permanence and political stability during humankind’s historic evolution in rational and epistemological abilities.

The fallacy of conquest rights argument is that it eventually fails in eradicating the sophism and cynicism of either the conqueror or the conquered and does not establish a durable bond between the two. The leviathan is destabilized by the constant suspicion between the sovereign and the subject and the latter’s reservation of right of resistance. I have argued that Hobbes himself started to realize the inadequacy of conquest rights and welcomed a more elaborate account of human’s rational and linguistic faculties in order to buttress conquest rights with a theory of consent. For Rousseau, however, perpetual servitude is unintelligible and indicates an epistemological half-measure because a slave whose life is spared after combat would nevertheless escape from his chains at the first opportunity and no permanent bond can be formed. The political bond, therefore, must be formed on the basis of true reason and genuine peace. This bond can only last if it is an equitable and free association of its members.

Chapter 5
The Fiction and Politics of the Contract

Our language and perfectibility define our moral personhood and political citizenship. Our language and perfectibility, not our sexual drives or our strong arms, make good lovers and good soldiers out of us. Political association is inconceivable without such elemental properties of our humanity. But Rousseau is also known for his profound ambivalence towards the very faculties that he says make us human. What gives us enlightenment, he laments, also gives us errors; what gives us virtues also gives us vices. Savages’ need for bare survival did not cause inequality; only after reason and language afforded us foresight and anticipation of future needs were men pressed to work together and live by the division of labor, which started to measure the talents or skills of one blacksmith against another or a blacksmith against a farmer and generated the first form of inequality. And later it was again the power of language that allowed us to transform material goods into representative signs of wealth, which could soon multiply and be accumulated without limit, producing a permanent divide among humankind, a still more stubborn and unmistakable form of inequality than ever before, between the rich and the poor. It seems the very linguistic and epistemic forces that unite men into a commonwealth also militate relentlessly against it.

In this chapter, I will first borrow from Paul de Man’s analysis of Rousseau’s linguistics. De Man’s reading goes considerably further than Rousseau’s original intentions in the Second Discourse or the essay on language, but it offers a very plausible explanation of Rousseau’s ambivalence on the political effect of human language and perfectibility. Rousseau has argued that equality among men is the condition of the political. For Rousseau, what overcame men natural aversion to civil life is the evolution of human language and the universal concepts that give men the confidence of equality,
and before our linguistic faculties were developed enough to comprehend the concepts, savages project their natural fearfulness of association with others through figural expressions of this fear. The radically equalizing effect of language allows us to be political in the first place. De Man argues, however, that even in Rousseau’s own account of the birth of universal concepts, the metaphoricity of the primitive language is never eradicated in conceptuality. Equality of men is itself an error of metaphor, and the political is founded on this error. For de Man, the equality proclaimed in the contract thus becomes elusive in political life, and the gap between the concept of equality and its literality creates a constitutional crisis. De Man insists that this gap accounts for the fragility of the political and the sense of anxiety that is often palpable in Rousseau’s political texts. Insofar as the gap between the concept and reality is a structural feature of human language, a feature of the construction of language and thus a feature of metalanguage, and insofar as men’s common life is a linguistic effect of their common conception and imagination of equality, this fragility is innate to the political.

Even if de Man has attributed metaphoricity to all concepts and the very structure of language and conceptuality and produced an account of linguistics that Rousseau himself may not recognize, de Man’s reading is valuable because it offers a way to understand the inexorable tension between the political and men’s linguistic and rational faculties that becomes transparent in Rousseau’s own writings. This tension exists for Hobbes as well, in fact, and the Englishman is likewise apprehensive of the seditious power of language both in *Leviathan* and in *Behemoth*. This chapter will show how Hobbes copes with the role of language in politics and use it a perfect contrast to illustrate Rousseau’s approach to the question of language and the political crisis triggered by the gap between the concept and literality of equality. It would be tempting to argue that there were different types of perfectibility and different manners in which humans could make use of language and speech in their political life, some conducive to political equality and some more malicious. Hobbes tries to cut the political use of language neatly in the middle and label one half a good sort of language that lets us see reason and commit to the transfer of rights and authorization of a sovereign and the other half a bad sort of language that stirs revolution and instigates insurrection and regicide. Hobbes explicitly accused some troublemakers (university students, Churchmen) of abusing language leading up to the civil war. But de Man’s reading of Rousseau suggests that language is intrinsically open to such abuses: while Hobbes the political scientist resents and fears metaphors and inconstancy in the use of words between different parties, even Hobbes the natural philosopher must concede that different people are affected differently by the same object and thus project different passions onto the same noun. De Man dims the optimism that language is ever a safe, reliable source of political equality, even though it has to be relied upon in the making of the political contract. In predicating humankind’s social evolution on its exercise of language and reason, Rousseau’s anthropology seems to ordain that the fictive equality and the concomitant risk of abuse and subversion would forever occupy political life. Political equality is but a rhetorical trick, a literary veil that the state must put on because epistemologically there is no way to cure the problem without compounding it.

Naturally, de Man’s analysis of Rousseau’s linguistics thus makes him very unsympathetic to Rousseau’s politics. One immediate political consequence of the fiction of equality is the gap that now opens between the constituted sovereign, which as an
artificial being knows only the formal equality of all its subjects, and the constituents, who by gift of language and perfectibility would always have an uncertain grasp of equality. In the second part of this chapter I will turn to Rousseau’s argument about the infallibility of the general will to excavate what I believe to be a vital response to de Man’s pessimism that the error of metaphor at the foundation of the political state may undo the state. I have argued in the previous chapter that equality is for Rousseau synonymous with liberty and is what makes political life possible and the logic of sovereignty operable. The subject’s cognitive error in knowing or at least approximating the general will is thus always a cognitive error about the concept and essence of the equality he envisions to exist in his political community. We will see that the infallible general will is for Rousseau only the foil of the very fallible particular wills: the chapter on infallibility, I will argue, is really Rousseau’s assurance that some epistemic failures on the part of the subjects to agree on the meaning of equality in the polity can indeed be coped with. This assurance is a qualified one in that in that chapter Rousseau has to carefully differentiate the small aberrations or cognitive errors of the individuals and the grievous deviation from any political consensus on the meaning of equality between the factions and classes or corporate bodies that increasingly assert their corporate will as separate from the general will. For the aberrations of the individuals, Rousseau suggests that the general will is actually the sum total of all the small errors; only when the concept of equality begins to be contested between corporate bodies should we start to fear terrifying consequences of the literary risk in the founding of the political and the gap between the concept and literality of the political, that is, civil war and despotism.

Rousseau fears that, for the small aberrations of the individuals to be overtaken by the digressions and clashes of large corporations or classes, the body politic would be plunged into a civil war. Class war annuls the logic of sovereignty. With the social contract, the constituents’ rational and linguistic faculties have already committed them to political unity when it gives them a lasting bond, a perpetual sovereign and (the rule of) law. Members of the society are unified by and in their political life because of the supremacy of rule of law and the conventional equality and liberty therewith actualized. To the seditious possibilities of inequality and class war Rousseau responds with elaborate treatises on government and political economy. I want to argue that the need for a weighty theory of administration results from the literary risk of the contract as well. It is not self-contradictory to speak of both the permanence of the political bond and the inevitable death of the body politic because although corruption brings the destruction of the commonwealth as an empirical and historical fact, for the commonwealth to exist for even one moment it must extract – cognitively, imaginatively – permanent loyalty and dedication from its members. Rousseau stoically discusses the death of the body politic, but the prospect of this death does not diminish the epistemological and moral significance that attends the birth of the body politic. But this is also to say that conceiving the political sovereign and sustaining its health are two distinct tasks in which language plays different roles. Because the literary risk of inequality occurs at the foundation of political association, the paramount objective of government is the management of the tension between the members’ commitment to political unity and the constant risk of inequality that leads to factionalism and civil war among the citizenry. Government or economic government is not practical application of ideal philosophical doctrines established by the contract. Government, I argue, is Rousseau’s inevitable
answer to the innate treachery of language and the constitutive instability of the contract and the political.

The rhetoric of equality

“Just as the first motives that made man speak were passions, his first expressions were tropes.” The first names we call out and give to other objects are metaphors and more projections of our inner feelings than any objective assessment of what we encountered, and Rousseau openly admits that there had to be a disconnect between these names and the literal reality. The example Rousseau uses is one that Paul de Man makes famous in his analysis: “A savage meeting others will at first have been frightened. His fright will have made him see these men as larger and stronger than himself; he will have called them Giants.” The name “giant” is based on a metaphor, not the expression of objective reality of the size or strength of the stranger we run into but that of our internal emotional state, fear. The first name a man has for another man just stands in for that fear and is a metaphor.

But Rousseau asserts that as language evolved, humans started to see genuine, universal forms for disparate physical objects and to substitute true names for the first metaphors, and they started to reason. If there is in reality little to fear from that stranger, that metaphor of fear also turns out to be an error. The error of the metaphor of “giant” could and indeed would be corrected by the concept of “man”: the concept, by virtue of its generality, bequeaths upon the person and the stranger a measure of similarity and equality that can assuage their mutual fear and suspicion of each other. “After much experience, [the savage] will have recognized that since these supposed Giants are neither bigger nor stronger than he, their stature did not fit the idea he had initially attached to the word Giant. He will therefore invent another name common both to them and to himself, for example the name man.” From the beginning, therefore, the ability to conceptualize and to substitute a whole category for a single object in our reasoning is taken as an egalitarian and equalizing moment. It is a momentous political event indeed, which transforms a fearful, asocial subject into a political animal who is comfortable in the company of men of equal stature and strength and ready to start civil life.

Whereas Rousseau has argued that primitive men tend to mistake each other for “giants” and that our growing intelligence later permits us to see and correct our error of metaphor, de Man argues that this simplistic account obscures some of the subtlest insights we can gather from Rousseau. In telling the story of one man encountering another man, de Man argues, Rousseau is not offering a lesson on anthropology at all but a lesson – a metaphorical lesson at that – on linguistics: “the element of reflective similarity mirrored in the example of man’s encounter with man is not the presentation of a paradigmatic empirical situation...but the metaphorical illustration of a linguistic fact.” After all, a concept (e.g., “man”) is a name (and substitute) for the earliest, figural names (e.g., “giant”), and what compels us to conceptualize is not the similarity of the objects that one single concept captures but the infinite differences and diversity in the figural denominations of savages. “Conceptualization...is an intralingusitic process, the invention of a figural metalanguage that shapes and articulates the infinitely fragmented and amorphous language of pure denomination.” We may thus notice the functional equivalence in the linguistic process of using the metaphor of “giant” to
signify fear and of using the metaphor of a singular conceptual name to signify an abundance of primitive, denominal names: of course, neither metaphor adequately signify what they were intended to signify. What imposed on men their egalitarian, common name may not be the literal equality and commonality of men; rather, the infinite diversity of names in primitive languages forces the issue and subsequently imposes on us that concept.

“The metaphor ‘giant,’ used to connote man, has indeed a proper meaning (fear), but this meaning is not really proper: it refers to a condition of permanent suspense between a literal world in which appearance and nature coincide and a figural world in which this correspondence is no longer a priori posited.” But if it is an error of metaphor to call other men “giants”, it is an error that is not easily corrected if the conceptual language itself is also a metaphor of denominal language. The misnomer of “giant” is supposedly “corrected” when men start to see each other as equals in strength and abilities and begin to identify with one another as “men”, but this quantifying process that equalizes us all is as much an error of metaphor as the initial denomination in that it reflects a dangerous faith in numbers. This is the second level of error, which “stems from the use of number as if it were a literal property of things that truly belongs to them, when it is, in fact, just one more conceptual metaphor devoid of objective validity and subject to the distortions that constitute all metaphors. For Rousseau, as for Nietzsche, number is par excellence the concept that hides ontic difference under an illusion of identity.” Therefore, what Hobbes and Rousseau have said about the natural equality of men is improper: it is always an error of figural speech; “what Rousseau calls ‘truth’ designates, neither the adequation of language to reality, nor the essence of things shining through the opacity of words, but rather the suspicion that human specificity may be rooted in linguistic deceit.”

The concept of “man”, therefore, may lack any relationship and adequacy to an objective reality of two men of equal or almost equal strength and intelligence. The concept still formally indicates a level of equality between the man and the stranger he comes across, but this only increases the danger it poses to the political society. Rousseau’s social contract depends on the constancy and the generality of language to enforce the basic justice and equitability of the contract. But the linguistic foundation of the contract is now taken to be problematic and dubious, which does not even mean that it can be replaced by a more solid footing because to countenance the possibility of a more valid solution, one free of metaphoric error, is tantamount to changing rudimentary structure of our cognition and reason. Rather, knowledge of the linguistic deceit at the foundation of political equality and the state should invite a reexamination of the nature of the contract, which is in truth “a complex and purely defensive verbal strategy by means of which the literal world is given some of the consistency of fiction, an intricate set of feints and ruses.”

Political usefulness of (the fiction or imagination of) equality does not diminish. In her analysis of Hobbes and the contractualist tradition in England, Victoria Kahn largely reaches the same conclusion:

“[Hobbes] contrasts metaphor conceived of as a stable contract between individuals who agree to ignore their differences – to imagine themselves as equal parties to the contract – and metaphor as overreaching and transgressive and as articulating relations of hierarchy and inequality (imagining oneself as a Hercules).
Bourgeois diffidence, the simple perception of likeness, is proposed as the remedy
for aristocratic self-aggrandizement or metaphorical usurpation. The contract must make good use of the linguistic trick because it is the epistemic error in
imagining equality that provides reassurance to those who are drawn together to create
the commonwealth. The fiction of equality makes peace in a positive way in Rousseau
(that in a political union everyone has the same share of protection and burden) and in a
negative way in Hobbes (that the equal opportunity to harm another convinces all to
submit to the leviathan). But that peace too must be thrown into doubt.

Still, the political covenant exists to make peace. Collective self-preservation is the
logic of the political and the purpose of the state, but for Rousseau the peace and
cohesion of the body politic are contingent on equality among its members; if any
member is unequal and has less of a share in the sovereign authority, the sovereign is no
longer popular and cannot exercise the right of self-preservation in the name of all. If we
are persuaded to banish inequalities from the community at the moment of political
founding and only because of that founding, then the fictive equality does not anteced
the political. How do we preserve peace when the one thing that peace can be tied to and
depend on, namely equality, is itself coeval and coextensive with that peace? The
inevitable philosophical solution, which I argue Rousseau eventually suggests, is to
concede that the political will, however potent, is on its own unable to sustain the peace
that it wills into existence; instead, another mechanism must rise in its place to ensure the
long term health and vigor of the body politic – that is to say, a clean separation of the
issue of founding and the issue of government.

Infallibility and deviancy
The general will is infallible and indestructible. If the will of all no longer coincides with
the general will, it is not a failure of the general will but signifies the failure of the voters
and members of the state. The first chapter in Book IV of the Social Contract describes a
corrupted state and corrupted body of citizens whose vote no longer affirms the public
good. Even so, Rousseau says the general will is not destroyed in this case and when a
subject casts a vote not for the public good but out of selfish reasons (e.g., selling his vote
for money), “he does not extinguish the general will within himself, he only evades it.”
The chapter on infallibility, however, seems to deal with a different subject from the
chapter on indestructibility. In the third chapter of Book II, Rousseau raises the
possibility that the result of the collective deliberation of the people may diverge from the
true sovereign will. But in that chapter he does not complain of a corrupt constituent or
constituency that willfully abandons what he knows to be the general will – there it is
rather an issue of error and fallibility in identifying and calculating the public good.

One obvious question to ask about the chapter on infallibility is: from what path
of correctness and uprightness can the people be led astray? On the surface of it, the
circularity of the sovereign logic renders this question superfluous: the sovereign always
wills its own self-preservation and acts (on itself) to preserve its own existence. But if a
Hobbesian sovereign defines for itself the conditions of and threats to its own sovereignty,
in his critique of Hobbes’s theory of conquest rights Rousseau makes clear that the
absoluteness and perpetuity of sovereign authority must depend on the equality of the
subjects. In its simplicity and circularity, the general will entails the equality for all – and
thus the unity of the body politic and its survival. The issue under scrutiny in the chapter
on infallibility is thus completely different from the issue addressed in the chapter on indestructibility. In a blatant act of betrayal, a voter may knowingly choose his personal welfare over the public good and unfairly to the detriment of others’ well being, but the chapter of infallibility details the cognitive impossibility for even upright citizens to arrive at a consensus about the meaning of equality.

While infallibility is usually taken as an important attribute of the general will, Rousseau hardly bothers to make an argument for it. The idea that the sovereign will cannot possibly wish inequality and injustice for any of its subjects and must always will its own self-preservation and security Rousseau must have taken to be self-evident and does not mention it anywhere in the third chapter of Book II. Rousseau asserts the infallibility of the general will purely in regard to the very real possibility that the citizenry can be misled and mistaken in wanting something other than what the general will would want: “One always wants one’s good, but one does not always see it: one can never corrupt the people, but one can often cause it to be mistaken, and only when it is, does it appear to want what is bad.” Of course, the political sovereign is an artificial person and not a natural one; the sovereign always wills formal equality within the state and cannot perceive the linguistic and epistemological problem in evoking the idea of equality. The individuals, however, will struggle with the discrepancy between the metaphorical concept and a perpetually inadequate reality and can never perfectly align their views with the general will.

