The Right to the Slum? Redevelopment, Rule and the Politics of Difference in Mumbai

By

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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

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by Sapana Lisa Dilipkumar Doshi
Abstract

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This dissertation engages a central paradox concerning spatial transformation in Mumbai today. It asks how elite-biased, global-city redevelopment interventions entailing the mass displacement of the urban poor are made politically feasible in an ostensibly democratic city with strong working-class movements. In unraveling this paradox, it offers a perspective that diverges from recent scholarly debates on social movements in Indian cities and neoliberal urban governance. The urban social movements literature has focused on the agency of the poor, seeing new slum mobilizations as a burgeoning form of substantive democracy through which the poor access their needs. Neoliberal governance debates position states and logics of rule as the primary agents facilitating transnational capital accumulation through new spatial practices in cities and regions. Instead, this research on the politics of slum eviction shows how differentiated social mobilizations are deeply intertwined with and constitutive of a changing state and its redevelopmental interventions.

Through a comparative ethnography of the politics of eviction, this dissertation makes two interconnected arguments. First, it shows how the structure and operation of the state has shifted to politically facilitate large-scale projects and en masse slum removal. In such new configurations, the urban poor no longer have the ability to leverage their votes in exchange for governmental compensation. Instead, bureaucracies have centralized control of redevelopment processes while unevenly distributing displacement compensation, via market mechanisms, through NGOs, social movements and other non-state actors.

Second, it demonstrates how changing meanings and historically sedimented practices of social mobilization around eviction in Mumbai are central to these transformations in redevelopmental governance. It draws on a Gramscian conceptualization of the state and hegemony to understand how redevelopment is advanced, thwarted and negotiated. Hegemony, as Gramsci understood it, is a historically specific set of processes through which the interests of dominant classes are secured. The hegemonic state is a site of social struggle within and beyond its formal structures operating in and through a variety of
interconnected institutions, civil society groups and social relations. As the apparatus of the redevelopment interests of elite classes in Mumbai, state hegemony has operated through a mix of force, negotiation and consent in multiple arenas through which evicted slum residents, NGOs, movements and other representative agents have become significant political actors. Redevelopmental hegemony also operates in the realm of meanings and cultural formations, what Gramsci called ethico-political struggles. This ethico-political dimension is immensely important in Mumbai's redevelopment and eviction processes. Because of a history of development in which class struggles over urban land and housing have articulated with gender and with Hindu-nationalist and regionalist identity politics, eviction has engendered differentiated experiences and politics. Furthermore, non-state intermediaries shape collective subjectivities by drawing on histories of struggle as well as globally circulating development and rights-based discourses. Accordingly, evicted slum dwellers have occupied highly contradictory positions—challenging, enabling and reworking redevelopment interventions through their aspirations and ethico-political claims to space.

The dissertation explores three political trajectories of eviction in ethnographic relational comparison—a method grounded in the idea that differentiated political practices and interconnections are crucial for understanding power-laden spatial processes like redevelopment and displacement. In all three cases, the experience and politics of eviction operated along three axes of difference: class, gender and ethno-religious identity. In the first case, gendered participation and NGO-mediation helped to suture cooperation with market-based resettlement for a World Bank-funded transport infrastructure project. In the second case, slum residents evicted for road construction under the same transport project contested forced displacement with the assistance of a lawyer in a transnational forum citing infractions of World Bank resettlement norms and loss of income. In the third case, evicted slum residents—many having marginalized ethno-religious identities—aligned with a social movement highly critical of neoliberal development and resisted state violence and uncompensated displacement as citizens excluded from the city and nation.

Through this comparative exploration of struggles over meaning and space, this study shows that difference—in the socio-spatial experience and in the practices of representation and mediation of eviction—serves to rework state power and its capacity to advance the cultural politics of belonging and the political economy of global-city redevelopment.
For my parents,
who instilled in me the love of their hometown
and so much more
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All ethnographic data—observations and quotations and paraphrases from interviews, speeches and conversations—in this dissertation were collected by the author during fieldwork in Mumbai between 2006 and 2008. Most names of informal settlement residents and evictees have been changed in accordance with human subjects protections protocols at the University of California.
# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSUP</td>
<td>Basic Services for the Urban Poor (component of the JNNURM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Floor Space Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOM</td>
<td>Government of Maharashtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Grievance Redressal Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>Indian Administrative Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>Independent Monitoring Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Independent Inspection Panel of the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNNURM</td>
<td>Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JVLR</td>
<td>Jogeshwari Vikroli Link Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCGM</td>
<td>Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (same as BMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHADA</td>
<td>Maharashtra Housing and Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Mahila Milan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMRDA</td>
<td>Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUTP</td>
<td>Mumbai Urban Transport Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUIP</td>
<td>Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPM</td>
<td>National Alliance of People's Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDF</td>
<td>National Slum Dwellers Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Project-Affected Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAH</td>
<td>Project-Affected Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIL</td>
<td>Public Interest Litigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Resettlement and Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (militant right-wing Hindu Nationalist group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCLR</td>
<td>Santacruz Chembur Link Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPARC</td>
<td>Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Slum Rehabilitation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Slum Rehabilitation Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDR</td>
<td>Transfer of Development Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULB</td>
<td>Urban Local Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USOA</td>
<td>United Shop Owners Association</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction:

Hegemony, Displacement and Difference in a Global City

1.1 Mumbai in the Urban Age: Beyond Evictions?

In the crisply air conditioned conference halls of the Hilton Towers in South Mumbai in November 2007, city leaders, politicians, activists, philanthropists and scholars from around the world gathered to discuss the promise and challenges of global urbanization. The Urban Age Conference, an annual event sponsored by Deutsche Bank and the London School of Economics, revealed some of the ways that Mumbai has balanced its contradictory dual role as both a Third World “Mega-city,” home to the majority of the world’s slum-dwelling poor, and India’s most opulent “Global City.” Yet, the pomp and pathology that one would normally expect in narratives about a city like Mumbai were remarkably restrained. Although everyone acknowledged the trenchant problems of informal slum settlements, density and inequality, conference participants seemed to embrace the urban age neither with blind optimism nor with anxiety but by vigorously and democratically debating visions for the future. The competing visions and diverse interlocuters at the Urban Age conference reveal much about contradictions of Mumbai as a city in the world today.

For instance, politicians, developers and CEOs argued that there was much potential to be tapped for Mumbai to join the ranks of other global cities as India’s finance capital. Inspired by a keynote speech by Saskia Sassen, the eminent scholar of the global city, they stressed the need for massive infrastructure investment, deregulation of land markets and slum redevelopment and resettlement. If elite agents were given the stage, so too was the fiery and charismatic Jockin Arputham, a former slum resident and leader of the National Slum Dwellers’ Federation, a partner of the world-renowned NGO SPARC. Jockin, as he is simply and affectionately called at home and abroad, has both jostled and cooperated with government officials, bankers and developers championing the participation of the urban poor, especially women, in redevelopment processes. In a panel called “Housing for the Urban Poor,” Nasser Munjee, Chairman of the Development Credit Bank, shed light on how slum dwellers and the city’s elite have combined and aligned their seemingly incompatible interests:

The housing context really has been a major issue . . . we go back, Jockin, how many years? 25–30 years? In the 1970s the whole debate was housing rights. I mean [it was about] just fighting for the rights of people to live in slums! . . . The bulldozers were very prevalent in those days. And that battle was won over a decade of very vigorous debate as well as activism. Now of course the issue is how do we house them. I don’t think anybody is talking about bulldozing the poor anymore.
Munjee then extolled the market-based strategies and partnerships that have unleashed slum land for redevelopment but also provided formalized resettlement housing for slum residents. However, the claim that Mumbai was beyond the barbarism of the bulldozer stood in stark contrast to the on-going reality of slum demolitions throughout the city. In fact, the same day of the conference I learned about a demolition sweep in the northeastern suburb of Ghatkopar. This eviction was among a series that the State of Maharashtra’s Chief Minister had ordered since the launching of the Vision Mumbai plan two years earlier, which had left a devastating 300,000 people homeless. Led by the world-renowned Medha Patkar of the Save the Narmada River movement, the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM) has engaged in ardent protests against these evictions in Mumbai and other development-induced displacements of the poor across India. Although not present at the Urban Age conference, NAPM leaders regularly take part in other global meetings like the World Social Forum and the World Urban Forum representing yet another interlocuter of the global city.

Despite the elision of these ongoing conflicts and brute state violence, it would be a mistake to interpret the Urban Age Conference and Munjee’s account of a bulldozer-free Mumbai as a complete ruse. Rather, it is both the bulldozing state and the consensual participation of slum dwellers that have advanced the city’s redevelopment. At the heart of this dissertation is this very paradox of how redevelopment—entailing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of mostly poor residents—has advanced in a cosmopolitan and ostensibly democratic city with such strong slum-based social mobilizations. I take this conjunction of violent displacement and its erasure as a starting point to unlock the contradictions of a hegemonic moment in the history of the city.

In unraveling this paradox, I have found that redevelopment in Mumbai actually provides a powerful lens into a larger set of processes unfolding throughout India today: the fundamental reconfiguration of the Indian state as the apparatus of capital accumulation. This dissertation develops an understanding of the state that radically differs from much of the current scholarship on Indian cities today. Through a comparative ethnography of the politics of eviction, I make two interconnected arguments. First, I show that the structure and operation of the state has shifted to politically facilitate large-scale projects and en masse slum removal, as have struggles over displacement and dispossession. In such new configurations, the urban poor no longer have the ability to leverage their votes in exchange for governmental compensation because bureaucracies have centralized control of redevelopment processes while distributing or negotiating compensation—via market mechanisms in the case of Mumbai—to the displaced through mediating NGOs, social movements and other non-state actors.

Second, I argue that changing constellations of eviction politics in Mumbai reveal that the deep interpenetration of state and society is in fact central to how redevelopment projects are advanced. In other words it is not simply that social movements of the poor act in response to the state; they are fundamentally constitutive of it and vice versa. In this regard, I draw on a Gramscian conceptualization of the state and hegemony to understand how redevelopment is advanced, thwarted and negotiated. Hegemony, as Gramsci
understood it, is a historically specific set of processes through which the interests of dominant classes are secured. The hegemonic state is a site of social struggle within and beyond its formal structures operating in and through a variety of interconnected institutions, civil society groups and social relations.

As the apparatus of the redevelopment interests of elite classes in Mumbai, state hegemony has operated through a mix of force, negotiation and consent in multiple arenas through which evicted slum residents, NGOs, movements and other representative agents, have become significant political actors. Yet, my reading of Mumbai also makes evident Gramsci’s warning that hegemony is not simply a corporatist process in which institutions and groups contest and negotiate material resources. Rather hegemony also operates in the realm of meanings, ideology and cultural formations, what Gramsci called ethico-political struggles. This ethico-political dimension is immensely important in Mumbai’s redevelopment and eviction processes. Because of a history of development in which class struggles over urban land and housing have articulated with gender and with Hindu-nationalist and regionalist identity politics, eviction has engendered differentiated experiences and politics. Accordingly, evicted slum dwellers have occupied highly contradictory positions, challenging, enabling and reworking redevelopment interventions through their aspirations and ethico-political claims to space. I show how the ethico-politics of difference and differentiated but interconnected eviction politics form the very basis of redevelopmental hegemony. To understand these politics I have used both comparative and in-depth ethnographic methods of research and analysis with attention to social practices and their meanings and political stakes.

Through this unique comparative ethnographic exploration of eviction politics, my work engages but departs from two major approaches to understanding the encounters of the Global City in the Global South. One is best characterized by the work of Mike Davis, who sees the onslaught of urban evictions as an instantiation of “Hausmann in the Tropics.” Third World evictions are likened to the ambitious modernist project of an 18th-century dictator whose demolition of working-class quarters for real estate and infrastructure development enabled enormous levels of wealth accumulation in Paris. In this reading, capitalist forces profit from the obliteration of slums, a precarious zone of survival for the world’s exploited “surplus humanity” (Davis, 2006). Slums and their dwellers are rendered passive victims of the whims of a bulldozing state and its capitalist patrons. A contrary approach, exemplified by the works of Partha Chatterjee (2004) and Arjun Appadurai (2002), has instead focused on the agency of the urban poor through attention to mobilizations in informal settlements. This set of arguments has demonstrated how the political participation of slum dwellers—for instance, through groups such as Jockin’s—have transformed the very meaning and practice of democracy in the space of the Third World City.

Whereas these theorists of urban political economy and social movements examine political economic effects or particular modalities of politics, the analysis that I use in this dissertation provides a completely different perspective on socio-spatial transformations in cities like Mumbai. Central to my reading is a focus on the ethico-politics of eviction in
slum mobilizations. Such mobilizations, I argue are meaningful and power-laden practices contoured by differentiated articulations of class, gender and ethno-religious relations. This analysis demonstrated that class, gender and ethno-religious identity are not incidental divisions among city residents. Rather, in the moment of eviction, sedimented histories of land struggle and relations of difference are reworked to consolidate, negotiate and contest redevelopment projects. The cases I explore offer a powerful lens into how spatial politics and production of difference is in fact central to hegemonic state processes undergirding neoliberal redevelopment.

Accordingly, I address the politics of redevelopment with an understanding of the state not as a bounded and coherent instrument of rule but as a social process. With the deepening processes of neoliberal restructuring of the economy since the 1990s, urban and peri-urban land is in high demand for investments in infrastructure and real estate redevelopment projects. Aiding the process that David Harvey has famously termed “accumulation by dispossession” (2003), the state is central to processes of acquiring land through the eviction of working classes in informal slum settlements. A focus on state practice and neoliberalism, therefore, also brings my work into conversation with scholars like Neil Brenner (2004) and Aiwha Ong (2007b) who have theorized neoliberal practices of rule. Brenner has argued that city regions occupy a key role and constitute an important site for changing governing practices aimed at neoliberal capitalist accumulation. Central to these processes, according to Brenner, is a rescaling of “state space” where interventions and functions shift to either local or global scales. It would seem that similar processes are occurring in India as local state bodies have seen dramatic shifts in their structures and practices toward more centralized authority, adopting differing forms and processes across Indian cities.

In Mumbai, state-level bureaucracies have taken on expanded powers for large-scale projects, overriding local municipal bodies through which poorer residents have long negotiated access to land and resources with the power of their votes. Shielded from the accountability of vote-based politics under volatile conditions of mass displacement and dispossession, these arms of the local state in Mumbai have decisively advanced the interests of transnational finance capital, local developers and upper classes. Yet, Brenner’s framework offers few tools for understanding new state spaces as contested and political processes. The Mumbai case shows how social mobilizations in slums have also been integral to the making of new urban governing practices, as state agencies have had to contend with struggles over displacement. Bureaucrats have treaded a treacherous potential crisis of legitimacy by negotiating with and enrolling the participation of non-governmental groups and movements to mediate relations with evictees. Key to these political processes are market-based resettlement policies that have entailed highly uneven compensation and eligibility. In this aspect of uneven displacement and compensation, Ong’s notion of graduated sovereignty provides a lens into how states often work through gendered, class and ethnic difference, deploying diverse socio-spatial strategies to accomplish projects of neoliberal transformation and accumulation. However, Ong’s framework tends to view rule in terms of unfolding logics, giving little attention to the ways...
that differentiated experiences of power and histories of struggle may also result in unrest, contestation and negotiations among those most severely affected by neoliberal projects.

In contrast, this dissertation argues that urban redevelopment and evictions reveal a dynamic and reconfigured local state as a critical node of class politics and a central site for understanding hegemonic processes. Differentiated social mobilizations and NGO mediations of displacement and resettlement have transformed the meanings and practices of claiming urban space and housing as well as the workings of the state itself. To grapple with these processes, I explore state practice and three cases of eviction politics in ethnographic relational comparison—a method grounded in the idea that differentiated political practices and interconnections are crucial for understanding power-laden spatial processes like redevelopment and displacement. In one case evictees—many of marginalized ethno-religious identities—contested uncompensated slum demolitions along with social movements, asserting their citizenship-based right to stay on their land. In another case, slum residents, especially women, unevenly embraced and participated in market-based resettlement as an improvement to their living conditions through a highly gendered set of political processes. In a third case, evicted residents contested distant resettlement through the quasi-juridical forum of an international panel citing legal rights to land and loss of income. Still other practices, effects and desires remain outside of the purview of public enactment, subverting and advancing global-city redevelopment projects in significant but quieter ways.

This analysis of hegemony reveals redevelopment as more than a form of accumulation through dispossession via state machinations, market logics or brute force. I show how eviction politics—grounded in ethico-political reworkings of class, gender and ethno-religious relations—have advanced a redevelopmental hegemony through what I call “accumulation through differentiated displacement.” I show how interconnected but differentiated eviction politics contour new meaningful claims to the city with critical stakes for the reconfiguration of redevelopmental state power and urban space. The hegemony of redevelopment in Mumbai reveals not only the consolidation of state power but also its fragility as it faces the contention and fissures of its own contradictions. These politics fit into a long history of development, contradiction and citizenship; it is to this trajectory that I now turn.

1.2 Mumbai Modern: Development, Class and Contradiction

I have introduced Mumbai as a global city not only for its integration with global capital but also because it is a site of transnational social encounters forging and contesting the very meaning and materiality of the global city. I now contextualize the politics of slum redevelopment in a longer history of political economy and social conflict. I argue that such current and past political constellations are best encapsulated by an understanding of Mumbai as a modern city—perhaps India’s most quintessentially modern city. My understanding of the modern city comes from Marshall Berman’s elegant treatise on the subject. A modern city is characterized by capitalist interventions, a contradictory set of processes that unleashes forces of dynamic change, opulence and opportunity as well as
devastating forms of destruction and exploitation, what Berman has called the “tragedy of development” (1987). At the same time, as Berman argues, these revolutionizing processes also entail class-based social upheavals that constantly threaten elite projects. Berman understands the experience of modernity as living and growing through coming to terms with the constant dynamism and contradiction of development.

However, Berman also argues that cities of the East and the Third World, exemplified by his reading of Dostoevsky’s St. Petersburg, are characterized by a “warped modernity” because of feudal relations and backwardness. Such cities exhibit a modernity in which productive and revolutionizing encounters of class are thwarted by traditional hierarchies. I urge against this dualistic reading. Mumbai has had a long history of contradictory, exploitative and contested modernizations prior to the current conjuncture. As a colonial city, development facilitated the extraction of resources; as a postcolonial Third World city Mumbai served as an engine of national industry. The creative destruction of modernizations, past and present, traverse the city’s historical incarnations, producing new rounds of growth, conflict and spatial transformation. Development, contradiction and encounter have thus been hallmarks of modern Mumbai since its beginnings, and land and class politics have been central to the experience of modernity in the city.

Located on the central, western coast of the South Asian subcontinent, Bombay (as the city was known before 1995) did not even exist as an urban center until its first encounters with European mercantile imperialism. Originally a set of fishing villages on seven islands under the Mughal Empire, it came under European rule with the settlement of the Portuguese crown in the mid-16th century. Bombay’s political ascendancy began in 1687 when the British East India Company took over and established the city as the capital of its western presidency, competing with the Mughal-controlled capital, Surat.
Figure 1.1: Greater Mumbai metropolitan area (source: The Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority)
From the late 18th century onward, Bombay was the site of multiple ambitious civil engineering projects that (a) amalgamated the seven separate islands into a single mass, (b) connected the city to its productive hinterland through a rail system and (c) introduced a modern system of water infrastructure (Goswami, 2004). In terms of social class structure, Bombay had a definitively more modern bourgeois character than its eastern counterpart, Calcutta, the seat of the British Raj until 1911. Whereas the native elites of that city were mostly absentee feudal landowners, Mumbai was home to Gujarati and Parsi traders who later spearheaded independent India’s major industrial and finance sectors.

Bombay witnessed its most substantial period of growth in the mid 19th century during the American civil war and upon the completion of the Suez Canal, when it became a major port supplying cotton to England’s voraciously growing textile industry. With the huge influx of cash flowing through the port, the city’s Indian traders began to expand their economic activities into industry, banking and new forms of joint stock ownership models for business and finance. British rulers and engineers also expanded urban services and invested more heavily in urban infrastructure and land reclamation projects, processes which spurred the development of India’s first municipal urban corporation for the purposes of raising local taxes and maintaining sanitation and other urban services. Indian traders, bankers and newly burgeoning textile industrialists who were granted title to most of the city’s land by the British benefitted from urban developments and tight rental markets. At the same time, Mumbai elites also engaged in vigorous local municipal and national politics through which they later contested the Raj, forming one of the strongest pillars of the national independence movement in Western India. Elite investments in
industry, land rejections and high-end real estate projects continued after independence. This history of capitalist economic dynamism, elite political participation, real estate development, finance and industrial production thus shaped a modern urbanism in Bombay marked by growth and contestation. But such vigorous political life was not limited to elites. From 19th-century rent protests and water-related uprisings (Chandavarkar, 1994; Dossal, 1991) to 20th-century textile worker strikes (Chandavarkar, 1994), slum mobilizations (Seabrook, 1987) and Dalit movements (Rodrigues & Gavaskar, 2003), Bombay's working classes have consistently made organized and robust claims to urban space and resources. The legacies of these revolutionizing processes and encounters of capital and class remain sedimented in the material and political geography of the city.

Class contradictions of modern, post-colonial Mumbai are most readily evident in the prevalence of informality in both labor processes and housing, particularly since the 1970s. As modernization has entailed the impoverishment of the countryside, rural migrants have made their homes through settling on peripheral urban lands. In Mumbai, like many other cities, the urban poor have made incremental investments of labor and earnings in their homes and neighborhoods often on formerly uninhabitable areas like wetlands. Through political arrangements with local officials, they have obtained access to vital services as well as temporary de facto tenure arrangements that are of course never completely guaranteed. The politics of negotiating informality and contesting evictions, as I discuss in great detail throughout this dissertation, has produced very strong neighborhood-based movements and organizations.

Informal settlement residents work in both formal sector jobs (petty clerks, police and cleaners) and a broad range of other informal income-generating activities supporting the needs of all classes of urban citizens. Such labor includes construction work, domestic service, recycling, petty commodity production, sex work and food processing. The informal sector is thus inextricably linked and constitutive of the so-called formal sector through provision of goods, labor and the social reproduction of the working classes on the cheap (Castells, 1983). Thus, several scholars have long argued against the dual-economy perspective—where informality is understood as a marginal arena of illegal survival and exploitation—that persist today (see Portes, Castells, & Benton, 1989; Roy & AlSayyad, 2004).

Informality is thus a key constitutive element of modernity and development in Mumbai. Furthermore, Ananya Roy and Nezar Alsayyad (2004) show how informality represents a “mode of life”—a zone of flexibility and negotiation for all classes, especially in terms of land use and access. Indeed, in the arena of urban redevelopment, wealthier classes have also claimed and developed lands with the tacit approval and active assistance of state agents, often breaking zoning laws with impunity (Ghertner, 2008). Projects are often undertaken with partnerships between state agents, developers and organized crime (Liza Weinstein, 2008). To the extent that informality is an arena of negotiating livelihood and social reproduction, however, it is also fundamentally constitutive of class. Specifically, I argue, the experience of class is constituted by juridico-economic relations of informality, contoured by people’s economic capacity (income) to live in centrally located areas and
their relative political capacity to legitimate their land claims under the law. At the same time, it is a mistake to see informality as a simple vestige of inefficiency that might be overturned by formalization and titling, as scholars like Hernando de Soto have famously argued (Bromley, 1994). Class is expressed through uneven experiences and positionings within a political terrain contoured by informal property and labor relations but not solely defined by them, as I demonstrate in chapter 4.

As the city has grown and transformed through liberalization and intensified integration into global financial markets, value has been injected into formerly peripheral slum areas. These lands now occupy a strategic location in relation to real estate markets and the demands of Mumbai’s global finance and business services. Slums have become a frontier for commercial and infrastructure redevelopment. The push for redevelopment of slums has been further bolstered by a new urban development imaginary since the turn of the millennium that has focused on projects of “global” or “world-class” redevelopment. City boosters in Mumbai have also drawn on the work of scholars like Saskia Sassen (1991) and Manuel Castells (1996) who delineate a set of criteria for achieving global-city status such as infrastructure, global connections and business services. Accordingly, Jennifer Robinson (2006) warns of the “regulating fiction” of global-city narratives as they resonate in and legitimate the elitist spatial interventions of urban power brokers and transnational capital. Indeed, imaginaries of rapid East Asian development in cities like Shanghai and Singapore (Roy & Ong, 2011) have further bolstered projects of the state, local developers and transnational finance capital seeking to capitalize on lucrative land markets in Mumbai and other Indian cities. Such interventions are inextricably linked to political economic pressures and forces operating both within and beyond city limits.

Several political economic factors stand out as key in the formulation of such global-city redevelopment ambitions in Mumbai. One is the powerful influence, in local government, of real estate developers who are driven by fortunes to be made from the city’s famously expensive land values. During peak markets land values in Mumbai’s most expensive neighborhoods rivaled those in London (Jan Nijman, 2000). The real estate bonanza has been even more explicit with the decline of the textiles industry. Although dispersed forms of production continue to exist in informal slum settlements, the downfall of the nationally subsidized industry has dovetailed with new understandings of what the city's function should be in the regional, national and global economy (Bannerjee-Guha). Mill closures have opened up acres of prime land, and factories and worker residences have been replaced with lucrative new residential complexes and upscale leisure and consumption spaces (Adarkar & Menon, 2004; D’Monte, 2005).
Another key force is finance capital, which has increasingly looked to investing in large-scale infrastructure projects—especially in the area of transport. National and transnational finance capital has been channeled into individual projects like the Mumbai Urban Transport Project, which I discuss extensively. The central government of India has also raised and distributed billions of dollars of finance capital systematically through a comprehensive set of initiatives called the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). These infrastructure projects rely on the ability of the state to extract the most value from land through commercial and up-scale residential developments used to repay debt-financed infrastructure. State agents, transnational finance capital, real estate developers and corporate leaders have embarked on an ambitious set of redevelopment projects—again under the broad and often vague rubric of producing a “global” or “world-class” city. Mumbai’s leaders, like those of cities around the world, have thus attempted to carve out their own position on the list of global cities (Sassen, 1991) by attracting investment and growth through a liberalizing national economy. Through what Harvey (1989) has called “entrepreneurialism” used to harness investment and growth, Mumbai’s power brokers have advanced infrastructure and real estate development, serving primarily (though not exclusively) corporate and transnational finance capital and elite and upper-class residential, consumption and recreation demands.

The very meaning of urban citizenship is also at stake in these processes of global-city redevelopment. For instance, state agents have articulated the imperative of attracting and retaining a new set of high-value globally connected citizens through a massive overhaul in the city’s infrastructure and real estate. As the High-Powered National Committee on Mumbai’s Transformation stated in 2007:
A defining issue for Mumbai’s becoming a credible GFC [global finance center] post-2015 will be the challenge of attracting around 50,000 high level people of the kind typically employed by global financial firms in the three GFCs. Only 20–25% of these are likely to be of Indian origin. All these people have a choice of living and working in any city in the world. Their choice will hinge on the attractiveness of a city as a place in which to live, work and play. All the attributes that a city must have—as a hospitable, friendly, welcoming, efficient and pleasant environment—matter very much in influencing the decisions made by this community. Once again, the more skilled a person is, the more sensitive he/she will be to the wastage of time, and the disutility associated with the very large number of mundane irritations imposed by Mumbai on its residents such as poor roads, air and noise pollution, road and rail traffic congestion, poor health and safety standards and frequent city shut-downs (Ministry of Finance, 2007, p. 180).

The city’s six million slum dwellers—50% of the population—clearly stand in an inferior position in relation to these coveted transnational citizens and in relation to Mumbai’s indigenous elite and upper classes. Within this vision Mumbai’s lesser citizens must make way for infrastructure and commercial redevelopment initiatives aimed at attracting the transnational agents that define global cityness itself. Thus, although evictions are not new, in today’s Mumbai, informal settlements are under increasing pressures as formerly peripheral areas have become lucrative frontiers for such projects. Here, classed citizenship is constituted not only through labor, property and income but also through the relative ability to make one’s body, home and place of work legitimate and desirable in the global city.

At the same time, these processes of urban transformation advanced by central and state governments and the elite have also instigated a complex and contradictory set of class politics in which middle and working classes have embraced and contested global-city projects in different ways. Members of the middle class have justified demands for spaces of leisure, residence and consumption by claiming “common man” citizenship status through the vilification of slums and their dwellers as a blight on the city, what Leela Fernandes has aptly called a “politics of forgetting” (2006). Furthermore, because of the political power of slum-based movements and organizations, compromises have had to be made in the arena of resettlement. While this is true of all resettlement, the resolution of the contradictions of slum redevelopment in Mumbai is unique. Here, displacement compensation itself has fueled the possibility for further development as market-based resettlement programs harness the participation of developers, as I discuss in chapter 2. The state has played an important role in enabling these market experiments in resettlement by awarding developers access to lucrative “transfers of development rights” (TDRs) to be used onsite or in other parts of the city in exchange for providing onsite or offsite resettlement to slum residents. TDRs have launched new opportunities for investment and speculation as they are traded and bought.
Through such resettlement schemes and negotiations slum residents have also (unevenly) embraced slum redevelopment schemes that harness the power of real estate markets and the participation of developers, NGOs and other non-state agents to resettle eligible residents into formal buildings. The articulation of slum politics and the growth imperative of modernizing projects of the global city are at the heart of this dissertation. To understand how they have unfolded and shaped the city, however, we must look to another political geography: that of Hindu-regionalist identity politics.

1.3 Modernity Reworked: (Re)development, State, Violence and Ethnic Populism

The city’s post-colonial modernity has also been constituted through another darker political geography marked by xenophobia, exclusion and communal violence. The Shiv Sena, a regional political party and movement infamous for inciting violence and hate speech against ethnic minority groups in the city, is a concrete manifestation of this dark geography. Shiv Sena influence was made most shockingly evident in the winter of 1992 and 1993 when communal riots among Hindus and Muslims engulfed the city. Ostensibly these riots were set off by events in the distant northern Indian town of Ayodhya, where militant Hindu Nationalist groups embarked on the demolition of the Babri mosque in an effort to reclaim the supposed birth site of the Hindu god Ram. In Mumbai, the Shiv Sena party and movement was the prime mobilizer and political beneficiary of violence directed most severely against the city’s Muslims. Several scholars see the Sena’s social conservatism and regionalist chauvinism as a threat and backlash to the cosmopolitan character of the city (Appadurai, 2000; Varma, 2004). The project is most strongly evidenced in the symbolism of the 1995 Shiv Sena campaign to change the city’s name from Bombay to Mumbai, after the local Maharashtrian Hindu goddess Mumba Devi (Patel & Masselos, 2003). Berman might read the prominence of the Shiv Sena as evidence of a warped modernity, the remnant of traditional ties that have not yet been severed by the revolutionizing social forces of the bourgeoisie. I would argue against such a reading; the Sena is better conceived an instantiation of what Allen Pred and Michael Watts have called the reworking of modernity (1992). By this I mean that such identity politics are produced by and constitutive of the processes of modernity I discuss above; Shiv Sena politics are symbolic instantiations of both capitalist discontent and rule. The phenomenon of the Shiv Sena is thus immensely important to the political trajectory of development in the city.

In particular, the Sena has been central to the reconfiguration of state power in relation to development practice, structure and ideology. Part of this has to do with the fact that the Shiv Sena defies categorization. As Julia Eckert (2003) has written, the Sena is at once an “NGO, a government agent, a criminal gang, a cultural club, and a social movement.” Operating in the state and through a vast network of neighborhood branches, the Sena thus blurs the lines of state and society, cultural ethics and spatial politics, violence and patronage. The Shiv Sena’s power is grounded in a tactical ethos of exclusionary populism consisting of a contradictory mix of right-wing social and economic positions, neighborhood patronage, regionalism and Hindu nationalism. Harnessing flexible nationalist and regionalist discourses yoked to longstanding struggles over land and livelihood in the city, the Shiv Sena has redirected understandings of rightful belonging in
the city. In so doing, it has been deeply imbricated in the politics of urban modernization and development throughout the city's post-colonial history.

Since the 1960s the Sena has cultivated a support base through identity-based populism, claiming to defend the welfare of working and lower-middle-class Maharashtrians considered the rightful “sons of the soil” of Mumbai. It also has a history of anti-communist union busting and slum demolition campaigns. The Ayodhya riots of the early 1990s represented the seizure of a timely opportunity for the Shiv Sena party and movement to expand its influence and power as India experienced the beginnings of a neoliberal restructuring of its economy (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000). The Sena challenged the locally dominant Congress party by aligning itself with the national Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a right-wing party supporting economic liberalization and a growing Hindu Nationalist movement. In Mumbai liberalization has led to a skyrocketing surge in land values in the city that has squeezed the poor in an already-tight land market, as I discuss in chapter 2. In a scenario of intense struggles over space, housing crisis became articulated with anti-Muslim, regionalist, and xenophobic sentiments fueled by the Shiv Sena in diverse arenas. Exclusionary populist discourses deployed by Sena leaders like Bal Thackeray combined the utopian promise of a Hinduized Indian city with a hyper-masculine, thuggish scapegoating of outsiders for the ills of the city and nation. As Arjun Appadurai has argued, the Shiv Sena “sutured a specific form of regional chauvanism with a national message about Hindu power through the deployment of the figure of the invader, the stranger, the traitor” (2000). From media campaigns to neighborhood-based organizing, the Shiv Sena has regularly conflated Muslims, North Indians, and slum dwellers as predatory invaders. These violent discourses of scapegoating outsiders have been both supple and powerful enough to rally hegemonic support among diverse audiences (Patel & Masselos, 2003). The work of the Sena has been to rewrite urban struggles over space and the city itself as a Hindu Nationalist geographical imaginary, the ethnically-cleansed dream space of a global India writ large on the city.

The party rose in power beyond municipal politics to win the state government in the mid 1990s. During its first tenure in state government from 1995 to 1999, the Sena boasted both globally oriented developmentalist ambitions for the city and state and homegrown Indian (read: Hindu) values and regionalist commitments. Sena leaders also displayed a special penchant for building expensive road overpasses known as “flyovers,” constructing dozens of these status symbols of urban development and progress throughout Mumbai. Criticized by the left for elitist biases in promoting development that benefited primarily car-owning upper classes in the city, the Shiv Sena still managed to retain and cultivate its populist appeal and base of support. This was nowhere more evident than in its redevelopmental projects in slums. In fact it was precisely through slum redevelopment that the party was able to mobilize to fuse the interests of developers and finance capital with its populist promise to the city’s slum-dwelling majority.

I argue that the articulation of spatial struggles over land with identity politics has entailed the embedding of ethno-nationalist ideologies of belonging into redevelopmental state practice and ideology. This outcome is most markedly evident in the implementation of
market-based resettlement policy operating through the distinction of legal and illegal
(read: legitimate and illegitimate) slum residents. Logics of rightful belonging to the space
of the city *qua* nation serve to unevenly distribute resettlement and legitimate demolitions.
But these logics of redevelopmental rule through difference have not simply unfolded from
above to accomplish the objectives of the powerful. As James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta
(2002) have noted, logics of rule must always contend with messy political processes and
contradictions in their implementation. Similarly, both of the urban spatial imaginaries that
I have discussed—whether global-city redevelopment dreams or regionalist Hindu-
Nationalist rewriting of the city—present false images of coherence. Slum redevelopment
has been bound with what Anna Tsing has called “friction” (2005) in its very constitution
and subsequent implementation. Projects to remake the city in the service of the powerful
have encountered and become shaped by shifting ethics and mobilizations of slum dwellers
in the moment of eviction.

If the political economy of urban deindustrialization and redevelopment has articulated
with ethnic chauvinism to produce a violent erasure of Muslim bodies, as Appadurai
(2000) has astutely argued, then there are also more progressive counter mobilizations
occurring among poor slum dwellers in Mumbai. In a follow-up article, Appadurai (2002)
discusses a now world-renowned movement, the SPARC Alliance, as an instance of deep
democracy and a recosmopolitanizing counter to the “decosmopolitanization” processes
resulting from the Shiv Sena politics. Ironically, however, it was precisely through prior
struggles and negotiations with slum dwellers that such compensatory policies and
governmental logics of resettlement have emerged. Again, uneven experiences of
displacement have produced new frictions and mobilizations that in turn threaten projects
of rule, forcing a constant reworking of state practice and social mobilization. These ethico-
political articulations thus constitute a key node of power in the dynamic process of
redevelopmental state hegemony spanning the spectrum of force and consent. This
movement and other ethico-political practices and mobilizations shape the reach and the
limit of redevelopmental governance. It is to these debates that I now turn.

1.4 Rethinking Urban Subaltern Politics, Subjectivity and the State

Questions of agency of the urban poor in the space of informal slum settlements have
come the subject of a rich and influential body of work in South Asian and broader Third
World city contexts. My study of Mumbai speaks to the works of two key Indian cities
scholars—Partha Chatterjee and Arjun Appadurai—for their focus on how slum-based
movements constitute what Fraser among others has called “substantive democracy”
(1990) under conditions of urbanization and inequality on a global scale. I share these
authors’ concern with going beyond simplistic corporatist class and bounded state analyses
to critically engage with the cultural meanings, ethics, non-state agents and global
interconnections shaping collective subjectivities. However, my study of redevelopment
politics in Mumbai departs from these perspectives in both theory and method, shedding
light on a different set of political processes with significant implications for a social justice
practice under conditions of large-scale evictions. A brief overview of these authors’
arguments will situate my contribution to these debates.
Both thinkers see slum movements as demanding a paradigm shift in understandings of democracy and popular politics in the space of the Third World city. Rather than seeing urban subaltern politics as a kind of “quiet encroachment” on the city, as Asef Bayat has discussed in relation to squatter politics in the Global South (2000), Chatterjee argues that subaltern “rumblings of the street” force us to think about modern democracy in radically different ways. Drawing on a Foucaultian framework, both demonstrate how mobilizations of slum residents and their representatives deploy governmental categories and technologies to access critical needs. Whereas Appadurai has called this governmentality and globalization “from below,” Chatterjee has coined the term “political society.” The realm of engagement with governmental welfare agents—whether bureaucracies, NGOs or elected officials—according to both Chatterjee and Appadurai operates most effectively through intermediaries with close organic ties in morally constituted communities of slum dwellers and connections to the state and other local and global agents of governmental welfare. However, the “politics of the governed,” as Chatterjee cautions us, operates very differently from bourgeois-dominated civil society. The urban poor, he argues, do not make claims to land and resources as rights-bearing citizens of a modern nation. One major reason for this is that the property-less poor live outside of the purview of the law in informal settlements. Therefore, they must access needs by leveraging relationships and making moral appeals to governmental welfare as vulnerable populations to be governed.

Critiques of the “political society” paradigm are now legion. For instance, in the rural context, Amita Baviskar and Nandini Sundar (2008) have noted that it is often the poor who latch on to legal processes and documents while upper classes blatantly flout zoning and other laws with impunity, reworking the law itself upon implementation of elite development projects (Ghertner, 2008). Similarly, Ananya Roy and Nezar Alsayyad (2004) argue that in fact informality does not map neatly onto class and that we must look beyond dichotomies of formality and informality to understand the inequalities and flexible modalities of life and rule and negotiation in the unmapped territory of the informal. In the Brazilian context, James Holston also presents a different story of popular urban politics than that of Chatterjee. He argues that it is precisely within the realm of the law that working classes make claims on urban land, countering “differentiated citizenship” with a rights-based insurgency (2008).

