Identity (Geo)Politics: Pakistani Communities and the Nation State System

by

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation explores the relationships between states in the age of globalization, and the construction and expression of Pakistani immigrants’ national, ethno-racial, and religious identities at the individual and group levels. It is driven by the question of how we make sense of boundaries and belonging, and I explore the relationship(s) between immigrant communities’ identities and local, state, and global contexts. Concretely, I examine how Pakistani immigrants in the global metropolitan areas of San Francisco, California and Toronto, Ontario construct and participate in various identity communities both within and across borders. I argue that accurate study of global phenomena requires we question the assumptions built into the nation-state system, which overly constrain our analyses and representations of reality. I demonstrate the import of American hegemony, and show how the US and Canada, in their separate and dialectic ways, create visually-identified others. I suggest an analytic framework of the administrative and the affective of the macro and the micro, and apply it to citizenship to comment upon the processes of racial disciplining that structure subjectivities in an increasingly interconnected global society. This dissertation adds to the little discussed question of how race is made across boundaries, shows how states structure subjectivities, and how immigrants’ identity projects are instances of the deterritorialization of the nation-state.
INTRODUCTION

“We know that Homeland Security, the CIA and the FBI are here, watching us. You would think that with all the money that is being invested in the war on terror, they might be able to find people who aren’t so obvious. You know, wear a shalwar kameez, at least put a little effort in” (audience laughs, exclamations of “riiggghht?!”). They come to every event, they take notes, and they watch us. But we want to let them know... we know who you are... and we are watching you!” (Field Notes, January 2011)

The MSA-West (Muslim Students Association, Western Region) president’s exhortation was met with passionate applause and triumphant whoops of agreement. Many of the five hundred young men on the right side of the auditorium were standing up, high-fiving each other; chest bumps happened. At the same time, my skin prickled and my face burned as glances of suspicion were shot my way because, as an ethnographer, I had consistently been taking notes. I was simultaneously hot and cold, things felt unreal, and I felt the sensation of floating that accompanies deep anxiety. For the hundredth time, I was self-conscious about not wearing longer sleeves, and being one of the small handful of women that did not wear hijab. I was thankful for the gender segregation in the auditorium: around two-thirds of the couple of thousand conference attendees were women, and felt I could blend in a little bit more by virtue of my gender (and ambiguous ethnic identity).

I was at the MSA-West annual meeting at UCLA as an attempt to broaden my research beyond the Pakistani community to see if and how Pakistanis understood and participated in a broader Muslim identity. The experience was one that highlighted how being Muslim in America is about using the discourses of civil rights and social justice to claim American rights: many of the panels and speakers talked about the importance of identifying and organizing against discrimination. Learning from other excluded minority groups in the US and creating coalitions was another topic discussed. But throughout, I was struck by the importance and relevance of bodily comportment and the visual markers of belonging. As my field notes excerpt shows, the Muslim community is well aware they are being visually surveilled and watched, but what is remarkable is how the speaker turned the tables on the state: as a group, the MSA was also visually policing belonging.

Bodily experience, embodiment, how we live, act and feel in the world is a quintessential sociological topic that overlaps with philosophies of being, psychology, kinesiology, biology, and questions of spirituality. As academics, we too often forget about the body, imagining we can be objective surveyors, and we project that onto our methodological and analytic processes. Indeed, our entire epistemology is prefaced on the assumption that there is an objective truth, one we can ferret out as impartial observers and analysts, while largely ignoring bodies. Bodies move through very specific historical configurations; thus, material space and context are major considerations of this dissertation. Taking physicality and the specificities of space seriously informs necessary
methodological and theoretical interventions that this dissertation makes.

Methodologically, we need to identify and abandon frameworks that hinder analysis, even if they are fundamental to western epistemology. My main contribution here is to remind scholars that the nation-state system is a social construction and thus to be cautious and limited in the use of cross-national comparison. It is important to acknowledge that the nation-state system is a colonial legacy and the current geopolitical configuration features the US as the fading hegemon, wreaking financial and martial violence in the world, in desperate attempts to maintain dominance. Thus, methodologically, I join geographers and globalization scholars in making the call to re-conceive of space and the specificity of context. At the same time, and following the lead of feminist scholars of color, I advocate the importance of addressing personal positionality (and privilege). This is especially the case because my work investigates the co-constitution of the micro (identity processes) with the macro (contemporary world system). Theoretically, I aim to advance the agenda of a global power perspective, which connects “contemporary forces of capitalist restructuring to the specific localities where migrants live and struggle” (Glick-Schiller, 2010, p. 26). This agenda mirrors racial formation theory, which asks how and why the meaning of race has been shaped based on different historical, political, and demographic contexts (Omi and Winant 1986). Here, I suggest an analytic framework examining the affective and the administrative, and within my own work, apply it to citizenship, and comment upon the processes of racial disciplining that structure subjectivities in an increasingly interconnected global society.

Dissertation Overview and Research Questions

My dissertation explores the relationships between states in the context of globalization, and the construction and expression of Pakistani immigrants' national, ethno-racial, and religious identities at the individual and group level. It is driven by the question of how we make sense of boundaries and belonging, and I explore the relationship(s) between immigrant communities' identities and local, state, and global contexts. More concretely, I examine how Pakistani immigrants in the global metropolitan areas of San Francisco, California and Toronto, Ontario construct and participate in various identity communities both within and across borders.

The history of Pakistan (literally “pure nation”) formation demonstrates the passion for self-determination that inspired people to leave their families and comfort behind for the idea of a nation. As a state less than 70 years old, the meaning of “Pakistan” is necessarily created outside of its borders. Many political choices are bound up in being Pakistani: enacting and performing citizenship, culture, religion, ethnicity, etc. Studying the intersections and variations of how people think about being Pakistani helps address questions regarding people’s relationships to/with “the state” (and which states) and helps illuminate how “the macro” functions to shape our micro responses, especially in respect to self-representation.
A central frame is the war-on-terror as racial project, one that advances American hegemony abroad and is justified through the racialization of – loosely speaking – the Muslim-appearing. This campaign is an example of how race travels across boundaries, as Pakistanis in a variety of places (including Canada) must deal with its consequences. I argue that how the US treats immigrants is an advanced means of establishing indirect rule, in so far as how immigrants maintain ties with their home countries is arguably altered. This diaspora is well off and well connected; thus, how people conceive of who they are, and how they perform “racial” identity within, across, and against state borders, helps address the “volatile and under-theorized global racial situation” (Winant, 2006, p. 1).

I add to the important question of how race is made across boundaries, show how states structure subjectivities, and discuss how neoliberal agendas are propagated via identity projects. Pakistani elites, especially those with capital, engage in self-governance and exemplify ‘internment of the psyche,’ the space where sociopolitical institutions and the individual psyche are knit together (Naber, 2006). Using a Foucaultian analysis, I marry a global power perspective (Glick-Schiller, 2010) with an examination of individual and group identity projects to show how neoliberalism and race have become intertwined. A global power perspective links contemporary forces of capitalist restructuring to the specific localities where migrants live and struggle (Ibid, p. 26). As discussed above, this requires accepting that the war-on-terror has functioned as a racial project that advances securitization and specific conceptions of the nation, a discursive terrain within which Pakistanis feel the need to struggle for narrative control. Their representations of themselves reflect the processes of self-governance that perpetuate neoliberalism.

My guiding research questions are the following:

1. Given the (arguably global) way Muslims have been racialized, how have Pakistanis dealt with hostile or uncomfortable situations via their identity constructions?
2. How do people perform race, embody the/a nation, proclaim their politics, and in what ways?
3. What do the answers to these questions reveal about contemporary processes of governmentality?

In the pages that follow in this introduction, I first explain why Pakistan and Pakistani immigrants are a population particularly well suited for understanding identity in our rapidly globalizing world. I expound on how and why personal positionality matters and summarize the sources of my data – interviews, ethnographic field work, and discourse analysis. Finally, I provide chapter summaries.
Why Pakistan and Pakistani Immigrants

In this section, I argue in favor of spatially, geographically, and historically situating the study of identities. I provide a brief history of the Pakistan state to show the diversity of its peoples, discussing a few of the dominant groups to demonstrate the importance of historicity in understanding modern identities. The important point to take away is that the nation-state, as a modern colonial invention, is constantly under contestation, and the identity category attached to Pakistan is complicated and intricate, and ultimately demonstrative of how identities are administratively and affectively constructed. I also situate Pakistan within the literature on South Asians, Arabs and Muslims, which highlights that any grouping or categorizing of a peoples is necessarily essentializing.

Within this ‘singular community’ that is somewhat arbitrarily assigned, people with connections to Pakistan choose between two predominant (and overlapping) identity camps: Muslims and nationalist Pakistanis. My dissertation shows why people choose these identities, and how they enact and embody (proud) Pakistani or Muslim (or subcategory within). I explain how these choices are influenced by not only the state, but by the cities and regions they live in, as well as the larger geopolitical and spatial terrain. Ultimately, I show that the issues or concerns that animate the ways they represent themselves helps map out the connections between the micro and macro, locating them in global cities that are special nodes in ongoing processes of globalization.

My dissertation ultimately provides a story for how people understand, create and participate in the political aspects of globalization, as of yet unrecognized by scholars perpetuating the mistake of methodological nationalism. In the pages that follow, I provide a background on Pakistan and Pakistani immigrants, demonstrating the colonial complications that territorial boundaries and empirical notions of categorization have imposed upon the social sciences. Pakistanis are theoretically interesting for a variety of reasons; most importantly, studying them unites the micro – identity choices – with the macro – history and politics.

Irrespective of self-claimed identities, immigrants need to deal with the identities they are ascribed in their receiving country; identities which are unstable and contingent on both domestic and international factors. In this respect, Pakistanis are uniquely situated as a group to study. As a recently formed nation-state, formulating the meaning of the Pakistani nation or Pakistani national identity is an ongoing project of construction – a complex process that illustrates the disjunctive flows that characterize globalization (Appadurai, 1996). (Pakistan came into existence upon the withdrawal of the British from India – the border between the countries was hastily created by a British technocrat who had never even visited the area.) Pakistan is comprised of a diverse array of religions and ethnic identities that cut across national boundaries. The majority of Pakistanis are Muslim, however not all are. Those who are Muslim can identify as Sunni, Shia, Ahmadiyya, or Sufi (among others). Of course, whether these groups are considered
Muslim is heavily contested, often violently so for religious minorities. Ethno-linguistic groups such as Pashtuns or Baloch are located in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Punjabis, Sindhis, and Kashmiris similarly are ethnicities located across the borders between Pakistan and India (and within “disputed territories”).

Figure 1: Ethnic Groups in Pakistan

The diversity of identities available to Pakistanis – some that cut across national boundaries or subsume multiple countries – makes the question of how Pakistani immigrants choose to identify an interesting question. Unlike other “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991), Pakistanis do not have myths of origin or a professed singular blood lineage that frequently characterize definitions of nationality. Pakistani “ethnicity” is already de-essentialized vis-à-vis “the three C’s that have guided the study of
ethnic processes: social cohesion, collective commitments, and the comparative project” (Baumann & Thijl, 1995, p. 4). They are an ideal group to study in order to address the following theoretical questions: how do institutional and political constraints affect immigrant identity? How do groups respond to being conceived of as different and other and what are the implications of that othering? Researching immigrant identities is important for understanding global processes and the contemporary world, yet social scientists often make the mistake of assuming the nation-state as an identity category. Instead, we need to reframe the race discussion geographically and spatially. For example, the difficulty of even categorizing a people as “Pakistani” demonstrates why assuming the nation-state as an empirical starting point is problematic.

Categorization is a colonial practice replicated in sociological attempts at empiricism, and it is required for truth production, especially if seeking to represent a population. Any geographical category is going to have a heterogeneous population, especially if colonial interventions resulted in massive migrations, such as what happened throughout the post-colonial world. Britain’s most prized colony was the subcontinent (now commonly understood as South Asia), and their departure was marked by partition, a hugely political act that created the states of India and Pakistan. Controversially, Pakistan was divided into East and West Pakistan; the state was territorially disconnected, and the politics over administrative power ultimately lead to discord and further fragmentation when East Pakistan declared independence as the state of Bangladesh. Pakistan was ostensibly meant to be a country for Muslims, however what that means in practice is fiercely debated. (Is it a state for Muslims or a Muslim state? Even the definition of who is considered Muslim is intensely conflictual: religious minorities are threatened by violence which influences their feelings of belonging and affinity towards Pakistan.)

The history of Pakistan is intimately connected with who is defined by (and seeks to define) the meaning of Pakistan. One of the contemporary categories of groups in Pakistan includes Mohajirs, a literal term for immigrant, but the word is imbued with a sense of a spiritual journey – the root being Haj, the one who makes a pilgrimage to Mecca. Some Mohajirs to Pakistan were people so moved by the spirit of nationalism that they left family and security behind. Partition stories are wrought with moving narratives about brothers fighting against one another, historically peaceful neighbors turning upon each other in violence. Mohajirs to Pakistan were frequently from successful industrial or merchant families, sometimes with generations of migration stories and family connections dispersed across the continent. Mohajirs are also known as being Urdu-speaking, a short-hand for being from a cultural elite that appreciate ‘adab’ or manners, and the art and history of the ghuzal, or melodic poetry with links to Persia.

Urdu (and English) were important signifiers in my research: they are associated with a social and class hierarchy. Regionally specific languages are considered ‘village-languages’ and parents forewent teaching their children these languages in favor of Urdu and English. The move for Urdu as an official language was a huge reason in the eventual
split between Pakistan and Bangladesh (During Partition, Bengal like other provinces such as Punjab was split between India and Pakistan. East Bengal (1947) became East Pakistan (1955) became Bangladesh (1971).) Urdu and Hindi are essentially the same language that has been increasingly politicized as different with further emphasis on Arabic (Urdu) versus Sanskrit (Hindi) root words. Urdu uses a stylized form of Arabic script, lending itself to artistry such as that at the Taj Mahal, and as a language, is seen as having a long history of deep culture. As such, for some Pakistanis, a central part of their identity is an emphasis on language and culture. Mohajirs also include small but tightly-knit subgroups such as Bohras, a community resultant from a religious schism in the 15th century. Mohajirs as a category (one seeking to gain more official recognition as ethnicity within Pakistan) is an example of how a lack of historicity brushes over the reality and complication of identity.

Besides Mohajirs, as mentioned contemporary Pakistan includes Punjabis, Sindhis, the Pashtun, the Baloch (and not shown on the map, Kashmiris). Much has and could be said individually about all of these groups, let alone in combination, or in respect to the politics between Pakistan and India. The important point to take away is to recognize the artificiality of the border and that these ethnic groups traverse borders. This happened in two ways. For groups like the Pakhtun (aka Pashtun/Batan), border traversing is literal but also requires geographic analysis – i.e., the Northwest Frontier Provinces, situated in the Kharakourum mountains (next to the Himalayas) are incredibly mountainous, the people have been relatively isolated, and there is a strong Pakhtun culture and code of behavior. (Hence, the discussion on how and why the Taliban have been able to find refuge in the north.) But understanding border traversing also requires understanding that the story of partition in the province of Punjab was a massive (and massively violent) migration, where a culturally similar group was split according to religious identity: Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus moved eastward to Hindustan (India) while some Punjabi Muslims migrated west to Pakistan. This reveals how assuming a nation-state identity asserts an administrative but otherwise artificial and imposed category on-top of pre-existing or alternative identities.

South Asian subjectivity provides a rich analytical terrain because the “South Asian” grouping is a type of provisional language for how people see themselves as part of broader social formations (Sandhya, 2001), possibly as a sort of diaspora. Diaspora is most productively understood as a “globally mobile category of identification” and understood “contextually through its production of different temporalities and subjects (Axel, 2004). A diasporic standpoint challenges and destabilizes the “us/them” dichotomy within fixed national boundaries, and emphasizes the significance of transnational, regional, and global forces (Lie, 2004). Research on South Asians tends to focus on Indians, which makes sense, as they comprise the largest number of immigrants from South Asia. But unlike other South Asian countries that share similar cultural heritages (most obviously India), Pakistan has been identified as a harbinger of terrorists, thus to be a Pakistani immigrant – irrespective of the degree to which one actually identifies as such – is to be fraught with an anxious circumspection. Muslims have had to become “accustomed to
facing political security measures, discrimination, accusations of ‘double-talk,’ menacing, malevolent looks, and acts of surveillance and control” (Ramadan, 2004, p. 226). Most of the literature on Muslims within the last decade focuses on the racialization of Muslims and the different ways the war on terror uses the security state to police belonging. The common and (and often scholarly) understanding of Muslim is conflated with Arab and Middle-Eastern identities and little has been written about specific immigrant nationalities. Thus, even though scholars have been arguing that Muslims are increasingly a racialized group (Jamal & Naber, 2008; Moallem, 2005; Akram & Johnson, 2002; Volpp, 2002), Pakistanis tend to be overlooked and understudied in both US and Canadian scholarship.

Pakistanis make up the single largest national immigrant contingent of American Muslims, comprising 17 percent of all Muslims in the US, and if the category was “South Asian,” the percentage would increase to one third of US Muslims (Nimer, 2002; CAIR, 2005). Similarly, though South Asians are currently the largest and most quickly growing immigrant group in Canada, there is a lack of research on subcategories based on nationality or ethnicity (Ghosh, 2007). Research on immigrant transnationalism in Canada has been slow (Satzewich & Wong, 2006); and the relationship between the settlement and integration experiences of immigrants to Canada and their transnational interactions is unclear (Kelley, 2003). The “organization of the transnational” includes non-state actors and institutions (Goldring & Krishnamurti, 2007), so a “two way street” understanding of immigrants and Canadian society (Biles et al., 2008) needs a multivalent reframing. The broad point here is that representations, especially those that are simplistic, are problematic. As Lie articulates, “[T]he persistent flaw of essentialism – seeking the least common denominator, or essence, of a group – is that its presumption often turns out to be empty” (2008, p. xi). In the future, as Glick-Schiller (2010) predicts, the recent revival of assimilation and ‘new’ integrationism will be perceived as reflecting the neoliberal project of the restructuring of nation-states -- not an advance in social science (p. 25). The fundamental concerns of inclusion and exclusion, in conjunction with the formation of post-national and cross-national bonds, would comprise part of a cosmopolitan research agenda, a much needed global framework that would help link immigration settlement and their transnational connections (Beck & Sznaider, 2010; Glick-Schiller, 2010).

Methodology

My project traces discourse across scales – from the macro (global political economy) – to the micro (Pakistanis’ identity choices). Using a genealogical approach, I begin with the US state’s war-on-terror as racial project and contrast post 9/11 policies with Canadian multiculturalism to probe at the ways states discursively construct belonging and difference along racial lines. By looking at paradigmatic socio-legal national scripts we can put state discourses in dialogue, to see geopolitical relations in motion. (These racial grammars are more fully analyzed and discussed in Chapter One,
where I unpack the US Patriot Act and Canadian Multiculturalism policies.) It is against the backdrop of US hegemony that my questions about ethnic identity making find their answers.

Geopolitical discourses have administrative and affective repercussions for how racially-charged immigrant populations – such as Pakistanis – understand, construct, and enact identity. States’ racial grammars are reflected in how immigrants dialogically conceive of themselves – their conscious and unconscious, individual and collective, representations of self. To tap into these representations of self, my research methods have involved collecting and analyzing in-depth interviews, participant observation, and virtual and material identity productions. By identity productions, I mean websites, videos, and list-serves; ethnic or religious newspapers, magazines, or flyers; event advertisements; and in general sources of data that reveal how people were producing representations of identity. In the micro realm, I analyzed formal and informal discourse, specific and general articulations of group attachments and loyalties, indifferences and apathies. Empirically speaking, I collected over 100 hours of recorded in-depth interviews, 50 in Toronto and 38 in the Bay Area. Participant observation and ethnography took place in various Pakistani-related organizations and events with Pakistanis in attendance. In Silicon Valley, the predominant organizations I worked with are The Organization for Pakistani Entrepreneurs (OPEN), the Pakistani-American Community Center (PACC) and Developments in Literacy (DIL). In both locations I attended meetings and events for student groups such as the Muslim Student Association (MSA) and Pakistani Students Association (PSA). In Toronto, the organizations I worked with were slightly more far-ranging, mostly because – with the exception of student groups – groups functioned through more informal networks and fluctuated more in terms of events and membership.

My choices of Silicon Valley and Toronto as sites were driven by demographics and industry. The Bay Area was admittedly a convenience sample, one driven by proximity to UC Berkeley. Though statistics and counts vary, the estimated number of Pakistanis in the Bay Area is over 20,000 (Najam, 2006). The Greater Toronto Area has the largest number of Pakistanis living in Canada, with an estimated population of around 90,000 (StatsCanada 2006). Though Torontonian Pakistanis are ostensibly also connected to the tech industry, over 40 percent of the Pakistani population there lives in poverty (Haider, 2012). Toronto and Silicon Valley are strategic sites for analysis as “global cities” that are “partly denationalized urban spaces that enable a partial re-invention of citizenship as practice and project” (Sassen, 2006, p. 281). In this sense, immigrant belonging can be understood at existing at a variety of scales: local, national, and transnational.

My experience of data collection was intimately shaped by my positionality in the world – who I am as a person influenced the shape and form of data to which I had access. As an outsider, one who sought out group spokespeople, I was exposed to some particularistic sides of the different communities that can make up the Pakistani label. One example is the credibility I achieved by having studied Urdu; despite elementary
capabilities I – in hindsight – appealed to an upper class of Pakistanis for whom Urdu signified class and culture. Many of the Pakistanis I spoke with understood multiple languages, but of them all, English and Urdu signified a privileged class of people. Though my Urdu was elementary, it signified more than commitment, it signified an understanding of culture and demonstrated class. As a counterpoint, a Pakistani-American colleague who knows Punjabi but not Urdu did not gain access to the same types of people that I did, just as his ability to speak Punjabi (and being a male) gained him access to different types of interview subjects.

When it comes to methods, one’s individual position in society is not a subject sociologists like to discuss. Who we are in the world – the intersection of our nationality, gender, race, class etc. – and what that means for our understandings and renderings of the world is a question rarely raised; lip service might be given, but only in the service of justifying ‘objectivity.’ Here I aim to do the opposite, to position myself accurately and honestly. Looking back at my reams of data and being attentive to the meta-discourses present in my work, I want to be clear that the only representation I can make of the Pakistani community are those I was privileged (figuratively and literally) to enter. Being a woman meant that the spaces I had or wanted access to were those that I felt comfortable or welcome in. I could not simply enter male spaces, nor would I necessarily have wanted to (for example, going to the musjid (mosque) or other gender segregated spaces). Remarkable are the ways that I was told the gender rules to follow, or learning the interesting ways that gender rules changed according to the intersection of my gender and nationality. One Pakistani-American man I interviewed while in India made a point of telling me it was inappropriate for us to be alone together and that was why he made sure to leave the door open. Being an American woman carried expectations that I would be more liberal in my relations with men, which made for some uncomfortable interactions. Unless people went to more elite private schools in Pakistan, gender segregation was quite totalizing and it was rare for the sexes to interact.

From the outset, this project and data collection in particular was wrought with personal identity considerations. Building trust has been a crucial component of my research, such that it becomes a remarkable part of my methodological narrative. Not long after my research began in late 2006, I began getting questions such as, “Do you work for homeland security?” or “How do I know you’re not FBI or CIA?” Since I am not Pakistani in origin, I have had to explain – and often in fact justify – why I am interested in the population. My personal reasons have to do with my biography, my ethnic identity, and my political orientation. My spiel included a narrative about living in DC where some of my closest friends were Pakistani and witnessing the difficulties they experienced. I would have to signal my political orientation, especially for those people without citizenship, a green card, or a cosmopolitan status that usually overlapped with being upper class. Pitching myself as safe, and having the correct political intentions was necessary – and I usually accomplished that by criticizing the war on terror or some such policy of the US that had double standards built in (for example, the legitimacy of preemptive attacks). The point is that positionality matters and our individual identities...
locate us in a global racial hierarchy that is veiled by an overemphasis on empiricism which reduces identity to empty variables.

Chapter Summaries

In the pages that follow, I begin with the macro view, an explication of the contemporary context within which we find ourselves: an increasingly interwoven global political economy wherein the US maintains hegemony. In the nation-state system, US hegemony is maintained, in part, because of state racial projects that mask the proliferation of neoliberal capitalism. The crucial point is that US hegemony must be acknowledged in any state comparisons; and further, our analyses must recognize how states and state discourses are de-territorialized. We should re-frame our conceptualizations in favor of spacio-temporal specificities and variegations. My micro analyses center on the Pakistani populations in Silicon Valley and Toronto, two sites that demonstrate the conceptual importance of cities as sites of globalization.

Chapter 1: The Macro View: Global Political Economy, American Hegemony, and State Racial Projects

This chapter sets the stage for understanding identity processes in the contemporary world system. It makes the point that the nation-state system, a colonial legacy, is a de-facto racial hegemony and that the war-on-terror, by racializing suspicious others, represents American nation-building. Neoliberal global capitalism dominates the contemporary world system and states are apparatuses of its advancement. This is the backdrop for a comparison of the US and Canada, and an analysis of the racial grammars – cognitive maps, classificatory pathways, logics, operations and models – imbuing The US Patriot Act and Canadian Multiculturalism Act. Though different in intent, like the Patriot Act, Canada’s policies of multiculturalism privilege a visual demarcation of who belongs and who is considered an outsider. When considered in combination, these two examples of racial grammars operate in tandem. The US asserts a racial hierarchy in the nation-state system, and though a similar settler-colonial white state, Canada is much less powerful. In this way, and when considering race at a global level, Canada's policies of multiculturalism and active efforts to be unlike the US allow a defacto racial hegemony to persist.

Chapter 2: Hijacked Identities: Silicon Valley Pakistanis and Tactics of Belonging

This chapter examines how Pakistanis have been interpreting and responding to the post-9/11 construction of Muslim identities, or more broadly, how a transnational community responds when it has been marked as hostile. Looking primarily at two Pakistani community organizations in the technology region known as Silicon Valley in
Northern California, I answer this question with evidence from document analysis, participant observation, and in-depth interviews. I argue that the bright boundaries that exclude Pakistanis from acceptance, and which categorize them as a suspicious other, have been a catalyst for community identity construction and management. If assimilation is the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences, then the examination of the ways by which an excluded community seeks to belong can help expose the boundaries of membership that a state erects against immigrant communities. Through such an examination, I have found that the Pakistani community in Silicon Valley has used performative tropes to contest racialized boundaries and to re-define their community (and any of its transnational endeavors or inclinations) as being within acceptable limits. Representations of themselves as “business-developers” and “secular-pluralists” show that their community is sincere about assimilating, and that any transnationalism is within the realm of assistance towards American geopolitical goals. Thus, one of the implications of my research is that a government, its media, and the public can influence an immigrant population to shape itself in ways that are friendly and amenable to (in this case) US ideologies.