Rousseau seems to take a more extreme position in the second paragraph in the chapter than the first when he suggests that private individuals in fact need not see the public good correctly: “from the same [particular] wills, one takes away the pluses and the minuses which cancel each other out, what is left as the sum of the differences is the general will.” This formula of “calculating” the general will or the true public good has been well studied in political science either in Rousseau’s original wording or in contemporary terminology, but what stands out here is that for an author famous for wanting a strong sense of civic virtue, it is not simply that the particular will may err and deviate from the standard of civic virtue and incorruptibility and equitable and fair spirit of politics: Rousseau seems to suggest that there never existed a simple binary system of fallibility and correctness for the citizen. It would be incorrect to speak of the contrast between the infallible general will and the very fallible subjects as a gap between republican ideals and the selfish individuals whom we must whip into good citizens. The citizens, as actual human beings, cannot be immunized against the ill effects that a figural language and the metaphor of equality play on them. No matter how they strive to literalize that concept, the equality that the subjects imagine for themselves cannot match the formal simplicity that is willed by the political sovereign. In proposing this formula of “calculating” the general will, Rousseau seems to have already accounted for the inevitable civic deviancy of the subject. There is likely no clearly marked milestone in the individual’s deviation from the ideal of republican virtue where we can say he has definitely failed in his civic duty, and there is no threshold, no cutoff point, on the scale of his republican devotion where we can say he is clearly a model citizen. Rousseau locates virtue and vice in the same subject-citizen (and he has already taught us that where there is no virtue, there is no vice). Enlightenment has traced both virtue and vice to the same human faculties now. The subject is thus as easily deviant as he is virtuous, and no amount of virtue can eradicate the possibility of error and aberration in a citizen.
The rest of the chapter pushes this line of reasoning still further: it is not enough that the individuals may err; it is necessary that all individuals err: the general will benefits if we all err, each in our own way and in different directions. Conformity is dangerous in that before we can hope to conform the many particular wills to the singular general will, some particular wills may coalesce into a corporate will that pulls a whole group of people in a single direction very far away from the general will:

“The general will would always result from the large number of small differences...But when factions arise, small associations at the expense of the large association, the will of each one of these associations becomes general in relation to its members and particular in relation to the State...The differences become less numerous and yield a less general result. Finally, when one of these associations is so large that it prevails over all the rest, the result you have is no longer a sum of small differences, but one single difference; then there is no longer general will.”

The small aberrations of the individuals are the more acceptable alternative to the extreme aberrations of corporations. In other words, Rousseau has already acknowledged the possibility that any and all individuals may contest the premise of equality and justice dispensed by the sovereign. The deviant, uncertain, and conflicting understandings of the fiction of equality by subjects can be easily accommodated in political life. Only the more extreme deviancy in the form of factionalism or class warfare poses an insurmountable difficulty to the political community. At the end of the Second Discourse, Rousseau would tell us that that extreme deviancy will be the work of tyrants and demagogues.

Rousseau opens Part II of the Second Discourse on a very poignant note: “the first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, to whom it occurred to say this is mine, and found people sufficiently simple to believe him, was the true founder of civil society.” The first proprietor believes that his discovery or “taking” of the land can be converted into a permanent title, and it is the same sophisticated logic Rousseau discerns in the conqueror-tyrant’s claim to dominion over his slaves. It is bitter irony from Rousseau that the first political person, i.e. the proprietor-conqueror, had to be tyrannical. The average man fears other men in the state of nature. Rousseau tells us that early men preferred to flee the presence of others and that this fear prompted them to call other men “giants”. Except in sexual encounters, they plainly did not enjoy each other’s company. But the conqueror did not fear the conquered, and he did not even eat his captives (which would have made him a mere savage); instead, he sought them out and sought a political bond with them, and in this he became the first sociable man. The tyrant’s politicalness is only questioned in light of the fact that in failing to appear as an equal to his subjects he also failed to secure their politicalness (the first property owner, for instance, must first find enough people around him “sufficiently simple to believe him”). The tyrant condemns his subjects to that primitive, natural apathy to a sociable existence, and as a result he has to live an apolitical life as well. Equality, the reality or the perception or belief of it, is the only thing that can overcome the fearfulness, distrustfulness and associability of the natural men, and I suspect even Hobbes would join Rousseau in agreement on this point. The tyrant’s (probably unnatural, certainly unusual and even aberrant) sociability, a result of his (abnormal, aberrant) fearlessness, is ultimately
insufficient to make him political. Genuine political bond and legitimate sovereignty, at least for Rousseau, must tame those who have that trait of fearlessness and sociability in their blood. (There is perhaps no better proof that Rousseau (and Hobbes) does not believe in natural sociability: even if he believes it to be real, it must be cut off for the sake of founding a more durable form of political bond on the basis of equality.)

The sanguine fearlessness of the tyrant should exempt him from Rousseau’s linguistic analysis: the tyrant does not know fear and never has any use for the name “giant” and the subsequent concept “man”. Therefore, the tyrant sees most clearly the inadequacy of the word “equality” and the divergence between the word and its meaning from the start. This psychological abnormality of the tyrant comes back to haunt the political community yet again at the very end of the Second Discourse where the proprietor-conqueror would take on yet another persona:

“From the extreme inequality of Conditions and fortunes...would arise masses of prejudices equally contrary to reason, happiness and virtue; one would see Chiefs foment everything that can weaken assembled men by disuniting them; everything that can give Society an air of apparent concord while sowing seeds of real division; everything that can inspire mistrust and mutual hatred in the different estates by setting their Rights and interests at odds, and so strengthen the Power that contains them all.”

Rousseau here portrays the tyrant as the figure who might exploit or exaggerate inequality between classes in order to manipulate them; his true opportunity only comes through such manipulation and consists in making equality such a malignantly contested idea and in causing a class war. The tyrant or despot is most willing to unhinge the metaphorically and artificially fixed relationships of words and meaning, thus setting everything loose in the politico-semantic field. In other words, the tyrant is the demagogue. All “good” citizens willingly take on the illusion of equality and see that illusion as vital to the social and political life they enjoy except the tyrant. The demagogue incites a civil war, a class war, by dramatically polemicizing the meaning of equality that was the very foundation of political life. All his fellow citizens need that assurance of equality – because they instinctively fear inequality – to overcome their asociability: the demagogue alone sees no connection between equality and politics; he alone is not afraid of inequality or the violence, making him the gravest threat to politics.

In theory, equality is the political concept par excellence, but it is also impossible to define and realize. In practice, all subjects must actively try to imagine the content and meaning of equality, and the authentic political will surfaces in every individual’s deliberation and imagination and in our mutual compensation for each’s somewhat errant imagination. In calling the fiction of equality a “verbal strategy” or “linguistic deceit” by the state, de Man and Kahn seem to suggest that the subject’s critical knowledge of this rhetorical strategy or deceit would induce a structural instability of the state. But it is highly doubtful what the subject may gain from the state with this knowledge unless he is of the deviant and tyrannical mind. Notwithstanding the fictitious equality, the inescapable error of metaphor, Rousseau never wavers in his belief that cynicism must not survive the founding of the state: the subjects continue to believe in the equality that propels them to constitute themselves as a sovereign, political people in the first place, and for them partaking in political power entails nothing other than imagining and deliberating the radically egalitarian meaning of political life.
The fiction and reality of equality
By virtue of its own design, the sovereign will can survive small gaps between the concept and reality of equality and can tolerate small deviancy in the subject’s political virtue and linguistic discipline. However, just because the general will consists of many small, deviant particular wills and can thrive with small frictions among its constituents Rousseau does not believe that the general will by itself can sustain the figural concept of equality and enforce a condition and reality of equality that can adequately to the idea of equality that is the promise of political life for all citizens in the original contract. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau also suggests the obvious limits to the subject’s willing acceptance of fiction of equality and his belief in the identity of the particular and general interests: extreme inequality invites back despotism and demagogy, and class warfare amounts to the death of the general will. What Rousseau proposes about political administration and political economy, I will argue in the end, addresses the politically vital problem of sustaining the concept of equality and an adequate reality of it, a semantic link that the sovereign by itself ultimately cannot sustain.

Language and reason make us see the benefit of the collective security and the merit of becoming political. Even when it gives us only a metaphorical notion of equality, from a political perspective we must see the deception as strategic and useful. If Rousseau considers man’s linguistic and rational faculties a treacherous friend to the general will and the state, it is only because the fiction of equality that makes the contract possible in the first place quickly turns against the body politic. Language first puts the idea of generality and equitability into our minds and moves us to make law for ourselves and to obey the law, but it is easily a seditious force. Having had to live through a civil war, Hobbes blames the cause of the bloody conflict on the clergy and university students who roused troubles against the royal authority, and their most lethal weapon was to call their sovereign “tyrant”, which in Hobbes’s opinion ought to mean the same thing as “sovereign” but was used to very insidious effect by the rebels’ propaganda. Indeed, “Hobbes explained the causes of the civil war in terms of linguistic abuse and dysfunction.” Yet, Kahn also notes that “the notion that there is no fixed relationship between words and things is available much earlier in the century and is, in fact, at the heart of the contractual theory of the state.”

As usual, Hobbes wants an efficient and straightforward solution, which is to certify the paramount political authority as the final authority on lexicon as well, although the merit of this solution is very debatable, given that a monarch’s putative reign as sovereign of the English language could end under the regicides’ axe at the same moment and as easily as his reign as the sovereign of England. If a king’s tenure as political authority and his tenure as linguistic authority are coterminous, then we are no closer to answering how language may be the source of peace and stability of the social contract state. Rousseau, by contrast, would attempt a more subtle and sophisticated solution.

If in Hobbes’s opinion tyranny was the most misused and subversive concept, the social contract state struggles with the notion of equality. The founding of the state ushers in the new condition of equality and liberty for all members, but the threat of economic and social inequalities persists. And since political peace depends on equality, Rousseau worries that disparity in economic fortunes would stoke factionalism and civil war and eventually breeds a class of despots and demagogues. But if differences in economic
conditions or natural talents are dangerous, it would be naive to say the solution is to even out the differences. Even absolute economic or material parity does not render literal that concept. The controversy over equality stems from the innate literary risk of using the term; correspondingly, any solution must confront the intellectual impossibility of giving a definition that is literal and adequate and free of error. The inadequacy and inconstancy of the term can be seen in the tenacious problem Aristotle describes in the *Politics*: “Justice is concerned with people...There is general agreement about what constitutes equality in the thing, but disagreement about what constitutes it in people”,

numerical and proportionate equalities are championed by different classes as a contest of both signification of vocabulary and actual political power. Vying for the meaning of equality really stands in as a proxy as the actual political battle to vie for equality and equal share of power. The struggle for equality is the primary passion in a political society and the root cause of factions and political division.

It is also futile to envision a Hobbesian, sovereign authority on language that can arbitrate between competing conceptualizations of equality because the linguistic authority’s power is synchronous and coterminous with the power of the political sovereign and because the political authority that is needed to make the arbitration very much depends on the result of that arbitration (and perhaps not the other way around). The struggle of equality that Aristotle describes is always the struggle for power, which is at once the linguistic power to construe equality. Rousseau tries to address the same volatility in political life thanks to the struggle over equality – and with the same imperfect tool that is our very fallible linguistic and epistemological faculties. This prompts de Man to say “one sees why civil order and government are, in Rousseau, such fragile and threatened constructions, since they are built on the very sands of error.”

In Aristotle as in Rousseau, the complete identity of the final power over politics and the final power over language threatens the stability of both fields.

Hobbes’s failure is thus his foolhardy attempt to stabilize one by attempting to stabilize the other – to create an arbitrating authority on language to protect the political from the treachery of language – which is self-defeating because this only ties the two instabilities ever more tightly. Also, it would be quite horrifying to conjure up a power so transcendental that it can intervene and arbitrate between competing versions of equality because it is bound to be too much and too arbitrary. To the extent that the error of metaphor is itself foundational and constitutive of human language and cognitive reason and as such admits no purely linguistic and epistemological remedy, the arbitrative power is not linguistic and must rather be political in nature. Moreover, this political power operates on a level of intelligibility with no linguistic and epistemological ground to justify and rationalize its arbitration and is bound to be completely arbitrary and creative; in other words, it is a patently decisionist power. Needless to say, there are supreme moments in political life when such decisionist power is needed. I have argued that in Rousseau the founding of the social contract state must indeed effect a simultaneous epistemological and social revolution. But Rousseau is no less unequivocal in asserting the rarity of the general will manifesting itself and in warning against the suicidal risk of the general will devouring the executive and judiciary functions of the state in its daily existence and expending and exhausting itself during the process. It is by philosophical and political necessity that Aristotle and Rousseau reach for a far more mundane solution than Hobbes’s.
In the *Politics* Aristotle advocates an elaborate fiscal and logistic system to regulate different classes’ access to the center of political power. Rousseau, too, draws on a sort of political geography and spatial arrangement to bring stability. While Rousseau prescribes agriculturalism as a sound economic policy that could rebalance the city and the country commercially and financially in the *ancien régime*, in the final analysis his strategy against the seeds of sedition and civil war is to forcefully substitute a notion of political equality for natural or social equality and superimpose a political geometry on the country that entails a spatial distribution of economic and demographic forces that makes political participation a regulated and leveraged process with the right balance of numbers and wealth. Rousseau’s political geography takes into account both the natural fertility and wealth of a nation and its territorial and demographic size in order to design an administrative apparatus of suitable size and strength that both provides efficiency of government and guards against the possibility of the government usurping of the sovereign will. Even this process cannot literalize or approximate the conceptual equality, which may only exist as a concept and a metaphor, and consequently this practice of political geography and government is an endless process of adjustment and variation. The sovereign will is a potent will of equality, but in its concrete form the state must carefully construct and protect equality of subjects with the aid of political economy and geography.

Therefore, the science of government consists in devising and constantly adjusting mechanism of equalization among the citizens. Science of government is kept apart from the doctrine of sovereignty because the latter conceives equality as an inviolable and immutable judicial category whereas the former is an acknowledgement of the fragility of political equality and the need to construct a distinctly political form of equality that is shielded from natural or social inequalities and, more importantly, the literary excess in perceiving and representing inequalities. For Rousseau, both the sovereign and the government benefit from the intellectual distinction, even though the fictive equality as a metaphoric error and the concrete equality worked by the government are eventually united in the sense that the fictive equality willed by the sovereign is what compels the government to reach for its materialization. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see Rousseau call for the highest level of vigilance in democracies whose pretense to equality is most conceited and obstinate and whose error thus tends to be the hugest. Equality is most talked about in democracy and most cherished as democracy’s defining feature, and people in democracy may have the least patience for a complicated economic and logistic process that produces no more than a precarious political equality in the end. Democracy, therefore, is most susceptible to the literary excess. Of course, this is not to say democrats are more cynical or make less exemplary citizens than those living under monarchy or aristocracy because Rousseau insists that no form of government can be said to be less or more republican than another in their fundamental principle of sovereignty and that in social contract states all governments uphold the rule of law and neither democracy nor monarchy can be exempted from the fundamental principles of equality and liberty. Rather, the difference between democracy and monarchy is that in democracy equality as a judicial principle and product of the sovereign will and metaphoric error is more likely to be brought into conflict with the intricate working of government; public opinions, perceptions, and speeches more easily circulate in democracies that pit the rich and poor against each other who are more likely to be jealous of the other class and agitated. When
Montesquieu says the guiding principle of democracy is equality, it is almost as if Montesquieu were offering an underhanded compliment to monarchy and aristocracy for managing the expectation of equality better than democracy.  

Conclusion

In Rousseau’s glossary political equality and liberty are inseparable because the subject is free only when the burden of the state is equally shared by everyone and no one can claim an advantage or superiority over him. We become equal and free, therefore, by submitting to the rule of law and sovereignty of law. In this distinct definition, freedom and equality are the very condition of our consent to the contract and not merely provisions in the contract that we agree to. Liberty and justice are not political rights chartered and sealed by consent; rather, it is the other way around: it is liberty and equality that give full meaning, philosophical significance, and political viability to consent.

As such, the opacity of the meaning of equality poses a serious threat to the unity and stability of the political state. In Rousseau, the linguistic operation that makes political society possible in the first place also quickly turns against it. Rousseau argues that only the evolution in human’s linguistic and cognitive capabilities can lift us out of the state of nature, and our language and perfectibility separate an entire moral category of romance, war, property and sovereignty from the violent or sexual acts of savages. Yet, these faculties are prone to errors, and these errors occur at the moment of political founding. Furthermore, as de Man points out, such errors are not aberrations of human reason and epistemology but its basic mode of operation. Thus language affords us the ability to conceive a durable political and make law of generality and equitability, but epistemological risks will forever attend politics.

