Power to the Powerless: Interpersonal Influence through Sympathy Appeals

by

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Abstract

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In this dissertation I examine the elicitation of sympathy as an influence strategy to overcome weak positioning in mixed-motive interactions. I show that by making appeals to sympathy, low power individuals can mitigate their disadvantage, and can claim more value in mixed-motive situations. This dissertation makes two contributions to the literature. First, attempts to elicit emotions in others is as of yet, an underexplored area of the emotions literature. The field has examined how experiencing emotions affect our judgment and behavior, and how our emotional expressions affect others’ judgment and behavior, but with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Fulmer & Barry, 2004; Kilduff, Chiaburu & Menges, 2010; Mayer & Salovey, 1997), researchers have barely scratched the surface on the idea that individuals can elicit and manage the emotional experiences of others. Thus, this dissertation explores the idea that individuals can elicit sympathy in others for their own instrumental gain. Sympathy is particularly interesting to examine, because the experience of sympathy can motivate the sympathizer to help the disadvantaged—thus showing potential as a valuable emotion to elicit in others. Second, I explore the connection between the psychology of power, and the effectiveness of appeals to sympathy. Thus far the literature on power has focused primarily on individuals in positions of power, and while notable exceptions exist (e.g. Simpson, Markovsky, & Steketee, 2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), I seek to contribute to the literature on power by examining a heretofore unexplored low power influence strategy. I explore these topics in eight studies which vary in methodology and participant population, and conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of my findings, and by presenting a number of potential avenues for future research.
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my older brother Mahito,
who would never have asked for sympathy,
but who gave the shirt off of his own back to any who asked.

I love you and miss you.
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Thank you to all of those who pulled me over the finish line. Thank you to my committee, especially to Laura Kray, who took me in, to Cameron Anderson who was always present with words of support, to Barry Staw for his sage advice and stories, to Adam Galinsky for setting the bar astronomically high, and to Robert Levenson whose work has been inspirational.

Thank you to my family - Seika, Anne & Aiki for your love. Thank you to the FTT, to my many friends, classmates and colleagues (especially Gavin Kilduff), and countless others. Thank you Brad, for always believing in me, even when I myself had all but given up.
PREFACE

"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." (Adam Smith, 1776/1976, p. 18)

“Sympathy will have been increased through natural selection; for those communities, which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring” (Charles Darwin, 1871/2004, p. 130)

The quotes by Adam Smith and Charles Darwin printed above present two diametrically opposed visions of the world. One states that we should not expect benevolence when we seek to fulfill our needs, while the other presents a strong argument for sympathy playing a role in the survival and strength of a community. This tension is at the core of what I explore in my dissertation. Even as some might advocate avoiding excessive sympathy to bypass inefficient outcomes, we are beset by situations where others ask for our assistance at a cost to ourselves. The victims of global tragedies seek donations, homeless citizens ask for our change on the streets of our hometown, and coworkers ask us to cover their shift due to a family illness. On the other hand we see evidence of selfless altruism in the soldier who dives on the live grenade to save his fellow soldiers, and in the individuals who volunteer their time helping the less fortunate. While there may be good reason to help family and close friends when they appeal to your sympathy, I seek to understand whether Adam Smith was right in asserting that there is no reason to expect anyone give up value based on sympathy in more competitive contexts.

My motivation in writing this dissertation came from two distinct sources. I was first fascinated by the idea that there could be expressions of sympathy even within competitive contexts. While this idea may have initially seemed to be a long shot, as I began to talk to people I found that the practice of appealing to sympathy was much more common, and perhaps even effective, than even I expected. Indeed, in conversations with colleagues and friends, I came across numerous examples of individuals seeking out the sympathy of others as a way of getting what they wanted. In one example, I sat on a plane next to a middle-aged gentleman, and a first-year college student. The flight was delayed, and the college student was afraid he would miss his connecting flight. Upon hearing this, the older gentleman advised him, without any solicitation, to invent a sob story about the importance of getting on the next flight. Countless others have recounted tales of both successful and unsuccessful attempts to gain the sympathy their own strategic gain.

As I thought more about sympathy, I began to wonder if sympathy appeals might specifically exist in the realm of the less privileged, or those who lack power. While it would be ill-advised to choose a position of weakness, in reality is that we often find ourselves in weak positions—and I wondered if appealing to sympathy might be a mechanism through which individuals can make the most of these positions. Occasionally, we have no strength and I sought to explore whether there is any good way to exploit this weakness for our own gain. Thus, in my dissertation I examine whether the emotion of sympathy can be purposefully elicited
in others, and whether this tactic might be used effectively to mitigate some of the trials and travails of lacking power.

Overview

The first chapter contains the theoretical background and literature review upon which this dissertation is founded. In Chapter 2 I examine the effectiveness of appeals to sympathy in a negotiation context, and show, through three studies, that eliciting sympathy can be an effective method of gaining the compliance of powerful counterparts. In Chapter 3, I test the effectiveness of sympathy appeals in the context of decision-making, and show that positive outcomes are mediated by the decision-maker’s experience of sympathy. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine two distinct boundary conditions to this proposition, and show that sympathy appeals are most effective when presented separately versus jointly (Chapter 3), and that low power individuals are uniquely situated to be able to appeal to the sympathy of others (Chapter 4). I also explore the idea that high power individuals are, by virtue of their power, more able to take action on the sympathy they experience (Chapter 4). Finally, I conclude with the theoretical and practical implications of my findings, and explore areas of future research (Chapter 5).
CHAPTER 1:
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This dissertation is an exploration of sympathy in mixed-motive interpersonal interactions. Sympathy is an emotion that has the ability to influence peoples’ behaviors and potentially encourage them to behave in a manner that can be counter to their own economic self interest (e.g. Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Batson & Morgan, 1999; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). The emotion of sympathy is both relevant and important to mixed-motive interactions because while economic theories of rationality (e.g. Smith, 1776/1976) suggest that individuals should not be motivated to give away value without rational cause, a few provocative studies have suggested that individuals who have been given explicit instruction to “feel for” their bargaining counterparts are likely to act in a less self-interested manner (e.g. Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Morgan, 1999; Galinsky et al., 2008). Thus, I chose sympathy as the ideal emotion to begin my exploration of the possibility and promise of emotion elicitation in others.

I examine the possibility of sympathy elicitation in the context of mixed-motive interactions. Mixed-motive interactions are situations in which two or more parties are faced with a tension between cooperation and competition for a valued outcome (Komorita & Parks, 1995). Prior work in mixed-motive interactions generally assumes that people in positions of low power are at a disadvantage. However, I seek to show that by making appeals to sympathy, low power individuals can mitigate their disadvantage, and can claim more value in mixed-motive interactions.

I begin with a review of the literature on the influence of emotion, building towards the idea that individuals can instrumentally elicit emotions in others. Next I define and distinguish sympathy from related emotions, and explore the social functions of sympathy, which motivates the importance of sympathy to my dissertation. I review the antecedents of sympathy, and explore the connections between the power literature and the elicitation of sympathy.

The Influence of Emotion

The influence of emotional experience. Our daily emotions and moods can have a profound effect on how we perceive and react to the world around us. Numerous theoretical models have been proposed to examine the influence of emotions on our judgment and decisions in daily life. Researchers argue that we use our emotions to inform how we perceive the world (Schwartz & Clore, 1988), and that experienced emotions may bias the way in which we encode, retrieve, and use information in social judgments (e.g. Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995; Petty, 2001).

Research shows that the experience of emotion has a profound influence on our judgment and behavior. For example, positive mood and emotions increases trust and receptiveness to advice (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008), and leads to more cooperative behavior, higher joint gains, and fewer contentious tactics in negotiations (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993). Negative mood and emotions on
the other hand can reduce understanding of others’ interests in negotiations, and can be detrimental to negotiation outcomes because they may create “destructive cycles of anger-driven retaliation” (Allred, 1999, p. 51). For example, angry negotiators tend to be less concerned about their opponents’ interests and fail to maximize joint gain (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). This stream of research suggests that experienced emotions can have a powerful effect on behavior in mixed-motive interactions.

The interpersonal influence of emotion. Emotions do not occur in a vacuum, but rather can influence, and be influenced by others in social situations. The interpersonal influence of emotions has been demonstrated in numerous areas from leadership (Van Kleef et al., 2009) and negotiation (Adam, Shirako, & Maddox, 2010; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a; 2006) to parenting (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983) and politics (Glaser & Salovey, 1998). For example, research on emotional contagion shows that emotions can be transmitted between people through various types of emotional sharing, and can have important implications for group outcomes (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). In studies of teams, experimentally manipulated positive emotional contagion improved cooperation, decreased conflict, and increased perceived task performance in groups (Barsade, 2002), positive mood linkage has been linked to greater subjective performance and to decreased stress in nurses and in professional sports teams (Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell, Kellent, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998), and emotional contagion from service-counter smiles has been shown to positively alter customer moods and attitudes toward the organization (Hennig-Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006; Pugh, 2001). Expressing emotions thus affects how others respond in interpersonal interactions be it through emotion contagion processes (e.g. Barsade, 2002; Hatfield et al., 1994) or through non-emotional reactions to emotional expression (Adam et al., 2010; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al. 2004a; 2006). In the context of negotiations, Van Kleef and his colleagues have shown that the expression of anger, worry or disappointment can elicit concessions in an opponent, while appeasement emotions such as guilt can lead to fewer concessions (Van Kleef et al., 2004a; 2006; see also Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006).

Expressing emotions to influence others. Given that the expression of emotions can affect emotional and behavioral outcomes in others (e.g. Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989), researchers have examined the idea that individuals can manage their emotional displays as a method of influence. Research on display rules suggests that we often regulate our emotional displays, to keep them in line with normative “rules” for the appropriateness of various emotions (Ekman, 1972). In other words, individuals can express emotions not experienced (such as feigning a smile) in order to make more sales or provide a positive environment to patrons (Pugh, 2001; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989). Many employees are required to engage in emotional labor, where the employees must regulate their emotions in order to affect the emotions of those around them (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Hochschild, 1983). Salespeople often amplify their displays of positive emotion to customers (Pugh, 2001), bill collectors strategically express anger to encourage payments (Sutton, 1991), and police interrogators use displays of compassion and anger to engage in a “good cop, bad cop” techniques to elicit confessions (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). In one extreme example of expressing emotion to manipulate others, Martin reports that the CEO of the Body Shop instructed an employee to “cry at this point in the … meeting” (Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998, p. 451).
In mixed-motive interactions such as negotiations, researchers argue that negotiators strategically express emotion as an influence tactic in order to gain distributive value (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004a; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). Barry’s (1999) work shows that the expression of false emotions to influence others is considered both acceptable and ethical in negotiations. Furthermore, the strategic display of positive emotions can be more effective in negotiations than the strategic display of negative or neutral emotions (Kopelman, Rosette & Thompson, 2006), and negotiators can even suppress their displays of positive emotion in order to claim more value (Thompson et al., 1999).

Andrade and Ho (2009) further this work by showing empirically that individuals may strategically show, or not show anger and happiness to others depending on their desired results in mixed-motive interactions. Despite these promising findings, few other empirical examinations of the tactical expression of emotion have been conducted, and fewer still are those that examine the strategic elicitation of emotions in others.

**Strategic emotion management.** The preceding paragraphs summarized research findings on the influence of experienced emotions on our behavior, and how expressed emotions influence the behavior of others. Given the powerful effects of emotion on our thoughts and behavior, it is worth examining the possibility of strategically managing other’s emotions. For example, if positive moods lead to more cooperative behavior, higher joint gains, and fewer contentious tactics in negotiations (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kramer et al., 1993), there would seem to be instrumental benefits in eliciting a positive mood in a counterpart.

While there is little evidence in the experimental literature on the possibility of eliciting emotions in others, it has been discussed theoretically. For example, the literature on emotional intelligence suggests that individuals can strategically “manage” the emotions of others (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). Of the four branches of emotional intelligence (perceiving emotion, facilitating emotion, understanding emotion and managing emotion), managing emotion speaks directly to the idea that individuals can regulate emotions both in the self and in others (Mayer et al., 2000). In negotiations, Thompson and colleagues argue that negotiators engage in emotional tuning, where “people tailor their message to an audience so as to regulate the other person’s emotional reactions” (Thompson et al., 1999, p.149-150), and Adair and Brett refer to affective persuasion as a method of persuasion using contextual or emotional appeals (2005). Research on status competition shows that individuals sometimes elicit emotions in others in order to ‘throw them off balance’ (Clark, 1990), suggesting that if one individual is able to make another lose his temper, the failure to control ones emotions may become a weakness which can be exploited.

Some of the best examples of strategic emotion management in others come from the literatures on influence and persuasion. For example, Leggett reviews the work of Aristotle, and writes that orators must create the right “emotional atmosphere” (pathos) in order to be truly persuasive (Leggett, 2006). More generally, ingratiating is the practice of putting the object of influence in a positive mood, or getting the target to think more favorably of the agent, before making a request (e.g. Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Liden & Mitchell, 1988). For example, one might complement a colleague’s planning skills before asking for a work-related favor. Ingratiation strategies attempt to induce positive mood and liking in the target, which in turn can lead to greater compliance.
The strategic emotion management work is most comprehensively explored by Kilduff and colleagues who discuss the “dark side” of emotional intelligence, and argue that individuals can use their emotion management skills to further personal interests in fixed sum situations (Kilduff et al., 2010). For example, Kilduff suggests that individuals can strategically present incomplete information to sway a supervisor’s opinion on a project proposal, or to obscure negative results for personal benefit (Kilduff et al., 2010). However, while the interpersonal effects of emotion are well documented, and it is generally acknowledged that individuals can elicit emotions in others for strategic purposes, few studies have directly, empirically examined the elicitation of emotions in others. In my dissertation I therefore take an important next step in the literature on emotion by empirically examining this possibility. I start with a study of sympathy, and emotion which motivates others towards alleviating the cause of suffering in the target of sympathy.

Sympathy

The importance of sympathy and related emotions to organizational life has come to the attention of researchers in recent years (e.g. Frost et al., 2006; Lilius et al., 2008). Sympathy is “an emotional response stemming from another’s emotional state or condition that is not identical to the other’s emotion, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for another’s welfare” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 92).

Sympathy is closely related to empathy and compassion. Although sympathy and empathy have often been used synonymously to describe the concern felt for others in need, empathy has also been used to describe a variety of emotional responses. These include understanding others’ emotions (Levenson & Ruef, 1992) and mirroring or vicarious matching of another’s emotions, both positive and negative (Eisenberg, 2002; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Empathy has also been separated into two dimensions: other-oriented concern at another’s distress, and self-oriented concern at another’s distress (also known as empathic concern and personal distress) (Batson, 1987; Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). The dimension of other-oriented concern for another’s distress is often referred to as sympathy (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990), and closely matches the conceptualization of sympathy used in this dissertation.

The term compassion has also been used synonymously with sympathy, and is preferred by some scholars (e.g. Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2011; Nussbaum, 1996; Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). Goetz and colleagues review the literature on compassion and describe both sympathy and compassion as belonging to the same other-oriented group of emotions concerned with desires to reduce suffering in others (Goetz et al., 2011). Thus, while I utilize the term “sympathy” in this dissertation, I reference studies on compassion and empathy as well as sympathy, because they have not always been clearly distinguished. Indeed, sympathy, compassion, and empathy are often measured by using multiple overlapping terms, combined to form measures of the construct of interest. For example, the terms sympathy, sympathetic, touched, softhearted, compassionate and concerned have been used to measure sympathy, (Eisenberg et al., 1994; Reyna & Weiner, 2001), moved, compassionate, sympathetic, warm, softhearted and tender have been used to measure empathy (Batson et al., 1995; Batson & Morgan, 1999; Cialdini et al., 1987), and touched, compassion, moved and sympathy have been used to measure compassion (Oveis et al., 2010; Van Kleef et al. 2008). All three are generally assumed to be related such that experiencing empathy may result in sympathetic or
compassionate feelings for the individual in distress (Eisenberg et al., 1994; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). Rather than utilizing the terms empathy or compassion, I focus on feelings of concern for others’ distress, which I refer to as sympathy.

The social functions of sympathy. The social functional approach to emotion suggests that emotions are functional systems that help individuals respond to the complex social environments within which they reside (e.g. Frank, 1988; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006; Keltner & Kring, 1998). Rather than viewing emotions as irrational or mere epiphenomena, the social functionalist approach takes the assumption that “emotions are reliable guides to action and help sustain the harmony and continuity of social interactions. Emotions prioritize and organize ongoing behaviors in ways that optimize the individual’s adjustment to the demands of the physical and social environment” (Morris & Keltner, 2000, p. 8). The experience of emotion may thus directly inform the behavior which should follow the emotion, as I examine in this dissertation. This “feeling-is-for-doing” approach suggests that experiencing emotions such as sympathy may pre-dispose individuals towards certain behaviors (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006).