Chapter 3: Middle East to Multiculturalism: Toronto Pakistanis and Constrained Citizenship

Pakistani immigrants in Canada have the experience of being pushed around the world. They migrate from Pakistan to the Middle East for economic opportunities, as well as to ensure various aspects of security for their families. However, as their children approach college age, migrants reassess their place in the world. Since it is extremely rare for students to obtain visas to study in Arab states, families evaluate their options in the world system and Canada offers what appears to be an attractive solution: affordable education, promises of professional incorporation, and support of multiculturalism. Upon arrival, parents become disenchanted because they are structurally and socially limited in their mobility and feel they have been sold a false bill of goods. They understand the situation as reflective of a white racial hegemony of the world system and respond by inculcating in their children the importance of their cultural and religious specificities. Pakistani-Canadian youth take seriously the state’s rhetoric about Canadian multiculturalism, and are demonstrative of a subjectivity I call affective citizenship where they enact and embody a multi-layered, flexible citizenship with an emotional valence. Canada’s multicultural national imaginary combined with parental disenchantment and youthful idealism highlights the reality that the lived experience of citizenship as belonging can be in direct contradiction with state designations.
I was born here... growing up, my older siblings told me to stay away from fobs. Kids who were “fresh off the boat,” because they smelled and looked funny and because we didn’t want to be associated with kids who were straight from Pakistan. So I didn’t grow up thinking that I was Pakistani so much, I was Canadian. Being Pakistani meant dinners with family and family friends, but it didn’t mean that much in school. But then sometime after 9/11 there was this new card, or new status: A National ID Card for Overseas Pakistanis. My family made sure to get one for all of us. Because they were afraid that what was happening in the US could happen to us in Canada. Canada usually follows the actions of the US, so we wanted to make sure we had someplace to go if things started to get bad. (Interview, November, 2011)

One of the themes in my research was that 9/11 and the subsequent actions of the US state influenced immigrants irrespective of their nationality or where they were living. Twenty-seven year old Moosa grew up in Canada, but recounted that his sense of identity changed after 9/11, even as an adolescent. He became more politically aware about being a visible minority, and what it meant to be Pakistani after his parents obtained Overseas Pakistani Identification Cards for the whole family. Whether it was a more shadowy reference to the need to adapt to the US’ influence or an extolling of Canadian virtues, on the whole when Pakistani Canadians spoke about identity it was always in reference to the US. Understanding whether and how Pakistanis identify as a community in response to power relationships at the state level require an exposition of state discourses of belonging and exclusion. I accomplish this using the organizing frame of grammars of the state.

Grammars of the state refers to a “classificatory structure or schemata that can be recognized in processes that define identity and alterity” (Baumann & Gingrich, 2002, p. ix). Grammars can also be conceived of as cognitive maps, classificatory pathways, logics, operations, and models (Ibid). This is similar to Bonilla-Silva, (2011) who argues that a “racial grammar” structures cognition, vision and feelings on racial matters, and normalizes the standards of white supremacy. Using grammars as an organizing framework helps capture the discursive nature of nation-building, a meta-level analysis of how states create notions of belonging and exclusion. Though often naturalized, the nation-state is a modern invention, a colonial organizing framework imposed upon the world centered around exclusion. Many scholars assert the pattern of nation-state building via exclusion (Marx, 1998). Boundaries of the nation are continually constructed through the exclusions of certain groups (Volpp, 2002), and law and policy represent expressions and discourses of the nation-state that demarcate who belongs. These
discourses are means by which contemporary state power – and its specific mores and mechanisms – can be both systematically, as well as incidentally racist (Brown, 1995). Building on Omi & Winant (1994), Gomez (2010) argues “the state (state institutions, state actors, government agencies and policies) plays a major role in constructing race and racism,” (pg. 491). Bhabha (2009) proposes the ‘nation’ is a narrative strategy, the cultural construction of which is a form of social and textual affiliation (p. 201). It has such discursive and psychological force on cultural production and political projects because the ‘nation’ is entirely ambivalent (Ibid). As Sassen (2006) argues, it may not be evident, but complex meanings of the global are being constituted inside the national; what is often conceived of as being national (e.g. policies, capital, political subjectivities, urban spaces, temporal frames, dynamics and domains, etc.) is being denationalized via the microprocesses of globalization.

In this chapter I make the argument that US hegemony is underappreciated in comparative research, and must be taken into account especially when comparing immigrant responses to different state institutions. The chapter proceeds in two parts. Part one is an exposition of the macro view of how the nation-state system is a de-facto racial hegemony and how the war-on-terror represents American nation-building. I discuss how neoliberal global capitalism dominates the contemporary world system and how states are apparatuses of its advancement. It is important to start with this macro view to situate how the state sustains and circulates discourses of the nation that may not reflect the contemporary transnational productions of social life and power relations (Glick-Schiller, 2010). Part two of this chapter compares Canada and the US and interrogates the grammars of the state by unpacking the US Patriot Act and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. I show that despite their differing intent, both are exemplars of state race making and do so by privileging visual difference.

Part One: The Macro View of Global Political Economy and the Nation-State System

Scholars have discussed how warfare plays a crucial mechanism in imperialist states’ advancement of unequal globalization (Cooper 2003, Ferguson 2004, Harvey 2003, Ikenberry 2002, Mann 2003, Reyna 2005) but “miss the relationship between neoliberal restructuring, migration, and the construction of images of the foreigner as enemy and terrorist” (Glick-Schiller 2010, 48-49). My research is an attempt to make this link, and leads me to make the argument that the nation-state system, in its current configuration – (with US hegemony prolonged by military incursions) – is a racialized means of proliferating neoliberal capitalism. My dissertation shows how, at the individual and community levels, immigrants construct identities in response to repressive and ideological state apparatuses. That is to say, American hegemony encourages assimilatory identity performances that demonstrate ideological acquiescence. This is not to assume that immigrants are passive conduits for a North-South ideological flow; in fact, there is a self-selection process where individuals who already possess neoliberal predispositions
are drawn to, for example, Silicon Valley. But the specificity of Silicon Valley neoliberalism includes access to capital that fuels technology-oriented development projects (where technical expertise authorizes incursion). And identity pressures for immigrants results in the self-disciplining processes of governmentality, where – as my research shows – the embodiment of neoliberalism highlights the ways it is racialized. This shows how the war-on-terror, as a racial project, is linked to and propels capitalism via identity projects. In abstract brushstrokes, this paints the theoretical landscape my dissertation explores. Connecting the micro to the macro involves the necessity of making suppositions, hypotheses about the nature of the world that are highly contestable. In part, my research is an attempt to investigate the mechanisms of macro structures that requires accepting aspects of what is ultimately only human theorizing of reality. Below, I define terms and provide more context for the following two hugely important macro conceptualizations of the contemporary era:

1. The nation-state system, a colonial legacy, is a de-facto racial hegemony. The war-on-terror represents American nation-building and racializes suspicious others.
2. Neoliberal global capitalism dominates the contemporary world system; states are apparatuses of its advancement.

My dissertation argues and takes as its starting point that the war-on-terror is a racial project that advances US hegemony. World hegemony refers to a state exercising governmental functions over a system of sovereign states (Arrighi 1990: 366). Racial projects are the historically and contextually situated clashes and conflicts, accommodations and overlaps of the representation and organization of race (Winant 2004: 40). This uses Omi and Winant’s foundational theory of racial formation which frames race as a struggle and contestation over structures (social stratification and distribution, institutional arrangements, political systems, laws, etc) and significations (production of meanings such as cultural representation). The war-on-terror has served as a racial project in that legally dubious claims of preventing terrorism justify violence and US state-terrorism via the racialization and criminalization of dark-skinned bodies. For scholars studying race in the United States, the issue of criminalizing and imprisoning black men is a well-known phenomenon, such that the prison-industrial complex can be pointed to as a racist state institution that privileges a white minority profiting from blatant abuse. Those studying immigration are well aware that border-issues and notions of illegality tied to appearance are neo-colonial assertions of territorial dominance. Islamophobia has different means and modes of operation, but the overall outcome is the same: a global assertion of control and ownership by a small cadre of white elites with a clever and convincing ideology centered on white authority. Undoubtedly, this argument could be read as offensive, conspiratorial, or “reverse racism” – even if the delivery of such critiques are masked by technical methodological detours. This is part and parcel of the contemporary “color-blind society,” where historical inequalities are erased in a neoliberal framework assuming a meritocratic market and emphasizing technicality and individual performance.
The war-on-terror advances American-style white hegemony by marking brown bodies suspect and reaffirming notions of (a now self-reflexively embraced) “Murica,” a national trope that has a white cowboy as the hero in a modern-day wild-west. Disentangling the relationships between the aggressive assault of global capitalism and how white elites create and exploit threats to white nationalism is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. But the literature is fairly clear that the contemporary system is a continuation of the exploitative processes that Europe’s colonial expansion wrought upon the world. In the past, the colonial frame rationalizing violent theft was the backwardness or inferiority of indigenous populations. The state backed religious and educational institutions to assimilate or improve natives for participation in the Manifest Destiny reorganization of people, places and societies. These colonial development logics are still in operation, though contemporary exploitation is cloaked in the primacy of market logic and private property. The nation-state aids elites and supranational organizations, especially multinational corporations, in capitalist processes such as accumulation and dispossession. Capitalism is prone to crisis, and the US state has been resuscitating the economy through increasing militarization and securitization (including large increases in war and incarceration spending). At the same time, social services are being privatized or eliminated, with corresponding rhetoric against immigrants and the poor. The war-on-terror represented a geopolitical grasp at control in the Middle East, an economy-boosting turn of neoliberal capitalism that emphasizes the importance of security against suspicious others, loosely racialized as the “Muslim-appearing.”

My dissertation shows how immigrants understand and respond to state-constructed essentializing discourses about Muslims. This examination helps show how race operates at the global level and demonstrates the power of American hegemony, materially and discursively. I suggest the nation-state system is a de-facto racial regime, and maps onto a global racial hierarchy instigated by colonialism and perpetuated by imperial processes. One of the central mechanisms of racial division is racio-citizenship, a constructed notion of groupness that can include the identification of phenotypical variations as a marker of belonging. But belonging is also constructed ideologically, which animates state legal and security apparatuses that enforce physical and material exclusion. The constructed groupness of racio-citizenship more-or-less maps onto the present-day nation-state system, and the struggle over racial projects exists at multiple levels: the local, national, and global. As such, the discursive construction of the nation is hugely important in understanding how the boundaries distinguishing belonging and exclusion are wrought. The war-on-terror and the securitized turn of the US state has been a defining feature of our contemporary time period. The nation-state system persists and American hegemony is temporarily maintained through the economic stimulus and geopolitical intimidation that war supplies. In the next section, I discuss the political economic agenda underpinning American economic and military dominance and the implications for identity construction.
Globalization scholars agree that the contemporary era is one in which capitalism has predominated, and are working through variegations according to temporal, political, and spatial specificities. In fact, the argument that variegations exist is relatively new, and geographers in particular have emphasized the importance of formulating theories of space given the complexities of how globalization is unfolding. By globalization, I mean the increasing interconnectedness of people and places, a reality that we empirically struggle to keep up with. Ultimately, in this dissertation, I argue that accurate study of global phenomena requires we question the assumptions built into the nation-state system, which overly constrain our analysis and representations of reality. Following post-colonial scholars, I argue that how we do research is informed by the very epistemologies that make truth-claims about divisions amongst people and justify hierarchical sorting. Thus, it is problematic to decontextualize nation-states from the complicated power relationships in which they participate. This means, for example, recognizing that neoliberal capitalism has proliferated in the global political-economic system, and states are its pushers.

Neoliberalism is differentiated from liberalism in so far as the latter espouses government intervention, whereas the former, neoliberalism highlights an autonomous individual and limits social spending (at the same time that the state works to expand the market). Critics of neoliberal rationality often use a Foucaultian conceptual frame of governmentality, defined as “the conduct of conduct” (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991: 48). The main idea is that neoliberalism has become “a mode of governance encompassing but not limited to the state, one which produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and a new organization of the social” (Brown 2003). That is to say, governmentality is a critical mechanism through which capitalist hegemony continues to occur and it occurs on all levels. The assumption, based on a rich literature, is that a capitalist hegemony of the world order exists. Below, I narrate in brief, how neoliberal capitalism arose as the hegemonic mode of globalization, outline the ways neoliberal capitalism has become globally dominant, and provide examples of the ways states (among other actors) have become apparatuses for its propagation.

At this point, capitalism has been in existence long enough for some basic conclusions to be drawn, such as its propensity towards crisis. Polanyi (1944) termed the oscillation between unrestrained capitalism and its more socialist forms the “double movement:” as inequality and exploitation rises, the people are bound to resist. Those in power allow moderate reforms placating enough people to prevent more dramatic social shifts. As a model, this obviously has many variations, and does not account for geopolitics, nor the increasing opacity due to complex, technology-enabled interconnections. The world system as historically documented has typically been lead by a single nation, the hegemon. Thus, by the turn of the 19th century, Britain had won the battle for world dominance amongst colonizing Europe, and by mid-century, the US emerged from World-War II as the new world hegemon. A previously sagging economy – (remember depression-era inequality) – was boosted by American war expenditures, and with a Keynesian model of state spending, the government expanded social services...
primarily for whites. The civil rights movement pressured the state for equal access and opportunities, and around the world, nationalist self-determination (often socialist) sprang from anti-colonial movements. Within the literature on political economy, the 1970’s are noted for being an economic turning point. The state was faced with fiscal, social, and legitimacy predicaments, and the turn to the market was an attempt to deal with these pressures (Krippner 2011). The Keynesian state was re-organized using a market logic that changed state priorities and began reducing redistribution-oriented policies. (One could do a genealogy of citizenship and human rights to understand the relationship between evolving notions of citizenship and rights and ideas about the market. There is a tension between the two, where privileging the market comes at the expense of human lives and privileges some lives as more valuable than others. In this respect, war and conflict become legitimizing covers for the erasure of lives and livelihoods.) An important scholarly agenda is understanding the (complex) mechanisms and processes through which a neoliberal “hegemonic globalization” (Evans 2000) has arisen. Much has been written about the supra-national organizations that have been implementing neoliberal policies around the world such as the World Bank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both organizations were instituted in the post-WWII reconstruction of the global economy and their formation represented the shift in power from the UK to the US as global hegemon but racially speaking, also represented the protraction of white dominance over the organization of global affairs. Based on the ideological dominance of Milton Friedman, rational choice theory, and an extreme emphasis on the individual, the execution of development projects around were frequently accompanied by extreme violence. Countries around the world were subjected to swift and radical economic changes involving deregulation, privatization, and austerity measures justified because of real and manufactured crises.

This overview does little justice to a rich literature, and follows in the same problematic macro-social science tradition of god-like description: vast claims about the reality of the world that reflect the colonial ontologies that propel the academic endeavor. In so far as one participates in this project, at the very least, it is important to acknowledge the contradictions involved in criticizing (and at the same time using) hegemonic epistemological paradigms. Caveat aside, the primary point is that neoliberalism is the reigning political economic agenda driving American economic and military dominance, and this has major implications for identity construction. And the takeaway is the importance of recognizing American hegemony and driving geopolitical forces in any comparison of states. In the next section I briefly trace some of the driving forces behind the varying modes of racial and ethnic categorization. Thereafter I unpack two paradigmatic examples of state policy that, though different in nature and intent, demonstrate how belonging is visually constructed.
Part Two: Comparing the US and Canada

In a positive and possibly ideal framing, the nation-state could be defined as formation of people (with a unique history and culture) in an ongoing process of democratic iterations and reflexive experimentation with collective identity (Benhabib, 2004). However, inclusion also implies exclusion, thus the “negative mirror-image [of the nation] is racism” (Lie, 2004, p. 187). Exclusion along racial lines is systematically tied to the modern institutions of inclusion, and “ethnic conflicts and xenophobia/racism are integral part of the modern order of nation-states” (Wimmer, 2002, p. 5). As these formulations imply, both the national and global are constructed conditions, and countries are assemblages of different historical formations of territory, authority and rights (Sassen, 2006, p. 4). The state does not “evolve,” but rather produces a new constitutive organizing logic as it adapts to new conditions (Ibid, p. 17). As such it is important to recognize how institutions and practices developed in an earlier moment of history can be foundational to a subsequent time period, but “only as a part of a new organizational logic that also foundationally repositions those capabilities” (Ibid, p. 15). In the cases of the US and Canada, loyalty (or independence) from Britain and the history of slavery are hugely important differences in these initially similar settler-colonies.

Sources that detail the differences between the US and Canada discuss the implications of America’s rebellion against the British, and Canada’s loyalty to the crown (Lipset, 1990; Bloemraad, 2006; Zuberi, 2006). This has been one factor in variances in classificatory structures, though further work is needed on the similarities and differences between the evolution of US and Canadian ethnic and racial categories. The theorization of the inscription of race and racial supremacy in political power, of “the white supremacist nature of contemporary state power – the specific mores and mechanisms through which state power is systematically rather than incidentally racist” is in its infancy (Brown 1995). The “racialized, gendered, and class elements of state power are mutually constitutive as well as contradictory,” and the specific racializations of the state should be analytically isolated and studied genealogically separately to avoid a totalizing kind of social power that frames all modes of domination (Ibid, pg. 179-80).

When comparing the US and Canada, it is important to note that one of the major differences is due to the legacy of slavery; thus, US categories tend to be couched more in terms of “race” and reflect the history of violent exclusion and ongoing mobilization for inclusion, while Canadian categories are more clearly related to immigrants. US political elites fostered a whites-only nationalism via “reshaping institutions and restructuring discourses” as the legality of slavery came to a close (Vickers & Isaac, 2012, p. x). The centuries of a “racial dictatorship” resulted in “American identity” being synonymous with whiteness and an assertion of the color line as “the fundamental division of US society” (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 66). Whiteness was a means for white “ethnics” to unify around racial prejudice towards blacks (Roediger, 2005), which fostered an oppositional racial consciousness and organization (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 66). Canada abjured from slavery, under direction from the British crown, and its ethnic conflicts have been framed
by linguistic and religious differences, marked primarily by ongoing sovereignty movements from the Quebecois. The struggle to maintain French and Catholic identities has resulted in an emphasis on pluralism that has meant that whiteness was never consolidated like that of the US. “Whites” in Canada retain, or continue to construct, their ethnicity as distinct categories and do not see whiteness as an overarching umbrella of belonging. Indeed, my experience in Canada was that some native-Canadians took offense at the idea of a similarity among whites, using terms like Anglican as a means of differentiating themselves. In respect to Asian immigrants, both countries severely limited migration from designated countries (including the subcontinent) and reinitiated acceptance of Asians around the same time period. The result is that the majority of Asian immigrants in the US and Canada are fairly recent, beginning in the 1950s.

Though the outcomes are different, the general principles of racial formation can be applied in different countries. Methodologically, this means that it is important to identify and analyze the institutions, practices, and discourses that have accompanied and propagated the “racial state.” In contrast to conceiving of the state as externally intervening in racial relations, the state is better theorized as “inherently racial,” and “the principal site of racial conflict” (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 82). A model of the racial state includes institutions, policies, conditions and rules, and the social relations in which it is embedded (Ibid). While racial power is ultimately defended via coercion and violence, racial domination is most effective when hegemonic (Bonilla-Silva, 2011), and thus they are not the central practices responsible for the reproduction of racial domination [in contemporary America] (Omi & Winant, 1994). Hegemony functions through the prevalence of “common sense,” thus how we understand belonging and inclusion, othering and exclusion are ideas understood as normal.

While states’ racial and ethnic categories vary according to different historical trajectories through the mechanisms and modes of categorization, states racialize immigrants. These racial projects ideologically link structure and representation, and “simultaneously represent racial dynamics” as well as endeavor to reallocate “resources along particular racial lines (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 56). Different countries divergently categorize otherwise similar immigrant groups, leading to varied paths of community identity construction and boundary drawing. Kastoryano (2002) argues that states play a role in immigrants’ identity, in part by defining when groups achieve legitimacy. But she also affords perhaps too much agency to immigrants when she asserts that national identity has to account for the expectations of groups within the nation. That is, the power relationship between states and immigrants is far from equal. And while certainly immigrants can and do mobilize to change the meaning of the nation, these struggles – at least in the US case – are tempered by political and ideological constraints of who belongs. Contemporary state power is white supremacist in nature (Brown, 1995), but these standards of white supremacy are normalized such that they seem invisible. My work aims to unpack the deep structure, logic, and rules of the racial grammars imbuing national discourses, the US PATRIOT ACT and Canada’s policies of Multiculturalism.
US Patriot Act: Racialization of Muslims

As a paradigmatic instance of how race and law are mutually constitutive, the US bodies largely dedicated to immigrant affairs are housed in the Department of Homeland Security and part of the “immigration industrial complex” which share the features of a rhetoric of fear, the convergence of powerful interests, and a discourse of other-ization (Golash-Boza, 2009, p. 1). The replacement of the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Services) with ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) foreshadowed the changing relationship the US state has to immigrants as potential threats to national security. Since 9/11 the actions of the government has created even more stringent requirements for inclusion, undermining the rights of certain citizens. The major policies impacting immigrants have included detentions, special registration, and the Patriot Act. A category was created – “enemy combatant” – that disavowed the government from assuring citizens rights to due process. A citizenship based on the idea of universal personhood (Soysal, 1994) is difficult to square with “enemy combatant” and the dialectic between the two can have serious consequences for belonging and exclusion. Even the more neutral USCIS (US Citizenship and Immigration Services) identifies strategic goals such as “strengthening the integrity of the immigration system” and “providing effective customer-oriented immigration benefit and information services.” The language is security-oriented and neoliberal, and designates a precarious position to immigrants, especially in respect to their behavior and expectations.

One of the major legislative outcomes after 9/11 was the now infamous USA Patriot Act signed into law on October 26, 2001 and renewed in 2006. Unpacking the Act’s acronym shows the emphasis on a strong patriotism: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. The Patriot Act can be read as a strategy of othering through creating visible boundaries around who is an American. It has been criticized for its civil rights infringements and for its implicit framing of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians as terrorists. Book-ending the Patriot Act are two sections that indicate who it is America needs to be wary about and suggests that this wariness involves visual vigilance. The initial section makes note of and condemns the discrimination occurring against Muslim and Arab Americans. Congress asserts the importance of “upholding the rights of all Americans” and goes a step further to say that the civil rights and liberties of “all Americans, including Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia” should be protected. This linguistic demarcation is troubling in the implication that all Americans should not necessarily be protected, and more explicitly, that those who are not American do not have rights. The beginning of the Act frames a larger charge leveled by the state – that the boundary around who is an American, a true American, may not be hyphenated like the ones listed are – the boundary circumscribing “American” does include these groups, but the line is fuzzy, easily questioned and movable.

The end of the Patriot Act discusses “findings related to Sikhs in the US,” which distinguishes them from Muslims (“the Sikh faith is a distinct religion with a distinct
religious and ethnic identity...”), noting their allegiance to the US (“Sikh-Americans, as do all Americans, condemn acts of prejudice against any American...”), and expressing concern about the discrimination Sikhs have faced since 9/11 (“many Sikh-Americans, who are easily recognizable by their turbans and beards, which are required articles of their faith, have suffered both verbal and physical assaults as a result of misguided anger toward Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack...”) (Patriot Act, 2001). The language denotes that the anger is misguided – not that anger towards hyphenated Americans is wrong, but that the anger towards Arab- and Muslim-Americans is legitimate.

Congress ostensibly asserts the rights of Arab/Muslim/South Asian/Sikh-Americans by noting these groups’ dual or hybrid identities. However, by only mentioning these ethnic groups, the Patriot Act points out their difference, and holds them apart from non-hyphenated Americans. The Act, by stating that these specific hyphenated Americans are, in fact, Americans, puts into question the loyalties and motives of hyphenated Americans – particularly of the Arab, Muslim, or South Asian variety. Further, the discussion of Sikh-American appearance, of “findings” that they are not Muslim, and of their having suffered from misguided assaults suggests an undercurrent of racial profiling and blame. The Patriot Act recognizes that Sikhs have been erroneously “lumped in” with, and thusly should be separated out from, the potential terrorist category encapsulating the other groups.

Note that the potential terrorist category includes large, general swaths of the population – the discriminatory distinction around Arab-Americans or Muslim-Americans, rather than a more precise grouping – and that the wording “misguided anger” implies that since Sikhs are in fact not part of this group; they do not deserve the assaults that the other population does. The language denotes that the anger is misguided – not that anger towards hyphenated Americans is wrong, but that the anger towards Arab- and Muslim-Americans is legitimate. The inclusion of Sikhs in the act undoubtedly reflects the lobbying and activism this cohesive and well organized community took after 9/11. (In Pakistan, Sikhs are a religious minority; other religious minorities – even a large minority, Shias – are similar in the respect of being more cohesive around their ethno-religious identities than national identities like being Pakistani.) This helps explain why there are no such “findings” on other non-Muslim groups, particularly those from South Asia (Hindus, for example).

Discursive analysis on the US PATRIOT ACT shows how suspicion and surveillance are wrought around visual boundaries in the war on terror. September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim reflecting a racialization of terrorist, non-citizens. This racial grammar solidifies the “imagined community” of the American nation in its depiction of the "Middle Eastern terrorist" at a moment of crisis (Volpp, 2002). In the next section, I unpack aspects of Canada’s policies of multiculturalism to show how, though different in intent, the outcome is the same, a visual demarcation of
Canadian Multiculturalism: Racialization of Visible Minorities

Besides not being American, one of the central tropes about Canadian identity is multiculturalism. The state does incredible work promoting the multicultural discourse. Indeed, part of my funding originated from the Canadian government to help ask and answer questions about Canadian diversity. I was on a Canadian academic fellowship meant to expose American scholars to Canada (and its resources), and of course, multiculturalism is a predominant discourse that emerges. I remember government talking heads, museum tours, boat rides, and light shows that all made points to underscore the history and diversity of the different groups in Canada and emphasize multiculturalism as a national value.

Multiculturalism is recognized as an official value of Canada in section twenty-seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms enacted in 1982. Rather than establishing a right per se, it provides direction for how the Charter should be interpreted. It reads, “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” As a country, Canada has a celebrated policy of multiculturalism, government services, and community centers geared to immigrant needs, and monies openly available to promote the economic, social, and cultural integration of integration (Citizenship and Immigration, 2009-2010 Annual Report of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act). Government programs and monies related to multiculturalism are many and diverse; as Bloemraad (2006) suggests, they promote – compared to the US – a more vibrant civil society and community organization. (My research contests the claim of vibrancy, and questions the meaning of the term and how we code for a variable as such.)