Certainly, abstraction and generality of our thoughts and ideas is what convinces men to search for political bond in the first place, but language itself lacks neither the “representational” nor the “transcendental” authority to hold the polity in place. The failure of the self-defeating solution proposed by Hobbes puts into relief the need and merit of an administrative theory in Rousseau. Government is the first order of business once verbal commitment has been made, not just to guard against enemies of the public but to cement the political bond against the treachery of language, against all the infelicitous metaphors that were once useful to the birth of the political state but are perpetually dangerous to it and ready to overthrow it at any moment. The making of general will and the setup of government, the founding of the state and sustaining of its well-being, are two distinct philosophical undertakings in Rousseau’s writings. The fragility of political life and the threats of civil war must be remedied through a complex economic, logistic, governmental operation, regardless of the potency and validity of the general will that unfailingly desires equality and liberty for all. That the linguistic effect of equality may be coterminous with the life of the political from its birth to its death means the metaphysical and judicial construct of sovereignty cannot be considered self-sufficient any more; government is not simply pragmatic application of ideal principles of the contract but must be seen as the inevitable philosophical solution to stabilize a concept of equality and liberty that is otherwise constitutively unstable.
Conclusion
Rousseau’s Political Realism

This thesis approaches Rousseau’s theory of international relations, of political economy, and above all his theory of sovereignty, as a realist doctrine of politics. Rousseau argues that the emergence of the political state is precipitated by an existential crisis when men have “reached the point where the obstacles that interfere with their preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces which each individual can muster to maintain himself in that state.” It is an abstract, “pure” crisis that prompts men to search for plausible rules of cooperation for collective self-preservation. As the proposed solution to this pure, existential crisis, the idea of political sovereignty in the *Social Contract* represents an abstract, universal organizational principle of all legitimate political associations (“[the clauses of this contract] are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized”). The *Social Contract* may thus be considered part – and certainly the most famous example – of the eighteenth century Enlightenment legal and political thinking that came to understand the essence of the political as “the defense of unity itself, beyond any actual content or substantial identity.” And it is for this reason that I consider Rousseau’s conceptualization of the political and of sovereignty realist.

According to Hoekstra, “the theories of medieval constitutionalists were embedded in historical and institutional contexts, whereas absolutists worked to abstract from such contingent features a universal political philosophy that proceeded from logical analysis of the meaning of supremacy.” In the divide between the medieval constitutionalists and the Hobbists, Rousseau would no doubt be aligned with the latter. Although highly critical of Grotius and Hobbes, it is safe to say that Rousseau has continued their search for that universal principle of absolute political power. In affirming the autonomy of the political and the supremacy of the logic of sovereignty, Rousseau comes very close to the political realism of Grotius and Hobbes and indeed offers a very realist doctrine of absolute sovereignty in the *Social Contract*.

But in this concluding chapter it is Rousseau’s differences with other realist theorists that I want to underscore. In this dissertation I have positioned Rousseau’s political realism against classical expressions of realism as found in two authors in particular: Grotius and Hobbes. I argue that Rousseau’s political philosophy can serve as a critique of a peculiar kind of political metaphysics that underlies the traditional understanding of realism. The two, I argue, embrace a concept of the political that is incomplete and inadequate and ultimately cannot render itself real and literal.

For Grotius, conquest is an important and perhaps the soundest way to found political society. Conquest rights are also strongly condemned in the first chapters of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*. The disagreement between the two authors is as much politico-juridical as methodological and metaphysical: Is it possible to be sovereign in just one moment? Does the “continuance of time” affect the nature of sovereign power? For Rousseau, coercive force that can compel a victim to obey is still just force, not a legitimate sovereign power, which is meant to be a perpetual power. Grotius’s realism is crude because in his metaphysical abstraction he is bound to equate the force of the tyrant with actual sovereignty: this crude realism leaves us a notion of sovereignty that cannot sustain itself and is in fact never absolute.
A second consequence of the abstraction of the idea of sovereignty, I argue, is the banishment of the theory of administration from political theory. Realism (from Machiavelli on) liberated an autonomous political reason from a set of ethical, cultural or theological norms long imposed on European state and political life and from medieval constitutionalism and the needs and interests of particular regimes and institutions. Grotius and Hobbes’s the philosophy of state drifted away from political science’s more traditional preoccupation with government and statecraft. For Hobbes (and later Rousseau), the absolute, indivisible sovereignty is not the same as the absolute government of one. In the age of absolutism, however, the realist idea of absolute sovereignty was perverted to mean absolute monarchy and mercantile economic and military consolidation. Realism was debased to denote the policies of the ancien régime, of realpolitik and mercantilism. For Rousseau, therefore, the distinction between sovereignty and government can only be sustained by a detailed explanation of government’s relation to the sovereign and principles of its formation and operation. Rousseau presents the comparative studies of national physiognomies as a theoretical opportunity to found a science of government that does not easily degenerate into mercantilism and despotism. Without a physiognomic science of government, the realist doctrine of sovereignty is not self-sustaining. In the ancien régime, it gave away to a vulgar realism that advocated policies of centralization, industrialization, militarization, balance of trade, and balance of power.

Further, I argue that the way Rousseau structures his argument about equality should raise more questions about the self-sufficiency of the concept of sovereignty. The subject must be convinced of the equality and justice of the political community, and that equitable spirit of the citizen, the political spirit par excellence, is contingent upon his linguistic and rational abilities to generalize and conceptualize equality and conceive of a durable condition of cooperation and coexistence with fellow citizens. Rousseau’s philosophy of language nonetheless casts doubt on whether the concept of equality is just a metaphor incapable of realization and adequation. The sovereign’s failure to literalize the condition of equality thus results not from a lack of political effort but the innate metaphorical quality of the concept itself. Even at the level of ideas, the concept of political sovereignty appears unstable and untenable. In this regard, Rousseau differs from Hobbes’s attitude towards the relationship between political realism and linguistic realism. I argue, therefore, that in Rousseau’s Social Contract government is not the practical application of the ideals of an equitable and just sovereign but is integral to the very idea of it. The completeness of the concept of sovereignty must already entail the inclusion of a component of government that can somehow conceal the rift between formal equality that the subject envisions of political life and the material, social inequalities he endures – a rift that exists entirely within the concept of sovereignty itself and not as a gap between theory and practice.

Bodin and Grotius: the perpetual sovereign
Sovereignty, Bodin says in The Six Books of the Commonwealth, “is the greatest power to command. For majesty is so called of mightiness.” But the power to command and compel alone does not define sovereignty because that power can be loaned. The true sovereign must not only possess the highest authority to command but also hold it for eternity. Lacking that property of perpetuity, whoever exercises political authority does
so merely as a commissioner, a deputy, and a lieutenant of the true sovereign, as evidenced by the ancient appointment of Dictators. Grotius objects to the requirement of perpetuity in Bodin’s definition of sovereignty, and the disagreement between the two is, at least from Grotius’s point of view, not historical as much as it is metaphysical: although the power of his office is not perpetual, the Roman Dictator is sovereign while in office because “the nature of moral things is known by their operations, wherefore those powers, which have the same effects, should be called by the same name...And the continuance of a thing alters not the nature of it.” We need not look for perpetuity in sovereign power because it unnecessarily frustrates a simple, metaphysical method to understand the nature of political sovereignty: the performance and effect of sovereign power can be frozen in time and suspended in its own operation, and its true nature can be fully grasped that way. A prince’s power may weaken or slacken, or he may simply go into sleep, but sovereign power can still be conceived and theorized at one perfect moment – just one instant and one instance of that sovereign power in action, which would reveal to us all its absoluteness and majesty. In that moment the concept of sovereignty becomes (sufficiently and completely) knowable and can be abstracted from all contingencies of occasional weaknesses and fluctuations.

Grotius is alone in his objection to Bodin. Hobbes in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, Pufendorf in *Of the Law of Nature and Nations* would both side with Bodin in insisting on the perpetuity of authentic sovereign power. But the two are concerned primarily with delegation and succession of the sovereign. Rousseau, by contrast, chooses to raise the issue of perpetuity at the birth of political sovereignty: immediately upon his victory and with the sword still in his hand, the conqueror can make the conquered obey; at this moment his power of compulsion is not even exceeded by a legitimate sovereign (after all, that the strong can make the weak obey is a point true and trivial), but Rousseau asserts that the conqueror is not made sovereign by this temporary power of compulsion because his coercive force may fluctuate, weaken and expire. The pistol in the hand of a robber gives him power over his victim but not a right to the victim’s purse. Only in vain does the conqueror or the tyrant try to convert his momentary advantage in force into a permanent title to shield himself against contingencies and his own possible weaknesses; in conceptualizing sovereignty the future infects the present: the subject must be convinced of the permanence of the absolute power to be obliged. This makes up the core of Rousseau’s argument against conquest rights.

Rousseau’s position is thus the obverse of Grotius’s: we cannot hold onto a thin, metaphysical notion of absolute power because even momentary weaknesses affect the absoluteness of power at the level of concept and intelligibility – subjects do not accept the ruler to be sovereign at any time if his repressive force could weaken. Grotius’s conceptualization is not only tyrannical but also incapable of sustaining itself. Because the subjects do not accept the tyrant’s power to be absolute at any moment, it is his weakness, not his mightiness, that is absolute and timeless and becomes the metaphysical and intellectual problem that distresses the supposed causality between conquest and founding. In disregarding the “continuance of time”, the concept of absolute power is not even self-sufficient because sovereign power is not absolute except when embedded in its own perpetual continuity. It cannot be in an isolated instant or episode. A sovereign merely of the moment has neither practical significance nor conceptual coherence, no matter how mighty he is and how absolute his power is to compel. We lose both the
practicality of the idea of sovereignty and the idea itself. Grotius’s concept of sovereignty is thus inadequate and incomplete.

If we reduce the concept of sovereign power to an abstraction stripped of all contingencies and fluctuations of forces like Grotius did, it becomes a tyrant’s delusion and a self-contradiction. There cannot be a metaphysics of absolute power that is shielded from contingencies, fluctuations of forces and temporary weaknesses. In Rousseau’s social contract, the sovereign must will and legislate a formal equality that guarantees citizens’ equal protection and obligations precisely because of the variations in their circumstances and strengths. From the Social Contract, I believe, we will have gained a fuller concept of sovereignty than from Grotius.

Rousseau and Hobbes I: theory of sovereignty in the age of absolutism
Of all the social contract theorists Rousseau has most to say on the art of government. Grotius banishes the subject from his jurisprudence entirely and evokes the name of statecraft but once in the Prolegomena of The Rights of War and Peace. Hobbes is slightly more patient and elaborates on the issue of government more than Grotius. Depending on whether sovereign power is vested in one person or several, Hobbes says there can be three forms of commonwealth. The difference between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy is of no judicial interest to him because “the difference between these three kinds of commonwealth, consisteth not in the difference of power; but in the difference of convenience, or aptitude to produce the peace, and security of the people.” Hobbes does not hide his preference for royalism because, in his opinion, the rule of one tends to encourage the convergence of the public interest of the state and the private interest of the ruler and because we can expect more constancy in temperament and passions from one ruler than from an assembly of people. Still, for natural law theorists like Grotius and Hobbes, the study of typology of governments and their respective virtues and operations has lost the theoretical importance that it was given in Machiavelli and classical political science.

Contrary to Hobbes’s preference for monarchy, Rousseau argues that in the government of one the private will of the prince converges completely with the corporate will of the government but is most prone to deviation from the general will. But he is no less emphatic than Hobbes about the theoretical distinction between the inquiry into the nature of sovereign power and the inquiry into classification of governments. He insists that divergence in their forms, whether monarchical or democratic, does not alter the fundamental, republican character of their sovereignty. According to Rousseau, it is impossible to settle the “argument about the best form of government” because “each of them is best in some cases, and the worst in others”. All the judicial and moral considerations in the first two books of the Social Contract concern the making of a sovereign people and the political logic and nature of the sovereign community, while the next two books deal with the question of how to pick one form of government to give the body politic the most effective way to aggregate the strengths of individuals to maintain itself. While the principle of sovereignty and collective self-defense never changes, practical considerations specific to each people and each nation affect its choice of government and setup of political institutions. Making the right choices entails such sublime understanding of the art of government that Rousseau recommends only a lawgiver of extraordinary authority be given the job in place of the people. The art of
government is thus the more practical part of political science that is distinct from and secondary to the more essential political and legal question about the origin, justification and legitimacy of the political association that social contract theories try to answer.

Political theorists are familiar with the story of how in early modernity the purpose of the political state became separate and independent from the onerous moral and religious demands that were imposed on the medieval state. Meinecke’s narrative is a historicist one that has long been familiar to political science and in which, starting with Machiavelli, ethical, religious, sectarian appendages began to be peeled off the body politic and the latter grew more and more autonomous: “to hand the State back to itself”, 465 in a manner of speaking. But Meinecke’s narrative paints only an incomplete picture because the intellectual interest in the supremacy and autonomy of the political reason gained pace after it was further distinguished from the writings of statecraft that serve only particular regimes and forms of political authority; hence the need (as perceived by Foucault, for example) to distinguish the discourse of reason of state in Machiavelli and the discourses from later centuries. 466 In this regard, Grotius and Hobbes’s theoretical achievement is not so much the autonomy of the state as “the separation of the question of the political from the contingent appearance of actual state regimes.” 467 The pure political reason is a new metaphysics that must be not only liberated from the medieval interpenetration of ethical, religious and political lives but also abstracted from all the reasons of state practiced by particular regimes and particular governments. For the philosophers of state, therefore, the science of government can best be ignored or left to others who write and read these “cookbooks” on statecraft – political philosophy must stay aloof and not judge the character of a regime. Even if a particular state fails to properly guard national interests, we can only blame its failure on bad government and bad policies. In relegating the art of government to theoretical insignificance in his state theory we can sense Hobbes’s confidence that, while different circumstances recommend different forms of government to individual states, as an abstract logic of self-augmentation and self-preservation the principle of sovereignty can be compatible with all forms of government.

Hobbes’s confidence was betrayed by the fact that all statesmen of the time had in their minds only one “good” form of government and one “good” type of policies. There seemed to be only one true and proven path for a nation’s pursuit of national interests and security. The princes and statesmen of the time hardly recognized the philosophical difference between sovereignty and government that the political philosophers insisted on: the ancien régime (and anyone who wanted to emulate the administration and policies of their most powerful neighbors) collapsed the difference between the abstract principle of sovereignty – that of a people unifying itself politically for the sake of collective security – and the tendency of the largest European states to consolidate themselves administratively, fiscally, militarily. The political logic of collective defense was universally and directly translated into an economically and fiscally centralized administration and an external policy of balance and equilibrium. Autonomous political reason was wed so tightly to the monarchic form of government that the security and sovereignty of the state was widely thought to depend on the adoption of this monarchic form as well as the mercantile policies of fiscal and military centralization of the most powerful monarchic states. Emulation became an instinct for policymakers in all major countries who raced to duplicate the success of another’s industrial, trade and military
policies. The “realist” doctrine of political sovereignty came to be identified wholly with a realist state that underwent mercantile centralization at home and took part in ceaseless rivalry and balancing abroad.

In collapsing the theoretical distinction between sovereignty and government, the classical, absolutist state was considered the ideal way to deploy sovereignty and defend the political essence of the state. This became a pattern so predictable and inevitable that Meinecke, as a historicist, was in the end virtually unable to separate two distinct intellectual inquires, one of documenting the legal and philosophical interest in discovering absolute sovereignty and an autonomous reason of state in early modernity, and the other of tracking the historical rise of and the nearly universal preference for absolute monarchy and mercantilism among European states at the time. Even though Meinecke was fully aware that the natural law theory of state was distinguished from and in fact frequently came into conflict with statecraft in the age of absolutism, in *Machiavellism* we see that *raison d’État* was increasingly associated with absolute monarchy, an association even Hobbes avoided as he assumed the practical benefits in the monarchic form of government but refused to assert any historical, judicial, teleological, or metaphysical inevitability in its adoption.

It would trouble Rousseau that the triumph of this autonomous political reason always took the shape of cameralist or mercantilist organization of government and political economy at home and a set of policies of balance and equilibrium in external relations. Rousseau’s criticism of the *ancien régime* would focus on the fact that the absolutist regime that thought itself to be acting in the political interests of the state always failed to recognize that its mercantilist policies at home and abroad contradicted the very principle of sovereignty, of liberty and equality, because it caused oppression, alienation, and division within the political community. The economic and international police of the *ancien régime* should be considered an example of inequality, injustice and tyranny, and such a regime dissolves the sovereign people and is rather unpolitical.