Findings from Mumbai discussed in this dissertation reveal several such co-existing political formations. In one of my Mumbai case studies, ethico-politics of gendered domesticity mobilized through NGO-mediated resettlement processes channeled compensation and enabled cooperation. In another instance, evicted slum residents have contested resettlement through an ethics of juridico-economic rights as informal property holders and dispossessed classes. In my third case, uncompensated evictees have contested dispossession along a register of moral citizenship as marginalized working classes and ethno-religious minorities. Here Solomon Benjamin’s notion of “occupancy urbanism” offers an important intervention highlighting the significance of place in analyses of the popular politics of land struggle (2008). Yet, it is not enough to simply take inventory of an infinite variety of political modalities and claims-making practices.
I have found it more useful to explore how political trajectories are not only differently but also relationally constituted. A relational perspective would for instance offer a very different reading of Holston’s argument about insurgent citizenship, which underplays how legal claims to property inherently operate from the implicit delegitimization of the property-less poor who cannot claim legal rights for any number of reasons. When accounting for this “constitutive outside” (Mouffe, 2000), we see how insurgency might actually reinforce the very systems of inequality that it ostensibly seeks to subvert. Similarly, in Mumbai differentiated experience and politics of eviction are spatially and relationally produced. It is precisely through negotiations with state agents and developers that market-based resettlement policies based on the exclusion of ineligible slum dwellers—often of marginalized ethno-religious identities—that other slum dwellers are able to claim legitimacy and eligibility as recipients of resettlement compensation. Exclusions and disposessions along multiple axes of difference produce other mobilizations as well. Such political trajectories of eviction and displacement are thus inherently wrapped up with experiences, relations and meanings of difference that become politically salient in divergent ways as they encounter distinct configurations of force.

These differentiated but interconnected political trajectories, I argue, demand a more robust theory of state power equipped to come to terms with what Hall has called “articulations of power and difference.” Although both Chatterjee and Appadurai start from the position of “ethnographic rule” and ethnic “urban cleansing” respectively, they fail to grapple thoroughly with the ways in which these consolidate, erode and remake slum movements and practices of rule. For instance, Chatterjee addresses the importance of identity politics of caste and religion as a means through which the poor consolidate into moral communities and access governmental welfare. Appadurai sees slum women’s participation as the moral core of an effective but non-confrontational “politics of patience”—a way to negotiate with the state while countering the ethnic and class-based violence of chauvanist urban transformations. However, neither addresses how the ethico-politics and processes of social mobilization in informal settlement have emerged alongside fundamental changes in state power and serve to reinforce or negotiate these governing practices. To the contrary, in attempting to chart a distinctly subaltern modality of politics, Chatterjee seeks to eschew notions of hegemonic consent that recall earlier subaltern studies arguments of “dominance without hegemony” (Ranajit Guha, 1997). In grasping an ideal form of politics, both authors fail to see how hegemony is sustained by and subject to differentiated ethico-politics.

I argue for a shift in paradigm that can account for changing configurations of power in the redevelopmental state, where local municipal electoral politics no longer offers slum dwellers the political opportunities (albeit incomplete, rife with power and patronage-based) for negotiating needs as it has in the past. Instead, mediating NGOs, movements and other agents enrolled in governmental resettlement projects in Mumbai provide access to eviction compensation from governmental agencies (state and non-state), shaping slum mobilizations and subjectivities. Both the material value and social meaning of land are negotiated in the moment of eviction but through the shifting ethico-politics shaped by such non-state intermediaries drawing on histories of struggles and circulating global and
national development discourse and practice. However, the terms of such political movements may in fact reinforce both state power and inequalities across the urban landscape. Furthermore, with the curtailment of the involvement of elected local municipal bodies, there is very little access to recourse and accountability. Of course, party patronage has always been on unequal terms, often exacerbating inequalities along multiple axes of difference (Hansen, 2001; Roy, 2003). Still this reconfiguration of state power becomes vital in a situation in which neoliberal market-based strategies rely on limiting the numbers of beneficiaries and harnessing slum dwellers’ cooperation on developer-friendly terms. Neither Chatterjee’s nor Appadurai’s frameworks offer a way for understanding the profoundly dangerous political implications of this shift with respect to the democratic enfranchisement of the poor. To the contrary, both have in fact celebrated (perhaps Appadurai more than Chatterjee) such alternative channels of governmental access.

In this regard, I have found that the legacy of communal politics and its relationship to eviction is a particularly critical site for understanding how state agents and urban citizens legitimate uncompensated and violent evictions. In this scenario ethno-religious difference becomes again enmeshed in exclusionary nationalist spatial imaginaries, demarcating the deserving poor from invading outsiders among evicted slum dwellers. Stuart Hall’s framework of articulation—between the nationalist politics of ethno-religious exclusion and class-based dispossession and displacement—helps to explain much about how redevelopmental hegemony is secured. Hall (1980) also points to the contested nature of hegemony by emphasizing the double meaning of “articulation” where the experience of power and difference becomes the vocal medium of dissent. However, Hall is less attentive to another key arena of power, difference and subjectivity: gender. In Mumbai, gendered ethico-political formations and subjectivities have also emerged, fracturing and rearticulating class and ethno-religious difference in relation to land struggle. I now turn to how gendered political practices shape the collective subjectivities of slum dwellers and hegemonic redevelopmental rule.

1.5 Displacing Difference: Gendered Subjectivity, Disruption and Reconsolidation

An analysis of gender and feminist theory interject politically significant concerns to the scholarship on urban slum or subaltern mobilization in relation to land and housing struggle. These perspectives are relevant to my argument about the hegemony of redevelopment in four key arenas. The first questions how some readings of slum mobilization in their silence or uncritical attention to gender elide complicities of movements with exploitative and violent processes of capitalist redevelopment and rule. The second arena concerns how symbolic vocalizations and subversive or regressive claims-making practices emerge through gendered spatial experiences of housing and practices of land struggle. The third examines how gender shapes redevelopmental rule of eviction and resettlement—via both state and non-state agents and governmental and sovereign forms of power. The fourth opens up the thorny question of contradictory desire shaping subject formation among the evicted, an issue addressed most explicitly in feminist theoretical perspectives.
The gender dimensions of housing and eviction politics offers a powerful disruption of the subaltern framework exemplified by Chatterjee and Appadurai among others. In particular, Gayatri Spivak's (1988) famous critique of subaltern studies' collective silence on the gendered subaltern is relevant to work on slum-based social mobilizations. For instance, Spivak's critique of the monolithic representations of the subaltern provides an important disruption of Chatterjee's singular notion of the "politics of the governed," one that has significant political repercussions. Spivak warns that unproblematized representations and silencing of the female subaltern in fact become complicit with the same imperial economic interests and narratives that such narratives have rallied against. She warns that the same (if not greater) danger exists when there is an uncritical or romanticized consideration of "women's" subjectivity in meaning and practice. For instance, in Appadurai's analysis of gendered participation of slum residents in the SPARC Alliance in slum upgrading and resettlement, there is a marked lack of critical appraisal of women's participation, which harnessed feminized roles and labor in the household and community toward shifting political ends.

The dangers of romanticized readings of feminized subjectivity are echoed in a number of recent debates on women's participation in development. Mohan and Stokke (2000), for instance, critique the assumption of empowerment through participation for eliding the reproduction of structural inequalities including gender and class. More recently, the work of Sylvia Chant (2008) and Ananya Roy (Roy, 2010) show how both poverty and the responsibility to deal with it have been feminized. For instance, globally circulating agents and discourses of development perpetuate these idealized gendered roles through a variety of anti-poverty programs relying on women's supposed propensity to make selfless decisions for the material and social welfare of the family and community.

While I find these interventions important and resonant, I disagree with the commitment to textual deconstruction (especially in Spivak's analysis) as the principle means of exposing the violent silencing of the subaltern and the implicit binaries of analysis that perpetuate it. In exploring complex gendered subjectivities and subjectifications, I have found that a focus on situated practices is necessary to understand what political ends they serve. I believe that there is an important space for engaging in an analysis of sedimented political practice as fundamental to subject formation especially under conditions of displacement. Analyses that focus on practice start from the premise that feminized subjectivities do not simply emerge out of a discursive field interpellating women as subjects in singular ways. For instance, as Raka Ray (1999) has shown in her comparative work on feminist mobilizations in Mumbai and Calcutta, political "habitus," is critical to the kinds of demands made by movements—whether more "traditional" women's concerns of violence or class-based concerns. Furthermore, as Shakya and Rankin's work on microfinance has shown, women may deploy discourses of responsibilization for ends other than self-exploitation. In other words, gendered meanings and practices become connected in very different ways with divergent political consequences.

In this study of eviction politics in Mumbai, I found that gender became politicized and salient in differing ways. Gendered expressions emerged through a conjuncture of
conditions and forces including place-specific histories of struggle, social reproductive and wage labor relations, experiences of state power and intermediary NGOs and movements, all of which shaped claims to housing, land and services. For instance, one political trajectory of eviction I found that feminized mobilizations (the same group that Appadurai discusses), enabled slum clearance and resettlement under terms that also exacerbated inequalities along both economic and gender lines. Women’s participation historically forged a new terrain of negotiation with the state, deploying a strategic “non-political” image because of its entrenchment with ostensibly less controversial feminized aspects of welfare like sanitation and housing (on less centrally located land). Later, however, these gendered mobilizations were reworked around changing notions of domesticity. Here, housing provision became yoked to market-based resettlement strategies through an accommodating instantiation of what Fraser has called the politics of “needs interpretation.” Reworked collective subjectivities legitimated and entrenched class and gender inequalities in that particular instance of displacement. They also operationalized state practices of market-based resettlement and NGO-assisted bureaucratic and authoritarian redevelopment governance.

Furthermore, gendered eviction struggle, when shaped through processes of what the Sangtin Writers and Richa Nagar (2006) have called “NGOization,” has reproduced hierarchy. Ironically, in arenas where women’s empowerment is supposedly the goal, these entrenchments of power become even harder to voice and counter. Patriarchal leadership within the structure of movements and NGOs has often heavy-handedly disciplined feminized participation as it took on governmental roles implementing resettlement on behalf of the state. This is an instance of what Aihwa Ong (2007b) has called graduated sovereignty operating not only through official state agents but NGOs and movements as well. Here Wendy Brown’s (1995) notion of masculinized logics of state rule—“the man in the state”—has in fact been operationalized through a process that I have called non-governmental patriarchy.

Of course, feminized subject positions based on social reproductive roles can serve as radical critiques of interconnected class, gender and ethnic or racialized structures of power. Ruthie Gilmore’s (2007) study on mother activism against the U.S. prison industrial complex, Gillian Hart’s (2002) work on Taiwanese labor struggles in the idiom of daughterhood and Judith Carney and Michael Watts’ (1990) work on gendered labor struggles unfolding in conflicts over marriage contracts in the Gambia are among many examples of this. For instance, in another trajectory of eviction that I analyze, feminized labor bolstered an ethico-politics of land struggle highlighting citizens’ exclusions from the city and nation, giving voice to experiences of marginalization based on both class and ethno-religious identity. Yet, the silence of women and feminized roles does not necessarily lead to a failure of representation of their (narrowly construed) economic interests. For instance, in a third case of eviction politics, I observed that feminized labor was not vocally politicized at all. In fact, public contestations and negotiations were dominated by men and waged through juridico-economic discourses and practices. Nonetheless, their demands for centrally located resettlement would benefit both genders because of many women’s
income generation activities in locally sourced home-based garments and other consumer goods production.

Feminized ethico-politics of eviction struggle is thus highly contradictory. On the one hand, it has enabled an avenue for negotiation and even subverted power relations. On the other, because gender symbolically and materially codes power (J. W. Scott, 1999), feminized participation has also reinscribed power through exclusions and exploitations in multiple arenas. Differently articulated embodiments of displacement and struggle have demanded a rethinking of what Saba Mahmood has critiqued as the dichotomous tendency to read either resistance or consent into women’s political subjectivity. Returning to Spivak, contradictory desires most readily evident in the “divided” subjectivity of subaltern women is a central problematic. Formations of gendered mobilization are thus not fixed in form or target in the space of urban politics. It is only through an analysis of political practice that we can best understand how these subjectivities shape governance and justice in more or less emancipatory ways.

Thus, across the three political trajectories of eviction addressed in this dissertation, gender politically articulated with class and ethnic identity to produce very different ethico-political practices that shaped the governing and hegemony of redevelopment. The major problem, I argue, with much of the work on urban subaltern politics is a fixation on modalities of subjectivity rather than relational processes of differentiated subject formation. Indeed, this was precisely the conundrum that the early subaltern studies collective faced. In demarcating an authentic politics outside of bourgeois and colonial misrepresentations, these perspectives ironically reproduce new essentialisms, obscuring fundamental relations of power. Thus, the frameworks of Chatterjee and Appadurai fail to offer the analytical lens necessary to understand how sedimented subjectivities fracture and reconsolidate in diverse ways in the moment of eviction. These articulations of difference must be understood in relation to simultaneously fragile and powerful structures of redevelopment and rule. A more robust understanding of subject formation with attention to gender can reveal how spatial productions of difference entail differentiated, interrelated productions of political spaces. The method and substance of this dissertation thus offers a completely different understanding of social movements and capitalist hegemony in Mumbai.

1.6 The World in a City: Relational, Comparative Ethnography as Method

One of the differentiating features of this dissertation is the relational comparative method that it uses. I believe that comparative methodology can help to tease out complex and globally interconnected processes. A number of urban studies scholars have called for the greater use of comparative methods for understanding urbanism under conditions of global interconnection and transnational power hierarchies (McFarlane, 2010; Roy & AlSayyad, 2004). Among these, Jennifer Robinson (2011) has recently argued that urbanists must operate from an understanding of “cities in a world of cities” to effectively grapple with post-coloniality and globalization. However, unlike comparisons that have sought to create global comparisons across countries, regions or cities, my work applies
this method in the intimate space of a single city—much of it in a single neighborhood. I argue for a conceptualization of the world within the city. This is a rather different understanding of Mumbai as a “global city” that goes beyond static typologies to unveil what Roy (2010) has called a “small world” of connection and contestation. The world in the city is not simply a metaphor; it is a material and meaningful jostling of power in which the city is both the site and the stakes of negotiating and contesting global capital.

Because redevelopment processes unfold through meaningful material practices, much of my analysis is based on empirical data gleaned from ethnographic interviews, observations and interactions. I spent eighteen months between 2005 and 2008 in Mumbai interviewing evicted and resettled slum dwellers in Lallubhai Compound and Gautam Nagar Resettlement Colonies and Mandala slum in Mankhurd district and Kanjur Marg resettlement colony. During this time, I also participated in a variety of multi-sited events coordinated by mediating NGOs and movements ranging from protests in Delhi and Mumbai to “best practice” tours throughout slums and resettlement colonies of the city. In addition, I developed ongoing relationships and friendships with residents through sustained presence in neighborhoods. In one neighborhood, for example, I conducted English classes for children, an activity that helped me to engage in ways outside the “interviewer-interviewee” relationship and learn about the experience and processes of eviction and resettlement in greater depth. I also conducted in-depth interviews with state agents and plan to supplement my analysis of state bureaucracies with more ethnographic methods in future work. I leave a fuller account of the processes and local political stakes of my research to my case study chapters: 3, 4 and 5.

I thus situate my work in the body of literature termed “development ethnography” which concerns the following:

How development ideas are institutionalized and how particular development interventions may generate conflict as much as consent. . . . This [work] takes the social construction of knowledge (by whom, with what materials, with what authority, with what effects), and the relations between knowledge and practice very seriously, and in so doing can identify struggles and spaces in which important changes can be and are made. (Watts, 2001, p. 286)

In so far as development is part and parcel of transnationally circulating discourses, practices, and flows of wealth and power, development ethnographies are also necessarily “global ethnographies” (Burawoy, 2000), an approach that pays attention to the highly uneven experiences of globalization. In my attention to space, the ostensible production of “slum-free” space through redevelopment, I also pay heed to Gillian Hart’s promotion of a critical ethnography (2004). I share Hart’s focus on spatial practices and relations grounded in an understanding of places not as passive receptacles of globalization but as sites actively implicated in the production of globalization. Accordingly, my analysis shows how eviction trajectories become embroiled in diverse global arenas and discourses of development. It is precisely through addressing these contradictory movements in the
space of the city that we begin to see how transnational discourses attain their subscribers and become substantiated.

The attention to practice in critical ethnographic analysis has revealed to me that the ethico-politics of eviction is differentially constituted through distinct articulations of class, gender and ethno-religious difference. In unpacking these differentiated politics, I have also found Hart’s relational comparison (2002) to be foundational to my analytical and methodological approach, in which global processes are not examined through a multitude of individual, bounded and discrete cases. Nor is conceiving difference as constitutive of eviction trajectories simply an exercise in unraveling diverse “local” complexities. Rather, these social configurations are intimately connected socially and spatially, connections that offer an important lens into understanding how structures of local and global power are reproduced, reworked and contested. To understand how the ethico-political configurations shape practices of redevelopmental rule and possibilities for social justice, I argue that we must examine differentiated political trajectories in relation to each other. For instance, we cannot understand resettlement processes in Mumbai without an understanding of the systematic exclusions upon which they are based, exclusions that profoundly shape possibilities for social mobilization. One benefit of doing a relational comparison located within (but not limited to) the space of a single city—rather than across cities or countries—is to give attention to the production of space and to also discredit a geographically determinist reading of places as singular sources for particular modes of rule or resistance. This approach does not deny the specific history of Mumbai and its interconnectedness with various other national and transnational sites. Rather, it more fully understands the city’s history as a site for the germination of different kinds of collective actions simultaneously emerging from, destabilizing and reproducing hegemonic rule.

The methods and theories that I engage in this dissertation are thus intimately tied to each other and to my understanding of power and spatial transformation. Theoretically, this dissertation argues that the spatial production of difference and the differentiated production of political spaces are keys to understanding the consolidation of rule and possibilities for social justice in Mumbai. Methodologically, it examines different eviction trajectories and political practices in relation to each other and to multiple forces of redevelopment as congealed in the state apparatus. Under conditions of state centralization (through the relegation of large-scale redevelopment projects outside the ambit of directly elected officials, toward a politically insulated bureaucracy) and governmental decentralization (through the uneven administration of resettlement via non-state intermediaries), these differently produced trajectories of eviction have become extremely important in the reworking of redevelopmental hegemony.

1.7 Overview of Chapters

In chapter 2 I examine the historical relationship between state practices in Mumbai’s slums and national and transnational development interventions from the 1950s to the present. I argue that recent transformations in the political economy of India have
accompanied a fundamental reconfiguration of the Indian state, especially in cities. Changing state structures for implementing slum redevelopment—relying on state bureaucracies, powerful developers and non-governmental intermediately—have transformed the channels and meanings of political participation away from the practices of party patronage long characterizing slum politics. Addressing recent debates on neoliberal governance, I argue that slum clearance through market-based resettlement partnerships cannot be understood simply as a new logic of restructuring. Rather, redevelopmental state hegemony—an unstable reproduction of legitimacy under conditions of extreme class inequalities—has operated through a fractured political terrain inciting distinct political practices in slums. The local state represents a key node of access, conflict and negotiation, remaking itself to govern the contentious processes of displacement due to redevelopment. The chapter shows how these reconfigurations of state power have emerged out of sedimented struggles over space in earlier rounds of development, especially through a critical articulation of violent ethno-religious populism and class politics of economic liberalization. It then delineates the translocal processes through which these simultaneously inclusive and exclusionary politics became concretely embedded into Mumbai’s unique neoliberal slum redevelopment and resettlement policy framework. Just as development has relied on a mix of force and consent garnered through partially inclusive political processes, so too has neoliberal redevelopment. The privileging of market imperatives has meant that slums must go, but only some displaced slum dwellers are eligible for adequate resettlement. Accumulation through differentiated displacement has in turn shaped differentiated political trajectories through which evicted slum residents leverage and rework claims to space and legitimacy.

Accordingly, chapters 3, 4 and 5 decenter redevelopmental rule, delving into three cases of eviction to explore how differentiated subjectivities among the displaced consolidate, contest and rework hegemonic governing practices. These cases reveal three different but interconnected political trajectories in which slum residents facing eviction engaged with the state and other non-governmental agents with varying degrees of cooperation and contestation. The first political trajectory is one where eviction politics turns on the reworking of domesticity. Feminized participation and patriarchal rule incite what Tania Li has called a “will to improve” living space through formalized housing while also persuading and enforcing cooperation with unevenly experienced market-based slum resettlement. The second case is a political trajectory centering on the struggles over the meanings and designations of jurido-economic rights. I argue that this was an eviction politics that exposed some of the class inequalities of the redevelopmental state and market-based resettlement without challenging the structural relations and practices of rule that reproduce these inequalities. In the third trajectory, eviction politics unfolds through a struggle over what it means to be a citizen. Eviction without resettlement compensation triggers struggles to reclaim slum space and challenge market-orientations and class biases of redevelopment and displacement. Each of these trajectories has evolved in relation to practices of developmental rule and struggles over land and resources in the city and hinterland.
Chapter 3 addresses the first of the cases: the participatory resettlement processes of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), a rail and road infrastructure expansion intervention funded in part by the World Bank. The MUTP was a large-scale effort to remove, resettle and rehabilitate over 25,000 slum residences located near railway tracks and in plots where new roads were planned. Since its initial stages in 1998 until about 2005, the MUTP was considered a model for peaceful, participatory and voluntary resettlement because of the community-mobilizing work of a non-governmental organization, the SPARC Alliance. Tracing the history and practices of SPARC Alliance members’ relationship with the state and slum communities, the chapter argues that the railways resettlement marked a shift in practices of non-confrontation and gendered negotiations over land and resources. The MUTP instantiated an eviction politics in which domesticity was reworked and deployed to multiple ends. On the one hand, a new sovereign figure emerged in the power vacuum of municipal party politics through the masculinized “fatherly” authority of A. Jockin, a key leader of the SPARC Alliance. On the other, feminized participation in community building activities served to entrench an ethico-politics of housing aspiration, in which slum dwellers strived for legitimacy through the ostensibly improved status and living conditions of formalized resettlement. The trope of the middle-class housewife figured prominently in shaping the subjectivity of leaders and participants of women’s groups who helped to build a sense of community solidarity, cooperation and desire for improved housing.

Gendered participation and leadership was also central in enabling relatively cooperative slum resettlement processes even though many residents were relocated far from their original neighborhoods under prolonged conditions of extreme hardship in transit camps and then in ghetto-like mass resettlement colonies. The chapter departs from one analysis that has positioned such slum dwellers’ groups as empowered subjects building toward incremental life improvements through “the politics of patience” (Appadurai, 2002). Rather, it shows that market-oriented redevelopment cooperation was achieved despite deepening inequalities because resettlement and practices of participation privileged gendered social reproductive labor in the home and community over women’s labor outside of the home. Women were positioned as beneficiaries of resettlement though poorer women who had to work outside of the home suffered job loss or increased burdens of commuting.

The contradictions of MUTP’s market-driven resettlement model did, however, surface more publicly through conflicts in later phases of the project—the topic of chapter 4, which examines the eviction and resettlement contestations and processes in the Gazi Nagar neighborhood, a slum neighborhood affected by a road project under the MUTP. Gazi Nagar residents, along with other road project evictees, resisted offsite resettlement and governance under the SPARC Alliance. Through juridical and semi-juridical processes and the mediation of an activist lawyer, evictees contested resettlement and challenged the legitimacy of state and NGO practices of governance with charges of corruption and failure to adhere to World Bank resettlement criteria. The chapter shows how the trajectory of eviction politics in Gazi Nagar turned on a reworking of juridico-economic rights and processes in three arenas. One was the institutional location, discourse and process of
contestation within the semi-juridical space of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. The juridical arena placed attention on whether there were corrupt practices and infringements in policy rather than structural concerns. A second aspect concerned the competing understandings of property rights and their relation to resettlement rights. Residents leveraged their own understandings of legitimate property ownership in addition to the World Bank’s recognition of informal property rights and resettlement criteria to contest state practices of forced displacement.

The third arena concerned debates and assessments of the relationship between housing or business location and income. Residents complained that distant offsite resettlement would adversely affect their income because of distance from their businesses and employment sources. Although the Inspection Panel acknowledged this problem, Gazi Nagar residents could not negotiate resettlement in the high value Bandra-Kurla Complex because they were classified as primarily residential users who would not be resettled in prime business areas given the cost and ostensible scarcity of land. Only a small number of upper-income business owners in adjoining informal plots were able to access the most desirable resettlement plots. Ultimately, the non-binding nature of the Inspection Panel and readily available financing from other less stringent multilateral banks put limits on the capacity to hold the state and Bank completely accountable to the displaced. I argue in chapter 4 that the juridico-economic framing of eviction struggles shed light on the class biases of redevelopment outcomes but failed to address the social structures that reproduce them. Other dimensions of exclusion and inequality remained silenced, such as the uncompensated displacement of informal renters in the MUTP-affected areas and the effects of displacement on women’s earnings. Relatedly, although promising coalitions were made with other evictees’ movements—such as the Mandala residents discussed in the following chapter—there were limits to sustaining alliances.

Chapter 5 shifts focus away from the MUTP project to examine the case of Mandala, a slum on Mumbai’s northeastern periphery that was evicted during an infamous mass demolition sweep in 2005. The demolitions in Mandala and several other slums throughout the city inaugurated the launching of a comprehensive redevelopment plan called Vision Mumbai by the State of Maharashtra. Residents of Mandala, deemed illegal in the state’s slum rehabilitation policy, were excluded from resettlement compensation. Although engaging with the same set of state bureaucratic agents and facing a similar set of initiatives to redevelop the city for “global” demands, Mandala residents were positioned very differently from the evictees of the two previous cases. Media and state discourses claimed that Vision Mumbai evictees were “recent migrants,” conjuring up images of invading North Indian and Muslim outsiders long vilified in the contentious spatial identity politics of the city. Thus ethno-religious identity played a key role in eviction processes, and clashes with the state were ongoing and much more severe than in the MUTP cases. In this chapter, I argue that because of historically sedimented ethno-religious violence and marginalization, the Mandala trajectory of eviction politics was centrally concerned with struggles over citizenship rights and belonging in the nation. Policy and bureaucratic discourse deemed Mandala residents to have lesser rights to resettlement than “legal” slum dwellers. This was most concretely evidenced by the fact that the plot itself was cleared and designated as a
resettlement site for slum evictees from more central parts of the city (who were contesting their own eviction and offsite resettlement). Mandala evictees became aligned with an intermediary social movement, the National Alliance of People’s Movements, a Gandhian-inspired eco-socialist group critical of development-induced displacement and marginalization across the country.

Mandala displacement struggles were waged though NAPM ideology and tactics and the deployment of symbols of anti-colonial struggle against contemporary state development and neoliberal interventions. As a result, until recently there was little room for compromise and negotiation with the state’s neoliberal redevelopment paradigms. Slum-dweller desires for engaging in neoliberal “compromises” exposed key differences from NAPM’s middle-class leadership. The ethico-politics of citizenship was not uniformly understood despite the appearance of outward solidarity. Three years after the initial demolition, Mandala residents have since adopted strategies of negotiation appealing to the central government for onsite resettlement on a smaller portion of the plot without developer involvement. The struggle has since been governmentalized as slum residents engage in information-collection activities for the resettlement proposal. In particular, decisions about who among the thousands of claimants should actually be placed on the final list reveal another grassroots reworking of citizenship. Through these practices slum dwellers have broadened concrete meanings of citizenship and belonging while also raising new boundaries.

In chapter 6 I bring the analysis of the three cases together. By examining these cases in juxtaposition, we see that there are important parallels and connections among them but that there is no singular politics of “the governed.” Rather, the moment of eviction reveals how governance and subjectivity—and the consolidation of redevelopmental hegemony—fundamentally operate through the production of difference. I explore three arenas in which difference becomes politicized. The first is the arena of community, about which I argue that collective subjectivity congeals around new solidarities and moral ethos—based on differentiated articulations of gender, class and ethno-religious identity—which each challenge and reconsolidate redevelopmental hegemony in different ways. Next, I examine the role of mediating agents—NGOs, social movements and legal advocates—representing evictees to various sovereign powers. Drawing on transnational political ideologies and strategies in relation to development, these agents fuse local politics with globally mobile discourses of development. In particular, the “participatory approach,” with a varied class-critical “rights-based approach,” aligns with the differentiated experience of neoliberal development, which simultaneously includes, dispossesses and excludes. Finally, I explore the embodied experience of eviction. In this arena, we see how the political salience of partial experiences of slum life under processes of eviction—again based on class, gender and ethno-religious identity—forms the basis of eviction politics. I argue that it is precisely the fracturing of embodied subjectivity that lies at the core of redevelopmental hegemony. Embodied practices and the meanings that they come to hold—especially practices of gendered labor and its relationship to land—are central to the consolidation and reworking of state hegemony, defying the dichotomy between resistance and consent to the processes and ideologies favoring accumulation by displacement.
In my concluding chapter, I explore the limits of practices of rule and hegemony through differentiated displacement by considering more recent events unfolding in Mumbai since I conducted my fieldwork for this dissertation. I also consider the lessons that Mumbai has to offer for understandings of "the right to the city" in the field of urban geography.
CHAPTER 2

The Redevelopmental State:

Governing Accumulation through Differentiated Displacement

2.1 Introduction

Mumbai and other Indian cities have witnessed two parallel political transformations since the early 2000s. On the one hand, the urban poor are experiencing intensified displacement as local states demolish informal slum settlements to make way for commercial and residential real estate and infrastructure projects. On the other hand, the urban poor have found that their points of contact in the “everyday state” (Fuller & Benei, 2000)—especially locally elected municipal ward councilors—no longer have the power to facilitate the negotiation of housing and services on their behalf. These changes demonstrate the ways that both the local state and urban space have increasingly come under the control of elites including upper classes, finance capital and local developers. However, such political processes differ vastly across and within Indian cities. In Delhi middle-class resident welfare associations have gained access to state power via courts and state-sponsored forums of citizens to advance a “bourgeois environmentalism” and slum evictions at a staggering scale (Baviskar, 2003; Bhan, 2009; Ghertner, 2008). In Bangalore, financial experts located in high-power parastatal agencies have won vast new powers to shape urban services and development (Solly Benjamin, 2000; Ranganathan, Kamath, & Baindur, 2009). In Calcutta, the nominally socialist state government has refashioned its mode of operation to deploy the uncertainties of informality—what Ananya Roy has called “unmapping”—to advance displacement of the urban poor for elite-oriented redevelopment (Roy, 2003b).

This chapter examines similar processes of state and urban transformation in Mumbai and argues that urban evictions and redevelopment politics demonstrate a fundamental reconfiguration in the structure and hegemonic processes of the Indian state. I have developed the concept of the “redevelopmental state” to explain the central paradox of the current political conjuncture in Mumbai that I introduced in chapter 1: how mass displacement for the redevelopment interests of dominant classes has been advanced in a city where 50% of the population lives in slums with a long and strong history of social mobilization. I argue that the redevelopmental state in Mumbai operates through a mix of coercion, negotiation and ethico-political hegemony to facilitate processes of slum removal necessary for urban capital accumulation. The redevelopmental state represents a remaking of the state in three key interconnected aspects. First, it consists of a fundamental restructuring of power whereby slum redevelopment has become increasingly centralized in state bureaucracies and out of the purview of local electoral politics through which slum residents have traditionally negotiated services and de facto tenure. Second, it has harnessed intermediaries—especially NGOs and social movements but also other non-state agents—to facilitate the highly political processes of implementing slum clearance and
market-based resettlement among evictees. Third, state practices of eviction and resettlement compensation operate in a highly uneven manner in which politicizations and experiences of difference—based on class, ethno-religious identity and gender—become central in logics of redevelopmental rule and ethico-political struggles over space.

By focusing on these political reconfigurations in Mumbai, this chapter argues that it is precisely the diverse "hows"—the geographically specific and historically constituted processes of state and urban transformation—that allow us to see that redevelopment is not a foregone conclusion but rather is painstakingly forged, negotiated and contested in various social, cultural and political spheres. Whether negotiating, protesting or facilitating eviction and resettlement, Mumbai’s slum dwellers have engaged a broad range of non-state intermediaries and strategies according to their particular experiences with displacement and market-based resettlement. Large-scale project-affected residents have interacted with upper-level state bureaucracies through non-governmental organizations instead of locally elected officials. In other cases, slum dwellers negotiate redevelopment compensation deals through brokers or directly with private developers. In some of the most severe instances of violent, uncompensated demolition, evictees have actively aligned with anti-displacement movements and coalitions through which they protest and negotiate with various agents of the state.

With the prominence of non-state actors in neoliberal redevelopment, this chapter asks whether and how the state matters in recent slum clearance interventions. The arguments against the “retreat of the state” (Strange, 1996) are now well known and thoroughly developed by geographers examining neoliberal state “roll-out” in cities (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, 2002). This chapter also argues that the power of local state has intensified through advancing urban accumulation focusing not only on the forms of shifting state power but also on the multi-scalar political processes ushering in those changes. The shift away from local ward politics in slums toward the more centralized authority of state bureaucracies and the concomitant broadening participation of private agents managing displacement may be seen as an example of what Brenner has called the “rescaling of the state” (2004). However, the new metropolitan geographies of cities like Mumbai reveal a complex confluence of politics of ethnicity, gender and informality that demand a serious reworking of Euro-American theories of globalized urban development (Roy, 2009b). In Mumbai state power engages populations and spaces in highly differentiated ways—including demolitions targeted at particular ethno-religious groups, uneven categories of eligibility for resettlement and exclusionary discourses of belonging to the city. These differentiations fundamentally shape changes in the city and reveal the incoherence of neoliberal rule. In this way, the Mumbai case demonstrates significant resonances with Ong’s notion of graduated sovereignty and citizenship, in which governmental “zoning technologies” manage differentiated spaces and bodies for neoliberal political-economic imperatives (2007b).

My discussion of redevelopment thus draws from the works of Brenner and Ong but departs from them by arguing that the changing forms of governance and uneven experiences of displacement and citizenship are not simply recalibrations of logics and...
scales of neoliberal governance. Rather, these political geographies are inextricably linked to dynamic struggles over eviction in slums that challenge and rework state authority and the hegemony of its redevelopment ambitions. State enactments of redevelopment are always subject to negotiations, challenged by conflicts and contoured by uneven experiences of spatialized power. I argue that these spatio-political productions of difference—including identity-based ideologies of belonging, uneven compensation practices and differentiated experiences of displacement—lie at the root of an unstable hegemony of state redevelopmentalism. While enabling rule in some instances, differentiated displacements have also rendered new arenas of sovereignty as sites of negotiation and contestation by displaced and representative groups.

These politics demonstrate that the state operates as an important node of redevelopmental power, a position that demands attention to its shifting, co-constitutive ethico-political and material integration with civil society over time. My exploration of the ethico-political dimensions of redevelopment draws from Gramsci’s theory that elite class interests are served through a combination of coercive force and ostensibly non-state arenas of meaning and practice. These are the arenas of everyday life, relations and institutions through which “common sense” understandings of social and individual experience in the world become ideologies that support capitalist class structures. Through these dimensions of the redevelopmental state, I show the state is in fact a process, a dynamic play of continuity and rupture that cannot be understood outside of multi-sited histories of struggle. Accordingly, this chapter has two aims: (a) to analyze how the redevelopmental state emerges historically through a periodization of development theory and practice and (b) to examine more closely how the redevelopmental state operates in the current moment.

2.2 The Developmental State: Theories and Histories of India’s Postcolonial Political Economy

Recent research on Indian cities has revealed significant patterns of local state transformation since the liberalization of the national economy in the 1990s. It is not only that infrastructure and lucrative real estate redevelopment in urban regions have invigorated the attention of national state development agendas in what Neil Brenner calls “rescaling” of the state (2004). The everyday spatial practices and institutions of the state in relation to society have also undergone significant changes as globalized redevelopment and accumulation entail mass displacements and dispossession of the urban poor. These politico-spatial processes of urbanization have called into question the developmental state framework which has served as the principal benchmark of analysis of Indian sovereignty since the mid 20th century. A brief overview of state developmentalism in theory and practice elucidates the shifts and continuities that have emerged in Mumbai.

Indian state developmentalism has been a topic of concern for scholars of two separate but related sets of literature: (a) those focused more specifically on post-colonial socio-economic processes in India and (b) those drawing on East Asian experiences as comparative ideal typical models of rapid growth. In the latter category is a diverse range
of literature that for several decades has focused on the political economic trajectory and ill
fate of the socialist-inspired, state-led vision of modernization launched by Nehru after
independence. Looking at state, capitalist and rural elites, Kaviraj (1997) and Chatterjee
(1986) have both used the Gramscian notion of the passive revolution to explain the failure
of urban capitalists and bureaucrats to undermine the power of the rural elite and capture
the hearts and minds of the peasantry to achieve a true bourgeois hegemony. The focus of
such works lay in the cultural politics of development as an elite-driven postcolonial
nation-building project—one which the authors argue failed to coincide with the
worldview of India’s rural masses.¹ In sharply distinguishing the consciousness of the
modernizers and the subaltern, however, such works have tended to singularize and isolate
the subaltern consciousness as fundamentally incompatible with class-based
understandings of political struggles.

On the other hand development theorists such as Francine Frankel (2005) and Pranab
Bardhan (1998) underplayed questions of discourse and cultural politics for a more
normatively driven, political-economic reading of Indian state and society. For instance,
Frankel’s treatment of rural politics in India, blamed “accommodationist politics” for slow
and uneven development as well as the failure to enact the comprehensive rural land
reforms necessary for sustainable poverty alleviation. Pranab Bardhan made a similar
point, arguing that the state in India emerged as more regulatory than developmental. The
problem for Bardhan lay in the fact that none of three “dominant proprietary classes”—
educated bureaucrats, urban industrial capitalists and rural landed elites—was able to lead
the country toward development, remaining trapped in sluggish, interdependent relations
of patronage and subsidies. While these analyses differed in their assessment of
development and analysis of power, they all saw the state as a central agent in advancing
developmental objectives.

By the mid 1980s, however, neoliberal attacks on the state for India’s developmental
failures gained traction in both national and transnational circles. Economists like Deepak
Lal (2000) blamed not elite capture nor the passive revolution but the “dirigiste dogma” of
the state. Such critiques linked into Washington Consensus criticism of state
interventionism and the celebration of supposed market-led growth in East Asia. A second
set of developmental state frameworks offered an important critique of free-market
theories of development in East Asia (Amsden, 1989). Originally introduced by Chalmers
Johnson in his analysis of MITI in Japan (1982) and later reformulated by Peter Evans in his
examination of “embedded autonomy” in Korea (1995), these works showed how state
interventionism enabled rapid growth in the region. However the comparative application
of this fixed ideal type to the Indian and other postcolonial states—as either “predatory” or
“intermediate” state forms—has been less useful. Evans’ and other narratives (Chibber,
2003) have tended to measure the actions of the Indian state in terms of success and failure

¹ Rural political economy and its interconnection with struggles over meaning were historiographically
explored in the colonial context by the Subaltern Studies Collective (Ramachandra Guha & Spivak, 1988).
Ramachandra Guha (1997) also argued that colonial rule was based on traditional forms of dominance rather
than hegemonic consent of the rural poor.
in matching the Korean developmental state yardstick with little analysis of the dynamic political forces that have produced distinct histories of development.

Both sets of literature offer important insights on the state as a necessary (if encumbered or problematic) site for the advancement of development. However, by focusing on either the macro-class politics of agrarian modernization or industrialization or the broad discursive politics of nationalism, these perspectives elide the complicated lived experiences of the state and social struggle. Anthropologists and geographers such as Akhil Gupta (1998), Aradhana Sharma (2008) and Corbridge et al. (2005) have instead usefully deployed ethnographic methods to examine the state and non-state organization, practices and cultural politics of postcolonial populism and developmental rule in India's villages. These rural ethnographies have shown how development and poverty alleviation projects incite different subjectivities among the poor and lower-level state employees. They also show how developmental knowledge production and state-society encounters entrench and subvert power relations in often-unexpected ways. But there have been fewer critical ethnographic studies on the popular politics of urban development in cities like Mumbai despite large spurts of urban migration and informal settlement occurring post-independence. A brief history of Mumbai helps to situate its development trajectory.

Political refugees of the Pakistan-India partition and economic migrants from villages fueled the political economic development of the city as formal and informal labor forces starting in the late 1940s through the 1980s. During this period thousands of workers in textiles, food processing, garments, petrochemical and construction industries as well as lower level bureaucratic and service sector workers made the city their home (Patel & Thorner, 1995). The integration of migrants and workers into the political economy of the city produced new sets of local and national state practices in Indian cities. Working class politics focused increasingly on securing housing and services rather than purely labor relations—what Manuel Castells called the struggle over "collective consumption" (1983) giving rise to state patronage relations in working class neighborhoods of cities. Informality nonetheless sustained housing inequality, tenure insecurity and skewed power relations with the state. With the proliferation of informal settlements as the primary site of the biological and social reproduction of the urban working classes in the 1980s, slums also became the site of modest international aid funneled again through the party patronage system. The following section addresses the configuration of the city as a site of postcolonial development politics by focusing on the interpenetration of state and civil society in Mumbai’s informal settlements since the mid 1950s.