What is interesting is that the funds are distributed according to official categories; thus, many of the services and opportunities for Pakistani immigrants fall under funding for “Asians” or “South Asians.” The result is an offering of services to a diverse collection of peoples, some of whom have little relationship to one another. But the grouping itself creates meaning, and individuals and organizations are crafted to the state’s terminology. The typical white Canadian is well-versed in a shared language of Asians and Aboriginals. In the US, desis (or brown people) are marked as potential terrorists and threats, and likely to be called an Arab or Middle Easterner. But in Canada, brown people are known and treated as Asian – a state-constructed category of belonging that constructs institutions and infiltrates discourse.

“Visible minorities,” a term recently adopted in 2009, “refers to persons other than Aboriginal peoples who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (Stats Canada, 2012). The term visible minority is remarkable in that it privileges the sense of sight – this minority is visible, we can see them, and they are non-white. Minorities that can be seen...
are those deemed as others, people who do not belong and can be visibly identified as 
outsiders. (The use of Caucasian as a race and what that means to the state and public is 
an interesting question involving questions of territory and narrative constructions of 
peoplehood over time.) That visible minorities are distinguished from Aboriginals 
indicates another marker that not all brown or pigmented people are to be thought of as 
the same, and thus to be treated differently.

The state identifies the following groups as the main visible minority categories: 
Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, 
Japanese and Korean. The listing encompasses national, regional, regional-linguistic, and 
continental terms of identity, many of which can overlap or be especially ambiguous in 
terms of identifying immigrant histories or backgrounds. Yet, despite the dissonance with 
actual groupings, community events and organizations become structured according to 
these categories. Individuals or organizations hoping to receive government assistance 
for their aid must apply using the same categories, thus expanding the reality of a “South 
Asian community,” (irrespective of immigrants’ grass roots understandings of 
community.) My research shows how people respond to state categorizations, and the 
interesting and colorful ways state categorizations come to life, materially and 
discursively.

One of the most immediately striking aspects of my fieldwork in Toronto, was the 
number and extent of ethnic festivals and events that happen. Within the first couple 
weeks of arrival in July 2011, the Gerrard Street South Asian Festival, the Festival of India, 
MuslimFest and Mosaic Festival of South Asia all took place. The Mosaic Festival is billed 
as the largest South Asian celebration in North America. In 2012, the Canadian 
government gave $40,000 to the festival, also considered important to the 2012 Mosaic 
Festival (“South Asian Heritage Festival of Mississauga). Much of the discourse that has 
surrounded these events, both in promotion/advertising and speeches made by festival 
organizers has mirrored the state’s narrative of the Canadian “mosaic.” For example, at 
the Mosaic: Festival of South Asia in Mississauga, a group of organizers were singing each 
other’s – and their sponsor RBC – praises, in addition to commenting on why the festival 
was important. Asma Mahmood, a founder and festival director of the Mosaic Festival, in 
a hoarse voice from so much emceeing, spoke explicitly about needing to carve out a 
place in Canada’s mosaic, that the community needed to be” seen and heard” and “show 
they are an important part of Canada’s multiculturalism” (Field Notes, July 2011). Her 
husband and co-founder, Asher discussed on stage why the festival was founded: “When 
you have a vision and you work hard to make it happen... we have to make sure that 
Canadian culture includes bhangra, includes samosa, includes all things South Asian!” 
(Field Notes, July 2011).

Local, provincial, and even national Canadian officials were paraded on stage and 
gave speeches to a largely disinterested audience about Canadian multiculturalism and its 
vibrant mosaic. The line-up of performers and events tended to be conscientiously 
diverse insofar as they cut across space and time. By that I mean, acts ranged from
traditional art forms, to Bollywood centered dances and references, to representations of hybrid desi-Canadian identity, such as comedians and rap artists that mix hiphop with South Asian music. Nationality seemed to be de-emphasized, and cultural similarity or background was highlighted, with the effect that regional or ethnic identities were more deliberately celebrated (in particular, Punjabi identity at the Mississauga festival was called upon to excite the crowd.) (Ex: “are my Punjabis in the house? Let me hear the Punjabis!!”) Asserting that any sort of “authentic” South Asian identity was the wellspring of these festivals would be a bit crude. An urban planning professor, Sandeep Agarwal at Ryerson, who focuses his research on ethnic communities (specifically South Asians), discussed a structural push factor. He remarked that all of the broader ethnic events were a function of government multicultural funding specifically earmarked for visible minority communities, such as the “South Asian” category. As such, there has been an institutional boundary-making effect that has served to provide incentives for organizing along different lines than in the US, which begs the question of whether in a longer-term comparison these differences in community boundaries will be even more pronounced and “real.”

Canadian scholars’ writing often suggests a deep anxiety that multiculturalism in Canada is identified as – if not successful, then definitely not a failure. Immigrants are ‘doing fine,’ because in terms of belonging and inclusion, it is the ‘historic divisions’ – francophones and aboriginals – that are the starkest (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010). But second-generation visible minorities report more discrimination than their parents, and strikingly, feel less of a sense of belonging to Canada despite having citizenship (Reitz & Banerjee, 2006). Thus the assertion that historic divisions are greater than that against immigrant groups does little to ally the real fear that if the majority society of Canada continues to exclude aboriginals – “visible minorities” from the outset of settler-colonialism – why would they treat immigrant groups any differently?

Research that asserts that illiberal values or radicalism are not issues because “less than 50% of women wear a headscarf” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010) shows a problematic assumption that the headscarf is somehow synonymous with a non-western value. Canadian defenders of and advocates for Canadian multiculturalism end up providing evidence for how deeply embedded racism can be, even in the most benign or benevolent seeming sources of state policy. How multiculturalism has been enacted serves as an example of how race constructs law, and how law constructs race. In the former instance, the terminology ‘visible minority’ implicitly defines the “us” as white and the “them” as visually non-white. The overwhelming bulk of law currently constructs race informally, not by directly addressing conceptions of race, but relying on, promulgating, and giving force to particular ideas about the nature of race, races, and racism (Haney Lopez 2006).

Multiculturalism came about as a result of mobilization and challenges from people of color towards white supremacy. But as per Bonilla-Silva (2011), we could ask if it has been watered down or co-opted. We should not accept at face value that multiculturalism is necessarily a “good” thing for minorities; or at the very least, we
should unpack the meanings or intentionalities of why multiculturalism is considered a
good thing. I argue it’s considered a good thing as an alternative to exclusion or
something “worse” or less progressive, something like the Patriot Act. Canada’s discourse
of multiculturalism is the definition of a racial grammar, the “hidden racial ideological
substratum or residue (like oil) which allows the ‘engine’ to operate somewhat smoothly
in any racial order” (Ibid, p. 188). Multicultural policy and ideology focuses on cultural
expressions (e.g. food, clothing, and music) but “trivializes, neutralizes and absorbs social
and economic inequalities” (Moodley, 1983: 326). Though different in intent, like the
Patriot Act, Canada’s policies of multiculturalism privilege a visual demarcation of who
belongs and who is considered an outsider. And when considered in combination, these
two examples of racial grammars operate in tandem – Canada’s policies of
multiculturalism and active efforts to be unlike the US allow a defacto racial hegemony to
persist.

**Contribution to Literature on Boundaries**

There has been a longstanding agreement among scholars of ethnicity that
ethnicity is socially constructed: it is not a “real” (i.e. self-evident, quasi biological)
exploration (Barth, 1969; Baumann & Thijl, 1995). Like many others, Jenkins (2008)
explains that ethnicity depends on ascription from both sides of a group boundary. But
he asserts a need to distinguish between groups and categories: group identification is
what happens inside and across ethnic boundaries, while social categorization occurs
outside and across the boundary. That is to say, categorization is wrought with power
relations. Whereas ethnicity can be understood as a more general social phenomenon
than racism or racial categorization, racism more specifically refers to historically specific
situations wherein one ethnic group attempts to dominate another set of people (Ibid).
Omi and Winant (1994) famously theorized that ethnicity, along with class and nation,
have served as paradigmatic approaches to race and race relations. The domination of an
“ethnic category” happens through racialization: a process that assigns meaning to
different constellations of identity (without a necessary relationship to class divisions);
ascribes physical and cultural differences to individuals and groups; and constructs bodies
and psyches (Barot & Bird, 2001).

The degree of power inequality impacts the characteristics of boundaries – their
political salience, cultural significance, and historical stability (Wimmer, 2008a). As
opposed to taking the boundaries between immigrants and citizens for granted,
immigrant incorporation (“assimilation” or “integration”) should be studied as a
fundamental part of nation building, an ongoing struggle over the boundaries of inclusion
(Wimmer, 2009). Three elements that structure the struggle over boundaries are
institutional rules, the distribution of power between various participants in these
struggles, and the networks of political alliances (Wimmer 2008a). In this sense, it is
important to analyze actual government practices (as per the previous section), as well as
the discourse that makes these practices seem reasonable and necessary.
There is a rapidly increasing literature on boundaries, with recent calls for interdisciplinary synthesis and collaboration. Some useful distinctions include that between symbolic and social boundaries (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities. Tilly (2004) defines the elements of a social boundary as “distinctive social relations on either side of an intermediate zone, distinctive relations across that zone, and, on each side, shared representations of that zone itself” (p. 222). By emphasizing the “social,” he advocates concentrating on the circumstances wherein actors on each side of the boundary “reify it by naming it, attempt to control it, attach distinctive practices to it, or otherwise create a shared representation” (p. 214). He usefully differentiates between mechanisms that cause boundary change and those that constitute boundary change and produce its direct effects. One of the mechanisms of constitution he identifies as inscription, an amplifying of the elements of a social boundary; inscription heightens the elements, differentiates relations more sharply and more emphatically.

An ongoing goal in the boundaries literature is to document and explain variation in individuals’ boundary-work strategies (Pachucki et al., 2007). Patterns between social distance and various forms of association need to be studied in greater detail to understand their connection to everyday understandings and representations about “us” and “them” (Ibid). The recognition literature focuses less on this than philosophical debates, and thus the internal/external dialectic of collective identity and the range of arguments minorities use to gain recognition are understudied (Lamont & Bail, 2007). There should be more exploration of the conditions that lead to boundaries differentiating, dissolving, or producing hybridity or alternative forms of categorization (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). It is in these respects that I seek to contribute to the literature. Specifically, I wish to help identify the relationship between group identification and social categorization for Pakistanis. In other words, how do the power relationships enacted at the state level influence whether and how Pakistanis identify as a community? What communities and identities are most important to them and how does it manifest according to different national contexts?

To answer these questions, my work has consisted of a cross-national comparison of Pakistanis in Toronto, Ontario and the Bay Area, California. A cross-national comparison is important because it allows for a detailed understanding of how varying institutional and political constraints affect immigrant groups. At the same time, I support the critique of methodological nationalism, where nation-states are understood as containers, and “categories of practice are adopted as categories of analysis” (Beck & Sznaider, 2010, p. 384). How states treat denizens is not in a vacuum, it is all part of an international system where geopolitical pressure, international opinion – and history – matters. Nation-states should be conceived of as relational rather than oppositional categories, and the
national should be examined as a changing narrative, rewritten by and from the margins (Moorti, 2003). How immigrants engage in and articulate transnational endeavors are examples of “the global in the national,” or processes that destabilize meanings and raise questions about crucial frameworks such as the nation-state and citizenship (Sassen, 2006). Toronto and Silicon Valley are strategic sites for analysis as “global cities” that are “partly denationalized urban spaces that enable a partial reinvention of citizenship as practice and project” (Sassen, 2006, p. 281). In this sense, immigrant belonging can be understood at existing at a variety of scales: local, national, and transnational.
CHAPTER 2

Hijacked Identities: Silicon Valley Pakistanis and Tactics of Belonging

For immigrants in the US, the current era of international tension has made homeland loyalties a hazardous endeavor. The possibility of transnational ties or attachments to shadowy “enemies of freedom” has meant that Muslims in the US, recent immigrants or not, have faced scrutiny as being “with us or against us,” bifurcating into “good Muslims” or “bad Muslims.” Mahmood Mamdani (2004) has described this emergent language as a “new round of culture talk” that joins terrorism and Islam, equating political tendencies with entire communities, which then require collective discipline and punishment. Rather than a terrorist-civilian distinction, “good Muslims” are differentiated from “bad Muslims,” creating a low threshold for seditious acts. For Pakistanis and other Muslim groups, this culture talk also includes a conflation of Pakistanis “here” (in the US) with a problematic conception of Pakistanis “there” (in Pakistan or the space of the Middle East identified as dangerous) – a conflation that identifies all Pakistanis as uneducated, reactionary fundamentalists who are anti-modernity. Culture talk creates an essentialized image of Muslims, where a group of people, in the broadest sense of membership, are understood as having a singular, static, categorical sameness – one that is negative, maleficent, and the binary opposite of the normal and the good.

I am interested in understanding the effects of culture talk on immigrant communities. (While not under explicit analysis in this chapter, I hypothesize that the US, by equating terrorists with Muslims, can justify “protective” steps from this threat both at home and abroad.) In this chapter, I ask how Pakistanis have been interpreting and responding to the post-9/11 construction of Muslim identities, or more broadly, how a transnational community responds when it has been marked as hostile. Looking primarily at two Pakistani community organizations in the Northern California area encompassing the technology region known as Silicon Valley, I seek to answer this question with evidence from document analysis, participant observation, and in-depth interviews. My resultant argument is that the Silicon Valley Pakistani community has been using specific identity tactics that challenge the dichotomizing discourses that have essentialized and vilified Muslims. By enacting overlapping business-capitalist and secular-pluralist identities, the community seeks belonging and traverses exclusionary boundaries to have their assimilatory and transnational claims accepted.

Representations

The US state has been erecting thorny boundaries around what it means to be an American in order to evoke the sense of threat and the need to discriminate. Consequently, it has been able to justify continued imperialism with the claim that the
civilizing project is needed for protection. The state and media have flattened the identities of some immigrants, making those identities hyper-visible. These representations have induced fear among “normal” Americans, that lurking behind the façade of a “good Muslim” could be a terrorist intent on blowing them up in the name of “jihad.” For example, the editor-in-chief of the U.S. News and World Report, Mortimer Zuckerman, asserts:

The most insidious threat of course, is that of Muslims living in the West who decide to put religious fanaticism ahead of loyalty to their host country. None of us can assume we are not at risk from some alienated American-born Muslim male inflamed by the Internet or brainwashed in prison or by a radical mosque (Sept. 25, 2006).

Interestingly, the above quote conflates the situation of Muslim immigrants in the US with those issues that are perhaps more salient to countries in Europe, where there are sizeable second-generation Muslim populations. Such a portrayal betrays the ignorance of the US popular media about the Muslim population in the US, which is composed largely of recent immigrants. Moreover, the warning has the effect of putting even the American-born into the category of terrorist. This is, in fact, the most insidious threat. Intensifying the sense of danger is the explicit reference to gender: the invocation focuses on a particular kind of man – one who is irrational, obsessive, and vengeful. The above also associates the idea of a Muslim terrorist (popularly understood as Arab or South Asian) with the African-American Muslim population, which plays upon fears of black males and draws a line around “us” and “them.” “us” being those who are afraid of blacks, Muslims, immigrants and “them” being those in the fear-causing categories.

Similarly, Senior Brookings Fellow Stephen Cohen writes:

It will only be a matter of time before upper-class, educated Pakistanis living abroad will come to share the belief held by all extremist Pakistani Muslims that there is a conflict of civilizations between Islam and the West, or at least between Pakistani Muslims and U.S. citizens and their allies, including the Pakistani government itself (2003).

Brookings Fellow Cohen evokes Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis (1996), and the inevitability that “upper-class, educated Pakistanis” could support terrorists, if not become extremists themselves. Even those Pakistani immigrants who might appear to have assimilated are portrayed as harboring ulterior motives. Sleeper-cell narratives evoke the imagery of the lurking terrorist hiding behind shirt and tie, ready to blow (invariably) both himself – and “us”– up. (Tongue-in-cheek commentary is made on this narrative in popular culture, such as the movie Harold & Kumar Escape from Guantanamo. The high-achieving and pot-smoking Kumar, an ultra-assimilated Indian-American, is mistaken for a terrorist because of his brown skin and a white woman’s misinterpretation of “bong” as “bomb.”)
Despite having gone to the best schools and working for the best corporations, middle-upper class Pakistanis in the US have found themselves targeted and painted as potential terrorists. Many of these transnational elites have attended western educational institutions and work for high-profile multi-national corporations (MNCs), but they find that their class attainment is not enough to keep them safe from being grouped with what is the more typical understanding of Pakistani Muslim extremist: someone poor, someone uneducated, someone against the American way of life. While this specific archetype is troublesome enough in its own right, the collapse of all Pakistanis into an oversimplified portrayal is another example of the way discourses construct oversimplified notions that allow surveillance and control.

Background on Pakistanis in the US

Since late 2001, the US government has been detaining people – mainly immigrants– as possible terrorists, resorting to extraordinary rendition to escape charges of illegality. Very little is known about the detainees, but in the first eleven months after 9/11, the Office of the Inspector General, (the internal watchdog of the Department of Justice), reviewed the cases of 762 individuals and found that although all of the hijackers were Saudi Arabian in nationality, the largest number of those detained were Pakistani, equaling about 33 percent of detainees, or more than double the number of those from any other country (US Department of Justice, 2003). The investigation revealed that the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) “made little attempt to distinguish” between immigrants who had potential ties to terrorism and those who were merely swept up by chance in the course of the federal investigations. Detainees were taken and held as a result of private citizens’ tips to the authorities. These tips were frequently based solely on appearance.

Figure 2: 9/11 Detainees by Nationality

Moroccan, Tunisian, Syrian and Guyanese. While much of the post-9/11 research has focused on Muslims or Arabs, little has been written about the specific immigrant nationalities. (In contrast to what many Americans assume, Pakistanis are not Arabs or Middle Eastern.)

Pakistanis make up the single largest national immigrant contingent of American Muslims, comprising 17 percent of all Muslims in the US; if the category was “South Asian”, the percentage would increase to one third of US Muslims. (Nimer, 2002; CAIR, 2005). The number of Pakistanis in the US is estimated to be no more than half a million: estimates range from 212,471 (2005-07, American Community Survey) to 480,000 or more (Pakistani Embassy). They are a young and relatively new community of immigrants. The majority (70–77 percent) are under the age of 44 (2005-07, ACS), and have been in the US for less than two decades; nearly half have resided in the US for a little more than a decade (Najam, 2006). They are also by and large extraordinarily well-educated and wealthy: over 50 percent of those 25 years of age or older have at least a college degree (it reaches nearly 70 percent by including associates degrees and some college) and almost a fourth have a graduate or professional degree (2000 Census, 2005-07 American Community Survey). Estimates of the aggregate annual income of Pakistanis in North America is at around $25 billion; their accumulated wealth around $100 billion; and their combined savings more than $6 billion (Burki, 2005).

Portrayals of and policies directed at a particular group as being poor, resentful, and fanatical stand in stark contrast to the actual community comprised largely of well-educated, resourceful, and cosmopolitan individuals. The incongruity between these dichotomous representations leads us to ask how these representations developed and whose purposes they serve.

Methods

I focus my research on the Silicon Valley area, where 14 percent of the world’s venture capital flows (equal in size to the UK); where some of the most highly educated work; and where one of the largest foreign-born populations in the country lives (Henton, 2007). Over half of the region’s science and engineering positions are filled with foreign-born individuals, and 14 % of the science and engineering employees are South Asian (2000 Census). Consequently, the area has a large percentage of the US Pakistanis, many of whom are H-1B visa workers who help fill the shortage of labor in the high-tech industry (South Asian American Policy & Research Institute, 2005). While they are not representative of the Pakistani population in the US writ large – these immigrants are wealthy, educated, and cosmopolitan (making them more emphatically transnational for those critics concerned with the overuse of the term) – they still make up an estimated half of the Pakistanis in the US. Besides remittances, this group is part of a technology-oriented “brain circulation,” courted by the Pakistani government and others for expertise and for representing the country abroad. (Individuals I spoke with have been contacted
by, among others, the Chief Technology Officer of the Pakistan military (Interview, August 2007) and maintain connections with a variety of companies and NGOs. Moreover, it is important to study this group because they are understudied population, both in terms of Muslims (where scholarship tends to focus on Arabs), and South Asians (where scholarship on Indians and India is more abundant).

To tap into this population, my research has included two of the leading South Bay Pakistani organizations, notable for their recognition amongst the Pakistani community and their degree of organizing: The Organization for Pakistani Entrepreneurs (OPEN) and The Pakistani-American Cultural Center (PACC). These are the only enduring Pakistani-named organizations in the Bay Area with an active membership and regular events. OPEN was founded in Boston in the late 1990’s and has six chapters across the US (Boston/New England, New York, Washington D.C., Silicon Valley, Houston, and most recently, Chicago), with burgeoning chapters around the globe (United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Canada, and England). Of these, the Silicon Valley chapter (OPEN-SV) is the largest, most active, and most visible. They claim to have about a third of the estimated 12,000 Pakistanis in the region on their listserve, and have a multitude of events each year, including a national conference. The organization is closely modeled on another somewhat ethnically centered group, The Indus Entrepreneurs (TIE), the largest entrepreneurial networking group in the world. Each region has a number of invitation-only “Charter Members” who set the direction for the chapter and serve as a type of “who’s who” amongst the Pakistani entrepreneurial set. Most relevant, it seems as though one of the main reasons for the chapter’s strength is because members and leaders— in response to the pressures caused by the hyper-visibility of Pakistan and Pakistanis—wish to publicize their professional and assimilatory success. Members and leaders have even talked about needing to wage a public relations campaign to better “market” themselves as a community and show Americans they are “normal.”

The second organization, the PACC, claims status as the first Pakistani-American cultural center in the US, and it is certainly one of the first cultural centers in the country dedicated to Pakistan. The PACC began in 2005 in Milpitas by an individual frustrated with the portrayals of Pakistan and Pakistanis (Interview, March 2008), and it now offers an array of programs, ranging from Urdu language study to karaoke night. It declares it is a non-religious and non-political organization, and its mission is “To educate and promote Pakistani languages, literature, history, and culture to all Americans irrespective of country of origin, with a specific emphasis to Americans of Pakistani descent,” (PACC Website, 2008). Similar to OPEN, the organization is modeled on the local Indian Cultural Center (ICC), founded in 2003, which is the largest Indian American cultural center in the US.

I have also “virtually” observed two other Pakistani organizations: Developments in Literacy (known mostly as DIL, which means “heart” in Urdu) and Pakistani Professionals for Peace. By virtual observation, I mean that I have studied their websites, publicity materials, newsletters, and other materials that can be obtained online. DIL is a
US-based educational non-profit organization created by Pakistani Americans in 1997, with chapters across the US, Canada, and the UK. DIL’s substantive position in Silicon Valley is social, centered around its fundraising efforts; in the last year, a gala and fashion show were held with tickets costing $200 a piece, tables, and “recognition donors” ranging from $3,000 – $7,500. There is significant overlap between these three organizations, particularly in terms of class.

Pakistani Professionals for Peace seems to only exist as a listserve, over which people send articles and discuss current events including the politics of Kashmir and India, Israel and Palestine, and Barack Obama and his cabinet. It is part of an organization created in the aftermath of September 11th – The Association for Pakistani Professionals – to dispel negative media about Pakistan. One signs up to be part of a focus group that will “contribute counter replies” to “neutralize the negative portrayal of Pakistan” and “highlight the positive role Pakistan has been playing as part of the international community” (AOPP Website, 2008).

At these sites, the methodology for my research project consists of several parts: participant observation; (OPEN Silicon Valley Chapter and PACC meetings and events); discourse analysis (documents and media from OPEN, PACC, AOPP, and DIL); and in-depth interviews (a snowball sample of mostly professional Pakistanis in the Bay Area using OPEN and the PACC as launch points.) Participant-observation allows me to better understand the dynamics of group interaction, and to conceive of the different relationships between actors. Besides offering me an opportunity to meet people to interview or talk about my project in the moment, attending various events provides data on the type of self-representation that Pakistanis have with each other and how they discuss the Pakistani community amongst themselves and in relation to the broader public.

The in-depth interviews helped me more fully understand the mechanisms by which a community identity is created, and whether and/or how a community deals with contestation – both externally and internally. Further, interviews allow me to gain an understanding of the different types of discrimination or pressures people have faced, particularly with respect to their individual or community identity. For this chapter, I analyzed 18 conducted interviews of approximately two hours each, with OPEN and PACC leadership, general members, and individuals of limited involvement in either organization, (and one individual with involvement in neither, but considerable involvement in the Muslim Student Association). Eleven of the interviewees have been men who generally hold positions in the various tech companies in and around the Bay Area. Seven of the interviewees have been women, two of whom are stay-at-home moms. Age has ranged from the mid-twenties to mid-fifties, and all are first generation immigrants – although one woman was born and raised in Canada. I have also conducted two interviews with Pakistanis from other parts of the country – a second generation woman from Houston, now living in Chicago, and a first generation man living and working in Washington, D.C. – to begin understanding possible differences in experience
according to location.

My not being Pakistani, nor possessing any substantive connection to the South Bay Silicon Valley community posed surprisingly few hurdles. I began showing up to OPEN events and introducing myself and my project to the leaders. Given that my questions overlapped with their concerns about the Pakistani community’s image, it was not difficult to engage their interest. In fact, not long after I had initiated conversations with OPEN’s leadership, I was told about a “business plan” that dealt with the image of the Pakistani community, and was soon sent a copy via email.

Theory

My analysis centers on the ways in which Pakistanis have been represented both in the here (The United States) and there (an amalgamation of terrorist harboring states, including Pakistan and the Middle East). The compression of identities occurs by the confusion of images of Pakistanis here and there, where the intersections of nationality, gender, class, and other variables of difference are rendered irrelevant. Citizenship (or more simply put, belonging) is dichotomized into an acceptable and unacceptable form, where being an immigrant heightens the unacceptability for Muslims, (especially men) because the Muslim category is painted as an all-consuming identity that negates any allegiances other than a fundamental religious one. In a word, Muslims (or those appearing to be Muslim) have been racialized. Racialization is a process that can assign meaning to different constellations of identity without any necessary relation to social class divisions; one that ascribes physical and cultural differences to individuals and groups; a process that constructs bodies and psyches (Barot & Bird, 2001). Thus, through racialized logic, all Pakistanis are “bad Muslims.”