Rousseau’s criticism of realpolitik, therefore, does not imply a disagreement with the “realist” doctrine of sovereignty. In fact, the very opposite is true. Rousseau’s social contract grows out of the same, autonomous political reason: the contract is an act through which a community of people becomes sovereign and political and generates the will and cumulative force to preserve itself. But whereas only a unified structure of sovereignty can overcome the civil war or state of nature, the unity and indivisibility of sovereignty need not lead to the monarchic and absolutist governments that dominated Europe. And whereas he accepts a permanent state of war among states, Rousseau argues that the social contract state must not subscribe to the grueling demands and machinations of European equilibrium. To truly preserve the unity and security of the state, Rousseau wants the mercantilist economy and the military institutions of the *ancien régime* to be abolished and replaced with a telluric organization of agrarian economy and guerrilla militia. The idea of a telluric government that adapts to the unique physiognomy and mores of a particular nation is Rousseau’s answer to how the abstract, existential logic of political sovereignty may be rendered into actual governmental organization and operation. As such, Rousseau wants a theory of government and political economy that is altogether absent from Hobbes’s or other contractualist theories of state.

Rousseau’s theory of government thus points to the philosophical disconnect between the conceptualization of the autonomous and supreme political reason and how that
reason invariably translated into the self-destructive policies of the ancien régime. In forming a government, there is no preference for a singular, rational, stoic organ in the form of a prince to perform the political functions of a sovereign people. A telluric government tailored to the unique physiognomy of a nation is needed to uphold absolute sovereignty because the sovereign is not indifferent to governmental operations and nor immune from their ill effects: it is easily jeopardized by bad government. The mercantile government of high centralization that was everywhere imitated and everywhere the same is most easily corrupted and tends to usurp sovereignty, and Rousseau believes the obsession with fiscal and military concentration is only the symptom of the terminal degeneration of government. If the state is the corporeal form that takes direction from the general will and serves it, how can a disembodied sovereign survive the destruction of this corporeal form?

Rousseau’s critique of absolutism and its combination of realpolitik and mercantilist policies remains a political critique. Rousseau does not revive a medieval or universalist framework of metaphysics and ethics to bemoan the fact that the absolutist state had to act in self-interest and a kind of limited, “conventional” political justice. Rousseau’s point is rather that a theory of political sovereignty would not be self-sufficient and a physiognomic theory of government is always needed to complete it. Otherwise, the principle of sovereignty is always rendered into an absolutist, mercantile form of government, which, with its economic and social inequalities and its taste for foreign wars and domestic exploitation and oppression, is no longer just a corrupt government but the death of the political. The mercantile, absolutist state is divided between the country and the city, divided between classes, and ultimately divided against itself. The sovereign must discriminate between physiognomic government and the mercantile, tyrannical kind for the sake of its own survival. The logic of political sovereignty entails a requirement of a good government.

Rousseau and Hobbes II: equality, rhetoric, and political economy

The real sovereign commands obedience in a way that a conqueror or a tyrant cannot. Under the yoke of tyranny, the subjects either try to grow as strong as the oppressor and become capable of resisting him, which results in a civil war between the ruler and the ruled, or simply escape, which dissolves the ties between them. In either scenario we lack a durable political bond and legitimate sovereignty. The fallacy of conquest rights comes down to this: an unequal tie is not political and cannot survive the disappearance of the sheer brute force that can chain the weak to the strong only so briefly.

Unlike civil rights that may be promulgated by a lawgiver, equality is not a gift of the sovereign but the basic disposition of a political community if that community ever comes to be. Equality gives meaning to the political logic of collective self-defense. In the Social Contract, therefore, Rousseau makes the will to equality the sovereign’s existential will. Rousseau further explains that every subject has an equal share of the burden and protection of the state, and no one citizen is placed above another. So Rousseau’s politics is emancipatory from the beginning: in joining fellow men in a political union, we are freed of personal dependency on them. Moreover, no one is inferior to any other person, so no one can be excluded from political life: political sovereignty is by definition popular sovereignty. Political liberty of the individuals and collective self-preservation of the whole community are both synonymous with equality.
But Paul de Man’s extrapolation of Rousseau’s linguistic and political philosophy also casts great doubt on how realistic this equality can be. De Man argues that in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* the hypothetical scenario of two men encountering each other (first calling each other “giant” out of fear and then correcting oneself by calling the other person with a common and instantly equalizing name, “man”) is more than a tale of man’s self-reflection but Rousseau’s implicit metaphor of the self-reflexive nature of *language,* that is, language as language of languages rather than language of things. While Rousseau explicitly argues that the first names are all figural names, it appears that concepts – those names of names – are no less figural. De Man thus argues that in Rousseau’s philosophy of language even concepts, which ought to be product of man’s maturing intelligence and reason, are just metaphors that capture the infinitely fragmented and diverse denominal names.

Rousseau, of course, realizes that for one person to call another “man” (compared to, say, call a table “table”) is significant not only linguistically but politically as well because this indicates an awareness of the newly discovered equality and commonality between the two individuals. The figural name he had initially given the stranger, “giant”, would have kept him away from him, but using the concept, “man”, demonstrates that he is ready to moderate his fear and suspicion of other people and to seek out the stranger for company and cooperation. The concept of man, by virtue of its conceptuality, serves as the first step of egalitarianism and lays down the foundation for future social coexistence and political ties. But if all concepts are metaphorical, then the concept of man, with its implied notion of equality, may well be a cognitive error, one that at least in Rousseau is based on the belief that some kind of quantitative measure and comparison between the two can form an identity. The perceived natural equality derives not from objective standards, of which there can be none, but from the illusion that numbers offer us valid assurance of the certitude of our knowledge. But in truth no physical reality can match the concept of equality. Even if Rousseau may not agree with de Man’s analysis of his philosophy of language, his political writings indeed convey a profound anxiety about a moral equality that cannot possibly be attained in reality and about the grievous political consequences to the political unity and sovereignty of a constituted people of a possible gap between the idea of equality as stipulated in the social contract and the lack of literality of the idea.

Concepts do not have a direct, transparent relation to the objects, not even to the proper nouns that the concepts are supposed to capture; concepts have the same figural relationship to denominal names that they conceptualize as the relationship between these denominal names and the things they name. That no reality of equality can be adequate to the concept of equality is thus first of all a problem of linguistics. If no reality is adequate to the concept of equality, this is not because the lawgivers do not work hard enough to create a condition of equality but because the concept itself is a metaphor and does not have a determinate reference; it is not the lack of political craftsmanship (for example, the skills of the lawgiver in designing our economic and governmental institutions) that forces us to settle for imperfection and inadequacy. That there cannot be an objective reality adequate to the concept of equality or the concept of man – man among men, one among equals – is a matter of ontological, metaphysical inevitability. In practice there would never be the kind of social and economic conditions that sufficiently reflects the moral equality at the foundation of the body politic.
Even after a people converts itself into a sovereign community of political equals, Rousseau understands that no social equality can match the political concept of equality. The gap between the political ideal of equality and the reality of material and economic inequality exists, and Rousseau is resigned to the inevitability of the gap. The concept of equality cannot be translated into practice: it is, in the end, only “a chimera of speculation which cannot exist in practice”.\textsuperscript{474} Even an agriculturalist reform of the political economy can be expected to only moderate the extent of economic inequality and hopefully reduce it to the degree that no citizen is so affluent that he could buy the freedom of another citizen and no citizen is so destitute that he could be pressured to sell his.\textsuperscript{475}

This epistemological problem instantaneously becomes a political problem as well because the subjects have always \textit{imagined} the sovereign to be capable of that equitability and justice. After all, unlike, say, Montesquieu’s theory of political sovereignty, a concept that he methodically reduces to instances of historical and cultural contingencies, for Rousseau obedience is a strictly epistemological contingency – which now threatens to be undone. We may add that the epistemologico-political problem of obedience that the Rousseauean state faces is also different from the problem of obedience that the leviathan faces, which mostly extracts obedience from its subjects by overwhelming them with its raw power and violence. By contrast, the Rousseauean state can remain a unified whole only because the citizens are convinced of their equality and hold a vivid impression of the just and equitable sovereign in their minds. But even Hobbes complains often and bitterly about the abuse of speech, especially deceptive use of metaphors.\textsuperscript{476} That political authority in Rousseau is always an epistemological contingency explains why it is not viable to go for Hobbes’s solution. For Hobbes, it is imperative that the sovereign be able to arbitrate in case of ambiguous or metaphorical use of words and ascertain their true signification.\textsuperscript{477} But if the concept of equality and the very act of covenant must be dependent on the subjects’ use of language, the very subjects who may one day resist the sovereign – that is to say, if political obedience is a linguistic and epistemological contingency throughout and through – then how can the sovereign arbitrate the linguistic problem? It is ironic that the author of the \textit{Behemoth} pinpoints the problem of the mismatch of words and reality as a cause of the civil war, which the “legitimate” king could neither prevent nor win in the end. A concept of sovereignty that can uphold a permanent and fixed relation between words and meaning and dictate the terms of the subjects’ perception and imagination of its power and majesty might indeed be self-sufficient, but for Rousseau the theory of political sovereignty, which is only an effect, cannot be put ahead of an account of human reason and perfectibility, which is the cause of men’s political union. And judging by Charles I’s fate, a Hobbesian sovereign that could not only command political loyalty but also enforce a discipline of the subjects’ speeches and semantics never existed.

If the concept of equality appears incomplete and if that concept of equality enables us to conceive sovereignty in the first place and become political at all, then the metaphysics of political sovereignty now appears incomplete as well. Because of the indeterminate reference of the metaphor of equality, the sovereign may want equality for all its subjects but never even knows the kind and true substance of the equality it wants; even in its abstractness, the sovereign will encompasses both the concept of equality and its government in order to be complete. The gap between political equality and economic reality exists not as flawed application and implementation of the general will but as a
result of an inherently incomplete sovereign will. I want to emphasize that it is this incompleteness, not the abstraction of the concept of sovereignty, that political government purports to address.

For Rousseau, the social contract comes into existence by virtue of the subjects’ ability to reason, conceive, and generalize a fair and equitable condition of political coexistence with their fellow men. But the theory of sovereignty is not self-sufficient because after each founding moment language quickly turns against the sovereign and works to undercut it. To preserve our political sovereignty, it is not enough that the subjects continue to possess the powers of speech and imagination because now these faculties are subversive. Rousseau does not believe, therefore, that the general will alone can maintain civil peace. A very practical art of politics, the design of our public economy and institutions, must emerge to manage the inequalities and injustices that predate the political community and to compensate for them. I have argued that Rousseau’s political economy is as much “economic” as spatial and geographical. Like Aristotle’s *Politics*, Rousseau’s political economy already implies an acceptance of the stubborn reality of social inequality and the futility of any attempt to “numerically” and “absolutely” level the wealth of all citizens. For Rousseau, a telluric, agrarian political government that diminishes the economic preeminence of the capital city certainly does help to fight the egregious concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, but the spatial design of the telluric government must also leverage the force of government, regulate its size, and manipulate the citizens’ participation in it. The *Social Contract*, then, actually contains two distinct discourses of equality: equality as the defining quality of political life and the existential political will of civil society on the one hand, and equality as the working and fruition of political economy and political administration in individual states on the other.

The *Social Contract* is thus a heterogeneous work. This is so because it rests on a dual discourse of equality. This heterogeneity inheres in Rousseau’s concept of the political, too: politics is not only our verbal and abstract commitment to equality and unity but also the governmental action that is required to realize some approximation of that equality. The two heterogeneous elements must belong to a single concept of the political because neither half – the half of the treatise about the principle of political sovereignty and the half about maxims of government – can be self-sufficient and stand on its own. On the one hand, the formal, moral equality cannot withstand the onslaught of growing economic and social inequalities that capitalist developments (which are quietly tolerated by Hobbes and happily predicted by Locke) would bring. The sovereign depends on governmental operations to “regulate” social inequality and fashion a sort of formal equality out of it. On the other hand, without the ideal of unity and sovereignty, what would still motivate the rich and poor to move beyond their class war and search for common peace and purpose? Without adhering to the abstract idea of sovereignty and unity, what would political practice be comprised of? We would stare at the most extreme form of injustice and inequality and the most horrendous violence engendered thereby. The idea and practice of sovereignty completely infiltrate each other. By necessity the concept of the political is ruptured from within: it must inhabit both the practical world and ideational world.

*
For Rousseau, sovereignty and autonomy of the political is inseparable from the nobility and dignity of political life. For individuals joining the social contract and forming a sovereign community, they do so because they find in their political sovereignty the revolutionary hope of liberation from various non-political forms of injustices and inequalities. This thesis has sought to highlight Rousseau’s political realism where this radical hope of emancipation is tied fast to his realist conceptualization of sovereignty in the *Social Contract*. On the one hand, because political life has a special claim on equality, justice, and individual liberty – a special claim, that is, to the exclusion of others forms of organization of our life – the political must have a secure, privileged ontic status of autonomy and supremacy over traditional cultural or economic orders; the pursuit of equality and freedom thus entails a realist conception of the political in Rousseau. On the other hand, the political as a radical hypothesis of equality and liberty is indispensable to the realist concept of sovereignty because without this hypothesis political sovereignty dissolves into factionalism and civil war: it will be less than itself – less than stable, less than perpetual, and as such always less than absolute and less than complete.

Rousseau’s engagement with the realist tradition thus unfolds in two ways: he affirms the achievements of earlier realists and contractualists who tried to envision a political authority most absolute and sovereign - and thus the autonomy and sovereignty of the political as well, but he also militates against a “thin” definition of sovereignty in Grotius and Hobbes that severs the conceptual link between sovereignty and equality. Rousseau’s theoretical accomplishment is in making equality a constitutive, organizing principle of political sovereignty and in arguing that the adequacy and completeness of the concept of the political depends on it.

But equality is an exceedingly onerous theoretical burden on political realism. Exactly because equality is a constitutive principle of sovereignty, in Rousseau it cannot simply be willed by the sovereign (nor defined or “fixed” by the decree of the sovereign, as one might assume with Hobbes). For Rousseau, the sovereign is born into a constitutional crisis thanks to its endless struggle to realize political equality. Because any gap between the concept and literality of equality also measures the same distance between the concept and reality of political sovereignty, I have argued that Rousseau’s theory of political economy or government is meant to compensate for and conceal, if not completely close, the gap. In the end, the theory and practice of government can be located entirely within Rousseau’s concept of sovereignty and afford the latter the completeness and self-adequacy that ought to be the birthmark of political sovereignty.
References


3 A few authors have tried to secure a place for Rousseau’s international theory at the center of his political thought, as either an inspiration of his theory of social contract or something that was developing in parallel to his theory of the social contract. In The Rights of War and Peace, for example, Richard Tuck makes the case that in Rousseau as in other contractualist theorists, the radical natural liberty and autonomy that these political philosophers ascribed to individuals mirrored the elemental freedom that the state possessed in acting to defend its interests and preserving its own existence in international competition with other states; Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Reconstructing fragments of the manuscript on “The State of War”, Grace Roosevelt also argues that Rousseau’s evolving positions on the nature of interstate conflicts relations could help account for the subtle changes in what his views of the state of nature from the Second Discourse to the Social Contract; Roosevelt, Reading
Rousseau in the Nuclear Age (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990), p.16. Merle Perkins also makes the argument that “Rousseau’s principles of individual liberty and political power within the nation are closely, even inseparably tied to his ideas about the bonds and frictions existing between nations”; Perkins, Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the Individual and Society (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974), pp.14-15. And still earlier, in his book on Abbé Saint-Pierre, Perkins already argued that Rousseau’s idea of the social contract was akin to the federative idea Saint-Pierre came up with to secure permanent peace between states; Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint Pierre (Geneva & Paris: Librairie E. Droz & Librairie Minard, 1959), p.91. While at times speculative, the domestic analogy is intriguing and at least tells of Rousseau’s serious interest in geopolitics and its potential impact on internal affairs of civil societies.

4 On this we often take cues from Friedrich Meinecke’s Machiavellism who, in discussing the development of the absolutist principle of sovereignty and the supremacy and autonomy of the political reason, actually left no place in the book for Rousseau at all; Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’État and Its Place in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). More recent scholarship has been kinder in acknowledging Rousseau’s importance to the raison d’état tradition; e.g., Jonathan Haslam’s No Virtue Like Necessity: Reality Thought in International relations since Machiavelli (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2002).

5 In his book on Enlightenment political thought, David Williams Bates traces the emergence of an autonomous political sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The political sphere slowly became freed from religious or cultural entanglement of the Middle Ages and became an autonomous domain with its own distinct function and logic. This development culminated in Rousseau’s conceptualization of the political, which guards the subjects against existential threats but also against the injustices and inequalities of historically contingent social and economic orders. See Bates, States of War: Enlightenment Origins of the Political (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).


7 Meinecke, p.225.

8 Meinecke respects their intellectual profundity and sublimity and does not fault them for the lack of such concreteness in their political thinking; rather, Meinecke’s criticism is that logically the leviathan may well turn out to be less absolute than it initially claims to be because of the liberal individualism the Hobbesian state accommodates; Meinecke, pp.214-216. Meinecke did not consider Pufendorf in the same chapter as Grotius and Hobbes, though, because, in addition to his writings on international and natural law, Pufendorf still spoke fondly of the doctrine of interests and still wrote about the state interests of Germany in particular; Meinecke, pp.208-209.