Sympathy often leads to helping and prosocial behavior (Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Keltner et al., 2006). Scholars as far back as Darwin suggest that sympathy may have played an important evolutionary role in the formation and maintenance of social bonds (Darwin, 1871/2004), and researchers have since built upon this early intuition that sympathy may have evolved as a functional solution to relationship maintenance (e.g. Haidt, 2003; Keltner, 2009; Keltner et al., 2006).

Empirical work conducted to test the relationship between sympathy and helping behavior have consistently found a link. For example, in a study of externally manipulated empathy, participants in a prisoner’s dilemma game were asked to “feel for” their opponent who was having difficult time due to a recently ended a romantic relationship. This manipulation increased the level of cooperation exhibited by participants, despite the monetary rewards for not cooperating (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Morgan, 1999). In a negotiation study, Galinsky and his colleagues compared the effectiveness of empathy and perspective-taking on negotiated outcomes, and found that empathy instructions in a counterpart led to greater value claiming by their opponent (Galinsky et al., 2008). This effect shows that externally induced empathy, which may result in sympathetic feelings for the other person (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1994; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990) can result in instrumental benefits for that person. In studies of sympathy, Eisenberg and colleagues found that participants who viewed what was ostensibly an interview of a car-crash victim and her injured children, gave greater offers of help with yard-work and household chores than participants in a control condition (Eisenberg et al., 1989). In sum, the literature shows that the experience of sympathy and related emotional states can lead to prosocial behavior towards the alleviation of the suffering in others.

Antecedents of sympathy. Given that receiving someone’s sympathy can have tangible benefits, it is worthwhile to review the antecedents of sympathy. Sympathy is generally reserved for those in need. Previous studies elicited sympathy by exposing participants to video-tapes of children with handicaps (Eisenberg et al., 1991; Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, Carlo, & Miller, 1991), children who were sad or in otherwise in need (Eisenberg et al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1988), mothers speaking about their children injured in a car accident (Eisenberg et al., 1989), or more generally slides depicting helplessness, vulnerability, physical and emotional pain (Oveis et
From a theoretical perspective, Goetz and colleagues’ appraisal model of compassion suggests that given a negative outcome, the first point of differentiation for observers will be to determine whether the other is a victim, or in need of help (Goetz et al., 2010). Similarly, Reyna and Weiner argue that once a transgression has taken place, individuals will feel sympathy when they perceive the cause of the transgression to be out of the person’s control, and the person to lack responsibility for the transgression (Reyna & Weiner, 2001). In other words, if the dog truly ate a child’s homework, this would likely absolve the child of both control over the situation, and responsibility for the missing homework, thereby creating a situation where sympathy might be possible. However, if the child put their homework in the dog’s food dish in the hopes that the dog would eat the homework, the teacher’s reaction would likely be one of anger rather than sympathy.

These antecedents of sympathy speak strongly to the three basic norms for the division of goods, equity, equality and need (e.g. Deutsch, 1975; Wagstaff, 1994). Given a resource, the equity norm suggests that each party receive what he or she deserves based on input or contributions, while the equality norm follows an egalitarian standard of justice suggesting that everyone should receive an equal share of the resource, regardless of input. Need-based allocations, or those which are likely to result from experiencing sympathy, suggest that individuals with special circumstances should receive preferential treatment. Thus, if one member of the work group recently had a baby and was having trouble paying the mortgage, he or she may be seen as more in need of preferential treatment. Overall, themes of need, vulnerability, and lack of control become apparent across various streams of research on sympathy. Given these antecedents of sympathy, it seems likely that some individuals, by virtue of their personal or situational characteristics, may be more likely to receive sympathy from others. One such characteristic is power.

Power

Power, defined as asymmetric control over valued resources, is central to social interaction (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). While there are many possible conceptualizations of power, I focus on a relational perspective of “asymmetrical interdependence,” whereby there is an inequitable distribution of control over valued resources such that one member of a relationships is more dependent that the other (Emerson, 1962; Keltner et al., 2003; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Stevens & Fiske, 2000). For example in a supervisor-subordinate relationship, subordinates generally have greater dependency on their supervisors for monetary rewards such as raises and bonuses than the reverse, and as such subordinates would be said to occupy a position of low power, while supervisors occupy a position of high power. Situations with an asymmetric power distribution may differ in the type of power held (e.g. coercive power vs. reward power: Raven, 1992; 1993; French & Raven, 1959) as well as in the sense or perception of power held by each party (e.g. Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Fast & Chen, 2009; Galinsky Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). For example, in a job negotiation the recruiter might be assumed to hold reward power (the ability to hire the candidate). However, in a strong job market, a desirable candidate might perceive themselves to be very powerful, given their alternatives, and perhaps their desirability as a candidate.
Given that the antecedents of sympathy include appraisals of need, vulnerability and lack of control, it seems theoretically possible that low power individuals are more likely than high power individuals to fit this description. A high power person attempting to elicit sympathy in a low power person may be seen as manipulative, given that they often have other sources of power to draw from. On the other hand, low power individuals have few other resources to draw on—they are likely to be more vulnerable and in need, and are therefore more likely to be in need of sympathy and assistance. Thus, low power individuals may be more likely to occupy a position which allows them to appeal to the sympathy of others. Because of the likelihood that low power individuals are more likely to be able to successfully elicit sympathy in others, I focus primarily on situations where the low power individual makes a sympathy appeal to the high power individual. I directly address this assumption in Chapter 4.

The strength of weakness. The idea that low power individual may be able to gain strength from their weakness is an intriguing one. In negotiations for example, textbooks and courses stress the importance of playing up one’s strengths and identifying a negotiator’s sources of power. Negotiators are instructed to downplay weaknesses, and highlight strengths, in order to gain as much as possible in the negotiation. Malhotra and Bazerman, in their book Negotiating Genius, include a chapter entitled “negotiating from a position of weakness” (2007). To deal with challenges associated with being in a position of low power, the authors recommend such tactics as hiding weakness, leveraging weakness by focusing attention on the opponent’s weakness, and identifying sources of strength and power to mask weakness (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). Only one suggestion in the entire chapter focuses specifically on the possibility that weakness can be used to a negotiator’s advantage. The authors suggest that sometimes, “if your position is very weak, consider relinquishing what little power you do have… simply ask them to help you” (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007, p. 247). This idea is bolstered by recent research showing that powerless individuals sometimes receive more than individuals with a small amount of power in social-decision making situations, and that this result is mediated by feelings of social responsibility (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke & De Dreu, 2008).

Sometimes we have little or no power in exchange situations, and it is important to understand how this weakness can be mitigated or even put to one’s advantage. Therefore, as a final contribution to this dissertation, I seek to understand whether individuals can take advantage of their weak position, and benefit through sympathy appeals.

Summary

Throughout this dissertation, I examine situations in which both naturally occurring, and experimentally manipulated sympathy appeals are made. I extend the research on emotion by examining situations in which sympathy elicitation attempts are purposefully made, and measure the results which follow. Second, I contribute to the burgeoning literature on power, by examining the possibility of sympathy elicitation as a tactic through which low power individuals can influence their counterparts to receive tangible benefits. Chapter 2 and 3 in this dissertation focus on situations of unequal power, in which one member of a potential mixed-motive interaction is in a position of power, and one in a position of weakness. In Chapter 2 I examine the effect of sympathy and sympathy appeals in the context of negotiations. In Chapter 3 I look at sympathy appeals in a decision-making context, and explore types of decision-making.
as a moderating effect on sympathy appeals. In Chapter 4, I examine questions of power more directly through experimental manipulation of a powerful role and perceptions of power.
CHAPTER 2:
SYMPATHY ELICITATION IN NEGOTIATION

Introduction

This chapter explores the possibility that it can be beneficial for individuals to elicit sympathy, an emotion consisting of feelings of sorrow or concern for another person’s welfare (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), in the context of negotiations. I investigate how sympathy, and the elicitation of sympathy, affects negotiated outcomes. I hypothesize that sympathy appeals, and the resulting sympathy experienced by the high power negotiator will result in greater distributive value claimed for the low power negotiator, and greater integrative value created for the negotiating pair. I test these hypotheses in three studies of negotiators.

Emotion Elicitation

Despite the enormous growth in popularity of emotions research in the past two decades, relatively few studies have empirically examined the possibility that individuals can elicit emotions in others. As reviewed in Chapter 1, research on the interpersonal effect of emotions demonstrates that emotions can be shared between people, and can have important implications for group outcomes (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield et al., 1994). Expressing emotions such as anger, happiness, guilt and regret can influence how others respond during interpersonal interactions, leading to tangible outcomes for the negotiators (Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al. 2004a; 2006). For example, Van Kleef and colleagues showed that expressing anger led to greater counterpart concessions in computer-mediated negotiations (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). While researchers have theorized that we can strategically manage others’ emotions (e.g. Emotional intelligence: Kilduff et al., 2010; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer et al., 2000; Ingratiation: Jones & Pittman, 1982; Higgins et al., 2003; Kipnis et al., 1980), few empirical studies have examined this possibility.

Sympathy. I examine the emotion of sympathy, and the potential for the elicitation of sympathy in others. In the context of negotiations, previous research has shown that negotiators whose opponents were instructed to “feel for” their negotiation counterparts claimed significantly more value than those in a control condition (Galinsky et al., 2008). This externally manipulated empathy induction essentially created an artificial situation in which the empathizer made decisions that benefitted the target of empathy. Rather than focus on empathy, which can include both the understanding of another’s emotions as well feeling what the other person is feeling (Eisenberg, 2002; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Levenson & Ruef, 1992), I examine the discrete emotion of sympathy which involves feeling concern for the target of the sympathy, and has been shown to lead to helping and prosocial behavior toward the target of the sympathy (e.g. Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). I build upon the findings of Galinsky et al. (2008) by examining the effect and effectiveness of sympathy elicitation in negotiation contexts. In other words, I examine whether one negotiator may induce sympathy in another negotiator as a tactic for personal gain, in contrast to the external manipulation used by Galinsky et al.

Sympathy Appeals
In order to elicit emotions in others, individuals can either serve as a passive stimulus (your coworker’s loud conversation may elicit annoyance), or they may actively gain the attention (and hopefully evoke the emotions) of others through direct appeals to the desired emotion. As was reviewed in Chapter 1, the antecedents of sympathy include appraisals of need, vulnerability and lack of control. Thus, in order to successfully elicit sympathy in another, an individual would have to share information regarding situations in which they lacked control over the situation, and in which they demonstrated need and vulnerability. I define a sympathy appeal as the active sharing of potentially sympathy-inducing information. For example, travelers who miss a connecting flight can sit and wait and hope that an airline employee notices and puts them on the next flight, or they can engage the employee in conversation and perhaps make sympathetic appeal to the employee (e.g. it’s my son’s first birthday and I need to get home), thereby eliciting sympathy in the employee. Experiencing sympathy for the passenger may in turn encourage the employee to make decisions that benefit the passenger, such as moving them up on the stand-by list.

Power

Because low power individuals are by definition at a disadvantage (i.e. they have less control over resources), they are more likely to occupy a position where they may be able to appeal to the sympathy of others. Therefore I begin by examining sympathy elicitation in unequal power contexts. This does not imply that individuals must be in low power positions to elicit sympathy in others; rather I start with the assumption that sympathy elicitation will be more likely to be used by low power individuals, and explore this possibility in order to establish the initial effect. The questions of whether low power individuals are uniquely situated to be the beneficiaries of sympathy, and whether the high power individual may be especially likely to make decisions based on sympathy, will be explored in Chapter 4.

Power is critically important in the context of mixed-motive interactions generally, and negotiations more specifically. In negotiations and other competitive situations, low power individuals are often encouraged to find ways to escape their low power position. Researchers have suggested that low power individuals hide their weaknesses (Thompson, 2005), leverage their weakness by focusing on others’ weaknesses (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007), make rational appeals (e.g. Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, & Goodman, 1997; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), and find improved alternatives to the interaction (e.g. Pinkley, Neal., & Bennett, 1994). Although these and other strategies might help low power individuals attain power, it is not always possible to do so. Sometimes hiding weakness or leveraging the other person’s weakness is not an option, and what is missing in the literature is an analysis of strategies to mitigate the disadvantages of a low power position. In this chapter I suggest that one method for overcoming weakness in negotiations is to elicit sympathy in the high power negotiator.

Negotiation

I examine the effectiveness of sympathy, and appealing to sympathy, in the context of negotiations. Negotiations are interactions in which two or more parties each have some degree of control over resources that are of interest to the other party, and in which the negotiators themselves are caught between dueling motives of cooperation and competition. Negotiators are often faced with a tradeoff between the motivation to claim distributive value in a negotiation,
and the benefit of creating integrative value (Froman & Cohen, 1970; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Thompson, 1990; 2005). Because negotiations can be competitive—negotiators must desire to claim some value, or there won’t be a negotiation, the negotiation context allows opportunities for the sympathizer to actually give up something which they value. This provides the perfect competitive context in which to examine whether emotional appeals can lead individuals to give up value even at a cost to themselves. I examine both distributive value claiming, and integrative value creation.

**Distributive value.** In a negotiation, distributive value refers to the proportion of total possible value within the negotiation claimed by each negotiator. To take a literal example, distributive value can be conceptualized as a pie, and distributive value claimed would be the size of the slice of pie obtained by a negotiator. In a fixed-pie situation, greater distributive value claimed by one negotiator necessitates less value claimed by the other negotiator.

In the context of negotiation, negotiators who feel sympathy for their counterpart may be more likely to give up distributive value in the negotiation. This is because the emotion sympathy is linked to a desire to alleviate the suffering of the target of sympathy, and sympathizers are likely to be motivated to help the disadvantaged other (e.g. Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Thus the initiator of sympathy has the potential to benefit when he is able to successfully elicit sympathy in his counterpart. I hypothesize that negotiators can strategically elicit sympathy in their counterparts, and that this sympathy can lead the sympathizer to give up distributive value.

**Integrative value.** Joint gain, or integrative value, refers to value that is created in the negotiation. Often, negotiations involve more than a single issue such as price, and negotiators may differ in the importance with which they weigh each issue. Negotiators can therefore trade off or logroll issues, conceding on issues that are less important, while gaining on issues that are more important (Froman & Cohen, 1970). In a classic example of integrative value creation, two sisters negotiate over a single orange. Splitting the orange evenly down the middle would be equitable distributive outcome, but understanding that one sister intends to use the orange peel for marmalade, while the other intends to use only the orange juice, maximally satisfies the interest of both sisters, and demonstrates integrative value creation.

One key to reaching mutually beneficial integrative deals is interest-based information sharing (Thompson, 1991; 2005). Just as the sisters in the parable must understand one another’s interests to maximally satisfy their goals of marmalade and orange juice, negotiators benefit from interest-based information exchange. Researchers have found that improved understanding of a negotiation counterpart’s interests can lead to more successful integrative agreements. For example, Thompson found that both volunteering information and seeking information from negotiation counterparts dramatically improved integrative value creation in the negotiation (Thompson, 1991). Of course, the division of integrative value is often inequitable, and negotiators are often instructed to create as much integrative value as possible, and then claim distributive value out of the newly enlarged pie (e.g. Thompson, 2005).

Because sympathy motivates the sympathizer towards helping, it is possible that negotiators may tend toward value creation when one party feels sympathy for the other. This result would be consistent with the results found by Galinsky and colleagues, where they found
that when a negotiator was externally manipulated to be in an empathetic mindset, the negotiation pair tended to create more value (Galinsky et al., 2008). The distinction between my studies and Galinsky’s studies is important because while in Galinsky’s studies participants responded to the experimenter’s instructions to feel empathetic, I examine whether negotiators can themselves elicit similar effects. While it remains untested whether sympathy appeals will have the same effect, I expect to find a similar pattern of results. When a negotiator feels sympathy for their counterpart, they will be motivated to help, which may lead them to expend more effort to find a mutually agreeable deal, which in turn may allow for the possibility of integrative value creation. It is also possible that the very act of making a sympathy appeal, presumably through sharing some type of sympathy eliciting information, spurs greater information sharing within the negotiation, and may help both negotiators see novel ways to increase joint gain. Simply appealing to sympathy may be construed as a type of information sharing, which may set the tone for greater information sharing within the negotiation in general (Thompson, 2001). Thus, while the exact mechanism remains unclear, I expect that sympathy experienced in the negotiation may result in greater integrative value creation within the negotiation.