2.3 Developing the Grassroots: Slum Improvement and Party Politics 1956–1991

The history of state practice in slums reveals an unstable dialectical relationship between policy discourses and neighborhood-based politics. Until the 1970s, punitive measures of slum clearance remained the principal state policy for treating settlements. The Slum
Clearance Scheme of 1956, the state of Maharashtra’s first official policy regarding slums, proposed the demolition of slums and the public provision of resettlement housing according to development plans. However, sporadic demolitions with little resettlement follow-through meant that the scheme did little to thwart the processes of settlement throughout the city.

From the 1960s through the 1990s (continuing through today, on a smaller scale), informal neighborhoods emerged on open plots, in marsh areas and along railway tracks and roads through the assistance of lower level bureaucrats, elected officials and brokers. Oral histories I conducted with slum resident confirmed a general process of settlement that was similar in many of these areas. Local strongmen closely tied to ward politicians and police often initiated and facilitated settlement processes on vacant public and private lands. Settlers whose jobs were often located in close proximity to the neighborhood would purchase or rent plots from these brokers and gain informal eviction and demolition protections in exchange for bribes and electoral support of local officials (see also V. Desai, 1995; Seabrook, 1987). As informal settlements proliferated, policy discourse, patronage relations and state interventions complexified.

The 1970s saw the emergence of a series of contradictory state interventions that simultaneously enforced harsh slum clearance drives and introduced more accommodating systems of public infrastructure and service distribution. Within the arena of accommodation, two interventions marked the initial change in public discourse from summary demolition to in situ improvement. The first was the Slum Improvement Program (SIP), launched in 1970 as a policy alternative to slum demolitions. The SIP furthered the notion of slums as not just encroachments but also substandard housing in need of environmental improvement through the provision of services such as water, sanitation, roads and lighting. Subsequently, the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act of 1971 legislated a key legal mechanism for making slums eligible for improvement funds. Under the Slum Areas Act, settlements were declared environmentally unsuitable for living through a process known as “notification.” Notification consisted simply of registering the plot in local state agencies. If the land was originally privately owned but considered vacant and unused, the owner would be summoned to sign a “no objection certificate” that would subsequently allow the neighborhood to be eligible for services and infrastructure (D’Souza, Josson, Nair, & More, 2005). However, notification processes and improvement schemes were not operationalized until the census of 1976, the first comprehensive attempt to collect information on the location and condition of the city’s slum population. By enumerating and classifying settlements, the census facilitated the socio-spatial legibility necessary for governmental resource distribution. However, the census was far from exhaustive. Major gaps excluded many residents from access to slum improvement resources and protection from demolition (R Chatterji, 2005).

On the heels of these official welfare and improvement schemes came a sharp increase in violent slum demolitions in the mid 1970s. The most severe eviction drives occurred during the 21-month period between 1975 and 1977, when a political state of emergency was declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s administration. Emergency military rule
suspended civil democratic processes throughout the country and enabled local
governments to carry out violent mass demolition sweeps of slums and low-income
neighborhoods in both Delhi and Mumbai. In Mumbai, the Maharashtra Vacant Lands Act of
1975 served as the legal mechanism for advancing evictions under emergency rule. By
legislating the process of declaring settlements as “illegal encroachments,” the Vacant
Lands Act allowed the state to override the protective provisions of earlier improvement
schemes (D’Souza, et al., 2005).

The largest and most infamous eviction in Mumbai was the 1976 demolition of 70,000
homes in the Janata Colony settlement in a swampy eastern suburb of the city for the
expansion of an atomic research center. Many of Janata Colony’s original residents had
been relocated to the site after a sweep of slum demolitions throughout the city in the
1950s. Though slum-based leaders and neighborhood groups had been repressed during
the 1976 demolition drive, movement leadership and organization had developed through
several years of negotiations and conflicts with the local government over urban service
provision. It was during this period that the National Slum Dwellers Federation became
galvanized under the leadership (among others) of Jockin Arputham, who would later align
with the internationally recognized NGO, SPARC. SPARC and its slum-based partner
organizations would become key intermediaries for redevelopment and resettlement
schemes in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Evictions subsided as official democratic processes were restored after 1977. Slum-based
groups began to negotiate legal recognition and services on a broader scale through slum
improvement schemes. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, these efforts came to be partially
financed by foreign assistance and thereby subject to international development
parameters and frameworks. The Bombay Urban Development Programme (BUDP), a
World Bank (IDA)-funded slum-upgrading initiative, was an important example of this.
BUDP exemplified the shift in the Bank’s development discourse toward basic needs
provision and poverty alleviation initiatives launched by Robert McNamara in the 1970s.
Emerging in response to pressures from India and other developing-country governments,
“basic needs” projects targeted the social development needs of the poor.³ By the time the
BUDP project was launched, it also reflected early stages of neoliberalism evidenced by the
Bank’s firm commitment to market-oriented growth and minimal public expenditure.

In Mumbai, the BUDP housing and services initiative was based on the housing “upgrading”
and “sites and services” paradigm of J. F. C. Turner, who saw the economic advantages to
the ways that squatters met their own housing needs. This approach called for low public
expenditures and a circumscribed, “enabling” role for the state through relaxed building
codes, service provision and land acquisition. To the contrary, critiques of the Turner
school (and similar ideas of Hernando de Soto) have advocated more structural reforms in
land and labor markets, arguing that urban informality in housing, enterprise and labor is
constitutive of exploitative relations of capitalist development in cities (Bromley, 1994;
Ward, 1982). Nonetheless, the Bank-prescribed technocratic thrust of the program

³ For a useful critique of aid discourse and practice under the basic needs paradigm, see Robert Wood (1986).
ostensibly relied on ensuring the affordability of housing for the poor to enable full cost recovery and project replicability. The logic of affordability positioned slum clearance and redevelopment as too expensive and the poor themselves as the most efficient providers of their own housing needs (P. A. Desai, 2001; Pugh, 1989). The most relevant component of the project for lower-income slum dwellers consisted of in situ slum upgrading and regularization. The term “regularization” refers to the governmental recognition of slum structures, which entitles residents to procedural protections and compensation upon eviction without fully granting land tenure rights.

The involvement of multilateral aid in the city’s urban welfare programs placed new pressures on the state. Development interventions in slums also entailed new governmental practices, especially regularization, which has become especially important in the current moment of redevelopment and mass eviction. Although the BUDP loan came under the soft interest and payment parameters of the International Development Agency (IDA), the Bank pushed for attaching neoliberal land reform policies that would repeal the city’s rent control laws, lower urban land holding ceilings and reformulate its property tax schemes. However, the strategic avoidance of the government of Maharashtra to implement such reforms demonstrates that it was not a passive recipient of Bank aid and neoliberal policy ideology. Repealing rent control would mean alienating Mumbai’s powerful renter constituency, and thus state agents strategically treaded an unstable political playing field regarding land and housing policy. Instead, state officials curried favor with the Bank to attract funds but thwarted decision-making around the highly politicized arena of rental and land markets. While the state of Maharashtra publicly endorsed these reforms, it failed to commit to the package, sending it to the central government for final approval (P. A. Desai, 2001). Bank conditionalities prolonged negotiations for the loan agreement several years from its initial proposal in 1977 to its signing in 1984 (Pugh, 1989). The reforms were eventually abandoned in the final project document.

Ultimately, the slum upgrading portion of the BUDP benefited only 22,000 out of the proposed 100,000 homes (P. A. Desai, 2001) due to the difficulties of acquiring slum plots located on private and central government lands (R Chatterji, 2005). Nonetheless the BUDP and other state-sponsored urban service projects constituted the principal material basis for party-based patronage relations and vigorous electoral competitions in slum neighborhoods. The municipal corporation emerged as the most direct face of the state for slum dwellers. Rather than the upper echelons of power in the state government of Maharashtra, ward-based nagar sevaks (locally elected officials known as “corporators” in English) emerged as slum residents’ everyday and personal connection to the state apparatus. By the same token, local politicians and their slum-based allies took advantage

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4 The two other components of the BUDP included a sites and services project and renovation of dilapidated buildings. The largest was a sites and services component that took up the largest portion of the funding (69%) while renovations took up the smallest (11%) portion; BMRDA, as referenced in (P. A. Desai, 2001). The sites and services project allocated a limited number of plots with very basic infrastructure on the periphery of the city, the majority of which ended up being developed and occupied by middle- and upper-income groups. The project was limited in scope due to the expense and difficulties of land acquisition in central areas of the city (P. A. Desai, 2001; O’Hare, 1998).
of the BUDP and other government-sponsored improvement schemes to rally electoral support in slums. Politicians, informal developers, leaders, brokers, residents, police and lower-level bureaucrats forged close working networks in newly formed neighborhoods throughout the city. These political enclaves grew stronger over time as service and infrastructure programs proliferated.

Along with the expansion of urban improvement and welfare schemes in the 1980s, the legibility of slum populations became a central concern for urban government. Because citizenship rights including voting, public rations, health and education had long been locality-based, documentation proving place of residence became all the more imperative for dwellers of informal settlements. Slum dwellers and their political representatives began to produce and employ a variety of documents and registers of informal residence for complementary purposes. Ward officials expanded their political base by adding slum-based constituents to electoral lists and distributing voting cards, rations cards, birth certificates and slum regularization documents in exchange for votes (V. Desai, 1995; Seabrook, 1987). These lists and documents served as technologies of legibility that (incompletely) connected populations to urban space, enabling access to welfare benefits for individual residents and services and eviction protections for entire neighborhoods (Roma Chatterji & Mehta, 2007).

Drawing on these practices in Indian cities, Partha Chatterjee has argued that the state relates to the urban poor as populations not citizens in civil society. Slum dwellers navigate their needs through collectively leveraging relationships with local strong men, politicians and other intermediaries to gain access to governmental welfare programs. The relationship between state and slum dweller represents a fusing of the “demands of electoral mobilization, on the one hand, and the logic of welfare distribution, on the other”—what he calls the terrain of “political society” (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 135). Although the Foucaultian angle in Chatterjee’s thesis represents a relatively new turn in studies of urban governance in the third world, the foundational narrative of slum-based patronage politics is not. As I discuss above, Manuel Castells argued in the early 1980s that squatters’ dependence on the patronage of the state meant that their political mobilization lacked coherence as a social movement: “the dependent city is a city without citizens” (1983).

Chatterjee has paid less attention to two key issues. First, slum politics is intimately tied to transnational development interventions with important ongoing repercussions for cities, as I discuss above. Second, political integration through technologies of legibility and patronage has remained incomplete. For example, new, very poor and socially marginalized settlements, especially “pavement dwellings” located along roadsides, were disenfranchised from this kind of clientelistic access to local state officials. Because they were not included in neighborhood-based electoral lists, census and other governmental technologies of legibility, these slum and pavement dwellers had virtually no access to publicly provisioned urban services. Furthermore, bureaucratic agencies also operated on the assumption that pavement settlements were temporary and unstable and therefore excluded from even the minimal health, education and service provision programs. The limited and precarious relationship with the state meant that these settlements were more
vulnerable to frequent demolitions and systematic impoverishment. An onslaught of demolitions of pavement dwellings in 1981 led to a landmark Supreme Court case that afforded some recognition of pavement and slum dwellers. In *Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation* (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that the demolition of slum and pavement dwellings infringed on the fundamental right to life protected by the Indian constitution because evictees lived in such settlements to be near their livelihoods. Although the ruling did not guarantee much in the way of substantive protection from eviction, it did begin to recognize the most marginalized of the urban poor living on pavements. For instance, pavement dwellers would need to be warned through notification before their homes could be demolished (D’Souza, et al., 2005).

Uneven practices of political inclusion are important because over time they have given rise to demands posed by slum-based movements and non-governmental groups in prompting reconfigurations of state practice. Recall that emergency-era evictions resulted in slum-based protests such as road and train blocks by groups, including the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), pressuring the state to respond to slum dwellers’ needs. Such groups operating in the political landscape since the 1980s have evolved and shifted the terms of the engagement with the state in recent years. For instance, subsequent combined efforts of NGOs and neighborhood-based groups helped to slow the pace and scale of uncompensated evictions of pavement dwellings. Non-governmental organizations including the Society for the Promotion of Area Resources Centers (SPARC) were actively involved in campaigns promoting enumeration, enfranchisement and governmental visibility for pavement dwellers Mumbai (Batiwala & Patel, 1997), as I discuss in chapter 3. However, despite the involvement of NGOs in promoting more inclusive practices of legibility, such exclusions have persisted, underpinning some of the most violent forms of displacement today. Besides pavement dwellers, other residents, including those in unrecognized slums as well as informal renters (Davis, 2006), have suffered deeper forms of marginalization. In my subsequent discussion of redevelopment, I show how similarly uneven governmentalities of evictions and resettlement articulate with exclusionary cultural politics of belonging to forge hegemonic consent to redevelopment in working class neighborhoods.

A particularly important point here is that technologies of legibility and practices of political inclusion articulated, produced and elided difference across the urban landscape. Foucault claimed that biopower operated through “dividing practices,” in which institutions including the modern state worked to “qualify or disqualify people as fit and proper members of the social order” (Danaher, Schirato, & Webb, 2000, p. 61). But, Mumbai’s social divisions go beyond the simple dichotomy between bourgeois citizens and a homogenous slum-dwelling “other half.” Morally inflected distinctions between categories of the deserving and the non-deserving poor have inscribed popular imaginaries and translated into state practices through slum redevelopment and improvement policies. For instance, the distribution of services through local party patronage politics has meant that marginalized groups such as Muslims and recent migrants have less access to the

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5 The court ruling only required that the Bombay Municipal Corporation give notice and hearings to slum and pavement dwellers before demolition.
welfare functions of the state. The following sections examine how politicizations of difference and new practices of governing in slums have articulated with both neoliberal urbanization and the cultural politics of Hindutva in national and local arenas.

2.4 Nation-State Space, Hindutva and the Urbanization of Neoliberalism 1991–2008

In most accounts of Indian political economy, 1991 marks a significant moment of transformation from developmental protectionism and regulation to economic liberalization. Brought on by a combination of trade deficits, debt crisis and various domestic and international pressures, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao embarked on a bold new economic policy for India. Rao appointed a politically unknown economist, Dr. Manmohan Singh, to undertake a variety of economic reforms including eased licensing and other restrictions for domestic finance and industry, decreases in import tariffs, liberalization of foreign capital and significant cuts in public expenditures (Ramachandra Guha, 2007; Kohli, 2006). These political-economic processes squeezed agricultural livelihoods but also prompted a surge in urbanization, wealth accumulation, and global economic integration in cities like Mumbai. However, liberalization was far from complete. Several banks and industries remained public and many subsidies also persisted, facts that indicate the various counteracting political pressures at play within the state rather than a uniform global neoliberal push. Although neoliberal economists, industrialists and other leaders blamed planned development and state regulation (known deridingly as the “license-permit-quota raj”) for slow growth rates, the evidence points to a more complicated scenario. There was substantial growth in both industry and agriculture and a decrease in the percentage (though not absolute number) of Indians living in poverty in the 1980s. It is more likely that businesses and urban elites that had benefited from state-led development in the past were now poised to benefit from some aspects of liberalization (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000).

The post liberalization period gave way to both skewed economic benefits and aspirational discourses on the powerful new role of India and its citizens in the global economy. However, global ambitions were met by stark realities. It is now well documented that conditions of life and livelihood among the rural poor worsened in many parts of the country (Bardhan, 2006; Topalova, 2007); the late 1990s and early 2000s became notorious for farmer suicides prompted by debt burdens and decreasing agricultural supports (B. Mohanty, 2005). At the same time, urban upper and middle-class incomes, spending and consumption desires increased in that period. These urban consumer-citizens attained much greater visibility in both national and local political discourse as vanguards of a liberalizing India (Baviskar, 2003; Fernandes, 2006) and have often positioned themselves as the “new common man” in opposition to the populist rhetoric associated with post-independence development politics (Fernandes, 2004; Ray & Katzenstein, 2005). The “new middle classes” along with non-resident Indians (NRIs) living abroad fueled surges in urban real estate through their demands for world-class recreational and consumption spaces and more luxurious housing. In Mumbai for instance, real estate prices rose to prices equivalent to London and Singapore in many of the city’s central neighborhoods during the mid 1990s, a speculative frenzy that Nijman has called
“casino capitalism” (2000). While the latter half of the decade saw a dip, the speculative land markets, new wealth and structural economic shifts led to a resurgence of redevelopmental efforts in the city in the early 2000s. The various state efforts to redevelop cities as spaces of both global economic integration and elite consumption may best be understood as the urbanization of neoliberalism.

At the national scale, Manmohan Singh as the prime minister of India introduced a new territorial dimension to the economic liberalization policies he had launched in the early 1990s. On December 3, 2005, Singh launched a major new urban redevelopment initiative, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). The program aimed to leverage billions of dollars in public and private finance to help Indian cities to modernize urban infrastructure to world-class standards. The World Bank and other international finance institutions and firms would provide supplemental financing in addition to over $20 billion in central government funding. Both government funding and multilateral debt-based financing have come attached to a variety of mandatory reforms that have had an uncanny resemblance to many of the reform recommendations and loan conditionalities of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (Baindur & Kamath, 2009). Although the emphasis of restructuring and reforms has varied across cities, they have broadly included the liberalization of land markets through elimination of laws that have controlled rent and concentrations of land ownership, public-private partnerships, property tax reform and the leveraging of private finance (Ministry of Urban Development).

The debt financing of urban infrastructure projects in JNNURM has also demanded full cost recovery, which has come from two principal sources. One is the expansion and increase of user fees for utilities. Water utility restructuring in cities like Bangalore is a prime example (Ranganathan, et al., 2009). The other source is state government revenues derived from property development and taxation. It is in this latter dimension that real estate development emerged as a key political economic pillar for projects of urban transformation. In Mumbai, for instance, the state government promoted a variety of real estate developments with the aim of stimulating growth, including shopping malls, upscale residential buildings and office complexes benefiting middle classes and elites and often entailing the displacement of lower income informal residents. JNNURM includes a program specifically aimed at expanding services, housing stock and tenure for the poor, but its principle interventions, restructuring and reforms are most likely undermining redistributive goals, which receive little public financial backing (Mahadevia, 2006). In some areas, JNNURM has mimicked much of what local states had already been doing. For instance, the state of Maharashtra had by the 1990s already begun the processes of liberalizing land markets, raising World Bank funding, adopting elite city development plans, enabling developers to access slum land and even embarking on its own real estate development ventures. Nonetheless, JNNURM represents the prioritization of cities in national development agendas and new pressures and incentives for local governments to instate neoliberal reforms.

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6 In a few instances, financing has come from not only through debt but also through direct rental income derived from the state’s own entrepreneurial projects, such as the MMRDA as I discuss below.
New strategies of governance in the area of planning and citizen participation have also been highly skewed toward elite-driven processes. As Soloman Benjamin has argued, JNNURM projects include new streamlined avenues of citizen participation in planning advancing a greater voice for upper middle classes to the detriment of the urban poor, whose politics have primarily occupied the arena of local municipal politics (2007). Furthermore, redevelopment projects have been shielded from the instabilities of electoral politics by being funneled through parastatal agencies answering directly to state government rather than locally elected municipal bodies. National five-year development plans and local master plans have taken a backseat to neoliberal urban-focused “city development plans” produced by private corporate consultants and elite citizens’ groups. In Mumbai for instance, Bombay First, a group of corporate executives, real estate developers and other elites commissioned McKinsey Corporation to devise a plan for Mumbai to achieve “world-class” status. The document outlined broad strokes for redeveloping the city, consolidating many ongoing local and national mandates for urban redevelopment. Among its key recommendations, the Vision Mumbai document advises infrastructure investment, land market liberalization and the promotion of Mumbai as a center of consumption, finance and business services rather than manufacturing.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 2.1:** Eight high-priority initiatives to achieve vision Mumbai (source: McKinsey and Company and Bombay First)
Such plans have mattered politically for their work in harnessing political support in diverse state and civil society arenas through consolidating a bold neoliberal vision for cities. For instance, the State of Maharashtra adopted Vision Mumbai in its entirety as the official city development plan. In 2004, the newly elected Congress party state government cited the plan to justify one of the largest slum-clearance drives in Mumbai’s history. PricewaterhouseCoopers has prepared similar plans in the states of Chhattisgarh and Karnataka.

Brenner’s notion of state rescaling (2004) provides a useful though somewhat partial framework for understanding some of the transformations in neoliberal urban governance in cities like Mumbai. Drawing on earlier arguments locating city regions as the principle site of neoliberal experiments in regulation, policies and institutional restructuring (N. Brenner & N. Theodore, 2002), Brenner (2004) posits that the transition from Keynesian-Fordism to the current neoliberal era is linked to new governing practices characterized by the rescaling of state interventions in city regions. Brenner argues that new state spaces have proliferated through “urban locational policies” that advance urban restructuring for competition in global markets. In the scalar dimension, state power has also shifted through the centralization of some areas of intervention and the decentralization of others. Results include reductions in social supports, the centralization of power (and corresponding decrease in democratic accountability), the fragmentation of institutions and policies and the single-minded prioritization of global competitiveness.

Although still focused mostly on Euro-American experiences, regulationists have recently applied these frameworks to the postcolonial context, arguing that that neoliberal urbanization is a “variegated,” geographically uneven and path-dependent process (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010). The authors acknowledge that while countries of the global South never experienced the full regulatory infrastructure of Keynesianism, there are parallels of transition for what may be called a developmental moment to neoliberalism. This is an important and laudable attempt to speak to the diversity of urban experience throughout the world. Indeed, local state interventions in cities like Mumbai and national policies like JNURM exhibit several of the features of neoliberal state spaces discussed by the regulationists. However, the political specificities of these transformations—especially regarding the conflicts and negotiations engendered—require a much deeper understanding of urban transformation as social process. By focusing on narrow institutional landscapes and market-oriented policies and privileging particular understandings of global forces, the regulationist perspective falls short of underscoring the broad range of contested socio-cultural politics constituting trajectories of (re)development.

Regarding the developing-world context, the authors’ understanding of the impacts of global agents of neoliberalism fails to account for the ways in which states and non-governmental actors have engaged neoliberalizing forces. For instance, the variegated neoliberalism argument equates post-Maastricht EU and institutions like the World Bank and WTO as similar marketizing regulatory institutions. In so doing, this perspective underplays the significant historic and political frictions of postcoloniality. The seeming
convergence between multilateral finance recommendations and state practice has not relegated the state to simply and directly doing the bidding of global banks. Rather, indigenous neoliberal strategies have brought states into conflict with transnational forces in ways that have drawn on postcolonial politics. For instance, when protests erupted in Mumbai over resettlement problems in the Mumbai Urban Transport Project, the World Bank pushed the executive agency of the State of Maharashtra to broaden its resettlement norms. The response of the defiant chief bureaucrat, T. Chandrashekhar, was to refuse to succumb to the Bank’s demands, threatening that “if World Bank is not ready to accept our point of view, then we are ready to implement the project with our own funds” (Business-Standard, 2006). Chandrashekhar publicly chided the Bank for attempting to undermine state sovereignty by imposing “first-world” systems onto a third-world context (Randeria & Grunder, 2009). Besides being reminiscent of anti-colonial sentiment, the threat was also practical. The agency had already been in conversation with Japan Bank and was ready to leverage competition among international finance institutions to meet its redevelopmental goals.

Furthermore, any discussion of neoliberalism in India must also contend with the resurgence of Hindutva politics at local, national and transnational scales. Along with the erosion of socialist principles of equality in development discourse and the rise of new forms caste politics, the 1990s saw the rise of Hindu Nationalist politics through both party politics of the BJP as well as right-wing cultural political movements like the RSS and VHP. The RSS and VHP and other local groups have had a long-standing grassroots presence throughout India that expanded dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Through involvement in a myriad of interventions including school building, curriculum revisions and a variety of health and recreational activities, the movement aimed to revive Hindu culture from various conceived degradations in the past and present (Jaffrelot, 1993). Much like colonial and post-independence adoption discourses of modernization tempered by an authentically Indian (read: Hindu) morality ostensibly sustained in the rural heart of the country (Chatterjee, 1986), neoliberal Hindutva also proudly proclaimed a genuinely “Indian” kind of participation in globalization, eschewing a mimicry of the West. Hindutva promised not only a new global prowess for the nation but also a reclamation of Hindu masculinity from the ostensibly anti-national Muslim and his secularist partners in crime.7 The multi-scaler character of these movements is evidenced by the funding and support they have received by diaspora Indians, especially in the U.S., who have also embarked on significant investments in urban property throughout Indian cities (Hansen, 1999).

The cultural politics of Hindutva became more solidly embedded in the state apparatus through the BJP oppositional politics, which gained momentum in many parts of the country where there was growing frustration with the Congress party. Through an intensive coalition building with oppositional parties (including the Shiv Sena in Mumbai), as well as Hindu Nationalist cultural movements, the BJP emerged as party with the largest number of supporters throughout the country. In addition to its linkage with the Hindu Right, the rise of the BJP was also driven by a variety of instances of what Corbridge and

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7 Also see Paola Bacchetta (2003) for a thorough analysis of women’s participation in right wing movements and the complex gender politics of Hindutva.
Harriss have called "elite revolts" (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000) against the state. These have included campaigns against caste-based affirmative-action-style reservations in education and government. Yet, the rise of the BJP cannot be understood as a solely elite movement, and these authors demonstrate the various ways in which subaltern discontents articulated (in often contradictory ways) with these party and cultural politics. The 1990s period of economic liberalization was inextricably linked to these cultural politics playing out in distinct ways throughout the country.

Finally, while I make the argument that there has been rescaling of formal state authority in slums under redevelopment—from municipal-level party politics to state-level bureaucracies and parastatal agencies—this has not meant that the state is hollowed out at the scale of the neighborhood. NGOs, social movements and other private agents have not only engaged in managing the distribution of compensation, they have become an important arena for negotiating governmentalities of displacement and resettlement. As I show below, differentiated governmental categories of eligibility have articulated with cultural political battles over belonging to the space of the city, processes that have given rise to significant conflicts and reconfigurations of power.

In Mumbai, local state practices and institutional mechanisms have been reworked through a complex interplay of exclusionary cultural politics as well as neoliberal strategies of participatory governance in slum redevelopment. The regionalist Shiv Sena party played a large role in the propagation of both xenophobia and attempts to advance redevelopment and neoliberal reforms. Through ostensibly more inclusive practices, the local state has recruited new sets of intermediary actors at the scale of the neighborhood, such as NGOs and community groups outside of the municipal governance structure. I show that these social processes demand a more extensive understanding of the state in the realm of cultural politics and non-state institutions. These political reconfigurations of state space in Mumbai’s slums are the focus of the remaining sections of this chapter.

2.5 The Neoliberal City-State: From Party Patronage to Market Logics and Ethnic Violence

The redevelopmental moment in Mumbai represents a significant transformation in state practice and slum politics stemming from the expansion of patronage politics from the 1980s to the mid 1990s. During this period, no political party garnered as much support in the city’s neighborhoods as the Shiv Sena. Although the Sena has consistently taken a hard-line approach to migrants and slum encroachments, in the later half of the 1980s it ironically began to emerge as the most powerful player in the municipal corporation, due partly to its strong support base in slums (Heuze, 1995). The Shiv Sena’s rising power in the local state apparatus and social fabric of the city advanced a simultaneously populist and violent brand of politics. The growth of the Sena’s cross-class power base throughout the city and the state government of Maharashtra enabled the party to garner widespread support and legitimacy for its neoliberal reforms and redevelopment programs. The exclusionary rhetoric for which the Sena is famous continues to resonate in popular urban...
cultural and bureaucratic-political discourse throughout the city even as its power in government has waned over the last decade.

Much can be said that is outside of the scope of this chapter in terms of the Shiv Sena’s political culture, ethno-historical imaginings, leadership and history. My concerns in this chapter, however, have received less attention. They hinge on questioning the history and processes through which a movement so vilifying of slum dwellers was able to gain the cooperation and hegemonic consent to redevelopment in the city’s informal settlements. The expansion in the Sena’s political base began in 1980, when it gained unprecedented support among slum dwellers and majority control over the municipal corporation. During this time, the Sena took on new activities beyond the identity-based religious and cultural festivals in middle- and lower-middle-class Marathi-speaking neighborhoods. The party initiated a multitude of social and health service programs through an expanding network of local branches throughout the city’s informal settlements. Activities under the rubric of “social work” included the facilitation of water connections, community clean-ups, medical camps, school admissions, local conflict resolution, job applications and necessary official documents for loyal individuals and neighborhood groups. By focusing on these needs, the Sena garnered a special appeal among working classes that went beyond the masculinist enrollment of angry “lumpenized youth,” as Jayant Lele has argued (1995, p. 200). As one branch leader complained, “the rich classes . . . don’t need us to help them. They are complacent. . . . We help the poor. They don’t know how things work” (Eckert, 2003, p. 18).

In 1985, Shiv Sena officials won majority control of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. During this period, the Sena also began to shift its political discourse away from a purely regionalist rhetoric toward a Hindu Nationalist identity. By 1990 the party had built strategic political alliances with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and other right-wing Hindutva movements. Through these new alliances, the Sena expanded its support base in rural Maharashtra by capitalizing on agrarian frustrations with the Congress party (Hansen, 1996). In Mumbai, the Sena fixed its wrath not on their earlier targets—non-Marathi speakers in white-collar jobs, communist trade unionists and the business elite—but on the specter of illegal Muslim immigrants crowding the city’s spaces and proliferating slum settlements. The new Hindutva framing of the Sena’s scapegoat politics constituted the Muslim and the slum dweller as a threat to both the city and the nation (Katzenstein, Mehta, & Thakkar, 1997). The best-known example of this was the Sena’s famous attempt to deport an entire area of slum dwellers allegedly of illegal Bangladeshi origin in 1997. It was later revealed that the residents were legitimate Muslim Indian citizens (Roma Chatterji & Mehta, 2007).

Like all hegemonic movements, the Sena’s exclusionary cultural populism was flexible enough to speak to a diverse range of supporters across language, ethnicity and class. In addition to its Maharashtrian support base, the Sena’s discursive practices of calling for the

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8 Others have more thoroughly explored the Sena’s institutional infrastructure (Eckert, 2003), its early political history (Lele, 1995), its brand of cultural populism delivered through media campaigns (Heuze, 1995), its close relationship with organized crime and real estate capital and its psycho-cultural registers of influence (Appadurai, 2000; Hansen, 2001; Lele, 1995; Liza Weinstein, 2008).
removal of so-called “anti-national” and “seditious” Muslims along with recently migrated slum dwellers appealed to a broad spectrum of upper classes. The Sena also continued to retain its characteristic ethnic chauvinism, appealing to frustrated lower and middle-class Maharashtrians by shifting its target to Hindi-speaking North Indians. Known by the derogatory term bhaiya, North Indians were lumped indiscriminately with Muslims in the Sena’s anti-migrant and anti-slum discourse.

At the same time, the Sena also incorporated a broadened base of support among the urban working classes living in slums. With access to the municipal coffers, the party was able to expand on its local patronage activities in slums. Patronage and governmental legibility converged as favored slums and their dwellers gained access to the technologies of recognition that channeled public welfare and protection. However, the Sena’s chauvanist politics of inclusion left significant populations of slum dwellers vulnerable to the Sena’s “ethnic cleansing” mission (Appadurai, 2000). The politics of clientelism and governmental technologies of welfare provision became deeply inflected with ethno-religious notions of urban and national belonging. As Roma Chatterji and Deepak Mehta have argued in their discussion of violence and slum politics in Dharavi, “technologies of regularization, such as ration cards and electoral lists, when allied with the rhetoric of the nation, produce the Muslim as an outsider” (2007, p. 15). Such forms of systemic discrimination meant that Muslim and mixed-religion North Indian neighborhoods and residents faced the deepest forms of governmental marginalization and vulnerability to evictions compounded by localized ostracism and violence.

By the early 1990s, the Sena had firmly established its dominant position in relation to other parties in the municipal corporation, police force and throughout the city’s Hindu neighborhoods. As it gained power, Sena branches escalated Hindu Nationalist activism through virulent public displays of Hindu prowess. Inflammatory anti-Muslim speeches by the party chief, Bal Thachery, threateningly promised to rid the city of “trouble-making Muslims” in a dictatorial fashion inspired by Adolf Hitler, as Thackeray proclaimed in a oft-quoted speech (Ramachandran, 2002). Sena-led maha-artis, Hindu rituals normally undertaken in temples and homes, occupied entire streets with sacred fire, clanging of bells and politico-religious rhetoric, often giving way to mob violence directed against Muslims. Ethno-religious bullying reached an explosive tipping point as Hindu-Muslim riots engulfed the city in the winter of 1992–1993. Violence ensued in the city in the aftermath of the demolition of the Babri Mosque by right wing Hindu militants in the North Indian city of Ayodhya. Aided by the Hindutva-friendly police force, Hindu residents were often directed by Sena activists to actively target Muslim homes, businesses and bodies. The city’s working-class neighborhoods, especially those in Muslim-dominated areas, suffered the most devastating riot damages (Roma Chatterji & Mehta, 2007; K. Sharma, 1995).

Tensions were further fueled due to a parallel development. The liberalization of the Indian economy beginning in 1991 was ushering in major shifts in the economic geography of the city, particularly in real estate markets. New urban wealth prompted a surge in land prices,

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9 The literal translation for bhaiya is “brother,” a benign-sounding term that obscures the maliciousness with which it is used in Mumbai.
stimulating demand for high-end housing and commercial establishments. Simultaneously, however, affordable housing shortages became more acute than ever for the city’s working classes. In a moment of conjuncture when real estate markets and ethno-religious tensions were at an all-time high, identity-based violence and housing crisis fused. As Appadurai has eloquently written of the 1992–93 riots, “spectral housing met ethnic fear, and the Muslim body was the site of this terrifying negotiation” (2000, p. 649). I would further argue that this negotiation continued to have effects in electoral politics and later underpinned the ostensibly inclusive policy discourse of neoliberal slum redevelopment.

In 1995, the Sena was able to expand and capitalize on the moment and its cross-class support base to win the State of Maharashtra government elections. Upon winning the state race, the party ushered in an era of sweeping real estate and infrastructure redevelopment projects. The construction of roads, especially the famed overpasses known as “flyovers,” became a prominent icon of the administration’s development mandate promising modernized “connectivity” for the global city. The Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation was established in 1996 to ease traffic congestion by initiating a variety of freeway, sealink and flyover construction projects. Although the Sena retained its populist and regionalist rhetoric, such road projects clearly favored automobile-owning upper classes. The expense and elite bias of such projects was acknowledged even by the World Bank in its initial refusal to bankroll infrastructure projects that did not support the enormous public transport needs of the city. Nonetheless, the symbolic value of nationalistic progress embodied by the roads has also traversed class (Anand, 2006; Banerjee-Guha, 2002). Shiv Sena leaders were actively involved in the redevelopment of lands occupied by defunct textiles mills into malls and high-end housing, projects in which many party leaders shared material stakes (Harris, 2008).

The redevelopment and removal of slums was the second pillar of the Sena’s urban agenda, one that had serious implications for residents of informal settlements throughout the city. The launching of the Shiv Sena’s Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) in 1995 marked a convergence between anti-slum discourse, redevelopmental state practice and the introduction of the “new economic policy” of liberalization at the national scale. The scheme emerged out of the Sena’s ambitious campaign promise to “clean” the city of its slums once and for all. The new scheme appealed to elite and middle-class desires to beautify the city while also engaging slum dwellers with promises of four million “free” legal flats to those who qualified. As I argue below, however, the city’s powerful lobby of real estate developers emerged as the greatest policy beneficiary.

The SRS introduced three major changes to slum policy. First, resettlement housing would be guaranteed for all slum and pavement dwellers displaced by redevelopment projects who could prove residency in Mumbai prior to January 1, 1995. Slum dwellers who could not furnish proof of residency prior to this “cut-off date” were to be quite literally cut off

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10 An energy sector concession to the U.S. Enron Corporation was another famous and controversial deal that Sena leaders like Bal Thackeray struck (see Mehta, 2000 for a thorough discussion of this).
Second, resettlement compensation would be financed entirely by the market; SRS would offer market incentives to private developers to build tenements for slum dwellers free of cost. Slum dwellers would be resettled in situ if the plots were open. In this case, developers would build units in excess of those required for rehabilitating slum dwellers and sell the additional units at market rates; the units for sale would cross-subsidize the “free” units. However, when needed for “public” purposes—road construction, river basin clearances, and railway infrastructure expansions—developers could build offsite resettlement tenements for “project-affected persons” (PAPs) in exchange for coveted transfers of development rights (TDR) to build taller buildings in other parts of the city. Finally, the program would be administered under a newly created Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) reporting directly to the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra. Slum redevelopment thus became relatively immune to the instabilities of local electoral politics, known deridingly as “vote bank politics” in the Indian context. All other public housing schemes would be phased out and replaced entirely by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority policy mandate.

The SRS thus hinged on state appropriation of slum land for private redevelopment and market-based compensation. The slum rehabilitation paradigm promoted several novel redevelopment mechanisms. For instance, the policy not only expanded the role of the private sector in low-income housing construction but also dramatically multiplied the availability of space for market-rate development by both clearing slum land and offering additional development rights to build taller buildings in other parts of the city. Furthermore, displacement compensation itself became lucrative for developers by creating a vigorous market for transferable development rights as well as the delivery or promise of market-rate sales opportunities. Market rate housing stock gleaned from freed slum land in combination with transferable development rights to build more densely in high-value neighborhoods created a boon to real estate and infrastructure developers involved in state-sanctioned slum redevelopment projects. The introduction of SRA was all the more profitable for developers at a time when real estate markets were inflated as high as London and Singapore values in many areas of the city (Jan Nijman, 2000).

Regarding compensation for the evicted, SRA relied not only on cross-class citizen buy-in but also on sharp divisions among slum dwellers. The logic of market-based redevelopment required a limit to the numbers of poor “beneficiaries” of free housing to remain profitable. That is, market-base redevelopment not only necessitated the legibility and quantification of settlements but also the exclusion of slum structures and residents. One of the key legal mechanisms for enforcing exclusions was the aforementioned “cut-off date” upon which eligibility for compensation critically rested. I return to the implications of this

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11 Exceptional extensions to the cut-off date policy were made for the multi-laterally funded Mumbai Urban Transport Project to meet the “universal resettlement” conditionalities established by the World Bank. However, even with the expansion of resettlement eligibility, significant restrictions remained, including the exclusion of informal renters and other unrecognized residents.

12 Government regulations of “Floor Space Index” (FSI), a variable and hotly contested ratio, determined how high developers could construct buildings on any given plot of land.

13 It also placed the costs of delayed rehab unit construction on displaced slum dwellers, requiring them to spend several years living in extremely crowded transit housing or renting in slums elsewhere.
and other mechanisms of exclusion and technologies of legibility for understanding redevelopmental state practice.

It is important to understand how the parallel logics of market-driven redevelopment and exclusionary populism fused and transmuted into policy through the Shiv Sena’s Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. From the beginning, anti-slum discourses pitted “rightful, tax-paying citizens” against the specter of the freeloading migrant of dubious national origin. Simultaneously, leaders publicly recognized the obvious strains of prohibitive real estate costs for millions of the city’s “legitimate” (Hindu and Marathi) working classes. Party and state officials assured Mumbai’s citizens that the government would not allow a mass influx of migrants into the city encouraged by the scheme. Early in the launching of the scheme, Thackeray announced that “municipal officers have been instructed to not recognize any new zopadpattis [shanties]. We don’t want to add to our problems by allowing more migrants into the city. We have to clean the system in a dictatorial manner—it is the only way” (quoted in Hansen, 2001, p. 208). The minister of housing, Chandrakant Khaire, further assured that the scheme was meant to benefit Maharashtrians and not “aliens” of supposed Pakistani or Bangladeshi descent (Hansen, 2001). Again, new urban immigrants were conflated with allegedly “anti-national” elements. Eligibility for free housing was thus restricted by the establishment of a new cut-off date that required slum dwellers to provide documentation of residency prior to 1995. To date, this eligibility criterion, along with other exclusions, has left many thousands of slum residents out of the compensatory framework of the governmental state and subject to the less mitigated forms of violent displacement and dispossession perpetuated by the sovereign state. As the ethnographies of eviction politics in the following chapters elucidate, however, the line between governmentality and sovereign power is a blurry one when the choice is resettlement or nothing.