9 Meinecke, p.215.
The *Leviathan* was widely seen as an opportunistic attempt to please Cromwell. See Kinch Hoekstra, “The *de facto* Turn in Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” in *Leviathan After 350 Years*, eds. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p.35.

11 Bates, p.51.

12 That the social contract is not as much a revolution against the state of nature as a revolution against existing social and cultural injustices and, as such, that the Social Contract in fact only picked up from where the *Second Discourse* ended is a thesis that Jean Starobinski advanced in *Transparency and Obstruction*. Holger Ross Lauritsen recently makes a similar argument in “The General Will between Conservation and Revolution,” in *Rousseau and Revolution*, eds., Lauritsen and Mikkel Thorup (New York: Continuum, 2011).

13 According to Daniel Cullen, therefore, “Rousseau certainly suggests that the disorder of social relations is connected to inequality; but it is not reducible to that problem. The latter creates a dialectic of domination and subordination that advances with the progress of civilization. The antidote to this fatal progress is a form of political equality, which will serve the restoration of freedom”; *Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), p.20.


18 N. J. H. Dent thus says the issue of government is pure “practicalities” that are straightforward; *Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* (Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p.122. Christopher Kelly also notes that the chapters on government stand out of the main thrust about political right in
the Social Contract: “the latter two parts of the legislator’s function are concerned with political practice and therefore stand outside of pure political right. In fact, these parts are not concerned so much with political practice in the ordinary sense as with establishing conditions in which politics can take place”; Rousseau as Author: Consecrating One’s Life to the Truth (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p.63. Perkins also calls the role of government an empirical one: the government serves a good that it “must discover empirically”, and “in this domain the government has a vision which is superior to the sovereign people and encompasses all parts of the nation in order to know the whole”. Perkins here conflates the role of the legislator and the (head of) government and appears to phrase the distinction between sovereignty and government as one between the unlearned mass and the political elite. Rousseau’s prince, argues Perkins, is only a scientist; as long as he is “enlightened” (enlightened, one assumes, both in understanding the relationship between his personal interest and the interest of the republic and in the science of concrete situations of his country and practical consequences of implementing his policies), the sovereign can place complete trust in his government; Perkins, Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the Individual and Society, pp.126-127. Like Perkins, Bloom believes Rousseau’s theory of government amounts to returning politics to the hands of heroic legislators and founders whose wisdom, prudence allow them to see farther than others, but unlike Perkins’s sympathetic reading Bloom condemns this as incompatible with liberal constitutionalism and calls the eminence of the legislator an antiquated perspective unseen since Machiavelli; Bloom, “Rousseau’s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism,” in Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, eds., The Legacy of Rousseau (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp.160-161.  


20 Kelly notes that “Rousseau calls the sort of community that succeeds in cultivating this sort of shared identity a fatherland (patrie), which he distinguishes from a country (pays) or a nation. A country is merely a geographical area under a single political rule, but lacks the strong sense of unity characteristic of a fatherland. A nation possesses unity from shared language, traditions, and customs, but need not have any political identity. Only members of a fatherland deserve the title of citizens in the full sense of the term”; p.90.  

21 Blaise Bachofen, “Why Rousseau Mistrusts Revolutions: Rousseau’s Paradoxical Conservatism”, in Rousseau and Revolution, p.26. Several other essays in the anthology also address this crucial issue of the relationship of politics and existing culture or customs of a country, e.g., Christiane Mossin, “Creation, Destruction and Continuity of Order”, p.142. Perkins also discusses Rousseau’s Letter to D’Alembert and the debate on Genevan theater in relation to Rousseau’s interest in preserving the unique national character of the Genevans; Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the Individual and Society, pp.149-167. C. Fred Alfrod also argues that “[the general will] reflects the consensus of the community, the ‘civil religion’ as he sometimes calls it – that is, the community’s interpretation of its culture and tradition, which may vary considerably from community to community”; Alfrod, The Self in Social Theory: A Psychoanalytic Account of Its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), p.164. See also O’Hagan, pp.155-156. The central thesis in


23 Masters says that “Climate and geography have a dual effect, for they determine not only the characteristics of the soil and thereby the natural potentialities for feeding and supporting the citizens, but also the character of the population itself. This double importance is decisive for Rousseau, especially because...he does not seem to believe that technology can fundamentally reverse the political effects of the physical factors conditioning social life”; p.375, italics mine.

24 Smith, “Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty in Rousseau’s ‘Government of Poland’,” The Review of Politics, vol. 65, no. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp. 410-411. H. D. Forbes also contributed an interesting comparison of Rousseau and Charles Taylor and contemporary discourse of multiculturalism in The Legacy of Rousseau. Forbes juxtaposes the liberal discourse of protecting unique minority identities in a contemporary European or North American multicultural society and Rousseau’s call for preserving national cultures in eighteenth century Europe. The discourse of multiculturalism, of course, is not about shaping a uniform national identity distinctly from a cosmopolitan identity, but about accommodating ethnic minorities within the border, which I believe could not be farther from Rousseau’s mind. Forbes is aware of the ethnic and cultural homogeneity Rousseau wanted to impose, and Rousseau’s interest in unique national characters has nothing to do with the modern sensitivity towards accommodating ethnic or cultural differences and diversity. See Forbes, “Rousseau, Ethnicity, and Difference,” in The Legacy of Rousseau, p.232. We must argue that the national physiognomies of different nations need to be preserved, not for their own sake, but for the sake of creating a level of political virtue and telluric attachment to the soil and earth. When talking about national physiognomy, Rousseau hardly makes any presumption of the inherent values of existing traditions, customs and cultures. For Rousseau, only in relation to the paramount objective of preserving the sovereignty of the community and political freedom of its citizenry can we appreciate the political utility of the diversity and differences in cultural life. And in this regard, I call Rousseau a political realist who asserts the reality of the political in face of the unreality – or secondary, inferior reality – of culture.

25 It is arguable that one of the central themes of Bates’s book is to take up Rousseau’s defense as well as that of other Enlightenment philosophers in face of accusations that they were chiefly responsible for the conflation of the social and the political; see, for example, Bates, pp.5-6.

26 Foucault adds: “you can then deduce from this only what we can call the bounds of governmental competence, but within the framework determined by the armature constituting sovereignty itself.” Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitic, p.39. On the contradistinction between governmentality and sovereignty, he explains that “whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and possesses its own intrinsic instruments in the shape of its laws, the finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the
pursuit of perfection and intensification of the processes it directs; and the instruments of
government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics.”

27 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p.40.
29 Even before his correspondence with the elder Mirabeau, Rousseau must have some
economic education. The First Discourse also contains an oblique reference to the work
of William Petty, arguably one of the earliest political statisticians who had a passion for
collecting statistics, a passion shared with several preeminent administrators and police
theorists in France at the time, and whose political arithmetic, of course, was an
unmistaken gesture towards police; Rousseau, “Discourse on the Sciences and Arts,” in
The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.18. Petty’s “arithmétique politique” thus speaks of
the likelihood that “the political world, just as well as the physical world, can in many
respects be regulated by weight, number, and measure;” Marian Hobson, “Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Diderot in the Late 1740s: Satire, Friendship, and Freedom,” in Rousseau
and Freedom, eds. Christie McDonald and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p.63. Hobson’s essay, as well as one by George R. Havens,
documents Rousseau’s use of Petty as well as the work of the French economist Jean-
Francois Melon; see Havens, “Rousseau, Melon, and Sir William Petty,” Modern
Language Notes, 6 (1940), pp.499-503.
31 Interestingly, John Dough has argued that Rousseau was using the term “social” in the
most innocuous way in his political theory: “one can only reach the negative conclusion
that in making use of the term ‘contrat social’ he was not attaching to it the specific
meaning of ‘a contract to establish a society’ as distinct from the type of contract – one
between ruler and ruled – which he specifically rejected. He appears simply to have made
use of the word ‘social’ at a time when it was gradually coming to fashion…a ‘mot
nouvellement introduit dans la langue’”; Dough, “The Encyclopedie and the Contrat
Social”, in Reappraisals of Rousseau: studies in honour of R. A. Leigh, eds. Simon
Harvey, Marian Hobson, David Kelley and Samuel S. B. Taylor (Manchester:
32 Gisela Bock, for example, argues that “Machiavelli’s ‘equality’ is not social or
economic, but legal and political, meaning equality before the law and equal access to
office”; “Civil Discord in Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine,” in Machiavelli and
Republicanism, eds. Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), p.189. Eric Nelson notes that for the Florentine the problem of
wealth is that it tends to produce “supereminent” individuals like Cosimo d’Medici who
“has used his private wealth to acquire a partisan following”, and insofar as Rousseau’s
own economic program aims at the prevention of unlimited wealth accumulation that
would similarly threaten the basic functioning of a republic, Nelson believes Rousseau’s
view is quite akin to Machiavelli’s and the Romans’. Nelson, Greek Tradition in
Republican Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.77-83, 193. On
Machiavelli’s assessment of the Agrarian Law and his view on the corrosive effect of
economic inequality on political liberty, see also John McCormick, “‘Keep the public rich, but the citizens poor’: economic inequality in constitutionalism, ancient and modern”, Cardozo Law Review, vol.34, pp.879-892. McCormick suggests a frightful scenario that he believes Machiavelli really favored and that nonetheless matches the reason Rousseau fears drastic economic inequality in the first place: what was needed to reverse trends of increasing material inequality is not moderate reforms that the Gracchi brothers attempted but the rise of a violent, “princely usurper”.

33 Steven Johnston, Encountering Tragedy: Rousseau and the Project of Democratic Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.76.

34 Johnston, p.75. Although this seems to read Rousseau explicitly against his own principles of the primacy of sovereignty, Johnston argues the Nietzschean, “tragic” perspective that he adopts in reading Rousseau permits him to do just that.


36 Johnston, p.93.

37 Johnston, p.104.

38 In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault discusses the “the insertion of freedom within governmentality, not only as the right of individuals legitimately opposed to the power, usurpations, and abuses of the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become indispensable to governmentality itself”; thus, “failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is above all ignorance of how to govern properly”; p.353. In the 1978 lectures on liberalism, he further notes that the governmental practice must itself become “a consumer of freedom. It is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist: freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of discussion, possible freedom of expression, and so on. The new governmental reason needs freedom therefore, the new art of government consumes freedom. It consumes freedom, which means that it must produce freedom.” The Birth of Biopolitics, p.63.

39 Johnston, p.98.

40 On de Man’s Rousseau, Inston’s book also includes a compelling criticism: “De Man interprets this lack of literalism as undermining informed political and ethical judgment because it enables deceit and corruption…However, he ignores how it equally obliges us to critique those institutions because, without objectivity, their legitimacy remains forever in question. Like Strauss, de Man avers the absence of irrefutable foundations in Rousseau’s thinking, representing him as an anti-foundationalist. For both theorists, that absence undermines political responsibility. De Man’s analysis thus fails to see how the lack of definite foundations actually produces politics and ethics”; pp.27-28.


42 Rousseau’s name receives exactly one reference in Meinecke’s magisterial work on the intellectual history of reason of state; and to some modern scholars, Rousseau is still too utopian and moralistic to be of greater appeal and relevance to international relations. Pierre Hassner, for example, argues that Rousseau had little to say on international
politics and speculates that the summary and judgment of St. Pierre’s work was no more than “a chore performed to please Madame Dupin”; Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations”, in The Legacy of Rousseau, p.205.


Roosevelt, p.6.
Roosevelt, p.16.

The peace proposal “that would enable sovereign states to unite in a confederation for international security undoubtedly helped to stimulate Rousseau’s final exposition, three years later, of an ideal political society that would enable individuals to unite for the sake of personal security”; Roosevelt, p.177. While Roosevelt’s rearrangement of the text on war is new, much earlier on Charles Hendel and Merle Perkins both suggested that the Social Contract might have had its intellectual stimulation from Rousseau’s reflections on interstate conflicts and a potential confederation of states to overcome them. See Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint Pierre (Geneva & Paris: Librairie E. Droz & Librairie Minard, 1959), p.98.

There is a general will for members of the association; a particular will for the large society, “which very often proves to be upright in the first aspect, and vicious in the second”; Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, in The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings, p.6.

“Sentiment of humanity dissipates and weakens as it spreads to the whole earth…we cannot be as touched by the calamities of Tartary or Japan as we are by those of a European people. Interest and commiseration must in some way be constricted and compressed in order to be activated”; Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, p.15.


Tuck, p.141, p.198.


“...It is very likely that ultimately men would have been obliged to live forever under the government of one alone if they had not devised a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of republican government and the external force of monarchy. I speak of the federal republic”; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, Harold Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.131.

Among early modern political thinkers, Tuck identifies Gentili, Bacon, Hobbes, and Montesquieu among those who would endorse preemptive strikes to diminish an ascendant power, and Tuck argues that the moral and philosophical root of their views on preemption is in the humanist tradition that dates back to at least Cicero and the Romans. See Tuck, p.17, p.19, p.21, p.126 and pp.138-139, for example.


On this Tuck and Waltz are apparently agreed, and so is Meinecke, who adopts the benign view of war as “a safety-valve to prevent civil war”; Meinecke, p.56. This is also where Michael Williams takes issue with Waltz’s reading of Rousseau from a realist angle. Williams argues that “both Kenneth Waltz’s influential use of the parable of the
stag-hunt as a model for an international ‘logic of anarchy’, and the tradition of thought that portrays Rousseau’s social contract as solving the problem of domestic order only at the cost of creating an insuperable international state of war, significantly distorts his thinking and its significance”; Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.65.

57 And this is precisely Hoffman’s reading: “the controlling principle for international politics is the law of nature, and he [Rousseau] provides something of a glimpse at this law of nature when he states that both tyrannical states and well-governed republics can wage unjust war”; Hoffman and Fidler, p.xvi.

58 “Think of the exhaustion in which any state is plunged by the most successful war; compare these ravages with the profit which results: and we shall find that we commonly lose where we suppose ourselves to gain; that the conqueror, always enfeebled by the war, can only console himself with the thought that the conquered is still more enfeebled than himself”; Esref Aksu, Early Notions of Global Governance: Selected Eighteenth-Century Proposals for “Perpetual Peace” (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2008), p.113.

59 Aksu, p.124; similarly harsh words against the kings of Europe can be found throughout the Judgment.


64 Rousseau, “The Government of Poland and on Its Proposed Reformation”, Ch.XII.


66 Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, p.29. Much of the idea on tax and depopulation likely comes from his admired Fénelon who makes these points in Telemachus: “remember that the countries where the power of the sovereign is most absolute are those where the sovereigns are least powerful. They take, they destroy whatever they please, and the whole state is their property. But the state on that account languishes, and the lands are neglected and almost deserted; the cities decline every day, and trade decays. The king, who cannot be such if he is alone and without subjects, gradually diminishes his own power by the continual diminution of his people, from whom his wealth and influence flow. His state is exhausted both of men and money: but the former is the great and most irreparable loss.” François de Fénelon, Telemachus, trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.170.

67 The early commentaries on Rousseau’s abstraction of St. Pierre’s peace plan were largely that Rousseau was too pessimistic about the princes’ ability to see their true and real interests in St. Pierre’s original proposal. And this view occasionally persists among modern scholars. In Jonathan Haslam’s No Virtue Like Necessity: Reality Thought in International relations since Machiavelli (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2002), he argues that Rousseau’s voluntarism and rejection of rationalism in state behaviors accounts for Rousseau’s differences with contemporary thinkers; see Haslam, p.80, p.83, and p.213.

68 Roosevelt conjectures that “it is likely that Rousseau hoped that his readers would speculate that if the sovereigns were the people themselves, rather than ‘princes,’ there would be much less resistance to the Abbé’s plan”; Roosevelt, p.111.
One needs to only highlight a few lines to see the nature of the peace proposal: the plan is said “to divest the house of Austria of the empire and of all the possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries; in a word, to reduce it to the sole kingdom of Spain, bounded by the ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Pyrenean mountains.” And then there are very naked threats of war: “what would a resistance have signified? The promise made to all the princes of Europe of enriching themselves by the territories of which this house was to be divested, would deprive it of all hopes of assistance from any of them” and “Henry and the confederate princes would declare war in form against their enemies and deprived the Spaniards of all communications”. And the resultant peace is essentially an imposed peace: “Spain, being abandoned by all, must, though unwillingly, have submitted to the will of its conquerors.” See Sully, Sully’s Grand Design of Henry IV from the Memoirs of Maximilien de Bethune duc de Sully, trans. David Ogg (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921), pp.35, 37 and 55.

Speaking of these potential allies, Rousseau observes that in Henry’s plan “each of them was working for his own private interest which Henry had been clever enough to display to all of them in the most attractive light…but the wise prince was well aware that in keeping nothing for himself by this treaty, he gained more than all the rest. Without adding a yard to his own patrimony, it was enough to partition that of the only man who excelled him in power, and he became the most powerful himself”. Aksu, p.129.