Relational capital. The competitive aspect of negotiations suggests a motive to claim as much value as possible, and acting on sympathy is likely to decrease the instrumental value one might gain in a negotiation. On the surface therefore, there is little reason for rational actors ever to feel sympathy towards a competitive interaction partner. However, it is possible that sympathetic negotiators gain relational capital, such that even if value is ceded in the present negotiation, the good-will created by sympathy may build future opportunities and beneficial long term relationships (e.g. Anderson & Keltner, 2002; Galinsky et al., 2008). While the cross-sectional design of the current studies prevent a full exploration of this idea, in Study 1 I explore the benefits of sympathy on rapport built in the negotiation, which may have implications for the potential of building long term relational capital.

Overview of Studies

In three studies, I both measure and manipulate sympathy and sympathy appeals, and examine their effect on outcomes in the context of negotiations. I empirically examine the elicitation of the emotion of sympathy in others, a heretofore unexplored area of the emotions literature, while also exploring a novel method of mitigating the disadvantages of low power in mixed-motive interactions. In Study 1, I examine the effect of sympathy experienced by the high power negotiator on distributive value claimed by the low power negotiator. Study 2 examines the elicitation of sympathy directly, and investigates the effectiveness of appeals to sympathy on integrative value creation in negotiation contexts. Study 3 utilizes an experimental manipulation to show that sympathy elicitation by low power negotiators can lead to greater distributive value for the low power negotiator, and integrative value creation for the negotiating pair.

Study 1

In this initial study, I tested the hypothesis that experiencing sympathy towards low power negotiation counterparts leads high power negotiators to relinquish value. In addition, this study seeks to distinguish sympathy from other closely related constructs, including rapport.
developed within the negotiation, and relational goals. Finally, Study 1 tests the potential benefits of expressing sympathy on the relational capital accrued by the sympathizer.

Method

Participants. Study 1 was conducted in a Masters of Business Administration (MBA) course at top ten United States business school. Participants were 106 MBA students (30% female) enrolled in a course on negotiation and conflict resolution. Of the 106 participants, three dyads (6 participants) failed to complete one or more of the measures and were therefore dropped from the analysis.

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to their role and negotiation partner, and were given one week to prepare for the dyadic negotiation. After the negotiation, participants completed a post-negotiation questionnaire regarding the negotiation and their negotiation counterpart.

The negotiation dealt with a contract of carpentry services between a contractor and a real estate developer (Greenlaugh, 1993). The developer had contracted for woodwork in an apartment complex, and the negotiators were tasked with resolving a dispute about cost overruns for the job. The real estate developer held a higher power position in that the contract clearly stated that cost overruns were the responsibility of the owner of carpentry business. In addition to the issue of payment for the carpentry services, the negotiation included a number of other terms of the deal, an outstanding loan and rental of workshop space.

Independent Variable

Sympathy. In order to measure sympathy experienced, the high power negotiators were asked to report the degree to which they felt sympathy, and the degree to which they felt concern for their low power negotiating counterpart. These two items, measured on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), were significantly correlated $r(49) = 0.72$, $p < .001$ and had high internal consistency (coefficient $\alpha = 0.83$), and were thus combined into one measure of sympathy experienced for the low power negotiator ($M = 5.2$, $SD = 1.34$). Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations among study variable are reported in Table 1.

Dependent Variables

Distributive value. Distributive value was calculated as the dollar amount given up by the negotiator in the high power role (Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007). Distributive value ceded ranged from $0 to $392,000, with a mean of $112,372 and a standard deviation of $101,563, numbers which are comparable to the means reported in previous research (e.g. Howard et al., 2007). Distributive value was standardized prior to analysis.

Relational goals. Because sympathy in this study was measured rather than manipulated, it is important to determine whether there are alternative variables driving the results. To this end, I measured two constructs closely related to sympathy that might potentially explain any observed relationship between sympathy and low power outcomes. The first of these is relational goals. Research suggests that individuals may hold cognitive representations of themselves as more or less socially connected to others (e.g. Cross & Madson, 1997), and
relationally focused individuals may fail to create and claim value in negotiation settings (e.g. Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishi, & O’Brien, 2006). The failure to claim value has been suggested to be a result of caring about relational concerns too much (e.g. “relational accommodation,” “relational satisficing” and “unmitigated communion”), and focusing on the instrumental task too little (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Curhan et al., 2008; Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983; Gelfand et al, 2006). Thus, it is possible that sympathy may simply be a byproduct of high power negotiators who care more about their relationships with other people. In order to account for this alternative explanation of the results, one month prior to the negotiation, participants were asked to self-report the degree to which they agreed with a single item measure of relational focus in negotiations, “When negotiating, the relationship with my counterpart comes first” (M = 4.20, SD = 1.40).

Rapport. The second variable that was important to control for was rapport. This measure was taken for two distinct purposes. First, it is possible that greater rapport developed among certain negotiating pairs, which may have led to greater sympathy and more positive distributive outcomes for the disadvantaged party. In other words, perhaps the negotiators who developed the best connection with their counterparts ended up feeling sympathy and also gave up greater value – in which case rapport, rather than sympathy, would be the driving force behind any distributive gains made by the low power party. Thus, I collected a measure of the high power negotiator’s perception of rapport to control for this possibility.

Second, I explore the possibility that expressing sympathy can have beneficial psychological effects for those in need. In other words, those high power negotiators who express sympathy may benefit by building rapport, which in the long term may result in positive relational capital. I expect that low power negotiators will feel more positively about the negotiation process and their relationship with their high power counterpart, and therefore build greater rapport with their counterpart, if that counterpart is sympathetic during the negotiation interaction (Galinsky et al., 2008).

The measure of rapport was collected using a subset of items from a rapport scale (Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006). Negotiators responded to five items regarding the negotiation process and the relationship, on a Likert scale of 1(not at all) to 5(very much) (M = 3.77, SD = 0.87). The items included “did the negotiation make you trust your negotiating partner?” and "did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your negotiating partner?” and had a high coefficient alpha, α = 0.88. Rapport is often thought of as a dyadic variable (Drolet & Morris, 2000), but although the high and low power individual’s self-reported perceptions of rapport were significantly correlated (r(49) = 0.40, p = .01), the reliability was not sufficient (α = 0.57) to combine the scores into one measure of dyadic rapport. Thus, I examine each negotiator’s perception of the rapport formed over the course of the negotiation, in keeping with previous research on perceptions formed during negotiation (e.g. Curhan, Elfenbein & Kilduff, 2009).

Results and Discussion

Distributive value. To determine whether the high power negotiators who experienced sympathy were more likely to give up distributive value in the negotiation, I ran a linear
regression of distributive value on sympathy experienced. As hypothesized, sympathy experienced predicted value ceded by the high power negotiator \( F(1, 49) = 5.06, p \leq .05, \beta = .31, p \leq .05 \) (See Table 2). In other words, when the high power negotiator felt sympathy for the low power negotiator, the low power negotiator received a greater portion of the distributive value. This result shows that even in the competitive context of a negotiation, emotions such as sympathy may arise, and can lead to better outcomes for the targets of the sympathy.

**Rapport.** In order to ensure that the measure of sympathy experienced was not simply a proxy for the rapport developed in the negotiation, I ran a linear regression. The high power negotiator’s perception of rapport was marginally significantly correlated the sympathy they experienced \( (r(49) = 0.24, p = .10) \); see Table 1). However, the effect of high power sympathy on low power distributive value remained even when controlling for the rapport perceived by the high power negotiator (See Table 2). This suggests that the effect of sympathy is not a result of greater rapport perceived by the high power negotiator, and instead should be considered a significant factor in its own right.

**Relational goals.** Some negotiators are likely to value relationships more than others, and in line with previous research (e.g. Amanatullah et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2006), relationally oriented high power negotiators were more likely to give up value in the negotiation \( F(1, 49) = 10.61, p \leq .01, \beta = .43, p \leq .01 \). The high power negotiator’s relational goals were not related to the high power negotiator’s likelihood of experiencing sympathy in the negotiation \( r (50) = .09, p > .05 \), however, and when entered in the model together, both sympathy and relational focus independently predicted the high power person giving up value (see Table 2) suggesting that the effect is not driven by relationally focused individuals. While high power people who endorse a relational focus are also more likely to give up value, the effect of sympathy experienced by the high power negotiator on distributive value remains even controlling for relational focus. The low power individual's relational goals did not have any effect on distributive value claiming \( F(1, 49) = 1.36, p > .05, \beta = -0.17, p > .05 \).

**Benefits of expressing sympathy for the high power negotiator.** The negotiation also provided opportunity to examine the potential benefits of expressing sympathy for the high power sympathizer. Results showed that the low power negotiator reported perceiving greater rapport in the negotiation when the high power negotiator expressed sympathy. Specifically, a linear regression analyses showed that the high power negotiator’s sympathy had a significant effect on the low power negotiator’s positive perception of the rapport developed in the negotiation \( F(1, 49) = 13.90, \beta = .48, p = .001 \). The high power negotiator’s sympathy was marginally significantly related to the high power negotiator’s perception of rapport \( F(1, 49) = 2.82, \beta = .24, p = .10 \).

One possible explanation for this effect is that low power negotiators who received a better deal also perceived greater rapport in the negotiation. However, the effect of high power sympathy on low power perceptions of rapport remained when the distributive value claimed by the low power negotiator was entered into the regression equation as a control. In other words, the relationship between high power sympathy and low power perception of rapport was not explained merely by the outcomes achieved by the low power person.
Discussion. Study 1 demonstrated the benefits of having one’s high power counterpart experience sympathy in the context of negotiations. The sympathy experienced by the high power negotiator was not the result of the high power negotiator’s stable tendencies toward valuing relationships, nor could it be fully explained by the high power negotiator’s positive perceptions of the rapport developed during the course of the relationship. Further, when the high power negotiator reported greater sympathy during the negotiation, the low power negotiator was left feeling better about the rapport developed in the negotiation, independent of the outcomes he or she achieved. The implication here is that there are benefits to expressing sympathy—the short term loss of responding to others’ need may be mitigated by the long term gain of relational capital. That this result held true after controlling for distributive value in the negotiation suggests that expressing sympathy may bestow the sympathizer with positive outcomes, without actually giving up anything tangible. In other words, it is possible by appearing sympathetic, it may be possible for high power negotiators to gain relational capital without actual loss of distributive value in the short term. Overall, Study 1 provides initial evidence for the important role that sympathy can play in negotiations, both for objective and relational outcomes.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to extend the results of Study 1 in three ways. First, Study 2 utilized a new negotiation context, one which allowed for the examination of value creation, or integrative value. Often negotiations involve more than a single issue such as sales price, and skilled negotiators can create integrative value in a deal by finding areas of mutual benefit (Thompson 2005). Second, Study 2 directly explores the sympathy eliciting behavior of low power negotiators, to examine whether eliciting sympathy can lead to positive outcomes for the low power negotiator. This is important because rather than simply measure naturally occurring sympathy within the negotiation, Study 2 seeks to explore the idea that low power individuals can purposefully take advantage the benefits of sympathy experience by their high power counterpart. Third, Study 2 compared the effectiveness of eliciting sympathy to rational arguments based on merit, previously suggested as an effective method of influence for low power individuals (e.g. Farmer et al., 1997; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), and to interest-based information sharing, which is often thought to be a key to integrative bargaining (e.g. Thompson, 1991; 2005).

Method

Participants. Participants were 112 (29% female) MBA students enrolled in an 8 week course on negotiation and conflict resolution at a top ten business school in the United States.

Procedure and role instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to both role and negotiation partner, and were given three days to prepare for a dyadic negotiation centered on the sale of a service station to an oil company (Goldberg, 1997). Following the negotiation, participants reported their negotiated results, and completed a number of post negotiation surveys.

The negotiation contains a clear power differential in that the service station owner has numerous personal problems that necessitate the speedy sale of the service station, while the oil
executive has a significant amount of power and nothing personal at stake. Previous research has verified the power differential in the negotiation roles of this exercise (Anderson & Thompson, 2004).

The negotiation is designed to have a negative bargaining zone, that is, the low power service station owner requires more money to cover his expenses than the high power oil executive is authorized to spend on the station. However, through an uncovering of interests, the negotiators can discover that part of the problem is that the service station owner requires money to help finance a sailboat trip, as well as employment upon return from the trip. The oil executive on the other hand needs skilled managers, and offering the service station owner a job upon return from his trip can solve the problem of the negative bargaining zone.

Additional information which is less relevant to forming an agreement, including the fact that the station owner’s spouse is at the point of suffering a nervous breakdown from having been working 18 hour days for the previous five years, is also embedded in the negotiation. While information sharing about the trip is critical to a negotiated agreement, information sharing about the station owner’s immediate need to sell (i.e. spouse on the verge of a nervous breakdown) is not. In fact, intuition suggests that having information about a low power opponent’s immediate need to sell might backfire by allowing a negotiator to force their opponent to accept any deal that is “good enough,” and thus capture greater value. Thus, from a rational perspective it makes little sense to share an Achilles heel with a negotiator opponent. However, if one subscribes to the hypothesis that eliciting sympathy in an opponent can foster a desire to help and garner positive negotiation results, then it may make sense to share weaknesses that may elicit sympathy and thus help the parties to reach a deal. This negotiation therefore provided an ideal context in which to differentiate sharing of potentially sympathy inducing information from sharing of interest-based information relevant to reaching a negotiated agreement.

Measures

Appeals. To measure the sympathy appeals, rational arguments and interest-based information sharing by the low power negotiator, participants playing the role of service station owner were asked to report the arguments or appeals they made during the negotiation. Negotiators were presented with fifteen pieces of information from the negotiation instructions that they could have utilized in the negotiation, and were asked to indicate which appeals they used. Appeals were categorized by a primary coder, and checked by a second coder. The interrater reliability for the raters was found to be Kappa = 0.88, p < .001 (Landis & Koch, 1977). The appeals were separated broadly into economic or rational appeals that specifically addressed the economic value of the station (8 items: e.g. “I have a loyal customer base” and “I estimate it would cost Texoil at least $650,000 to buy land and build a comparable station”), and sympathy-based appeals, which included information that could potentially elicit the sympathy of the station owner, but did not address the economic value of the station (3 arguments: “my spouse is about to suffer a nervous breakdown,” “my spouse and I have been working 18 hour days for 5 years” and “I do not want to sell this station to somebody who may well make a failure of it.”). Because information sharing was an important component of this particular negotiation (Goldberg, 1997), participants also reported whether they shared interest-based arguments that were relevant to the information needed to secure an agreement (3 arguments: “I
must have $75,000 in savings for living expenses upon my return,” “I have made a down payment on a boat and plan to take a 2 year trip” and “I shared my estimates of the cost of my planned trip around the world”). The appeals used were summed to create one measure for each of the three types of information shared: Rational appeals (M = 3.74, SD = 1.73), sympathy appeals (M = 1.12, SD = 0.86), and interest-based appeals (M = 0.53, SD = 0.90).

**Dependent variable.** The primary dependent variable was whether or not an integrative deal was reached. In keeping with Anderson & Thompson (2004), impasses were coded as a "0," non-integrative agreements were coded as a "1," and integrative agreements were coded "2." A second coder coded 20% of the agreements, which were 100% in agreement with the first coder's codes. Non-integrative agreements were those in which the negotiators reached an agreement which did not satisfy the interests of both the buyer and the seller, or those which only included a sales price of the station. Integrative agreements were those which allowed both the buyer and seller to maximize their interests—for example, one negotiating pair settled on a sales price of $405,000, in addition to $75,000 in consulting fees, and a job at $75,000 per year upon return from the trip. This deal satisfied both the seller’s needs for immediate, and long term capital, and the buyer’s goal of finding good managers. 37.5% of the dyads were able to overcome the appearance of a negative bargaining zone and come to an integrative agreement, 8.9% (5 dyads) reached a non-integrative agreement, and 53.6% were unable to reach an agreement at all.