As Mamdani (2004) and others have pointed out, Western epistemology is dichotomizing and has too often characterized other societies as “pre-modern.” While western culture is portrayed as dynamic, modern, creative, and expressive of what it means to be human, Muslim culture is painted as habitual, instinctive, and emanating from a mummified religion. According to the culture talk about Islam, Muslims – rather than making culture – conform to and are shaped by an unchanging set of practices and beliefs into which they have been born. The effects of the cultural construction of Pakistanis (or Muslims) living here in the U.S. evokes an all-encompassing feeling of threat for Americans, helping to justify the steps needed for protection. However, the representation of Pakistanis “there,” as discussed above, has the effect of diminishing the diversity of identities and feelings of belonging to a primarily singular narrative – one that creates an image of Muslims who are primitively traditional. Useful here is Yuval-Davis’ (1999) conception of multi-layered citizenship where one’s “citizenship in collectivities—local, ethnic, national, state, cross or trans-state and supra-state—is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each layer” (p. 119). That is to say, Pakistanis and other immigrants by definition have a multi-layered citizenship,
which does not preclude them from having loyalty to, or citizenship with the US. However, the way that loyalties and belonging can be interwoven among a variety of collectivities is ignored, and the complexity of connections and identity is reduced to a good/bad, with us, or against us - binary.

Too often the immigration literature does not account for the types of understandings generated by post-colonial scholars (such as Mamdani and others) that help explain the portrayals of—and hence the possibilities for and expectations placed upon—particular immigrant groups. Doing so helps address self-recognized gaps within assimilation theory, in addition to enhancing how those theories can be deployed. Assimilation theory is moving towards the concept of boundaries, allowing for greater dynamism in conversations with other fields and literatures, and in cross-national comparisons of immigrants and their situations. What post-colonial theorizing has underlined is the way the colonizers understood the colonized, how western powers justified domination and rule, and how the rulers differentiated themselves from those to be ruled. In my project, I seek to incorporate scholarship on the mechanisms of “othering,” to help move forward the immigration literature, particularly that of assimilation.

Alba and Nee (2003) define assimilation as the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences. They say that a viable definition of assimilation must recognize ethnicity as a social boundary; the boundary should feel concrete, and assimilation occurs on both sides of the boundary. That concreteness is embedded in a variety of social and cultural differences between groups, and is based on distinctions individuals make, those that shape their actions, and mental orientations towards others. Thus “assimilation” occurs as the salience of these distinctions becomes attenuated, and the occurrence of distinction becomes fewer and increasingly irrelevant. Alba (2005) goes on to hypothesize that associated with the prospects and processes of assimilation and exclusion are the differences between “bright” and “blurred” boundaries. Bright boundaries are defined as having an unambiguous distinction: individuals always know on which side they stand. In contrast, blurry boundaries, Alba says, have an ambiguous boundary location, and thus self-presentation and social representations are involved. Alba contends that different histories of minority groups and receiving societies carry over into boundary construction. Boundaries are path dependent, and the nature of the boundaries affects the likelihood and nature of assimilation, but specificity about those processes is lacking. Despite this theorizing, there is in general a lack of knowledge around the mechanisms of boundary activation, maintenance, dispute, crossing, dissolution, etc., (Lamont & Molnár, 2002), and I suggest the binaries that post-colonial theory takes for granted can be an avenue to help assist with the project.

This conversation is missing a detailed understanding of how institutional and political constraints affect immigrant groups; how groups respond to being conceived of as different; and other and the implications of that othering. In this paper I use my research on Pakistanis to help fill in some of the gaps in the immigration literatures to
illuminate the mechanisms of boundary construction and negotiation. Through such moves as detentions, special registration, and the Patriot Act, the US state has shaped the representation of Arabs and Muslims here to include all Muslims, anyone from the Middle East, and many from South Asia, irrespective of class and at times, even of US citizenship. That is to say, the often parallel discourses of the government, media, and public operate to draw a bright boundary between “them” and “us” by defining a transnational identity or multi-layered citizenship as dangerous for Pakistanis. State suspicions are allowed to take on larger dimensions: having these hyphenated identities, Pakistani-American, Muslim-American, are underlined and identified as threatening. Understanding how a community deals with the double bind – on the one hand, of hostile treatment from the receiving country; and on the other hand, of restraint in relationship to their home country – is important to fully flesh out the immigration literature and the research on boundaries.

Moreover, I contend that using insights from post-colonial theory provides a fruitful starting point for identifying how boundaries are created around certain communities, as well as the nature of those bounds. While the identification and analysis of dualisms is routine in current post-colonial and critical theory realms, the analytical framework generated perhaps most famously by Edward Said (1978) has yet to be picked up in quantitative leaning disciplines or fields. These dualisms are co-constituting – one is defined against the other – and in this case, good Muslims are situated against bad Muslims; suspicious, Middle-eastern appearing, foreigners against loyal Americans. My research shows how immigrants encounter and grapple with confining boundaries, providing evidence to advance and add to immigration theory.

To accomplish these goals, I center my research on the Pakistani community in and around Silicon Valley, and how this elite group in particular has been working to create a community identity. How have Pakistani immigrants in the US been experiencing and responding to the bright boundaries distinguishing them as others, and how have they been managing their identities in the context of changing geopolitics and negative portrayals of immigrants?

My discourse analysis centers on a 30 page document titled “Re: Present: Blueprint for Recasting Pakistan’s Image in the US” (herein referred to as the “Blueprint”), and it was created by the OPEN leadership in 2005. It is a rich piece of evidence: leaders in the Pakistani community have written, in essence, an outline of the perceived challenges their community faces in assimilation and how they plan to address these challenges. In the course of doing so, they use particular language that can be analyzed for meaning, both in terms of who they perceive the community to be, and also the ways in which they are reacting to the current political climate. Given the stature of the authors and their involvement in the Pakistani community here (and in Pakistan), the document serves as a useful framework for understanding the agendas of transnational elites for their immediate community, and perhaps, even for their homeland.
Similarly, the language used by the various organizations about their events, activities, and mission, etc. is a signal for how the community conceives of itself, its roles and responsibilities, and its relationship to the US and Pakistan. All of these organizations have been making conscientious use of online resources. In a way, the virtual life of an event or organization can be more communicative, especially to the society at large, about a community than the happening of the event itself. Those organizations I have observed seem aware of this, and have put significant effort into maintaining websites, list-serves, additional resources and multi-media – all of which can be analyzed for their content, and for how Pakistani groups are representing themselves. I primarily analyzed their language, similar to the document analysis.

Situating Pakistani Identity

When scholars speak of identity, they talk about it being fluid, layered, and changeable (Nagel, 1994; Soysal, 1994; Lie, 2004; Waters, 1999). However, identity is not something simply “put out into the world” by an individual: people have to deal with identities others impute upon them (Taylor, 1994). Pakistani identity has been essentialized in a variety of ways: Pakistanis have responded by contesting the limiting boundaries that conceive of their membership as part of a diffuse understanding of “Muslim” (including those that “appear” Muslim, Middle Eastern, or Arab), a membership threatening to America and Americans. This contestation takes the form of disputing the rigidity of the boundaries: arguing that they are not bright, so much as blurry; and re-situating those blurry boundaries to include community. Pakistanis are creating a collective identity of their own, constituted by a dialectical interplay of internal and external definitions (Jenkins, 1996).

Public opinion surveys over the last five years confirm the reality of Muslim stigmatization: a survey conducted by Cornell University found that Americans, when asked to characterize Islamic countries and peoples, characterized them as oppressive to women (74 percent), and as violent, dangerous, and fanatical (about half). Only about a quarter of respondents characterized Muslims as modern or tolerant (Media & Society Research Group, 2004). A majority (53 percent) of the Muslim population in the US, state they feel it is more difficult to be a Muslim in the US since the 9/11 attacks, and that the government singles out Muslims for extra surveillance (54 percent). This view is particularly prevalent among highly educated, wealthier, and highly religious Muslims: nearly two-thirds of US Muslims who have attended graduate school (65 percent) and have household incomes of $100,000 a year or more (68 percent), say that 9/11 has made it harder to be a Muslim. Moreover, Muslims say the biggest problems they face are rooted in prejudice, ignorance, or misunderstanding, while problems that dominate the concerns of the public at large barely make the list: less than 2 percent volunteer economic or job worries. While citing discrimination as their greatest challenge (19 percent), Muslim Americans say being viewed as terrorists (15 percent); ignorance about Islam (14 percent); and stereotyping (12 percent), are their most important problems (Pew Research Center,
As an exemplar, the authors of the Blueprint recognize the different ways “Pakistan” and “Pakistani” have become transitively linked with “terrorist,” suggesting that interests are what drive the negative imagery of Pakistan: “Due to association with largely negative public perceptions of Pakistan and Muslims, Pakistani Americans are also perceived negatively in the US, and in the West in general” (Introduction, p. 3). Pakistan is self-identified as a Muslim country, and most Pakistani Americans are Muslim-named. The “war on terror” is targeted against radical militants associated with Islam, and the well-funded PR connected with the war effort therefore supports a negative view of Pakistan (Special Considerations, pg. 5).

The authors voice the feeling that the boundaries around Muslims are calculated, serving the purposes for those at the helm of the “war on terror.” Stressing that “prejudices, racism, and Islamophobia are tangible expressions of the hard reality of Western societies,” Ramadan (2004) asserts that “increasingly, and for a considerable period, [US Muslims], will have to become accustomed to facing political security measures, discrimination, accusations of ‘double-talk,’ menacing, malevolent looks, and acts of surveillance and control” (p. 226). One of the mechanisms of control is the battle over Muslim representation, where Muslims are “pressed to find a spokesperson for Muslims, lest something should emerge not to the liking of authorities” (Ramadan, p. 251-2). Indeed, this tension finds itself in OPEN and PACC’s mobilization, where one of the motivating reasons for action is the feeling of having bright boundaries placed around their community:

[T]he increased spotlight, post 9-11 on Pakistan and on Muslim nations has given rise to new stereotypes and accentuated existing stereotypes. Pakistan’s image is now a very direct issue for Pakistan-born immigrants in the US, as civil rights and freedoms look more vulnerable than ever before. Standing on the sidelines is no longer an option. While there are plenty of instances of success among Pakistani expatriates, there is a severe dearth of published accounts of these stories. What we need is “positive” relationship building based on balanced information and understanding of the potential and actual contributions to American society by Pakistani-Americans (Background, pg. 4).

The above excerpt demonstrates that for Pakistanis in the US, the “spotlight” on their community has been a call to action in respect to group representation. The group in need of representation is “Pakistan-born immigrants,” though the spotlight is on their country of origin, not themselves. This, in addition to the “expatriate” word choice (implying they still belong to Pakistan), suggests their awareness of outsider status based on nationality and place of origin, and their primary sense of belonging to Pakistan. Their solution for dealing with Pakistan’s image is to point out the contributions their community does and could make, and to emphasize their attachment to America.
To signal belonging and wishes of belonging, the founder of the PACC, Farhad, very consciously included “American” in the naming of the community center. When I asked him about why he started the center and in particular, why he included “American” in the title, he responded with a narrative about his father’s death shortly before 9/11. Farhad said that he was claustrophobic, as his father had been, and compared nightmares he had – in which his father was trapped within his coffin – with the feeling he experienced as a Muslim immigrant in the US after 9/11. Farhad had felt enclosed, anxious and afraid:

After September 11, the Muslim picture... on the community there was huge pressure. Everyone who was Muslim was suddenly suspect. Before that it was totally opposite, people could say whatever was on their mind. So there was a big shift. Personally, I started feeling a lot of pressure (Interview, March 2008).

I asked him to elaborate, and before responding, he remarked that he had been a software engineer at the time:

If I see a cop behind me... if I am sitting in my workplace and people are walking around with their walkie-talkies... I’ll feel that somebody is coming to get me. Those types of feelings were there. Not sure how many people were feeling it, but it was a very intense experience for me. And I haven’t done anything! (laughs)

After being detained and interrogated at an airport in Florida, Farhad felt frustrated and paralyzed – an attitude he said was shared within the Pakistani community – “that feeling that somebody isn’t letting you do something” (Interview, March 2008). Such experiences led to anger, which motivated him to “instead of staying in hiding, to go out and do a very public thing.” Farhad changed careers, starting a television program about Pakistanis in business and technology to show a “different face” of the community. With the success of the show, he felt further empowered to “keep doing bigger things.” This led to the formation of the PACC, which Farhad conceptualized as a launch pad for new Pakistani immigrants, who could join a community that actively participated in American culture, while still celebrating Pakistani heritage and cultural traditions, and also taking seminars on retirement and investing for recent immigrants. They have about one financial or business seminar per month, for example November 2008’s was entitled “Financial Planning in an Uncertain Economy.” Initially, Farhad attempted to show a different side of the Pakistani community through his television program by portraying savvy Pakistanis in technology and business. He did not see this as enough, however, and decided that the creation of PACC would be even more effective for shaping a positive Pakistani community identity.

Belonging is more than just social locations and constructions of identities and attachments. It is also about the ways an individual’s or group’s positionality and identity assertions are valued and judged (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 203). As such, contesting terrorist connotations involves allies outside of the group; as an example, the incoming president
of OPEN, Adil, gave an introductory talk to volunteers in February 2007, encouraging them to try and get more people involved in OPEN:

OPEN is first and foremost, a networking organization. Sure, we have Pakistani in our name, but that does not mean this should be a club exclusive to only Pakistanis. It will be better for us as a community to get more people involved in our events – they’re valuable! Bring your co-workers and friends to a meeting. We have a lot of success in our community and we need to show that off, and show to people we are driven and work in the best companies and are very entrepreneurial, educated, nice, (sardonically, and with great emphasis) NORMAL people (Field Notes, February 2007).

Through a variety of ways, Adil was suggesting a means for the relocation of boundaries. Not only are Pakistanis normal (implying that they are perceived as abnormal), they are “nice” and “smart.” They are people one would want to know, especially for business-related reasons. The quote above provides a window into how Pakistanis wish to be portrayed versus how they have already been portrayed: not normal or modern, but fanatical and dangerous.

As the above examples demonstrate, Pakistanis in Silicon Valley have been experiencing the effects of stereotypes around both Muslim and Pakistani categories, and as a result, the community has been engaged in a significant amount of identity work – seeking to “establish meaning and a consensus about meaning about the identity and unity of [their] group” (Bourdieu, p. 221). The bright boundaries that exclude Pakistanis from acceptance and categorize them as suspicious and other have been a catalyst for community identity construction and management. If assimilation is the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences, then the examination of the ways an excluded community seeks to belong can help expose the perceived meanings necessary to portray in order to belong. Through such an examination, I have found that the Pakistani community in Silicon Valley has engaged in a performative discourse to counter the dominant, but misrecognized definition of their community and to get people to know and recognize a new, legitimate definition. The performative discourse has two core tropes, what I call identity tactics: (1) a business-developer identity tactic, and (2) a secular-pluralist identity tactic, that contest racialized boundaries and re-define their community and any of its transnational endeavors or inclinations as within acceptable limits.

Identity Tactics Overview

To help explain my findings I am using a combination of Spivak’s (1996) concept of strategic essentialism and de Certeau’s (1984) conceptual differentiation between a strategy and a tactic, and am thus deploying a concept I term “identity tactics.” Identity tactics can be understood as the temporal maneuvers people (individuals, groups, or
communities) use to represent themselves and to contend with boundaries confining them to portrayals not of their own creation. An identity tactic is the narrative a group gives about itself to achieve specific means, and is imbued with a dialectic (as per de Certeau, 1984) and reflexive simulations (Spivak, 1996). After providing a sketch of the intellectual antecedents of the identity tactic concept, I discuss two different identity tactics that help show in greater detail the boundary work involved in how immigrant groups respond to institutional and political constraints about who they are.

In his discussion of the “modes of operation” or “schemata of action” of everyday actors, de Certeau (1984) makes the useful distinction between a “strategy” and a “tactic,” the former is associated with institutional forces and the latter with the subordinated or “weak.” Strategies are actions that elaborate systems and totalizing discourses – technocratic rationalizations – a specific type of knowledge that is generated through the calculation or manipulation of power relationships. Strategies assume a “place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threat can be managed” (pg. 36). Tactics on the other hand are “calculated actions determined by the absence of a proper locus... the space of a tactic is the space of the other.” They depend on and take advantage of opportunities – tactics must “play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power. [Tactics] must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers” (pg. 37).

In a somewhat confusing overlap of terminology, though not meaning, Spivak’s concept of “strategic essentialism” (Guha & Spivak, 1988; Spivak, 1996) is a similar sort of political tool that groups can use to temporarily represent themselves to achieve a short-term goal. It serves as “a tool for redressing power imbalances...when a stigmatized group forms an oppositional identity to counter negative ideologies” (Bucholtz, 2003, p. 401). (Bucholtz points out that essentialism is also strategic for scholars, when assumptions aid analysis for preliminary description.) In contrast to essentialism’s permanent linking of essences to a group, what marks strategic essentialism is that the “essential attributes” are self-consciously defined by the group itself rather than outside oppressors. While much has been made of Spivak’s term (so much so that she says to have disowned the term, despite holding out hope for the concept (Danius, Jonsson, Spivak, 1993), if we were to apply de Certeau’s (1984) distinction between tactics and strategies, it would be appropriate to think of her idea as tactical essentialism, one that can help dismantle externally imposed constraints by being critically employed.

The resultant “tactical essentialism” can be understood as the types of central identities groups highlight about themselves, and understanding the variations of these narratives can help clarify the ways in which an immigrant community reacts to a framing not of their own creation and negotiates the terms of exclusionary boundaries. It is useful as a concept because it allows for an analysis of different types of identities a community may put forth but still recognizes that identity is conditional and in flux. The climate of suspicion has pressured the Pakistani community to respond to “good Muslim/bad
Muslim” state-constructed discourses, and they have done so by deploying two central identity tactics, which I term the “business-developer” and “secular-pluralist” identity tactics. Pakistanis use them individually and at the community level to refute a simplified (vilified) identity, and respondents have indicated that they feel a certain pressure to take on these identities and that there is a reward for doing so. These identity tactics are overlapping, not mutually exclusive, and are used to demonstrate this immigrant population is dedicated to assimilation and that any transnational activity is helpful (or at the very least, not hazardous) for American security.

**Business-Developer Identity Tactic**

In contestation of the boundaries and external pressures that situate the stereotyped Muslim as irrational, pre-modern, and anti-development, one of the identity-tactics that Pakistanis in the Bay Area have employed is what I call the “business-developer” identity tactic. Pakistanis use this identity tactic to re-situate boundaries to be perceived, at both individual and group-levels, as successful professionals, rational capitalists who advocate developing Pakistan in a way that is friendly to US interests. To convey the message they are eager to assimilate at high levels – and should be accepted similar to other immigrant communities – Pakistanis in Silicon Valley have “marketed” themselves by broadening community exposure and opportunities and as having mastered the techniques and language of business. Those Pakistanis with relationships to and in Pakistan have used similar tactics to justify why their attachment is not only acceptable, but good for their new home: contrary to the accusation of disloyalty, they have shown how their developmental desires have translated to efforts to improve and reform Pakistan to be a neoliberal partner in global capitalism. In both instances, the emphasis is on how it is the Pakistani community has represented and re-presented themselves to US society – tactical efforts through identity.

Individually, though especially at a group-level, Pakistanis seek to portray themselves as professional, successful, efficient and organized – particularly in the realm of business – and it is within this framework that Pakistani organizations have been reaching out to the broader community. The PACC regularly hosts financial wellbeing seminars for Pakistanis’ relationships in the US and abroad, and both the PACC and OPEN have been very self-conscious about showcasing its members and leaders as successful members of elite schools, companies, and various professional networks. Previously criticized for being a closed, elitist organization, OPEN has in recent years sought to incorporate more and more professionals into its membership rolls, billing itself as an organization for more than just the Pakistani community. Mahnaz, a woman in her early forties, was individually enlisted to serve in a leadership position (as most women in the organization have been), and stated the importance of broadening OPEN in terms of how the community would ultimately fare:

Siraj, the current president, has talked a lot about the importance of reaching out to
the community, and it’s something that resonates with me, so I’ve done as much as I can to increase our membership. We want to let people know, people in the community, you know, we’re there for you. We’re trying to change the whole face of OPEN, all of us are trying... getting more women, more professionals... it’s important because it’s a support system, if people join and come to the events they can advance faster and further, it’s great for networking, and you get a chance to learn from experts. And it’s not just for Pakistanis. I’ve invited a lot of other guys I work with, a Swede, an Iranian, you know some white guys – and they’ve thanked me for inviting them, they learned a lot and said they met a lot of really fascinating, accomplished people. So that’s good for us, too... more people can see our community like that (Interview, February 2008).

In highlighting those most successful in the business community and trying to create a stronger professional network for advancement and recognition, these Pakistanis wish to show they are high achieving and “assimilating” at a high level similar to other prosperous minorities. There is a curious element of emulation in the outreach to the Pakistani community, as Mahnaz (Interview, February 2008) acknowledged: it was in pushed in part because “the Indians and Chinese are doing it.” Group discussions about the Pakistani community have pointed out that “the Indians have been very good about selling themselves as hard workers and very smart;” and the leaders of OPEN have talked very frankly about needing to get the “best practices” from the “marketing challenges” that other ethnic communities have faced. In fact, a large theme in my research was the comparison of Pakistanis with other ethnic groups, and even more interestingly, the comparison incorporated a management-consultant or sales type of framework. For example, “we need to ask ourselves ‘what’s the Jewish model’? How have they been able to, despite being a small ethnic community, garner the best positions in business and government in this country?” (Field Notes, March 2008).

To the extent that Jews are perceived as highly assimilated in the US, when the PACC called the Indian Community Center (ICC) for tips on starting their organization, they were delighted to find out the ICC had hired consultants from the Jewish Community Center. Ethnic emulation, often entwined with a management-consultant or sales type of framework, is a self-conscious attempt to attach well-received “essences” of a group; it is in other words, a type of tactical essentialism, where “essential attributes” are being modeled and defined from other minority groups. The purposeful comparison to other ethnic groups, frank analysis of how other groups have succeeded, consultation with and modeling of how other ethnic organizations operate shows a very self-conscious effort to assimilate into American culture while still retaining their ethnic identity. “[I]t is increasingly in the market and through marketing discourse that [Latinos and other minorities] are increasingly debating their social standings and public standings” (Dávila, 2001, p. 2).

The Pakistani community has not only been seeking to refute negative essentializations but to use the business-capitalist developer tactic as a means of
demonstrating their worth to US society. Members and especially leaders of both
organizations (OPEN and PACC), in interviews and during public events, have talked
about “marketing” Pakistan or the Pakistani community. The community needed a
different “brand,” because the current brand of the community was the essentialized
portrayal of Pakistan (and Pakistanis) as hostile to America. As the authors of the
Blueprint noted:

Certain current realities must be acknowledged upfront. In particular there are PR
and Marketing efforts underway that are in opposition of the goal of the Re:
Present project to improve Pakistan’s image (Special Considerations, pg. 5).

The use of business language – particularly the use of the term “marketing” –
indicates the authors think that someone may be profiting from Pakistan having a bad
image. Discussing dueling PR campaigns creates sides – professional Pakistanis on the
one hand, and the administration and neoconservatives on the other. In terms of the
latter, elsewhere in the Blueprint, it advocates that, “We must learn how to unite in a
mission to represent ourselves in a truly fair and balanced manner...” (Introduction, pg.
3). Implying that Fox News’ portrays Pakistanis, Pakistan, and Muslims unfavorably, this
conjures up a tongue-in-cheek reference to the media channel’s tagline, subtly marks the
boundaries of the community as those that are capable of representing Pakistan and
Pakistanis in a mission against those opposed to Pakistan and Pakistanis. Taking the
reference a step further, the Blueprint identifies the “NeoStrategy Group” as the initiators
of the Re: Present Project and describes the group as the following:

[A] group of Pakistanis and Pakistani Americans with strong business leadership
experience. The NSG has a board of directors as well as a board of advisors. The
executive and operating teams that shall be put in place for the Re: Present Project
as a whole and for the individual initiatives, will report to the NSG which will
provide governance and oversight (NeoStrategy Group, pg. 6).

When I asked Maqil, the president at the time (early 2007), what or who the NSG
was, he laughed and said to just ignore it – it was an inside joke, and a play on the term
“neo-con”. The punning of community organization is an example of conscious tactical
essentialism; the jokes are a recognition they must “play on and with a terrain imposed on
[them] by the law of a foreign power” (de Certeau, pg. 37). Even though the group name
may not have been seriously intended, it indicates that Maqil and other OPEN Charter
Members (an invite only group of individuals who tend to be high-profile and well-off)
see themselves as community leaders capable of garnering wide support. Some
seriousness was intended, because Maqil said he asked various OPEN Charter members
(an invite only group of individual who pay a $500 annual membership fee) to chip in a
few thousand dollars for the project and in this manner had raised about $60 K to get the
Re: Present project off the ground. The NSG is organized like a typical corporation – a
board of directors, board of advisors, and executive and operating teams – locating
community organizers, the ones who could “best represent the community,” as those with
strong business experience.

The stereotype of Pakistanis or Muslims is that they are “against the American way of life” and anti-development, especially capitalist development via multinational corporations or institutions of the West. To question or disagree with neoliberal development would render an immigrant suspect, especially one from such a frontier of “underdevelopment” like Pakistan, and would demonstrate they are pre-modern, knowingly or not rejecting what would be good for them and their people. So it is an assimilatory advantage of Pakistanis to emphasize that they do wish to contribute towards a certain type of development, one perceived to benefit all involved. Being a harbinger of capitalist development distinguishes the transmigrant as someone who consents to and urges for the transmission of knowledge and way of life from the North to the South.

The meaning of development is itself entwined with neoliberalism, and is commonly understood to be the transfers of capital, expertise and technologies from the advanced countries of the Northern hemisphere to the “underdeveloped” South (Goldman, pg. x). It is a hegemonic discourse incorporated into the common-sense way many Americans interpret, live in, and understand the world (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). It is “a frame of mind, a cultural dynamic, an entrepreneurial personality type, and a rule of law that penetrates the most intimate relations people have with each other, state apparatuses, and their natural environments” – and it is a pivotal component of American identity (Goldman, pg. 8).

These capitalists, using the business-developer identity tactic, try to make clear the message that assimilation to American values is not mutually exclusive from transnationalism – maintaining connections to Pakistan. This is so because wanting to “improve” Pakistan through corporate development, and to introduce freedoms of the market and consumption, demonstrates not a disavowal of attachment to the US, but an appreciation for and immersion in the American way of life. Rather than being a threat to security, the Pakistanis try to prove through the business-developer identity tactic that their connection to Pakistan is acceptable, preferred, and even strategic for geopolitical reasons. While many Pakistanis have attested to some of the difficulties of literally maintaining a physical connection to Pakistan (trouble in airports especially), doing so with the clear intention of contributing to a future Pakistan compatible with US interests argues for the recognition that transnational Pakistanis can be an asset to American businesses and thus, American security.

The development framework employed by these Pakistani migrants seeks to demonstrate how their role in developing Pakistan can potentially shift US-Pakistani relations. For example, at the 2007 OPEN Forum, the founder of Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), and prominent entrepreneur, industrialist and transnational elite, Syed Babar Ali, gave the keynote address on his successes as a serial entrepreneur and the transition into philanthropic work. He encouraged those in
attendance to follow in his footsteps, and use their location in Silicon Valley to their advantage. Linking business success with the ability to make change in Pakistan (specifically through the creation of western-style schools and technical universities), he urged the audience to, “Go make not a million dollars, but a billion dollars!” This was met with chuckles, and Dr. Ali quickly followed with, “And then write [LUMS] a fat check!” which was met with more appreciative laughter (Field Notes, June, 2007).