Rousseau cannot support Sully/Henry IV’s project because “the idea of federation by force…would have to be achieved by propagating the very violence the whole project aims to eliminate.” Hoffman and Fidler, p.xxvii.

Henry/Sully bitterly complains that of the wars the French had to fight with the English, Spaniards, Italians, Burgundians, “all of them can be attributed to no other causes than the civil dissensions by which they were preceded and here the weakest side, stifling the voice of honor, and the interest of the nation, constantly called in foreigners to assist them in the support of their tottering liberties. These were shameful and fatal remedies: but from that time they were constantly employed, down even to our times, by the House of Lorraine, in a league, for which religion was nothing more than the pretense.” Sully, p.21.

Aksu, p.61.


tyranny were to continue, better tyranny with peace than a wise government in times of war. The Abbé leaves his readers in no doubt, then, of his primary concern, to eliminate war, and of his belief that an end to war must ipso facto benefit subjects, whatever the type of rule.” Carter, p.140. And when this preference of monarchism is so intertwined with his vision of perpetual peace, St. Pierre’s plan is in effect turned into an intellectual harbinger of Metternich’s conservative, legitimist Holy Alliance. When Burke wrote at the end of the century after European equilibrium was toppled by the revolutionary France and before the alliance of all other states finally defeated French power, he summarized well the eighteenth century beliefs that had supported the equilibrium before the Revolution: the Revolution was a civil war and radical aspirations towards French hegemony while it was the Bourdon monarchy that had represented unity and at the same time exhibited admirable self-restraint in its dealing with its European neighbors. See Select works of Edmund Burke, vol.3: Letters on A Regicide Peace, ed. E. J. Payne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999).

80 Rousseau, Emile, p.481. The deletion of these lines would appear to be just prudence on Rousseau’s part, much like his rhetorically undertoned mockery of Henry VI’s peace proposal.
82 Friedrich says “like the United Nations Charter, the Abbé Saint-Pierre’s union has a distinctly conservative flavor in the sense that it primarily aims to preserve the status quo”; Friedrich, pp.168-169.
84 In The Spirit of the Laws, he laments that “if a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large, it is destroyed by an internal vice”; Montesquieu, p.131.
85 He warns that “Poland is surrounded by warlike powers with large, perfectly disciplined, permanently standing armies, to which Poland could not, even with the utmost efforts, ever oppose similar forces without exhausting itself…if it wants only to imitate them, it will never resist them.” “The Government of Poland”, p.233.
91 Rousseau, “Constitutional Project for Corsica”, pp.296-298. His view of Swiss also echoes Bacon’s. Haslam notes that “Bacon generally considered ‘that there is too much ascribed to treasure or riches in the balancing of greatness.’ Indeed, he considered Machiavelli’s skepticism justified. Were not the invading French armies ‘needie, and ill provided’?...most of the great kingdoms of the world have sprung out of the hardness and scarceness of means, as the strongest herbs out of the barrenest soyle”, and Rousseau
would certainly concur because the barrenness of the land fosters – and even entails - democracy and builds national character. See Haslam, p.129.


93 He suggests that “Corsicans must pay a duty in order to obtain the favor of being unarmed”; see Rousseau, “Separate Fragments: Corsican Constitution”, in *Collected Works, vol.2*, p.160.


95 “Balance-of-power language and doctrine was often used and sometimes discussed in explicit terms. By and large, statesmen in the late eighteenth-century understood the rules, presuppositions, and practices of international politics quite well. These governed conduct in the sense that statesmen accepted them as the way politics had to work; those who operated according to them were playing the game and those who did not were not.”


97 See Schroeder, p.9. For Schroeder, it was truly marvelous that the apparent moralist rhetoric of a European, Christian family of states could mix with acts of betrayal with sincere conviction on the part of diplomats.


99 According to Burke, obviously only big states have the dignity of independence whereas the small states must find their niche of existence in humiliating compromise and quick surrender; see Burke, p.69.

100 Schroeder, p.77.

101 Rousseau, “The Government of Poland”, p.257. Modern historians have certainly agreed with Rousseau’s assessment on the prospect of a successful Polish reform, given Russian watchfulness of Poland’s domestic politics and willingness to interfere and derail any development Russia did not like.

102 Montesquieu, p.131.

103 “Offensive force is regulated by the right of nations”; Montesquieu, p.138.

104 It would be mistake, however, to conflate the positions of Montesquieu and Rousseau, despite the latter’s generally high opinion of the former. While Rousseau believes in defense and deterrence through national resistance and guerrilla war, Montesquieu believes constant and frequent adjustment to European equilibrium, especially through small-scale wars initiated by small states, to be a better solution. The problem is, of course, these adjustments themselves would soon become the commonest cause of conflict in the eighteenth century. One suspects that the German model, which putatively allows for the small states’ advantage of compact size and political vibrancy and big states’ advantage in military strength, was evoked by Montesquieu to support balance of power and preemptive strikes. As such, the stability and success of the Montesquieu-esque system actually requires the smaller states to exercise the right of preemption more actively and plays the game of international politics to a greater extent than even the great powers. For a social contract state, this system places an impossible burden on small
states because they are asked to develop offensive capabilities that can never match the
great powers’. It is reasonable to argue that Montesquieu’s international system was
warped in the humanist tradition of the state’s right to self-defense and right to
preemptive war to stem the ascendency of a neighbor.

There is a general will for members of the association, according to Rousseau, and a
particular will for the large society, “which very often proves to be upright in the first
aspect, and vicious in the second.” In contrast with Locke, Rousseau believes “it is not
impossible that a well-governed republic might wage an unjust war”. Rousseau,
“Discourse on Political Economy”, pp.6-7. See also Carter, p.180 and Friedrich, p.163.

Roosevelt documents Rousseau’s early obsession with Grotius as well as the
theoretical distance Rousseau later put between himself and the Grotian tradition. See
Roosevelt, p.44, p.50, p.52 and p.60.

According to Carter, “the most obvious point to be made regarding the kind of
confederal association which can be seen as compatible with Rousseau’s principles of
political right is that it could in no sense diminish the separate identities of the component
members, or usurp their sovereignty. The association would thus be of necessity a very
loose one, its defensive purpose clearly defined; were the bond to become any closer, the
basic of the individual republic’s legitimacy would be undermined”; Carter, p.187.

Rousseau, Collected Works, vol.9, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush (Hanover,

Quoted in Malcolm Hill, Statesman of the Enlightenment: The Life of Anne-Robert

N. J. H. Dent thus says the issue of government is pure “practicalities” that are
straightforward; Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political
Theory (Oxford & New York, 1988), 122. Christopher Kelly also notes that the chapters
on government stand out of the main thrust about political right in the Social Contract:
“the latter two parts of the legislator’s function are concerned with political practice and
therefore stand outside of pure political right. In fact, these parts are not concerned so
much with political practice in the ordinary sense as with establishing conditions in
which politics can take place”; Rousseau as Author: Consecrating One’s Life to the Truth
(Chicago and London, 2003), 63. Merle Perkins also calls the role of government an
empirical one: the government serves a good that it “must discover empirically”, and “in
this domain the government has a vision which is superior to the sovereign people and
encompasses all parts of the nation in order to know the whole”. Perkins here conflates
the role of the legislator and the (head of) government and appears to phrase the
distinction between sovereignty and government as one between the unlearned mass and
the political elite. Rousseau’s prince, argues Perkins, is only a scientist; as long as he is
“enlightened” (enlightened, one assumes, both in understanding the relationship between
his personal interest and the interest of the republic and in the science of concrete
situations of his country and practical consequences of implementing his policies), the
sovereign can place complete trust in his government; Perkins, Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy,” in The Discourses and Other Early


Rousseau first used the term “physiognomy” to moan the fact that in modern history “our men all resemble one another” in *Emile*. Later in the book, this term expands in meaning to refer to not only how entire races came to lose their distinctive facial features (Germans, Frenchmen, Romans, etc.) but how their homelands were flattened and all started to look alike. *Emile or On Education*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 239, 453. It is this expansion in meaning of this term that holds special interest for me.


Allan Bloom, for example, argues that “what is called the sacred today and is understood to be the summit of culture finds a place in Rousseau’s project more central than the very ambiguous one it has in liberal legislation, where religion may be understood to be unnecessary or even dangerous to the civil order”; Bloom did not hesitate to call Rousseau “the presiding genius of the excesses of the French Revolution” while Locke and Montesquieu were safely the fount of wisdom for the more “moderate” and liberal American founding; Bloom, “Rousseau’s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism”, in *The Legacy of Rousseau*, 162. That Rousseauan politics entailed a high degree of homogeneity makes Rousseau’s political philosophy very incompatible with modern multicultural societies, according to Charles Taylor, and ethnic differences between states that Rousseau embraces, made only more pronounced by homogeneity within each’s borders, is an even more unpleasant consequence that cannot square with basic individual rights; Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, 1994).


In his book on Rousseau, Mark Hulliung has extensively discussed the symbolism of Rousseau’s move to the country and the virtues of rural life and agriculture vis-à-vis the evil of cities and industry and commerce in Rousseau’s political philosophy. See Hulliung, *The Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes* (Cambridge and London, 1994), 76, 127, 177-178, and 223.


“With the forests leveled, the marshes dried up, and the land more uniformly – although worse – cultivated, there is no longer even the same physical difference from land to land and from country to country”; Rousseau, *Emile*, 453.


Plattner, pp.185-186.

Carter, p.131.


St. Pierre’s call for growing industry and commerce, for rapid urbanization and tax reforms, and for developing lines of communication within the state all shows a man with a very modern perspective who forcefully advocated a theory of administration that is meant for states to copy and adopt.


“[Military] discipline is now everywhere the same”, and St. Pierre clearly believes that the equal war-making ability of all major powers can help found peace through power parity. See Rousseau, “Abstract of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace”, 102.


Smith, *The Moral Sentiment*, 111.2.3, quoted in Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge,
2005), 115. On the continent, Montesquieu was also alarmed by the proliferation in many nations – with vastly different sociological conditions – of similar political institutions that serve the same geopolitical goals, and he described them as “contagious” disease. See Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge, 1989), 224.

147 Hont, 120.


152 Fénelon, *Telemachus*, 292.


163 Stanley Hoffman notes that “Rousseau’s thinking offers two shields from the continuing state of war. First, the fierce but defensive patriotism acts as a deterrent against aggression. Second, social contract politics can form confederations…Such confederations do not signal international sunshine; they provide a shelter against the storm. *Both shields adhere to the logic of peace via deterrence, rather than of peace through law.*” Hoffman and Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations* (Oxford, 1991), lxiii-lxiv; my emphasis.

164 Rousseau, “The Government of Poland”, 237. And in the Poland essay Rousseau repeatedly cited the Parthian example of expulsing the Romans: “All of man’s art cannot prevent the sudden onslaught of the strong on the weak…leave your country wide open as did Sparta; but, like Sparta, build good citadels in the citizens’ hearts, and just as Themistocles carried away Athens aboard its fleet, carry away your cities on your horses if need on. The spirit of imitation produces few good things and never anything great.”


Meinecke, 207-8.


Meinecke, 211.

Meinecke, 212.

This point Grotius stresses over and over again in the opus and considers to be essential to the foundation of a new state and sovereignty. See Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Book I, 285; Book II, 563, 670; and Book III, 1250, 1320-1, 1327, and 1498.

Acquisition of sovereignty through war is theoretically more “neat” than other methods of acquiring dominion and thus the most favored method for Hobbes. See Kinch Hoekstra, “A Lion in the House: Hobbes and Democracy”, in *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, eds. Annabel Brett and James Tully (Cambridge, 2006), 208-210.

Meinecke, p.212.

Hobbes’s translation of a propaganda pamphlet during the Thirty-Years’ War was perhaps his closest flirtation with contemporary diplomacy and international politics. Furthermore, Noel Malcolm documents Hobbes’s familiarity with authors like Botero as well as the prolific art-of-government literature associated with Machiavellism and a renaissance of Tacitism in early modern times. See Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War: An Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford, 2007). Hobbes’s knowledge of Botero, Machiavelli and the Tacitists was only made more curious by their absence from his published works.

Pierre Hassner and Hoffman have both argued that Rousseau was willing to accept reforms of international law that can bracket violence between states but not anything more than that. See Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations”, in *The Legacy of Rousseau*, 207, and Hoffman and Fidler, p.xxi. Hoffman concludes that “in the real world, then, Rousseau’s answers to the problem of war are two. First, we have the deterrence offered by patriotism and confederation. Second, if deterrence fails, Rousseau offers the law of war principles introduced in Fragments on War to mitigate the violence of war”; Hoffman and Fidler, lxiv. Grace Roosevelt also documents Grotius’s influence on Rousseau about the plausibility of creating the law of nations to cope with the problem of war as well as Rousseau’s eventual dissatisfaction with the Grotian solution; see Roosevelt, *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age* (Philadelphia, 1990), 285.

“There is serious tension between Rousseau’s maxim of non-combatant immunity developed in Fragments on War and his emphasis on patriotism in the *Discourse on Political Economy*. As Rousseau intends it, patriotism explodes the artificial distinctions between the ruled and the ruler, between the public and the private realms. Patriotism encourages a national rather than purely governmental approach to war.” Hoffman and Fidler, xxii-xxiii.

Rousseau, “The State of War”, 175. Further, “war is a permanent state which presupposes lasting relations, and such relations rarely obtain between man and man, where everything between one individual and another is in continual flux which constantly changes relations and interests.” Rousseau, “The State of War”, 166.
impossibility of a private war stressed here echoes a similar line from “The Social Contract”, 46-7.

182 Rousseau, “The State of War”, 176; my emphasis.
188 Rousseau says that “he must take from man his own forces in order to give him forces which are foreign to him and of which he cannot make use without the help of others. The more these natural forces are dead and destroyed, the greater and more lasting are the acquired ones, and the more solid and lasting also is the institution.” Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, 69.
189 The setup of the government must result in “the smoothest cooperation of the parts, and finally the greatest force of the whole”. Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, 68.
193 Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, 58. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau again argues that the constituency need not meet to make a policy, and no guarantee that if assembled they will make the right decision. Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy,” 12.
202 Roger D. Masters’s chapter on government is devoted to deciphering the abstruse geometrics Rousseau uses and discerning its possible Cartesian influence. Masters sees in Rousseau’s use of the language of physics as proof that he intends to borrow for political science the reputation and credibility of physical sciences. See Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1976), 335-48.
204 Rousseau, “Polysynody”, 80; my italics.
206 Rousseau, “Polysynody”, 86.
208 Thus the tyrant need not be he who rules without law or places himself above the law. Rousseau wants to stress that tyranny is by definition usurpation of popular sovereignty: “In the vulgar sense of the term, a tyrant is a king who governs with violence and without
regard for justice and the laws. In the precise sense of the term, a tyrant is an individual who arrogates the royal authority to himself without having any right to it...Thus tyrant and usurper are two perfectly synonymous words.” Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, 108.

Rousseau, “Polysynody”, 89.


In a relatively new treatment on Rousseau’s political economy, Bertil Friden returns to Starobinski’s argument that market constitutes an obstruction of the moral transparency that Rousseau desires in his political philosophy. See Friden, Rousseau’s Economic Philosophy: Beyond the Market of Innocents (Dordrecht, 1998).


In a clearly dated Rousseau treatise, Alfred Cobban argues that Rousseau has no economic theory and has substituted a moral philosophy in its stead, that Rousseau’s attack on luxe was just motivated by the fact that “[society] had one standard of value and he had another” and “it is not on account of any economic virtues that Rousseau upholds this idea [of rural life]. He puts it forward on the ground of morality.” See Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London, 1964), 128-9. Yet others have tried to update Rousseau’s economic analysis. In one section in Rousseau’s Theory of Human Association: Transparent and Opaque Communities, Greg Hill restates some of Rousseau’s economic ideas in very modern language in a way that has certainly made these ideas more accessible to economists.


Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2005), 96.

“I should like that...there be no public treasury, and the taxing authority not even know about payments in money”; Rousseau, “Constitutional Project for Corsica,” Jean Jacques Rousseau: Political Writings, ed. Frederick Watkins (Madison, 1953), 230. To the Poles, he would say the same: “Is it certain that money is the mainspring of good government?...Poles, leave be all this money to others, or be content with as much of it as
they will have to give you since they need your wheat more than you do their gold”;
Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Projected
Reformation”, in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, ed. Victor
Gourevitch (Cambridge, 1997), 225.

223 “I should like always to have more taxes borne by men’s arms than by their purse; to
have roads, bridges, public buildings, the service of Prince and of State performed by
corvée and not paid for by money”, says Rousseau, “in Switzerland the citizens
themselves perform the functions for which everywhere else they prefer to pay so that
others perform them. They are soldiers, officers, magistrates, laborers, they are
everything in the service of the State, and as they are ever ready to pay with their person,
they need not also pay with their purse”; Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government
of Poland”, 226, 230-1. In “Constitutional Project for Corsica”, Rousseau would again
repeat this advice.