**Results & Discussion**

**Integrative deals.** A logistic regression analysis confirmed the hypothesis that sympathy appeals are positively related to the ability of the negotiators to come to integrative agreement versus those who did not reach a deal (b = .84, SE = 0.40, Wald = 4.46, p = .04) – the more sympathy appeals made by the service station owner, the greater the likelihood of the parties reaching an integrative agreement. As we can see in Table 3, this result held when controlling for rational appeals, interest-based appeals, and negotiator gender (b = 1.10, SE = 0.47, Wald = 5.59, p = .02). Interest-based appeals had also had significant and positive effect on integrative deal-making (b = .76, SE = 0.39, Wald = 3.82, p = .05), which is unsurprising given previous research on the beneficial effects of interest-based negotiation (e.g. Thompson, 1991; 2005), and given the importance of information sharing in this particular information (Goldberg, 1997). A logistic regression of rational appeals on deal making was not significant (b = -0.04, SE = 0.20, Wald = 0.05, p > .05).

**Discussion.** Study 2 supported the hypothesis that sympathy appeals by low power individuals predicted integrative agreements. This negotiation, designed specifically to teach students the importance of information sharing, was one where neither party was able to accept a purely distributive offer due to the negative bargaining zone (Goldberg, 1997). However, even in a negotiation context which required significant sharing of interests in order to reach an integrative agreement, sharing sympathy eliciting information predicted integrative deal-making above and beyond the effect of interest-based appeals. Although the current data do not allow me to definitely say why this effect occurred, it seems that high power negotiators exposed to sympathy appeals may have been more motivated to try to find a mutually agreeable deal. On the surface, this negotiation seemed to offer no such deal, so it is only those negotiation pairs who explore interests are able to overcome impasse and reach integrative agreements. Overall, Study 2 provides additional evidence for the power of sympathy, and particularly, sympathy
appeals by low-power negotiators, to affect negotiation outcomes. In Study 1, I found that sympathy experienced in the negotiation can benefit the distributive value gain of low power negotiators. Here I found that sympathy appeals can affect the rate of integrative agreements, and importantly, that low power negotiators maybe able to use sympathy as a strategy for their own gain.

**Study 3**

Study 1 and 2 show that in the context of negotiation, naturally occurring sympathy and sympathy appeals can lead to greater distributive and integrative outcomes for the disadvantaged negotiator. However, these studies lacked experimental manipulation of the sympathy appeal, leaving open the possibility that some omitted third variable was responsible for the effects found in both Study 1 and 2. Study 3, therefore, includes a randomly assigned experimental manipulation of sympathy appeals. Further, Study 3 examined a negotiation context that involved both integrative and distributive bargaining, to allow for the simultaneous assessment of sympathy appeals on the creation and claiming of value.

**Method**

**Participants.** 98 undergraduate business students (63% female) comprising 49 dyads completed Study 3 for partial fulfillment of course credit. Two dyads (one from each condition) were unable to come to an agreement within the allotted 25 minutes, and were thus dropped from the analysis.

**Procedure and Role Information.** Study 3 had a 2 condition (sympathy appeal vs. rational appeal) design. Participants entered the lab and were led to individual breakout rooms, where they were randomly assigned to play the role of either recruiter or candidate in a simulated job negotiation (Neale, 1997). The recruiter and candidate negotiated the terms of eight different pre-selected negotiable issues, including salary, health benefits, moving expense coverage, and branch location. Points were ascribed to each issue to indicate the importance of the issue to the negotiators, such that greater points indicated greater importance to the negotiators. Points ranged from -8,400 to 13,200.

There were three types of negotiable issues—distributive, integrative, and compatible. Distributive issues were those in which the recruiter and candidate had diametrically opposed preferences, which were equally important to both negotiators. For example, the recruiter wanted to give the candidate the lowest possible salary, while the candidate preferred the highest possible salary. Integrative issues were those issues which the recruiter and candidate had opposing preferences, but differed in terms of the importance placed on each issue, thus allowing negotiators to trade concessions to achieve higher mutual gain. For example, it was very important for recruiters that vacation time was minimized, but the size of the bonus was less important. The candidates on the other hand did not prioritize vacation time, and instead wanted the promise of a large bonus. Finally, compatible issues were those in which candidates and recruiters had the same preferences. For example, both the recruiter and candidate preferred that the candidate accept a job in San Francisco.
Previous research utilizing this negotiation exercise has shown that the recruiter is considered to have greater power than the candidate (Allred et al., 1997; Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Galinsky et al., 2011). In the present study, recruiters were given supplemental instructions informing them of another candidate who was willing to accept an offer of 2,200 points. This information gave the recruiters an alternative to the negotiated agreement, and served as an additional source of power for the recruiter (Pinkley et al., 1994). All candidates, regardless of condition, were given the following information designed to provide material for both rational arguments, and sympathy arguments.

You are a recent graduate of a top university, and have had several years of summer internship experience. You achieved good grades in your university courses, and are confident in the quality of your reference letters. This job would be a very good fit for you, and you think you are a strong applicant, given your qualifications, not to mention your strong work ethic. However, you are also worried given that this is currently your only prospect for a job, and you have considerable student loans to pay off. In addition, your mother was recently diagnosed with a life-threatening illness, and your family is struggling to keep up with the hospital bills. Getting a good deal on the terms of employment is therefore very important to you.

Experimental manipulation. In order to experimentally manipulate the use of sympathy appeals, participants in the role of candidate were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Half of the candidates were instructed to appeal to the sympathy of their counterpart, and half instructed to use rational arguments. Participants in the rational condition were asked to use rational arguments to keep the length of the preparation materials the same between both conditions. Both the sympathy appeal and the rational argument instructions can be found in Appendix A. Similar methodologies have been used successfully in previous studies (e.g. Adam & Shirako, 2011; Maddox, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008).

Approximately ten minutes after distributing the negotiation instructions, the experimenter entered the room and asked if the participants fully understood the role information, and whether they had any questions. For those participants playing the role of the candidate, the experimenter referred directly to the supplemental instructions and asked if the participant was comfortable with either making rational arguments, or sympathy appeals. Most participants reported that they were comfortable with the instructions. In cases where participants felt unsure, the experimenter reiterated the written instructions, and asked the participant to do their best. Participants were then given up to twenty-five minutes to negotiate with their counterparts. Once the negotiation was concluded, participants returned to their individual breakout rooms and completed a post-negotiation survey to capture the terms of the agreement.

Dependent Variables

Integrative value. The negotiation was structured in such a way as to allow for integrative value creation, in that the sum of points earned by the recruiter and the candidate served as a measure of integrative value (e.g. Allred et al., 1997; Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 1991). The minimum number of points obtainable by the dyad was -1,200, however, this required that both negotiators accept the worst possible deal, and was exceedingly unlikely
to occur. By contrast, taking a "split down the middle" approach would garner 4,400 points, while negotiators able to maximize integrative potential could earn a sum total of 13,200 points. On average negotiating dyads earned 10,074 points ($SD = 2,032$).

Distributive value. Distributive value was calculated as the proportion of points gained by the candidate out of the total points scored by the dyad, in order to unconfound distributive value from the measure of integrative value utilized above (Adam & Shirako, 2011; Anderson & Thompson, 2004). In keeping with previous research, higher numbers in this measure indicate greater value claiming by the candidate, and an even split of points would result in a score of $-0.50$ ($M = 0.48, SD = 0.21$).

Manipulation Check

Negotiation instructions. In order to ensure that the manipulation was effective, a careful check was made to ensure that negotiators followed instructions. At the end of the experiment, negotiators were asked to report what, if any instructions they received to conduct the negotiation (use sympathy arguments/ use rational arguments/ did not receive instructions), and whether they followed the instructions (yes/ no). In total, nine participants (four from the sympathy appeal condition and five from the rational appeal condition) reported that they did not follow the instructions provided, and were dropped from the analysis.2

Sympathy appeals. I also examined whether the sympathy appeal condition led to greater use of sympathy appeals, and to greater sympathy experienced by the recruiter. Sympathy appeals were measured in two ways. Analogous to Study 2, the negotiators in the candidate role were asked to report the information they shared with the recruiter. The candidate could share three potentially sympathy eliciting arguments (mother is in the hospital; school loans; family struggling with hospital bills) with the recruiter. These argument shared by the candidate were summed to form the sympathy appeal measure ($M = 2.05, SD = 1.15$). In order to ensure that the candidate’s self-report of their own behavior was not significantly biased, recruiters were also asked to report the information the candidate shared. Recruiter and candidate reports of sympathy information shared were highly correlated ($r = 0.60, p < .001$), providing confidence in the validity of the candidate’s self-reported behavioral measure of sympathy appeal. Second, candidates were asked to report the degree to which they used sympathy appeals as a tactic to gain influence in the negotiation ($M = 4.57, SD = 1.63$). These two separate measures of sympathy appeals were significantly correlated ($r = .65, p < .001$). In validation of the experimental manipulation, the sympathy manipulation predicted both the self-report of use of specific sympathy arguments ($M = 2.65, SD = 0.75$ vs. $M = 1.35, SD = 1.67, t(35) = 4.00, p \leq .001$), and self-reported sympathy appeal ($M = 5.05, SD = 1.28$ vs. $M = 4.00, SD = 1.83, t(35) = 2.04, p \leq .05$).

Sympathy experienced. Analogous to Study 1, sympathy was measured by asking both the recruiter and the candidate to report the degree of sympathy and the degree of concern they felt for their counterpart on a Likert scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). These two items had high internal consistency ($\alpha = 0.93$), and were therefore combined into one measure of sympathy experienced. As expected, recruiters in the sympathy appeal condition reported feeling greater sympathy for their counterparts than recruiters in the rational appeal condition ($M = 4.18, SD = 0.98$ vs. $M = 3.19, SD = 1.00, t(36) = 3.05, p = .004$). As might be expected, the low power
candidate did not feel a great deal of sympathy for the recruiter, and the amount of sympathy felt for the recruiter did not differ between the sympathy and rational conditions ($M = 2.19, SD = 1.11$ vs. $M = 2.75, SD = 1.57$, $t(36) = -1.22, p = .23$).

**Results and Discussion**

*Integrative value creation:* I analyzed integrative value at the dyad level. In order to examine the effect of condition on integrative value, I conducted an independent samples t-test. Consistent with the results of Study 2, the results of Study 3 show significantly greater integrative value creation in the sympathy appeal condition than in the rational appeal condition ($M = 10,650$ vs. $M = 9,433$, $t(36) = 2.26$, $p = .03$). Thus, dyads in which the candidate was instructed to employ sympathy appeals created more overall value than dyads in which the candidate was instructed to employ rational appeals.³

*Distributive value.* Using the proportional measure of distributive value, I ran an independent samples t-test. Results showed that the candidates in the sympathy appeal condition gained significantly more distributive value than those in the rational appeal condition ($M = 0.56, SD = 0.13$ vs. $M = 0.40, SD = 0.25$, $t(36) = 2.53$, $p = .02$). In other words, in those dyads where the low power candidates were instructed to appeal to the sympathy of the high power recruiters, the candidates ended up receiving more value overall. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1, and with Study 1’s results.

**Discussion.** Study 3’s findings replicated and extended the results from Studies 1 and 2 in several important ways. Rather than relying on naturally occurring sympathy or sympathy appeals, Study 3 experimentally manipulated the use of sympathy appeals and confirmed that sympathy appeals can be used strategically by low power individuals. Study 3 further provided direct evidence for the effectiveness of sympathy appeals on integrative value creation for the negotiating pair, and on distributive value claiming for the low power negotiator. Taken together with the results of Study 2, these studies provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that sympathy may be conducive to integrative deal-making.

**Chapter 2 Discussion**

Across three studies and negotiation contexts, involving both masters of business administration students and undergraduate business students, I found evidence suggesting that low power negotiators can benefit by eliciting sympathy in their high power counterparts. Study 1 showed that sympathy experienced by the high power individual was related to greater distributive value claiming by the low power individual, and Study 2 showed that sympathy appeals were related to integrative value creation in negotiation situations. These results were significant even controlling for the interest-based information sharing, rational arguments, rapport, and the degree to which the high power individual was relationally focused. Study 3 built upon the results of Study 1 and 2 by experimentally manipulating low power individuals’ use of sympathy appeals, providing evidence for a causal link between sympathy appeals and distributive and integrative outcomes in negotiation. The three studies each utilized a different negotiation context, further strengthening the evidence for the robustness of the effect of sympathy appeals on positive outcomes for the low power negotiator.
There are a number of important limitations to the studies in Chapter 2. First, Studies 1 and 2 used a correlational design, which does not preclude the possibility that there were other variables at play. In Study 1 for example, I showed that sympathy experienced led to greater distributive gains for the low power negotiator. However, this sympathy may have been associated with other variables such as personality or individual differences in the tendency to feel sympathy, and may not have been the result of direct sympathy appeals. While I controlled for both rapport and relational goals as likely third variables that may have contributed to the effect, the correlational design does not allow for establishing causality. Study 3 utilized an experimental design in an attempt to mitigate the limitations of the first two studies, but here too the results were not perfect. Despite showing that experimentally induced sympathy appeals led to greater integrative value creation and distributive value claiming, there may be other possible explanations for this effect. For example, it is possible that low power negotiators who were instructed to elicit sympathy found the instructions inherently more interesting and were thus more motivated to perform well independent of the sympathy of the high power negotiator. Study 4 attempts to mitigate this possible alternate explanation by focusing on the high power individual. Finally, the causal mechanism through which sympathy appeals lead to greater integrative gain is as of yet unclear and will require future research to fully untangle.

The results of these studies provide the first empirical examination of sympathy in the context of negotiations, and contribute to two areas of the literature. First, I take an important step in the research on emotion by examining the possibility of strategically eliciting emotions in others. While much research has been conducted on the influence of emotion, this chapter takes the first step towards showing empirically that individuals are able, and in negotiation situations can benefit from, using emotional appeals to manage others’ emotions.

Second, I present a novel way in which low power individuals can mitigate some of the disadvantages of their position, and indeed in some cases fare better than they would have using traditional bargaining techniques such as rational persuasion. While it is undoubtedly ill-advised to purposely enter a negotiation in a low power starting position, the reality is that all too often we find ourselves in positions of low power. These findings are provocative because they suggests that rather than hiding a personal weakness, in some cases individuals may capitalize on that weakness and use it for their own benefit. The current chapter suggests that emotional appeals to sympathy can result in positive outcomes for individuals in positions of low power.
CHAPTER 3:

PREFERENCE REVERSALS IN SYMPATHY-BASED DECISIONS

Introduction

Chapter 2 demonstrated that in the context of negotiations, sympathy appeals made by the low power negotiator and sympathy experienced by the high power negotiator led to both integrative value creation, and distributive value claiming by the low power negotiator. This chapter builds on Chapter 2 in two important ways. First, I expand beyond in-person negotiations, and examine the effects of sympathy in the context of decision-making. Unlike in negotiations where there might be multiple rounds of communication and counteroffers, in this chapter I focus on the moment where one individual must make a decision regarding one or more options based on the information at hand. While negotiations are inherently interdependent tasks involving two or more individuals, focusing in the high power decision maker allows me to isolate the effect of sympathy found in the previous chapter. Thus, the decision-making context allows me to rule out the possibility that the low power individuals in the previous three studies were simply more motivated, but rather that the effect is a result of the high power decision-maker. In this chapter, I compare the relative influence of sympathy appeals to other types of appeals in a decision-making context, and examine how the sympathy experienced by the decision-maker mediates this effect. Second, I begin to explore boundary conditions of this effect. Specifically, I turn to the work on joint versus separate decision-making, and examine the differential effectiveness of sympathy appeals when decision-makers have only one choice versus multiple choices before them.

Will decision-makers favor those who seek sympathy over those who make rational arguments based on the merits of their case? Building on the results of Chapter 2, I expect that sympathy based arguments, or sympathy appeals, may in fact trump rational arguments in decision-making situations. We know from previous research that the experience of sympathy can have a powerful influence on an individual’s cognition and behavior, in particular motivating individuals to help those in need (Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Thus, experienced sympathy is likely to affect decision-making outcomes to the benefit of the target of sympathy. In the first two studies I examine the mediating effect of the experience of sympathy on the decision-maker’s decisions. In all of the studies reported in this chapter, I contrast sympathy appeals with rational appeals and with appeals to fairness. Preferences for fairness have been shown to be a powerful motivator (e.g. Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997), and I include fairness as a contrast condition. I hypothesize that it is the experience of sympathy which leads sympathy-based arguments to be more successful than their rational or fairness-based counterparts.

Are Sympathy Appeals Always Effective?