In the Blueprint, driving community organizing are two motives: the threat to civil liberties, and the lost offshore outsourcing opportunities. Pakistani-American organizations and individuals, because of their access to Pakistani labor markets, need to be “marketed as viable business partners to the West.... The impact of our poor image in the US has not been tackled head on: until this is done, it will undermine our ability to benefit from the outsourcing phenomenon” (Background, Pg. 4). Hamid, a microchip engineer in his early thirties, further explained that organizing the community would help create positive recognition of entrepreneurial Pakistanis, so access to industry could be translated into development in Pakistan:

We need to build up Pakistan’s image in terms of business. China, India – the big companies have established major design centers there. But Pakistan isn’t a part of that. So we are trying to establish trust so we can replicate it in our own country. That’s how industry was built up in China and India – the people and immigrants here established that trust (Interview, August 2007).

Besides refuting the notion that Pakistanis are “bad Muslims,” this kind of exposure benefits an exclusive cadre of the community who use the business-developer identity tactic to further simultaneously capitalistic and philanthropic goals. For example, expressing interest in and promoting “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) is a way that Pakistanis can show belonging to the places they work. CRS is perceived as a priority for a corporation to pursue for economic and social reasons (Lee, 2007), and the case of Pakistani offers both the potential of profit and developing a “troubled” part of the world. For many Pakistanis, there is a wish, if not active commitment, to “give back” to Pakistan, which works in partnership with a more selfishly oriented profit motive.

An OPEN volunteer meeting in February of 2008 held at one of the glass and steel buildings on the SAP campus in Palo Alto, California, featured the types of conversations underlining this point. On a gray Saturday, about 20 people (mostly men, ranging in age from early thirties to early sixties) wearing business casual discussed the importance of making the perception of Pakistan as being a good place to invest, and how the tumultuous politics there made it difficult to do business. Standing at the front of a bright and airy “classroom,” populated with about 40 stylish black leather chairs on hidden wheels, with ergonomic, adjustable pullout desks, a Charter member stood in front of the group and complained, “How many weekends have we all spent worrying about the future of Pakistan? I have a business there with 15 employees, but my wife won’t let me go – I am not allowed to go there!” In response, a chic woman in her late twenties said, “Faiz,
you have a business there because you want to help...” but she was quickly interrupted by Faiz shaking his head no with a mischievous smile on his face. He then exclaimed impishly, “It’s cheap!” and everyone laughed (Field Notes, February, 2008).

Irrespective of the capitalistic or philanthropic desires for development, the attachment to Pakistan and its changing circumstances are demonstrative of the flexibility and quick-changing nature of identity tactics. The business-developer and secular-pluralist (to be discussed below) identity tactics became even more important as a response to the violent events of 2007 in Pakistan.

Before the multiple bombings – including at the prominent Islamabad Marriot; before the high-profile protests and strikes in opposition to Musharaff’s removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry; before the attempted then realized assassination of the returned from exile, ex-prime minister Benazair Bhutto; before the seeming unraveling of civil order in Pakistan, the Pakistani conceiving of the Re: Present project hoped to deflect the negative reputation that some of them seemed to think Pakistan unfairly had. (During a conference this issue was brought up, and the “danger” in Pakistan was compared to that of India – that the US media covered those events in Pakistan with more drama than that with which India was covered.) The assumption then, was that through the deployment of the business-developer identity tactic, the American public could be manipulated and that with effort, the Pakistani community could reframe the representation of themselves and their country. Pre-existing connections to those in Pakistan, and new connections with corporations and start-ups in the US, and possibly connections with the US state itself – all combined with the power that capital provides – means that transnational Pakistanis can call the shots in their country of origin to quite an extent. According to the Blueprint:

This project will not defend, explain, or be an apologist for Government of Pakistan policies. However, we start with a commitment to (and support of) our home country that is unequivocal, and a desire to improve it in any way we can. As Pakistan struggles with its “business model,” an effective Image makeover plan will have the beneficiary side effect of giving Pakistan PR cover, under which to improve the reality on the ground (Guiding Principles, pg. 5).

As the planners of a makeover, these Pakistanis saw themselves as both leading Pakistan’s development, “marketing it,” and being in charge of representing the positive aspects of Pakistan to the rest of the world, especially the US. Similarly, the Blueprint authors saw themselves, and those the project was intended for, as conduits for neoliberal globalization, in so far as “PR cover” would allow Pakistan to improve their “business model” – a curious coding of Pakistan’s civil instability.

However, the way the community dealt with the flashpoint of Pakistan’s well-publicized and worried over downfall illustrates the rapidity with which identity tactics can rework themselves, and the impact that geopolitical events have on an immigrant
The community feels no choice but to deal openly and vocally with the center stage Pakistan has taken in global power struggles. One of the authors of the Blueprint, Siraj, talked frankly about the change in tactics:

This plan, it’s not applicable any more! We have to face the facts that Pakistan is going to hell, and we have to do something about that. We can’t pretend that with just a little fixing, it will be a good business environment. Pakistan has always had problems, but from an immigrant’s perspective – my perspective – we need to do more politically. Use our connections in Washington and take a more hands-on approach – contribute more to the building blocks that Pakistan so desperately needs, education, a basic infrastructure (Interview, August 2007).

Events that take on a geopolitical significance have an effect on an immigrant community, their means of assimilating, and how transnationalism is sustained. Identity tactics are just that, tactics – the art of finding and implementing means to achieve particular immediate or short-term aims. The renunciation of certain parts of the Blueprint – particularly the “re-branding” aspect – is an example of how immigrants maneuver the changing situations from the reverberations of states’ affairs.

**Secular – Pluralist**

The Pakistani organizations I observed have worked on bringing middle-class transnational people together because of their shared experiences and similar orientations, being pro-business and development (as discussed above), and pro-secularism and pluralism. Articulating these orientations is an attempt to blur or even erase the boundary of unacceptability, and instead mark themselves as a model minority-immigrant group – “good Muslims.” The details of doing so have involved distancing themselves from Islam religiously – though accepting it culturally – emphasizing their secularity, enthusiasm for pluralism and diversity, and championing women’s equity in the public sphere. Ultimately, the secular-pluralist identity tactic is one used in representations of their transnational encounters, coupled with a disproportionate transparency about how their organization is run, where and how do

dated money is used, and all the parties involved.

Secularity as a key aspect of people’s identities was something I heard over and over again; many of the Pakistanis I spoke with identified as secular, some strongly so. Some explained being secular as being agnostic, or not being religious, and expressed their religious preferences and practices within the context of pluralism – that what and how they chose to worship should not matter to anyone else because spirituality is something personal. Those who said they were secular or agnostic recognized Islam as “something cultural,” though also noted that the brand of Islam in the US available tended to be based more on Middle Eastern practices or religion. Many of the first-generation immigrants said they never went to masjid even when they were in Pakistan;
that going to mosque or being religious was not something they grew up doing. Subtly or not, secularity was linked to class status: those from upper class families eschewed Islam and the negative stereotypes that accompany it, such as being violent and/or oppressive to women. Mahirah, who has been living in the US for nearly twenty years, (and from a “family that is not religious at all”) said she was confused about why so many Americans thought that Pakistani women were subjugated or did not have any options:

You know for me, my family was quite wealthy, we knew Jinnah and that sort of thing – and I always knew I could do whatever I wanted. My father and uncles even, it was very important to them – and my mother – that I get a really good education. I’ve had tons and tons of support from my family. I think this whole oppressed women thing is just a stereotype. I mean, it happens sure, but I don’t know anyone like that. It’s just politics, you know. Why does the US want everyone to think that Pakistani women are like that? It’s just stupid (Interview, March 2008).

It is the act of telling these narratives that pushes against the bright boundary that puts all Muslims in the potential terrorist or oppressed women categories, though the tropes have the simultaneous effect of affirming the reality of the otherwise essentialized identities.

Secularity and its accompanying expectation of empowered women was not just or primarily a pre-existing identity however. One respondent, when asked whether she felt like people in the Pakistani community were very secular, said:

Yeah, that’s the new thing that’s developing among Pakistanis… people feel like, here and even in Pakistan, that people relate Islam with terrorism, and they want to go away from that. They want to say, okay, we’re just Pakistanis and not terrorists. They’re trying to say, we’re not religious, we’re so liberal, and we’re just normal people (Interview, March 2008).

Surprisingly, there seems to be little research on whether and how immigrants might use secularity as a means of integration or assimilation. There is also a lack of research on post-1960’s immigrants that compares identity construction differences between religious and nonreligious immigrants, or how religious and ethnic identities relate to one another outside of specifically religious contexts (Cadge & Ecklund, 2007). Social and historical contexts affect how a religious identity manifests (Peek, 2005) and thus states and geopolitics have an impact on immigrant communities. For the OPEN leadership, constructing a distinction between Pakistanis and the larger Muslim category was a goal of the Re: Present project and for the organization as a whole. During a conversation in early 2007, when I asked about why the Blueprint was created and what the Re: Present project was about, the president at the time, Siraj, clarified:

A group is emerging among the organization that realizes that Pakistani-
Americans need to take charge of our destinies and create our own image in the US. The Pakistani-American identity is getting hijacked in various ways by other Muslims, and while these well-meaning individuals have good intentions, they are just not the best faces the community has to offer. OPEN can deliver better results than these well-meaning organizations (Interview, January 2007).

Siraj went on to talk about how people had the wrong idea about Pakistanis, because of their misinterpretations about Muslims. He felt the Pakistani community needed to distinguish itself, both for American society and for itself. That is, “people need to know more about the successes within the Pakistani community and realize they have a lot to be proud of,” that Pakistanis are productive members of society and have made many positive contributions to the US. Pakistanis should be proud to tell people they are Pakistani and that “being Pakistani means more than just being Muslim.” “Yes, of course, many Pakistanis are Muslim, but that does not mean that all are. And certainly there are many Pakistanis who are quite secular, myself included, who are far from strict adherents to Islam.” According to Siraj, the US media had picked up on a few voices who claim to speak for Pakistanis in the US, and groups such as OPEN had a responsibility to show another, “better” side of the community. Showing that a group of “affluent, educated and successful” Pakistanis exist would help continue developing a critical mass of “similarly minded people who have disassociated themselves with community because of the way it’s been represented” (Interview, January, 2007).

The PACC similarly shies away from any sort of religious identity, instead trying to shape and show a community diverse in its interests and activities. Many classes offered at the Community Center for students and adults are centered on Pakistani culture, or just things the community has expressed interest in. They hold Urdu immersion classes, but also offer chess classes, martial arts classes, family music night, and “homework helpers.” The founder, Farhad, saw the Center as key to helping the Pakistani community become more comfortable with and participatory in American culture and traditions, and similarly to have their own cultural events in such a way as to make Americans feel more comfortable with Pakistani events. In this respect, keeping their involvement strictly non-religious and non-political was important because

Religion and politics... there are just so many things to fight over and people get heated about what they think is right. I want to just focus on the fun things – music, dancing, singing, these things cannot be held at the masajid – and things that will help our community grow stronger – speaking classes, math, career workshops for women, poetry... Pakistan has a very rich cultural background and it will be good to showcase those things and celebrate them so many people can come and experience it (Interview, March 2008).

The emphasis is on a mode of upper-middle class cultural authenticity. Artists, poets, classically trained singers, (and more recently, those skilled performers of Bollywood and Pakistani pop music) are the types of people the PACC brings to share
with the community, and the subtext of the event is that Pakistani denotes, not reactive and repressive, but self-assured, open-minded, and refined. (Or in the pop instance, modern, light-hearted, and fun.) But such events and classes come at a cost: classes usually start at around $80, and events start at minimum $60 for a family of four – not unreasonable, but exclusive in who could take advantage of such offerings. At a celebration of Pakistan Day, in March of 2008, the PACC had a full line-up of performers of all ages, and had invited the Fremont and Milpitas mayors to partake in the festivities, as well as to give a short talk to those in attendance. The tickets to that event would have run $100 for a family of four (student tickets were $25) in return for a nice buffet-style dinner, an evening of entertainment, and mostly an extensive social and networking event. (At times, you could barely hear the speakers because people were talking to each other with enthusiasm.) The Pakistani community this PACC event was trying to show was a cosmopolitan set, individuals who were very interested in Pakistani culture and maintaining ties to Pakistan. If not for business and development goals, then because they wanted their children to “learn Urdu and experience Pakistani culture.” The hall it was held in was fancily decorated and everyone was well dressed – it was a conspicuous effort to achieve recognition for the Pakistani community’s assimilatory efforts – and the mayors delivered, remarking how “important” the Pakistani community was to their respective cities, how accomplished the community is, and also what “nice, warm people” they are.

A so-called “guiding principle” of the Blueprint is a pluralist endeavor: “This project will be inclusive rather than exclusive, working with non-Pakistani groups and individuals wherever possible” (Guiding Principles, p. 6). Efforts to include outsiders – such as the mayors – is a means of addressing negative imagery of Pakistan and Pakistanis in several ways. By drawing others into a somewhat self-enclosed group, certain leaders and members are able to serve as spokespeople, representing their community and interests. There is the hope the outsider will advertise the Pakistanis’ high-achievements and their good (or normal) qualities, and the Pakistani community can also point to the outsider as evidence for how they are assimilated, nice minorities.

Inclusivity has also meant focusing on the visibility of women. Both organizations and their male members emphasized the need to have more women get involved in their organizations, and have provided events geared specifically towards women, creating some insight as to what Pakistani women should aspire. The tropes of liberal feminism have become commonplace and expected in various domains, significant enough that new immigrant populations see the espousal of western gender-equity paradigms as a means of blurring the line that makes the Pakistani community seem distinct. That is to say, the male leadership of the PACC and OPEN has worked hard on trying to get Pakistani women into more public arenas to show that the community is, if not assimilated, then assimilating. Farhad, the PACC founder talked about the PACC being a “first stop shop to get help on financials” among other things:

We want to provide career workshops for women because there’s a weakness in
the Pakistani community. We want to encourage women to understand there’s a different culture here. It’s good for the family and community. They should be taking jobs and...(Interview, March 2008).

When I asked why “should” and not “could,” Farhad provided the metaphor of learning to breathe in air after a lifetime spent in the water:

If you keep acting like you’re in the old environment, the adjustment will impact the community, the species. Those who adjusted first will survive – who get lungs out of gills. That’s the way I see it, we’re in different environment and culture. The values we carried with us were good there in Pakistan, but here we need different mindset. You need to volunteer, take part in some part-time thing (Interview, March 2008).

On OPEN’s part, when I have asked why the focus on women, the men talked about needing to be “more diverse” and to “showcase all the talent and expertise that the Pakistani community has to offer.” Despite the aggressive and active recruitment of women into leadership positions, some of these recruited women have been a little skeptical about how sincere some of the OPEN men were about their intentions. Mahirah, an entrepreneur in her middle ages said, lowering her voice:

You know Adil keeps going on and on about how there need to be more women, to get more women involved, let’s do more for women…. But have you ever once seen his wife come to any of these events? If he wants to have women get involved so badly, then why doesn’t he bring his own wife to any of these things? Or any of those guys – where are their wives? (Interview, April 2008).

What is desired is the promotion of women who use the same type business-developer and secular-pluralist identity tactics in portraying themselves and how they live their lives. In February 2009, OPEN sponsored a “Women’s Leadership Forum – Empowering for Success” with panels called “Navigating for Success” and “Profiles in Success” where nearly all the women featured were corporate experts and white. The model or ideal for Pakistani women is the same type of ideal for Pakistani men – high achieving capitalists, with an emphasis on rationality and logic and an appreciation for diversity – and a refutation of the stereotype of burqua-clad Pakistani women oppressed by fundamentalist men.

The women I spoke with in interviews talked about themselves in very strong terms; they “weren’t silent or oppressed,” and that “most Pakistani women are very loud and will have their way. It’s not like the media portrays it” (Interviews, February, 2008). Shireen, a tech saleswoman in her mid-twenties, said she was a “proud Pakistani” that would always point out her country of origin because “Pakistan is not just terrorists, or uneducated women covering their head” (Ibid). Other women talked about working in more practical terms; they needed to work because “the area is so expensive, and what with college and everything (for children), you just can’t survive without two incomes.”
The two stay at home moms told me with great vigor they wanted to work and that they expected to work, once their children got a little older. Sabina, a stylish woman in her late twenties, laughed as she pulled her toddler, Haroun, away from a tall pyramid of Starbucks coffee for the third time during our interview – “he’s a handful! I just want to wait until he’s a little older before I start really looking for a job.” All of the women talked about the men in their lives – husbands, brothers, fathers, fiancés – not only being supportive of them getting education or working, but even expecting it (Interviews, February, 2008).

The contouring of community boundaries is responsive to the exclusionary boundaries that paint Pakistanis as “bad Muslims,” and Pakistanis reflexively imitate other ethnicities, especially Indians, for the purposes of acceptance. Both OPEN and PACC have regularly looked at TIE (the Indian entrepreneurial group) and the ICC (Indian Community Center) to see how it is that they have involved women, and have used those examples as ways of motivating their community. Essentially, “if the Indians can do it, then so can we.” The emulation, tinged with envy, happens at the individual level as well. Shireen (the tech sales woman) told me that she “will correct anyone who thinks I’m Indian, and will tell them I’m from Pakistan.” She told me how once she was at a client’s office with several white men in their mid-forties to fifties when she said something about outsourcing. She said, “they kind of smiled, and I could see what they were thinking, and I told them – ‘I can see what you’re thinking... you think I’m Indian, but I’m not. I’m Pakistani.’ They were surprised, and also surprised that I told them that, but I feel like I need to correct people... because it’s not just Indian women who are career women and successful and independent.” Not long before she left for lunch in her Mercedes Benz convertible, Shireen talked about the different ways class plays out for Pakistanis versus Indian women, that there were “so many of them [Indian women from the middle class] who were successful and have made it.” Shireen’s positionality as an immigrant coming from a middle-class background influenced her developmental goals for Pakistan; it was important to her to help women in Pakistan become more “professional and know how to get involved in business and, you know, put themselves out there.”

I come from a middle-class family, and middle-class in Pakistan is not the same thing as middle-class in the states. Middle-class in Pakistan is like ten people sharing two rooms, and maybe you have a car. It’s not like Benazair or other women like that who grew up with drivers and eight servants. I didn’t have that. I was lucky to come to the states because my dad worked for PIA (Pakistani International Airlines), so we were able to travel. But once I got here, I have had to work so hard. It’s been stressful, you know working every summer and over breaks so I can pay for tuition. And I just feel like more women in Pakistan need to know what it’s like and how they can get educated and get jobs and be independent (Interview, February 2008).

Shireen’s ambitions of transnational attention to women like herself are marked by
her experiences in the US, and in particular, the distinction she made between herself and other immigrant Pakistani women: there were those that needed to work (such as herself), and those that “work if they want to, not because they have to” (Interview, February, 2008). However, other Pakistanis, in particular some of the organizations, drew more distinctions between themselves and the Pakistanis back home. DIL, the one with the fancy fundraisers – (most recently a fashion show) – conceives of their mission and vision as follows:

DIL is dedicated to providing quality education to disadvantaged children, especially girls, by establishing and operating schools in the underdeveloped regions of Pakistan, with a strong focus on gender equality and community participation. No child in Pakistan, no matter how poor or underprivileged, should by denied access to quality education. All children should have equal opportunity to reach their full potential and contribute toward the socio-economic betterment of their communities (Mission and Vision, DIL website, 2008).

The wording has the effect of not only signaling to the US public that they are seeking to combat the roots of terror, but also their mission draws a line between themselves and the Pakistanis over “there.” It is the boundary of foreign-ness that marks Pakistanis as different, and attachment to their country of origin (a “haven for terrorists”) that positions them as disloyal; thus, the ways Pakistanis are transnational are of special interest. Interviewees were generally frank about what they perceived to be the situation in Pakistan; as Sara said, “It’s sad because, there are these crazy mullahs exploiting all of the poor, uneducated people in Pakistan who have no opportunity in their lives and don’t know any better” (Interview, March 2008). Individuals I interviewed talked at length about the need for a more moderate or liberal Islamic discourse in the US – not only to be more representative of Islam, but also as a possible group they would feel comfortable belonging to. They also talked about the need for a more progressive Islam globally, and especially in Pakistan.

Transnational organizations such as DIL that seek to help Pakistanis over “there,” have to acknowledge the fundamentalist threat from abroad and show they are not affiliated with it in any way. Under the FAQs section of the DIL website, tellingly, the first question addressed is “What is a ‘madrasa’ and are DIL schools related to madrasas?” They respond with the definition of madrassa – (“The word "madrasa" is derived from Arabic-- and refers to a Muslim school, college, or university that is often part of a mosque (Merriam Webster dictionary)” – then say “Some madaris (the plural of madrasa) have become extremist, promoting violent practices. DIL schools are not in any way associated with madaris.” Elsewhere on their site, they again deal with the media-informed image Americans have about madaris:

DIL actively engages in student-centered teaching at its schools. This approach is an alternative to the traditional system of repetitive memorization and has been shown to improve student achievement. Child-centered education emphasizes
creativity as well as social skills and critical thinking skills (FAQs, DIL website).

In contrast to the imagery of rows of boys reciting passages of the Koran while they rock, DIL must prove they are using western methods and - in particular - are helping to create Pakistanis who can be social and think critically. These types of representations bear out the claim that immigrants’ transnational activities are constrained or at least contingent on political and institutional restraints.

The secular-pluralist identity tactic helps alleviate the pressures of being involved with the home country in that the values of secularism and pluralism are seemingly transported to Pakistan. Distancing themselves from Islam and focusing on what they pitch as a positive or neutral cultural attachment, Pakistani immigrants can be transnational conditional on extolling western-defined notions of secularism and pluralism. The underlining of their distance and differences with Islam reinscribes the dichotomy between the “good” and “bad” Muslim, making the negative character of the essentialized Pakistani seemingly more real. Specific ideologies about how it is that people should be socialized, what their values are, and how they should relate to their community and the world are imbued with a neoliberal tinge (as per the business-developer identity tactic) and “secular myths of American individualism” (Roof & McKinney, 1987, p. 85), rendering tolerable involvement with the home country.

Contributions and Discussion

The immigration literature can be criticized for multiple reasons most recently because it assumes the container-ness of states – that immigrant experiences are only analyzed and discussed within the confines of the nation-state. However, the supposedly rectifying transnationalism literature has gone the other way and failed to interrogate how state actions affect immigrant lives and outcomes (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). Over and above this discussion are the broader questions of boundaries: how is it that immigrants are assimilated or not; what are the roles of symbolic, social, and physical boundaries; and how are those boundaries created, maintained, disputed, and reconstructed? Many immigrants have had to deal with exclusions, and the process of assimilation and integration has been one where the immigrant group shows they are, in fact, not all that different from the receiving population, or that their differences are not threatening and can co-exist with existing traditions and understandings. However, some immigrants have faced particular challenges in trying to demonstrate their capability and willingness to assimilate, and these instances – such as what Pakistanis have faced – provide a means for understanding, in more stark relief, of how groups are marked as outsiders and the interpretations and responses an immigrant community makes. The responses are informative for revealing the specific mechanisms by which immigrants seek to prove their belonging and/or maintain difference.

I argue that it is important for immigration theorists to take into account the work
that post-colonial and critical theory scholars have done to expose the frameworks of normalcy and superiority, particularly in western countries and cultures. Doing so can help provide the lenses for understanding the manner in which various actors (the state, the media, the public) paint boundaries around a population to other it. In this sense, I have evoked descriptions of dichotomies, arguing that the Pakistani population has been dichotomized as belonging to a vilified, essentialized group. This group is diffuse and its boundaries flexible to contain large groups of people based on vague racialized categories and loose understandings of foreign-ness. Transnational behavior or identities were marked as suspect and unsafe, providing a particular quandary for people who wished to maintain contact with their home country.

My research on the Pakistani community in the Silicon Valley area shows the ways that individuals and groups have felt and responded to the types of boundaries drawn around them. They have organized themselves in specific ways and, as I show, have embodied a series of overlapping identity tactics, means of tactical essentialism to show that they can and do belong. The specific contributions I make to the immigration literature are the following: (1) A demonstration of the flexible and changing identity processes an immigrant community undertakes to refute, blur and re-construct the boundaries around their community to present themselves as eager to assimilate (with helpful or at least non-threatening developmental goals for their home country), and (2) A recognition and explication (via a post-colonial framework) of how states and geopolitics influence immigrant opportunities and activities both in the US and abroad.

One of the implications of my research is that a government, its media and public can influence an immigrant population to shape themselves in specific ways, ways that are friendly and amenable to US ideologies. This is a way the US government can control a population, and it is suggestive that pressurizing an immigrant population the way that these Silicon Valley Pakistanis have been pressured in the US can have effects for how development and politics end up getting carried out in the home country – Pakistan. In a way it is similar to policies of indirect rule, where the “other” with power is rewarded for cooperation and subdued for dissidence.
CHAPTER 3
Middle East to Multiculturalism: Toronto Pakistanis and Constrained Citizenship

We rounded the bend next to the St. George train station next to the University of Toronto campus. It was cold, and despite the lack of snow, you could see people’s breath…I was not eager to leave the car. The new black luxury SUV was conspicuous: I was conscious of the comfortable warmed leather seat and perfectly calibrated temperature. The owner, the man driving me, was too young to be retired, and yet he was; he had cashed out at the right time, selling mortgage-backed securities, but as he informed me, hadn’t sold any toxic securities that ended up causing a global financial crisis. We had met at a meeting of the Society of Pakistani Canadian Professionals and Academics, and he had offered to give me a ride back from Mississauga, which had been a long ordeal getting to by train and bus. (I was lucky to have even gotten there: Google maps had given me the wrong address and in my sleepy haze I had fortuitously spotted a sign for Candles Banquet Hall just in time for me to hop off.) As was typical of my research in Canada, I had found out the event nearly at the last minute and had been invited by word of mouth. The event was not advertised on their website – and the main issue to be addressed at the meeting was how the Society could be improved. The overall theme of people’s remarks was that more people needed to become aware of the organization, and the organization needed to be better organized, especially in respect to its marketing to the community. Yet there was also ambivalence about the extent to which membership should be expanded, that membership should remain exclusive to those people that had achieved some degree of status in Canada.