227 “If your only wish is to become noisy, brilliant, fearsome, and to influence the other
peoples of Europe, you have their example, seek to follow it. Cultivate the sciences, the
arts, commerce, industry, maintain regular troops, fortifications, Academies, above all a
good financial system which makes money circulate well.” See Rousseau,
“Considerations on the Government of Poland”, 224.
228 It is recommended that even peasants not trade with each other; this restriction reduces
efficiency but let the inhabitants “lead better regulated lives”. Rousseau, “Constitutional
Project for Corsica,” 308-9.
229 Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality”, in *The Discourses
230 Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, in *The Social Contract and Other Later
Political Writings*, 28.
231 Rousseau, “Last Reply”, in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, 68-70.
232 In a fragment on aesthetic taste, Rousseau makes the curious distinction between
luxury of softness and luxury of vanity: “it is not so much the luxury of softness that
ruins as the luxury of vanity. This luxury, which does not turn to anyone’s good, is the
true scourge of society. This is what carries misery and death into the countryside; this is
what devastates the earth and makes the human race perish.” One wonders if, in ranking
luxury of vanity below luxury of softness, Rousseau is arguing that the depopulation of
rural France constituted a more urgent moral crisis than the moral decline associated with
luxury. See Rousseau, “On Wealth and Fragments on Taste”, in *Collected Works*, vol.2,
trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush (Hanover, 2005), 18.
234 François Quesnay, *The Economic Table: An Attempt towards Ascertaining and
Exhibiting the Source, Progress, and Employment of Riches*, trans. Marquis de Mireabeau
(London, 1766), xiii.
235 Friden, 74.
236 According to Cantillon, “if...the prince, or the property owner, made [peasants] use the
land for other purposes than the upkeep of the people...if...they determine that the farmers
will employ the land for other purposes than the maintenance of men...the people will necessarily decrease in number”; Cantillon, *An Essay on Economic Theory*, trans. Chantal Saucier (Auburn, 2010), 88. Elsewhere, Cantillon argues that a good circulation of money (good enough, that is, to sustain economic activity in the countryside) requires that some amount of money always stay in the countryside and that consumption of luxury by townspeople puts this objective in danger. We can again see that Rousseau duplicates this argument as well. See Friden, 85, for a comparison of Rousseau’s and Cantillon’s analyses on luxury and its effect on the flow of money.

237 “The best tax…the most natural and the one which is in no way subject to fraud,” Rousseau says, “is a proportional tax on land, and on all land without exception…for after all what produces is what ought to pay.” See Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland”, 232. On luxury tax, see “Discourse on Political Economy”, 30, 32-4, 36.


Turgot probably lays out Quesnay’s argument for tax reform in clearer terms than either Mirabeau or Rousseau: “There were two consequences of switching the burden of tax onto things other than the *produit net* of land. First, during a time of high and rising tax levels, the shifting of tax liability onto prices and individuals caused a rise in prices and inflation was bound to follow the attempts of the state to increase taxes and that of individuals to increase wages...Second, there were many parts of France farthest from the fertile lands and centers of population where agricultural land was too poor to yield a *produit net*. The land was so marginal as to furnish only a bare living. In such places, therefore, the new tax could fall only on earnings; and as this caused them to fall below the minimum levels acceptable, production would cease and unemployment and poverty would result.” See Malcolm Hill, *Statesman of the Enlightenment: The Life of Anne-Robert Turgot* (London, 1999), p.56; see also W. Walker Stephens, *The Life and Writings of Turgot* (London, 1895), 62-3.

241 Rousseau underscores the enormous economic and demographic cost of maintaining a standing army: “In order to raise these armies, tillers had to be taken off the land, the shortage of them lowered the quality of the produce, and their upkeep introduced taxes which raised its price”, and this goes on like a vicious cycle. Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, 29.
Lionel Rothkrug, *Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1965), 254. The anonymous author in fact makes many of the same arguments Rousseau would repeat: the rise of the capital city, all the courtesans, officeholders, “along with judicial and financial officers residing in this enormous city drew revenue from estates situated in all parts of the realm”. So the burden of tax on farmers is rendered doubly onerous because royalty and officialdom never spend the money in the country. If officers of the state were to spend the money, it is likely that they would spend most of it in the city, creating an economic imperative for rurals to migrate to the city as well because there lies their employment prospect.

“In a monarchy that has worked long for conquest, the provinces of its first domain will ordinarily be badly trampled. They have to suffer both the new abuses and old ones, and often a vast capital that engulfs everything has decreased their population…what the conquered provinces would send in tribute to the capital would no longer return to them…Such is the necessary state of a conquering monarchy: frightful luxury in the capital, poverty in the provinces at some distance from it, abundance at the farthest points.” See Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge, 1989), 145.

Of course, placing wealth before population is of huge theoretical significance to physiocracy. Still, the political orthodoxy of populationism must be so formidable at the time that one does get the impression that rhetorically physiocrats hedged their bets and had to reassure their audience that ultimately a wealthier class of peasants or “cultivators” should still mean greater population in the country and greater strength to the state. So Rousseau’s populationism (and his rebuttal of the elder Mirabeau) may not indicate a lack of knowledge of physiocrats’ principles so much as the latter’s success in disguising their anti-populationism.

Yet, Rousseau’s populationism also appears to be a very doctrinaire moral conviction. It is easy to answer, he asserts, “what is the surest sign that they are preserving themselves and prospering? It is their number and their population…All other things equal, the Government under which the Citizens, without resort to external means, without naturalizations, without colonies, populate and multiply, is without fail the best: that under which a people dwindles and wastes away is the worst”; “the Social Contract”, 105. Moreover, he speaks very approvingly of St. Pierre’s practice of fathering many children with many women; “Portrait of the Abbé de St. Pierre in *The Age of Louis XIV*”, in *Collected Works*, vol.2, 111-2. In this regard, his disagreement with physiocracy may be a genuinely ethical one.

Lastly, it deserves to be noted that Carol Blum, reading Rousseau from the angle of family and sexuality, portrays Rousseau rather as an anti-populationist who blames the earliest population explosions in the history of human race for mankind’s forced exit from the primitive state of isolation, self-sufficiency and contentment. See Blum, *Strength in Numbers: Population, Reproduction, and Power in Eighteenth-Century France* (Baltimore & London, 2002), 113-52.

For an interesting recent study of historical geographic (and, by extension, ethnographic) studies, see David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers, eds. *Geography and Enlightenment* (Chicago and London, 1999).
Physiocracy does not dismiss the state’s fiscal needs, certainly not a state of France’s stature and prestige. It is just that mercantilists’ view of fiscality was too narrow and self-defeating in the long run because “taxes were not fixed ‘except in relation to the needs of finance, and not to the advantage of commerce, agriculture, the arts and the interests of finance properly understood.’” Their bullionist bias and the ambitious colonial expansion that myopically catered to fiscal needs of the state eventually “accelerated the growth of despotism at home.” Spain, for example, experienced a precipitous decline as a European power that was befallen by its addiction of fiscalism. Cheney, 124-7.

Quesnay, *The Economic Table*, 76, 91, 134.

Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 5, 14. See also Rothkrug, 7-8. Foucault argues that “economic reason does not replace *raison d’état*, but it gives it a new content and so gives new forms to state rationality...we should of course keep in mind that we are still in the realm of *raison d’état*. That is to say, in this new governmentality sketched by the *économistes* the objective will still be to increase the state’s forces within an external equilibrium in the European space.” Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p.348.

Metternich embodies this logic of exteriorization of domestic police. Foucault explains that at the congress of Vienna, “the Austrian objective was to reconstitute a European equilibrium in the old form of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ensuring that no country can prevail over the others in Europe. Austria was absolutely tied to this kind of project inasmuch as it only had an administrative government, being made up of a number of different states and only organizing these in the form of the old police state. This plurality of police states at the heart of Europe meant that Europe itself was basically modeled on this old schema of a balanced multiplicity of police states. Europe had to be in the image of Austria for Austria to remain as it was.” There is no way to tell where Metternich’s diplomacy ended and his reactionary domestic policies began. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 60. See also Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart (New York, 2004), 348, 354.


Henry C. Clark, *Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France* (Lanham, 2007), x, 175. Clark adds that “strategically, there was the question of what place commerce might have in France’s overall standing within Europe and beyond.” While physiocrats neither desired war nor construed trade war as a substitute for military conquest, the era of fraternity of European states based on commerce and peace must nevertheless accept France’s hegemony; 162-163. Fox-Genovese tracks France’s agricultural policies from the end of the religious wars to the revolution and finds that there were several policy reversals on agriculture – Sully had supported it; Richelieu and Colbert turned to industrialization and manufactures; the physiocrats again favored agriculturalism. But their “strong statist bias” survived all the temperamental policy changes, and all these figures wanted the same goals for the state: money and soldiers. Fox-Genovese, 101, 107. Gianni Vaggi also argues that there was a political imperative for Quesnay to “convince the ruling classes that certain apparently dangerous measures ultimately increase the revenue of the landlords and of the country”; Vaggi, *The Economics of Francis Quesnay* (Durham, 1987), 27.
It can be argued that it is Fénelon and not St. Pierre, Fichte and not Kant, who have most in common with Rousseau, for Fénelon and Fichte too would argue for a new economic program that would at once revolutionize the European system of states as well. Rousseau himself speaks often of his debt to Fénelon. Fichte’s debt to Rousseau’s political economy and international thought is no less obvious, as Isaac Nahimovsky has argued; see Nahimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte* (Princeton, 2011). The crucial lesson Fichte learned from Rousseau was that a nation state’s withdrawal from international politics must take place simultaneously as its withdrawal from the global market. Hont also argues that physiocracy is about as much the natural right to private property as French supremacy in Europe; Hont, 368-0.


Cantillon, 89.

Hont, 61.


Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 350. Turgot, for example, insisted that good government “required accurate and detailed social information”. Turgot’s desire to see the unification of weights and measures of the kingdom is certainly part of a political scheme of centralization, but the unification of weights and measures could serve the purpose of centralization only because it first and immediately makes possible the political statistics the sovereign wants compiled. See Keith Michael Baker, *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* (Chicago, 1975), 65, 203. Even the conservative ministry of Terray, which rolled back much of the liberal reform in the previous decade, understood the importance of statistical knowledge to economic administration: “the key element in [Terray’s] strategy was control through collection, centralization, and analysis of information...the refrain of letter after letter emanating from his bureaus was that good data was the best police.” Conversely, the fear of rising tax and tax collection from the center was the reason locals and local officials were resistant to even the most basic information- and data-gathering inquiries from the controller general or the parlement. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV*, 156, 549. This is indeed what Foucault has called “scientific rationality”. See also, Rothkrug, 132.


Montesquieu, 135. France and Spain are perfect in size for national defense in his opinion.


Take Turgot for example: “Turgot was primarily interested not in the mere transfer of power from one body to another but in the more profound transformation of power through enlightenment. His assemblies were not initially intended to give voice to the political will of the nation; they were instituted, on the contrary, to provide accurate social information and public enlightenment through the exercise of the common reason.” Baker, 211. Habermas also observes that “the Physiocrats wish to install the monarch as
in praxis the guardian of the ‘Natural Order’ of society which they have analyzed theoretically; the monarch, however, does not gain insight into the laws of the ordre naturel directly – he must allow this insight to be mediated for him by the public éclairé.” Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston, 1973), 77.

264 Fox-Genovese, 28.
266 Regarding his thinking of civic virtue and wealth, Nelson argues that Rousseau “eventually embraces a vision of the state which allows for real dialogue with Montesquieu and Malby”, two figures that he is able to more tightly tie to the Greco-Roman tradition of republicanism. Therefore, even if lacking direct evidence of the influence of the Agrarian Law on Rousseau’s policy recommendations to the Corsicans, Nelson argues that Rousseau’s economic program shares the same political objectives with the classical theorists. Nelson, *Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* (Cambridge, 2004), 185, 190-1.
268 Aristotle, 1326b39.
269 “There is no doubt that Montesquieu wrote the first books with [Aristotle’s *Politics*] beside him. There are allusions to or comments on the *Politics* on almost every page”. It is also fair to emphasize Montesquieu’s independence in thinking because although he is indebted to Aristotle’s classification of government, “at the same time, Montesquieu would be a sociologist trying to discover how religion, climate, the nature of the soil, and the size of the population influence the various aspects of collective life.” Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol.1: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, de Tocqueville, Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848* (New Brunswick and London, 1965), 18-19.
272 Aristotle, 1302a22.
274 Aristotle, 1304b20-1305a7.
279 Clark, x.
280 Clark, 4.
281 Clark, 34-5.
282 Schumpeter, 239.
283 Fox-Genovese, 177.
284 Baker, 212.
Extreme democracies generally have large populations and it is difficult to get the citizens to attend the assembly without a system of payment...the necessary funds have to be procured by a tax on property, by confiscation, and by means of corrupt lawcourts; and these are all methods which have led in the past to the overthrow of many democracies. So, unless there are sufficient revenues already in hand, the meetings of the assembly should be infrequent, while the lawcourts, although they have a large membership, should meet on only a small number of days. This has two advantages: in the first place, the wealthier classes will cease to fear the expenditure involved – the more if it is only the poor, and not also the well-to-do, who are allowed to receive pay; and secondly, the cases before the courts will be much better decided, as the rich (who do not care to be absent from their business for days together, but do not mind a short absence) will now be willing to attend”; Aristotle, 1320a17-1320a29.

In a very Aristotelian fashion, Rousseau tells the Corsicans that their citizens ought to be made to pay a fine for refusal to play a part in their civic life: “Corsicans must pay a duty in order to obtain the favor of being unarmed.” Rousseau, “Separate Fragments: Corsican Constitution”, in Collected Works, vol.2, p.160.

Indeed, Aristotle often dwells on the topic of using a system of financial payments as well as time and travel restraints to find balance and equality between the rich and poor, the many and the few; see, for example, Aristotle, 1292b33, 1317b31, 1320a17-1320a29.

“If there is one person...so pre-eminently superior in goodness that there can be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he shows (or several show, when there is more than one) and what is shown by the rest, such a person, or such people, can no longer be treated as part of a city. An injustice will be done to them if they are treated as worthy only of an equal share, when they are so greatly superior to others in goodness and political capacity...Reasons of this nature will serve to explain why democratic cities institute the rule of ostracism. Such cities are held to aim at equality above anything else; and with that aim in view they regarded as having too much influence owing to their wealth or the number of their connections or any other form of political strength.” Aristotle, 1284a3-17.

“Revolving round the market-place and the city center, [mechanics, shopkeepers, and daylaborers] generally find it easy to attend the sessions of the popular assembly – unlike the farmers who, because they are scattered through the countryside, neither see so much of each other nor feel the need for meetings of this sort. When there is also the further advantage of a countryside which lies at a considerable distance from the city, it is easy to construct a good democracy or ‘constitutional government’.” Aristotle, 1319a19; also 1318b6. That the fiscal system that rewards or taxes political participation of different economic classes was ultimately a geographic and logistic system that regulates each class’ access to the political center prompts Jacques Rancière to call the coincidence of the economic, territorial, and political center in the Politics a “utopia”, or more precisely

“Where a territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there conditions are favorable for the construction of a strong oligarchy: the inhabitants of such a territory need a cavalry force for security, and it is only those with large means who can afford to breed and keep horses. Where a territory is suitable for the use of heavy infantry, the next variety of oligarchy is natural; service in the heavy infantry is a matter for the well-to-do rather than for the poor. Light-armed troops and the navy are wholly on the side of democracy”.


Aron, for examples, declares Aristotle’s typology of government obsolete because the Greek philosopher “had created a theory of forms of government to which he apparently assigned a general validity, but he was presupposing the Greek city-state as its social basis.” Aron, 21.


After all, that we submit to the compulsion of force is a precept that is “good but superfluous…it will never be violated”; Rousseau, “Social Contract”, p.44.


Bodin, p.84.