While the results of Chapter 1 established the effect and effectiveness of sympathy appeals in a negotiation context, and in the first half of Chapter 2 I provide further evidence for my initial results, there are likely to be boundary conditions on this effect. One possible boundary condition on the effectiveness of sympathy appeals comes from the literature on
preference reversals in joint versus separate evaluations. Research on preference reversals shows that the manner in which we evaluate decisions can be fundamentally altered when we are presented with multiple choices simultaneously (joint evaluation) versus making one decision at a time (separate evaluation) (e.g. Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni & Blount, 1999). In the airport example from the previous chapter, imagine that instead of one individual appealing for the flight attendant’s sympathy, multiple individuals are simultaneously jockeying for the last seat on the plane. In this situation, the flight attendant may be less inclined to respond with sympathy to the person in need, and may instead assign the seat based on previously determined allocation rules, such as airline membership or order in which the request was made. In order to examine the possibilities of a preference-reversal effect in joint versus separate sympathy-based decision making, I present a brief overview and discussion of the preference reversal literature.

Preference reversal in decision-making. Researchers have long documented differences in preference that occur when two or more distinct options are viewed one at a time rather than viewed simultaneously (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1999). For example, in the context of decision-making regarding the allocations of public funds, Kahneman and Ritov showed that when presented separately, decision-makers prioritized attractive options such as the conservation of elephants over the lead poisoning in the inner cities. However, when forced to allocate public funding to one of the two options in a joint comparison, decision-makers had difficulty justifying the preservation of elephants over lead paint problems in their own communities, and lead paint was deemed to have greater importance (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994). Kahneman and Ritov argue that decision-makers often make attitude-based decisions, that is, they make decisions based on prominence or perceptions of importance of the option when options were presented separately, but are unable to make decision based on prominence when the same options were presented jointly (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994).

Bazerman and colleagues built upon the research on preference reversals, and argue that prominence is intricately related to the tension between what an individual wants to do versus what the individual thinks that he or she should do (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, 1998; Bazerman et al., 1999). In other words, individuals often have an emotional desire (or visceral want) to engage in behaviors that are inconsistent with the behaviors in which we believe we should engage. Under separate evaluation, lacking a counterbalancing alternative, individuals are free to lean toward what they ‘want’ to do. However, in joint evaluation, individuals tend to select the most justifiable option—the one that he thinks that he ‘should’ choose. Thus, the direct comparison between options puts the ‘want’ self in check, in favor of the ‘should’ self. For example, individuals may want to eat ice cream while on a diet, when they should skip the ice cream and opt for a salad. In the presence of an ice-cream shop, many individuals will succumb to the temptation of their visceral wants. However, if presented with the option of either a small, low fat sorbet or a large chocolate ice cream, the joint decision may remind decision-makers to choose the lesser of two evils. In these examples, be it ice-cream, or lead paint, we see preference reversals when choices are presented jointly versus separately (Bazerman et al., 1994; Milkman, Rogers & Bazeman, 2008).

Emotion & preference reversals. While Bazerman and colleagues suggest that ‘gut level’ responses allow individuals to make “want” choices when evaluating decisions separately (Bazerman, Schroth, Shah, Diekmann, & Tenbrunsel, 1999), few studies have explicitly studied
the experience of emotion in the context of preference reversals in joint versus separate decision-making situations. In a notable exception, Ritov and Baron (2011) examine intensity of emotional experience, and find evidence for the idea that greater emotion is experienced in separate decisions than in joint decisions. This finding is important because it is the first experimental evidence to revealed greater emotion experienced in separate evaluation situations than in joint evaluation situations. Ritov and Baron show that in separate evaluation situations, participants were more likely to report experiencing disgust, anger, sadness, fear, guilt and eagerness, and that these ratings decreased when the same options were evaluated jointly (2011). Although Ritov and Baron suggest that emotional experience should mediate the effect of the decision, their experimental design precluded them from showing this effect directly. However, these findings support my hypothesis that sympathy will be less effective in joint decision contexts.

I build upon this previous research by examining the specific discrete emotion of sympathy in separate versus joint decision-making contexts, rather than general emotionality as measured by Ritov and Baron, and show how the experience of sympathy mediates the preference reversal effect. I propose that individuals will be more willing to make sympathy-based, “want” decisions when presented with just one option in contrast to joint decision-making. In other words, given a sympathy-eliciting antecedent, decision makers are more willing to act on the sympathy that they feel, positively benefitting the target of the sympathy, but only when there are not other, more rational options for the decision-maker to evaluate. For example, in Study 3 (Chapter 2), recruiters were presented with a candidate who appealed to their sense of sympathy. It is possible that if the recruiters were evaluating more than one candidate, the sympathy eliciting candidate would not have benefitted in the same way. Thus, I seek to explore an important boundary condition on the effectiveness of sympathy appeals.

In all of the studies reported in Chapter 3, I hold power constant, and examine only the effect of a low power individual appealing to a high power decision-maker. Because I am examining situations in which one individual has control over the allocation of valuable resources, that person has power by definition (French & Raven, 1959; Keltner et al., 2003). The topic of whether powerful individuals are more likely to make decisions based on sympathy is one I will address in Chapter 4.

Overview of Studies

Chapter 3 is comprised of three sets of studies. Studies 4A and 4B explore the effectiveness of sympathy, fairness, and rational arguments using a three condition (sympathy, fairness & rational) between subjects design, holding constant all other information. In Study 4A, I examine undergraduate business students, and in Study 4B, I replicate the findings using a national sample of working adults. In both samples, I conduct mediation analysis and show that the expected effect is due to the sympathy experienced by the decision-maker. Studies 5 & 6 utilized a within subjects methodology to examine the same sympathy, fairness and rational appeals used in Study 4, and to examine the possibility of sympathy-based preference reversals. In both Studies 5 and 6, participants evaluated all three appeals simultaneously, but with different dependent variables. I show that when the same appeals are presented jointly, decision-makers reward rational appeals over sympathy appeals. I conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of my findings.
Study 4A

Study 2 of this dissertation provided evidence for the idea that sympathy appeals can be more effective than making rational arguments within the context of some negotiations. In the following studies, I compare sympathy appeals to rational appeals directly in the context of decision making. Study 4 further contrasts sympathy and rational appeals to fairness appeals. Norms of fairness have been found to be both pervasive and powerful (e.g. Tyler et al., 1997), and fairness was therefore included in this study to provide additional contrast condition. Study 4A was undertaken using an undergraduate business sample, and study 4B utilized a national sample of adult managers. This replication provides an additional layer of external validity by showing that sympathy does not lie solely in the domain of naïve undergraduates, but can arise in diverse audiences.

Method

Participants. 60 undergraduate business students (51% female) from a large, west coast university completed study 4A for course credit.

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three appeal conditions (sympathy, fairness & rational), and were asked to take the role of a supervisor making decisions about an employee’s raise. Participants evaluated only one request, but were told that their own chances at receiving a raise could become less likely should they give the employee a raise, and because they would be evaluating two other employees in the next few days, and it would be difficult to give raises to all three employees. This text was included to convey the sense that the raises were a limited resource within the company, and to prevent participants from simply allocating the maximum raise each time.

The text of the vignette was identical across conditions except for the sympathy, rational, and fairness appeals, reported below. Participants were instructed to imagine that they had asked the employee requesting the raise to include a note in their application detailing the reason for their request. The note read as follows in all three conditions:

“Thank you very much for considering my application for a raise. While I know that this has been a difficult year for the company, I am asking that you grant me a 6% raise. Not only do I have an exemplary working record... [Condition-specific text inserted here] Thank you again for your consideration.”

The manipulations for each condition were as follows:

“...I am also faced with extenuating circumstances—my mother is in the hospital with a terminal illness, and I am struggling to pay the bills.” (Sympathy condition)

“...employees with records similar to mine have been granted raises as recently as last month.” (Fairness condition)

“...I have overseen the success of many of our most profitable deals over the past few months.” (Rational condition)
Dependent variables. After reading the scenario, participants were first asked to recommend a raise on a scale of 0% to 6% \((M = 3.48, SD = 1.20)\), and then on the following page to report the degree to which they felt sympathy for the employee on a scale of 1 \((not at all)\) to 7 \(very much\) \((M = 4.37, SD = 1.77)\).

Pre-Test

In order to ensure that the manipulation check in each condition was effective, I conducted a pretest. Participants were a national sample of 29 adults (59% female, average age 31) recruited over the internet. The pretest utilized a within subjects design, whereby participants were asked to judge each of the three appeals on the degree to which each relied upon rational, fairness, and sympathy arguments. Specifically, participants were asked “how much does each statement rely on rational arguments?” “how much does each statement rely on a fairness argument?” and “how much sympathy do you feel for each employee?” Participants scored each appeal on a scale of 1 \((not at all)\) to 7 \((very much)\), and were not asked to assign a raise to any of the arguments.

Confirming expectations, a series of repeated measures t-tests revealed that participants experienced more sympathy for the employee making the sympathy argument \((M = 5.59, SD = 1.87)\), than for the employee making the rational argument \((M = 3.17, SD = 1.87, t(28) = -5.29, p < .001)\) and the fairness argument \((M = 3.07, SD = 1.58, t(28) = 7.13, p < .001)\). Results of the pretest showed that the rational argument was judged as more rational \((M = 6.14, SD = 0.99)\) than the sympathy argument \((M = 4.00, SD = 1.95, t(28) = 4.65, p < .001)\), as well as the fairness argument \((M = 4.31, SD = 1.54, t(28) = 5.31, p < .001)\). As expected, the fairness argument was seen as relying more upon fairness \((M = 5.62, SD = 1.43)\), than the rational argument \((M = 4.55, SD = 1.90, t(28) = -2.32, p = .03)\), and the sympathy argument \((M = 3.48, SD = 1.83, t(28) = -3.99, p < .001)\). Thus, the pre-test results confirmed that the rationale behind each argument was comprehensible to participants, and that each argument was received as intended.

Results

Sympathy. To determine whether sympathy was significantly more likely to be elicited in the sympathy condition, I conducted an ANOVA with the student sample of 60 undergraduates, and found a statistically significant main effect for condition \((F(2,57) = 21.84, p < .001)\). Planned comparisons showed that participants in the sympathy condition experienced greater sympathy than those in the fairness \((M = 5.67, SD = 1.02 vs. M = 4.45, SD = 1.61, t(39) = 2.92, p = .002)\) and rational conditions \((M = 2.84, SD = 1.32, t(38) = 7.40, p = .001)\). These results show clearly that the sympathy condition resulted in greater sympathy experienced.

Raise. Did the sympathy appeals lead to greater financial outcomes for the low power employee in the scenario? An ANOVA showed that significant differences existed among the three groups \((F(2,57) = 5.28, p = .01)\), and planned comparisons showed that the sympathy condition \((M = 4.05, SD = 0.97)\) led to a significantly greater raise than the rational argument condition\((M = 2.89, SD = 1.30, t(38) = 3.22, p = .003)\) and marginally significantly greater than the fairness condition \((M = 3.45, SD = 1.10, t(39) = 1.84, p = .07)\) (See Figure 1). Further, the sympathy condition resulted in a significantly greater raise than the rational and fairness
conditions combined ($M = 4.05, \text{SD} = 0.97$ vs. $M = 3.18, \text{SD} = 1.22, t(58) = 2.83, p = .01$), which did not significantly differ from each other ($t(37) = 1.45, p = .16$). The results showed clearly that making sympathy appeals in this decision-making context led to greater monetary outcomes than did making appeals to rationality or fairness.

**Mediation analysis.** In order to ensure that the experience of the emotion of sympathy was in fact causally related to the experimental outcome, I conducted a mediation analysis, and found that the relationship between condition and raise granted was mediated by sympathy. A comparison of the sympathy condition versus the combined rational and fairness conditions showed that condition was a significant predictor of raise granted $F(1,58) = 7.99, p = .01, \beta = .35, p = .01$) and of sympathy $F(1,58) = 24.49, p < .001, \beta = .55, p < .001$). Sympathy experienced by the participants was also a significant predictor of raise granted $F(1,58) = 14.15, p < .001, \beta = .44, p < .001$, and when entered into the equation together, the effect of sympathy remained ($\beta = .36, p = .01$), while the effect of condition disappeared ($\beta = .15, p = .28$), satisfying the requirements for a mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981). As Figure 2 illustrates, the standardized regression coefficient between condition and raise decreased substantially when controlling for sympathy. A Sobel test revealed that the mediation analysis was significant ($z = 2.29, p = .02$). By experimentally manipulating the arguments presented, this study provided empirical evidence that sympathy appeals can result in greater monetary outcomes for the low power person than fairness or rational arguments in decision-making contexts. Furthermore, the mediation analysis shows that the effect in the study was due to sympathy experienced by the high power decision maker.

**Study 4B**

In order to ensure that the results of Study 4A were not simply the result of an overly sympathetic undergraduate population, Study 4B was undertaken with a national sample of an adult population with management experience. Study 4B followed the procedures outlined in Study 4A, except for the change in participant sample.

**Method**

**Participants.** Participants were working adults recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. Amazon Mechanical Turk allows experimenters to recruit anonymous participants from a pre-existing pool of registered Mechanical Turk “workers.” Potential participants completed a pre-screen measure which asked them to rate the extent of their management experience on a scale of 1 (no management experience) to 7 (extensive management experience). Only potential participants who recorded a 4 or greater on this question were allowed to complete the main survey ($M = 4.89, \text{SD} = 1.01$). Out of 140 participants who completed the pre-test, 44 participants recorded a 3 or less on the management experience question ($M = 1.84, \text{SD} = 0.89$), and were not asked to complete the main survey. This resulted in 96 participants with an average age of 37 ($\text{SD} = 11.84$).

**Procedure.** Once the screening process was complete, the procedure was identical to that undertaken by the undergraduate participants in study 4B, except that this study took place in the context of an online internet survey, while the undergraduate participants filled out a paper and pencil survey. Participants were again randomly assigned to one of three conditions (sympathy,
fairness & rational), and asked to take the role of a supervisor making decisions about an employee’s raise.

**Dependent variables:** Like the procedure, the dependent variable in this study remained the same as in study 4A. Participants were asked to recommend a raise on a 0% to 6% scale (\(M = 3.26, SD = 1.45\)) and report the degree of sympathy felt for the employee after reading the scenario (\(M = 4.38, SD = 1.65\)).

**Results**

**Sympathy.** The results of study 4B mirrored the results of study 4A very closely. A one-way ANOVA revealed a statistically significant main effect for condition (\(F(2,93) = 6.63, p = .002\)). As in study 1, participants in the sympathy condition experienced greater sympathy than those in the fairness (\(M = 5.19, SD = 1.55\) vs. \(M = 4.06, SD = 1.71\), \(t(61) = 2.73, p = .01\)) and rational conditions (\(M = 5.19, SD = 1.55\) vs. \(M = 3.88, SD = 1.41\), \(t(63) = 3.56, p = .001\)), showing that the sympathy condition resulted in the greatest sympathy experienced by the decision-maker.

**Raise.** Again confirming the results of Study 4A, an ANOVA showed that there is a significant difference in raise granted among the three groups (\(F(2,93) = 3.57, p = .03\)). T-tests showed that the sympathy condition led to a significantly greater raise than the rational argument condition (\(M = 4.75, SD = 1.50\) vs. \(M = 3.82, SD = 1.19\), \(t(63) = 2.78, p = .01\)) but did not lead to a significantly greater raise than the fairness condition, although the means trended in the expected direction (\(M = 4.23, SD = 1.52\), \(t(61) = 1.38, p = .17\)). The sympathy condition yielded a significantly greater raise as compared to the combined fairness and rational conditions (\(M = 4.75, SD = 1.50\) vs. \(M = 4.02, SD = 1.36\), \(t(94) = 2.41, p = .02\)).

**Mediation analysis.** The significant effect of condition on raise was mediated by sympathy in study 4B. Condition was a significant predictor of sympathy \(F(1,94) = 11.25, p = .001, \beta = -0.33, p = .001\) and of raise granted \(F(1, 94) = 7.18, p = .01, \beta = -0.27, p = .01\), and sympathy experienced by the participants predicted raise granted \(F(1, 94) = 9.50, p = .003, \beta = 0.30, p = .003\). When entered into the regression equation together, the effect of sympathy experienced remained significant (\(\beta = 0.24, p = .02\), while the effect of condition on raise dropped to marginal significance (\(\beta = -0.18, p = .07\)), yielding a significant mediation as measured by the Sobel test (\(Z = -1.93, p = .05\)).