The political moment of the scheme’s introduction—at the height of regionalist chauvinism, Hindu Nationalist violence and bullish real estate market—was perhaps more important than its market-oriented novelty. After all, the Congress party had launched an almost identical policy program entitled the Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRD) in 1991. The earlier scheme failed to be fully adopted for two key reasons. First, real estate market conditions were still not strong enough for developers to take advantage of the scheme. Second, the Congress party simply could not rally the same level of support for the program within slums as the Sena’s political machinery had. Over time, developer interest would wax and wane, depending on the vagaries of the real estate market, which often determined the profitability of slum clearance.14

Beyond specific market conditions, however, the market-oriented policy was deeply imbricated in changing state-society relations throughout the city. This outcome was evidenced by the fact that the administration managed to enroll the cooperative participation of diverse groups after the election, well beyond the initial campaign promise  

14 In some exceptional instances, including the World-bank supported Mumbai Urban Transport Project resettlement, the state compensated for a sluggish market by offering developers payments in addition to transfer of development certificates.
phase. Indeed, SRA emerged out of a consolidation of different processes, including the rising role of NGOs, the rapid expansion of real estate and infrastructure development, the changing role of the state as a facilitator of the market, anti-migrant and anti-Muslim xenophobia, and increasing elite desires for a slum-free city. While developers who had much to gain from the process commanded a strong presence and influence in the SRS negotiation meetings hosted by the Sena administration, the participation of other groups should not be underestimated. A particularly remarkable aspect of the SRS was that representatives of slum dwellers, including NGOs like the SPARC Alliance, were also actively involved in both the early rounds of negotiations and the later implementation process. Since that time, displaced slum dwellers qualified for compensation under SRS criteria have increasingly relied on NGOs and local leaders to ensure legibility in the appropriate eligibility lists, systematic implementation of resettlement and protection from the bullying of private developers and state agencies. Although some local politicians have refashioned themselves as brokers for both slum dwellers and developers in scattered and smaller-scale redevelopment projects, NGOs have been the principle intermediaries for large-scale projects. In many cases, these groups have emerged as the new principle face of the state for slum dwellers, a phenomenon that has had important ramifications for redevelopmental governance in the city.

2.6 Redevelopmental State Space: NGOization and Bureaucratized Rule

Thus far, I have argued that the conditions for redevelopmental hegemony at the scale of the city emerged out of the violent political crucible of ethnocratic populism and economic liberalization. However, the processes of implementing and negotiating the resulting neoliberal slum redevelopment agenda reveal significant shifts in everyday state practices since the era of more intense party patronage from the 1970s through the early 1990s. Two interconnected processes have fundamentally shaped redevelopmental governance since the mid 1990s. First, bureaucratic state agencies of the state government, rather than the locally elected municipal corporation, have occupied a more substantive role in advancing slum redevelopment and resettlement projects. Second, NGOs, social movements and other private agents, rather than municipal ward officials, have emerged as the most immediate face of the state for evicted slum dwellers. This is not to argue that ward officials have disappeared. They are still involved in basic service provision in neighborhoods. However, in the context of slum clearance and redevelopment, their role has either diminished or significantly changed. In some instances, ward officials have taken on a new entrepreneurial role as brokers mediating relations between developers and slum dwellers in smaller-scale, market-based resettlement schemes where developers work directly with bureaucratic agencies. The key is that patronage and electoral politics have given way to these other more private forms of mediation and governance. Private groups and agents are directly involved in processes of accessing resettlement compensation through

15 In a few recent instances, municipal officials have attempted to reclaim power through organized resistance of large-scale, state-led redevelopment schemes. For example, local ward officials have been at the helm of resistance efforts against evictions and distant resettlement for an airport expansion project. In this instance, ward officials have supported slum dwellers’ non-cooperation with both NGOs involved in facilitating resettlement and bureaucratic agencies (Kumar, 2008; Times News Network, 2007).
mediating relations between bureaucratic agencies and slum dwellers affected by large-scale redevelopment. Although state bureaucracies and non-governmental groups have distinct histories in Mumbai, the surge in redevelopment projects has propelled both as major political forces in ways that have reworked city governance and the interpenetration of state and society.

Since the mid 1990s, two bureaucratic agencies have emerged as key players in Mumbai’s redevelopment politics: the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) and the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). Both agencies’ recent interventions in redevelopment projects reveal a shift in state-society relations. I have already discussed the Slum Rehabilitation Authority as the agency charged with coordinating resettlement of slum dwellers through the market-based Slum Rehabilitation Scheme policy. The MMRDA was originally formed in 1975 as a regional authority charged with tasks of planning and implementing various development activities, including transport and environmental infrastructure and improvements and the promotion of alternative growth centers. The level of involvement in implementation has varied over the years, and for many projects funds were simply channeled to other governmental bodies. The World Bank required that its funding be channeled through parastatal agencies like the MMRDA that were relatively insulated from electoral politics and accountable directly to the Bank over long spans of time. In the 1980s the MMRDA served as the primary funneling agency for projects like the Bombay Urban Development Projects’ Slum upgrading and sites and services schemes as well as water and sewerage infrastructures projects. However, in these earlier schemes the MMRDA left direct implementation tasks to the Municipal Corporation which, as I have argued above, served as the everyday face of the state in the city’s informal neighborhoods. A brief history of the MMRDA will situate its new role in the (re)developing city.

The MMRDA undertook two major initiatives in the 1990s. One was the ambitious construction of global business center, the Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC), which it created by reclaiming centrally located marshlands in the close northern suburbs of the city. The rental of prime real estate BKC plots to national and transnational banks and other corporate headquarters exponentially increased the MMRDA financing capacity, making it a significantly more powerful state player. The Bandra-Kurla complex is now one of the highest-value business centers in the world housing several corporate headquarters including Citibank, Dow Chemicals and many national banks and state government agencies. This rental income has enabled additional sources of funding for projects beyond debt. The MMRDA also took on the role of primary implementing agency for two of the state’s main transport expansion initiatives for Mumbai: Mumbai Urban Transport Project (partially finance by the Bank) and the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project. It was in this later capacity that the MMRDA first became more involved in dealing with low-income neighborhoods to be displaced by the projects along the lines of both the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme policy framework and World Bank resettlement guidelines.

16 Its other earlier projects included the planning and implementation of the far eastern New Mumbai region, an arguably unsuccessful attempt at creating an alternative to the South Mumbai business district (Shaw, 2004).
By the early 2000s the MMRDA had become the principal state development agency in the city, commanding a powerful political presence. The agency’s Commissioner from 2004 through 2007, T. Chandrashekar, was a firebrand figure who incited anger and conflicts in diverse quarters from slum dwellers to the World Bank for his dictatorial style of running projects, especially in the area of slum clearance and resettlement. For instance, the MMRDA became embroiled in a public conflict with the Bank over instances of non-compliance with the latter’s resettlement norms in 2004. In a public display of defiance to the Bank suspension of MUTP funding, Chandrashekhar threatened to turn to other transnational sources for funding that did not entail such impractically high standards that the state could not meet them.17 The chief minister of the State of Maharashtra also placed the MMRDA in charge of securing a large portion of the slum lands cleared under the citywide demolition sweep that razed 45,000 structures in 2005.

Through their new roles in managing displacement and resettlement in the 2000s, the SRA and MMRDA are important nodes in changing configurations of “stateness” for Mumbai’s slum dwellers. As state bureaucracies, they are less beholden to the patronage-based party politics of earlier slum upgrading interventions of the developmental state. These agencies exhibit many of the “anti-political,” and technocratic developmental regimes that scholars like Timothy Mitchell, James Ferguson (1994) and Michael Goldman (2005) have discussed. Yet, parastatal bureaucracies are also not left untouched by subaltern politics. In their study of Bangalore, Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari deployed the notion of the “porous bureaucracy,” which describes the channels through which the urban poor negotiate access to land. By leveraging strategic socio-political ties with lower-level bureaucratic staff and with elected officials through a “politics by stealth,” slum dwellers are able to penetrate otherwise undemocratic state institutions (Solomon Benjamin & Bhuvaneswari, 2001).

To a certain extent, the porous bureaucracy has operated in Mumbai in plot-by-plot redevelopment schemes and smaller-scale neighborhood demolitions. In some instances, ward politicians have transformed their modus operandi from government-based patrons to entrepreneurial brokers, making connections between slum dwellers and developers all seeking to cash in on SRA projects. However, in large-scale, state-led projects politicians and lower-level staff seem to have less penetrative power to negotiate on behalf of informal settlement residents. Instead, in these “top-priority” as well as in many smaller projects, the state has maintained a somewhat more insulated position. This does not mean, however, that slum dwellers affected by such projects have no channel of negotiation. The Mumbai experience shows that evictees have increasingly engaged with the state through other social agents: non-governmental organizations and social movements.

These non-governmental groups have a significant history of interconnection with state bureaucracies, transnational development circles and neighborhoods that can help elucidate the slippery boundaries and interpenetration of the categories of the state and civil society. The SPARC Alliance is one group that has been especially involved in mobilizing slum dwellers and negotiating with the state. The Alliance consists of SPARC, an NGO led by social workers and former state bureaucrats, and two slum-based groups,

17 Details of the conflict follow in chapter 4.
including the Mahila Milan network of women slum and pavement dwellers and the National Slum Dwellers Federation which spearheaded the major anti-eviction protests during the 1970s (discussed in section 3.2). SPARC Alliance’s involvement in a few important interventions will illustrate how state redevelopmentalism harnesses and engages non-state forces.

SPARC’s relationship with state bureaucracies began through its social welfare work in pavement dwelling communities of South Mumbai. Recall that from the 1970 through the early 1990s the city’s pavement dwellings were excluded from the networks of slum-based party politics and electoral patronage networks. With little public-service support and protections from demolitions, pavement dwellers were among the most vulnerable of Mumbai’s informal citizens at the time. By providing state agencies information about neighborhoods gathered through community-based surveys, SPARC appealed to the state to include these residents in governmental welfare schemes and resettlement plots. In its engagement with the state, SPARC eschewed the patronage system and began to develop a strong network of relationships in high-level bureaucracies at the state and national level. The organization took on a highly vocal “non-political” position with regards to party politics, agreeing to work with whoever was in power. Therefore, in the 1990s while other NGOs refused to engage with the Shiv Sena party due to its complicity with violence against minorities, SPARC took an active role in many high-level meetings, including the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme negotiations in 1995.

The Alliance’s involvement in SRS negotiations with the Sena resulted in some significant gains for the urban poor. For instance, SPARC leaders negotiated pavement dwellers’ eligibility for resettlement as well as the stipulation that female heads of households and wives along with their husbands would be required to be on the title of compensation flats. Indeed, the SPARC Alliance’s gendered, “non-confrontational” mobilization of women in negotiations with state agents to access resettlement and services has served as a useful strategy to make gains by defusing the otherwise highly politicized questions of class and ethnic exclusion, as the following chapter elucidates. Another result of these dialogues was the recognition of NGOs along with private developers in facilitating the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. While several NGO leaders in Mumbai have acknowledged these gains, many lament the legitimacy given to a scheme that has clearly exhibited bias toward the interests of developers and the exclusions of other categories slum dwellers.18 Since the establishment of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the SPARC Alliance began to facilitate neighborhood-based processes for various slum clearance and resettlement interventions, including the World Bank-funded Mumbai Urban Transport Project. As a result NGOs have increasingly assumed part of the role of ward politicians in forging connections to the state apparatus. In this manner, such NGOs not only operate “like a state” but also facilitate interconnections between state agencies and slums dwellers.

For instance, groups like SPARC bring slums into the space of the state—and vice versa—through activities like surveying, mapping and document preparation for resettlement. Again, in the case of the SPARC Alliance, another aspect of this interpenetration comes from

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18 Interview with P.K. Das on December 5 2007.
the fact that the NGO actually employs ex-officers of the Indian Administrative Services, the federal agency that coordinates national and state bureaucracies throughout the country. These ex-officers not only retain close ties to state bureaucracies and officials but also have in-depth knowledge of how state bureaucracies work. The blurry boundary between SPARC and state bureaucracies became concretely evident to me when I was invited to interview one Alliance leader in his second office, located within the MMRDA building itself. Indeed, NGO staff and neighborhood leaders spend many hours working through the myriad complicated documents required to process resettlement. Such tasks, which most of the poorest would not have the capacity to undertake, presuppose an intermediary. Many other NGOs have followed suit in assisting eligible slum dwellers in relocating and accessing resettlement for redevelopment projects.\(^\text{19}\)

In this manner, groups like SPARC have helped to fuse the vacuum left by the curtailed power of municipal officials in the wake of mass slum clearance drives. Simultaneously, state bureaucratic agencies have begun to engage more intensively in the volatile politics of eviction, previously the arena of municipal government.\(^\text{20}\) In other words, the rescaling of the state in slums from the municipal corporation to state and national governments has also meant a shift toward more privatized practices of governance through NGOs, social movements and other agents. In scholarship on Indian cities, NGOs have often either been dismissed as elite appendages of neoliberal governance or celebrated as participatory models of grassroots democracy. Little attention has been given to NGO-state spaces as a political site operating throughout the city’s neighborhoods along with the bureaucratic authoritarian state. The ethnographic case studies of eviction and resettlement in the following chapters elucidate the political life of such groups in the space of the neighborhood and show how new subjectivities in slums have both facilitated and challenged state redevelopmentalism.

NGO resettlement management has in many cases left little space for contesting the terms of resettlement compensation. Such terms include the thorny questions of eligibility and relocation sites, which have resulted in more or less visible forms of displacement and dispossession. For instance, recent agitations over the famed Dharavi Redevelopment Project (undertaken by a bureaucratic authority of the same name) have eclipsed the fact that close to 50% of the removed slum dwellers will not be able to access resettlement because they live in units that are not on the ground floor\(^\text{21}\) (Bharucha, 2009). In addition, entire settlements that have been deemed illegal for having emerged after January 1, 1995

\(^{19}\) For other cases of NGO-assisted slum redevelopment and resettlement, see Jan Nijman’s (2008) article on the Slum Rehabilitation Society and P. K. Das’ (2003) discussion of the Nivarra Hakk Suraksha Samiti’s work in the Sanjay Gandhi National Park.

\(^{20}\) The judiciary has also played a role; public interest litigations such as the Sanjay Gandhi National Park in the 1990s and legal battles such as Olga Tellis vs. the Bombay Municipal Corporation in 1985 have set precedents for evictions. However, in Mumbai, the courts and legal discourse have not played as extensive and decisive of a role in catalyzing evictions as in Delhi (see Bhan, 2009; Ghertner, 2008).

\(^{21}\) The two dimensional “foot-print” perspective of SRS policy stipulates that only qualified occupants of ground floor slum units are eligible for resettlement flats. In many settlements, slum structures have second, third and fourth floors that are often rented out. Renters and other upper floor residents are often the most vulnerable in rehabilitation schemes for this reason.
are also ineligible for compensation. The violent demolition sweep following the launching of the Vision Mumbai plan in the winter of 2004–2005 evidenced the devastating effects of such exclusions. Although leaders of NGOs like the SPARC Alliance’s A. Jocki have publicly denounced such exclusions, the choice to continue to implement resettlement policy has limited the ability to protest SRA’s exclusionary eligibility criteria.

If NGOs manage resettlement for evictees of large-scale projects, then the experience of the state for evictees excluded from governmental programs elucidates the other faces of state readvelopmentalism. Solomon Benjamin has argued that the urban poor continue to “work the system” through local elected officials who remain embedded in both neighborhoods and hierarchical chains of state power despite the evisceration of municipal government. For instance, he cites findings that some Mumbai neighborhoods evicted in 2005 (deemed illegal and ineligible for compensation) stealthily reoccupied cleared slum areas, and in fact, “strengthened their de-facto tenure” by securing additional water pipelines via local ward politicians’ connections with upper-level parliament members and bureaucrats (2008, p. 722). Benjamin calls this form of local land politics “occupancy urbanism,” which he claims “poses a political consciousness that refuses to be disciplined by progressive activists and the rhetoric of ‘participatory planning.’ This is also a politics that rejects ‘developmentalism’ where ‘poverty’ is ghettoized via programs for ‘basic needs,’ allowing the elite ‘globally competitive economic development’” (Solomon Benjamin, 2008, p. 719). Benjamin rightly highlights the diversity of urban politics in Indian cities and counterposes both the participatory narratives of NGOs and elitist disparaging of “vote bank politics” in slums. However, the notion of occupancy urbanism may also fall prey to a different sort of romanticization of localized politics deemed more authentically subaltern.

I argue instead that slum dwellers’ land politics is fundamentally shaped by how they are positioned in relation to state readvelopmentalism and the variety of social forces at play in the space of the neighborhood. For instance, in some areas occupancy urbanism is simply not a political option for evictees who instead might find channels to the state through the mediation of NGOs and movements. Many of the neighborhoods evicted in the demolition sweep of 2005 aligned themselves with the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), which has advocated for land rights unbound from compensation eligibility criteria. The NAPM emerged as the principal movement-based advocate for the rights of evictees excluded from resettlement. Most recently the NAPM has been establishing new networks with sympathetic contacts in national-level agencies in the efforts to negotiate either tenure or resettlement through other programs. For instance, slum dwellers of the Mandala neighborhood who were also evicted in the infamous 2005 sweep have chosen to retain their connections to NAPM to secure land rights for a portion of the cleared site. With the mediation of NAPM, Mandala residents are also engaging with different sets of state agents at the national level to circumvent the State of Maharashtra’s SRA policy cutoffs. This struggle is more fully discussed in chapter 6; here, I emphasize that even movements like NAPM that maintain a contentious relationship with government authorities remain tightly bound with state readvelopmentalism. One of the Mumbai-based leaders of NAPM revealed in an interview that evicted slum dwellers in various parts of the city have been directed to NAPM activists by politicians and lower-level bureaucrats as the
point of contact for addressing their grievances. Like earlier rounds of developmental state practice characterized predominantly by party-based local patronage, state agents, NGOs and movements continue to be deeply intertwined and implicated in the production and reproduction of differentiated slum-based subjectivities.

2.7 Spaces of Difference and the Politics of Legitimacy

Every relationship of power puts into operation differentiations which are at the same time its conditions and its result. (Foucault, 1994, p. 140)

In the preceding sections, I have shown how state-led facilitation of capital accumulation has been characterized by violent dispossession as well as uneven distribution of public services, evictions protections and resettlement compensation across the city’s informal settlements. For the city’s slum-dwelling citizens the line between the violence of the evicting state and the ostensibly inclusive (non-)governmental state is thin and unstable; the former evicts and the latter compensates in highly uneven ways. Indeed, the experience of state violence sets slum dwellers apart from those citizens positioned as more legitimate occupants of urban space. Analytically opposed dualities—formal versus informal, rich versus poor—do not adequately elucidate the actually existing politics of displacement and hegemonic processes in the current moment of redevelopment. In both past patronage-based negotiations of collective consumption and current politics of displacement and resettlement, the categories of slums and slum dwellers are fractured.

Drawing on various cases in Southeast Asia, Ong argues that neoliberal governmental technologies segment spaces and populations to best meet the demands of the global market. Here Ong distinguishes the notion of the developmental state from “postdevelopmentalism,” in which the target of government is no longer the uniform space of the nation-state. Instead postdevelopmental sovereignty rules in a graduated manner across differentiated spaces and citizenries, advancing both neoliberal exceptions (to prevailing governing philosophies and practices) as well as “exceptions to neoliberalism” (Ong, 2007a, p. 3). Diverse categories of citizens corresponding to particular spatialities of neoliberalism are organized along class, gender and ethnic identity to have very different sets of rights and experiences of sovereign power by both state and non-state agents.

The notions of graduated sovereignty and citizenship correspond in many ways to the most recent experience of Mumbai’s neoliberal redevelopment projects. Liberalization and intensified integration into global markets have injected value into formerly peripheral slum areas. These lands now occupy a strategic location in relation to real estate markets and the demands of Mumbai’s role in global finance and business services. In the process, state agents have articulated the imperative of attracting and retaining a new set of high-value globally connected citizens through a massive overhaul in the city’s infrastructure and real estate.

The city’s six million slum dwellers clearly stand in an inferior position to these more coveted transnational citizens and to its indigenous elite and upper-middle classes. From this perspective Mumbai’s lesser citizens must make way for infrastructure and
commercial redevelopment initiatives aimed toward attracting elite residents. Spatializations of value have resulted from market forces shaped by not only by state and developers as urban boosters but also the kinds of “zoning technologies”—of populations and spaces—that Ong discusses. Yet, the uneven manner in which slum clearance is actually done reveals the more deeply layered gradations of citizenship among lower income populations undergoing redevelopmental discourse, practice and politics. This is nowhere more evident than in the demolition sweeps of so-called illegal or “post cut-off date” slums such as those occurring in Mumbai during the winter of 2004–05. This devastating demolition drive affecting an estimated 300,000 residents was only a more dramatized instantiation of the large numbers of ongoing dispersed and less visible evictions throughout the city. Eligibility has excluded thousands of renters, poorer groups and recent migrants from the resettlement schemes in which their neighbors have enrolled through their collaboration with developers, NGOs and state bureaucracies.

Lesser citizens have also been correspondingly relegated to less valuable spaces in the planning imaginary. For instance, the Vision Mumbai redevelopment plan that inspired the state-led demolition sweep suggested the low value lands on the city’s northern coastal fringes as the most appropriate resettlement site for eligible slum dwellers displaced by infrastructure projects. These areas known as “salt pan” lands have long been deemed environmentally sensitive but have over the last five years undergone deregulation with the enthusiastic support of Mumbai’s real estate developers’ lobby. State-led environmental deregulation has predictably faced protest by environmental activists as well as a less likely source: slum dwellers’ groups. In at least one known case, evictees to be resettled from a slum clearance have filed court cases against distant resettlement based on the government’s violations of its own environmental regulations. Such agitations elide the fact that “illegal” slum dwellers already occupying salt pan lands have been evicted to make room for the resettlement of “legal” slum dwellers removed from other parts of the city. These graduated forms of slum citizenship have thus had real spatial consequences creating both opportunities for resistance and deepening inequalities among differentiated legal categories of informal housing. Such slum-based struggles are discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. Here, I emphasize the active role that the state has taken in remaking and segregating urban space and differentiating slum citizenship.

Inequalities among diverse categories of slum dwellers have again articulated with politicizations of ethnic difference and exclusionary notions of who legitimately belongs to the space of the city. Demographic data of slums demolition and redevelopment reveal that the majority of uncompensated evictees since 2004 have been poorer Muslims and lower-caste groups of North Indian origin. Some were recent arrivals to the city but many others had been in the city for ten or more years living in temporary rental housing in other parts of the city and settling to a more permanent informal housing a few years prior the demolition drive (D’Souza, et al., 2005). The formal dimensions of evictees’ legality status, however, are underpinned by a less precise though more persuasive ethico-political logic of legitimacy. The legacy of Shiv Sena’s exclusionary populism reverberates in state practice and discourse even as the Sena’s electoral prowess has waned.
Herein lies the difference between Ong’s understanding of state and civil society and what I am arguing about the redevelopmental state. Outside of NGO appeals for the human rights of migrant domestic workers, there seems to be very little room in Ong’s narrative of graduated citizenship for political action among the less powerful of governed populations. By the same token, it seems that while Ong’s account privileges difference, class inequalities often map directly onto ethnic and gender divisions. Instead, I argue that redevelopmental state practice is tightly bound with the production of difference within categories of informal housing status and class. These politics are fundamental to an understanding of space, citizenship, and hegemony in the redeveloping city.

The analytical framework of graduated sovereignty also attributes perhaps too much determining power to the state, which seems to orchestrate segmentations of spaces and citizens all on its own in its pursuit of the wealth that global economic integration has to offer. By advancing urban accumulation through uneven displacement, the redevelopmental state in Mumbai is also significantly shaped by the political demands and imaginaries of its unequal citizenry. By the same token, Hansen’s analysis of Hindu Nationalist politics in the city is suspicious of the state as an agent at all. Instead, Hansen attributes socio-spatial violence and change to the work of psychoanalytical registers of identity produced and exploited by movements like the Shiv Sena. Yet, to argue that Mumbai’s politics of difference lays bare the “myth of the state” (Hansen, 2001) is to underestimate the multi-sited state practices and agents of rule operating through a mix of societal force and consent that have shaped the city’s redevelopmental trajectory. It is precisely these spatio-historically specific instantiations of conflict and cooperation with redevelopment that have produced and reworked state institutions and practice.

This terrain of slum citizenship is deeply inflected by ethico-politics of legitimate membership in the space of the city and nation and governmental legibility in programs of welfare and compensation. Even as the power of the Shiv Sena has waned in the last several years, the legacy of ethnicized notions of legitimacy and belonging has persisted in state discursive practices. For instance, during an interview a chief resettlement officer in the MMRDA warned of the challenge of dealing with a city that was changing from Mumbai to a North Indian, Islamicized “Mumbaibad,” referring to the burden of the influx of migrants to the city. Subsequent to the Congress-led state demolition sweep, Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh echoed Shiv Sena discourses urging the deportation of illegal Bangladeshis in the city. The result was a rare moment of cross-party unity as the chief Shive Sena leader, Bal Thackeray, himself congratulated the efforts of the Congress party in cleaning up the city of invasive, illegal, “anti-social” elements.

Such violent moments of sovereign power over the shelter and bodies of the urban poor might be interpreted as the power to determine the state of exception in either Agambem’s or Ong’s use of the term. Yet, these frameworks do not address other exceptions that have also been made to mitigate the state’s most visibly violently exclusionary practices. For instance, World Bank funding for the Mumbai Urban Transport Project came with requirements for the “universal” resettlement of “project-affected persons.” These requirements meant that to access financing the state had to violate its own laws under the
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme by forgoing the 1995 cut-off date eligibility requirement. Nonetheless, the agents of the authoritarian bureaucracy maintained the prerogative to allocate the cheapest offerings on the urban fringes, often in violation of local laws and World Bank norms, causing local unrest and transnational ripples as chapter 6 elucidates. Redevelopmental sovereignty thus hinges on the governmental power to make slum dwellers eligible for compensation upon eviction. The power to determine eligibility constitutes a broad range of practices, discourses and institutions that shape questions of legitimacy—who rightfully belongs to urban space—and legibility in governmental programs. Eligibility is never a black-or-white condition. Working with brokers, NGOs and developers, some slum dwellers may be eligible to be resettled onsite in buildings occupying their plots. Others with different status due to slum location (in the path of infrastructure or no-development zones) are relegated to warehouse-like resettlement colonies on the fringe frontier of the city. Ineligible persons seek other ever-narrowing avenues of negotiation with local officials or survive by forging new informal arrangements in other settlements throughout the city.

Just as there are diverse categories of eligibility, there are also gradations of legitimacy embedded in state and popular discourse. Some slum dwellers are deemed legitimate enough to deserve access to resettlement (though not the right to stay in the slum) by virtue of their legal status, length of stay in the city and ethno-regional origins as well as the institutions involved in projects. Others are vilified as parasitic outsiders or dangerous anti-national elements to be expunged from the city space. The following chapters show how evicted slum dwellers themselves deploy, contest and rework the discourses of legitimacy. Whether and how slum dwellers themselves consent to or challenge evictions and the governmental technologies of uneven compensation is the critical terrain of redevelopmental hegemony. These are the articulations of struggle that have produced and challenged the legitimacy and power of the state itself.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter analyses the changing structure and practices of redevelopment governance in Mumbai. I have argued that the current moment of redevelopment and mass slum evictions in Mumbai indicates not only changing political economic conditions but also a fundamental reconfiguration of the local state. The chapter presents “the redevelopmental state” as a conceptualization of these changes consisting of three key aspects. First is the centralization of state power in local bureaucracies implementing large-scale slum clearance and redevelopment projects and the concomitant evisceration of local municipal bodies which previously provided access to political participation and welfare for slum dwellers. Second is the increasing role of intermediary agents implementing resettlement and negotiating on behalf of evictees. Third is the proliferation of market-based redevelopment, eviction and resettlement practices that have entailed differentiated eviction politics and ethico-political struggles operating through class, gender and ethno-religious relations of difference.
This analysis of the state engages with recent debates on neoliberal governance but differs by deploying a Gramscian understanding of the state and hegemony. The redevelopmental state is understood neither as a coherent apparatus of capital nor as a logic of rule but as a social process and a site of struggle. The state advances the interests of dominant local and transnational class forces—in this case redevelopment—through a mix of force, negotiation and ideological formations through which it attains legitimacy and consent. I argue that these current practices of the redevelopmental state must be understood historically as emerging from prior configurations of developmental power and processes in cities as well as in India’s rural hinterlands. I examined these changing state practices through a periodization of national and urban development and slum politics from 1950 to 2008. Such practices included the negotiation of informal housing and evictions, development interventions and practices of patronage in which political parties came into power by unevenly provisioning welfare and de facto (though insecure) tenure in exchange for electoral support. In addition, this chapter shows how Shiv Sena party politics inaugurated an exclusionary regionalist and Hindu-Nationalist populism that ushered in a new hegemonic moment as well as consent toward a neoliberal redevelopment of the city. Social movements in slums have also shaped governance by politically engaging initially through local party politics and later through mediating NGOs which have changed the forms and ethico-politics of claims to space. The current conjuncture of redevelopment politics and rule must be understood in terms of these histories of struggle and negotiation and through meaningful claims to urban space, resources and identity.

In examining the historical trajectory of current governing practices and the processes of neoliberal redevelopment, I show how a politics difference—especially differentiated experiences and ethico-political struggles of eviction—orient redevelopmental state hegemony. This reconfigured redevelopmental state must be understood in terms of practices of rule and negotiation, particularly in the arena of eviction. Accordingly, the next three chapters illuminate three different trajectories of eviction politics in which gender, class and ethno-religious difference were politicized in divergent ways and toward diverse ends. By examining the contours of these politics and their interconnections, I show how they constitute the dynamic processes of hegemony that I call the redevelopmental state.
CHAPTER 3

Redeveloping Women, Enabling Infrastructure:
Participatory Resettlement and the Mumbai Urban Transport Project

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the political processes and resettlement experiences of slum dwellers displaced in the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), a World Bank funded transport infrastructure expansion project. As the first of the three case studies of eviction politics presented here, the MUTP represents a political trajectory in which an ethico-politics of gendered domesticity helped to consolidate market-oriented redevelopmental hegemony. The chapter considers the processes and conditions that enabled slum dweller cooperation with a large-scale slum clearance and a difficult offsite resettlement. With over 20,000 project-affected households, MUTP is among the world’s largest World Bank-funded urban resettlement projects and has been deemed a model for peaceful and participatory slum clearance and resettlement for more than a decade. The project consisted of railroad infrastructure expansion, road construction, and residential and commercial resettlement and rehabilitation (“R&R”) financed jointly by the World Bank and the Government of India at a cost of over U.S. $1 billion. Although the loan was made to the central government, the Bank managed and administered both (a) the infrastructural and (b) the resettlement and rehabilitation components through a local parastatal entity linked to the State of Maharashtra: the Mumbai Metropolitan Development Authority (MMRDA). The MMRDA in turn contracted the SPARC Alliance to conduct the majority of the resettlement implementation and distribution work.\(^\text{22}\)

Besides being one of the largest investments in urban infrastructure in the city’s history, for several years the MUTP stood out for being a model of voluntary and participatory resettlement. The project’s favorable reputation was a result of the mediation of the world-renowned movement and NGO, the SPARC Alliance, which has a large popular base in slums throughout Mumbai and other Indian cities as well as an active presence in international development circles. Thousands of slum dwellers living along Mumbai’s main railway lines were relocated to transit camps and later resettlement colonies in several of the city’s northern suburbs. The bulk of my research took place among residents who formerly lived along the Harbor and Central railway line. These slum residents relocated to the northeastern suburb of Mankhurd, first to transit camps for five to seven years, later to Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony (see figure 3.1). This high density resettlement colony built by local developers under the state’s market-based Slum Rehabilitation Scheme policy is the largest resettlement colony in the city, housing over 5000 MUTP

\(^{22}\) There was one other NGO, Slum Rehabilitation Society, involved in resettling a much smaller number of MUTP affected people.
project-affected families as well as several thousand more residents from other slum clearance projects throughout the city (see figure 3.2).

The MUTP resettlement was the first of its kind on this scale, a remarkable feat. The thousands of slum dwellers evicted for the MUTP railways project might have posed a potentially volatile situation of violence, dissent and ungovernability, especially given the diminishing channels of negotiation to local state government that I discussed in chapter 2. Below, I show how and why the MUTP railways resettlement operated so smoothly. Conducting an ethnographic examination of the history of social mobilization and slum dwellers’ experiences of displacement under the MUTP, I argue that NGO mediation—harnessing both locally powerful and globally circulating ideals and practices of women’s participation—helped to suture a redevelopmental hegemony based on both force and consent to displacement.

Figure 3.1: Map of railways lines and resettlement colony (source: modified from www.mapsofindia.com)
At the heart of the MUTP railway’s trajectory of eviction politics, I argue, was a reworking of gendered domesticity operating in three interconnected arenas. First, SPARC Alliance involvement in organizing participatory resettlement processes stimulated middle-class aspirations and desires for formalized housing. Participants and leaders in resettlement processes served as vanguards of status improvement through housing. Second, the idealized (and often partial) social reproductive roles of women as housewives were redirected toward consolidating community cooperation with resettlement processes. In other words, women participants as feminized subjects not only consented to resettlement but also helped in persuading others to cooperate. Finally, state sovereignty itself, mediated through the SPARC Alliance, established a domestic trope of dictatorial but ostensibly benevolent masculinized leadership. Slum dwellers faced sovereign power not only through state bulldozers but also through the patriarchal leadership of one of the Alliance’s key leaders, A. Jockin. Domesticated eviction politics helped to advance resettlement cooperation, to a limit, under conditions of severe inequality and hardship for many evictees. However, evictees’ position as consenting subjects of redevelopment was rife with the contradictions of exacerbating inequalities and dispossession along the axes of gender and relative economic status. These contradictions have exposed the vulnerability of such projects of hegemonic neoliberal redevelopment, as the case studies of subsequent chapters demonstrate.

The following section of this chapter examines issues of research method and access and situates this critical ethnography in current literature on the SPARC Alliance, the intermediary NGO involved in this project. The next section examines the history of the SPARC Alliance and the emergence of its famed “non-confrontational” mode of negotiation.
through an analysis of women pavement dwellers’ struggles for housing in South Mumbai. I show how MUTP’s domesticated eviction politics emerged from a spatially and historically interconnected set of processes that fused feminized negotiations over land and resources, transnational participatory development discourses, xenophobic urban politics and neoliberal redevelopment interventions. The subsequent three sections focus on the MUTP resettlement and the shifts in the meaning and processes of cooperative, non-confrontational participation, addressing the following political elements: (a) how non-governmental mediation advanced patriarchal forms of state authority; (b) how feminized participation in resettlement garnered cooperation by advancing pro-development ideals of progress, non-confrontation and community; (c) how the differentiated experiences of resettlement and participation shaped evictee subjectivity (especially women). The MUTP railways resettlement belied a fundamental contradiction: even as the discourse of participatory resettlement espoused the causes of poor women, the market orientation of resettlement and redevelopment exacerbated class and gender hierarchies among the displaced.

3.2 Literature, Method and Access: The Politics of Researching a “Best Practice”

A brief foray into questions of research access and method will help to situate my findings and analysis. The story of the MUTP first requires an understanding of the world-renowned SPARC Alliance, the group that meditated the slum clearance and resettlement for the railway project. The SPARC Alliance defies simple categorization as an “NGO” operating in multiple social and political arenas in Mumbai and throughout the world. In one of its avatars it is a powerful combination of a middle-class–led development NGO and a grassroots slum movement that has been able to negotiate development throughout Mumbai’s slums. It is among the several new forms of movements with a much greater base of support than typical local NGOs. Such movements have appeared throughout South Asia and include such diverse groups as SEWA, (Self-Employed Women’s Association, a trade union of informal sector workers in Gujarat), Janagrahaa (a middle-class urban citizenship and anti-corruption movement in Bangalore and BRAC (a multi-issue poverty alleviation organization in Bangladesh). These groups form what Roy has called a new “infrastructure of populist mediation” (2010) aiming to represent the figure of the common man to states and transnational development entities. SPARC has also emerged as an authoritative source of development knowledge, and its practices have circulated in development arenas throughout the world. Because SPARC is seen as setting the standard for development “best practice,” its interventions have been the target of a deluge of mostly laudatory research in academic and mainstream development circles. People skeptical of the NGO and its modus operandi in Mumbai were quick to express to me their disappointment that I was “yet another” researcher focusing on a SPARC project when there were so many under-studied, hard-working groups in the city. Throughout my time in Mumbai I regularly encountered among my interlocutors the sense that there was really nothing more to say about the SPARC Alliance or the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) resettlement. Such reactions have compelled me to provide a brief overview of the literature on the SPARC Alliance and the MUTP project to better situate and distinguish my research methods, process and findings.
The literature on the SPARC may be divided into four main categories. The first consists of documentation of activities and models of practice produced in mainstream development circles and within the NGO. These works generally reinforce the NGO's own populist characterizations of its work, drawing on evidence from key leaders' narratives, community-based surveys and model initiatives. SPARC is the largest knowledge producer about its initiatives, releasing a myriad of reports and articles on its websites, edited volumes and international journals. The second category consists of socio-economic impact assessments commissioned predominantly by the World Bank or donors and conducted by university-based research teams. These studies rely on large-scale surveys of project-affected groups using standardized sets of impact indicators. Although they often provide important data, the technical methods that these studies use have often rendered slums and their residents either passive beneficiaries or affected groups obfuscating the social processes, power relations and systems of meaning that shape social mobilization in slums (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 2007). Third are institutional and socio-economic analyses of the NGO’s activities in partnership with state agents and neighborhood groups. Institutional studies generally draw on data from project documents and interviews with SPARC leaders and other organizational representatives, documents and government partners (McFarlane, 2004; Mukhija, 2003; Ramya Ramanath, 2005; R Ramanath, 2009). While such analyses consider interactions of various interest groups, they similarly lack an angle into everyday practices and meanings that constitute the foundation of political relations within and among the groups. The final and thinnest body of literature consists of socio-cultural analyses that investigate the discursive systems of meaning and power associated with SPARC interventions. Most cited among these is Arjun Appadurai’s celebratory piece entitled *Deep Democracy* (Appadurai, 2002), which argues that the Alliance’s work has shifted power relations in favor of the urban poor. Appadurai deploys the notion of “governmentality from below” to describe the empowering practices of anti-elitist knowledge production, horizontal exchanges among the poor and cooperative engagement with the state and transnational development forces. Other more skeptical approaches question whether NGO governmental practices in fact serve to empower the poor (McFarlane, 2004, 2008) as they harness a particular “urban strategy” (Roy, 2009a). Whether critical or laudatory, the analysis of power continues to be limited to SPARC Alliance’s already well-known institutional narratives and representational practices.