Franklin, pp.109-110.
317 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.130; my italics.
318 Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.88 and p.373. It is important to note, however, that among Hobbes’s contemporaries, not all de facto theorists assume the *de jure* legitimacy of the rule; in fact, many of them assume the exact opposite; Hoekstra, “The *de facto* Turn in Hobbes’s Political Philosophy”, in *Leviathan After 350 Years*, eds. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p.50. Hoekstra opposes Hobbes’s “*de facto* theory of authority” (by which Hobbes derives *de jure* authority from *de facto* power) to Ascham’s “*de facto* theory of obligation”.
322 Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Book I, p.285. On the difference between civil and personal liberties and what can be stripped through a defeat in war, see p.332. “As other things may be obtained in a just war, so the right of the sovereign over a people, and the right which the people themselves have, in regard to the sovereignty, may be acquired”; see Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Book III, p.1498.
323 Samuel Pufendorf, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law*, trans. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.147. See also p.149. It is significant that only the king with the fullest sovereign power holds that power in perpetuity; that is to say, he has the power to pick his successors. In other words, only conquest yields permanent power: “Kings who hold their kingdom as a patrimony can make arrangements about succession at their pleasure. Their arrangements will be respected like the testaments of private persons, especially when a king has founded and acquired his own kingdom.” We see the same argument with Grotius and Hobbes.
324 See Tuck, pp.120-121. Conquest implies non-application of home land laws and harsher exercise of war-time royal prerogatives. Colonial empires were fruit of “conquest”; and yet conquest has the unpleasant implication that the colonists now live with law of war and conquest and “*greater* royal authority” instead of the rule of the home country, and it was precisely the colonists who were now most ardently resisting the applicability of conquest rights in the land they helped to seize from the aborigines.
328 See, for example, Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Book III, p.1379, and Hobbes, *De Cive*, pp.206-207. The crucial difference between the three, however, resides in what they say of the legally permissible treatment of the war prisoner turned slave.
According to Pufendorf, “as soon as a mutual agreement of association in the household has been made between victor and vanquished, all past enmity is deemed to be remitted. After that it is a wrong on the part of the master even in the case of a slave so acquired either to fail to provide him with the necessities of life or to be harsh to him without reason, much less to put him to death”. See On the Duty of Man and Citizen, p.130. For Grotius, the conqueror has the right to kill the slaves (“the effects of this right are infinite, so that there is nothing that the lord may not do to his slave…so that all manner of cruelty may be exercised by the lords over their slaves”; see The Rights of War and Peace, Book III, p.1362), but Pufendorf’s dissenting view is that this means the conqueror never becomes a true master and the war prisoners never becomes a true servant. Only with the continuation of the state of the nature could the conqueror so easily evoke again the right to kill the conquered. Hobbes’s position seems to be an intermediary between the two polar views held by Grotius and Pufendorf: the sovereign power acquired through conquest would indeed include the power to kill a subject in the future, but the subject can also recover his natural liberty to self-defense in that case. But Pufendorf here is insisting on something that Hobbes and Grotius seem to have denied: that violence must truly cease between the victor and the vanquished. If conquest rights must be the sole reliable bridge between the fleeting world of violence and the world of moral permanence, Pufendorf seems to want to end the state of nature with greater finality and bigger success than Hobbes and Grotius. Hobbes’s and Grotius’s argument that the sovereign always retains the right to punish and to kill at a future point (and to make matters worse in the case of Hobbes, the subject also retains the right to resist) is certain to keep the state at the edge of renewed violence and chaos thereafter.

329 Hobbes, The Elements of Law, pp.130-131. It is safe to assume Hobbes wrote this when abortion was not considered a choice for parents. Pregnancy and giving birth is an unconditional gift, which is precisely why the mother derives no right from giving and preserving life. Giving or preserving life does not generate any rights. This makes it still clearer that when Hobbes says the title of dominion proceeds from preservation, he really means the title of dominion proceeds exclusively from the power to kill.


335 In the First Treatise, after dismissing Filmer’s various arguments about title of dominion by fatherhood, Locke gets tantalizingly close to challenging the Hobbesian argument that the parents’ sovereign right over their children actually stems from their power to expose them. But Locke takes an entirely different direction than Rousseau in answering the question: instead of engaging this argument in terms of state of nature, Locke resorts to a very Thomistic line of reasoning, asserting that it is not nature’s intention for parents to snuff their young and blaming perversity for exceptions. It is thus the limitation of Locke’s natural law writing to fail to even envision a true state of nature where no universal principles of ethics are yet established. See Locke, “First Treatise”, in
Rousseau gives an articulate account of the discovery of temporality. But more than a simple epistemology, Rousseau’s account of human’s discovery and imagination of temporality is one about man who is bound by his nature to transgress any boundaries of his anthropological “nature”. See Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), p.140.

“The right of conquest, as it maketh one man master over another, so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures”. Hobbes, The Elements of Law, p.129.


Hobbes, De Cive, p.126.

Hobbes, De Cive, pp.128-129.

Hobbes, De Cive, p.130.

Hobbes, The Elements of Law, p.125-126. Here Hobbes insists on the identical rights of servants and captives: “when a servant taken in the wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in prison; there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master; for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant; and they shew the servant is not trusted.” While Hobbes allows that at least for the chained captive “there remaineth…a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means soever.” Still, “a master…is to be supposed to have no less right over those, whose bodies he leaveth at liberty, than over those he keepeth in bonds and imprisonment; and hath absolute dominion over both”. See Hobbes, The Elements of Law, p.127; my emphasis. That Hobbes would carefully distinguish the rights and duties of captives who have not yet surrendered and slaves who have agreed to servitude in Leviathan is evidence of Hobbes’s change of heart on the moral and judicial import of consent.


Alan Ryan, “Hobbes and Individualism”, in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, eds. G. A. J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp.90-91. See also p.92. Ryan notes that Hobbes is drawn to the story of Job, for in the story there is no consequentialism or reciprocity, just the awesomeness of God’s power: “the right of nature whereby God reigns over men and punishes those that break his laws is not derived from the fact of his creating them...what Hobbes is concerned to deny is any thought that ‘he required obedience, as of Gratitudes for his benefits’”. See p.96. The relevant question for the leviathan, the earthly god, is whether it should and could ask the same of its subjects.

Hobbes, Leviathan, p.92.


The savage is “always near danger, Savage man must like to sleep and be light sleeper”, and his reason is of such a kind that “He does not make a movement, not a step, without having beforehand envisaged the consequences.” Rousseau, “Second Discourse”, pp.139-140 and Emile, p.118.
Documenting Rousseau’s own usage of the term “moral” may be in order here. In “Discourse on Political Economy”, he writes “The body politic is...a moral being that has a will; and this general will...tends to the preservation and well-being of the whole and of each part” (p.6), attributing free will to the moral being. But in the “Geneva Manuscript” Rousseau’s emphasis on what defines the moral being shifts from the question of will to the divergence of the will of the whole and the will of the constituent parts: a moral being has “qualities of its own and distinct from those of the particular Beings constituting it, more or less as chemical compounds have properties which they owe to none of the components that make them up” (p.155); here Rousseau means to stress mainly that the moral quality of a being is not seen as a result of the mechanical accumulation of its parts and that ethics is defined by its contradistinction with physics. Neither definition of morals originates with Rousseau, and neither maps well onto the purpose and results of his investigation of the origins of our civility and morality. Leo Strauss details Rousseau’s difficulty with using either free will or the dualistic metaphysics of man and machine as the foundation of his argument in the Second Discourse and argues that he replaces “freedom” by “perfectibility” in the text to avoid dispute on the definition of man (for “no one can deny the fact that man is distinguished from the brutes by perfectibility”; Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p.265). The substitution of one term for another tightly bounds man’s morality to his perfectibility and entails that what Rousseau means by the term “moral” accommodates his account of humankind’s evolution from savages to members of civil society. For this reason this chapter skirts the issue of free will and focuses instead on how Rousseau’s story of our linguistic and epistemological evolution gives moral character and legitimacy to our actions.

“[W]ar does not consist of one or a few unpremeditated conflicts, or even of homicide or murder as long as they are committed in a brief fit of anger. Instead, war consists in constant, reflected, and manifest will to destroy one’s enemy...one needs coolness and reason—both of which produce a lasting resolve...The public effects of this will reduced into acts are called *hostilities*.” Rousseau, “Manuscript on ‘The State of War’”, reconstructed in Roosevelt, p.195; my italics.


Starobinski, p.305.

He indicates that the big mistake Hobbes commits in his description of men in the state of nature is to imagine a race of human beings who are “naturally intrepid, and [seek] only to attack, and to fight”; Rousseau, “Second discourse”, p.135.

Examples of Rousseau’s description of savages’ violence against each other can be found in “The State of War” (p.155) and “Essay on the Origin of Languages in which Something is Said about Melody and Musical Imitation” (in *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*, pp.268-69). The latter is especially relevant to the discussion of the *Second Discourse*, since it was composed at around the same time of the *Second Discourse*, suggesting that when Rousseau’s description of savages changed from timidity to ferocity, it was not a considered change of mind. It is plausible that Rousseau simply accepts this equivocation in his speculations of what savages were truly like and does not deem the ambivalence damaging to his overall thesis at all.

Between sexual partners, “males and females united...without speech being an especially necessary interpreter of what they had to tell one another”; a mother nurtures her newborn less because of the latter’s vocal cry for help but more “because of her own need”; and the merchants of the Orient can “transact all their business in public and yet secretly without having exchanged a single word.” Rousseau, “Second Discourse”, p.145, “Essay on the Origin of Languages”, p.251.


“[T]he state of war cannot arise from simple personal relations but only from property relations”. Rousseau, “Social Contract”, p.46.


That romantic relationship is ultimately a rational relationship is beyond doubt. Emile’s education helps him use reason to tame crude sexual passion and replace it with fine taste and true attraction: “choice, preferences, personal attachments”, they seem “to be the opposite of reason” but ultimately “[come] to us from it”. Once we choose, “except for the beloved object, one sex ceases to be anything for the other”, thereby reversing the natural promiscuity of the human race. See Rousseau, *Emile*, pp.214, 397, 429.


Cullen, p.77.

Rousseau, “Geneva Manuscript”, p.156. It is useful, therefore, to remember that even where Hobbes comes the closest to a denunciation of the “Foole” who recognizes no public justice or interest (e.g., Leviathan, Chapter 15), his real target has been the loud fool, not the silent fool, the latter’s rationality and cynicism still beyond reproach in Hobbes’s political philosophy. See Hoekstra, “Hobbes and the ‘Foole’”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 25, No.5 (Oct., 1997), pp.620-654. In other words, whereas Rousseau’s contract aims at overcoming that cynicism and sophism, this cynicism, albeit carefully disguised, is deeply embedded in the rationality in the Hobbesian agent living in civil society.


Viroli, p.46.


Rousseau, “The Second Discourse”, p.171. Of course, in the Second Treatise of Government, Locke said the same about the explosive impact of the substitution of metal coins for perishable goods during the nascency of capital accumulation.


Especially the “name of tyranny”, which means nothing more and nothing less than “the name of sovereignty” in Hobbes’s opinion, must be nevertheless considered seditious as political rhetoric; see Leviathan, p.470 and many other instances elsewhere in Leviathan as well as in Behemoth and De Cive.


de Man, p.152.

de Man, p.152.

As such, the concept is just a metaphor that points to and masks the fact that, given the infinite diversity of denominations, a language, in order to function, needs something to “[literalize] its referential indetermination into a specific unit of meaning”; de Man, p.153.
According to de Man, “the similarity in size and in the observable attributes of strength should, at first sight, act reassuringly and make the reaction less anxious than if the man had encountered a bear or a lion. Yet Rousseau stresses fright, and Derrida is certainly right in stating that the act of denomination that follows — calling the other man a giant, a process that Rousseau describes as a figural use of language — displaces the referential meaning from an outward, visible property to an ‘inward’ feeling. The coinage of the word ‘giant’ simply means ‘I am afraid.’...fear is the result of a possible discrepancy between the outer and the inner properties of entities. It can be shown that, for Rousseau, all passions — whether they be love, pity, anger, or even a borderline case between passion and need such as fear — are characterized by such a discrepancy; they are based not on the knowledge that such a difference exists, but on the hypothesis that it might exist, a possibility that can never be proven or disproven by empirical or by analytical means. A statement of distrust is neither true nor false: it is rather in the nature of a permanent hypothesis”;

In the republican tradition, the eulogies offered to the good and virtuous citizen who is entirely devoted to the public good are countless since the day of the Romans. But I will offer one example from the contractualist tradition of the “good” political subject: Pufendorf argues that at least some citizens actually do become good citizens who promptly obey all orders and not just out of fear of punishment. So at least some Pufendorfian subjects, if not most or even many of them, can be elevated above the cynical rationality that the awesome and overwhelming power of the Leviathan is the only thing that deters rebellion. Again, only a small minority can transcend that kind of cynicism: “Most people are barely restrained by fear of punishment. Many remain bad citizens throughout their lives and not political animals.” Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, p.133. We will not find a Pufendorfian “good” citizen in the Leviathan, but Hobbes firmly rebukes “the fool” as well; in addition, Hobbes desperately wants to preserve the distinction between people who evoke their natural right of self-preservation to resist the state and people who violate natural laws to rebel against the state. It is interesting to read Rousseau as a republican and then to read his remarks that says all citizens err and the difference between the good citizen and the bad citizen is in the degree and direction of civic deviancy — which nevertheless does not make Rousseau a cynic, just as the idea of the “good” citizen does not make Pufendorf less of a cynic.

It would be beside the point to say that the tyrant’s taste for sociability and social life sounds utterly depraved, a point that the Greeks made long ago: in the very least he craved the social ties, much like what Hannah Arendt would later say about the different
perceptions a proletarian would hold of the industrial capitalists who mercilessly exploited him and those (Jewish) financial capitalists who did not even have that level of economic and social relationship with the worker.

441 At least the tyrant appearing at the end of the Second Discourse.
442 Kahn, p.135, Hoekstra says something similar about the word “tyranny” and its abusive use during the civil war; see Hoekstra, “Tyrannus Rex vs. Leviathan”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2001), pp.420-446.
443 Kahn, p.27.
444 Aristotle, Politics, 1280a7.
446 De Man, p.158.
447 Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, pp.90-92. Economically and administratively, Rousseau stresses the poverty of democracies, but poverty does not necessitate constant vigilance (“Let’s add that there is no Government as subject to civil wars and intestine turmoil as Democratic or popular Government”). The issue here is whether we must call for vigilance for modern reasons (i.e., in Rousseau’s time democracy was found only in poorer, more barren, and less populous nations) or for reasons classical philosophers offered: that democracy easily slides into a particularly fractious form of politics, certainly more fractious than in monarchies and aristocracies.
448 In the chapter on democracy, I believe Rousseau implicitly compares the drawbacks of the monarchic and the democratic forms of government: “It is not good that he who makes the laws execute them, nor that the body of the people turn its attention away from general considerations, to devote it to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on public affairs, and abuse of the laws by the Government is a lesser evil than the corruption of the Lawgiver, which is the inevitable consequences of particular considerations.” Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, p.91. We shall recall that for Rousseau the strongest and most active government is monarchic, whereas democracy is the weakest form of government which also enrolls most members of the republic in its magistracy. By virtue of its strength and activity, therefore, monarchy is most easily abusive; by contrast, in democracy where the executive function of the state is so weak and the legislative power so active, the sovereign itself threatens to bring its weight to bear on economic inequalities and thus threatens to escalate any social disparities between classes into a political crisis per se. Montesquieu’s analysis of democracy does not involve the conceptual differentiation of government and sovereignty, but he too notes that in a democracy where virtue is lacking the state tends to be gripped by endless civil turmoil; see Montesquieu, The Spirit of Law, p.22.
449 De Man, p.158.
454 Hoekstra, “Early Modern Absolutism and Constitutionalism”, Cardozo Law Review, vol.34, p.1080. Similarly, Bates argues that the Enlightenment concept of the political is “not at all limited by the specific historical form of the state in place during this period of
absolutism and expansionist colonialism... The great achievement of the Enlightenment was the discovery that formal characteristic of a political community were absolutely independent of the contingent formation of concrete human communities”; Bates, pp.28-29.

455 Bodin, p.84.
456 Bodin, p.84.
457 Bodin, pp.85-87.
465 Meinecke, p.57.
466 “On the threshold to modernity, two parallel discourses have been set in motion. On the one hand, there is a defense of the central state as an independent power – sovereign in its territory – that brings order and justice to a particular society...On the other, there is an acute interest in discovering the best kind of regime to fulfill that task. For this reason, the autonomy of the state at this moment was always understood as the autonomy of a particular kind of authority. It was not an abstract logic of the political”; Bates, p.40.
467 Bates, p.51.
468 By his own argument, “[statecraft] is still influenced in many ways by the old absolutist methods which include it to seek for the best, the ideal and normal State, instead of the concrete and individual one”; Meinecke, p.18.
469 Indeed, in Rousseau’s theory of government and institution, we see that “the ability to coerce and unify the members of political society would not be imagined as a higher-level sovereign force that would make this artificial beast move and act”; Bates, p.193.
470 “Conventional” justice, that is, artificial and having only contractual or conventional basis, the kind that, in Strauss’s opinion, severs the genealogical link between antiquity and the Hobbesian/Rousseauean modernity and is by his definition sophistic. See Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1952). Tuck expresses his reservation on Strauss’s contrast between ancient and modern natural law in *The Rights of War and Peace*; see Tuck, p.4.
472 de Man, p.152.
473 de Man, p.154.
475 He asks rhetorically, “If abuse is inevitable, does it follow that it ought not at least be regulated?” Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, pp.78-79.
Bibliography


McCormick, John. “‘Keep the public rich, but the citizens poor’: economic inequality in constitutionalism, ancient and modern.” *Cardozo Law Review*, vol.34, issue 3, pp.879-892.