The investment banker was only in town briefly to “deal with family issues” before going back to his jet-set lifestyle – he was already tired of the cold and was leaving for a tropical paradise shortly after New Year’s. As he pulled to the curb, he animatedly told me about a conspiracy theory floating around:

The idea is that Canadians, white people, feel entitled to their supremacy and to being served. They get well-educated, fairly well-off immigrants to come here with various promises – and there are benefits, health, education – but then these people get here and despite their degrees they are working in service jobs and their education and credentials are not valued. But they don’t have much choice because they can’t go back to Pakistan, and their kids are growing up here… but there is a deep disillusionment. And it’s a great deal for Canadians! They keep the best jobs and the power, but have plenty of English-speaking brown immigrants to serve them – the immigrants are educated and respectful of western institutions; they are relatively docile (Field Notes, October, 2011).

Discussions with this man included inevitable environmental chaos (he told me about Amazonian-based intentional communities of wealthy expatriates), and with the outright
suggestion that Canadian whites consciously sought to maintain their status at the top of the racial hierarchy – his remarks were some of the most explicit in their racial power analysis. But the refrain was there (another respondent called Canada “a hoax”) if not outright that Canada was not the multicultural promised-land, especially when it came to equity and opportunity. While there were variations on white intentionality of control, the theme was clear that South Asian adult immigrants to Canada experienced structural and social impediments to the lives they felt they had been promised. Many immigrants felt they were lead to believe a multicultural oasis awaited them in Canada, but sensed white racism through their interactions and experiences in society. While their administrative relationship with the state remained intact, affectively, emotionally, adult immigrants felt disappointed, resentful, or resigned.

In this chapter I show how, in response to disappointment with Canadian promises, migrant parents’ tried to instill an ethno-religious identity in their children in conformance with the value of Canadian multiculturalism. However, as the children transitioned into adulthood and experienced more of the world (visiting Pakistan, exploring and learning about Islam), they came to understand their parents’ identity lessons and expectations as spatially and temporally specific. Their parents preached a time-capsule culture that created conflicts for young adults’ identity actions and choices. The subject of identity was deeply interesting to young adults, and the discourses of Canadian multiculturalism provided a framework for understanding their multiple attachments and identities. University students and young professionals parroted state tropes, often word for word, though enthusiasm and assessment varied between idealism and realism.

Notes on Theory and Method

This chapter links the micro concerns of identity choices to the macro issues of global political economy, by asking how people understand and enact identities especially those related to the nation state? I seek to avoid a presentist bias because “popular national identity is a belated achievement of the modern nation-state” (Lie, 2001, p. 359). Political scientists, economists, and most sociologists often make the mistake of taking nation-states as an empirical starting point when it comes to understanding identity. Geographers and anthropologists (Harvey, 2005; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Glick-Schiller, 2010; Delgado & Covarubias, 2010,) highlight how Cartesian assumptions of nested-ness problematically structure our analytic frames, which are further bolstered by a fetish for statistics and generalizations. My research was initially structured as such: a cross-national comparison of immigrant contexts and experiences. But as my Toronto-based interviews and fieldwork progressed, it became increasingly clear how important American hegemony is in shaping immigrant identities, and that a more appropriate analysis must conceive of states as relational and contextualized within the broader world system and its geopolitical specificities.
Thus, while I do compare socio-legal structures and discourses, my research sites are more fruitfully conceived of as global nodes: diverse, cosmopolitan, urban areas that are territorially distinct yet linked via processes of globalization. In other words, spaces such as Toronto and the Bay Area are connected, especially because of low-cost travel and technological connections, and it makes much more sense to study immigrant identity within a global frame than one limited by a nation-state-as-container model. This is especially true for the South Asian community, which – like others – shares many connections between various global hubs, including Toronto and the Silicon Valley. In addition to echoing globalization scholars’ calls for problematizing our assumptions of the nation-state, I argue the importance of taking a more global vantage point in understanding immigrant positionality.

Models of migration, similar to those of development, assume stages based on European history. US migration scholars often compare contemporary migration with those of the past (i.e., migratory waves of Europeans during the 20th century). Models of migration are thus marked by two assumptions: one, the goal of immigration is assimilation; and two, understanding migration is best done using a generational model. In the assumption that the goal of immigration is assimilation, and further, that contemporary immigrants’ achievement pinnacle is based on upper-class whites, the immigration literature has been criticized for being in service of the nation-state. The embedded racism and problematics of this paradigm are evident in assimilation models that posit immigrants as assimilating “upward” towards whiteness or “downward” towards blackness. Western epistemics is geared towards generalization and fetishizes linear or stage-ist models. For the immigration literature, this means that there has been an assumption that contemporary migrant experiences and outcomes will mirror the generational waves of European influx into the US.

A detailed examination of the contemporary Mexican experience has shown how, unlike in the past (for European populations), there have been fairly continuous flows of Mexican migrants, which changes internal community dynamics (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Especially as there are ongoing (and evolving) social and institutional mechanisms of racial exclusion, predictions as to contemporary migrant experiences do not match previous generational models. Thus, using a generational model of comparison (especially when thinking of a generation status as static) is not always the most useful. In the case of Pakistanis, understanding migratory narratives is more dependent on when people migrated (and the circumstances surrounding their migration), not necessarily the designation of first or second. Pakistanis who migrated to Canada in the 1970’s versus the young men and women who have moved to Canada in the 2000’s onward – both of which would be classified as “first generation” – do not share enough in common for this designation to make much empirical sense.
Data and Findings

Analyzing how belonging and membership administratively and affectively play out for Pakistani immigrants in the Greater Toronto Area reveals that:

1. Within the world-system, there are material and discursive pushes and pulls among states and localities (See Table 1: ) – it is important to recognize the temporal specificity of these relationships.

2. Citizenship is constrained (as opposed to flexible); for immigrants it is predominantly an administrative identity. Affect is experientially and discursively constructed within and by the context of those constraints.

Using immigration’s basic “push-pull” model as an initial frame, I explain how, in Pakistan, instability and state failures push immigrants; how, in the Middle East, economic opportunities pull immigrants towards the Middle East, but subsequent educational constraints push immigrant families away; and how, in Canada, the multicultural discourse pulls immigrants, but pushes them away with limitations in structural and social mobility. The primary point of this section is to situate the constraints (pushes) and opportunities (pulls) that different places represent for Pakistani migrants. There is a big class story to tell, one where the variances of material, cultural, and social capital are determinative of particular pathways within the world system. Understanding and discussing class becomes complicated in a global framework when these variations are not simply predictive gradations. For example, individuals that are able to pursue education in the US and obtain jobs in multinational corporations have more of a cosmopolitan status that those who migrate to Canada and obtain more modest jobs. In part this reflects the US administrative regime that favors highly skilled immigrants, but then also requires these immigrants obtain employment that sponsors them. Unlike in Canada where highly skilled immigrants are allowed into the country based on a checklist but does not require further action or demonstration of highly skilled labor.

Temporal specificity is important to note because it speaks to the ever-changing nature of pushes and pulls in the global world system. For example, after 9/11, there was a large decline in students to the US from predominantly Muslim countries, whereas the number of students to Canada increased (Mueller 2009). This reflected not only the chilling effect that post-9/11 policies had on the perceived favorability of US education, but also Canada’s aggressive marketing efforts and lower cost of education. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a reduction in the number of all visas (permanent resident and non-immigrant visas such as those for visits, work, business, pleasure, student, or other) allowed or granted to Pakistanis (Najam 2006).

An historical assessment of Pakistan also demonstrates the importance of taking into account temporal specificity. When Pakistan was formed in 1947 there was a massive
migration of Muslims to East and West Pakistan, and much of this migration was propelled by nationalism and the idea and possibility of a new state for Muslims. (Of course the question of a Muslim state or a state for Muslims is still very much debated. Respondents would often make the case for the latter – a state for Muslims – by pointing out that Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, ate pork and drank alcohol, which had little bearing on how the state operated.) However people who migrated for nationalistic reasons have had to accept the reality of limited economic opportunities in Pakistan and migrated once again despite maintaining hope for their home country.

Table 1: Push Pull Dynamics for Pakistan, the Middle East, and Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Push</th>
<th>Pull</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>• Lack of economic opportunities</td>
<td>• Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State failures (infrastructure, human</td>
<td>• Values</td>
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<td></td>
<td>development, corruption, sovereignty)</td>
<td>• Comfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Instability and violence</td>
<td>• Nationalism (duty/responsibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>• Lack of higher-education</td>
<td>• Economic opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>• Citizenship not granted</td>
<td>• Social mobility opportunities (in other states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Islamic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>• Racism</td>
<td>• Discursive &amp; material promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of social and structural mobility</td>
<td>• Educational opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Weather / geography</td>
<td>• Family and social networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Pakistan: Instability and State Failures

The Pakistani community here is pretty good. They are loyal, sincere to Canada. There is no peace of mind in Pakistan. There is no security. Here there are a lot of rights, security. I keep up with the news about Pakistan, I’m very concerned, but what can you do? You can pray. I’m proud to be Canadian. As long as you have somewhere safe to sleep, it is good. (Field Notes, February 2012).

A significant push factor to Canada is the lack of safety and security in Pakistan. In the above excerpt, the father of three equated rights, safety and security – things that Canada is able to provide – with goodness. The question I had asked the man was what his experience was like in Canada, and it is telling that his answer had as much to do with Pakistan as it did to Canada. When people spoke positively about their relationship with Canada, it was in comparison to their lives and opportunities in Pakistan.

Pakistan is complicated, fascinating, and full of contradictions. It is frequently called a failed state, while economically lauded for its growth. Life can be dangerous, and there is a tremendous amount of instability: earthquakes, political and social change, drones.
When trying to summarize Pakistan, it is impossible to avoid western media’s descriptive influence: “terrorism” is frequently applied in discussions of sectarian (intra-Muslim) and state (Pakistan-India) conflict and violence. Religious minorities are actively threatened by Muslim extremists with links to the Taliban – a militant Wahabbi-origin (i.e. Saudi) group that, with US funding and training, came to power in a proxy war against the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Whereas in the 1960’s, Pakistan was hailed as a model Third World country and an exemplar of economic development (Burki 1999), in the years since, it has comparatively lagged in achieved social progress (for example, infant mortality or female literacy) (Easterly 2001). The country’s Human Development Index – a UN created measure to assess progress in three basic dimensions of human development (lifespan, access to knowledge, and standard of living) – locates Pakistan at 145 out of 187 countries and territories; decidedly in the low human development category (Human Development Report 2011). Decades of systemic corruption has meant the state has been unable to provide appreciable levels of public goods or services such as reliable energy and water supplies and law and order (Khan 2007). In all government departments, corruption is rampant: surveys have shown that virtually all respondents have reported needing to pay a bribe or participate in some other corrupt act to complete transactions with the Pakistani judicial, police, electricity, taxation, health, education, or land administration departments (Transparency International Pakistani, 2002). Corruption has led to state failures which have provided the breeding ground for social instability and violence and these all serve to push people from Pakistan.

Corruption was a strong discourse attached to Pakistan. The avoidance of practices or perceptions related to corruption or insider types of dealings were strong influences on how some individuals and organizations presented themselves. The Pakistan Development Fund (PDF) was an organization created to address young adults’ need to have a connection to their homeland, one that had a “measurable impact.” This language borrowed from legitimating institutions such as the World Bank and the development industry. But it served the purpose of differentiating PDF from other ethnically specific organizations, ones “more about socializing” or considered “corrupt.” Both of these were criticisms leveled at student organizations that had “brought over ways of doing things from Pakistan” (Field Notes, October 2011); practices unattractive or to be avoided. For Pakistani-Canadians, trying to embrace their ethnic identity via student groups such as the Pakistani Students Association were thwarted by “feeling very clique-y” and “not super welcoming.” Urooj, a junior at the University of Toronto explained:

It was like everyone already knew each other and already had their own friend group. It was pretty hard to break in, and it just seemed to be all about social hierarchy. I just didn’t fit in as someone who was pretty Canadian and also it wasn’t helping me learn about culture, you know, and especially since I wanted to do something. They just didn’t seem to be serious about actually helping, you know, or at least regularly…. Like they had a fund raiser for the floods, and people were concerned, but events were more about socializing (Interview, July 2011).
For Urooj and others, there was a specific hope and desire to ‘do something’ to be involved in their home land, no matter the attachment. People who had such an attachment were often born in Pakistan, but even if they were born Canadian and never even been back to visit, they shared a desire to know about Pakistan to try to be involved in some material or tangible way.

For a founder of PDF, a more scandalous story followed the one about cliques, that of ‘back home’ practices of corruption. The story about an ethnic-based organization was that they had formals, gala type events with very expensive tickets. The president had allegedly siphoned off funds to buy a motorcycle for himself. With an eye roll, the founder of PDF complained:

Can you believe it? It was absolutely absurd. It’s just like back home, where the corruption is so rampant and happens at every level. This type of thing is just normal. It’s just how business gets done. I wanted to have an organization that was completely transparent about what our funds were and how they were being allocated (Interview, July 2011).

Corruption (and the resultant lack of transparency) serves as a push factor away from Pakistan and towards other countries such as a Canada, where it becomes a point of comparison. Accountability and transparency become alternative practices to be adopted in contrast to “normal” practices back home. The above excerpts shows the transnational effects of state practices in how immigrant communities seek to organize and represent themselves.

Money Calling: Middle East Opportunities and Constraints

Many Pakistanis migrating to Canada have come directly from Middle Eastern countries. Pakistanis working in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman have done so primarily for economic reasons: they can earn much more in these countries than in their home country of Pakistan. The Middle East is a huge importer of migrant labor. A case in point is the United Arab Emirates (UAE): this small and wealthy gulf coast state’s population is over 85 percent expatriates. Skilled and unskilled labor makes up over 90 percent of the private workforce, and this large labor force is primarily from South Asia. Estimates vary, but there are around 1 million Pakistanis in the UAE, meaning Pakistanis are over 10 percent of the UAE’s total population (United Nations 2013). Better economic opportunities mean that Pakistanis in the Middle East are able to gain economic and social status relative to non-migrants by buying property or sending remittances back home.
Table 2: Pakistanis Migrants in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Pakistanis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>1,200,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations 2013

By and large, people with connections to the Middle East felt very positively by their experiences. I asked questions about whether Pakistanis felt looked down upon by Arabs but that was not the case. The reasons for liking the Middle East had to do with similar culture and values: an emphasis on family and Islam. When it came to missing the Middle East, food was a big mention... followed by descriptions of flavors, spices, and accompanied by reminiscent inhalations and sighs. Some of my interview subjects who now call Canada their home were born in or essentially grew up in the Middle East, and their idea of Pakistan is shaped by visits to family. Depending on the class situation of the parents, visits might be short and infrequent or long and more regular. In either case, these young adults always mentioned being surrounded by cousins and how they learned about the importance of familial belonging and duty. While some youth missed only their parents and the food “not the area so much,” some young people sung the Middle East’s praises. Kainat, an outgoing young woman that wore an all-black abaya, spoke glowingly about living on Aramco compounds in Saudi Arabia. Though now completely owned by the Saudis, Kainat described Aramco in its historical sense as an Arab-American partnership:

The compound is great! It’s like the best of both worlds, because it’s a combination of Saudi Arabia and America. Like, women can drive in the compounds, so I drove. I have so many friends and we had a lot of freedom, it’s not like people think about women in Saudi. I went back for break, and I loved it. I had such a great time. Plus the company flies you back home so all of our flights were covered (Interview, February 2012).

Kainat’s enthusiasm, besides reflecting her personality, also had to do with her class status. While Kainat dressed conservatively, her fraternal twin sister styled herself much more alternatively... when I met her, she was wearing an oversized white button-down with a loose and hanging men’s tie. The sisters’ individuality, and the freedom and sense of possibility Kainat exuded came from being part of a high-flying class of people. But the reason she, her sister, and other young people who grew up in the Middle East were in Canada was because Middle Eastern countries do not give citizenship to migrants, even if they are born in the country. For example, Kainat and her sister had been born in Qatar and spent most of their lives in Middle East, but had Pakistani citizenship until they were
able to obtain Canadian citizenship.

A significant push factor for Pakistani families, is that educational opportunities for children dissipate at the time of university. At that moment, their options are to go back to Pakistan or to try and move elsewhere for their children’s education. Many families do move, because of the relative ease of migration to Canada and the personal networks already established in Canada, (specifically Toronto). Some families will only send their children to Canada, sometimes posting them up with relatives, while remaining behind to make money.

There is also a phenomenon of people establishing residency and citizenship in Canada while still living in the Middle East. This is because some of these countries and companies will pay according citizenship status. As Shehzad, another young Pakistani Canadian told me,

When I moved here it wasn’t my entire family. My dad was still working in the Middle East. But we got Canadian citizenship because you are paid according to the standards of living for where you are from. Canadian citizenship is worth a lot more than Pakistani citizenship (Interview, October, 2011).

There existed a whole economy centered upon helping people seek and obtain Canadian citizenship. Interviewees and analysis of ethnic newspapers confirmed there was an industry for helping people go to the Middle East on worker visas, and similarly an industry in the Middle East that would help people move to Canada. Some of these operations were exploitative or illegal, while others leveraged the expertise of immigrants who had done it before... for a fee. While certainly immigrants were drawn to Canada for more than just higher education, the takeaway is that lack of educational opportunities in the Middle East for Pakistani children was a push factor. The “worth” of Pakistani citizenship and its higher education credentials – coupled with Pakistan’s instability as a country – were also push factors towards Canada.

Identity Discourses, Part I: Parents: Landed Realities and Reactions

One of the findings of my research is that parents often feel misled about the actual opportunities available for them in Canada. Within the Pakistani community – and undoubtedly other immigrant groups – people have a hard time finding work that matches their experience and education. Part of this is the difficulty of transferring foreign credentials. But even if people go through the steps of credentialing, there are some serious structural issues that keep people from being able to have the “skilled positions” they thought they would be able to find. Medical doctors from Pakistan present a useful example. Before Pakistani doctors can practice in Canada, they are required to take three tests. These tests cost $500 each and require extensive study, which means immigrants need to have a nest-egg that can support their families for the
year or more in which it takes to be able to pass these exams. Once they pass the exams, they must then obtain a residency position, which they are often unable to achieve because of their outsider status as immigrants, regulatory bureaucracy, and lack of advocacy to help navigating the system. Nabeel, a young man who, at that point, been in Toronto for two years said,

To some extent I can understand. My father (a doctor) is 64 years old. If medical establishments have to choose between him and someone in their twenties, someone who is Canadian and has gone to Canadian schools, then obviously they are going to choose the younger person (Interview, January 2012).

Many of the first generation immigrants that I spoke with had had stellar careers abroad, and had had to adjust their expectations given what types of jobs were available in Canada. I interviewed Nabeel’s mother, who had been lauded for her expertise in Western and Arabic literature as a professor in the Middle East, but was now teaching basic English to immigrant women. Being in academia myself where obtaining work is very competitive, she did not need to explain how and why it would be difficult to get work in her field. Nonetheless it seemed she would have been able to teach literature or something more appropriate to her background. With a mild manner, she explained:

I’ve been able to make peace with it. It is teaching, which I enjoy, and at least it is work and I can make some money to help support my family. Though I felt much more fulfilled career-wise (in the Middle East), I have the hope that my children will be able to achieve more because they went to school here” (Interview, December 2011).

Nabeel’s mother adjusted her expectations to the fact that she has limited opportunities, even though it was radically different from her previous situation. Her coping mechanism was to acknowledge that those holding Pakistani citizenship were limited in their opportunities, and, especially for her children, needed a different citizenship to have safety, security, and flexibility in their life choices. Pakistani immigrants who had work, even though it might be below their qualifications, had to do significant work to “fit in” and would criticize other immigrants that complained about not getting work that matched their educational background. These immigrants would be criticized for “being expected to be handed things,” when “they needed to work for things.” “They need to make better efforts at transferring their degrees and work harder at being and acting Canadian,” said one woman in her 40’s, a rare divorcée and single mother whose children were watching cartoons when I came over. Though she had been somewhat ostracized from the community due to her divorce, her comments echoed many immigrants that did seem more assimilated.

Talat, a woman in her 60’s, complained about immigrants that needed to “work much harder at fitting in” and “not take for granted you can just get work without going up the ranks” (Interview, January 2012). At the same time, this crotchety grandmother
character complained about needing to work in a shoe shop with young Canadians and also the alienation she experienced as a “brown person.” I was a bit surprised, because in appearance this woman had light skin, which I remarked upon saying it wasn’t obvious she was brown. She huffily exclaimed, “oh no. It is obvious. They know.” I pressed her, but how do they know? She sniffed, “I can tell by the way they look at me and treat me. Even on the bus or the train, you can tell they look down on me because I am brown.”

There was a distinct sense among Pakistanis and other immigrants that racism was real. A couple of interactions with African immigrants stand out to me in this respect. Both instances were chance encounters where I was slightly lost and was seeking directional confirmation (“is this the way to ...?”). In the subsequent random chitchat of people commuting the same direction, I explained I was studying immigrant identity choices in Canada, followed by the question, “what do you think? What’s your experience been like?” Thence came a spontaneous and intense excoriation of Canadian society’s acceptance of outsiders. As Umar, a very well-off Pakistani immigrant said,

In some ways Canada is a hoax. The reality is that Canadians are bringing in skilled immigrants when there aren’t any jobs available for them. Canadians benefit from getting more educated immigrants because it is easier for these immigrants to assimilate: they are somewhat familiar with western culture, speak English, etc. And also they buy into the dream of Canadian multiculturalism. (Interview, December 2011).

I met Umar at a small after-party for an event entitled “Pakistan: An Unstable State?” It was hosted at the home of an outspoken communist (who I was surprised to see drove a brand new Acura SUV). Umar owned some mines in Balochistan and in the conversation that ensued, declared he was against Balochistan seceding because of their lack of infrastructure, not because he was anti their sovereignty. He was an enthusiastic participant in conversation and spoke loudly with a pronounced but unselfconscious speech impediment; he was dressed stylishly, with contemporary blue glasses frames. While living in Mississauga he felt there had been a lot of racism and proceeded to detail his experiences. He said he lived in a neighborhood with a bunch of white families and his family was ignored, despite efforts to have people over and be friendly. Umar emphasized that they were very secular, in fact a-religious, never went to prayers (“in 20 years”), drank, and lived in the neighborhood for 10 years. He recounted that a neighbor at some point made a comment that Umar “should be thankful to Canada.” His response was “why should I be thankful? Canada needed people to work and I could contribute to their economy, it’s a mutually beneficial relationship.” The neighbor responded that if he [Umar] didn’t like it, he should go back to where he came from. Umar narrated his (perhaps unspoken?) response, which was “It wasn’t my relatives that killed off all the natives, you should go back to where you’re from” (Field Notes, October 2011).

Umar went on to recount that his son had come home from school one day and told his parents that a white boy had said “brown people are bad.” I commented that these
were at the individual level, not institutional. But he replied that there were structural
issues, especially in the realm of job discrimination. He gave an example of a Pakistani
woman who could not find a permanent teaching job. All the other (white) people in her
teaching credentialing class got jobs while the Pakistani woman was only able to get
substitute positions. Also that all of the teachers and administrators in his son’s school
are white, despite Mississauga having such a huge immigrant population. Finally, he
found out that his son’s second grade class, which had two sections, had been segregated
according to race by the principal. He mentioned the racial composition about the school
board as well. Our conversation was halted by food and beverages being served – people
chose either wine or Heineken in cans – and the hosts tried to quiet the group down
because a daughter was trying to study upstairs. Umar would talk very loudly, then try to
be quieter, but had a hard time containing himself and would progressively get louder.
He would re-realize he was being loud and said, in a loud strained whisper, “I can’t be
quiet!” causing everyone to laugh (Field Notes, October 2011).

Umar was very conscious of the ways that he and his family were racialized,
identified as other, and outsiders – people who should be “thankful” to Canada. The
assumption built into the neighbor’s remark was that Canada was doing a favor to
immigrants; that immigrant populations were getting more than they gave. Though Umar
was an example of an immigrant who was already “westernized” (drinking, being “a-
religious”), parents often coped by trying to instill the specificity of culture into their
children. Canada’s mosaic society appealed to parents – at least discursively, there was
the promise of being able to maintain or continue the same types of values and family
patterns that people were familiar with back home. At times this meant creating notions
of Pakistan or Pakistani culture that were not entirely authentic. One mother talked
about playing a Pakistani television station so her kids would have exposure to Urdu:

I would have never done so back home ... I think GeoTV is kind of a joke and don’t
think it’s that great of a source for anything, especially news, but being here
[Canada] I don’t have as much of a choice. Language, culture, it’s just not as
naturally immersive as being back home. So GeoTV... that’s what the kids are
getting exposed to” (Interview, January 2012).

This mother was more self-reflective about what her actions meant and understood
Canadian multiculturalism as the best outcome her children could have, given the high
quality but lower cost of education and most of all safety. Other parents were glad to be
able to instill the ethno-religious values they saw as so important. Typically the people
who migrated in their 30s or later that I had access to were more cosmopolitan in nature:
they had travelled, seen the world, grew up speaking English and Urdu, and were
generally open-minded to western sensibilities. These were also the types of people who
were more open to speaking with me, more receptive to an outsider, and more
comfortable with the idea of participating in research. These people were often educated
in a handful of private schools in Pakistan. Private schools such as Karachi Grammar
School or Aitchison College followed the British system of education with O-levels and

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were markers of upper-class Pakistanis who were comfortable and familiar with western institutions and social settings. In contrast, were people who had less exposure to the world, were educated in Pakistan, but not in the private schools. These individuals performed their notions of western culture and social norms but would sometimes miss the mark, and notable in my experience, did so within the realm of assumptions about gender relations.

Most of the stories about the specificity of parental cultural and religious inculcations (and the resulting contradictions this caused) was from the youth. But the contradictions of parents navigating Canadian culture and their own value system was crystallized in the interactions and interview (February 2012) I had with a man in his late 40’s. I met this man at an event for the Pakistani Community Center (“Celebrating 7 Years of Community Excellence”); he was vying for a leadership position within the organization and was eager to talk about how the current leadership could be improved. This man was from the Southern part of Pakistan with a strong notion that Pakistani culture meant his culture, thus he wanted to change the way that the Pakistani Community Center was run – it needed to be “more professional.” Regarding the Pakistani Community Center, he said the following:

To some extent they are organized, on the other hand they are not... I was highly disappointed when I attended a meeting. There was a conflict of opinion. The Consulate General is my ambassador but he left because of a family emergency. Tasleem [the Chair of the Pakistani Community Center] complained about him after he left. It gave a negative impact. She disrespected the community. This is the hard part. They are educated but sometimes they are unprofessional (Field Notes, February 2012).