My research is critically engaged with these rich bodies of work but takes a different approach following the social processes and lived experiences of slum dwellers involved in resettlement processes undertaken by the SPARC Alliance. My investment of time and ethnographic methodology allowed for an “against-the-grain-reading” of spaces dominated by the NGO narratives of participation. The juxtaposition of SPARC Alliance’s narratives of cooperative community participation with ethnographic research brought to light not only how participatory discourses and practices are received and reproduced but also how they obfuscate social processes. In the case of large-scale displacement and market-oriented resettlement, it is precisely these social processes, meanings and experiences that reveal critical moments of political rupture in the transmutation from narrative to life. Subsequent ethnographic chapters of this dissertation demonstrate how the lived contradictions of resettlement discourse and practice profoundly shape the landscapes of
power and possibilities for social justice mobilization. In this way, the methodological approach I have taken in my study of the MUTP resettlement offers a distinct set of conclusions as to how and why slum dwellers faced displacement and resettlement in an ostensibly cooperative and participatory manner. However, attaining such a research position presented a host of challenges.

My experience of gaining access to participating individuals and neighborhoods can help elucidate the aspects of slum redevelopment governance and territoriality at the neighborhood scale that have remained invisible despite ample research. Initially, my interest in the SPARC Alliance as an institution was indirect; my principal focus was on how slum dwellers politically stake claims to land in a city that was intent on eliminating the neighborhoods of the urban poor. Though I would need to engage with SPARC leaders and community liaisons, I did not wish to conduct research while embedded within the organization. However, as I began my research, I quickly realized that political territoriality within the resettlement colonies made it impossible and naïve to think that I could just go “directly to the people.” Local liaisons were always present and vigilant such that without the approval of SPARC Alliance leaders, my access could easily and quickly be thwarted. My double challenge was thus to try to simultaneously gain institutional “permission” to interact with community members and not become viewed as an NGO appendage. I began my efforts to meet with SPARC leaders at their head office in South Mumbai. I can only describe the process as researcher hazing: on more than one occasion I was given a meeting time of 10 a.m. and either sent away or made to wait, with endless cups of tea, until 5 p.m. before any senior staff would speak to me. SPARC staff requested a thorough research plan, and one senior staff member even attempted to retain the right to edit my dissertation should I represent their work in an “unfair” manner. I declined this latter request, offering to show and discuss my findings but retaining my right to scholarly independence.

My experience of access revealed how and why NGO-dominated narratives have been so consistently reproduced. As an NGO that needed to control its image to survive donor demands, SPARC has carefully (though not always successfully) controlled access to its territory of operation, allowing mostly pre-organized tours and short interviews with liaison leaders. Furthermore, it should be noted that I was attempting to gain research access at the worst possible time and place. SPARC and the MUTP resettlement project had recently undergone the scrutiny of the Independent Inspection Panel of the World Bank as part of an investigation into malpractice in resettlement implementation. If the organization had controlled research access in its areas of operation earlier, its restrictions were even tighter now. The process was so frustrating that I soon began to question whether independent research in SPARC territory was at all possible.

A stroke of luck helped to solve my dilemma. Over the course of getting established in Mumbai and trying to find an apartment, I befriended a woman who took on a motherly liking to me. I confided in her about my research difficulties in getting a substantial meeting with SPARC. To my surprise she informed me that both Arjun Appadurai and Sundar Burra, one of the senior staff members of SPARC, were her long-time friends with whom she had
attended grade school. She assured me that a quick phone call to her friends would resolve my problem. The following week I was finally given a substantial meeting with the three main SPARC leaders. Ultimately, it was through tapping elite Mumbai social networks that I was able to get a foot in the door of the slum resettlement colony.

Even after attaining my coveted meeting, I continued to face questions from the SPARC leadership as to what I sought to learn from researching the resettlement process. I insisted that I was interested in understanding the role of women’s participation in the MUTP resettlement processes not in evaluating SPARC’s performance as an NGO. Upon expressing my interest in women, I sensed a positive and relieved response from the NGO team, who subsequently gave me the green light to conduct research in the Mankhurd resettlement colony. SPARC’s permission for research was based on the condition that I would research the organization’s strong suit, what leaders deemed to be the least politically threatening: women’s participation. Conducting research among women seemed to suggest to them a circumscribed range of topics—savings schemes, housing improvement, and so on—that would not raise thorny charges of resettlement conflicts that the organization was facing. Though the political charge of “women’s participation” played a key role in enabling my research access, my focus on the feminized politics of eviction and resettlement revealed much about how conflicts have been managed.

I conducted ethnographic research over 18 months within the spaces of SPARC Alliance initiatives but more extensively in the everyday residential spaces of the largest MUTP resettlement colony, Lallubhai Compound, located in Mumbai’s eastern suburb of Mankhurd. Although I interacted with residents of both genders, my research focused on women’s experiences for both practical and strategic reasons. Practically, my identity as a South Asian-American female researcher made women’s spaces more easily accessible for ethnographic research. Strategically, however, I chose to focus on women in order to investigate the gendered and populist claims of the SPARC Alliance—that women’s participation ensures equality and cooperation in development projects. By examining this claim on its own terms with a focus on the everyday experiences of women, it becomes evident how other axes of difference such as class have been reinforced and reproduced. Most of my interlocutors were leaders and participants of Mahila Milan (the federation of slum-based women’s groups affiliated with the SPARC Alliance). I observed building- and colony-based as well as citywide Mahila Milan meetings, interviewed leaders and members and also drew from informal conversations and social exchanges. In addition, I also engaged with non-participating women residents of Lallubhai Compound of varying social backgrounds and economic means. This qualitative data was supplemented with survey data from an impact-assessment study commissioned by the World Bank and conducted by a local university. In addition to conducting interviews, observing meetings and accessing survey data, I developed an independent relationship with neighborhood residents by teaching basic English in weekly language classes for women and children in the Lallubhai Compound. In this manner, my ethnographic data came from everyday interactions and informal conversations with less powerful residents as well as neighborhood leaders and NGO staff over long periods of time. I thus achieved a degree of independence from Alliance leadership and the permission to wander, observe and ask questions in the resettlement
neighborhoods. By engaging in activities such as teaching English and participating in various social gatherings for over a year, I developed a set of contacts, interlocutors, friends and experiences separate from the SPARC network. Nonetheless, ethnographically observing and participating in SPARC-led “development tours” and interviews with neighborhood leaders in SPARC Alliance spaces also offered rich data on NGO terrains of power that have exceeded the organization’s best-practice discourses. The following section provides a brief history of SPARC and its work with both the state and slum groups to situate the MUTP experience of participatory resettlement.

3.3 Sweet-talking the Bulldozer: The Birth of SPARC’s Feminized Development Politics

What is the quality of woman? Woman is money. Woman is information. Woman is communication... For me these are the basic ingredients of... development. ... [In] India you name woman as Laxmi. Who is the Laxmi? [In] any common house, how to change your sons’ behavior? Bring a Laxmi, he will change... The daughter in law comes to the house and he will change. Otherwise he won’t change. (A. Jockin, 2007 interview with author)

A. Jockin, quoted above, is one of the most famous slum community leaders in the world, male head of the National Slum Dwellers Federation in India, and a key leader of the SPARC Alliance. In describing the role of the women slum dwellers of Mahila Milan in the Alliance, Jockin is echoing a well-known women-in-development mantra. From the World Bank to local NGOs, mainstream development agents extol the virtues of Third World women’s participation as key to creating positive change at the grassroots level. However, well-known critiques from critical development studies (G Hart, 2001; Mohan & Stokke, 2000), urban studies (Miraftab, 2004; Roy, 2002) and transnational feminist theory (C. Mohanty, 2003) have deconstructed the empowerment thesis of women’s participation in development. Others have exposed the “tyrannical” potential of local communities (Cooke, 2001; Hickey, 2004), which often reinforce structural inequalities. In many of these views, participation serves as a neoliberal political strategy for transferring the burden of a shrinking welfare state onto NGOs, communities, and ultimately the bodies of working-class women.

Yet, the quote above illustrates a less explored aspect of women in development: the participating woman’s moral authority to transform development by influencing the actions of others. Jockin’s narrative invoked commonly held Hindu cultural representations of women in the family and extends them to society and development more broadly. A woman’s role in the household is likened to the goddess of wealth and prosperity, Laxmi. She represents an auspicious contribution to the family and thus has moral authority to change the behavior of the men around her. Jockin playfully remarked that women are the essence of developmental information and communication because it is the housewife who spends her time observing and gossiping about the status and social dynamics of everyone in the family and neighborhood. Upon asking Jockin to explain women’s association with money in light of the fact that men still often control family wealth, his response was again
playfully provocative. He argued that though the man of the house may control the money, it is the woman who understands where to use it and can indirectly control how the man spends it. “Men have no idea know what to do with their money and must always ask the wife. . . . [The woman] is in control.” In this rendering, the daughter-in-law’s power—unlike that of the Goddess—comes from her auspiciousness, social role and culturally ascribed moral authority, which are not necessarily associated with direct power over family wealth.

As we continued our conversation, Jockin advanced the claim that the participation of women in development projects extends beyond the family into the spaces of relations with the state as well as community social dynamics. Indeed, the role of women in Alliance activities has consisted of ritualized practices of savings, community mobilization, information collection, and engaging with agents of the state in a non-confrontational manner. Appadurai has described these women-centered practices as the “the moral core of the politics of patience,” a politics that has privileged a gradual path to the social and economic advancement of the poorest by avoiding threatening the state and its base of power. Both Appadurai and the Alliance leadership have stressed the importance of a slow and steady mode of negotiation as the principle means of empowering the poor through increasing the visibility and legitimacy of slum dwellers in urban development policy. They have argued that this form of engagement with state and community is the only way to further a pro-poor, democratic form of development while also preventing the traditional forms of cooptation and patronage by political parties which have kept the poor in a dependent position.

Such forms of representation of women in development have played a major role in the history of the SPARC Alliance’s political strategies of encountering development and evictions in the city. By advancing gendered participation, the SPARC Alliance’s community-organizing and resettlement activities have been powerful factors in negotiating with the state and shaping a pro-development, cooperative slum politics. The MUTP resettlement processes must be understood in relation to these influential trajectories of gendered politics as they have changed over time. A brief history of Mahila Milan—the slum-based women’s group arm of the SPARC Alliance—and its engagement with the state through its famed non-confrontational and cooperative approach in the pavement dwellings of South Mumbai will situate later MUTP resettlement and governance processes.

In attempting to retrieve the history of the SPARC Alliance and its political strategy, I have drawn on a mix of resources ranging from NGO documents to interviews with staff and long-time neighborhood-based leaders to observation of public events where the Alliance’s history is often narrated. SPARC public events and documentation are characteristically marked by a ritualistic account of the philosophy and beginnings of the alliance between the NGO and the two community-based groups, Mahila Milan and the National Slum Dwellers Federation. The exposition of such moments of origin is nowhere more prevalent than during tours and presentations of SPARC’s community-based initiatives. In March of 2007, Sharmila, a SPARC field staffer, invited me to attend one such event, a field study program prepared for master’s students of the Development Planning Unit (DPU) of the
University College London. Site visits to SPARC projects have become a central component of the curriculum of study for programs like the DPU.

SPARC Alliance members, leaders and staff narrate their early work in the pavement dwellings of South Mumbai as foundational for the organization’s strategy and practice of pro-poor urban development. As one senior SPARC advisor put it to me “you cannot understand our work today without knowing the story of the pavement dwellers.” The struggles against eviction undertaken by SPARC and women living along the “pavements” of Mumbai are the key facet of these origin stories. In my experience of trying to glean the history of the movement, it was often impossible to distinguish events from an almost legendary narrative that placed poor women as heroines and vanguards of SPARC’s novel non-confrontational way of promoting participation of the poor in urban development. And yet even in these moments of recounting SPARC’s now tightly weaved narrative of its history, there were brief moments of disruption and contradiction.

And so on an extraordinarily hot Monday morning, I joined a group of thirty jet-lagged international students and professors led by SPARC staff to the bustling streets of Byculla in South Mumbai. The introduction to SPARC work consisted of two presentations on the foundational collaboration of the NGO and its community-based liaison organizations. The first presentation was conducted by SPARC co-founder Celine D’Cruz, with the input of two former pavement-dwelling leaders of Mahila Milan women’s groups. Continuing the tour in the afternoon, the group would head to the Dharavi slum redevelopment site, where SPARC Executive Director Sheela Patel and Jockin Arputham, the charismatic head of the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), led the second presentation.

In the morning session, D’Cruz explained how SPARC’s community participation approach and engagement with the state began in the mid 1980s with its initial work with women living precariously on the sidewalks of southeast Mumbai. These were the women who eventually formed the Mahila Milan women’s wing of the Alliance. Pavement dwellers have historically been among the poorest and most marginalized groups in the city. With a Supreme Court ruling in 1985, 25,000 pavement dwellers in the city faced repeated, violent demolition of their homes. Unlike slum dwellers, who at least had the patronage of local politicians, pavement dwellers’ existence in the city was invisible in censuses and elections. D’Cruz described the early work of SPARC as that of a traditional social welfare group led by middle-class women working with women on non-controversial issues like health care and education. The logic of working with women and pavement dwellers, she explained, was to ensure that they privileged the most vulnerable in their work. “Whatever works for the most vulnerable will work for the better off among the urban poor.” In later sections of this chapter, I demonstrate how the expansion of this politics of the weakest into the implementation of the MUTP would have uneven implications for negotiating resettlement.

During the early part of their “learning curve,” as D’Cruz explained, SPARC did not touch political topics like demolitions, nor did the group consider questions of empowerment and agency of the poor in creating longer term solutions and negotiating for their own change. She described a change in the organization as it confronted the devastating, systematic demolitions of pavement dwellings during the mid 1980s. D’Cruz contrasted SPARC’s
strategy with what she described as the “misguided middle-class mentality” of other NGO leaders, activists and lawyers agitating and protesting evictions in the name of pavement dwellers’ rights. As in several other SPARC documents (such as “From Demolitions to Dialogue”(Undated)), D’Cruz stressed that “women . . . had a different perspective and did not want confrontation.”

SPARC leaders have often contrasted the Alliance’s pragmatic, non-confrontational strategies with anti-state protests, which they categorize under the rubric of “rights-based” movements. Such agitations are associated primarily with middle-class advocates, who they claim do not understand the needs or agency of the poor. For instance, SPARC’s prologue to Mitlin and Patel’s (2005) paper asserts:

To go back 20 years, when the homes of pavement dwellers in the city were being demolished at will, one group of activists approached the Supreme Court of India. They argued that the pavement dwellers had a fundamental right to live on pavements because they were close to their places of work and, since they could not afford public transport, their livelihoods would have been threatened were they to be shifted, and hence their fundamental right to life. In the event, the Supreme Court threw the case out with the caution that public authorities should give notice before demolitions, and pronounced that pavements were meant for pedestrians. The irony was that these well-meaning [middle-class] activists did not consult the pavement dwellers whose cause they espoused. Had they bothered to do so, they would have been told that pavements were the last places where these people wanted to live in places without water, sanitation, and electricity, and exposed to inclement weather and the hazards of traffic. The people wanted to be resettled in proper housing with secure tenure.

D’Cruz’s speech and the SPARC prologue highlight two important elements in the SPARC development discourse. First, rights talk and confrontation are positioned squarely as “middle-class” tactics foreign to the poor. Second, cooperative negotiation is relegated to the domain of women as a naturalized and gendered response to the experience of eviction. This discourse has elided the possibility of a diversity of political strategies among the poor. Instead, cooperation and protest are mapped onto dichotomies of “middle class” versus “poor” and “women” versus “men.” Subsequent sections demonstrate that poor and slum-dwelling women have engaged in a variety of confrontational and conciliatory political strategies with or without middle-class advocates. Nevertheless, non-confrontation was systematically cultivated as a pragmatic strategy at all levels of the SPARC Alliance and the “politics of patience” emerged and evolved over years of struggles to promote the visibility of pavement and slum dwellers to negotiate for better housing conditions.

Continuing with her presentation to the DPU, D’Cruz introduced Shenaz and Sagira, two of the founding women leaders of the pavement dwellers’ movement. Shenaz and Sagira are now elderly and well seasoned representatives of the SPARC Alliance who traveled throughout Mumbai and India and around the world describing their experiences. The
women recounted key aspects of the pavement dwellers’ movement facing demolitions, establishing a savings fund and (twenty years later) attaining permanent housing since the mid 1980s. The most legendary of these experiences is that of pavement-dwelling women taking the lead in facing the police and bulldozers during an impending demolition in 1986. Instead of antagonizing or allowing the reckless destruction of their homes, the women addressed the demolition crew by kindly offering tea and biscuits and subsequently disassembling their homes themselves so as to save their precious and few belongings. In this comic narrative, the police simply took away the trash and remnants and the women subsequently reassembled their homes on the same spot. Shenaz recounted another legendary story of pavement dwelling women offering rakhis as a symbolic appeal to their powerful “brothers” in state agencies to protect them from homelessness. These are some of the foundational experiences that the women of Mahila Milan recount not only to foreigners in international development circles but also to other slum dwellers in peer exchanges. In less public informal interviews that I conducted, evictees and Mahila Milan members interpreted such strategies in less romanticized ways. For instance, one Mahila Milan member admitted that “no one in the government is really afraid of a bunch of women,” but there is still a certain moral obligation; “when woman asks ‘brother please help me’ he has to answer her request.”

At this event and other less formal interactions, Mahila Milan leaders recounted that SPARC leaders and Jockin always insisted that the community take charge of their own well-being. “Jockin and Sheela would show the path to progress but we would have to walk on it ourselves” recalled Shenaz. In community meetings, Jockin and other SPARC leaders clearly described his interpretation of progress for slum and pavement dwellers: finding a way out of living in the precariousness and filth of their living conditions through savings, community organization and non-confrontational cooperation with the state. In addition D’Cruz and the women of Mahila Milan recounted the importance of information in negotiating with the state and improving the lives of the poor. One example that SPARC has cited repeatedly is the assembly and dissemination of information collected by local women in a landmark document titled “We the Invisible,” which presented data on the living conditions of the Byculla pavement dwellers. “We the Invisible” was distributed to state authorities to dispel myths of criminality in official state discourse and to cast light on pavement dwellers as very poor day workers with no other choice but to live on the streets.

Shenaz and Sagira recounted their experience struggling for over 20 years to finally move into the resettlement colony in 2006. Only 80 people have moved into their new homes, while the remaining 450 families of the original neighborhood still wait for new homes. Nonetheless, the Mahila Milan leaders express much of what D’Cruz had emphasized with

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23 Rakhi’s are colorful symbolic threads that blood related or adoptive “sisters” tie on the wrists of their “brothers” as a blessing in exchange for material gifts and promises of protection during the Rakshabandhan holiday. This Hindu ritual represents a bond between sisters and brothers that holds immense symbolic value in South Asia. The ritual also serves as a culturally sanctified promise made by male heirs of family property to ensure the well-being of female siblings who were denied property inheritance. The rakhi thus may be interpreted as a moral regulator of unequal and gendered property and inheritance customs. Another important cultural-political layer of this act is that the pavement dwelling women were Muslim, offering this ritualistic submission to the primarily Hindu Maharastrian, often xenophobic, governmental staff.
regard to value in the process. In listening to both Sagira and Shenaz at this event and in individual interviews, it became clear to me that SPARC and Mahila Milan narratives have been refined and systematized over years of formal presentation as well as local and transnational peer exchanges. Still as I watched the presentation, I noticed moments of disruption in the narrative. Such “bumps” in the narrative were often smoothed over by SPARC staff. For instance, as the Mahila Milan women spoke in Hindi, certain things were either left out of the translation or under emphasized in the presentations of the event, particularly with regards to their answers to the questions put forth by some of the DPU students. For instance, when a student asked about the quality of governmental services now that they have finally moved into their homes in Mankhurd, Sagira began to explain that hospitals, jobs ad schools were very far. D’Cruz stepped in to correct the translation of the question, adding that the student was trying to understand how their relationship to the government had changed. Sagira then changed her response to say that they had more izzat, honor, in the eyes of the state and society. Such instances reveal the seepage of contradictory lived experiences into even the most complete historical narrative. Such contradictions would surface in my ethnographic research on the MUTP resettlement as well.

Analyzing the key elements emphasized by SPARC Alliance leaders reveals an important political strategy initiated during pavement dwellers’ struggles—that of a shift away from interacting with the electoral dimension of the state toward the bureaucratic arms. Excluded from the election roles, and thereby more vulnerable to the violent fist of sovereign power, SPARC and pavement dwellers shifted focus toward state bureaucratic welfare agencies. By systematically presenting information about the poor, they appealed to these technocratic agencies, some staff of which were ideologically sympathetic to the poor. SPARC leaders describe this as an empowering move away from disempowering vote-bank politics by which the poor remained at the whim of the state. Appadurai describes this combination of tactics as “deep democracy” and “governmentality from below.” However, SPARC Alliance’s strength is not limited to its “civil society” roots with women and men slum dwellers. Among the processes less emphasized in Alliance narratives are the bureaucratic alliances made by the NGO. In fact, one former Indian Administrative Services (IAS) official, Sundar Burra, joined the ranks of SPARC’s senior staff in the early 1990s. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is the administrative civil service of the executive branch of the Government of India. IAS officers play a major role in managing bureaucracies in both Central Government and the state governments. Such alliances forged a path of beneficial relations with bureaucratic state agencies that facilitated negotiations on behalf of pavement dwellers as well as other slum dwellers, including those later affected by the MUTP.

The popular support of SPARC through its affiliation with slum-based organizations such as the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan would later extend beyond bureaucratic agencies to strategic, non-aligned relationships with political parties. The extent of SPARC’s good relationship with the state was evident in the fact that it was the only representative of slum dwellers invited to attend the Slum Redevelopment Authority negotiations during the Shiv Sena government in 1995. In an interview, Sheela Patel
recalled that many of the city’s NGO leaders were critical of SPARC’s involvement with the violent and exclusionary nativist and Hindu-Nationalist politics of the Shiv Sena, the party that had instigated some of the bloodiest communal riots in the city in 1993. In an interview Patel explained to me that despite her personal distaste for the party, she was compelled to participate by Jockin of the NSDF, who “pushed SPARC to go beyond its middle-class role” and represent the interests of the urban poor. Such acts of “representation” have had uneven implications for the slum evictions and resettlement. SPARC’s role on the committee served to further key issues regarding slum rehabilitations, such as securing resettlement eligibility for 25,000 pavement dwellers and insisting that women’s names be included on resettlement unit titles. As a trade-off, however, these same negotiations also instated eligibility cut-offs that would later provide legal justification for the mass demolitions of several hundred thousand informal structures without resettlement compensation in 2005. In this case, pavement dwellers were not the most vulnerable group as per D’Cruz’s categorization; rather, it was those informal settlements without proof of residence prior to 1995 that were in greater risk of demolition. Furthermore, local developers maintained a strong foothold in the SRA policy, benefiting from lucrative development rights through their participation. SPARC’s pro-development stance involved not confronting the developer lobby but instead advocating for “win-win” solutions. A decade later, the MUTP resettlement model was also formulated in conjunction with SPARC’s key bureaucratic contacts in the IAS. I return to some of the contentious eviction politics that have resulted from the uneven geographies of eviction and resettlement under the SRA in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

One of the most important aspects of the gendered, non-confrontational mode of negotiating with the state is the way in which such discursive practices are both implicitly and explicitly linked to a pro-development position. In public discourse for instance, Mahila Milan and the leaders of SPARC Alliance repeatedly claim that the communities are not interested in fighting development and that slum dwellers just want a decent place to live in the city. It is in this manner that I argue that pro-development cooperation is grounded in the SPARC Alliance’s non-confrontational strategy of negotiation. Again this position is consolidated in SPARC’s supportive role in the SRA, MUTP and other redevelopment programs of state bureaucracies, elected officials, real estate developers, transnational development organizations, and the World Bank. This pro-development stance is exemplified in the presentations of Sheela Patel and A. Jockin in the afternoon session of the DPU tour.

In a freshly painted community center of an onsite resettlement building constructed with the participation of SPARC, Patel and Jockin recounted the Alliance’s other moment of origin—the merging of NSDF and SPARC. Again, the leaders emphasize the importance of women’s participation and non-confrontational negotiation. Jockin described the collaboration of NSDF and SPARC as a marriage between a predominantly male slum dwellers federation and the female-headed NGO, resulting in the auspicious birth of a “girl child,” the Mahila Milan federation of women pavement and slum dwellers. He explained

See chapter 2 for more details on the convergence of Slum Rehabilitation Authority policies and Hindu-Nationalist and regionalist political movements in the city.
that the work resulting in this union as one of community empowerment and habitat improvement through active and informed participation of slum dwellers. Jockin went on to argue that the work of the NSDF since its foundation in the mid 1970s had limited potential for sustained influence before it started to cooperate with SPARC and substantively include women and pavement dwellers in its fold. Jockin explained that the NSDF had hit a wall using strategies of protest and confrontation against the government. Women were able to penetrate state bureaucracies because the officials could not engage them in the same way as male slum-based leaders. In a subsequent interview Jockin remarked, “I observed how quiet and articulate they were. The male-dominated bureaucracy reacted differently to women.” He explained that government officials could not just buy the women off with bribes and drinks but were forced to answer their questions. It is clear that women were not automatically treated better for their gender alone. In interviews, Mahila Milan women explained that it was their affiliation with SPARC and Jockin that gained them more attention and respect than they would have otherwise received. As one member explained, being involved in the organization meant that at agencies such as the ration card office, she no longer had to wait in line. Nonetheless, women seemed to change the dynamic of state-slum relations with bureaucrats diffusing conflict.

In focusing on the non-confrontational tactics of the Alliance in this presentation, Jockin did not directly address the NSDF’s early more militant history. Indeed, NSDF’s anti-eviction struggle in confronting the mass demolition drive of 60,000 slum dwellers made an indelible mark on the history of housing struggle in Mumbai (Seabrook, 1987). In a later interview, Jockin described the militant strategy of the National Slum Dwellers Federation to me as an important step in the movement’s history, one that showed the state “the power” of the slum dweller was one to be reckoned with. He spoke of the train and road blocks that he and other slum leaders organized in response to demolitions. His neighborhood had also engaged in a protest during which they dumped garbage on the municipal corporation grounds in downtown Mumbai to make a statement about the neglect of the public sanitation services in slum neighborhoods. “They needed to see that we could stop the city when we wanted to.” Such actions gained the NSDF recognition throughout city neighborhoods as well as among state officials. Now, Jockin argued the Federation had the respect of the state and no longer needed to engage in such tactics. As the partnership with SPARC developed in the late 1980s–90s, NSDF’s presence expanded throughout the city’s informal neighborhoods. Branch groups were formed based on legal ownership and standing of the land being occupied, including the Railway Slum Dwellers Federation. Thus the Mahila Milan, NSDF and SPARC coalition secured recognition and support base among slum dwellers, the state and international development circles.

At the DPU meeting and other public events, Jockin systematically returned to the discourse of gendered participation asserting that the NSDF’s previous militant strategies were limited in power. In so doing, he undermined the achievements of the confrontational tactics that he admitted privately. He insisted that while women were always his federation’s base of strength, early on he failed to treat them as substantive partners; “they were only numbers to make a crowd.” He also admitted that initially he did not see the
value of including pavement dwellers or women in more substantive positions until his 
encounter with SPARC. Today, Alliance leaders agree that Mahila Milan and women’s 
participation has been indispensable for promoting deeper change. This combination of 
positive working relationships with the state and a solid grassroots base of support has 
been further bolstered by substantial linkages to transnational development networks. In 
particular, the SPARC Alliance has been a key member of Slum/Shack Dwellers 
International, a transnational coalition of NGOs and slum-based groups in several countries 
of Asia, Africa and South America that has espoused a similar urban community 
development philosophy. The high profile of the Alliance in international development 
circles, including the World Bank, combined with the group’s slum base of support and 
working relationship with the state to afford it the principle job of facilitating the MUTP 
project. The following section examines the MUTP processes of resettling slums located on 
railway authority lands. By focusing on the shifting trajectory of governance through 
gendered participation and the influential intermediary role of the Alliance, I argue that the 
MUTP exemplifies a delicate hegemonic balance of force and consent under potentially 
volatile conditions of mass displacement.

3.4 The Politics of Expediency: Participatory Resettlement as Model and Practice

The cooperative relationship that SPARC had cultivated with the state brought the NGO 
into new political terrains in the mid to late 1990s when the MUTP was being negotiated 
and launched with the World Bank. In addition to the organization’s participation in the 
market-oriented Slum Rehabilitation Scheme policy negotiations, SPARC also became 
deeply involved in planning processes for the resettlement component of the Mumbai 
Urban Transport Project (MUTP). World-Bank funding of the MUTP required the state to 
implement more stringent universal resettlement of “project-affected persons” (PAPs) and 
the involvement of civil society partners. In 1995 the Government of Maharashtra 
appointed a task force with representatives of various state agencies including the Slum 
Redevelopment Authority (SRA) and MMRDA to establish a set of resettlement 
procedures and parameters. With its links to international development networks and 
state bureaucracies, SPARC was the most obvious choice as a civil society partner. The 
NGO’s directors were invited to work directly with senior bureaucrats including former IAS 
officer D. M. Sukhtankar to help design a resettlement model that would involve the 
participation of “project-affected persons” (PAPs) in community organization processes. 
Resettlement units would be built and distributed in accordance with almost all aspects of 
the state’s SRA policy. This meant that each project-affected household would be allocated 
one 225-square-foot apartment unit (counting only ground floor units to the exclusion of 
renters and household members living on upper floors). Private developers were 
contracted to build the resettlement buildings in exchange for fees and Transfer of 
Development Rights (TDRs) to build taller buildings in high value areas of the city (Burra, 
2001). However, because the World Bank insisted on universal resettlement, the MUTP 
could not enforce cut-off date exclusions, a condition that officials resisted for some time 
before ceding to the Bank’s demands.

25 Refer to chapter 2 for a review of the neoliberal design features of the SRA resettlement policy.
Outside of these basic SRA policy parameters, the neighborhood-based organizational aspects of the MUTP resettlement model were based on the work of the Alliance in the areas of savings schemes and self-surveying. However, with involvement in the MUTP, a shift began to take place in the SPARC Alliance’s approach and mode of operation in relation to both the state and slum neighborhoods. Unlike the pavement dwellers movement, there was very little contact between evicted residents and state officials in the MUTP. SPARC Alliance staff and leaders became the primary intermediary between the state and evicted slum dwellers. Correspondingly, the gendered negotiation practices of Mahila Milan were redirected into new political arenas. Through my ethnographic research I learned that the women members of Mahila Milan involved in MUTP were more engaged in facilitating the political processes of slum resettlement within neighborhoods than in negotiating with the state. Through this critical reconfiguration in its conciliatory politics—targeting communities rather than the state—I argue that SPARC and neighborhood leaders became complicit in a process of stemming conflict and facilitating consent to large-scale displacement. Understanding the politics of this shift in SPARC’s practices requires an examination of the participatory model, its inevitably uneven implementation, the technologies and practices of community governance and the resultant configurations of power and difference arising from the processes of resettlement. SPARC reports and training exchanges are often based on one or two of the exemplary earlier experiences of project. A brief overview of the model, its varying phases of implementation and SPARC’s representation of it works to situate and distinguish the resettlement plan and practice throughout the duration of the MUTP.

The MUTP resettlement experience that SPARC most frequently cited was that of Kanjur Marg, a Northeastern suburb of Mumbai where 900 families living along the railway tracks were resettled in buildings near their former place of residence. It was here that MUTP’s famed participatory resettlement model was put into practice, incorporating several key participatory aspects: (a) a voluntary and conflict-free relocation of slum dwellers, (b) the participation of slum dwellers, especially women, in information collection and input on design and location of resettlement units and (c) resettlement resulting in improved quality of life. Regarding the first and most distinguishing feature, the voluntary nature of the resettlement, project proponents and Alliance leaders have argued that slum dwellers agreed to the move because they would benefit from safe, secure and hygienic formalized homes. Alliance leaders repeatedly emphasized that the Kanjur Marg MUTP experience was an example of voluntary relocation rather than demolition. For instance, in public presentations, Jockin has often provocatively exclaimed, “It is not a human right to eat shit!” in response to questions about the justness of evicting slum dwellers from their homes. He emphasized the filth and precariousness of life in slums along the railways, conditions that SPARC reports and articles also describe in great detail. Included among these were the humiliation and health implications that women slum dwellers faced in having to defecate publicly on the railway tracks as well as the noise and constant threat of death of those living adjacent to the path of speeding trains. Neighborhood leaders of involved in the Kanjur Marg resettlement have reiterated this position.
Alliance leaders also emphasized the model’s second aspect—that slum dwellers, particularly women, were actively involved in various implementing and decision-making activities of the resettlement at the neighborhood scale. The Kanjur Marg experience elucidates how women were mobilized. During initial meetings with residents, SPARC staff and community leaders explained the purpose and process of the impending demolition. Local leaders then organized residents into committees well before the demolition squads arrived, and resettlement proceeded without conflict, a rarity in cases of eviction. Several women participated in training sessions with NSDF leaders and Mahila Milan women leaders from the pavement dwellers’ movement. These women played a major role in facilitating the relocation through their involvement in hut counting, slum mapping and household surveying. Such activities helped to promote accuracy in resettlement and trust in the community. Residents spoke of the difficulties of life in the cramped and underv serviced transit camp accommodations prior to attaining the units. Under these conditions, Mahila Milan women also helped garner sustained cooperation during long and difficult stays in transit camps through regular engagement with residents. As with the pavement dwellers, women gave their input on the best and most economical building design to SPARC staff, who conveyed this information to state agencies. Through Mahila Milan, they also formed savings schemes to supplement the needs of residents in resettlement buildings. Women continue to facilitate maintenance activities within the cooperative building society.26 According to SPARC internal evaluations of this model experience, this participatory process ensured that the resettlement improved the quality of life for the project-affected families. Although stays in transit camps were long (three years) and arduous, Kanjur Marg slum dwellers were relocated close to their former neighborhoods (Burra, 1999, Batliwala, 2005, Patel, D’Cruz and Burra, 2002). I did not conduct extensive research in this “model” space of the Kanjur Marg resettlement colony, but the little exposure I did have indicated that residents were happy with the location and design of the resettlement units.

Though this participatory model as exemplified by the Kanjur Marg experience has continued to represent the MUTP experience in international and local development circles, few of the subsequent rounds of MUTP demolitions corresponded exactly to the key aspects of the model. In the Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony in Mankhurd district, where I conducted most of my research, residents described a more complex and contradictory set of experiences regarding resettlement processes. Before launching into these discrepancies, I want to emphasize that my goal is not to discredit the specific claims made by SPARC or to imply that the NGO has intentionally mislead the world about its practices. Indeed, the Kanjur Marg case as well as the subsequent “less-than-ideal” resettlements represent a vast improvement over previous slum clearances, in which resettlement was virtually non-existent or extremely corrupt. Furthermore, SPARC directors have admitted in both interviews and publications (see Burra, 2001; Patel, d’Cruz, & Burra, 2002), that the time scale and process constraints imposed by the state’s rapid

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26 A group of appointed or leaders—generally though not exclusively men—form a “building society” with a group of residents who will live in a single building. The society handles decision-making for the building as well as the collection and accounting of funds for maintenance. Women Mahila Milan committee members assist in organizing and implementing various maintenance and social activities.
removal of slums strained the process. The participatory resettlement model was an ideal that was ultimately impossible to achieve at the larger scale because of the privileging of elite redevelopment interests and resettlement “on the cheap.”

An examination of subsequent rounds of MUTP demolitions will elucidate the point of divergence between model and reality more deeply. Conversations with residents in Lallubhai Compound revealed differing interpretations between evictees and Alliance leaders as to whether resettlement led to improved quality of life. While most residents agreed that toilets, for instance, were a welcome convenience for many, few people emphasized them to the same degree as Alliance leaders. Some claim that they had easy access to other public or shared sanitation or “were used to” relieving themselves in public. Residents acknowledged the difficulties of living beside railway tracks but again felt they were able to manage the dangers and noise. Non-participants and less powerful MM and NSDF members who had been resettled at a distance expressed a greater degree of hardship caused by resettlement in terms of distance as well as social marginality of the neighborhood. These varying experiences indicate that SPARC’s claims of resettlement desirability did not represent the full gamut of experience.

With new rounds of project implementation, the demands of state authorities at both the national and state levels and anti-slum sentiments of middle-class residents of the city converged, leading to rapid court-ordered demolitions that strained the participatory process. SPARC leaders have publicly addressed the difficulty the organization faced when court-ordered evictions (urged by the Railways Authority and groups of Mumbai residents) in 2001 derailed the MUTP resettlement processes (Patel, D’Cruz and Burra, 2002). Furthermore, as the scale and pace of the project expanded into other parts of the city, new evictions were characterized by sudden demolition, involuntary and distant relocation, and transit camp difficulties. In several instances Alliance leaders and SPARC staff were only able to make contact with affected slum dwellers less than two weeks before the demolition, when their primary role was to quickly facilitate movement into transit camps. In other areas stunned evictees staged riots and instigated railway line blockades after their homes were abruptly demolished. One woman who later joined Mahila Milan likened the demolition to an explosively violent scene from Bombay, a popular film about Hindu-Muslim communal riots in the city during the early 1990s. “People were charging the police with sticks and setting fires on the train tracks.” Such experiences clearly undermined the model’s main tenet of “voluntary” relocation. Several Lallubhai Compound residents said that they had camped on the clear site for up to eight months before being moved into the transit camp.

If the model claims of voluntary resettlement and improved quality of life thus did not represent the fuller reality, the ideal of participation did circulate in neighborhoods, state agencies and international development circles without fully being achieved because of the market-driven basis of the MUTP. I would argue that the participatory resettlement exhibited the productive power of a fetish. Here the gap between the circulating image of the participatory model and the experience of the large majority of subsequent MUTP evictions can be interpreted as a productive dissonance. As Ferguson (1990) has argued, it
is precisely this gap between the plan and the practice of development that produces convenient outcomes for the forces of capital—in this case attaining large-scale slum clearance for infrastructure redevelopment. But this process also entailed a host of new arrangements of governance and relations of power in the spaces of slum eviction. Therefore, in addition to considering socio-economic processes and outcomes of later rounds of the MUTP, I am interested in addressing the political work done by the on-going circulation of various aspects of the participatory model and Alliance development philosophy. The participatory resettlement model is especially significant in the present analysis because it not only traveled among transnational networks of development NGOs but also shaped political praxis among the evicted through the process of trainings, meetings and peer exchanges. The following sections will discuss how the Alliance’s practices of rule—both sovereign and governmental—in evicted neighborhoods were fundamentally shaped and inflected by gendered tropes of authority and community solidarity.

3.5 Harsh but Benevolent: Bureaucratic Authority via Non-governmental Patriarchy

A brief examination of the layers of authority in the MUTP governance structure will help to elucidate how evictees came to “experience” the state as mediated by the SPARC Alliance. One layer of sovereignty consisted of the bureaucratic planning agency, the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority, which served as the main implementing agency coordinating both infrastructure development and resettlement with the World Bank, SPARC, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority and private developers. At the national scale, another layer of state power was the Railways Authority based in Delhi, which placed the greatest pressure on rapid slum removal by introducing rapid slum clearance court orders. Furthermore, as chapter 2 illustrates, the courts enforced slum clearance through honoring citywide middle-class activists’ public interest litigations. These layers indicate how the channels of access and experience of the state for evicted slum dwellers shifted under the MUTP eviction and resettlement process. Whereas the party politics of municipal government had long served as the principal channel of access to the state for slum dwellers, this local political space was overshadowed under the MUTP. For instance, several slum leaders with whom I spoke recalled that they initially approached their local ward and district level politicians to see if they might enable a stay of the demolition or enable a better resettlement deal. But the local ward politicians, with virtually no access to the workings of the project, directed slum dwellers to their new connection to the state, the SPARC Alliance. Under the pressures of rapid and sometimes violent slum removal and resettlement on the cheap, SPARC, a private, non-governmental entity became the seat of resettlement governance at the scale of the neighborhood.