**Discussion: Studies 4A & 4B**

Studies 4A and 4B study provide support for the hypothesis that sympathy appeals can result in greater monetary outcomes for the appealer than rational appeals and fairness appeals. In other words, employees who argued that their superior work merited extra pay did not see as much of an increase in raise as the employees who discussed their hospitalized mother, a situation completely unrelated to the workplace context. Furthermore, the mediation analysis in both studies confirmed that the effect of sympathy appeals was due to the sympathy experienced by the high power decision maker. It is also notable that sympathy appeals affected the decisions of experienced managers just as they did undergraduate students.
In contrast to the expectation that managers should make compensation decisions based on merit alone, and that individuals should favor rational arguments more generally, these studies show that experiencing sympathy can have a powerful effect on decision-makers. Specifically, it seems that asking for special considerations due to extenuating circumstances may not only be effective, but it may, in some circumstances, be more effective than making rational, merit-based arguments. Of course, there are likely to be boundary conditions on the effectiveness of sympathy appeals, and in Studies 5 & 6, I explore one possible boundary condition. I test whether joint evaluation attenuates the effectiveness of sympathy appeals.

Study 5

Studies 4A and 4B showed that in the context of decision making, sympathy appeals can be more effective than rational and fairness-based arguments when each is considered in isolation. However, managers in real workplace situations often evaluate multiple employees at the same time. Given the hypothesis that the experience of sympathy plays a mediating role in the effectiveness of sympathy appeals on distributive outcomes for the low power individual, it is possible that this sympathy will be less likely to occur, and or that individuals will be less willing to act on the sympathy in joint decision making contexts. Study 5 was therefore designed as a within subjects design with a side-by-side comparison of the sympathy, fairness and rational arguments used in studies 4A and 4B, to test the effectiveness of sympathy appeals in the context of joint or comparative decision making. Here, I test the hypothesis that the joint comparison of the same appeals used in Studies 4A and 4B will result in a preference reversal such that the rational appeal will be favored over the sympathy appeal.

Method

Participants. 61 undergraduate business majors (54% women) from a large university in the western United States participated in Study 5.

Procedure. Participants read the sympathy, rational, and fairness appeals, purportedly written by three employees, requesting bonuses. The appeals used were the same appeals used in studies 4A and 4B.

Dependent variable. Rather than assign a percentage point raise as in Studies 4A and 4B, decision-makers allocated a percentage of total available bonus money (100%) among three employees making the three different types of appeals. This change in design from Studies 4A and 4B was made to convey the sense that the resources were limited, as in generally the case within real-world organizations. Thus, decision-makers were presented with a head-on comparison of the three conditions, and were faced with the fact that allocating a greater bonus to one employee directly affected the other two employees. This change was made to ensure that participants did not simply allocate the maximum amount to each employee; rather, participants were forced to decide which employee to favor at a direct cost to other employees. The dependent variable was therefore the percentage of raise granted to each employee.

Results and Discussion

On average, participants allocated 43% of the bonus money to the employee who made the rational appeals, 31% to the employee who made the sympathy appeals, and 26% to the
employee who made the fairness appeal. The overall effect was significant, $F(2, 116) = 17.90, p < .001$. Planned comparisons showed that rational appeals received a significantly greater portion of the bonus than sympathy appeals ($t(58) = 3.44, p \leq .001$), and fairness appeals ($t(58) = 6.13, p \leq .001$). Sympathy appeals were marginally significantly more effective than fairness arguments ($t(58) = 1.90, p = .06$).

When compared side-by-side, participants allocated the highest raises to employees making rational arguments, with the sympathy and fairness arguments coming in second and third place, respectively. This supports my hypothesis that sympathy appeals will be less effective in join evaluation decisions, and is in sharp contrast to studies 4A and 4B, which demonstrated clearly that when presented in isolation, sympathy appeals were more effective than rational or fairness based arguments.

**Study 6**

While Study 5 provided evidence a limitation on the strength of emotion in decision-making situations, the change in dependent variable does not allow for a direct comparison to studies 4A and 4B. In Studies 4A and 4B, participants allocated a raise on a scale of 0-6%, while in Study 5, participants were asked to divide 100% of an available pot into bonuses for employees. Study 6 was therefore undertaken to provide a direct comparison of Sympathy appeals to rational and fairness based appeals, using the same dependent measure (percentage raise granted) used in Studies 4A and 4B. Study 6 also utilized a national sample of adults with management experience, as opposed to Study 5 which was conducted with undergraduate students.

**Method**

**Participants.** 51 adults from an online United States national sample (54% women) participated in this study. Participants were pre-screened on the degree of experience they had managing others in a professional setting on a scale of 1 (no management experience) to 7 (extensive management experience). Only participants who scored 4 (moderate amount of management experience) or higher were allowed to complete the full survey ($M = 4.75, SD = 1.02$), disqualifying 32 respondents, and resulting in an average age of 38 ($SD = 11.60$).

**Procedure.** Participants read a hypothetical decision-making scenario where they took the role of a manager making allocation decisions to determine the raise of three employees. The design of the study was identical to that of Studies 4A and 4B, except that participants saw all three arguments jointly, rather than separately. Participants were told they could assign any raise between zero and six percent to each of the three employees requesting a raise. The sympathy appeal, rational appeal, and fairness appeal used were identical to those utilized in studies 4A,4B and 5. After reading the decision-making scenario and employee appeals, participants made judgments regarding the raise (0%-6%) that they thought should be given to each employee.

**Results and Discussion**

As studies 4A and 4B, the critical dependent variable in Study 6 was the amount of value allocated to the employee by the decision-maker. By presenting the rational, sympathy, and fairness appeals jointly, this study seeks further confirmation for the hypothesis that joint
presentation of the three arguments will result in a preference reversal from the results of Studies 4A & 4B. The overall effect was significant, $F(2, 100) = 34.34, p < .001$, and planned comparisons confirmed that participants allocated a significantly greater bonus to the employee who made the rational appeal ($M = 4.59, SD = 1.22$), than to the employee who made the sympathy appeal ($M = 3.41, SD = 1.50, t(50) = 5.96, p < .001$), and the employee who made the fairness appeal ($M = 3.06, SD = 1.46, t(50) = 6.86, p < .001$). As in Study 5, participants allocated a greater raise to employees making sympathy appeals ($M = 3.41, SD = 1.22$) than to employees making fairness appeals ($M = 3.06, SD = 1.46, t(50) = 2.31, p = .03$).

By utilizing the identical arguments and decision structure as Studies 4A and 4B, Study 6 provides evidence for preference reversal effects. Together with Study 5, these results extend the research on joint versus separate decision-making by providing empirical evidence for the idea that emotion-based decisions are more likely to be made in single decision contexts. One possible avenue to be explored in explaining this result is that norms of rational behavior are cued when there are joint decisions to be made, while rationality norms are not salient when only one decision must be made. Thus, while sympathy elicitation may be effective in one-on-one situations, the results of Study 5 and 6 suggest that sympathy appeals may be less effective when the appealing individual is simply one in a crowd.

**General Discussion**

Across three sets of studies, I compared sympathy appeals to rational and fairness appeals in single and joint decision-making. Decision makers in the real world often face both types of decisions, so it is important to consider the effects of sympathy in each case. This chapter therefore extends upon previous research in several significant ways. First, I show that in the absence of other options decision-makers are willing to reward sympathy appeals over rational or fairness based appeals, and that this effect is mediated by the sympathy experienced by the decision-maker (Studies 4A & 4B). Thus, I show that the elicitation of sympathy in others is not only possible, but also a viable method of persuasion.

Second, I contribute to the research on joint versus separate decision making by providing initial experimental evidence for preference reversals based on the experience of a single discrete emotion of sympathy (Studies 5 & 6). In separate evaluations, research suggests that decision-makers are able to rely on 'gut level' responses based on what they "want" to do rather than what they "should" do. It is possible that decision-makers cued with multiple decisions jointly are primed with norms of rationality, which forces them to make decisions based on "should" rather than "want." As we can see from the studies, participants presented with only one appeal faced no such constraints on what their emotions may have led them to "want" to do. I find evidence supporting the want/should perspective, and show that when comparing identical appeals jointly, rational appeals resulted in more positive outcomes for the appealer, indicating a preference reversal.

There are a number of limitations to the studies reported in this chapter. First, the studies utilized the same simple vignette, with similar dependent variables, thereby limiting claims that can be made about generalizability. The use of the same methodology was also a strength in that it allowed me to compare the separate versus joint comparison studies. However, this brings to light a second weakness. Although the participants in Studies 4A and 5 were both drawn from
the same sample population, the studies were conducted at different times meaning that participants were not randomly assigned to study. Thus, comparing the results of the two joint versus separate evaluation studies and interpreting them as a between-subject effect is not ideal. Studies 4B and 6 similarly utilized comparable adult management populations, but again the data were not collected together. I attempted to mitigate these weaknesses by running multiple studies with different populations to replicate my own effects, but future studies should collect both the joint and separate evaluations at the same time in a between-subject design, so as to avoid this methodological weakness.

The results of Chapter 3 are important, because combined with the results of Chapter 2 they show conclusively that sympathy appeals garner instrumental gains for the person making the sympathy appeal. However, this chapter also outlines an important boundary condition on the effect. Those who seek to use sympathy appeals should approach the tactic with caution— if the target of the sympathy appeal has multiple options to choose from, for example if an organization has the choice between multiple vendors, relying on sympathy appeals may not be the most effective course of action. However, life seldom presents us with all of the options at once— just as negotiators typically face only one counterpart at a time, we often face each new decision separately, and thus should be aware of the potential influence of sympathy explored in this dissertation.
CHAPTER 4:  
SYMPATHY & POWER

Introduction

Thus far, the studies described in chapters two and three examined situations in which low power individuals appealed to the sympathy of their high power counterparts. This seemed a logical starting point given that low power individuals are more likely to be in situations where they have a need for sympathy. However, the studies conducted thus far leave open the question of whether the effectiveness of sympathy elicitation lies solely in the domain of low power individuals, and/or whether high power individuals are in any way uniquely susceptible to sympathy appeals from their counterparts. Chapter 4 was thus designed to address two lingering issues. First, can high power individuals leverage the sympathy of their low power counterparts, or must the person eliciting sympathy from others be seen as lacking power? Second, is an actual power imbalance necessary for sympathy appeals to have an effect, or is simply a feeling of power on the part of the decision-maker enough for sympathy to sway decisions?

Power

As reviewed in Chapter 1, power is conceptualized as asymmetric control over valued resources (Emerson, 1962; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Stevens & Fiske, 2000), where powerful individuals are those who hold greater control over the valued resource. For example, a manager who has decision-making power over what raises to give each of his employees would be considered more powerful than the employee receiving the raise. Low power and powerless individuals on the other hand, are those who have little or no control over the valued resource.

Who is asking for sympathy? Building from the previous chapters in this dissertation, the first question I would like to address is whether high and low power individuals are equally likely to be able to make sympathy appeals for their own strategic gain. For example, the studies reported in Chapter 3 show that low power subordinates appealing to the sympathy of their high power managers can successfully elicit concessions from their managers. In this chapter I ask, is it possible for high power individuals to receive tangible benefits from appealing to the sympathy of their low power counterparts? In other words, low power individuals may be most likely to benefit from sympathy appeals precisely because they are seen as lacking power, and therefore in need of greater support. Conversely, someone who is not in an obvious position of disadvantage might not benefit from making sympathy appeals. This would suggest that sympathy appeals may be equally effective in eliciting tangible concessions within both high and low power targets, but that the person making the sympathy appeal must be low in power. In Study 7, I examine this question in an experimental context.

Power to action. Research on power has proliferated in recent years, and one of the most robust theoretical and empirical findings concerns the link between power and approach (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). Specifically, power causes people to be more approach and reward focused, such that they are more likely to engage in approach type behaviors such as taking action against an irritating environmental stimulus,
risk-taking, and goal-directed behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003). Conversely, low power tends to lead to an inhibition of these types of responses.

Power also leads people to attend to others only to the degree that the others “enable the power holder to satisfy current goals and desires” (Keltner et al., 2003, p. 272), meaning that power holders do not always attend to others (Fiske, 1993). Indeed, research finds that power holders are less likely to take others’ perspectives, less likely to perceive rewards and threats from others, less apt to decode others’ emotions (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). Of particular relevance to the current research, powerful individuals are less likely to experience distress (empathy) and complementary emotions (sympathy/compassion) in response to others’ suffering (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Van Kleef and colleagues found that when confronted head-on with distressing personal stories, participants who were primed with power showed increased autonomic emotion regulation, and reported experiencing less sympathy and compassion (Van Kleef et al., 2008). I suggest that one reason powerful participants reported less sympathy, and resorted to greater emotion regulation in this context was because there was no action to be taken. Power predisposes toward action (Keltner et al., 2003), and in the context of a stranger telling a sob story in the lab, there is little that can be done to alleviate any feelings of distress. Thus the power holder may have responded by regulating their emotions to avoid sympathetic feelings.

In the context of making an active decision over a valued resource that could at least partially alleviate the suffering of the individual making the sympathy appeal, it is possible that power holders respond by taking action on the sympathy they experience. In other words, powerful individuals might be especially likely, by virtue of their power, to take action upon experiencing an emotion. In support of this idea, the literature on power suggests that power increases the association between personality and behavior (e.g. Bargh, Raymond, Pryor & Strack, 1995; Chen et al., 2001), and insulates the powerful from situational cues, allowing them to pursue personal goals (e.g. Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). For example, Chen and colleagues found that exchange oriented individuals primed with power were more likely than those primed with low power to behave selfishly, while communally oriented individuals primed with power were more likely to behave in a generous manner (Chen et al., 2001). Building upon this work, Galinsky and colleagues offer empirical evidence for the argument that powerful people are, in general, less affected by the situation (Galinsky et al, 2008). Thus, if a power-holder feels sympathy, they may be uniquely able to act on their desire to help the person in need. Individuals who do not feel powerful may feel sympathy, but their ability to respond may be inhibited (Keltner et al., 2003), resulting in decisions in line with what is “right” (or at least most easily defensible), rather than sympathy-based decisions. In Study 8, I examine whether feeling powerful leads decision-makers to respond positively to those who make sympathy appeals.

Overview of Studies

Chapter 4 contains two studies designed to explore the questions outlined above. In Study 7, I examine whether high power individuals are able to benefit from appealing to the sympathy of their lower power counterparts, and in Study 8 I explore whether the psychology of power has an effect on sympathy-based decision-making.
Study 7

Study 7 focuses on the question of whether high and low power individuals are equally effective when using sympathy appeals. The studies in Chapter 3 showed that in single decision-making contexts, high power individuals favored sympathy appeals over rational appeals, an effect mediated by the sympathy experienced by the high power decision-maker. Study 7 was designed to test whether the same sympathy appeal would be equally effective— in terms of sympathy elicited as well as resources allocated— when made by high power individuals toward low power counterparts. Study 7 was further designed to examine whether the same sympathy appeal would elicit equivalent sympathy regardless of whether the target is high or low power.

Method

Participants. 57 undergraduate business students (47% female) completed study seven. The average age of the sample was 22.29 (SD = 2.14).

Procedure. Study 7 was a 2 (appeal: sympathy vs. rational) by 2 (power: high vs. low) design. Participants entered the lab, and were randomly assigned to survey condition, which they completed with pencil and paper.

Power manipulation. The procedure was identical to that in Study 4 for participants in the high power condition. Participants in the low power condition were told to take the perspective of an entry level employee, and asked to give their opinion on raises. While in the high power condition participants were told that they should take the perspective of a senior manager deciding whether to give an employee a raise, in the low power position participants were told they occupied an entry level position in the company, but were told that "you have been asked to give your recommendation on a raise for several Senior Managers." In other words, all participants in the high power perspective conditions evaluated low power individuals, and all participants in the low power perspective conditions evaluated high power individuals. The scenario text and power manipulation is reported in Appendix B. To confirm that the power manipulation was effective, a pretest sample read the power manipulation materials and responded to the question "how much power do you have in this situation?" on a scale of 1 (no power) to 7 (a great deal of power). The pre-test sample (N = 21) confirmed that participants reported having greater power in the high power condition (M = 6.36, SD = 0.50) than in the low power condition (M = 4.5, SD = 1.35, F (1, 20) = 18.15, p < .001).

Appeal manipulation. The appeal condition manipulations were identical to those in Chapter 3, except that the fairness conditions were dropped to focus solely on the comparison between sympathy and rational appeals, resulting in a four condition design. The sympathy appeal condition read: “…I am also faced with extenuating circumstances— my mother is in the hospital with a terminal illness, and I am struggling to pay the bills.” The rational appeal condition read: “…I have overseen the success of many of our most profitable deals over the past few months.”