At the PCC event, he had brought up Islam to suggest he might have some conservative inclinations. However when we met to do an interview, he tried to hug me when meeting in downtown Toronto. The attempt at embrace represented an assumption about western gender relations. In the freezing air of Toronto with copious amounts of cold-weather clothing, he assumed that even an air hug was something that would be normally exchanged. It stood out to me in highlighting the rules of what a hug between different sexes means or under what circumstances it would be exchanged. In my mind the meeting was strictly professional with a relative stranger, who took me on an interesting ideological ride of how he had chosen to raise his daughters and his thoughts on western gender norms. We did the interview in a Tim Horton’s, Canada’s primary coffee chain most similar to the US’ Dunkin Donuts in feel. Under the flickering fluorescent lights in a corner of the basement coffee shop, the over two hour long interview began with an assertion of the importance of religion and how it was completely compatible with being Canadian. However, as many youth reported, his understanding of Islam was temporally and spatially specific to the region and village he was from. Thus culture and Islam were entwined and as he waxed on, he made comparisons between his value set and those of Canadian culture. Though he had
provided many of the bonuses of Canada and espoused the discourse about the virtues of multiculturalism, ultimately he derided Canada and western culture for its sexualization of women. He discussed the importance of modesty and why it was important for women to not reveal themselves to men. Though I was dressed modestly, I felt marked as a western (even worse American) woman who, though he did not say it, was wanton with her sexuality. It was clear he had a specific set of behaviors he expected from his daughters and felt strongly about the superiority and importance of his specific understanding of being Pakistani and being Muslim. But there was a contradiction between his views and the “liberal” and ideologically western assumptions built into Canadian multiculturalism.

Identity Discourses Part II: The Second Generation: Ideologically Canadian

“I make it a point not to wear a black hijab. I will wear really dark gray or navy, but almost never black” (Interview, October 2011). My interview with Niya, a vivacious young Ryerson University Student, helped illuminate some of the contradictory pressures that Pakistani youth faced from their immigrant parents and Canada’s multicultural society. One of the challenges that she and others faced was negotiating the very specific religious cultural expectations from their parents, especially when it conflicted with their own experience of learning about Islam and encountering the realities of cultural subgroups. In Niya’s case, she agreed with her parents’ ideas about girls and women being modest, but didn’t wear black, because it represented in her mind, someone with a much stronger religious faith. She talked about contradictory types of expectations she received from her parents:

My parents really want me to marry someone who is the exact same as we are – come from the same place in Pakistan. And I’m like, hey, can you give me a chance to finish my schooling? It’s something they emphasize all the time to me. It’s not just that we’re Pakistani Muslim, no we’re Pakistani Muslim Sunnis. And we’re not just Pakistani Muslim Sunnis, we’re Punjabi. And then apparently we’re Jut? It’s like some caste – I didn’t even know as Pakistanis we had caste, but it’s a big deal to them that I end up with someone who’s the exact same as us. I’m still trying to figure out what we even are! And I just don’t feel like it’s realistic. And learning more about Islam, it’s like, the types of things that they [my parents] tell me is Islam, I’m learning are cultural. It’s very confusing and I’m just trying to focus on school right now and put all that aside. But it causes some stress and pressure for me (Interview, October 2011).

Marriage was an important theme among Pakistani Canadians, primarily for parents and thus transmitted to their kids. Another Punjabi respondent, Naushaba, who grew up in Canada but moved to the Bay Area as an adult, was able to articulate with more exactitude the distinctions between her family and her husband’s family:
So my in-laws aren’t Punjabi. They’re from Gujarat. They’re not even Urdu speaking. They’re actually Memon, which is like, they originated from India but they’re kind of business people and they’ve traveled everywhere. But when the separation happened, a lot of them did choose to come to Gujarat. You can call them Mohajirs, but Mohajirs just means “immigrant”. But they are not Mohajirs per se. I think Mohajir is more for Urdu speaking. They’re not Urdu-speaking. They speak Memoni. Which is a dialect. Actually some of the leading business people in Pakistan are Memon. They own banks, they own textiles, they own like...they’re pretty well off. My husband isn’t, but anyways [laughs]. I don’t think he wants you to know that, but that’s fine [laughs]. I mean, that’s their background. So that’s my husband’s family. My family, my mom and dad, came from... basically, we’re similar to Sikh people. Our background’s Punjabi and we speak Punjabi at home. We’s also, and we believe—we’re not supposed to, when it comes to Islam —culturally, of course, we still have some Hindu aspects to our culture. So we still believe in the caste system, but I was like, “no, I want to marry someone who’s outside the Punjabi caste.” Because I wanted someone who was more religious and down to earth and not so egotistical [laughs]. I mean Punjabi men can kind of be egotistical. That’s my perspective. My brother is like that, I can say that! [laughs] (Interview, August 2012).

Naushaba was older than Niya and had a clearer sense of how and why there were contradictions in her Pakistani identity, especially by marrying outside of her subgroup. Her father-in-law and her husband were leaders in the Bay Area Pakistani community and she had taken the time and effort to educate herself more about Pakistan’s and Pakistani’s histories. She was able to identify migration patterns and the historical relationship that Pakistan and India had – for example, the retention of Hindu aspects of culture, such as caste – as reasons for the specificity of parent identity teachings.

The emphasis on a very specific type of culture that intertwined ideas about nationality, religion, and ethnicity often was temporally specific as well. Hasan, a 28 year old who worked for Deloitte explained his surprise at the realization that his parents had presented Pakistani culture as being a specific way, but upon visiting Pakistan as a young adult, realized the culture and even language was very different.

People – my cousins – were laughing at me, because the words I used were old-fashioned. My expectations were totally turned upside down. I expected people to be dressed a certain way, to think and behave a certain way, but it was a lot more modern than I was expecting. I realized my parents had presented Pakistan like it was when they left in the 1970’s. It was like a snapshot of Pakistani culture that they taught us. But of course, culture and slang and so forth changes. I just didn’t realize that until I visited and saw and experienced it for myself (Interview, December 2011).

This type of time-capsule culture was common among Canadian respondents, much more so than Pakistanis in the Bay Area. (Though not entirely so: a set of Bay Area sisters related their embarrassment that their mother insisted on making 1980’s Indian-style
kurtas for them to wear at Pakistani events, where women would wear the latest fashions from expensive Pakistani boutiques.) The reason was because Canadian multiculturalism allows for and indeed encourages people to “hold on” to their own culture and values. One of the fundamental aspects of Canada culture is retention of cultural identity. As Naushaba articulates:

You can retain your own cultural identity. There are so many immigrants there and Canada’s proud to be multicultural. But in America, even though, yes we do have our culture and our religion at home, they really push you in subliminal and obvious ways to ... become like everyone else. When I go to Toronto, I think, “Whoa, overdose.” It takes me awhile to adjust because I’m not there for awhile. Everyone has their own individual kind of ways and creates their own kind of “at home”, whatever you brought with you, from the country you originated from. That’s kind of what you try to maintain and protect, at home. (Interview, August 2012).

The “overdose” to which Naushaba refers is can be felt very viscerally. In Toronto, and especially in the suburb of Toronto cum city of Mississauga, it is very common to see people wearing clothes from their home countries. In particular, there are lot of young women who wear hijab, though at times the meaning or intent of hijab can often solely be symbolic. This can take the form of gauzy scarves that do little to hide hair and are more in the vein of fashion accessory. A pair of sisters wore beautiful gauzy scarves and one identified doing so as purely symbolic, wearing the veil because she was free to do so. I saw some young women wearing scarves covering their hair and clothing that covered all of their skin, but was confused because the clothing was form fitting and the young women would be wearing full faces of makeup. With skin-tight clothing and heavy-handed sexualizing makeup, it seemed to defeat the intent of covering, which is supposed to be modesty. Respondents informed me that these young women were “probably experimenting with hijab” or “in the initial stages of exploring what it means to be Muslim.” In contrast to the US, where “you are pushed in subliminal and obvious ways to be like other Americans,” (Interview, August 2012) Canadian immigrant youth feel freer to experiment with identities and use ethnic and religious markers.

According to my interviews, the second (or 1.5) generation generally thinks of being Canadian as something positive, especially compared to the US. However positivity was mediated by two things: their exposure to or experience with racism and also the fact of their location being in Toronto. The importance of being in Toronto cannot be overstated – that is, people’s understanding and experience of being Canadian was shaped by the fact they were in a global city. In a focus group (Interview, July 2011) with four Pakistani-Canadians in their twenties, I asked if there was a difference between Canada and the US. They all agreed, “oh yeah, a lot,” and as a group interjected over one another to explain:

Especially after 9/11. There wasn’t that much racial discrimination here as in the States. In Canada, it’s different. Pakistanis don’t have that insecurity here... they are part of the... it’s like the difference between Canada and the United States. Melting
pot vs mosaic. Canada is a mosaic, because we’ve got... it’s in our constitution, we accept different cultures. Whereas in the states the goal is to go towards American identity... they want everyone to be the same. Versus here we accept differences... and we like, have little China town, little India, little Italy... we have all these different festivals, a South Asian festival... Especially in Toronto, very much so (Interview, July 2011).

Muriam, 20, clarified: “We’re speaking as Torontonians, because we’re so multicultural in the GTA, versus in some hick town they [her friends] probably wouldn’t say that... where I grew up. I knew an Indian... if you look through my yearbook it’s all white people.” Urooj agreed, “I came here when I was four... if I go away from Toronto, and I don’t see people who are different from me, it’s kind of odd to me, because it’s not multicultural” (Interview, July 2011). These young people’s understanding of being Canadian was intimately tied with being Torontonian. The diversity of the city was an important rationale that drove their understanding of Canadian multiculturalism. In particular, actually seeing diversity in the form of ethnic festivals or specific neighborhoods, was a defining aspect of how they understood Canadian multiculturalism. This reflected state discourses of Canadian multiculturalism, along with state actions such as spending money to support ethnic festivals. The conflation of being Torontonian with Canadian multiculturalism is demonstrative of how cities can represent spaces of denationalization; citizenship can be re-invented and re-imagined. Moreover, the comfort with being Canadian came from being comfortable in a diverse urban space.

As the above focus group excerpt also indicates, Canadian identity is constructed in opposition to being American. Time and time again, when interview respondents talked about being Canadian, invariably a comparison to the US arose:

Being an American in America... that in itself is an identity for a lot of people. You get rallied around the Americanness. Your flag, your constitution, or whatever it is. In Canada, it’s a very—people talk about the whole idea of being Canadian. What does it mean? And it’s very difficult to define. What being Canadian means. What do we rally around? I feel like people get more excited about hockey than anything to do with Canada per say. (Interview, November 2011).

Canada’s just different. It’s just different from the US. I feel like the upbringing I had, I appreciated the difference and not having to amalgamate and just conform to the “American way” and just being myself, whatever that means (Interview, August 2012).

There was the idea, expressed in the above quotes, and in other interviews, that Canadian identity was more multifaceted and not as rigid or defined as American identity. Being Canadian meant “being yourself,” not having to assimilate, and thus having attachments to other places or peoples was okay and encouraged. Many respondents specifically identified Canadian multiculturalism as a reason for not having to choose a fixed identity. It was not incompatible to have Canadian citizenship but call oneself Pakistani. This also had to do
with looks – whether or not one looked like they were from Canada. Kainat, 20, explained her choice of calling herself Pakistani:

I would say that id [Canadian] is not as strong as it is to Pakistan because when people ask where I’m from, I say Pakistan. Someone said I’m Pakistani Canadian and I said, no, I’m Pakistani. [Why?] I guess it’s because, like when you look at me you don’t think I’m Canadian, right? Ethnically, if I say I’m Canadian it’s not representing where I’m from.... When I ask someone where they’re from, I’m asking ethnically.... I don’t want to associate myself too strongly [with Canadian identity], it has nothing to do with Canada. I just have a stronger Pakistani representation (Interview, October 2011).

Kainat was born in Qatar (thus with Pakistani citizenship) but moved to Canada when she was little then moved back to the Middle East when she was eight. She talked about initially having a strong Canadian identity when she moved away from Canada, but said, “it’s died down now.” While she did not explicitly link the decline in her Canadian patriotism to racism, the fact that she identified her looks as a reason she did not strongly associate with the Canadian identity is telling. The question of “where someone was from” was a theme amongst immigrants demonstrating that though Canada claimed inclusivity, the notion that a person was “from” somewhere else, subtly marked them outsiders.

Being marked as an outsider also took the form of name discrimination. I interviewed a woman, Noor S. who lived in a tony part of Toronto, off of a high street with expensive shops. At night, with the cold winter air refracting the light, the side street she lived on appeared enchanted. Her house was large and beautiful, and the interview was conducted in the study. A fire was blazing and she had a lovely spread on an understated silver platter. “Please excuse the grunts of banging (eye roll), my brother is working with his trainer in the basement.” Like others, Noor was in Canada because of the ease of gaining Canadian citizenship, but she was struggling to find employment in her field. She had impeccable credentials – an undergraduate degree from Brown University, a Master’s degree from New York University, internships in conservation with the World Bank – but “wasn’t getting any bites.” At the suggestion of a family friend, and somewhat as a joke, she changed the name on her job application materials to Nora Sachs – the same initials as her own and similar in sound, though both names marked as white.

The next day I received four phone calls! I didn’t really think that simply changing my name would have such an effect. It was quite remarkable. But also discouraging to think that people could simply read my name and pass me over as a candidate (Interview, February 2012).

Noor considered herself a “citizen of the world” and discussed class differences among Pakistani women in Karachi. There were “burgers” – women who dressed western and ate burgers – versus “kebabs” – women who were more likely to eat kebabs and were not as well traveled or well versed in western ways. She was a “burger” and often found or placed...
herself in spaces that accommodated many different nationalities. For her, her schooling emphasized the importance of being a global citizen and “even things like going to burning man... there’s a recognition that people are equal no matter your race or nationality... even though most of the people who go to burning man are white, at least the idea is there.” Having Canadian citizenship was similar for Noor in that it ideologically accepted people from different cultures, even if her experience was one where acceptance did not necessarily happen in practice.

Like many children of immigrants (or college students in general), the search for and trying on of identities is an important aspect of coming of age. Many college students begin exploring their religious faith and become part of a larger Muslim community via the Muslim Students Association. In both places, especially in Toronto, students begin questioning their parents’ interpretation of Islam, and come to the conclusion that much of what their parents taught them about being a Muslim is, as they put it, actually cultural. However, the primary concerns of the students vary by country. For the second generation in Canada, it isn’t contradictory to have multiple layers of identity and be simultaneously Canadian and Pakistani.

Regardless of generational status, youth’s enactment of Canadian belonging reflected state-influences in two ways. First, Canadian identity is oppositional to the US – that is, Canada and Canadians often pride themselves on being what the US is not: peacekeepers and tolerant (in contrast to violent US military campaigns and the perceived required assimilation pressures). In this respect, youth (people college age to early thirties, with different generational statuses) echo the predominant Canadian discourses, either with idealism (often parroting the various state-generated multicultural tropes) or pragmatism (recognizing realities that belie the tropes, such as structural impediments for immigrant mobility). Second, and in either case (idealist or pragmatist), youth have multiple senses of belonging and minimal conflict about having various types of attachments to places and identities. They enact and embody a multi-layered, flexible citizenship with an emotional valence, a subjectivity I call affective citizenship.

The Affective and the Administrative: an Analytic Framework for Studying Immigrant Identity

The above two sections show how Canada’s categories and multicultural national imaginary are understood by immigrants: there can be disenchantment, idealism, or pragmatism. Understanding citizenship as belonging shows that the lived experience of citizenship can sometimes defy state definitions. It was not contradictory for people to feel more Pakistani-Muslim (or to feel more affinity towards a sub-group according to religious, linguistic, or ethnic specificities) than to feel Canadian. Citizenship was an administrative categorization that afforded some aspects of security and privileges to immigrants, but it was a strategic decision and not one that changed belonging of the heart. Besides Canada’s discursive celebration and encouragement of a visible otherness,
there was social and structural racism that inhibited immigrants’ emotional attachment to the country. Belonging and exclusion were felt administratively and emotionally, demonstrating while there are some flexible elements to it, citizenship for immigrants is ultimately constrained.

By studying an immigrant community, one is required to deal with immigration scholarship, which is lacking in quite a few respects. Many migration scholars largely ignore concepts of society and culture that reflect historic nation-state building projects. These projects obscure the past and encompass contemporary transnational fields of power that shape political and economic development (Glick-Schiller 2010.) The interpretive strength of migration theory is hampered by a lack of strong theoretical constructs or the use of partial or isolationist theories that address only limited aspects of a phenomena. Scholarship tends to focus on a given phase of migratory process (origin, development, or consolidation) and rarely attempts to cover the ample range of migratory dynamics from a multi-dimensional and multi-spatial perspective. Migratory dynamics are embedded in contexts of global and regional integration, and migration scholars often fail to depict this fully. The Northern perspective (receiving countries) is still dominant and there is only a marginal emphasis on questions of development (Delgado and Covarubias, 2010).

Migration scholars should strive to join sociology in a cosmopolitan constellation that is concerned with the formation of post-national and cross-national bonds, or who belongs and who does not, and how inclusion and exclusion arise (Beck and Sznaider 2010). These formative and enduring philosophical questions make the need for more cutting edge analysis and frameworks imperative. I propose a framework that helps us understand citizenship in contemporary globalizing society. This framework also helps address a gap in the globalization literature, which focuses on macro institutions and states and privileges outcomes that are self-evidently global. As Sassen (2006) argues, there is a historical shift in the national, and micro-transformations in the institutional and subjective need to be decoded. To understand citizenship, we must analyze the administrative, as well as the discursive or affective contexts and experienced realities for people. As Table 3: Administrative and Affective Analysis for Canada shows, this can be further assessed at the State (the macro) and Individual/Community (the micro) levels.
Table 3: Administrative and Affective Analysis for Canada

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<th>Individual / Community</th>
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<td>Skilled immigrant visa draws in educated immigrants</td>
<td>Citizenship benefits pull immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism policies use visible minority categories</td>
<td>categorization as visible minority structures interactions with state</td>
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<td>structural discrimination</td>
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<th>Affective</th>
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<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism is acceptance of otherness</td>
<td>Social discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Otherness can/should be visibly performed</td>
<td>Performance of belonging is embodied</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian identity counter to American identity</td>
<td>Belonging deterritorialized and created discursively</td>
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In this chapter, this framework can be applied to my evidence to show how the Canadian state creates affective tropes about belonging. Some of the discourses that emerge about these discourses about the nation are that multiculturalism is acceptance of otherness. However, that otherness can and should be visibly performed – that is, there is the idea that immigrants are free to retain their cultural and ethnic heritage but there is also a strong discursive encouragement of doing so. This relates to the trope that immigrants can and should visibly perform their otherness. The affective is intimately tied to the administrative, thus the performance of otherness is tied to the state’s construction and use of visible minority categories.

Affectively, Canadian identity is posited as counter to American identity and ultimately as better. 9/11 had a chilling effect for many communities in the US, and the repercussions were felt worldwide. There was a report about students in particular “getting sick of it” – it being detentions, deportations, and the administrative (and sometimes actual) nightmare that accompanied the struggle to gain physical access to the US (especially for education). The Canadian state was able to leverage the US state’s rollback on rights to assert Canada’s moral superiority as more accepting or tolerant of immigrant populations. This discourse was able to flourish because the Canadian state does issue visas allowing so-called skilled or educated workers to enter Canada. But it should be noted that whether or not this plays out according to immigrant expectations is another story.

At the individual or community level, the administrative relationship with the state is related to the purported benefits of citizenship: education, health, and security offered real material benefits to some immigrants. However, structural discrimination is real and challenging for people to overcome. Similarly, and affectively, social discrimination, feeling unwelcome or contingently accepted pushed people away from the Canadian identity. There is an interesting mechanism where being a visible minority was celebrated and supported. But in doing so, the state created categories and groupness
which were visibly marked as others. The Canadian government, by virtue of their mosaic policies and discourse engages in a process of ethnogenesis wherein smaller minority groups are accepted through larger easy-to-administer categories (Wimmer, 2008b) – such as “South Asian” which constitutes a vast diversity of peoples.

People took seriously the idea that Canadian identity allowed for other attachments, and would perform their attachments in their speech and actions. People embodied difference, which was sometimes an amalgamation or approximation (e.g. time capsule culture) of culture and language. How people felt emotionally about citizenship or belonging was deterritorialized... an ongoing physical attachment was not necessary or required for someone to claim the Pakistani identity. Belonging was created discursively, ongoing discussions and enactments that, in the case of development efforts, had material effects for ‘back home.’ As this chapter shows with a summary of pushes and pulls from Pakistan and the Middle East, there is an interplay of the administrative and affective effects from different states on immigrants understanding of belonging. In this respect, different states can influence the performance of identity such that young people performing Pakistani-ness in Canada would want to distance themselves from, for example, corruption.

Within debates about citizenship and globalization, some big questions are the extent to which citizenship is denationalizing (Sassen 2006) and/or how citizenships are specific articulations amongst states and transnational actors (Ong 2007). Are political borders becoming insignificant? How is the state refashioning relationships to capital mobility and to the maneuvers of citizens and non-citizens? For Ong (1999), citizenship can be manipulated as per her definition (and book title) of “flexible citizenship.” This refers “to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions” (p. 6). However Ong’s examination of the relationship between the state and capitalism involves the “transnational practices and imaginings” of elite immigrants, which structures her findings in a manner that privileges individual autonomy and opportunity. Given anthropology’s anti-structuralist inclinations this makes sense.

 Plenty of my respondents were elites and in fact my interactions with less-privileged Pakistanis were limited and often awkward. But even (or especially?) elites reported structural and social discrimination in Canada, thus their ability to maneuver through the world, their citizenship was ultimately constrained. At the same time, understanding citizenship as belonging and analyzing it in its affective dimension, shows that denationalization is happening when it comes to immigrant identity. Despite immigrants administrative relationships to Canada in the form of formal citizenship, affectively they could belong to other states and places. Citizenship and alienage are highly formalized, but incompletely theorized contracts with the state. My work is compatible with Sassen (2006)'s argument that we are seeing a blurring of the distinctiveness of states and citizens, despite a renationalizing of membership politics. Citizenship can thus be simultaneously constrained and denationalizing.
Across the board – young, old, idealistic, realistic – there was always a comparison to the US. When it came to geopolitical constraints Pakistani immigrants faced, people had to deal directly with US state actions, and they recognized Canada followed (America’s securitization) suit, noting that detentions, repression, and discrimination could easily happen in Canada. It is important to recognize the unequal power relationships between states, and to acknowledge that within this unequal world-system, the US state has unmatched sway. Canadian identity is drawn in comparison to US identity – the power of being an American was felt beyond the territorial boundaries of the US. As Idris, a successful Pakistani (of Bori heritage) in the Bay Area discussed:

I go to colleges and universities in Pakistan and speak there because tens of thousands of people can be affected. Educated people are the cream of the crop, the best of society, and somehow I want to Americanize them. I tell them America is not a country. It’s a way of life. It’s a state of mind. I tell people, America is not just geographical...it’s a system, a state of mind, it’s a concept. Innocent until proven guilty. Everyone has a right to do practices whichever way they want...the ways of following the laws are a state of mind (Interview, March 2013).

The repetition that America is a state of mind is fascinating, especially given that Idris actively seeks to “Americanize” Pakistanis. Despite having another citizenship, indeed, being territorially located, he attempts to groom and transform subjects into an American state of mind. His words and actions crystalize the affective power of America. Despite the administrative actions of the US, there is a strong discursive power that America carries. He actively deterritorializes the US by saying “America is not just geographical” and allows for other places and peoples to be American in their state of mind and way of being.

Idris explained he thought by clamping down on visas and not trying to encourage more skilled and educated immigrants, the US was “missing the boat,” unlike Canada who “was taking advantage” of the US being more restrictive. However he and others were frank in saying they believed everyone would choose to come to the US if they could. The director of the Gerrard India Bazaar in Toronto, Subbu, recounted about his own history: “Growing up, it was always about going to the US. We thought of Canada as the 51st state, like the US’ backyard where everyone lives in igloos” (Field Notes, July 2011). Given that the state of California has a larger population that the entirety of Canada, it is reasonable to assert that any analysis of citizenship or identity must take into account American hegemony.
CONCLUSION

The epistemological frames with which we see the world are incredibly important. They provide the parameters for how truth is painted. Empiricists like to ignore this reality, instead focusing on facts, figures, numbers; they follow a paint-by-number formula. The result is predicted by the recipe, and in the case of studying immigrants, there is an oversampling on the dependent variable. Immigrants are understood as state classifications, an administrative designation that has supposedly has a territorially-specific location in the world. This classification by state of people to a place of origin may or may not have much connection to how people think of themselves or locate themselves in the world. In other words, using a state categorization is a forced categorization and wrought with problematics when we try to understand identity in the world.

I have tried to understand how Pakistanis make and understand identity and found myself stymied by the emphasis on the nation-state and state categories. How does one make sense of someone from “India-occupied Kashmir” who locates himself within and among the Pakistani community? Pashtuns who have a strong identity, culture, and code... and who are only due to geographic reason are Pakistani vs Afghani? Mohajirs, a constructed ethnic category to refer to people who left their homes and their lives for the idea and promise of Pakistan. The Urdu-speaking, people whose identity centers on language and culture, and whose insistence on Urdu being a state language ultimately had some hand in the schism between East and West Pakistan.

The boundaries of a nation-state are, as Anderson (1991) famously argued, imagined, socially constructed, an idea perpetuated as a reality. Methodologically we need to recognize that we consistently perpetuate what a nation-state is. It is an in-motion social construction, and our choices of variables worthy of study reifies and concretizes a nation-state. My dissertation was at the outset framed and funded as a cross-national comparison. Though I caveated that my research would go beyond the cross-national to ask questions about globalization, the nation-state paradigm was so principal, that in ways, it clouded my analysis... an ex-post facto realization. As I engaged in the uncomfortable processes of data collection – awkwardly hanging out in places I did not belong – the importance and meaning of bodies and space became increasingly apparent.

Firstly, appearance and representation matter a lot. As a non-hijabi, being alone and creepily taking notes, I was often visibly marked as an outsider. Or in more explicitly Pakistani spaces, I sometimes did not perform ethnicity-tinged class in the appropriate context-specific manner. For example, one cold evening in Toronto I had been planning to go ice skating with my Pakistani friends (near undergraduate age) but at the last minute, found out about a community event at the mysterious Pakistani Community Center on Gerrard Street (Toronto’s ostensible “little South Asia”). I came in as a smartly dressed snow bunny toting newly acquired hockey skates to a dressy, ethnic scene. This
was differentiated from dressy scenes in the Bay Area where outfits were from fashion-forward expensive Pakistani boutiques. Another time, after returning from vacation, I nonchalantly went to a UC Berkeley Pakistani Students Association meeting and immediately regretted not bringing a designer handbag or having done my hair and makeup. I did not fit in with the social scene, making it harder for me to break into these groups.