As the bureaucratic implementing agency, the MMRDA, the Railways Authority and the courts emerged as the meaner and more distant face of the demolishing state, SPARC and Jockin came to serve as the primary link to state power for slum dwellers, who no longer had recourse for negotiating with municipal government. In describing their initial encounter with the Alliance, many evictees in Lallubhai Compound recalled that Jockin and the NSDF leaders made it clear to residents that there was no choice but to relocate. They
explained that the project was a top priority for the government and necessary for the city’s development. Jockin would exclaim that people did not belong on railway lands, but that with slum dwellers cooperation with the SPARC Alliance could guarantee that the state would provide resettlement compensation. In this manner, Jockin as a leader took on many of the attributes of local ward officials. Similar to the scene at the offices of ward officials, people regularly line up outside of Jockin’s office for a variety of needs both related and unrelated to the work of Alliance mediated projects. These demands led Jockin to express that slum dwellers would often urge him to run for elected office. He has responded to these suggestions by saying that he has had no intention to run for office because being confined within the government’s political system would undermine his effectiveness. I would argue that Jockin and the Alliance already embodied state power through their involvement in bureaucratic agencies.

Lallubhai resettlement colony residents described Jockin’s role in a varying ways. Uma, a non-leading member of Mahila Milan, describes his involvement as she understood it: “Jockinsir goes to the government and the foreign people at the World Bank, tells them about the situation of the poor and gets money to help us.” Here Jockin seemed to be interpreted as an “organic” leader, one who has experienced the life of a slum dweller but could also engage with the state and transnational agents of development on behalf of the poor. NSDF and Mahila members as well as some non-participating residents of Lallubhai often expressed Jockin’s presence in slums as benevolent but also dictatorial. Men from evicted areas of varying degrees of power worked hard to align themselves with Jockin through various positions in the NSDF and in resettlement building societies. Most slum dwellers referred to him as “sir” and he had the reputation of being easily angered when leaders and members of NSDF and MM did not conduct their duties to his satisfaction. As one resettled resident put it, “Jockinsir dua bhi dete hai aur gaali bhi” (Jockinsir gives both blessings and curses). On several occasions I observed women leaving Jockin’s office at the NSDF headquarters in Dharavi with tears in their eyes after being scolded by him. When I ask Mahila Milan members how they felt about his temperament, one woman responded that she did not mind his burst of anger. “Jockinsir is like a father; he scolds us harshly but it is for our own good so that we may progress... I don’t mind it at all.” Another member said that Jockin could sometimes scold but that he also expressed to women that the SPARC Alliance was their true home, “like your fathers’ home not your in-laws.”
Some residents were critical of Jockin’s position, though I did not meet anyone who confronted him directly. For instance, a few residents thought that Jockin acquired money to address the slum dwellers’ needs but did not always convey the difficult realities that they continued to face after resettlement: “He shows only a pretty picture of resettlement to the people from abroad, not the full truth.” Others suspected that, like a politician, he took cuts of the project funds for himself and his allies. I do not flag these remarks to suggest that Jockin or other Alliance leaders were corrupt; in fact, I found no such evidence. Rather, these patronage-based relationships and understandings of Jockin’s authority on the part of evictees again suggest experiences of the state similar to those of slum dwellers with elected local ward officials.

Furthermore, the masculinization of authority is not new to this particular circumstance. Indeed, gender often signifies authority, not just relations of power (J. W. Scott, 1999). The central point here is that through the leadership of Jockin the SPARC Alliance served as the principal face of bureaucratic authority for slum dwellers. He acted as a mediator for addressing evictees’ concerns but also served as the deliverer of the state’s message to slum dwellers: there was no choice but to relocate. Although there is clearly a governmental end—slum removal and redevelopment—being achieved, the form of authority exemplified by Jockin and SPARC does not easily fit into any framework on authority and governmentality. According to Foucault, one of the key aspects of modern power is that earlier forms of sovereign power modeled on the dictatorial role of the father in the family have given way to governmental power that has sought to rule through the
family. The family emerged as the target of governmental intervention rather than as the model of sovereign power, a process that he calls the governmentalization of the state. Here, modern powers accomplish rule through subjects themselves as they participated in knowledge-production aspects of governmental technologies. Indeed, SPARC’s role in slum dwellers’ self-enumeration and mapping activities points to the group’s complicity in the production of voluntary subjects of development and resettlement. Yet, the mediation of SPARC and the leadership of Jockin as an articulation of patriarchal authority also resembled authoritarian forms of sovereign power.

We may interpret Jockin’s authority as an instance of a process Gramsci called transformism. In this interpretation, we may read Jockin as an organic leader co-opted by the state and, to a certain extent, ruling elite interests. On the other hand, it is also evident that the effect of SPARC’s governing role was not simply a replication of “traditional” sovereignty through the local boss as mediating patron and representative of state governmental authority over non-citizen “populations,” as Chatterjee has suggested in his rendering of political society (2004). This is not an case of pure “dominance without hegemony” (Ranajit Guha, 1997). If state authority was experienced through NGO mediation and masculinized leadership, gendered power and the discourse of patience and non-confrontation also seeped more deeply and broadly into the everyday spatial experiences of MUTP evictees. As I argue in the following section, SPARC Alliance efforts to advance participation helped to garner cooperation and consent through key educative interventions. I suggest that it is this ethico-political role of the Alliance that is crucial to understanding resettlement cooperation among MUTP evictees under some of the most difficult and potentially volatile conditions.

3.6 From Patience to Persuasion: Remaking Community in the Space of Transition

The ideal of patience and cooperation that emerged with the pavement dwellers’ movement and other earlier resettlements was redirected in later rounds of the MUTP railways resettlement beyond negotiating with the state. Interactions with residents and Mahila Milan members at Lallubhai Compound revealed that Alliance leaders and participating residents engaged in the ethico-political work of advancing community solidarity, the aspirational ethos of which helped to garner cooperation and consent to development and resettlement. Feminized participation of evictees in Mahila Milan peer exchanges, meetings and community activities—arenas of participatory subjectivity and community governance—were crucial to SPARC’s educative activities. According to SPARC staff, the general processes went as follows. Depending on state demolition schedules and level of prior history of engagement with NSDF, Alliance leaders began the work of organizing residents either in the slum prior to demolition, or after demolition in the transit camp. Jockin and high-level NSDF and Mahila Milan leaders would set up meetings with neighborhood leaders to gather residents and explain the reasoning and process of resettlement. Volunteers (of both genders but mostly women) were asked to volunteer for various tasks including surveying activities, building-society mobilization, explaining the resettlement processes to the community more broadly and initiating savings schemes.
Subsequently, these representatives were asked to take part in meetings, training exercises and peer exchanges led by Jockin and the women and men of Mahila Milan and NSDF.

Although the level of history and exposure to working with the SPARC Alliance prior to eviction varied across neighborhoods, all of the evicted neighborhoods became engaged in Alliance activities in at least one “captive” space of community organizing: the transit camp. Most project-evicted family stays in transit camps (located near the proposed resettlement site of Lallubhai Compound in Mankhurd district) lasted for as long as five to seven years between demolition and resettlement. In speaking with the Lallubhai Compound residents and leaders, it became clear that the space of the transit camp was an important site for SPARC’s ethico-political work. Through exchange meetings and training new neighborhood groups in the transit camps, Jockin, NSDF leaders and Mahila Milan leaders from the pavement dwellers’ movement and earlier rounds of the MUTP resettlement helped disseminate a particular set of ideals of progress and cooperation anchored in concrete instantiations of community. Transit camp mobilizing was especially important for slum dwellers of later rounds of the MUTP who were evicted suddenly with minimal or no prior contact with the Alliance. Ethnographic oral histories of transit camp experience elucidate how this ethos was developed and nurtured.

In assembly meetings in the transit camps, Jockin and top Mahila Milan leaders would attempt to motivate new residents to change their lives and the lives of those around them. A familiar phrase that Jockin and other leaders used was aage badho, a call to evicted slum dwellers to “advance forward” or “progress.” For Jockin and Alliance leaders, progress consisted of moving away from the unhygienic and vulnerable life that slum dwellers were used to living. They emphasized the benefits of resettlement amenities like toilets and piped water for all slum dwellers, especially women. Formalized resettlement housing was posited as the most promising path out of the environmental ills of the slum toward a more comfortable and legitimate existence. One interviewee recounted that when residents confronted the Alliance with complaints of resettlement difficulties, Jockin and other leaders would explain the value of the improvements they would achieve in their lives. “They explained to us that it was wrong for us to be living near the railways, that it was government land and that we needed to progress and move into a better, permanent place.” Residents recounted their experiences hearing Alliance leaders talking about the importance of the project for the development of the city and the government.

The Alliance leaders’ declared position was that what is good for the city is good for the slum dweller; in this way, the discourse of progress was fundamentally pro-development. Bolstering this position, Mahila Milan leaders (from the pavement dwellers’ movement and earlier MUTP resettlements) narrated their own personal histories to new evictees—similar to the DPU and other presentations. They explained how they improved their lives by learning to “speak and act properly” and moving into better living conditions. They explained to newly evicted members the importance of savings schemes for personal and community financial wellbeing. Alliance leaders would further urge transit camp residents to maintain patience because such improvements to life through formal resettlement processes would take time. Newer Mahila Milan members echoed these sentiments: “It was
not right, the way we used to live near the railway track. Filthy water kept entering our homes. There was always a long line for public toilets. So many people died by getting hit by train cars.” Many newer members expressed feeling motivated by Jockin’s speeches to participate in the Alliance’s activities. Besides health, hygiene and safety, leaders and members eschewed other aspects of informality. One member described it as theft: “The light we had was stolen. We paid 300 or 400 rupees, still it was stolen. Water connections too. Jockinsir showed us the correct path, but told us that we had to walk it ourselves. We have improved so much now, with the leaders’ guidance and help.”

In the space of the transit camp, these trainings and group meetings took on an important additional dimension in serving to morally consolidate disparate groups of slum dwellers from different parts of the city. Participation in larger meetings with top Alliance leaders served as the avenue through which Mahila Milan members conveyed the needs of residents in the camps and learned about status of the resettlement, which they communicated back to residents. Alliance events helped to circulate information and foster collectivity in addressing the material and social needs in the camps. Collectivity and communication was especially important during the difficult experience of living in the transit camp, which people uniformly recalled for its extreme hardship, inhuman conditions and deep suffering. Several people referred to the transit camp stay as one of the worst periods of their lives. Many of these high-density camps lacked water and sanitation and were prone to monsoon flooding. Residents complained of increased incidences of illness and death due to the lack of clean water, pests and toxic fumes from a nearby chemical plant and adjacent garbage dumps. The realities of the transit camp were a far cry from the discourse of safe and hygienic resettlement. A few resettled residents, like P. Tamil Selvi, who could afford to do so rented out rooms elsewhere or stayed with other family members. “We couldn’t bear the conditions, so we left. Most others did not have the financial wherewithal to do the same,” she admitted. Stories of memories of transit camp experience often had a distinctly gendered character reminiscent of idioms of long and “silent” suffering of dutiful wives and mothers. One male leader even used the analogy of a wife covering her mouth to silence her own screams while being beaten by her husband to describe how slum dwellers endured the treatment of the government during the transit camp days: “We endured so much but did not complain.”

The ethos of patience and participation was highly gendered and relied on familiar South Asian cultural narratives positing women as naturally more understanding and tolerant of difficult situations. In these ideals of womanhood, it is precisely women’s non-complaining suffering and self-sacrifice that make them the ideal vehicle for the advancement of moral and cultural values of society. Gayatri Spivak has produced some of the best-known critiques explaining how South Asian women’s desires and self-sacrificing womanhood have become instrumental for capitalist (and non-capitalist) exploitation (1982, 1988). More recently, a number of scholars have addressed the global representations of poor women as the ideal target and deliverer of development for the poor. For instance, Sylvia Chant (Chant, 2008) and Ananya Roy (Roy, 2010) have both shown how the feminization of poverty has entailed the proliferation of new development practices and ideals that assign poor women responsibility for resolving the problem.
The transit camp experience of difficulty and suffering articulated with the carefully cultivated Alliance ethos of patience. I argue that this articulation yielded a reconfiguration in the feminized non-confrontational and cooperative politics of negotiation that had originally emerged in the pavement dwellers’ struggle. Mahila Milan women worked with the SPARC leadership toward softening the sting of eviction and transit camp difficulties that may otherwise have been interpreted as a raw deal. Under MUTP, the gendered participation was less involved in negotiating with the state and more engaged in practices of facilitating solidarity and cooperation with slum clearance and resettlement within the community of evicted slum dwellers—what I call a “politics of persuasion.”

Top leaders and newer women participants alike often invoked this gendered trope. For instance, Mahila Milan volunteers also repeatedly used one word to express the work they would do in the transit camp: samjhana. As they described it, *samjhana* consisted of patiently “persuading” others to cooperate during trying times, “explaining” the processes of resettlement or “making them understand” the situation at hand. *Samjhana* also connoted a slow and painstaking process of dealing with diverse strong personalities and convincing them that it was worth cooperating with resettlement and Alliance activities. As a veteran Mahila Milan member from earlier rounds of MUTP railways resettlement, Maalti Aamre described the painstaking processes of gaining evictees’ trust and support. “No one trusted us in the beginning. We had to explain that the government’s rule is that we must move. Railways are not a legal place; we can be thrown anywhere by the government. We will get a home in exchange, but only one home. Families living on upper floors cannot get a room. Like this, we helped to make people understand. It was not in just one meeting but ten that people started to trust and become unified.”

The deemed naturalization of women’s unique capacity for understanding and persuasion was sometimes deployed toward the practical purpose of gaining trust and stemming dissent among distraught transit camp residents. In an interview, Maalti Aamre recalled getting people to work together during the initial years of life in the transit camp:

> In the beginning it was very difficult. No one in the transit camps believed that they would get resettlement flats. We kept having meetings to explain the project again and again. Finally people came to take part in the group and trust us. It took sometimes 2 or 4 years but they eventually trusted us that the flats would come and started to take part in group activities.

Another two Mahila Milan leaders recalled facing distressed and enraged mobs of residents complaining of living conditions in transit camps far worse than they suffered in the slums and fearing that the resettlement flats would never materialize. The women described the difficulty of calming the crowd down by ensuring them that SPARC was working hard at getting the government to move forward on the resettlement units. “We tried to make them understand that getting angry would not solve anything,” one of the leaders said. They encouraged residents to cooperate patiently with community activities and continue the work of preparing for permanent resettlement. “Eventually things calmed down.” Another male resident, Karthik, who was critical of the resettlement process and the leadership in his building complained:
Mahila Milan women deliver news, requests and information that people don’t like. When a woman arrives you cannot easily shout at her; it looks bad. Even here [in the permanent resettlement colony], women are sent to ask for maintenance payments. Why should we pay maintenance when we have difficulties like water supply shortages? If the society chairman came to me, I would fight with him. Women are used to shut men up.

Although his was among the most cynical perspectives that I encountered, it nonetheless exemplifies the diplomatic nature of Mahila Milan members’ intermediary role.

In addition, these interactions indicated that the ideals of pro-development progress rested not just on individualized patience, behavioral changes and embrace of resettlement but also cooperation among resettled slum dwellers and a commitment to the advancement of the community more broadly. Newly established committees and cooperative societies further operationalized the ideals of progress as a practice of community formation and cooperation. Such groups were formed under the guidance of other Mahila Milan and NSDF leaders during the period of residence in transit camps and continue to today. Among the most important groups that evictees took part in were the building “societies,” a group of slum or transit camp residents that would live in a resettlement building together. The building society as the central organizing unit for evicted slum dwellers was a key arena where the ideals of self-improvement and community cooperation fused in practice. Slum and transit camp residents split into groups of 70 families represented by a chairman, a secretary and possibly a few other head positions (often but not exclusively held by men) appointed by Alliance leaders or chosen by vote in the transit camps. Society heads were responsible for building maintenance, the collection of fees and all documentation ranging from registration to book keeping. Each society also had an associated Mahila Milan group, usually consisting of two to four women who would help with the various responsibilities of the society heads. The most active of these new Mahila Milan participants and society heads also represented their society members in larger transit camp-wide and some citywide meetings with Alliance leaders. Mahila Milan members would encourage members to make contributions to a building fund to be used for maintenance and repairs in the resettlement colony. These interactions between Mahila Milan participants and residents helped in building a sense of community working together. As one member recalled, “we explained to them giving to the fund was for the good of the whole society and would ensure that we will have a systematic and well maintained building.” Mahila Milan members also took part in organizing religious and cultural festivals for transit camp residents, activities that helped to further build morale and solidarity among residents. Residents like Shukantala looked back fondly on these events. She recounted that life was tough in the transit camps, but gatherings and festivals helped: “I came to know more people. The events made me feel better and forget about our situation for a short time.”

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27 Society members’ contributions of up to Rs 20,000 were supposed to be matched by the government according to the World Bank project document, but many Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony residents complained that these promised funds have yet to materialize.
At transit camp-wide meetings, Mahila Milan members organized residents for a variety of community interventions. Mahila Milan members from each society volunteered to take part in one or more of four different committees: (a) the finance committee, (b) the “BMC” committee, (c) the police panchayat committee and (d) the management committee. The finance committee handled the savings pool, encouraging residents to contribute to daily collections as well as partaking in decision-making for loan distribution. Several members talked about how conversations about savings were a way for Mahila Milan members to know how residents were doing. “We found out what were the difficulties each house was facing—if someone fell ill, if there was a wedding in the house, if someone lost their job, if they needed money for their children’s school supplies. After knowing their situation we could help them with advice or a loan. We also taught residents to save for these kinds of things . . . why pay so much interest for a loan when you can save for such unexpected needs and borrow from the fund?”

The “BMC” committee’s name derived from the acronym of the local government arm of the city, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, as the municipal government is generally the principal provider of environmental services. This committee was also originally formed by Mahila Milan members from earlier rounds of MUTP resettlement who were directed by Jockin and other NSDF leaders to approach government officials to get the needs of transit camp residents met. However, in subsequent rounds of evictions, SPARC staff and top Alliance leaders served as the principle intermediary between the government transit camps residents. Mahila Milan members of the BMC committee in the Mankhurd transit camps were often more involved in organizing residents to devise their own systems of dealing with issues of environmental management such as getting water from private sources and organizing communal clean-ups of the camps.

The police panchayat committee dealt with issues of conflict management in the transit camps and resettlement colonies in liaison with the local police. The police panchayat was a city-wide program operating in slums that SPARC introduced to the MUTP transit camps and resettlement colonies. The term panchayat refers to the system of village level government wherein elders and high status leaders of the village gathered to decide on any number of local social concerns. In a similar manner, the police panchayat work drew on the premise that the community itself could deal with local conflicts within families or among neighbors without calling on the police unless absolutely necessary. Again the majority of members were Mahila Milan women. Finally, the management committee assisted with administrative issues in neighborhoods including building society formation, documentation and organization. Through participatory practices in these societies and committees, Mahila Milan members helped to spread Alliance ideals of progress and community betterment and build a sense of cooperative solidarity among disparate groups experiencing a long and difficult stay in transit camps.

As it promoted solidarity, the politics of patience and persuasion also demarcated exclusionary borders and hierarchical dimensions of “community” by advancing a sense of seniority-based entitlement. For example, among the earlier MUTP evictees of Lallubhai compound there was a marked disdain for some newly resettled slum dwellers from later
road projects who were not required to stay in transit camps before moving into an apartment. One irate Mahila Milan volunteer exclaimed, “They did not suffer the way that we did for so many years in the transit camp. We should get the best apartments and they have no right to complain.” Similarly, when asked about their thoughts on the recent mass uncompensated demolition drives associated with the launching of the Vision Mumbai plan, some residents sympathized with the evictees while others felt the demolitions were justified. “I understand what government thinks. It cannot keep giving housing to everyone. We have been here suffering for years. We deserve this room. Why should the new people have such an easy time?” These observations point to exclusions embedded in the articulation of patience and entitlement within and beyond the MUTP project. Such exclusions have contributed to instabilities in and resistances to the resettlement process—topics that will be more deeply addressed in the next two chapters.

Not everyone took kindly to Alliance leaders’ urging to change and progress. For instance, one resettled resident told me that she started to attend Mahila Milan meetings but was put off by Jockin’s demeanor: “He kept telling us that before we were living in filth and that he was trying to get us to understand how to come out of it and live a better life.” She explained that when he was displeased with us, he would shout that “I keep trying to show you the path to improvement but you people just do not want to learn!” For other members, participation in Mahila Milan opened the space for negotiating better resettlement from the Alliance leadership. Indeed, it was common for the most seasoned and powerful leaders—women and men—to receive first choice of flats and in a few cases even extra rooms.

But, less powerful members also found a space for negotiation. For example, one Mahila Milan member, Uma, recounted her long battle to correct a misallocation of flats that left her married daughter without her rightful room. She would spend several hours per day over many weeks at the transit camp office, grandchildren in tow, trying to persuade SPARC Alliance staff to resolve her issue. Uma observed that not everyone had the time or capacity to confront a faulty or unfair flat allocation, like her daughters who worked all day as domestic workers. Uma also expressed adamantly the need to “speak loudly” or face the possibility of getting marginalized in the resettlement process. Her experience indicates that gendered participation did not always retain a soft domesticated voice. As Uma explained, those who are not used to persistent or rowdy complaining would not be able to confront the administrators to address such mistakes. She laughed as she recounted that she taught her daughters to be rude and even curse like men if necessary.

The strategic use of participation for self-advancement was not necessarily mutually exclusive to acceptance of the Alliance ethos of community progress. To the contrary, I would argue that the meaning and effects of gendered participation were multiple. Women interpreted Alliance ideology in contradictory ways and directed their participation in Mahila Milan for various ends. Patronage-oriented relations, and the “will” to persuade and advance progress, both animated participation. The following sections elucidate further the meaning and experience of gendered participation among slum dwellers and the ways that resettlement processes reworked key axes of difference.
3.7 Housewives, Entrepreneurs, Workers: Hierarchies of Participatory Resettlement

Involving women is both a means as well as an end. It is an end in itself as it ensures greater equality and more rights for women. It is a means because it ensures sustainability and practical solutions and democracy in peoples movements... Women have the following essential qualities: they ensure that the process is equitable in distribution of resources; they have a commitment to a sustainable process; [their] spirit of collective behavior makes it democratic. (Patel, Year Unknown)

If the persuasive power of Mahila Milan women helped garner cooperation and manage dissent, then how did women themselves experience participation and resettlement? The materialities and meanings of participation in the resettlement process were highly uneven among the women with whom I spoke. This section focuses on women’s experiences of participation, with the goal of exploring the gendered and populist claim highlighted in the quote above: that participation ensures individual empowerment for women and equality in development projects. By examining this claim on its own terms with a focus on women, it becomes evident how other axes of difference such as class have been reinforced and reproduced as unintended consequences of resettlement processes.

Here, my analysis extends beyond the space of the transit camp to include on-going participation in the Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony to explore experiences of participation as they relate to process and effect over time. Participation in Mahila Milan activities were characterized by varying degrees of time commitment, power and status. At the minimal level were simple contributions to the savings schemes while greater degrees of involvement consisted of various resettlement tasks over several years. Committees of women who originally formed in the slum or transit camps continued to work in the resettlement colony. Such tasks have included the collection of maintenance fees, organizing clean-ups of communal spaces, organizing festivals and special events, deciding on loans, participating in the police panchayat, attending SPARC Alliance events, trainings and exchanges and various other tasks. Most of this work was of a volunteer nature with only a very small number of women—primarily those involved in daily savings collection and administration for SPARC—earning salaries or other forms of remuneration for their work.

I have described the machinations as well as the effects of women’s participation for community relations. There were also real benefits to resettling that some women mentioned, including the convenience of indoor plumbing and less precarious surroundings. Yet questions remain regarding why women joined and participated in Mahila Milan, especially in the later rounds of the MUTP. Though partially explanatory, the answer goes beyond a mere instrumentalist reading of participation wherein women leveraged their positions to access favors from SPARC Alliance or others. In fact many members emphasized that their work was unpaid and that they did it because of non-material interests. Sometimes, the urge to help others was mentioned. But most active members cited a better standing in their neighborhood as the most important benefit of participation in Mahila Milan. This nebulous sentiment was described in a number a
different ways. The most active Mahila Milan members often cited the honor—izzat—they received in doing work for their neighbors and other communities. Others were blunter in describing a certain sense of power and standing they obtained in being associated with powerful leaders like Jockin. Madhuri, a very active member who occupied a unique position as the only hijra (member of a recognized third gender) to participate in the women’s groups, perked up boasting about her connections: “Sharmila (a key SPARC staff member) is my friend. And Jockin, well I don’t even call him sir and always joke with him.” When I informed her about some of the English classes I was conducting for the kids of Lallubhai, Madhuri informed me that she could work it out with Jockin to get any materials I needed, a helpful offer that was clearly meant to inform me of her strong connections to the powerful leaders. During an interview in Pratibha’s home, two people came by to speak with her in a deferential manner. One man came to explain a delay in his loan repayment, asking whether she could explain the situation to the finance committee. Another woman who was living in a recently demolished transit camp came to follow-up on the possibility of obtaining help in attaining a resettlement: “Because I am connected to this organization, people respect me and always ask me for help.”

This sense of status through connection was concretely evident in a citywide police panchayat that I attended in Lallubhai Compound. Hundreds of women from Lallubhai and other resettlement colonies, transit camps and slums attended the ceremonial event at which SPARC Alliance leaders and the Chief Police Commissioner spoke. My fieldnotes recall a sense of space shot through with feminized social hierarchy:

As participants and observers lined up in rows to be seated and watch the show, one of the main leaders in Lallubhai Compound grabbed my hand to take me to a cordoned off area in the front. “This is the VIP section,” she told me. SPARC staff and many of the most active Mahila Milan members were seated on chairs. Other women seated in both the VIP and the non-VIP sections would come by to greet the SPARC staff. They laughed, caught up with news and complemented each other on their outfits. Something about the VIP section felt more like a middle-class housewives’ tea gathering than a working class movement event. Those who were seated there were proud of their belonging, others who weren’t established their association with higher-ups or simply sat with their own on the asphalt at the back.

In addition to these forms of status consciousness, my conversations with Mahila Milan members also indicated that participation at the highest levels required a great deal of free time. Women constantly referred to themselves as “housewives” who could take care of things in the neighborhood that their husbands could not because of their work schedules. When asked if their participation interfered with other paid work, several active women members explained that work was not a concern for them. Non-participating women in the resettlement colony confirmed the time requirements of Mahila Milan. Two domestic

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28 This woman might have been from one of several families who purchased transit camp units from occupants who were shifted into permanent flats with the hope of also accessing resettlement or of at least being able to stay in the camp. Several camps were demolished to discourage this practice.
workers in the Lallubhai resettlement colony explained that only older women without young children and women with steady earning husbands had the time for such activities. An interview with Pratibha was especially revealing of the kinds of middle-class status markers that participating “housewives” imparted. Pratibha was an active member and leader who regularly attended citywide meetings and SPARC presentations for international visitors. When I arrived for an interview with Pratibha at her resettlement flat at Lallubhai Compound, she informed me that she was used to telling her story for people like me. She had come to Mumbai from a village in Karnataka to support her recently widowed mother. Pratibha had worked tirelessly in domestic service jobs until she met her husband. With his income she proudly explained that she no longer had to work but still found living conditions in the slums along the railways to be uncomfortable. She conveyed that she could now fully enjoy her life of leisure—“I can eat and watch T.V. in peace”—and spent her free time volunteering for SPARC and Mahila Milan.

This “housewifization” of women is not new or unique to the discourses of participation and resettlement. Early feminist critiques of development (Mies, 1998) focused on gender-biased development practices for the dangerous omission or underestimation of women’s work in both productive and reproductive labor. Yet, the MUTP case shows us that the discursive domestication of women’s roles in participatory resettlement has rested on the naturalization of women’s volunteer community work, thereby privileging the involvement of women with more leisure time and resources. These relatively well-off “housewife” participants could advance their status through association with the Alliance. However, women who worked outside the home and maintained the family often could not afford to take up leadership positions and channels of power in the Alliance. Accordingly, rarely did discussions concerning wage-laboring women emerge in official Alliance meeting spaces. Interactions with women in the MUTP resettlement colonies, however, revealed the trying daily life of many women workers in the Mankhurd transit camps and Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony.

I spent a morning with Rani, a former member of Mahila Milan, accompanying her on her daily commute from the Mankhurd resettlement site to her job as a domestic servant in the central Matunga area of the city where she used to live. I arrived at the resettlement colony at 9 a.m., and we left soon after. Normally Rani is awake before 5 a.m. preparing the day’s food and getting the children ready before leaving for work at 7. But today Rani had asked her employer whether she could arrive a bit later so that she could show a young student from America around. We passed through innumerable blocks of resettlement buildings then through a neighboring slum and down through a ditch until we arrived at the railways tracks. Along with dozens of other residents on their way to work, we walked for ten more minutes along the tracks to reach the Mankhurd train station. The platform was packed, and Rani complained to me that the station could not handle the thousands of new people that are being resettled here. She warned me that we may not be able to board the first train because of the crowd and that I should not be afraid to push my way in. After more than an hour and half on foot and train, we passed the area where her house once stood. She showed me around and explained that it used to take her only twenty minutes to walk to work. She was grateful to have a resettlement flat but laments the effects of the distant
resettlement location. She explained that she initially became involved in the Alliance’s community-based activities to seek the best resettlement deal after residents came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to move. She soon was forced to quit Mahila Milan activities because of the strain of the increased workload and commute.

Rani’s building neighbors all moved to the Mankhurd Lallubhai resettlement site from their slum neighborhood. Several building women explained that they were either commuting to their former neighborhoods for work or had lost their jobs because they could not afford to commute and simultaneously meet their household and child-rearing responsibilities. Their experiences appear to match survey data showing that real household incomes have decreased along with an increase in the cost of living due to transportation and maintenance fees (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 2007). Yet, according to both official surveys and statements by NGO leaders, women were the greatest beneficiaries of resettlement because of their access to toilets and secure shelter. Many women did express appreciation of the benefits of living in flats. However, when I queried another woman who had lost her job because she was unable to commute to her former residence, she lamented, “What good are toilets when one can no longer eat?”

Rani explained that she began to participate in Mahila Milan just prior to the scheduled demolition to ensure that resettlement was done properly and that the evictees were located closer to their original homes. The key male leader of the slum neighborhood had worked closely with Jockin, and they were told that the move to the Mankhurd site would be temporary; Rani had maintained hope for this move. Seven years later, however, her work and commute have prevented her from going to Mahila Milan meetings, and she has lost hope for the possibility of moving to a better location. Interviews with other women residents and Mahila Milan members demonstrated that few women who work outside of the home have participated in SPARC Alliance activities for lack of time and energy. Some of the building women said they continued to go to meetings with the hope of getting a chance to stay connected to SPARC Alliance leaders for the possibility that they might exchange their resettlement flats for something closer.

Despite the aforementioned bias toward participation of women without jobs, a small number of women did take part in Mahila Milan despite their demanding work schedules. In these instances, women also cite the honor of working for the community through Mahila Milan. One active Mahila Milan member with who I spoke was Meera, a widow with a steady position working as a cleaner for a municipal government office located near her former place residence. She explained that she often could not take part in the citywide meetings and events during the day because of her work and commute schedule, but she was actively involved in the transit camp in activities such as water distribution. Subsequently in the resettlement building, she has been involved in trying to organize residents to maintain cleanliness in shared spaces and address conflict management. She complained that it was not easy to convince people to think for the good of others and to work together for more hygienic and well-ordered surroundings. Nonetheless she explained that she loves to work in the service of others and that Jockin had the same intention. Thus while the ability to participate in Mahila Milan was structured by offsite
work demands for women, these women expressed similar motivations of wanting to help and feeling a sense of honor in working toward the improvement of their surroundings.

Some of the key citywide leaders of Mahila Milan have also strategically deployed their domesticated roles and launched lucrative new business ventures through SPARC projects in slum-based construction contracting. Leena, an important Mahila Milan leader, explained what a difference her involvement in the early rounds of MUTP resettlement made in her life. Leena was clearly a seasoned interviewee who has represented the SPARC Alliance in many city and international development venues. She barely left a moment for asking questions. As Shakya and Rankin (2008) have shown in the context of micro-credit, women often deploy feminized development discourses and roles for a variety of ends. Using the terminology of micro-enterprise development, she described how her business grew from a small grocery shop earning less than U.S. $20 per month to contracts totaling more than U.S. $300,000. Leena was regularly contracted for state-sponsored projects through SPARC to build slum public toilets and small-scale resettlement buildings all over the country. “Women know a little bit about construction because of working at home and making household repairs; I also learned about construction supplies from my brother-in-law,” she explained. Juggling business-related cell phone calls and interactions with other members, she recalled how Jockin guided her into success. She noted that she continues to engage in Mahila Milan’s volunteer activities locally even though contracting takes up most of her time now.

My interview with Leena took place at a citywide gathering of Mahila Milan leaders, where I interacted with a broad range of women involved in the MUTP and other projects. The Mahila Milan gathering revealed hierarchical relations among members of the group. As I spoke with Leena, I observed that the other members greeted each other by name but greeted her and two other women as “madame.” As a post-colonial marker of class distinction in India, the use of the term “madame” struck me as incongruous in this setting. Yet, it also symbolized the contradictions of the Alliance’s populist discourse of community participation: the dream of success through participation, saving and work was not realized uniformly. Still, the implications of such hierarchies went beyond the simple enriching of some Mahila Milan women over others. Mahila Milan leaders regularly privilege their roles as housewives, community volunteers, and in some cases entrepreneurs working for the SPARC Alliance.

One Mahila Milan resettlement site leader, Farzana, has attempted to address the issue of lost wages for women by creating a work cooperative. When I arrived to speak with her in her flat at Lallubhai Compound, a group of women were seated in a line on her small apartment floor waiting for payment for work that they had done in a SPARC food project. Farzana had to explain to them that they would not be receiving the full day’s wage that they were promised for their work. Although their irritation and impatience was palpable, none of the women confronted or blamed Farzana. As they left, she lamented to me the lack of support she received from top SPARC Alliance leaders and the Mahila Milan including

29 Citywide leaders consist primarily of women who originally became involved in Mahila Milan activities through the MUTP project and pavement dwellers’ eviction and resettlement processes.
Leena and Jockin. She has tried to get work for women in SPARC Alliance projects, but their labor is often poorly remunerated. She argued that the success of SPARC and the NSDF resulted from the power of women who could “get work done.” She has tried to get the support of Jockin for some of these activities, but has not pushed because she worries about being construed as a demanding troublemaker. She argued that as the leaders of the SPARC Alliance have expanded their work, they have failed to pay attention to the base of women who have long strengthened the movement. Besides the top leaders of Mahila Milan who work in the area of construction contracting, most women were simply mobilized for voluntary activities and presentation to international visitors. “They speak of women’s empowerment, but they do not want too much of it,” she claims. To take this further, I would argue that is precisely (at least partially) the role of gendered participation that enabled consent to processes of resettlement that have in fact exacerbated inequalities.

The foregoing examples reveal the contradictions of women’s participation; a small number of women have advanced socially and economically through participating in resettlement and other SPARC Alliance activities while others remain in volunteer and laboring positions. Nevertheless, many active members who continue to work as volunteers cite the honor they received through their membership. They express that they enjoy the social aspects, the sense of growth and accomplishment of being involved in the SPARC Alliance and learning from Jockin. With few exceptions, however, the most active Mahila Milan women participants claimed to have less need to work in wage labor due to the earnings of other family members. Class hierarchies across Mahila Milan members and other residents in the resettlement colonies may in fact have widened through the process of resettlement according to one comprehensive survey (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 2007). Furthermore, disparities in experiences of resettled women from participation in Mahila Milan and the SPARC Alliance activities, and the meanings of those experiences, often mapped on to these inequalities. The emergence of socio-spatial inequality in the participatory resettlement process reveals broader forces of production of difference at sway in Mumbai’s urban redevelopment trajectory.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter uses ethnography to examine the emergence and implementation of a participatory slum redevelopment and resettlement project. While the state relied entirely on the profit motive of private developers for financing resettlement, it also harnessed the SPARC Alliance as an intermediary NGO to facilitate slum clearance through participatory mechanisms. SPARC not only fulfilled governmental functions of producing knowledge to implement the resettlement project. Through trainings and meetings, SPARC Alliance members and leaders also played an important educative role in shaping slum dwellers’ appreciation for resettlement and non-confrontational modes of political engagement. I argue that these dimensions of SPARC’s mediation were crucial for securing (a sometimes shaky) hegemonic consent to slum clearance and resettlement. This was a trajectory of eviction politics entrenched in a fundamental reworking of domesticity.
While slum dwellers experienced the force of the demolishing state and patriarchal forms of authoritarian sovereignty under the leadership of Jockin, explaining the processes of hegemony in relation to MUTP requires theorization of power not simply as a top-down force. Rather a “will to participate” was engendered among many evictees through meetings and trainings that promoted cooperation, a pro-development ideal of community and the promise of social progress. Feminized participation in Mahila Milan women’s groups that have employed non-confrontational discourses of patience and community solidarity politically enabled rapid and cooperative slum clearance under difficult conditions. Participatory resettlement was contradictory in that it simultaneously enabled a space of negotiation and power for some evictees but also produced and reinforced gendered and class inequalities. In this manner, this ethnographic analysis reveals that the politics of the evicted cannot be understood homogenously. Rather, it is precisely the production of difference along multiple axes that formed the basis of hegemony and consent to neoliberal redevelopment. However, the experience of intensified inequality has also posed limits to cooperation within and across evicted neighborhoods. The following chapter addresses these limits of hegemonic participation by examining a case of resistance to resettlement in the Gazi Nagar slum that emerged in later rounds of the MUTP.
CHAPTER 4
Spaces of Contention I: Resettlement and Juridico-Economic Rights in Gazi Nagar

4.1 Introduction: Illegal or Classist Redevelopments?

In the previous chapter, I examined how a reworking of gendered domesticity through participatory resettlement fused new hegemonic state practices and evictee cooperation with resettlement. This chapter shows how these hegemonic processes, challenged as contradictions of market-based resettlement governance, emerged in later phases of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP). Specifically, I analyze the divergent political trajectory of eviction in Gazi Nagar, a neighborhood affected by the Santa Cruz Chembur Link Road (SCLR), a road project component of the MUTP. In contrast to the majority of prior railway-affected neighborhoods, four groups of road project evictees, including those located in Gazi Nagar, engaged in more prolonged and publicized forms of resistance against offsite resettlement (see figure 4.1). These conflicts had very significant political implications leading to a temporary suspension in World Bank funding and an Independent Inspection Panel investigation of resettlement processes. Evictee mobilizations challenged the legitimacy of the authoritarian state, market-oriented resettlement and non-governmental mediation by appealing to a transnational semi-juridical body, the World Bank Inspection Panel. In so doing, the mobilizations revealed a distinct ethico-political character marked by a juridico-economic logic. By juridico-economic logic, I mean that eviction politics turned on understandings and contestations over property laws and resettlement norms and procedures ostensibly aimed to produce broad economic benefit and mitigate economic harm.

The juridico-economic framing of eviction struggles is exemplified in the following field notes that I wrote after an interview with Raj Pal and two other Gazi Nagar leaders at their demolished neighborhood plot in the centrally located Kurla district.

As I prepare to leave the demolished Gazi Nagar plot, Mr. Pal offers to accompany me part of my way home and refuses to let me pay for my bus ticket. As we ride along in the bus, the dusty, congested streets and alleys of Kurla give way to the polished corporate buildings of the Bandra-Kurla Complex. Pal asks me about whether I know the nice places of natural beauty in Mumbai. He points out the Mithi River winding along a massive corporate and administrative complex. He wryly informs me that the MMRDA has encroached on the Mithi River basin and that all of the government and corporate buildings we are seeing are illegal. Along the ride he points out some of the areas in the BKC that Gazi Nagar residents could have been resettled but were denied. He complained that these buildings either defied or rested on conveniently overturned zoning laws and yet the state would
not allow even a small plot of the area to be designated for the legitimate project-affected residents of nearby Gazi Nagar.

Mr. Pal and other leaders and representatives of MUTP road-affected areas liken these “illegal” state practices to its infringement of World Bank resettlement norms. In a very different kind of slum politics than the mobilizations discussed by Appadurai (Appadurai, 2002) and Chatterjee (2004), evictees and a neighborhood-based lawyer have used legal and semi-judicial norms established by the Bank to contest and delegitimate the redevelopmental state. It is an example of what Holston has called “insurgent citizenship” where poorer urban residents are increasingly using the apparatus of the law to make and secure land claims (2008). This is a unique development in the context of recent politics of urban informality where the law has increasingly favored upper-class property owners. In Delhi, for instance, it is the elite and middle classes that instigate legal battles advancing mass slum clearance.