Outcome variables. Sympathy was measured by asking participants to report the extent to which they subjectively experienced (i.e. actually felt) sympathy towards the recipient of the raise on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) (M = 4.5, SD = 1.65). As in previous studies,
the primary dependant variable of raise granted was measured on a 0 to 6 percent scale ($M = 3.45, SD = 1.42$).

**Results & Discussion**

**Sympathy.** Are high power individuals able to successfully elicit sympathy in their low power counterparts through sympathy appeals? A 2 (power: low vs. high) × 2 (appeal: sympathy vs. rational) analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of the sympathy appeal ($M = 5.1, SD = 1.56$) over the rational appeal ($M = 3.33, SD = 1.66$) on sympathy experienced ($F(1,56) = 18.45, p < .001$). There was no effect of power condition on sympathy experienced ($F(1,56) = 0.39, p = .54$). However, a marginally significant interaction emerged, showing that greater sympathy was felt by high power individuals regarding their low power counterparts than the reverse ($F(1,56) = 3.22, p = .08$). While the interaction was only marginally significant, an exploration of the simple effects sheds light on the effectiveness of sympathy appeals for high and low power individuals, and thus further analyses were conducted. Planned comparisons of the high power decision-makers' sympathy showed that those in the sympathy appeal condition responded with significantly greater sympathy ($M = 5.64, SD = 1.08$) than participants in the rational appeal condition ($M = 3.08, SD = 1.50, t(25) = 5.13, p < .001$). However, planned comparisons of the low power decision-makers' sympathy did not differ across appeal condition. While the means trended in the expected direction, participants in the sympathy appeal condition ($M = 4.63, SD = 1.78$) did not report significantly more sympathy than in the rational appeal condition ($M = 3.57, SD = 1.83, t(28) = 1.60, p = .12$). (Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4).

**Raise.** A two (power: low vs. high) × two (appeal: sympathy vs. rational) analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for power, with the high power prime ($M = 3.52, SD = 1.34$) resulting in a greater raise granted than the low power prime ($M = 2.67, SD = 1.65$, $F(1,56) = 4.82, p = .03$), and appeal condition, with the sympathy condition ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.50$) garnering a higher raise than the rational condition ($M = 2.59, SD = 1.50, F(1,56) = 6.12, p = .02$). The expected interaction was not significant ($F(1,56) = 1.71, p = .20$) but for the sake of the dissertation planned comparisons were conducted and revealed trends in the expected direction. Looking just at high power participants (replicating the results of studies 4A and 4B), raises granted in the sympathy appeal condition ($M = 4.21, SD = 0.98$) were greater than in the rational appeal condition ($M = 2.77, SD = 1.30, t(25) = 3.28, p = .003$). Planned comparisons of the low power participants did not yield a statistically significant difference: Participants in the sympathy appeal condition ($M = 2.88, SD = 1.61$) did not grant a significantly greater raise than in the rational appeal condition ($M = 2.43, SD = 1.70, t(28) = 0.74, p = .47$). Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 5.

**Discussion.** Study 7 showed that given the identical sympathy appeal, low power individuals were less likely to experience sympathy for high power individuals than the reverse. Thus, while sympathy appeals made by low power individuals successfully elicited sympathy in high power decision-makers, these same sympathy appeals were less effective when used by high power individuals on low power decision-makers. Low power decision-makers gave correspondingly low raises to their high power counterparts. These results suggest that sympathy appeals will not be equally effective for everyone, particularly for high power individuals. It is
It is interesting to note that low power individuals gave lower raises overall, regardless of the appeal made. One possible explanation is that the task may have lacked realism because low power individuals are not often asked to comment on the pay of their superiors. Thus, participants in the low power condition may have simply been more cautious overall. A more general and speculative explanation for this result is that the study was conducted in the spring of 2010, as the United States economy faltered, and unemployment rates climbed. Participants taking the perspective of a low power employee may have been primed with thoughts of the abysmal job market, and may have felt that high power employees did not deserve to receive raises in a market when low power individual were struggling with job searches and mass layoffs. This may have resulted in the relatively low (less than 3%) raises recommended in both appeal conditions.

Summary. The results of Study 7 show that participants in the low power position were less likely than participants in the high power condition to feel sympathy, and correspondingly, awarded lower overall raises to their high power counterparts. Sympathy appeals thus appear to be more effective when made by low power individuals, than when made by high power individuals.

Study 8

While the results of Study 7 were promising, power was manipulated through hypothetical assignment to a hierarchical position within the organization, which changed the target of the sympathy depending on condition. Thus, Study 7 did not provide any opportunity to examine whether the experience of power in itself may change a participant’s willingness to make decisions based on emotions such as sympathy. Thus, rather than focus solely on control over resources, Study 8 was designed using a second conceptualization of power, an individual’s self-perception of power. In other words, given two people who occupy the same hierarchical rank and hold the same control over resources, the two people may have very different perceptions of the degree to which they hold power (e.g. Bargh et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2001; Fast & Chen, 2009; Galinsky et al., 2003). Thus, while Study 7 sought to examine whether the target of sympathy (high or low power) mattered, it may be that feeling powerful is what drives high power decision-maker to allocate greater resources to individuals who employ sympathy appeals.

Study 8 utilized a power prime manipulation rather than an assignment of power based on control over resources. The power prime manipulation (Galinsky et al., 2003), which has been used extensively in previous research, increases participants’ psychological experience of power without actually giving them any control over resources (e.g. Fast & Chen, 2009; Galinsky et al., 2006). Thus, this manipulation allows for an experiment in which all other elements of the decision-making scenario, including the high power structural role of the participant, are held constant. Rather than vary whether the target of the sympathy was a power holder or not, Study 8 holds the target constant, and manipulated the self-perception of power. Here, as I elucidate in the beginning of this chapter, I hypothesize that feeling powerful allowed decision-makers to follow their feelings and prioritize sympathy appeals over rational appeals.
Method

Participants. The participants in study were 154 (54% female) individuals from a national sample recruited using the internet. The average participant age was 28 ($SD = 9.12$).

Procedure. Study 8 was a 2 (perception of power: high vs. low) X 2 (appeal: sympathy vs. rational) design, resulting in four conditions. Power was manipulated using a power prime recall task developed by Galinsky and colleagues (Galinsky et al., 2003), described in the following paragraphs. Participants randomly assigned to the high-power condition were given the following prompt, and asked to record their recollections.

Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power—what happened, how you felt, etc.

Participants assigned to the low power position were given the following prompt.

Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power, we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which you did not have power—what happened, how you felt, etc.

After completing the power prime, participants read a decision-making scenario and were randomly assigned to one of the two appeal manipulations, which consisted of the same one-sentence sympathy and rational appeals used in Study 7, embedded in the text of the scenario. In line with previous studies, the scenario began with the phrase “Imagine that you are a Senior Manager.” However, in order to ensure that the scenario did not neutralize the effects of the writing power prime, the language was modified slightly to tone down the inherent power indicated in the scenario (See Appendix C). Participants in both conditions were still told to imagine that they occupied identical high ranking position with the same decision-making authority, but the language was simplified as compared to Study 7. Again, the only difference between the two conditions was the text of the appeal manipulation. The modified scenario is reported in Appendix C.

Outcome Variables. Both sympathy experienced and raise granted were measured in the same manner as in Study 7. Sympathy was measured by asking participants to how much sympathy they felt on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) ($M = 4.48$, $SD = 1.64$). The dependent variable of raise granted was measured on a scale of 0-6% ($M = 3.87$, $SD = 1.28$).

Results & Discussion

Manipulation check. To check that the power writing prime was effective, a research assistant coded a random sample of 30% of the essays on a Likert scale of 1 (not powerful at all) to 7 (very powerful). As expected, participants described themselves as more powerful in the high power condition ($M = 5.41$, $SD = 1.24$) than in the low power condition ($M = 2.33$, $SD = 1.24$, $t(46) = 8.38$, $p < .001$).
Sympathy. A 2 (power: low vs. high) × 2 (appeal: sympathy vs. rational) analysis of variance had a significant main effect revealing that the sympathy appeal condition \((M = 5.10, SD = 1.50)\) led to greater sympathy experienced than the rational appeal condition \((M = 3.87, SD = 1.50, F(1,153) = 30.51, p < .001)\). While the power manipulation did not have a significant main effect on sympathy experienced \((F(1,153) = 2.13, p = .15)\), there was a marginally significant interaction between power and appeal condition \((F(1,153) = 3.34, p = .07)\). In the high power condition, participants experienced significantly greater sympathy in the sympathy appeal condition \((M = 5.14, SD = 1.57)\) than in the rational appeal condition \((M = 3.37, SD = 1.56, t(76) = 4.97, p < .001)\). Similarly, in the low power condition, participants reported experiencing greater sympathy in the sympathy appeal condition \((M = 5.05, SD = 1.45)\) than in the rational appeal condition \((M = 4.16, SD = 1.37, t(74) = 2.75, p = .007)\). In order to understand the marginally significant interaction, I also examined the within appeal comparisons. In the sympathy appeal condition, high power participants did not differ in sympathy experienced \((M = 5.14, SD = 1.57)\) from low power participants \((M = 5.05, SD = 1.45, t(80) = 0.26, n.s.)\). However, in the rational appeal condition, low power participants \((M = 4.16, SD = 1.37)\) reported experiencing greater sympathy than did high power participants \((M = 3.37, SD = 1.56, t(70) = 2.30, p < .05)\). Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 6.

Raise granted. A univariate analysis of variance did not reveal a significant main effect for Power condition \((F(1,153) = 0.04, p = .85)\) or Appeal condition \((F(1,153) = 1.91, p = .17)\), but did reveal a significant interaction \((F(1,153) = 19.71, p < .001)\). Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 7. As expected, planned comparisons of high power participants revealed significantly greater raise granted in the sympathy appeal condition \((M = 4.40, SD = 1.22)\) than in the rational appeal condition \((M = 3.26, SD = 1.34, t(76) = 3.93, p < .001)\). By contrast, participants primed with low power allocated a greater raise in the rational appeal condition \((M = 4.16, SD = 1.09)\) than in the sympathy appeal condition \((M = 3.56, SD = 1.19, t(74) = 2.28, p = .05)\).

Discussion. The results of Study 8 provide evidence for the moderating effect of power on the effectiveness of sympathy appeals. Feeling powerful resulted in participants allocating significantly greater raises to sympathy appeals as compared to rational appeals, consistent with the prior results from Chapter 2 and 3. Individuals primed to feel powerless, on the other hand, were generally unswayed by their emotions and were instead more responsive to rational appeals. Thus, power does appear to be a critical determinant of whether individuals take action in response to their feelings of sympathy. Despite reading a scenario with identical role instructions, participants primed to feel powerful allocated more positive outcomes to sympathy appeals, while participants primed to feel powerless prioritized rational appeals, in a reversal of the original findings.

One unexpected result was that participants who were put in a low power mindset were more likely to report feeling sympathy for the rational appeal, as well as the sympathy appeal. This finding can perhaps be explained by the fact that high power individuals are generally less likely to take into account others’ feelings and perspective, as compared to low power individuals (e.g. Galinsky et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2008). Thus, it might be this tendency for low power individuals to perspective-take that accounts for why they experienced greater sympathy when faced with a rational appeal as compared to high power individuals – they placed
themselves in the shoes of the individual making the appeal and thus sympathized with the idea that hard work deserves a raise.

**General Discussion**

In Chapter 4, I found that sympathy appeals are more effective for low power individuals than for high power individuals (Study 7), and feeling powerful allows individuals to take action on decisions based in sympathy (Study 8). Study 7 provides an important boundary condition on the effectiveness of sympathy appeals. Simply appealing to sympathy will not suffice, rather individuals must also occupy positions that justify their need. Bosses should therefore think twice before asking subordinates to work late based on sympathy appeals—the subordinates are not likely to agree because they feel sympathetic.

The results of Study 8 reveal an important and previously unexplored dimension of power. Participants primed to feel powerful acted upon the emotions that they experienced. This result is consistent with research showing that powerful individuals are less likely to be influenced by situational cues, and instead act upon their internal states and traits (e.g. Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Bargh et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2001; Galinsky et al., 2008). This result is especially interesting because it may shed light on perplexing social issues such as the proclivity for high power public figures to engage in nefarious sexual affairs. Put another way, the link between feeling powerful and acting on emotions may explain why so many high power politicians feel free to engage in lustful behavior. This link may also suggest that powerful individuals are likely to make decisions based on their ‘gut’ or intuition, rather than on hard data or other information with logical backing. This can have potentially negative consequences, as decisions made in anger or in contracts signed in a spurt of euphoria may not in actuality be the best for the company.

The results of Study 8 also suggest that individuals who want to appeal to the sympathy of others should either select a time when the decision-maker is feeling powerful, or should somehow put the decision-maker in a powerful state of mind before making the sympathy appeal. A high-ranking decision-maker who is not currently feeling powerful is unlikely to respond positively to sympathy appeals.

Several weaknesses with Study 7 should be noted. First the target of the sympathy is inherently different in the two conditions. In the high power conditions, the target is the low power employee, and results replicate those found in previous studies. In the low power conditions, the target is a high power supervisor. It may have been difficult or uncomfortable, or may have felt artificial for a low ranking employee to make suggestions regarding a high ranking employee’s pay. This is consistent with the low average raise granted in both the rational argument and the sympathy argument conditions. Second, the relatively small sample size may have contributed to some of the marginally significant results. Third, although the results of Study 7 suggest that the individuals must be perceived as lacking power in order to successfully appeal to the sympathy of others, actual perceptions of power were not measured. Finally, the low power condition conflated two, substantially different manifestations of power. By defining power as control over resources (e.g. Emerson, 1962; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Stevens & Fiske, 2000), it became impossible to assign power to a low power person, without also giving that person control over resources, which in turn would give them some degree of power. I attempted
to navigate this issue by asking the low power employee to make a “recommendation” rather than a “decision” about the target’s raise, but this may still have given the low power individuals some sense of control, thus affecting the outcome of the experiment. Thus, while Study 7 showed that high power individuals are less effective in utilizing sympathy appeals, many future directions remain, and are explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.

In sum, Chapter 4 takes a first systematic look at the role of power in making sympathy-based decisions. Through two studies, I found that low power individuals are uniquely able to make sympathy appeals, and that the experience of power leads decision-makers to be more likely to make decisions based in sympathy.
CHAPTER 5:
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this dissertation, I showed that the emotion of sympathy was successfully elicited by low power individuals through sympathy appeals, and that this resulted in more favorable outcomes for the person making the sympathy appeal. I demonstrated this effect both in the context of negotiation and decision-making, using a variety of methodologies and subject populations. Sympathy appeals were more effective than both rational appeals and appeals to fairness. In Chapter 3, I built on the research on joint versus separate evaluations, which can fundamentally alter the manner in which we evaluate decisions (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1999; Kahneman & Ritov, 1994), and showed a preference reversal effect for sympathy appeals. This finding provided empirical evidence for the hypothesis that emotions play a differential role in making joint versus separate decisions (Ritov & Baron, 2011). Finally, in Chapter 4, I explored the effects of power on sympathy appeal, from two distinct perspectives. First, I showed that sympathy appeals are most effective for low power individuals. Second, I found that the perception of power led decision-makers to allocate greater instrumental outcomes to individuals who made sympathy appeals rather than rational appeals.

This dissertation contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this dissertation is the first empirical examination of the elicitation of emotion in others, an area that has just barely begun to be explored. Many theorist have argued that it is both possible and potentially beneficial to manage others’ emotions (e.g. Fulmer & Barry, 2004; Kilduff et al., 2010; Mayer & Salovey, 1997), and I provide experimental evidence for the effectiveness of eliciting sympathy in others. Second, I demonstrate a potentially viable strategy for low power individuals to utilize in lieu of other types of arguments or appeals. Often individuals have little or no power in mixed-motive interactions, and it is important to understand how this liability can be reduced or even eliminated entirely and turned into an economic asset. I showed that low power individuals can effectively appeal to the sympathy of their counterparts for their own strategic gain, and more specifically, that low power individuals can leverage their weaknesses through the strategic use of sympathy in order to mitigate the disadvantages of lacking power. In addition to these two primary contributions, I extend the research on joint versus separate decision-making by showing a preference reversal effect for sympathy, and I explore the relationship between power positions, power perceptions and the effectiveness of sympathy appeals.