Secondly, spaces are marked by social relationships in a variety of ways, and as a single woman, my lack of physical (unaccompanied) and symbolic (no engagement/wedding ring) attachment similarly marked me as an outsider. (I should remark here that a tenured sociology professor encouraged me not only to wear a wedding ring, but to wear hijab and otherwise pretend to be Muslim. Though I was often conscientious about dressing conservatively, I found this suggestion problematic, offensive, and indicative of sociology’s reductive tendencies.) My single woman status marked me as an outsider especially in male dominated spaces, such as technology or politically-related events, thus being a woman provided a necessarily gendered perspective on reality. Similarly, class routinely defines social spaces, though I argue it is a globally-situated understanding of class – (at the apex is a cosmopolitanism derived from western-sensibilities... often very wealthy) – that helped highlight how, in a cross-national frame, even a class-comparison was problematic and obviously needed a global analysis. I also saw how spatially, neighborhood and the specificity of the metropolis – including landscape, geography, weather, population density / demographics, and tropes about the city – were defining factors in the particularities of community identity building.

Global cities are spaces of citizenship. Immigrants’ understanding of citizenship is often geographically specific to metropolitan areas or global cities. My findings were Pakistanis are American in the Bay, and Canadian in the GTA. People talked about their understanding of being American or Canadian as specific to their experiences of being in the Bay Area or the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Immigrants to Canada, especially the younger generation, frequently talked about the value of multiculturalism as being linked to their being in Toronto. One Pakistani-American memorably told me she and her siblings felt American in the Bay Area, but not when they were vacationing at the Hoover Dam. Spaces of citizenship are linked to global cities, urban areas full of diversity and places where globalization happens at the realm of individuals and communities.

The San Francisco Bay Area is a bastion of wealth and promise. If utopia were to be realized, this is one of the major metropolitan areas in the US in which the idea would have a fighting chance of not being squelched. Driven by Silicon Valley, the Bay Area’s capitalist class thinks of themselves as more enlightened, more progressive, by far more creative, open-minded and “innovative” than their material brethren elsewhere. Proximity to an artistic and activist colored underclass provides legitimacy of intention – the neoliberal market ideology loosely veiled with Silicon Valley glitz, gel, and informal (seemingly laid-back) culture. The space of Silicon Valley defines the community’s actions – contours of both possibility and confinement. The space is entrepreneurial, sky is the
limit, expansive, and rewarding of hard work and brilliance; but it also a confined space, where discrimination exists as an opaque glass ceiling because of brown skin and Muslim affiliation.

Both the macro and micro must be considered in conceptualizing how space interacts with identity formation. As alluded to above, it is the structure and design of the spaces Pakistanis work and live that simultaneously allow Silicon Valley community organizing to thrive, but also, it is the limitations on mobility, the boardroom discrimination that compels and constrains the way Pakistanis do organize. At the same time, Silicon Valley Pakistanis also point to the diversity, education, and liberal-nature of the west coast as a big reason why they have not had to face psychological or physical threats in the same way Pakistanis and Muslims elsewhere have. In Toronto, the physical cold and physical and cultural segregation functions to create insular communities that are relatively fragmented. The visual diversity (and Canadian state’s administrative and discursive efforts at constructing it) of the Greater Toronto Area encourages subgroupings in Pakistani’s identity formations.

Empirically, it is important to re-conceptualize space in our analyses. When we listen to respondents, there are interesting ways that space is discussed. In contrast to Torontonian Pakistanis who talked frankly about the danger and insecurity there was in Pakistan, some Silicon Valley Pakistanis discussed bombings or violence as a backdrop to be avoided. They suggest the understanding of violence or terror is more about framing, perspective, and discourse than dominant portrayals and popular definitions. For example, one entrepreneur likened violence in Pakistan to other contexts:

Is getting carjacked in Karachi any more dangerous than being mugged in Oakland or detained at the airport? The threats Israelis supposedly feel on a daily basis? No, you simply carry dumbphones – stash your iphone and handbag under the seat ... you adapt, you keep things in perspective, and ultimately, it mostly doesn’t affect you, it’s something you watch on the news, and you go on with your daily routine” (Field Notes, June 2012).

This respondent drew comparisons between different types or spaces of violence to make the violence in Pakistan seem manageable. However, in his discussion of how to mitigate scenarios of violence for people in Pakistan, he underscored how dangerous Pakistan is. His solution is laden with class, assuming people mostly live in safe (wealthy) neighborhoods, will have drivers and cars, and carry material items marking class privilege (an iphone or a designer handbag) even in a US context, let alone one with the rampant poverty of Pakistan. In his discussion, the man made an interesting leap, by equating different places of violence, he drew linkages amongst and between these different urban spaces.

Another example demonstrates the importance of re-conceptualizing space in our analyses. A well-off Silicon Valley man wanted to do something meaningful back home
and re-located his family to Pakistan. So as to not shock his American-born children, he had their house in Pakistan built exactly like the home they had grown up in California. The bedrooms of the children were decorated exactly the same, so they experienced a continuity of spatial familiarity. When we think about the different spaces we inhabit, they do not register on our cognitive maps as "places," so much as experiences. Dreams allow you to travel great spaces in an instant, a reality of being in Korea or Canada or Los Angeles at a breath’s (plane ride’s) notice. That is why we cannot classify spaces as 'real' places that have a mapped relationship: that is to say, the nation-state is not a box, with one city in it. As such, you cannot treat the nation-state as a variable, collect some 'sample of responses' and claim that it is representative, especially in our increasingly pluralistic communities (that seemingly comprise the nation-state). When examining Pakistani immigrants choices, my evidence demonstrates the importance of conceiving of the nation-state system cohesively (thus being wary of stand-alone state comparisons), and moreover, that it makes more sense to examine the world in terms of connected nodes (broadly speaking, cities).

There’s ALWAYS a connection [between the Bay Area and Toronto]. There’s a reason Canada has like five flights a day to Toronto and back [to the Bay Area]. There’s a lot of traffic ... there’s a lot of Canadians in the Bay Area but there’s like a lot of Canadian people that’ve married Americans. So there’s a lot of connections. My sister-in-law, who’s from Chicago, is like ‘the Pakistani community in the Bay Area is a little bit incestuous because they know each other and they know everything about each other.’ But in Toronto, the Pakistani community is so big—it’s humongous. There’s so many that you can’t know everyone and you can’t know everyone’s business unless you’re some kind of local celebrity (Interview, August 2012).

For a Canadian woman who married someone in the Bay Area, there was a large degree of connection between the Bay Area and Toronto, but they also differed. In terms of social connections, she asserted there was always a connection, often via family between the Bay Area and Toronto. It seemed everyone in the Bay Area had some relative or friend of the family who lived in Toronto. While of course the Bay Area had links to the Middle East, for the Pakistani community in Toronto the Middle East was much more of an intermediary step. Well-off immigrants come to the US for educational credentials and high-paying jobs, and though they might be categorized in the same “upper class” category as many immigrants who go to Canada, there are often material and social class differences would be analytically helpful to distinguish.

One of the most striking distinctions that I found between the Pakistani organizations in the Bay Area and Toronto is the high degree of organization in California, and the comparative lack of organization in Toronto. Whereas in the Bay Area it became quickly obvious which organizations are the most active and well attended: they have been in operation for years, have regular well-advertised events, and easily contactable and responsive leadership. In contrast, in Toronto, there are a plethora of
organizations, but sporadic in terms of events and meetings, out-of-date websites and leadership contact information, and a general lack of responsiveness. Comparatively, Canada has more associations dedicated to a particular region or ethnicity, which matches findings that note the dearth of subgroup organizations for American Pakistanis (Najam 2006). This finding reflects the ways that the Canadian state has administratively and affectively encouraged visible performances of other-ness. It also reflects the US context, where Pakistanis have felt compelled to organize, and the context of Silicon Valley, where Pakistanis use technology and technologies to organize.

Unlike the US, the Pakistanis in Toronto have not felt – to the same extent – the pressures to organize and “re-present” their community. Many of the events that happen in Toronto are more broadly cultural in nature, for example Urdu poetry readings, or related more strictly to people’s religious identities. The Muslim identity in Toronto is strong, but according to interviewees it still tends to break out according to sect and ethnicity. As opposed to the notion of a diverse ummah (Muslim community), mosques are divided not just in terms of Sunni / Shia, but also in terms of a combination of nationality and ethnicity. Arabs, South Asians, and Africans will all tend to worship within their own groupings. Events are much more network oriented: word of mouth, circulated among friends and informal acquaintances interested in similar topics.

Leaders of Toronto-based chapters, such as The Citizens Foundation Canada, struggle to get more community members involved. At a TCF Canada recruitment meeting held at a plush KPMG office building in downtown Toronto, leaders lamented that, compared to the US, there were not as many professionals in Toronto compared to US cities, which meant there were not enough resources, both materially and in terms of human capital to be as productive as US TCF chapters. A husband-wife couple further explained that the lack of activity was because “Americans are more active, they are more entrepreneurial and more likely to do something” (Field Notes, January 2011). I asked for clarification, because why would it be the case that first generation immigrants would behave differently in different countries? Salma, an accountant that had previously lived and worked in New York, said she thought that American and Canadian culture were very different, “Canadians are much more passive, people are just wrapped up in their own families and their own lives, they aren’t going to take that step to get involved. People who come here from Pakistan fall into that mindset. People who go to the US are already more… they just, you know, they’re more forward and get-up and do things. Americans in general.”

Salma identifies American culture as “more get-up and do things” which reflects my findings about Pakistani organizing in the two sites. It also highlights the power American identity plays in the world and how other identities are drawn in relation to it. A fundamental lesson in identity making is the way that identity is defined by what it is not. In the case of my research, a central trope about Canadian identity was that Canadians are not Americans. Of course, Americans rarely think about Canadians (or most anywhere outside of the US). When I told other Americans I was doing / did part of
my field research in Canada, it caused them to think more about Canada than ever before in their lives. While American identity is simply American, the Canadian identity is held as counter to and juxtaposed against American identity.

A central topic in conversations about globalization is denationalization and the political salience of state borders. Important to this conversation is the recognition that state projects are rooted in institutions past, and contemporary existing arrangements are particularities, genealogical arrangements that need to be unraveled, not taken for granted. But how do we classify or think about “the state”? What is the state and how is it distinguished from a state, or distinguished from lesser or controlled states that are marked off territorially in arbitrary and changing ways? In the history of the US and around the world, land was stolen violently taken away from a peoples. These small nations, some larges tribes, were swallowed by the machinery, so suddenly and fiercely it attacked and laid claim to resources. Property, a major marker of power and control was initiated. What was once considered communal-land to be shared with everyone according to their need became parceled off; papers drawn; signatures sought, taught, and signed. Lie notes that the “most successful nation-building efforts entailed mass murders, including colonial conquest and ethnic cleansing” (2004, p. 226).

The law as a tool of the state creates truth. Within the US state, as a collective, our challenges should go to the court. But the courts are not infallible when it comes to race; historically, the courts have used “common knowledge” as a determining factor in who is considered white (Haney Lopez 1996). 9/11 was significant in the ways the Executive Branch, sometimes with cooperation from the courts, was able to suspend democracy and democratic processes. The US Patriot Act rolled back rights for all citizens, though asserted a visual identification of who is deemed suspicious. In the assertion (re-assertion, reinterpretations) of race, it exists, becomes fact, a legitimized form advocated by and perpetuated by the state. The central mechanism the US state has been able to use, is its hegemony of violence. The state is able to generate fear, which justifies defense, and calls for special measures to take place, i.e. curtail civil rights, privatize, patrol, and police. In both its hard and soft dimensions, American power is an example of how state power is extraterritorial effects.

Is it the case that race has fundamentally contradicted the promise of liberal democracy (including citizenship), and does this mean that it is inevitable that identity disrupts citizenship (Volpp 2002)? My work suggests the answers to these questions are yes. Visual othering happens. The US has created a Muslim-appearing (loosely racialized as brown) other, to which all other states and migrants must respond. Canada delineates outsiders through the delineation of visible minorities, then further categorized people into state groupings of race. The US and Canada, in their separate and dialectic ways, create visually-identified others. US hegemony necessarily creates the standards to which the rest of the world must respond. That is, how the US determines and enforces exclusion has repercussions for immigrants and states everywhere. American power in its hard (military) and soft (identity) forms hold sway on the world. Race and other markers
appear and reappear to patrol the borders of belonging to communities in both Canada and the US. This helps address the research gap in the examination of how political economy and the state structure racial hierarchy (Gomez 2010; Romero 2005). This dissertation adds to the little discussed question of how race is made across boundaries, shows how states structure subjectivities, and how immigrants’ identity projects are instances of denationalization. My project has sought to link contemporary forces of capitalist restructuring to specific localities where migrants live and struggle (Glick-Schiller, 2010).

Chapter 1 delineates the macro view of the contemporary global political economy with a focus on American hegemony and state racial projects. Broadly speaking, we can say with assuredness the following: first, the war-on-terror represents American nation-building and racializes suspicious others. (This further suggests that the nation-state system, a colonial legacy, is a de-facto racial hegemony.) And second, neoliberal global capitalism dominates the contemporary world system, and states are apparatuses of its advancement. These points are important to note because not only does it contextualize my research, but they are borne out of my data. At the macro level is how the war-on-terror has functioned as a racial project with global repercussions. As a racial project, it advances securitization and specific conceptions of the nation. Chapter 1 raises empirical questions about American hegemony and citizenship as belonging. How does American hegemony structure citizenship opportunities and constraints? Within this macro context, how do people understanding belonging and membership? How does American hegemony influence immigrant identity? And what does citizenship mean to migrants and what does it mean for how they make material, social, and psychic choices?

Chapter 2 shows how neoliberal agendas are propagated via identity projects, or an examination of individual and group identity projects to show how neoliberalism and race have become intertwined. The war-on-terror has created notions of the nation – a discursive terrain within which American Pakistanis feel the need to struggle for narrative control. Their representations of themselves reflect the processes of self-governance that perpetuate neoliberalism. Pakistani elites, especially those with capital, engage in self-governance and exemplify ‘internment of the psyche,’ the space where sociopolitical institutions and the individual psyche are knit together (Naber, 2006). For Pakistanis in the US, there is pressure to demonstrate belonging, which for the population I studied manifests as a Silicon Valley-infused neoliberal embodiment. This exemplifies how the specificities of geography and place play into the variations of neoliberalism. As a specific form of capitalism, neoliberalism plays out differently across different landscapes; the context-specific variegation of neoliberalism is termed neoliberalizations (Brenner and Theodore 2002).

Chapter 3 shows how Pakistani immigrants are pushed and pulled in the world system. In Canada, the state celebrated and supported immigrants being visible minorities, made possible by the state’s creation and visible demarcation of categories and groupness. Despite Canada’s efforts at discursive and material multiculturalism,
immigrants experienced social and structural racism that inhibited immigrants’ emotional attachment to the country. Defining citizenship as belonging shows that for Pakistanis in Canada, the lived experience of citizenship can defy the strict administrative definitions a state creates for citizenship. For immigrants, Canadian citizenship was an administrative categorization that afforded some aspects of security and privileges to immigrants, but it was a strategic decision and not necessarily tied to how people understood, felt, enacted and embodied belonging. Belonging and exclusion were felt administratively, demonstrating while there are some flexible elements to it, citizenship for immigrants is ultimately constrained. At the same time, analyzing citizenship in its affective dimension, shows that immigrant identities are examples of denationalization, as belonging could be represented by other states and places.

In Chapter 3, I advance an analytic framework for understanding citizenship in a globalizing society. This framework helps address fundamental questions of who belongs and who does not, how inclusion and exclusion arise, and the formation of post-national and cross-national bonds. The globalization literature privileges the macro level and we need to decode transformations in institutions (their genealogies) as well as the subjective. My framework helps accomplish this by advocating that we analyze the administrative and the affective contexts and experienced realities for immigrants. In Table 4: Administrative and Affective Analysis of the Macro and Micro, I apply this framework to draw conclusions about Pakistani citizenship vis-à-vis the Nation-State System, as suggested by my analysis of the US, Canada, and to a lesser extent countries in the Middle East. I begin with the administrative dimensions of the Nation-State system, then the affective. For the Pakistani Individual/Community, I also begin with the administrative dimension where I re-cap constrained citizenship, then continue to the affective analysis where there are interesting findings suggesting denationalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Administrative and Affective Analysis of the Macro and Micro</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-State System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased securitization (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Categorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deterritorialization of state actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nation = identity container</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discursive belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discursive exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Belonging is discursive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identity performances embodied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Belonging spatially situated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Belonging deterritorialized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As I have argued, when we think about immigrants, we must consider the entirety of the nation-state system and recognize the role of American hegemony. When assessing the administrative aspect of the nation-state system, the first thing to acknowledge is the increased securitization of the US. The administrative tightening of visas combined with physical and violent exclusions impacted Muslim immigrants, especially Pakistanis. This means that the administrative apparatuses of other countries were also impacted. Sovereignty is a relational concept in a globalizing world (with multidirectional flows – not just north to south), with increasing degrees of interdependence, and transnational identities and loyalties. The policies attached to citizenship (and access to citizenship) have multilateral consequences, and influence other entities in the world community.

In examining political economy and how states structure racial hierarchy, we must put state actions in interplay, recognizing that state actions shape other states action. For example, the Pakistani state created a new category (Overseas Pakistanis), in part in response to 911, as a means to provide people with connections to Pakistan (but not necessarily citizenship) a way to come back if the situation necessitated it. States create constantly changing administrative mazes which constantly shift and are very much entangled. It is fruitful to compare how and why states create groups out of new immigrants (and to what effect, though that shall be discussed in the immigrants reaction to the administrative). State processes of categorization and exclusion include such actions such as putting specific nationalities on watch lists or giving money via multiculturalism grants. As discussed, both of these are mechanisms of visual othering, whereby outsiders can and should be visually distinguished. The why of state categorization can be explained by context: the fading hegemony of the US has played out by positioning immigrants (especially those with brown skin) as enemies. Canada emphasizes multicultural diversity but it is a manifestation of Canada’s inferiority complex compared to the US. In both instances, states categorize and single out outsiders that are visibly different.

Though not under explicit analysis in this dissertation, the deterritorialization of state policies and actions represent another administrative feature of the nation-state system. A strong example is the number and extent of US military bases around the world, of military incursions that infringe upon the sovereignty of other states, foreign policies that strong-arm other states into submission. Another example is the practice of Asian countries buying (or purchasing into long-term leases) land in Africa to provide food for their populations. These are ways that states are becoming de-linked from the territorial demarcations of what a state supposedly represents. A question within the globalization literature is are political borders becoming insignificant? The reality of state deterritorialization shows the need for further analysis of how administrative apparatus of a state does indeed transcend physical borders. While not in the table, it is important to note the rise of non-state actors in the nation-state system and the administrative impacts of supra-national organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or human rights organizations. In the administration of the human, there have been two kinds of transformations. First, citizenship is linked to an externally defined moral worthiness
promoted by transnational regimes. Second, as states exclude protection from some citizens, a spectrum of non-state agencies provide resources and protections that fall grievously short of actual citizenship (Ong, 2007).

While states are becoming ever more integrally linked to production and consumption processes elsewhere, states create narratives that stress national identities. These narratives are increasingly ‘identity containers’ maintaining and disseminating images of the nation as a society... but they are not necessarily linked to how social life and power relations are produced in otherwise transnational institutional structures (Glick-Schiller, 2010). Part of the affective construction of the nation-state is related to administrations of belonging and exclusions, for example visa rules and restrictions or different forms of categorization. The Patriot Act and Canada’s Multicultural Act and related policies are examples of how who is considered American or Canadian is discursively constructed and visibly marked. Discourse is also created by subjects and the prevalence of American identity was powerful. Though the administrative constraints of the US state were strong, so too were the discourses about an idealized notion of American entrepreneurialism and way of life. Canadian identity was always drawn in contrast to American citizenship and focusing on racism and exclusion, indicating how Canada positions and advertises itself compared to the US. Indeed, the discourses of Canadian multiculturalism lead many immigrants to believe a society devoid of racism existed for them in Canada. Yet by marking and administering immigrants as visible minorities, the state also created discourses of otherness that influenced how native Canadians (non-Aboriginal whites) treated newcomers. The important point to take away is that the affective constructions of the nation-state is useful to paint a fuller macro context for how immigrants construct identity. We must be thinking about if and how a global racial hierarchy is created and the mechanisms through which it is constructed. Analyzing the administrative and affective dimensions of nation-states helps us uncover these mechanisms and the complex way they interrelate.

Analyzing the administrative dimension for Pakistani immigrants shows that citizenship promises and opportunities are very constrained. In the nation-state system, having Pakistani citizenship automatically posits an individual relatively low on a hierarchy. People are for a pushed elsewhere to secure better opportunities and those that are able to afford it, seek to obtain US or Canadian citizenship (since Middle Eastern countries do not grant citizenship). Throughout the process, there is a reality of constraints, exclusions and limitations. As an example, Middle Eastern states bar Pakistanis from citizenship (even if they are born there), and this exclusion limits Pakistanis ability to stay in the Middle East, especially as educational opportunities are barred. In contrast, the Canadian state does offer administrative citizenship including benefits such as higher education. By way of transitioning to how the administrative and affective are linked, it seemed that in a way the act of total exclusion on the part of Middle Eastern states allowed Pakistanis to avoid emotional or mental anguish in respect to whether or not they belonged. As non-Arabs Pakistanis did not belong, and they understood the exclusion as part of a clannish Arab culture.
As far as I could tell, there was not animosity or grief that Middle Eastern states did not grant citizenship. There was a cultural logic to the exclusion and to Pakistani migrants it was ultimately straightforward. This is in contrast to the mismatch between Canada’s discursive portrayals of multiculturalism and immigrants’ lived experience, where despite and because of the discourses of the state, disappointments and dashed expectations meant something emotionally. This had the effect of pushing people toward other identities. With Canada’s emphasis on retaining (and thus re-constructing) ethnic and cultural differences and allowing for multiple identities, belonging for Pakistani immigrants because strongly discursive. That is, through language, thought and action, how Pakistanis thought of themselves and the identities they asserted were personally constructed and done in fragmentary ways. There were instances of ‘time-capsule culture’ where parents instilled in their children temporally- and spatially-specific notions of identity that were replications and re-enactments of a remembered sense of belonging. Though immigrants may have had an administrative relationship to Canada by way of formal citizenship, emotionally and affectively they could belong to other states and places (and times). Having identities that were more important than being Canadian was not uncommon, though cohesion around identities, especially the Pakistani identity was looser.

Whereas Pakistanis in Toronto seem nonchalant when it comes to conceiving of any sort of community identity, Pakistanis in the Bay Area have reacted to government inscriptions marking some Muslims as outsiders, and have done so by contracting the boundaries of who is part of the “Pakistani community.” Contraction is accomplished by drawing narrower boundaries as to who belongs, and thus people who identify as “Pakistanis” seek to detach – or at the very least distance themselves – from the broader category of racialized Muslims. However, at the same time that they seek to refute this identity, they uphold the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” binary. They shift emphasis to differentiation based on class and ideological approaches towards secularity, pluralism, and development in terms of how they classify who can belong to the Pakistani community. (Contraction is an appealing identity tactic for those that may not have much power in the central political arena (Wimmer, 2008b), though I would argue that it is through contraction that the Pakistani population in the US seeks to gain power).

The assessment in the difference in ethnic organization represents the meaningful ways that state policies and discourses structure the social boundaries in immigrant communities. The implication is that these objectified social differences (unequal access to and distribution of material and nonmaterial resources) have repercussions for how ethnic leaders and organizers assert and define symbolic boundaries. Of course, it is necessary to contextualize the striking difference in character of these two populations. The demographic profiles of Pakistanis in the Bay Area versus Toronto have real differences, as well as a selection effect in terms of which immigrants move where. There is also, as discussed, the importance of recognizing these places as global cities, nodes linked through processes of globalization. Thinking this way means that it might be conceptually useful to shrink states, to conceive of them as partial hard shells around
complicated and fascinating microprocesses of globalization that happen in urban metropolises. This meets the call for cross-national comparative research on ethno-racial boundaries to help us better understand the role of globalization and other transnational processes in the ethno-racial boundary-making process (Pachucki et al., 2007). Ethnic community differences in these global cities, especially in respect to organizing, reflect the character of states: Americans were active, bold, and American. Canadians were drawn in contrast to Americans and as such were fragmented with a mosaic ideology that celebrated and encouraged micro-difference. A government, its media, and its public can influence how an immigrant population defines and understands itself in ways that are friendly and amenable to the state’s ideologies. In doing so, a government is able to exert control over the population – both at home and abroad. The social and consequential symbolic boundaries that emerge in response to state categorizations can have not just local and national implications, but global and transnational as well.

Understanding citizenship as belonging and analyzing it in its affective dimension, shows that when it comes to immigrant identity, denationalization is happening. Belonging is something discursively constructed, belonging is how Pakistanis understand, discuss, and perform their identities. Whether these identities are more fragmented, as in Toronto, or more conscientiously constructed as in the Bay Area, they are modes of belonging expressed in ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices. In the same vein, identity performances are embodied. When discussing my Canada experience with Silicon Valley Pakistanis, I hypothesized that Bay Area Pakistanis were less religious. One man remarked that the Bay Area was generally anti-religion, the culture of the region quelled people from being religious. This highlights the importance of the cultural specificity of an urban area, something that can be missing by prioritizing cross-national comparison. Another man remarked that he thought “religion is the same everywhere, but here [Silicon Valley] we teach our sons to pray privately, at home” (Field Notes, June 2013). He was making a comparison to Toronto, where people were more public in their ethnic and religious performances, but he highlights the ways the same identity can be embodied very differently according to context.

The differentiation of how people perform and embody religion or ethnicity also shows how belonging is spatially situated. These embodied identities were defined by the space the individual was in – you could perform identity differently in different spaces. The point is that performances of belonging are defined by the spaces that surround them – it was by virtue of being in diverse metropolitan areas that allowed people to discursively construct particular identities. An example is how affective citizenship is tied to global cities – people are American in the Bay, Canadian in the GTA.

At the same time that belonging is spatially specific, belonging is deterritorialized. “Pakistanis outside of Pakistan are more patriotic than Paksitanis in Pakistan” (Field Notes, July 2011). “America is not a country. It’s not just geographical. It’s a way of life. It’s a state of mind” (Interview, March 2013). Both of these quotes show how belonging is detached from a precise territory. Without being in Pakistan, one can belong... and as the
quote indicates, one can be a bigger flag waver than a territorially linked person. Being an American was about how one lived and acted in the world, one detached from the actual geographic borders of the US. And part of being a Canadian was having another identity, something other than Canadian, an identity of difference that Pakistanis were encouraged to visibly perform.

The affective analysis of the individual and community levels opens up some rich examples of denationalization: partial reinventions of citizenship as practices and projects enabled by being in globalizing urban spaces. In other words, global cities provided the space of possibility for people to articulate and enact identities that may have differed from their formal citizenship. These performances of belonging within other states challenges traditional notions of the nation-state as being territorially discrete. My data demonstrates the importance and necessity of disputing the primacy of the nation-state system in our empirical analyses.
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