Such contestations must also be understood in terms of a broader geography of development intervention and conflict. They recall on-going battles over development-induced displacement such as those in the Narmada Valley and have found support in groups working against displacement in both rural and urban India, especially the National Alliance for People’s Movements (NAPM). In this geography of development struggle, the World Bank and its Inspection Panel have occupied a dual role as both financier and arbiter between the state and the displaced. This contradictory role is especially salient in the current political conjuncture where accumulation is increasingly accomplished through land dispossession and displacements and resettlement negotiation with the state is the key arena of struggle.

Juridico-economic eviction politics in Gazi Nagar represent a disruption in practices of redevelopment governance with important implications for redevelopemental hegemony. Critical to this process, I argue, was a reorientation of juridico-economic rights operating in three interconnected arenas. First is the contestation of resettlement in the semi-juridical space of the World Bank Inspection Panel (IP). Here charges of infractions of World Bank resettlement norms concerning distance of relocation and loss of livelihood enabled a quasi-judicial medium for contesting both the authoritarian bureaucratic state and NGO mediation. Second, Gazi Nagar struggles were connected to local, national and transnational networks of rights-based advocacy and land struggles. These alliances—with a local lawyer, the NAPM and relatively wealthier slum evictees—bolstered the strength and visibility of the movement and entrenched juridico-economic claims practices. Third, World Bank norms, combined with historically sedimented practices of political mobilization around slum regularization and improvement, consolidated a sense of collective legitimacy and entitlement to land despite informal ownership. Among Gazi Nagar evictees, this ethico-political framing of eviction advanced a moral condemnation of the state as corrupt for flouting development law and property rights.

Through each of these arenas, juridico-economic struggles challenged the key class contradictions of state-sponsored redevelopment interventions. One of these is the class nature of road projects themselves. With a growing population of automobile-owning
residents, city boosters and upper middle classes have lauded new high-speed roadways as the quintessential symbol of world-class city status. As many urban activists have argued, however, road projects constitute one of the most inefficient uses of public funds because they fail to serve the mass transport needs of the majority of commuting residents who use mass transit in the form of railways (Anand, 2006). Despite charges of being the most elite-oriented forms of public infrastructure investments, the State of Maharashtra has since the early 1990s increasingly promoted road projects throughout the city to appease a growing and influential middle class. The other class dimension of such projects concerns the market driven nature of slum removal and resettlement on the part of the state and the World Bank. According to slum redevelopment statutes, slums located along infrastructure or ecologically protected areas necessarily must be resettled off site. Offsite resettlement is a direct result of these policies’ market orientation demanding zero public expenditure on resettlement. Evictees are thus resettled on the cheap in low value areas on the urban periphery. Since the construction of the resettlement colonies under the MUTP railways resettlement, the majority of eligible affected people were forced into the extra buildings of colonies like Lallubhai Compound discussed in the previous chapter.

The experience of class is thus fundamentally constituted by juridico-economic relations by shaping people’s economic capacity (income) to live in centrally located areas and their relative political capacity to legitimate their land claims under the law. Gazi Nagar evictees’ juridico-economic mobilizations thus exposed the class effects of resettlement: distant displacement not only defied resettlement norms and criteria but also economically hurt residents through loss of land value and income. In this chapter I argue, however, that the juridico-economic modality of eviction politics failed to question the structural relations that reproduce other inequalities. In fact, a focus on corruption, legality and norm infraction in semi-juridical arenas either reinscribed or ignored the class biases and exclusionary practices of the state and global finance capital itself. Thus, although the struggle posed a significant challenge to redevelopment and market-oriented resettlement, it also reproduced an acceptance of fundamental structures of power upon which redevelopment rests. A discussion of my research processes contextualizes these findings.

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30 Because of the potential political volatility of skewed benefits, the World Bank initially agreed to fund the project as a primarily mass-transit railways project. This decision was overturned when the state added to two major roads to the MUTP in 2002.
Figure 4.1: Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) map (source: World Bank Group)
4.2 The Origins of Juridico-Economic Land Struggles: NAPM and Local Lawyers

A discussion of research methods and processes requires a prior disclosure of the politics of access. My introduction to neighborhood leaders and residents was initially forged through contacts in the Mumbai chapter of the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM). A new NAPM member organization, Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao Andolan (GBGB, Save Homes, Build Homes Movement) emerged after the 2005 Vision Mumbai demolition sweep with the aim of representing displaced slum dwellers in Mumbai. As in the case of SPARC affiliated resettlement colonies, my relationship to evicted slum dwellers was mediated to a certain extent by NAPM. NAPM involvement in the Gazi Nagar struggle began after neighborhood-based leaders and lawyers had already sent letters to the World Bank requesting an inspection of the resettlement processes. NAPM sent letters of support to the World Bank Inspection Panel on behalf of MUTP road project evictees and invited them to join a coalition of other evicted groups in Mumbai and across India. As the head of the Narmada anti-dam movement which prompted important resettlement policy reforms and as well as the Inspection Panel process, the support of NAPM’s internationally known leader Medha Patkar helped bolster the recognition and political weight of the MUTP case at the World Bank and the Independent Inspection Panel (Inspection Panel, 2005, pp. xviii, 8, 103, 170).

Like SPARC, NAPM represents a highly influential political phenomena in Indian development politics—one, however, that has very different ideologies and transnational linkages. Forming alliances among displaced dam-affected Adivasis of the Narmada River Valley and other rural and urban displaced groups, the NAPM has made fundamental critiques of large-scale development for the social and ecological damage that it entails. The movement has a long history of resisting development through a mix of Gandhian and ecological Marxist ideology and mobilization. It also has important transnational linkages with rights-based and advocacy-oriented groups that share the development critique. The Narmada struggle was key in the introduction of the juridical mode of contesting development.

Spearheaded in 1992 by activists involved in displacement struggles over dams in the Narmada Valley, NAPM campaigns address both a broad range of concerns that challenge state-sponsored development and the globalized liberalization of markets and public-private partnerships constituting processes of neoliberal capital accumulation and displacement today. NAPM’s members include economically threatened or displaced fishers, farmers, street vendors, slum dwellers and laborers of a variety of ethnicities and caste backgrounds. The movement began to engage more deeply in urban struggles during the Vision Mumbai demolition sweeps of 2004 and 2005. Among its recent interventions, the anti-evictions struggles in Mumbai and subsequent involvement in farmers’ anti-displacement struggles in the infamous Special Economic Zone (SEZ) projects of Nandigram and Singur West Bengal stand out for invigorating the coalition’s actions and attention in national and international media. The movement’s focus on social justice and environmental sustainability has important formative roots in rural struggles over
development and displacement. While SPARC Alliance’s discursive positioning harnessed the non-confrontational gendered negotiation strategies in Mumbai’s pavement dwelling communities, Gazi Nagar’s leadership drew upon juridical strategies and discourses that derived in part from the history of the NAPM and the local legal battles over land. NAPM ideological origins stretch out geographically to anti-displacement struggles over the (initially) Bank-funded Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada River Valley. A brief history of struggles in the Narmada Valley will help situate NAPM’s recent interventions in urban evictions.

The Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement, NBA) formed under the leadership of Medha Patkar in 1987 in an effort to confront the issue of mass displacement caused by dam projects along the river. While villages in the area had been organizing for access to forest resources well before the dam was proposed, the NBA mobilized a much larger number of villages across the Valley to collaborate and contest the state-sponsored project. The movement brought international attention not only to the authoritarian process and injustice of displacing the most socially and economically marginalized of indigenous communities but also the dubious economic and environmental calculus that justified dam construction in the area. The movement gained worldwide attention by deploying a number of strategies including Gandhian civil disobedience tactics such as protest marches, occupation actions and hunger strikes. It highlighted the plight of tribal communities whose ecologically sustainable traditional livelihood was threatened by a socially and environmentally destructive model of development. That NBA protested the World Bank for failing to adhere to its own social and environmental impact mitigation standards was a crucially important aspect of its strategy; the protest enabled international visibility and support for the struggle to spread through networks of transnational organizations and media. The campaign successfully gained the support of several U.S.-based environmental and social advocacy groups that campaigned for important changes to Bank practices. U.S.-based advocacy groups also pushed for the formation of an institution, the Independent Inspection Panel to review grievances by people affected by problematic implementation of World Bank projects. The Morse Commission conducted a review of the Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada Valley and released a scathing critique stating that “problems besetting the Sardar Sarovar projects are more the rule than the exception to resettlement operations supported by the Bank.” An internal Bank report known as the Wapenhans Report later admitted that a “culture of approval” pervaded the Bank wherein appraisal processes were dubious and loan clearance was privileged over any considerations of impact and implementation procedure (Hunter & Udall, 1994). Ultimately, the NBA’s campaign to reveal inconsistencies and injustices drove the World Bank to abandon the project, though the Indian government has continued dam project implementation and displacement (Baviskar, 2005, p. 22).

The Narmada struggle launched a new era at the Bank in terms of the knowledge production and assessment procedures. Development scholar, Robert Wade has shown that Bank officials are now much more careful of impacts. Indeed, Bank staff are now much more wary of “the Narmada effect” and the need for ostensibly more thorough project appraisals. This change demonstrates how social movements have caused ripples in
“business as usual” in the Bank (1997). New norms at the Bank were established for mitigating the effects of displacement, including more scrutinizing of social and environmental impact assessments, participatory processes and procedures of independent inspection of grievances by project-affected groups (Fox & Brown, 1998). Given the antagonism between the NAPM and SPARC today, it is ironic that those very norms have been incorporated into the latter organization’s resettlement model for the MUTP. At the same time as Narmada launched a new era at the Bank, Michael Goldman has also shown how practices of appraisal—what he calls “eco-governmentality,” technologies under a set of power-knowledge practices that he calls “green neoliberalism”—enable continuities in neoliberal economic restructuring and financing of development while still undertaking procedures of social and environmental impact assessments. These practices enroll participation and consent from a broad range of agents in the Bank, in states and in civil society groups (2005). Goldman also shows how these practices have now extended into the urban realm through various infrastructure projects in efforts to create world-class cities out of third world ones (2006).

Goldman concedes that neoliberal hegemony World-Bank style is as fragile as it is agile and subject to revolts. However, Goldman misses the ways in which the legacy of the “Narmada effect” has put the Bank in a rather contradictory position. I show how state agencies were forced with respect to Gazi Nagar to negotiate with evictees to a certain extent. When resettlement costs proved to be too high, however, state agencies threatened to relinquish Bank funding and seek it elsewhere. Thus, as experiences in both Narmada and Mumbai show, the state has been a more agile and violent adversary for such struggles than the Bank, one that finance capital nonetheless benefits from. In this context and when exposed and pushed by mobilizations of evictees and Inspection Panels, the Bank performs the role of arbiter between violent developmental regimes and people most severely affected by them. It must tread lightly on the state, however, because it wants to retain the business in a context in which many other less stringent sources of finance capital compete.

I have spent some time now discussing the juridico-economic logic of the World Bank and its Inspection Panel as it emerged through prior struggles over displacement. Though semi-judicial processes of contention have their origins in Narmada struggles with the state and Bank, this legacy, however, was not the sole source of struggle. Furthermore, aside from some public support and letter writing, NAPM’s actual involvement in efforts of Gazi Nagar evictees remained minimal, unlike the Mandala case discussed in the following chapter. Therefore, I conclude my analysis of the struggles of NAPM’s predecessor, the NBA, here and continue it within my in-depth discussion of the group’s ethico-political and mobilizational practices in the Mandala eviction discussed in the next chapter. Another major source for the juridification of land struggle speaks to a rather different set of debates focused on cities. I discuss these in later sections and situate these more specifically urban origins of rights struggles by first briefly discussing my research access and process and the history of the neighborhood—especially mobilizations around improvement regularization and legal mediations.
4.3 Research Process, Access and Neighborhood History

Gaining access to research subjects required demonstrating to leaders and activists a certain level of allegiance to NAPM’s strategies and ideology as well as intent to contribute concretely to its work. Activists expressed a mistrust of academic researchers as extractive, a perspective with which I sympathize. I agreed to the conditions of my participation in no small part because my sympathies did in fact lay more closely with the NAPM’s ideological stance than with SPARC’s. Over the course of research and writing, I have come to understand the strengths, weaknesses and circumstances that have shaped each groups’ practices in a more nuanced manner. Fairly soon after I made initial contacts through NAPM, my communications and interactions with Gazi Nagar leaders began to develop independent of NAPM. The uncomfortable aspect of this research was that I was compelled to downplay with both NAPM and SPARC my interaction with the other due to the public clashes between NAPM’s Medha Patkar and SPARC’s Sheela Patel. For the sake of access and some attempt at balance and accuracy in the representation of diverse perspectives, the choice to do so seemed appropriate.

I conducted individual and group interviews with a total of 27 people (6 leaders and 21 more or less politically active residents) at their resettlement colony homes. I pieced together the political-economic geography and history of Gazi Nagar through oral histories conducted with resettled residents. The land was originally an abandoned swamp plot claimed by a local slumlord who sold out individual plots for residential use starting in 1979. New residents were migrants from rural villages in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh who worked in textiles mills, garment production or in other service jobs such as taxi and rickshaw driving. Over the following decade, residents leveraged their material and political resources to fill in wetlands, build roads and gain access to water supply and public toilets. At the same time, the early years of the settlement were marked by repeated demolitions where residents were forced to pay bribes to the police to rebuild their homes. Efforts to prevent demolitions and access infrastructural services led to neighborhood alliances with ward officials in the municipal corporation associated with the Congress party, which helped with slum regularization and improvement interventions. Neighborhood leaders involved in resisting the recent MUTP resettlement originally gained local political footing through this party system.

Jitendra Maurya, a major anti-resettlement leader, recounted his initial leadership activities beginning with organizing religious festivals and then organizing oppositional activities in the party system in both local and citywide political struggles and direct actions for services, against fuel price hikes and worker strikes. Raj Awasthi, another major leader in the Kurla area, also rose in the political ranks of the Congress party at this time as a youth leader. It was integration into the political party system that initiated local political activism, especially among the more upwardly mobile middle-income residents. Awasthi would later become a local shop owner trained in the law; he helped to spearhead legal actions in the courts and at the World Bank Inspection Panel, as I discuss in the following section. At this point, however, legal battles were less the purview of slum-based mobilizations. Upper-middle-class leftist activist lawyers espoused in the legal realm the
causes of groups not politically enfranchised in the local party machinery, such as the pavement dwellers discussed in the previous chapters.

During this period in the 1980s, there was little developer interest in Gazi Nagar, as it was located on the periphery of the city, just outside of the main industrial districts. Thus neighborhood politics centered on service-oriented party patronage. In the early 2000s, however, the situation began to change as Gazi Nagar and other neighboring road-affected settlements located in Kurla district have seen real estate values increase substantially. The area has become coveted for its location adjacent to the Bandra-Kurla Complex, a new business center built by the state of Maharashtra and housing government offices and several national and transnational corporate headquarters. This new political economic geography has emerged alongside new governing practices and notably the rise of non-governmental entities operating in partnership with the redevelopmental state. I now turn to the meanings and practices of rule and contestation in Gazi Nagar since the 2000s.

4.4 Tyranny, Betrayal, Corruption: Encountering a Changing Sarkar

When the MUTP road project was initially announced in Gazi Nagar, residents and shop owners firmly rejected the involvement of the SPARC Alliance in resettlement processes. In a conversation Farzana, a SPARC women’s group member from a railway-affected slum, recounted to me the process through her personal experience. Farzana had been sent by SPARC Alliance leaders to facilitate the slum clearance through surveying and organizing residents in Gazi Nagar. After she visited her first few homes, residents began to threaten and force her out of the area. Farzana recalled her frustration in discovering that her job was not simply administrative but one that required “convincing” a volatile and unwilling group of people to relocate. She reasoned that she was most certainly spared violence on the part of residents for being a woman, but was nonetheless scared to enter the space. Residents showed such a deep distrust of SPARC and Jockin that at a certain point Farzana resolved to represent herself in subsequent road-affected areas as government staff from the MMRDA rather than expose her NGO affiliation. SPARC leaders represent the reaction of the residents as a symptom of the fact that the Alliance did not have the chance to establish a working relationship with the neighborhood leaders who were more interested in personal gain than participatory cooperation. I would argue, however, that the Gazi Nagar response had more to do with the political and economic geography of the area, especially the changing everyday experience of the state.

The relationship between the settlement and state agents began to shift with the redevelopment of the Kurla area in the early 2000s. This changing relationship reflected the ways that my interlocuters in Gazi Nagar describe their interactions with elected officials. In investigating the state and practices of redevelopmental rule, I take seriously the admonition of Corbridge et al. (2005) to not simply imagine how a monolithic state “sees” the territories and populations it seeks to govern (J. C. Scott, 1998). Instead, a focus on the everyday ways that slum residents “see the state”—or rather how they express their experience of their relationship with the state—is central for understanding how and why evictees engage politically to challenge, remake or facilitate projects of rule. Over the
course of my research, I found that Gazi Nagar leaders and residents repeatedly described the state through one of three tropes: corruption, tyranny and betrayal. These tropes mark shifts in residents’ perceptions of the state as well as their relationship with its agents—what I would call the lived state.

Following and extending Akhil Gupta’s (2006) analysis of discourses of corruption in development contexts, I would argue that these tropes also indicate changing understandings of rights to urban space. Gupta argues that given their prevalence in multiple contexts, under-analyzed corruption talk offers valuable insights into the culture of politics and discursive and material practices that constitute the state in the everyday experience of citizens. He writes,

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\text{The postcolonial state consciously sets to create subject positions unknown during the colonial era: ‘citizenship’ does not just mark inclusiveness in a territorial domain but indicates a set of rights theoretically invested in subjects who inhabit the nation. One of the crucial ingredients of discourses of citizenship in a populist democracy such as India has been that state employees are considered accountable to ‘the people’ of the country. The discourse of corruption by marking those actions that constitute an infringement of such rights, thus acts to represent the rights of citizens to themselves. (Gupta, 2006, p. 226)}
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In statements made by Gazi Nagar residents, discourses of corruption, betrayal and tyranny fundamentally question the legitimacy of state and NGO actions in a context of a highly contentious spatial politics of redevelopment and eviction. In this way, as Gupta rightly asserts, such discourses serve as an important “diagnostic of the state” (Gupta, 2006, p. 226), one that in the present case gave rise to juridical forms of contention targeted beyond its geographical and institutional boundaries. These declarations are also rich for examining the specific meaning of rights talk because they refer to perceived unjust actions on multiple and sometimes conflicting moral, social and legal registers. Corruption talk not only referred to the illegal siphoning of development funds and dubious land-use decisions but also of the failure to act in the interest of the residents to whom officials had a social and moral obligation. Iterations of betrayal did similar work but with a more communal dimension, referring to a breach in obligations based on community or identity-based bonds. Most broadly, these discourses implied the right of Gazi Nagar residents to have their land rights taken seriously. For many residents, this meant a greater effort on the part of the government to minimize the difficulties associated with displacement if not the absolute right to stay. Accusations of tyranny, however, pointed to a somewhat related but different category of more procedural rights of democratic participation in processes of development. Such procedural demands were well directed at discourses of the World Bank and NGOs on the importance of civil society participation. I expand below on how such discourses formed the basis of a juridical form of contention, but first an account of key encounters with state agents described by Gazi Nagar residents and leaders serves to elucidate these discursive practices.
The key elected officials with whom residents interacted included Rajhans Singh, a ward councilor of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, and Nawab Malik, the district representative in the Maharashtra state parliament. Between these two, Singh has had a particularly revered position in the neighborhood as the ward official who concretized allies and built roads, drainage, sewerage lines and public toilet blocks. He was trusted for his background as a “bhaiya,” originally from the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Singh’s popularity solidified Gazi Nagar resident’s alliance with the Congress party since the late 1980s. One resettled Gazi Nagar resident described her early days of campaigning passionately for Singh as if he were her own brother. She lamented that Singh was “such a good man before being spoilt by money.” Singh responded to residents’ appeal to help stay the eviction by insisting that there was no use in fighting the government on this project and that there was no other choice but for them to move to the Mankhurd resettlement colony. While some residents suspected that Singh was profiting unwholesomely through his relationship with the head of the MMRDA, T. Chandrashekhar, others thought that he was pressured by the Congress party into cooperating and had very little political leverage in relation to the powerful national and transnational forces involved. In all cases, Singh was perceived as a fallen ally, someone who was “one of us” but no longer showed loyalty to Gazi Nagar whether or not it was a greed-inspired betrayal or a strategy of political survival.

There was a more unified consensus on the part of my interlocuters on the betrayal and corruption of Nawab Malik, the state parliament representative for the Kurla district where Gazi Nagar and the Bandra-Kurla business complex are both located. My conversations with Gazi Nagar's activist advocate, Raj Awasthi, and three main leaders, Raj Bahadur Pal, Siaram Maurya, and Dwarka Yadav Prasad, were full of critiques of Malik's dubious land grabs. Malik had purchased neighboring plots of land from the state housing authority where he was also a board member, a position that allowed him to purchase land for a deeply subsidized price. Malik met public purpose land-use regulations by building a school and then changed the road project route to improve access to his newly acquired properties, causing a much larger number of evictions in Gazi Nagar and other Kurla settlements. An initial group of Muslim residents closely aligned to Nawab Malik agreed to move to Mankhurd out of fear that their homes would be demolished without resettlement. Interviews with residents relocated to Lallubhai Compound in Mankhurd suggest that many of them also felt a sense of betrayal. Three of the cooperative society heads complained about wrongly trusting Malik, who told them there was no other choice but to move, but those who fought the process were relocated to better areas. Gazi Nagar leaders often expressed their suspicions that slum removal and redevelopment was part of an effort to amass and redevelop valuable land through the corrupt use of his bureaucratic position. Investigations into Malik’s land acquisition activities in central Mumbai by Anna Hazare, a well-known anti-corruption activist, seemed to confirm these suspicions, and Malik was soon forced to resign from his position in the state housing ministry (Abraham, 2005) though the trials did not change the MUTP and evictions in Gazi Nagar.

These experiences demonstrate how elected officials like Singh and Malik collaborated with bureaucratic forces to facilitate resettlement but were no longer responsive to
residents’ appeals to remain on their land. Although Gazi Nagar residents identified these actions as wrong, they eventually accepted the move as inevitable and shifted the focus of their efforts to obtaining better resettlement options rather than fighting to remain on the land. However, there seemed to be little incentive on the part of officials to meet residents’ demands for better resettlement units perhaps because their constituents would soon be resettled into another voting district on the outskirts of the city. Thus residents’ mode of negotiating displacement with the state through elected officials was forced to change in the context of increasingly authoritarian practices of bureaucratic state developmentalism.

Evictees identified the head of the MMRDA, T. Chandrashekhar (reporting directly to the Chief Minister of the state government of Maharashtra), as the most powerful arm of the local state for their concerns. Gazi Nagar leaders and residents often described T. Chandrashekhar as a single-minded tyrant who threatened slum dwellers and refused to negotiate resettlement options. For instance, when neighborhood leaders refused to sign consent forms and attempted to negotiate a closer alternative resettlement site, Chandrashekhar threatened to demolish the area without any compensation. As I show in the following section, conflicts between T. Chandrashekhar and Gazi Nagar residents emerged as a highly publicized and controversial aspect of the project and the Inspection Panel Investigation that called into question the project’s participatory mandate. In part because of these controversies, his appointment was shifted out of the MMRDA and into the Dharavi Development Authority, another contentious project.

Aside from these governmental agents, non-governmental groups like the SPARC Alliance also had a significant role, as I mention above. However SPARC’s involvement did not mitigate the perception of the tyranny and corruption of the state and in some instances actually reinforced them. Gazi Nagar residents described SPARC as a thuggish and corrupt surveyor contracted to do the bidding of the MMRDA. Gazi Nagar leaders recalled that SPARC’s leader, Jockin, often warned residents of their fate in the hands of the MMRDA if they did not cooperate with the NGO’s resettlement processes. Leaders also accused SPARC of corruptly extracting payments from residents and siphoning off project funds (accusations not substantiated in investigations). Gazi Nagar residents remained adamant in their non-cooperation with SPARC and the MMRDA, and neighborhood leaders adopted the neighboring Kurla shop owner association’s strategies of contention.

The discourses of corruption and wrongdoing were most evident in the accounts of Raj Awasthi, the advocate for Gazi Nagar residents and the neighboring United Shop Owners Association. When Gazi Nagar resident leader Raj Pal described Awasthi to me, he glowingly put him in the same category of activists and that included Medha Patkar, the head of NAPM and Anna Hazare, the anti-corruption crusader who successfully accused a state Parliament member, Nawab Malik, of numerous counts of fraud. Simpreet Singh, NAPM’s principle Mumbai-based anti-evictions activist, similarly described Raj Awasthi as “a threat to the MLA and the builder lobby as he was a whistle blower of the corruption that was taking place in the rehabilitation package of the World Bank.” Awasthi also saw his efforts in a similar light though, as I discuss below, findings of corruption ultimately did not materialize in the project.
I first met Awasthi in his small office located just down the street from the Mumbai High Court. He was clearly a busy man juggling many cases simultaneously and it took several attempts to meet him at a time when he was not in court. Located in a dilapidated two story building in an area that could easily be designated a slum, Awasthi’s office was a bustling place with piles of files and constant streams of visitors coming to speak with him about a variety of cases ranging from slum resettlement discrepancies to an ongoing trial of police involvement in anti-Muslim violence during the infamous Ayodhya communal riots of the winter of 1993. When I told him that I was interested in learning more about the MUTP, he asked me why in a friendly but challenging manner. I responded by saying that I was interested in understanding why some people like those involved in the railways resettlement described the project as a successful model of participatory development while others like Gazi Nagar residents have lodged complaints. Awasthi chuckled and asked if it was SPARC who told me that it was a “model.” If so he had plenty of stories of corruption among SPARC staff, MMRDA staff and local politicians to argue otherwise. “The only reason that the [other] railway slum dwellers did not complain [as Gazi Nagar residents] was that they were not informed of their rights,” he declared. According to Awasthi, residents came to know their rights through his own activism and the organizing work of three main neighborhood leaders. Such rights included material aspects such as adequately located resettlement but also procedural concerns such as consultations with project-affected people articulated in the World Bank resettlement directives as well as the development regulation statutes of Mumbai (though the latter is clearly less stringent).

Of course, tackling corruption in this manner depends on legal infringements, leaving little recourse if policies and regulations already exhibit a class bias. In this regard Awasthi’s statements were unique. While the discourse of corruption in India often articulates with middle- and upper-class frustrations with the dirtiness of plebian politics, Awasthi made class critiques of various injustices aimed at a wide range of agents. “Removing slums by corrupt practices ensures that Mumbai is only for the rich,” he argued, indicting the “corrupt” maneuvers of developers and NGOs in a similar manner as government officials. For instance, he claimed that NGOs like SPARC got “illegal” powers to create eligibility for resettlement without any monitoring. He also described a variety of “scams” by builders and politicians who acquired public funds, land and lucrative development rights through slum rehab schemes that failed to comply with city regulations. In this manner, Awasthi’s and other leaders’ discourse of corruption did in fact begin to touch on material rights though within limits, as I will address below.

In so far as the discourses of corruption, betrayal and tyranny articulated evictees’ understandings of their rights to land and interrogated the state and its partners, they also implicated a particular set of political strategies for claiming those rights. Gazi Nagar leaders came to counter the state through juridical practices of contention directing appeals and charges of corruption and resettlement malpractices to higher and ostensibly more just sovereign powers beyond national boundaries: the World Bank and its Inspection Panel. These actions eventually brought Gazi Nagar into contact with other groups including the National Alliance of People’s Movements working in a rights-based framework against the state but also against global institutions of neoliberalization. I will
now analyze the events, discourses and practices of contention that emerged in Gazi Nagar from 2004 to 2007 and the brief alliance the neighborhood leaders formed with NAPM.

4.5 The Juridification of Contention

In our midst, many people argued that it’s no use to fight the sarkar. We did so anyway. (Mr. Pal, Gazi Nagar leader and resettled resident)

As it became evident that various neighborhoods in the Kurla district of Mumbai were slated for demolition, Gazi Nagar leaders and residents were forced to re-strategize after merely refusing to allow the surveying and organizing activities undertaken by SPARC on behalf of the state. When state agents presented more forceful threats of demolition, leaders’ subsequent response was to engage in more systematic, juridical forms of contention directed toward the World Bank. In April 2004, advocate and project-affected shop owner Raj Awasthi prepared and sent letters to the World Bank and Inspection Panel first on behalf of 118 members of United Shop Owners Association (USOA) located in the Kismat Nagar neighborhood of Kurla. Later in July Awasthi submitted a similar complaint on behalf of three groups of residents (totaling approximately 500 households) in the neighboring Gazi Nagar settlement. The Gazi Nagar inspection and conflict continued for three years before residents were ultimately forced to resettle.

Two aspects of the Gazi Nagar complaints are salient for understanding the political unfurling of resistance. First are the implications of Gazi Nagar leaders’ articulation of their complaints, in particular the reliance on charges of corruption and non-compliance with World Bank directives. The leaders’ articulation marks a very different framing of claims based on juridico-economic rights and indictments of infringements against bank directives. These charges represent a creative re-articulation of what Holston has called “insurgent citizenship,” in which working-class residents use the law to subvert the legal structures of property ownership that suppress them. In Mumbai and other Indian cities, activists have long used the courts to argue for rights of displaced citizens with little success. In recent years, however, the courts have increasingly favored middle-class claims to space to the detriment of informal slum residents. As Gautam Bhan and others have argued for instance (Bhan, 2009; Ghertner, 2008), Delhi has thus become a “juridical city,” a political space that overlaps with what Chatterjee calls the “bourgeois city” (Chatterjee, 2004). In this scenario within which courts favor the elite and governmental resettlement is distributed to unaccountable NGOs working for an authoritarian bureaucratic state, the opportunity to direct juridico-economic claims to another transnational body was a useful move. The Bank with its resettlement and rehabilitation criteria and the IP’s moral and investigative pressures to maintain them have offered a new semi-juridical arena for contestation. This is a juridical body with inadequate powers that remains limited by a powerful state with multiple financing options, as the below discussion reveals.

A second issue concerns the manner in which complaints were translated and re-inscribed in the responses of the Bank and the Inspection Panel. Particular diagnoses of the problem and solutions were privileged over others. I will now show how through shifting juridico-
economic framings Gazi Nagar residents’, the Inspection Panel’s and the World Bank management team’s diagnoses of problems converged in some instances and diverged in others. The World Bank responded quickly to the letter sent by Awasthi and Gazi Nagar leaders and attempted to further a solution through organizing a meeting with representatives of the Bank’s India Office, the MMRDA, the NGO SPARC and leaders of Gazi Nagar. The meeting went sour as T. Chandrashekhar of the MMRDA dismissed residents’ demands for larger and more closely located resettlement flats and full disclosure of the resettlement processes as per the World Bank’s resettlement directives. This was the first moment that Chandrashekhar famously charged that it was impossible for the government in India to be held to the same standards of compensation as America, and that if the World Bank imposed such unreasonable demands, then the government would seek funding elsewhere. This declaration cum threat would be replayed in English-language media coverage as well as in the written complaints of evictees who used this assertion as evidence of the government’s failure to adhere to World Bank policies. Gazi Nagar residents’ appeal to the Inspection Panel juxtaposes the Bank’s resettlement directive with T. Chandrashekhar’s threats as follows:

We feel that this is too unfair an attitude of an officer holding such an important chair in the government department. When the implementing agencies are not ready to even provide us basic informations regarding the project but performing tricks and showing their skills in hiding and defending their irresponsibilities by making illogical and baseless statements as stated above, where the question arises of following the guidelines of the World Bank, “Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs.” Now we, the poor residents of the Gazi Nagar, are unable to understand where to go for justice in such circumstances. (letter dated July 12th 2004 to the World Bank feedback website)

Immediately following this complaint against the “unfair attitude” of the state, the letter continues to allege the “corruption” and “irregularities” of SPARC. These are evidenced in the same letter by the fact that SPARC staff requested residents to pay 25 rupees (to issue photo ids) without providing receipts. They also complained about the roughly stated demands of A. Jockin for residents to make sure women of the household were present for resettlement documentation even if they were away in rural villages. Although the allegations of corruption would later be found baseless, residents’ claim that “we cannot bear with ‘SPARC’ anymore” effectively rejected being governed by the NGO. The declaration attempted to show the hollowness of the participatory discourse, thereby delegitimizing its power. In addition to charges of corruption and failure to abide by participatory processes, Gazi Nagar residents’ letter to the inspection panel included the demands not just to participate but also to be resettled close by in centrally located areas including the Bandra-Kurla Complex in order to retain their livelihoods. In a direct challenge to the government’s assertion that no such lands were available, they argue “that the government has acquired many private plots of land in this SCLR project itself and the government possesses full powers to acquire any land at any given time.” The letter
continues by indicting Parliamentary Minister Nawab Malik for his easy acquisition of prime properties in the Kurla district from the government through his private family trust. Finally, the letter ended by referring to Indian legal precedents. Citing in particular the famed Olga Tellis case ruling, the letter showed how the constitutionally protected rights to life and livelihood were linked to housing through the argument that slum and pavement dwellers lived in informal settlements to be located close to their livelihoods.

Bank Management also wrote back to Gazi Nagar leaders ensuring residents that there would be improvements in communication and consultations but failed to directly address the demand to be relocated in an alternative resettlement site. Despite the urging of the Bank’s India representative, I.U.B. Reddy, for residents to continue to resolve issues internally with the MMRDA, the situation escalated. The Bank then sent an official response report to the Inspection Panel, in which it conceded to the charge of the possibility of a lack in consultation processes and inadequacies in grievance redressing institutions, continuing to insist on the suitability of the Mankhurd site and the lack of alternative locations. The Bank Management’s official response to the Gazi Nagar claim for Inspectional Panel Review maintained its position that the Mankhurd site was suitable according to its criteria and denied the charges of distance of the resettlement site as significant problems. The report also argued that the alternative sites proposed by evictees for resettlement were inadequate because they were earmarked for other purposes including as an international finance and business center and therefore not appropriate for resettlement housing (World Bank, 2006). Finally, it ensured that the nominal 25-rupee charge that SPARC levied to pay for photos—which residents identified as “corruption”—would no longer be undertaken.

A second letter sent to the Panel by Awasthi and Gazi Nagar leaders again emphasized the keys issues of failures to “consult” with project-affected families, corruption within the NGO and lack of appropriate resettlement location options and related livelihood concerns but also added several key dimensions. One was a sharp criticism of the MMRDA’s representations of the Mankhurd resettlement site. The leaders argued that the site was dangerously polluted due to its location near a municipal dump. The letter also harnessed evidence of the horrible conditions of previously evicted railway slum dwellers living in Mankhurd transit camps and indicted the MMRDA for its false promises to residents as well as the World Bank. The letter incisively argued that “on the one hand, MMRDA could not provide the basic amenities to the already shifted PAP’s, on the other hand, they are claiming to provide the necessary infrastructure [for us].” The letter blamed the MMRDA for too conveniently using future plans of schools, hospitals and transport infrastructure improvement in Mankhurd as evidence of a current high quality of life and suitability of the site for resettlement. Charging the MMRDA for the “manipulative expertness” and “hollowness” of planning ambitions, the letter goes on to chide the agency: “MMRDA people might be living in future but . . . we poor people prefer to live in present time and hence kindly do not show us the sweat dreams of Good Township of the future.” In response to the Bank’s assurance that proper consultations would take place so as to show residents the resettlement site, the Gazi Nagar letter to the IP counters and reworks the very meaning of consultation in the resettlement operative discourse. They write, “Our issue is not that we were not consulted on the issue of shifting to Mankhurd site as we do not want
to be shifted there because of so many reasons stated earlier . . . In fact the residents of Gazi Nagar are being coerced upon and pressurized to accept this project and their resettlement without their consent and will . . . [it is also true that] we were neither consulted nor informed about anything related to this project prior to writing letters to the World Bank.” The letter thus confronted the minimalist notion of “consultation” understood by the implementing agencies as one of merely informing evictees of the project plans without actually obtaining meaningful consent (letter dated July 23, 2004).

The Independent Inspection Panel investigation thus ensued after the meetings and correspondences to resolve the conflict and Gazi Nagar leaders refused to continue talks with what they considered an intransigent state authority. Under the direction of Edith Weiss, the panel examined all project documents in depth. The Panel also made a site visit in Mumbai for interviews with MMRDA staff, SPARC staff Gazi Nagar resident leaders and shop owners and for inspection of the Mankhurd site. SPARC underwent an especially severe investigation process that Sundar Burra, one of the NGO’s lead advisors, described as a “witch hunt” that ultimately revealed no proof of corruption on the part of the NGO. Indeed, when the actual substance of the charges was investigated, little by way of damning evidence of financial siphoning or other significant foul play materialized. The 25 rupees charge for providing materials was a well-established practice by SPARC and was not really enough to surpass the organization’s expenses. And the MMRDA and SPARC may have bent some rules (according to some residents that I interviewed) by offering first choice of housing and perhaps even extra space to the most active neighborhood leaders to facilitate cooperation. But given the scale of the project and resources mobilized, there did not seem to be much diversion of funds and units so as to significantly undermine resettlement processes, as Gazi Nagar’s discourse of corruption seemed to imply.

Subsequent to the investigation, the Panel produced a 270-page report detailing their assessment of the key problems in the project. The Panel’s assessment was an impressively thorough one that captured many dimensions of the project. In addition to standard concerns of implementation inconsistencies and lack of “capacity” of the MMRDA and SPARC, it pointed out political and structural issues as well. For instance, the Panel criticized the Bank resettlement plan for failing to consider income restoration concerns, for underestimating the true costs of resettlement and for failing to consider the specific needs of PAPs in the road-affected component of the project, especially the middle-income shop owners. The Panel further condemned the misguided decision of placing the rail and road infrastructure component of the project together and under the charge of the MMRDA, an engineering and development agency with little interest or experience in the complex socio-economic issues of resettlement. It also disapproved of the use of the government of Maharashtra’s market-based Slum Rehabilitation Authority model for resettlement finance, development and land acquisition, which the Panel reasoned relied too heavily on developer participation. Specifically, the Panel report criticized the use of market-based, economic incentives such as “transfers of development rights” for its effect on resettlement location, claiming that the project was “strongly influenced by finding sites that suited the developers.” Finally, in a damning charge against the all-too-convenient deployment of “consultation” as a stand in for democratic participation and consent, the Panel report
found that “when meetings with PAP’s took place, ‘consultation’ with them seemed to be more in the nature of telling them what was to occur than engaging them in meaningful discussion on alternative options that might better meet their needs” (Inspection Panel, 2005, p. 91).

The Bank’s response to the Panel’s report addressed but underplayed most of the Panel’s criticisms that pointed to political and economic power imbalances and their effects on resettlement. The Bank report continued to justify the market orientation of the project, insisting on the lack of better resettlement site options due to high land prices. The only points of the Panel’s criticism that were significantly conceded in the Bank Management response report were its own failure to assess the “institutional capacity” of both the MMRDA and the NGO involved, weaknesses in the grievance redress mechanisms, the lack of appropriate environmental improvement initiatives in the resettled area and inadequacies in the treatment of the middle income shop owners (a significantly small portion of the entire group) whose specific location concerns needed to be considered (World Bank, 2006).