The study of sympathy and sympathy appeals requires analysis of the careful balance between individual gain from sympathy appeals, and the potential results of responding pro-socially to such appeals for the sympathizer. On the one hand, the social functional approach to emotions suggests that there is a potential benefit to expressing sympathy for the sympathizer, as well as for the recipient of sympathy. On the other, it is important to be aware of power’s effect on decision-making, and on our proclivity to be influenced by emotions such as sympathy when in a powerful position. There is a fine line at play here—it is undoubtedly important for employees to feel as though they are supported by their superiors, but it is also important that the best performers are rewarded. In other words, there may be such a thing as too much sympathy. I present this dissertation as a first step toward untangling these issues.
Future Directions

This dissertation only begins to scratch the surface of the study of the elicitation of sympathy, and of sympathy in the workplace, leaving in its wake many potential future research directions. First, are sympathy appeals something that can be used more than once? For example, if a family located in a river-adjacent low lying area’s home is destroyed in a flood, friends, neighbors, and perhaps even strangers over the internet would likely feel sympathy and flock to their aid. However, if the family rebuilt on the same plot, or if others built homes in the same area and within a few years floods were to come again, would there still be an outpouring of sympathy and aid? There are two sub-issues to this question that future research should address. First, can an individual repeatedly make sympathy appeals to their own benefit, or is there a limit? At what point, if ever, will that individual lose credibility within the organization, or social circle? Repeated use of sympathy appeals could potentially be damaging to the reputation of the person making the sympathy appeal. For example, making repeated sympathy appeals may lead others to view the person making the appeal as being chronically low power, or simply incompetent. Second, can multiple individuals appeal to sympathy using the same (or similar) situations and still receive instrumental benefits? For example, if an employee appeals to their boss for a raise due to their ill mother, and the next week a second and third employee do the same, at what point, if any, will the boss cease to be sympathetic? Research shows that in general, the more exposure an individual has to a given sympathy-eliciting situation, the less sympathy that situation will elicit (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). However, further empirical research is needed to test the limits to this scenario. The answers to these questions will have important implications for the manner and caution with which sympathy should be evoked in others.

Second, there are a number of moderators that should be examined. For example, in the studies conducted in this dissertation, there was little to suggest that the person making the sympathy appeal was not competent. It is possible that if the person was already in low regard (e.g. a terrible worker) they could not, or would not benefit from sympathy appeals. Indeed, research on the antecedents of sympathy suggests that if the individual is responsible for their situation, there is little chance for the situation to result in sympathy (Goetz et al., 2010; Reyna & Weiner, 2001). Future research should examine the effect of the efficacy of the person making the sympathy appeal, as it is likely that the truly pathetic will never gain the sympathy of others.

Another category of possible moderators would be personality variables such as relational orientation. Study 1, Chapter 2 confirmed previous research (e.g. Amanatullah et al., 2008; Curhan et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2006) and found a main effect of relational orientation on ceding value, but there was no evidence that relationally oriented people might be more likely to experience and respond positively to sympathy. However, the sample size in Study 1 was relatively modest. It is possible that individuals who are high on relational orientation, or other personality variables such as agreeableness (e.g. John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008), empathy (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1994; Davis, 1983), collectivism (e.g. Hofstede, 1984, 1990), communal orientation (e.g. Clark & Taraban, 1991), or interdependence (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991) might be more likely to experience sympathy, and thus be more susceptible to sympathy appeals. This “bleeding heart” effect would suggest that other variables beyond simply holding power may play an important role in the effectiveness of sympathy appeals.
A third important future direction deals with the benefits of expressing sympathy, for the high power sympathizer. In the paragraph above I suggested that certain “bleeding heart” types may be more susceptible, a word which could perhaps connote gullibility. However, Study 1 in Chapter 2 showed evidence for the idea that there are real, relational benefits to expressing sympathy. Low power negotiators who received sympathy from their high power counterparts left the negotiation feeling more positively about the rapport built in the negotiation, meaning that the high power negotiators gave up immediate distributive value when they felt sympathy, but they accrued valuable relational capital. Research shows that the related experience of empathy plays an important role in the maintenance of social bonds (Anderson & Keltner, 2002), and this finding on the potential long term benefits of sympathy expression should be further explored. The potential benefits may exist at the individual level for the sympathizer, perhaps through reciprocal concessions in future interactions or the development of a more positive reputation (e.g. Anderson & Shirako, 2008).

A fourth possible avenue for research is the benefits of sympathy in organizations more generally. It is worth asking, does the presence of managers willing to express and act upon sympathy benefit the organization? Future research should examine important job outcomes such as turnover rates and job satisfaction in organizations with sympathetic versus unsympathetic managers. Previous research shows that this link is likely. In a study of postal employees, Eisenberger and colleagues found that employees’ perception of receiving organizational support was linked to organizational commitment and performance (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhoades, 2001), and research on favor exchange shows generosity can lead to positive feelings between exchange partners (Flynn, 2003). Whether the expression of sympathy within organizations will have similar positive results remains a question yet to be tested. It may be that certain organizations as a whole develop a culture of sympathy, while other organizations may differ across managers, departments or functional areas.

Fifth, there are many questions to be answered on the topic of power and sympathy. Study 7 indicated that high power individuals were less able to appeal to the sympathy of their low power counterparts. More research is needed to determine conclusively whether the effectiveness of sympathy appeals varies by the power level of the appealer. For example, can high power individuals appeal to sympathy from other high power individuals, or must one member of the exchange be perceived to be in a low power position? Can sympathy appeals be successfully utilized by individuals with equal power, and can low power individuals successfully appeal to the sympathy of other low power individuals? Or perhaps, as the results of Study 8 suggest, the most critical factor may not be the person making the sympathy appeal, but rather the powerful mindset of the decision-maker. Thus, it may be that the perception of power will mediate the effects found in this dissertation. These questions require further scrutiny as this stream of research moves forward.

Sixth, will the perception of power allow individuals to make other types of emotion-based decisions? Study 8 found that perceiving oneself to be more powerful allowed the prioritization of sympathy appeals, and that perceiving oneself to be less powerful made individuals prioritize rational over sympathy appeals. If holding power allows individuals to act on the sympathy they experience, will this translate to other emotions? For example, Tiedens found that individuals who expressed anger were conferred status (Tiedens, 2001). Might the same be true in reverse? That is, are high power individuals who feel anger likely to express and
take action on that anger, just as they are able to act on the sympathy they experience? Are high power individuals likely to take action on all emotions they experience, or only those which are more dominant (e.g. anger) or action oriented (e.g. sympathy) versus those that are more submissive (e.g. sadness). The potential connections between power and taking action on experienced emotions is one that may provide fertile ground for future research.

Finally, in this dissertation I have suggested that sympathy appeals may be used strategically to benefit low power individuals. This dissertation was undertaken in part to explore the effect and effectiveness of sympathy in mixed-motive interactions, but questions remain as to the ethicality of purposeful sympathy elicitation. This dissertation is not meant to advocate that individuals should appeal to the sympathy of others, nor does it explore the ethicality of the idea that individuals may lie about sympathy eliciting situations in an attempt at personal gain. The ethical implications of strategic sympathy elicitation, as well as the potential negative reputational consequences of such actions remain open to further research.

Conclusion

In my dissertation I examine sympathy appeals as an influence strategy to overcome weak positioning in mixed-motive interactions. I began with a juxtaposition of two quotes about sympathy from influential scholars. On one hand, Adam Smith suggested that one should never expect sympathy in exchange relationships. On other hand, Darwin argued that sympathy is a central element in human communities. By showing that the elicitation of sympathy in high power counterparts can have strong positive outcomes for the individual making the sympathy appeal, the results of my dissertation speak against arguments of purely rational self-interest. This research leaves open many exciting future avenues of research.
REFERENCES


FOOTNOTES

1. Integrative deals vs. all other deals. The results for integrative deals versus all other types of deals (e.g. impasses and non-integrative deals) were consistent with the analyses reported.

Non-integrative deals. Previous studies have examined non-integrative deals in the context of the negotiation utilized in Study 2. However, only five dyads reached a non-integrative agreement in this sample, and thus I did not expect the analysis to be meaningful. Confirming expectations, sympathy appeals did not predict non-integrative deal-making ($b = 0.86, SE = 0.63, Wald = 1.86, p = 0.17$).

2. The failure of a number of participants in each condition to follow the manipulation is problematic, because it defeats the purpose of random assignment to condition. However, researchers often check to ensure that participants have followed the experimental instructions. For example, researchers routinely discard participants who do not appear to take the experiment seriously (e.g. Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004b; Tripp & Sondak, 1992). Thus, in this study I acknowledge the possibility that I am excluding cases where there might be individual differences, such as tendencies to feel sympathy, or comfort with manipulating others’ emotions. This weakness of Study 3 is mitigated by the results of the other studies in this dissertation, which, taken together, support the findings in Study 3.

3...I included several measures in an attempt to understand the mechanism behind integrative value creation. While promising, the variables did not perfectly explain the integrative value creation seen in Study 3, and thus were not included in the primary manuscript. However, I include the results here. Two variables that seemed especially promising were time spent negotiating and information sharing within the dyad. Dyads in the sympathy condition spent significantly more time negotiating ($M = 18.9$ minutes, $SD = 4.40$) than dyads in the rational condition ($M = 15.06$, $SD = 3.10$, $t(36) = 3.08$, $p = .01$), perhaps speaking to the effort expended toward reading an agreement. However, time spent negotiating was not significantly correlated with integrative value ($r = 0.07$), preventing further mediation analysis.

I also explored the hypothesis that sympathy appeals and sympathy may have led to greater information sharing. Sympathy condition predicted information sharing within the dyad (e.g. I shared information about my interests; the other person sought info about my interests), measured on a scale of 1(disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly), ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 0.84$ vs. $M = 3.56$, $SD = 0.58$, $t(36) = 3.15$, $p = .003$). A linear regression showed information-sharing to be significantly related to integrative value ($\beta = 0.37$, $F(1,35) = 5.49$, $p = .03$, and when entered into the model together, sympathy condition is no longer significant ($\beta = 0.12$), while information sharing is marginally significant ($\beta = 0.31$, $F(2,34) = 2.94$, $p = .07$). These
results fail to meet the requirements of mediation analysis (e.g. Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981), thus precluding further analysis.
### Table 1

*Chapter 2, Study 1 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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<td>0.31*</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>High Power Relational Goals</td>
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<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.43**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Low Power Relational Goals</td>
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<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>High Power Rapport</td>
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<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.24†</td>
<td>0.24†</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Low Power Rapport</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.26†</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
<td>.32*</td>
</tr>
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</table>

†p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. (two-tailed).
Table 2

**Chapter 2, Study 1: Linear Regression Table: Distributive Value Claimed**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Model</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Distributive Value</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High Power Sympathy</td>
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<td>0.37*</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
<td>(2.55)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power Gender</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power Gender</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.31)</td>
<td>(-1.01)</td>
<td>(-1.31)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power Rapport</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relational Goals</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.38 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(2.98)</td>
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<td>R^2</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>50</td>
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*t statistics in parentheses

*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. (two-tailed).
Table 3

*Chapter 2, Study 2: Logistic Regression Results – Integrative Deal-Making*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
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<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrative Deal Reached (0/1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy Appeals</td>
<td>0.84*</td>
<td>1.10*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest-Based Appeals</td>
<td>0.76*</td>
<td>0.85*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Appeals</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power Gender</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.29</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power Gender</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. (two-tailed).
Table 4

*Chapter 4, Study 7: Sympathy Experienced: Means & Standard Deviations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appeal Condition</th>
<th>Rational</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Power Condition</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(1.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

*Chapter 4, Study 7: Raise Granted: Means & Standard Deviations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appeal Condition</th>
<th>Rational</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power Condition</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.88</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>4.21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
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</table>
### Table 6

*Chapter 4, Study 8: Sympathy Experienced: Means & Standard Deviations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Condition</th>
<th>Appeal Condition</th>
<th>Rational</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>4.16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>5.14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

### Table 7

*Chapter 4, Study 8: Raise Granted: Means & Standard Deviations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Condition</th>
<th>Appeal Condition</th>
<th>Rational</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>4.40</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURES

Figure 1: Experiment 4A, Comparison of fairness, rational & sympathy (dv = raise)
Figure 2: Study 4A: Mediation Analysis. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between condition and raise granted as mediated by sympathy experienced.

The standardized regression coefficient between condition and raise granted controlling for sympathy experienced is in parenthesis.

**p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. (two-tailed).
Appendix A: Study 3 (Chapter 2)

Candidate Rational Instructions

In this negotiation, you must follow the negotiation strategy recommended by negotiation experts. Both negotiation scholars and experienced negotiators agree that remaining professional, and making rational arguments is a good way to succeed in a negotiation. **Thus, in this study you should stick to the facts, and use rational arguments to explain your position.** This has been a proven successful strategy in certain negotiations.

In fact, your negotiation counterpart will normally not make concessions right away. It is thus necessary to explain to your partner that you have professional reasons for what you are asking for, so that you can get what you want. Even if you are satisfied, you will be able to get even more if you make quality rational arguments. If your counterpart does not want to make a concession, the simplest strategy is to remain professional and stick to the facts.

It is very important that you make your rational arguments convincingly. People do not like to feel like they are being manipulated. Rather than try to manipulate them, you are simply making rational reference to the facts at hand (you want the job, you are a quality candidate). Making rational arguments allows you to help your counterpart understand that what you are asking from him or her is really important to you.

Candidate Sympathy Instructions

In this negotiation, you must follow the negotiation strategy recommended by negotiation experts. Both negotiation scholars and experienced negotiators agree that gaining the other person's sympathy is a good way to succeed in a negotiation. **Thus, in this study you should attempt to elicit the other person's sympathy for your position.** This has been a proven successful strategy in certain negotiations.

In fact, your negotiation counterpart will normally not make concessions right away. It is thus necessary to explain to your partner that you have a real need for a good outcome, so that you can get what you want. Even if you are satisfied, you will be able to get even more if you can help the other person feel sympathy for you. If your counterpart does not want to make a concession, the simplest strategy is to ask for sympathy.

It is very important that you appeal to their feelings of sympathy convincingly. People do not like to feel like they are being manipulated. Rather than try to manipulate them, you are simply honestly explaining your negotiation situation (your mother is ill, you have a lot of college loans etc.), and appeal to their sense of sympathy. Asking for sympathy allows you to help your counterpart understand that what you are asking from him or her is really important to you.
Appendix B: Study 7 Scenario (high power manipulation in brackets [])

Imagine that you are a junior associate [Senior Manager] at a large manufacturing firm. Given the current economic crisis, your company has not been as profitable this year as it has in previous years.

This week, you have been asked to give your recommendation on a raise for several Senior Managers. You occupy an entry level position in the company, but the CEO has asked for your feedback. [you are deciding whether to give a few select employees a raise.] Although the company is not in the best position to be giving raises at this time, the CEO has informed you that the company wants to be sure top performers are taken care of.

It is completely up to you whether or not to recommend the Senior Managers receive [give the employees] a raise, and you know that if one or more of them receive the raise, costs will have to be cut elsewhere for the company. In fact, your own chances at receiving a cost of living raise may become less likely. Each of the Senior Managers has written a brief note accompanying their request for a raise, to help evaluate their application. [You have asked each of the employees to write a brief note accompanying their request for a raise, to better help you evaluate their application.]

Today, you have one Senior Manager’s [employee’s] file to evaluate. The senior manager [employee] is a good worker, and a strong leader of the team. You will be evaluating two other Senior Managers [employees] in the next few days, and it is unlikely that you will be able to recommend [give] raises to them all.

In his note, the Senior Manager [employee] writes:

“Thank you very much for considering my application for a raise. While I know that this has been a difficult year for the company, I am asking that you grant me a 6% raise. [CONDITION SPECIFIC TEXT INSERTED HERE] Thank you again for your consideration.”
Appendix C: Study 8 Scenario text

Imagine that you are a Senior Manager:

This week, you must decide whether to give a few select employees a raise. These employees are your top performers and you want to be sure they are taken care of. However, you are aware that your budget is very tight this year. You have complete discretion over what raise, on a scale of 0% to 6%, to allocate to these employees. In order to help inform your decision, you have asked the employees to write a brief note accompanying their request for a raise.

Today, you have one employee’s file to evaluate. The employee is a good worker, and a strong member of the team. You will be evaluating two other employees in the next few days, and it is unlikely that you will be able to give raises to them all.

In the note to you, the employee writes:

“Thank you very much for considering my application for a raise. While I know that this has been a difficult year for the company, I am asking that you grant me a 6% raise. [CONDITION SPECIFIC TEXT INSERTED HERE] Thank you again for your consideration.”