As the Panel and the Bank wrangled over the charges, the MMRDA took matters into its own hands. In the same month that the Bank responded with its report in response to the Inspection Panel, activist-lawyer Raj Awasthi was jailed under criminal charges despite protests by project-affected residents and other city-wide housing activist groups. Days later, a force of 200 police and government officials descended on the Gazi Nagar residential area (shop keepers area was not approached at this time) with bulldozers and consent documents. In interviews, leaders recounted to me that they were threatened with demolition and no resettlement should they refuse to sign the consent forms and move. They felt vulnerable to these threats especially since their lawyer and main advocate had been jailed. The neighborhood was assigned alternative resettlement sites in two areas: Kanjur Marg and Mankhurd (not in the Lallubhai compound). Hindus were suggested to go to Kanjur Marg and Muslims to the Mankhurd site for easier access to appropriate places of worship. After combing through all of the highly detailed Inspection Panel and Bank Management Report from 2004 to 2007, I was surprised to find that not a single mention was made of the process by which Gazi Nagar residents were ultimately resettled. This information came only through discussions and interviews with residents and neighborhood leaders. Official project and Inspection Panel documents never categorized the eviction as forced, though in an interview with one of the Inspection Panel’s consultants, Renu Mody I came to learn that the Gazi Nagar demolition was the principle event that prompted the suspension of World Bank funds in March 2006.

The funds were reinstated a few months later in June 2006 after the Bank claimed that the MMRDA showed evidence of procedural compliance. According to project documents, these improvements consisted primarily of providing more staff time at grievance redressing, more public information offices and more negotiations with shop owners to find alternative sites. In its final report, the Panel (2007) notes that it “had the impression that PAPs [from Gazi Nagar] have started to settle down at the resettlement site” but that “a number of issues still need to be resolved” with respect to building conditions, local
infrastructure provision and post-resettlement rehabilitation. Instead, the Panel’s focus in the report was the shop owners’, whose resettlement was still under negotiation. It concluded that the Kurla shop owners’ special needs had to be accommodated, and the Bank and MMRDA were at fault for delegating responsibilities to SPARC, which did not have the “institutional capacity” to handle the complex and specific resettlement needs for this group. The Bank had agreed to those terms, and in its action plan it phased out the involvement of SPARC. At the Bank’s urging, the MMRDA started to negotiate with shop owners on an individual case-by-case basis. To date, all shop owners have agreed to be resettled as per negotiations.

Despite what seemed to be a sincerely sympathetic stance toward PAPs, a thorough and relatively independent investigation and an acknowledgement of the political economic power imbalances, the IP system of accountability ultimately proved inadequate for addressing the issues faced by Gazi Nagar residents. The target of subsequent action plans ultimately focused on procedural aspects within the institutions most directly involved in neighborhood resettlement activities, SPARC and MMRDA, rather than a significant shift in project orientation and resource allocation. Though the Panel has significant moral sway, it is nonetheless a quasi-juridical body with no true powers of enforcement. Furthermore, in a context of a free market for development finance, the Bank was presented with stiff competition. The MMRDA’s Chandrashekhar made it clear that the state could easily turn to other courting financiers like the Japan Bank, which had less stringent standards. The Panel also recognized its own limits in this regard. As Awasthi recalled, Panel representatives cautioned shop owners that if they did not accept the modified compensation package, the Bank could drop the project altogether. If that occurred, Edith Weiss warned that the state could take more severe forms of revenge that could leave them with nothing. Randeria and Grunder (2009) have argued that through these power plays, the state demonstrated its “cunning nature,” ultimately evading accountability toward citizens. I argue that this exemplifies not simply a cunning maneuvering but the violent power of state sovereignty one that ultimately benefited its financiers even as it undermined their conditionalities and standards of compensation.

There were also limits to the juridical form of contention undertaken by project-affected groups. The juridical discourses left political economic forces at the local and transnational scales unexamined. For instance, Raj Awasthi and other Gazi Nagar leaders consistently argued that the World Bank was not at fault; Bank policies were reasonable and staff members responded promptly and respectfully to their requests. Rather, it was the government and the NGO SPARC which they claimed had corruptly and brazenly violated the Bank’s resettlement policies. They contrasted T. Chandrashekhar’s rough dismissal of residents with the more respectful manner of Bank and Panel members who held tasteful lunch meetings at a luxury South Mumbai hotel, the Oberoi. One resident leader, Raj Pal, went to the extent of making a culturalist indictment: “policies may be good, but Indian people are corrupt wherever you go.”

Furthermore, the lack of correspondence between the gravity of the charge and actual findings of corruption begs the question of what work was being done by the discourse of
corruption. If following Gupta the discourse of corruption articulates claims to citizenship rights as I have presented, did such articulations also inadvertently elide the agents and structures that were behind the elite bias of development? In general, corruption talk and juridical forms of contention implicated the actions of the state and private agents directly engaged with the concrete implementation of public projects. The World Bank may have been accused of “violating its own norms” but neighborhood leaders quickly deflected blame onto SPARC and the state (MMRDA and the MLA, Nawab Malik). Pal’s statement about the good intentions of the Bank being undermined by the corruption of the government was an oft-echoed sentiment among the resettled residents. With the exception of the advocate Raj Awasthi, there was little critique among Gazi Nagar residents and leaders of the intervention and profit on the part of developers who benefited from the market-oriented resettlement paradigm under the state’s Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (discussed in greater detail in chapter 2). Despite the class-critical iterations of Gazi Nagar residents and leaders, these juridical discursive practices were less effective in indicting the “legal” structural conditions of urban political economy, local developers and the transnational agents that have privileged upper-class interests in projects. The discourses of corruption, betrayal and tyranny nonetheless represented an indirect challenge to the project financiers’ and implementers’ claims of grassroots accountability supposedly embedded in the participatory model. To the contrary, NAPM activists targeted the World Bank and private developer involvement in Mumbai’s redevelopment. Yet, despite these ideological distinctions, the course of action in resistance remained similarly within the realm of the juridical by appealing to courts and the Inspection Panel. These tactics have had little teeth to directly combat the more structural conditions of uneven redevelopment and displacement despite NAPM’s ideological stance.

4.6 Unequal Evictions and Differentiated Citizenship

The entire Gazi Nagar neighborhood was finally demolished in early 2006 though the clearance of the area may be characterized by a politics of attrition, where sub-groups broke off and agreed to resettlement out of fear and/or through the striking of deals. An early group of residents aligned with parliamentary member Nawab Malik agreed to move to the Mankhurd Lallubhai resettlement colony early in 2005. A second group signed consent forms after threats and negotiations with SPARC’s leader Jockin. Residents had been warned by the MMRDA, SPARC and even the Inspection Panel that they risked policy changes that might leave them with nothing if the government abandoned its loan agreement with the World Bank and accessed funding from another international bank with less stringent resettlement conditions such as the Japan Bank. The final blow came on January 3, 2006 when Gazi Nagar residents’ legal advocate, Raj Awasthi, was arrested and jailed for several weeks. The remaining residential structures were demolished on February 10, 2006 when a small army of police, SPARC staff and MMRDA officials arrived with bulldozers and consent letters. Only the shop owners located in the neighboring parts of Kurla were able to stay on in the area and later negotiated a better resettlement package with the Bank and MMRDA.
Gazi Nagar residents and leaders recalled the demolition day with bitterness, convinced that their struggle would have continued had Raj Awashti not been jailed. Without an advocate they felt vulnerable and forced to sign consent forms for fear of losing everything. At the same time when I asked whether their struggle was worthwhile, responses were mostly positive. Many residents and leaders felt that their decision to fight at least resulted in some capacity to negotiate a better resettlement, rather than being “thrown” into the least desirable flats in the Mankhurd Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony. Yet, one of the leaders admitted candidly that they might have gotten a better deal (through obtaining extra rooms) had they cooperated with the MMDRA instead of appealing to the Bank. Although I was unable to confirm the allegations, many residents suggested in a matter of fact manner that leaders received special accommodations and extra rooms. A contradictory mix of acceptance and critique of hierarchy and inequality thus marked the entire political process.

Regarding the critique of urban inequalities, Gazi Nagar residents’ resistance to resettlement was partly attributed to the visible injustice of the changing economic geography of the city. The movement’s principal demand was to be resettled nearby. They especially had an interest in the Bandra-Kurla area where real estate values are among the city’s highest. Several leaders echoed Mr. Pal’s indictment (quoted in the beginning of this chapter) of the government and elite redevelopment. For instance, Jitendra Maurya insisted, “the sarkar (state) cannot make Mumbai into a hi-fi Singapore without considering people in the jopadpatis (slums).” What is significant here is the articulation of a set of rights that challenged—to a limited extent—the notion that slum dwellers have lesser rights than the rich. For instance, during a conversation about the motivations of residents’ struggles, Gazi Nagar leader Raj Pal made a direct comparison to me despite the class differences he clearly observed between us. He explained in English, “just think Madame that you are in your Bandra flat in a nice area and some one tells you to go, you will not go until you get a same or better place, no? If they give you a flat on this nice Carter Road, you would not mind leaving, isn’t it?” The statement seemed to imply that despite our class differences I should act and be treated in the same manner as Gazi Nagar residents.

At the same time that such iterations challenged class-differentiated rights—what Verma (2002) has called the chasm between the “rights of little people” and the “rights of big people”—a variety of structural exclusions and inequalities within the movement went unchallenged. For instance, informal renters, who constituted up to 50% of the residents, were completely excluded from any resettlement possibilities. Farzana, one of the SPARC Alliance surveying team members asserted that renters left homeless by the road project often approached her with stories of their difficulties, asking for a resettlement flat allocation. “It hurt my heart to turn them away but there was nothing I could do to help them,” she lamented. Resettled Gazi Nagar residents, however, universally saw the exclusion of renters as fair, and there were no visible signs of protest of the part of the latter. Indeed, rights talk continued to be based on a certain notion of legitimate property ownership, one that was more expansive than the state’s categorizations but nonetheless exclusionary of less powerful groups. Similarly, in reference to railway slum dwellers, several residents and leaders claimed that there could be no comparison with Gazi Nagar
because the former were living in an environmentally and legal more precarious situation. They were living on the railways, and they did not pay taxes, so how could they choose or complain? Gazi Nagar residents thus saw their claims to better resettlement as more legitimate because of their relative material wealth and because of the fact that they paid taxes. They reasoned thus that they should have more binding rights to their properties and privileged form of resettlement. Under both World Bank policy and Maharashtra development regulations, however, such hierarchies did not necessarily apply. World Bank directives required that all project-affected people be entitled to the same kinds of resettlement whether their land was formal or informal. The Maharashtra government also addressed all legal slums with the same SRA policy, thus Gazi Nagar residents were in the same legal category as the railway slum dwellers. Nonetheless, an important aspect of these claims was the distance Gazi Nagar residents placed between themselves and “lesser” groups, a distance based on material inequalities.

At the other end of the material spectrum, the relatively more wealthy medium-sized shop owners were able to hold out longer, and several of them were awarded plots in the neighboring Bandra-Kurla area. The shop owners had both the motivation and the resource base to continue resisting resettlement for a longer period of time. The coalition between residents and wealthier shop owners was mutually beneficial, to a limit. Poorer (eligible) Gazi Nagar residents benefited from the power of the shop owners and leveraged their strength to negotiate better resettlement location. But, ultimately they were forced to resettle offsite without being able to secure a deal as attractive as that of the shop owners. Furthermore, resettled Gazi Nagar residents’ struggles were often elided in relation to the shop owners’ in both Bank and SPARC official discourse. World Bank management was more responsive to the shop owners’ complaints claiming that their needs were more complex than those of residents and small-scale home-based shop owners. The Bank’s response to the Inspection Panel acknowledged that timber, textiles, automotive and metal work businesses would be more adversely affected by relocation in terms of access to markets and the difficulties of the relatively smaller resettlement unit size relative to their original spaces (Inspection Panel, 2006). Yet, the Bank management team estimated the loss of income on the part of residents and employees to be less of a problem in Mumbai, where space is the most paramount concern. SPARC Alliance leaders and literature have highlighted the complaints of only shop owners and not the residents of Gazi Nagar, arguing along with the MMRDA that “these shopkeepers were neither poor nor slum dwellers” and that “such a small group [...] should not hold the project and city to ransom” (SPARC, 2005, p. 22). Thus, all resistance to the project was made illegitimate due to the relatively privileged status and implied greediness of the shop owners. The four hundred Gazi Nagar households were never acknowledged.

The case of shop owners and Gazi Nagar residents parallels other clashes over eviction and redevelopment in the city. For instance, in the highly publicized Dharavi redevelopment project, businesses have had a much stronger presence in protests and negotiations over

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There was evidence of other areas that were not officially designated as slums that were nonetheless incorporated into Slum Rehabilitation Programs, though most of Gazi Nagar did not have the same kinds of lease agreements.
resettlement than many lower-income residents. Struggles over evictions linked to airport expansion have also waged similar concerns of loss of income due to offsite resettlement. Yet, what makes the MUTP road evictions case unique is the process and meanings linked to evictees’ encounters with the local state bureaucracy, its partnering NGO and the World Bank. The idioms of struggle that highlighted corruption, impoverishment and authoritarianism clearly challenged dominant narratives of participatory resettlement that touted accountability, slum dweller input in resettlement design and location and an improvement in the quality of life of the displaced. By demanding resettlement in the Bandra-Kurla complex, Gazi Nagar residents and Kurla shop-owners challenged class biases of redevelopment that placed corporate and finance interests in the physical center of the city and small-scale industry and poorer residents on the urban fringe.

The privileged status of Kurla shop owners in relation to Gazi Nagar residents and the complete marginalization of renters are two examples that demonstrate how the process of contention consisted of its own inequalities and silences. Another less privileged voice was that of women residents who lost income due to resettlement. In my visits to the three resettlement sites where Gazi Nagar residents lived, I was informed by some leaders and the few women residents I was able to speak with that many women engaged in piecemeal work for nearby garment industries. Some lost access to these sources of income while others expressed that they continue to work from home but found it more difficult to maintain their employment connections. Similar to the railways resettlement of the previous chapter, the importance of place for women’s income generation was all but ignored in Bank assessments of resettlement impacts and benefits. A fourth form of marginalized experience was that of ethnic identity. On several occasions, Gazi Nagar leaders saw the maltreatment they experienced as partly attributed to their region of origin, North India. For example Jiitendra Maurya said, “the MMRDA thought that they could treat however they pleased because we were simple bhaiyas [North Indians] and would not fight back.” They saw their actions as a defiance of not only corruption and class bias but also identity-based discrimination.

These experiences—gendered loss of livelihood, the experience of being marginalized for one’s ethnic or caste identity and the material exclusions of resettlement for renters—had little place the juridified processes and discourses of contention. To the contrary, NAPM discourses have attempted to articulate some of these issues, especially women’s labor and loss of income linked to evictions, as well as some (but not all) of the multiple forms of exclusions embedded in the state’s slum rehabilitation policy. NAPM’s involvement in the World Bank resettlement conflicts and complaints began a year after Kurla shop owners and Gazi Nagar residents submitted their grievances to the Bank and Inspection Panel. Rahul Nagar, a settlement located on the eastern portion of the SCLR road project, was demolished, and residents approached Medha Patkar to request help. These interactions brought NAPM into contact with Raj Awasthi and leaders of the Kurla shop owners and Gazi Nagar residents. Medha Patkar and Simpreet Singh would later submit several grievances in support of MUTP evictees, which added weight to the requests that had already been submitted by the Kurla shop owners and Gazi Nagar residents (Inspection Panel, 2005).
Medha Patkar and other NAPM leaders have also attempted to convey a more structural critique, placing the blame on the Bank and on developers as the primary beneficiaries of the “builder-politician” nexus. In May 2005, Gazi Nagar leaders participated in a NAPM-organized protest in downtown Mumbai over the Vision Mumbai evictions and displacement of the urban poor more broadly. From the perspective of neighborhood leaders, NAPM’s involvement in the World Bank conflict helped to leverage publicity and transnational linkages to the Vision Mumbai evictions, which did not have explicit World Bank support. NAPM facilitated for a brief period of time the alignment of the movement in Gazi Nagar with a larger group of uncompensated evictees of the Vision Mumbai. These included the evicted residents of Mandala, the case addressed in the following chapter. In NAPM press releases and public events, Patkar and other activists placed in the same category both the state-led Vision Mumbai demolitions and MUTP resettlement as examples of the state’s corrupt efforts to appease transnational capital and local builders at great cost to Mumbai’s poor slum dwellers. This was a familiar strategy rooted in the history of gaining transnational support for the slum dwellers’ cause by invoking outrage over evidence of the continuance of colonial economic relations. Unfortunately, NAPM strategies also tended to silence the differentiated desires and subjectivities of the displaced, as I show in the following chapters. Efforts to build solidarity have been powerful for drawing attention to the scale of development-induced displacement, especially among less powerful evictees like those displaced from the Mandala neighborhood of eastern Mumbai.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I examine the processes and discourses of contention among Gazi Nagar residents affected by road projects of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project. I show how the trajectory of eviction politics was markedly different in this area compared to the earlier MUTP railways case. Not only was there more outward resistance leading to a lengthy Independent Inspection Panel process, but the political trajectory of Gazi Nagar also centered on a symbolic reworking of juridico-economic rights. The juridification of land struggle emerged at a conjunctural moment when semi-judicial practices of the World Bank Inspection Panel (emerging from earlier anti-displacement struggles in the Narmada Valley) converged with new urban practices of legal advocacy (emerging out of histories of legal activism and the demise of prior political infrastructures of party patronage). Because of the Bank’s official recognition of informal property rights, Gazi Nagar residents were able to leverage more political weight for their demands under the Inspection Panel process than by facing the state alone. The involvement of transnationally recognized Medha Patkar of the National Alliance of people’s movements helped to bolster the strength and visibility of the struggle.

However, the non-binding nature of these norms and the power of the state agencies to refuse the Bank funding should it make “unreasonable demands” ultimately weakened residents’ case. At the same time, the Bank’s mandate to ensure that resettlement replicates or betters former standards of living among the displaced was selectively applied to larger-scale—and economically more secure—businesses rather than people from primarily
residential areas such as the Gazi Nagar area. Furthermore, the Bank’s economic calculus of onsite resettlement did not add up in favor of residents’ demands and concerns about living close to their sources of income. It insisted that high land values left no onsite resettlement options for Gazi Nagar and kept changes focused on “governance,” “grievance redressal” and the “institutional capacity” of state agencies and the NGO involved. Market logics prevailed.

Residents’ own rights claims and corruption charges also underplayed other interrelated mechanisms through which redevelopmental dispossession operated: ethno-religious discrimination, gendered labor and relative material wealth. By focusing on infractions to resettlement procedures, rights claims of Gazi Nagar residents ironically reinforced notions of legitimacy through property ownership, albeit informal. By claiming the right to resettlement based on legitimate informal ownership and Bank resettlement criteria and by focusing charges on the corruption of the state and its non-governmental partners, the discourse left those who stood to gain the most from redevelopment—local developers, corporate heads and the World Bank itself—relatively unscathed by critique. Moreover, the entire leadership structure of neighborhood-based mobilizations was gendered masculine, despite the fact that women working in home-based production were among the most severely affected by resettlement through their loss of income. Furthermore, this discursive politics of eviction silenced other systemic exclusions of its property-based rights claims, namely the plight of informal renters within Gazi Nagar and other “illegal” slum dwellers throughout the city: the topic of the following chapter. Ultimately, Gazi Nagar eviction politics was characterized by a failure to question fundamental structural class processes, in particular private-property and market biases. In this way, the Gazi Nagar struggle challenged redevelopmental hegemony but also reconstituted it by retaining a juridico-economic frame of contention. Although residents made some gains, the struggle ultimately gave ways to a politics of attrition and a vulnerability to the violent face of the redevelopmental state. In the following chapter I discuss how other more violent exclusions of neoliberal slum redevelopment, silenced in the narratives of the MUTP cases, have led to a third trajectory of eviction politics centered on ethico-political re-workings of citizenship writ large on the city and the nation.
CHAPTER 5
Spaces of Contention II: Citizenship and Struggles for the Right to Stay in Mandala

5.1 Introduction: Encroachments

Winding through the muddy streets of old Mandala, Azizbhai and Samira led me to the barbed wire fence marking the border of the land where their homes were bulldozed. Azizbhai and Samira are neighborhood leaders who have been struggling for over three years to reclaim the area for themselves and some 3,500 other displaced families. After spending hours over months attending meetings and protests and pouring over homemade slum maps, crossing the fence again two years after the last demolition felt to me like treading toward the unknown edge of the world. A corrugated metal shack serving as a mosque at the cleared plot's edge provided shelter from the sun for two young guards stationed there to prevent reoccupation. The rest of the land, strewn with toxic piles of earth and trash, unfurled toward a hazy river's edge. As we followed the paths of now unrecognizable old streets, my guides pointed to areas where their houses once stood, commenting on how much space they had and how they were betrayed. The memories of life here before the demolitions and the subsequent three years of struggle over the land made the space feel ghost-like. This part of Mandala is a frontier land of sorts, one of the farthest eastern points in the city and located in the northern suburb of Mankhurd. Though the swampy wilderness seems like an unlikely solution to Mumbai’s so-called slum problem, developers and state agencies have built thousands of resettlement colonies near here. Several more have been planned throughout Mankhurd including on the Mandala plot itself. Looking to the south, Samira pointed to the blocks of concrete resettlement buildings appearing to slowly encroach on Mandala through a thick gray fog. “Those buildings are supposed to be for evicted slum dwellers, but the government will not build any for us.”

The field note above describes a visit to Mandala, the case study at the center of this chapter. In the previous two chapters, I examined the political trajectories of eviction and resettlement associated with two different groups—railway land residents and road component residents of Gazi Nagar—both affected by the World Bank-funded MUTP project. This chapter addresses a case of violent demolition and eviction without resettlement compensation. If the previous two cases instantiated a reworking of hegemonic state power marked by a mix of force and material and ideological negotiation and consent with the processes of redevelopment, Mandala experienced the full brunt of state violence. Residents of the Mandala slum settlement were among 300,000 people left homeless over the span of a few weeks in the winter of 2004 to 2005. The city of Mumbai witnessed its largest slum demolition sweep in over 20 years, in which 45,000 to 90,000 informal structures deemed illegal by the state were rapidly and violently razed. The demolitions stunned housing activists and NGOs, many of whom had been working within the parameters of resettlement implementation. The demolitions were also a cruel betrayal.
in the experience of evicted slum dwellers; prior to the elections, the Congress party announced that it would regularize and resettle all slums existing before 2000. Some left-leaning media called the demolition drive Mumbai’s tsunami for displacing as many people as that Asian natural disaster occurring in the same month. Others in the media and elite and middle-class circles applauded the government for aggressively following through with efforts to transform and clean up the city.

Figure 5.1: The razed Mandala plot in November 2007 with resettlement colonies in view in the distance (photo credit: Saloua Chaker)

These evictions dramatically inaugurated the highly publicized city clean-up and redevelopment campaign, Vision Mumbai, launched by the newly elected Congress party in the State of Maharashtra. Vision Mumbai, as I discuss in chapters 1 and 2, represents one of the most public efforts of the local state, developers and finance capital to re-imagine and reconstitute Mumbai as a global city geared toward business and finance services. This vision has bolstered developer and finance capital access to land occupied by slums throughout the city to build commercial and residential real estate and infrastructure. In this reimagining, however, slum residents’ economic activities would need to be removed from prime central locations of the city. Furthermore, those displaced by infrastructure projects like the MUTP would be resettled on the urban fringes, precisely in places like Mandala in Mankhurd district that are often already occupied by settlements. In these

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33 Government officials later insisted that the party did not in fact renege on its promise but that there was an unfortunate typological error in the announced cut-off date.
processes where slum residents already occupy a less powerful position, residents like those in Mandala have experienced even more severe forms of marginalization and dispossession due to multiple and interlocking forms of class and identity politics.

Although officials underscored the aim of making Mumbai “slum-free,” not all slums were razed equally. The demolition drive focused mostly on areas deemed illegal and encroached after the 1995 cut-off date. The demolitions especially targeted slums like Mandala where the majority of residents’ ethno-religious backgrounds have made them the target of xenophobic campaigns of the Shiv Sena. According to surveys conducted by housing rights activists, most evictees were ethnically North Indian or Muslim. Aside from survey data, ethnic discrimination has been corroborated in the everyday lived experience of evictees who have faced systematic forms of discrimination in state bureaucracies. As Samira, an evicted resident of Mandala slum, expressed with frustration, “this would not have happened to us if we were Maharashtrians.” At the same time, Congress party officials normally seen as more tolerant of diversity and secular politics also invoked the rhetoric of ethnic cleansing and security against illegal migrants. For instance, the newly elected chief minister of the State of Maharashtra defended the demolition drive by asserting that the city had no other choice but to “take action against illegal Bangladeshis.” It has become commonplace in Indian cities to decry the elusive “illegal Bangladeshi,” though rarely have evictees proven to be from anywhere other than India. However, the assertion had especially strong political valence in Mumbai given the influence of the Shiv Sena; in fact the opposition party’s leaders Bal and Udhav Thackeray notably praised the actions of their political rivals (Times News Network, 2005). Some activists have thus speculated that ethnic targeting was one of the reasons that such a large scale demolition sweep was politically feasible (2005).

These reimaginings of urban space and rightful belonging to the city and nation—based on class and regional/ethno-religious identity—that animated official justifications of the Vision Mumbai demolitions represent an important reconfiguration of urban citizenship. In Mandala, where evictees were left without access to governmental compensation and where previous avenues of negotiation with the state have shifted and eroded, a distinct trajectory of eviction politics emerged. This was a political trajectory in which the meaning and materiality of citizenship and belonging in the space of the city and nation have come into struggle. I argue in this chapter that eviction struggles have posed an ethico-political challenge to state hegemony by claiming urban and national citizenship, a status that evictees like those of Mandala have been systematically denied in the current order of urban redevelopment. These ethico-political struggles unfolded in two interconnected arenas: (a) social movement mediation which shaped new practices of contestation and negotiation with the state and (b) discursive and material land claims practices.

Mandala residents’ alliance with NAPM forged a means of negotiating with the state outside of the realm of neighborhood politics that evictees referred to as the “public.” Although connoting understandings of civil society and democratic deliberation (Calhoun, 1993), the “public” was an arena of informal negotiation and personal relationships similar to what Chatterjee has called “political society” (2004). At once intimate and fraught with betrayal,
the “public” constituted a political terrain of relationships with powerful members of the neighborhood, police, elected officials and lower bureaucracy where residents have negotiated access to land. However, due to articulations of identity politics and redevelopment governance practices, this political space has narrowed, no longer providing a means for negotiating informal land claims. In this scenario of eviction politics, NAPM helped to redirect land claims into a differently understood state and public sphere including national state bureaucracies, symbolic city spaces and new forms of demands on city offices. Such mobilization practices accompanied reoccupations of demolished plots expressed in the idiom of citizenship rights to the city and nation. This was a somewhat different articulation of rights than in the Gazi Nagar case, in which juridical discourses and arenas of contention were available and present. Instead, these land claims contested the interconnected class and identity exclusions of ethno-nationalist urban politics and market-driven redevelopment and resettlement. In the process of moving from contention to negotiation, however, the ideals of legitimate citizenship have been reformulated. The demands of governmental legibility have resulted in a shift in the way that slum residents negotiate access to land, blurring the boundaries of Mandala’s political trajectory with the previous two cases. I now turn to my research process, access and neighborhood history before delving into these politics.

5.2 Research Process, Access and Neighborhood History

Access to a broad spectrum of informants was more difficult in Mandala than in the areas covered in the previous two chapters because inhabitants were evicted but not resettled. The majority of evicted Mandala residents were scattered throughout Mankhurd district and other parts of the city. Many women and children and some entire families moved back to rural villages after the demolitions. Thus my in-depth interactions were limited to 11 residents and leaders more actively involved with the movement and living in informal rental housing in the remaining standing sections of Mandala on the outskirts of the demolished plot. Although others were difficult to locate, I did interact briefly with a larger number of evictees who were less actively involved in the anti-eviction movement during major protest events. These and other residents have continued to maintain contact with other evictees through networks of former-inhabitants linked to Mandala’s leaders.

One major factor influencing Mandala’s land struggle was evictees’ close collaboration with the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), headed by Medha Patkar of the Save the Narmada anti-dam movement. NAPM was an important oppositional force against the state’s demolition sweep, uniting several (though not all) of Mumbai’s housing rights groups for a brief period. NAPM facilitated my initial introduction to Mandala residents. Beginning in 2005, I attended a number of Mumbai and Delhi-based protests and slum reoccupation actions spearheaded by NAPM. I assisted NAPM leadership with report writing and audio and visual documentation of movement events, which enabled access to perspectives of activists and leaders. At NAPM protest actions and events, I observed interactions among middle-class movement leaders and neighborhood-based organizers and residents.
Regarding my relationship to slum evictees, mediated engagement was of course a double-edged sword that offered a sense of trust among many residents but also produced a level of self-censorship to match the ideological stance of NAPM, with whom my interlocutors saw my allegiance lying. Furthermore, the life and death exigencies that evicted slum dwellers faced demanded self-representations of solidarity among community members and leaders of the movement in relation to outsiders. Still, the contradictions of tense political relations and personal experiences emerged over time through participant observation in meetings and ethnographic interviews with key leaders, neighborhood-based activists and ordinary residents as well as groups who left the movement over time. Eviction politics were rooted in a confluence of factors ranging from neighborhood history and leadership, relationship with the state and involvement of the NAPM in land struggles. The brief overview of the political geography and history of Mandala that I present next comes from oral historical interviews I conducted during fieldwork.

Located on the swampy far eastern edge of the city, Mandala, like most informal settlements, was settled incrementally. For convenience, the entire area is called Mandala, but residents still distinguish two components of the demolished section: New Indiranagar, which began to be settled around 1997, and Jantanagar, which was settled starting in 2000. Although the area is located on the urban fringe, several qualities make Mandala desirable for both residents and the state. For residents, the plot is well situated in terms of access to the train station, which is a 10 to 20 minute walk away (depending on location within the settlement). It is also located near the Vashi Market, an area just outside of the city limits that is a major depot for agricultural produce from the city’s hinterland. Many Mandala residents worked in day laboring and food processing jobs at the market. According to a survey conducted by residents and NAPM activists, sources of income included recycling work, domestic service, tailoring and piecemeal garment work. From a discussion with one resident who earned money through home-based recycling and piecemeal garment work, I obtained a sense of how exhausting and low paying some of the work is. If three or four people in a family, usually women and children working from home, worked all day, the family would earn 20 to 25 rupees per day. While most Mandala evictees may be considered poor in terms of earnings, they considered their homes in Mandala an important step toward economic stability.

The oldest (still standing) sections of the slum are located closer to a main road while the newest sections had sprawled toward the coastal wetlands. The demolished areas began to be settled in two spurts starting in 1997. Contrary to popular discourse that frames such newly settled slums as bastions of recent rural migrants, my interviews with evictees revealed that the majority of residents had been living in Mumbai for significant periods of time prior to moving to Mandala. Many residents had been living in informal rental housing in slums in other parts of the city. Although most residents had strong contacts to their native villages (mostly in the Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Assam), many were born in Mumbai. For instance, one resident, Bhairavi, grew up in Mumbai and went back to her family’s village to have her marriage arranged. Upon returning to Mumbai, the couple lived in three different rental rooms (the last one located in the older part of the Mandala
settlement) before saving enough money to build their own house in the newer part of Mandala in 1998.

Like Gazi Nagar and many other Mumbai slums, Mandala land itself was mostly swampy wetland unfit for housing until new settlers invested their labor and money bringing in earth in truckloads to solidify the land. Sections of the land were simply claimed by inhabitants who then filled and built on the land. Other parts were collected and claimed by men that some residents described as “dadas” (translated as strongmen or slumlords) who filled the land and sometimes even built structures for sale or rent. Other residents chose not to use the word “dada” to describe the men from whom they purchased their plots or homes. The idea of the slumlord, prevalent in mainstream discourses on slums often connotes an evil, relatively wealthy and exploitative figure, but many of my interlocutors did not see them in this manner: “I did not buy from any slumlords; they were men just like us who helped us acquire our houses.” Instead they would use terms like “bhai-log” (brothers) or “gharwale” (family members) to describe these men (figuratively, as there was often no kinship relation). These intermediaries occupied a fluid space of both distance and familiarity, a perception that depended on the experiences of the person with whom I was speaking. The fluidity between community insider and outsider or between friend and foe continuously reemerged with agents who shaped state-slum relations on an everyday basis, as I demonstrate in the following section.

5.3 Violence, State Space and the “Public”

Pre-eviction interconnections with the state in Mandala were similar to those of many other slums in the city. A central feature of the relationship with state agents was the political economy of bribes and extortion. Residents conveyed the constant pressure to pay bribes to police officers and others who threatened to demolish their homes. Demolitions also occurred prior to the major eviction sweep in the winter of 2005. Following development regulations, government would regularly display “notices” informing residents of impending demolition throughout Mandala. However, only the newest parts built of the least stable construction material—earth, wood and stones—were demolished on several occasions soon after the notice was displayed. Until 2005 it was a common and expected practice that after each demolition residents would immediately rebuild their homes after bribing local police.

While ward officials often play an important role in collecting votes in exchange for tacitly allowing slums to remain and preventing demolitions, the newer (demolished) sections of Mandala had not had the chance to develop a close relationship to the Nagar sevak (ward official representing the area in Mumbai Municipal Corporation). In the months and years prior to the 2005 demolition, the ward official known as Gullu Swami Naidu of the Congress party often threatened to clear the area. Still as Mandala evictees matter-of-factly recounted, there were strong lines of connection from slums to various layers of government. For instance, when talking about demolition, Mandala evictees often referred disparagingly to dalals—loosely translated as broker or intermediary. Dalals were local residents that Mandala evictees blamed for tipping off the police about the settlement and
suggesting areas to demolish. Dalals were considered despicable characters who facilitated the political economy of pay-offs, demolitions and rebuilding. Some dalals owned multiple slum structures and profited from evictees by renting rooms out to them. Mandala evictees recounted that many dalals were connected to political parties and state agents like the local nagar sevak, the Collector’s Office (the agency dealing with land boundary demarcations, property taxes and electoral lists) and local police. In conversations in public spaces of the still-standing sections of Mandala, my interlocutors were constantly aware of their prying ears and duplicitous efforts against evicted resident and movement leaders. Thus, from the perspective of many evicted Mandala residents, the state was able to harass the residents because of traitors within the neighborhood. Evictees regularly used the English word “public” to describe people in the area who were both compatriots in land struggles and people who undermined their efforts. For instance, Mandala leaders often said that the work they were doing was for the “public.” “I am constantly running and struggling for the public,” Azizbhai once remarked. In other instances when describing less savory members of the community, some evictees would complain, pablik hi kharab hai (the public itself is bad).

This contradictory use of the word public—at once good and bad, both community member and traitor—struck a cord with me. I found myself unconsciously engaging in the often futile attempt to order the motivations of people with whom I spoke into some kind of moral hierarchy. Often, when I spoke to one leader or resident, another would later approach me with stories of how the former was being unethical or troublesome in some way. I usually tried to determine who was telling the “truth” and who was deceiving. Was I talking to a dalal? Were some of the people I spoke with who claimed to have a right to a plot even residents of Mandala prior to the demolition? Even if they were not, did it matter? After all everyone needed homes. Although I answered some such questions for myself as I got to know the area and its long-time residents, many have remained unanswered. Ultimately, evictees involved in the struggle for Mandala also accepted rifts in the community and disagreeable characters in their midst. They sometimes complained of the wrongdoing and illegitimacy of people with whom they worked, yet Mandala residents and leaders also presented a face of solidarity toward the outside world of upper-level state officials and journalists. The struggle of the “public” demanded it.

Such slippery boundaries between public and state are of course not uncommon for life in informal settlements (or other political spaces for that matter). However, one aspect of the Mandala struggle made it stand out in relation to the other neighborhoods that were evicted in the Vision Mumbai demolition sweep. Despite the initial impact severity and protest uproar of the demolition sweep, within a few months most of the demolished neighborhoods slowly rebuilt their homes onsite much as they had done in the past. The Mandala experience was, however, much more violent and conflicted. The initial demolition in Mandala took place in January 2005, and residents remained off the land and engaged in protests and direct actions in various parts of Mumbai and Delhi with NAPM activists and other displaced groups for the following six months. Then, on July 27, 2005, record rains afflicted Mumbai causing large-scale flooding throughout the city. Residents along with the NAPM activists took the opportunity of chaos in the city to rebuild on the
Mandala plot. Despite occasional clashes with the police, residents were able to stay on the plot for nine months.

On May 9, 2006, police forces and bulldozers descended on Mandala again. This time the force of the state and the push back of evictees led to an even greater onslaught of violence than had the previous sweep. The demolitions started at night and continued for three days. “They would arrive at night when no office was open and there was no where to go, no way of fighting,” one evictee surmised. A barricade of residents, with a majority of women in front, confronted the impending bulldozers, and police were violently beaten down with batons. Various witnesses reported police charging into homes and thrashing residents. In several parts of the settlement, fires were set and people were forced out of their homes with little opportunity to salvage any belongings. The police claimed that the fires were started by the residents themselves as a way to “deflect” blame onto the police. According to a study (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 2006) conducted by university and activists groups the morning after the demolition, however, the fire was most likely started by police or affiliated agents, as the motives and evidence pointing to slum dwellers was scant. It is common knowledge that setting fires facilitates swift demolitions because it leads people to flee the area. Residents recalled not only brute force toward women, men and even children (one young girl died in the fire), but also violent ethnic slurs toward residents of North Indian descent by police officers who were mostly Maharashtrian (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 2006). The discrimination was reflected also in the statements of Ashok Gaude, one of small handful of Maharashtrians who lived in Mandala, who assumed a leadership position because of his ethno-linguistic background. Ashok expressed to me that residents chose him to be a leader because he could more easily speak to government officials who would otherwise discriminate against a Hindi-speaking North Indian. “The government thinks that because illiterate bhaiya-log live here that they won’t be able to fight,” he surmised.

After the demolition, the MMRDA cordoned off the area with barbed wire, a “boundary” as residents described it. In the final days of my research in early 2008, the area continued to be watched by two guards stationed at the two mosques just inside the fence, the only remaining structures on the plot. The guards and fence now stand as more of a symbolic barrier to rebuilding, as people regularly traverse the grounds, which as of early 2008 had served as an open latrine. On the muddy outer edge of the plot a few residents and one leader, Panditji, a Hindu religious leader continues to camp with some 15 others in very basic tent-like structures awaiting an opportunity to reenter the space through official or extra-official means.

Over the course of my research, one question consistently perplexed me: Why was sovereign force so much more violent and unyielding in Mandala? In the MUTP evictions where in several instances state force was certainly present, resettlement negotiation processes helped to attenuate the most severe clashes. Most Mandala residents did not have the appropriate documentation proving their residency prior to January 1, 1995, and they were among the most marginalized of ethno-religious communities in Mumbai. But this was also the case for many of the other communities evicted in the Vision Mumbai
sweep. It is safe to assume therefore that there were other significant political factors at play in Mandala. I still do not have a single explanation but have come to understand the resulting clashes as an outgrowth of a confluence of a number of different factors. One was that the Mandala had a definite purpose for the MMRDA, the development agency involved in the MUTP and many other infrastructure, redevelopment and clean-up projects throughout the city that required resettlement. The majority of plots cleared under the Vision Mumbai plan were transferred to the MMRDA, which acted as the central authority responsible for preventing reencroachment. The MMRDA had designated plots for a resettlement colony for eligible slum dwellers and shop owners evicted in infrastructure and river basin clean-ups in the central parts of the city. City plans like Vision Mumbai and authorities like the MMRDA have increasingly targeted Mankhurd as central resettlement hub for the city, a process that was precipitated by the massive rehabilitation projects for the MUTP project.

The earmarking of Mandala as a resettlement site for evictees from other parts of the city became more deeply entrenched by other political events set off, ironically, by the same devastating flood of 2005 that residents took advantage of to rebuild on the plot. Poor state response to the flood had caused outrage among middle-class residents. In the political aftermath of the flood, state authorities blamed—dubiously according many environmentalists (Prabhu, 2005)—slum structures on the Mithi River in the city center for choking the basin with their waste and causing it to flood. The Chief Minister made a public pledge to “clean-up” the river by removing slums located on the basin to prevent future calamities. These events added impetus for the second demolition of Mandala in May 2006. Soon after Mandala was cleared, the MMRDA brought truckloads of debris from the Mithi River to Mandala to solidify the land and prepare it for resettlement of the slum residents and shop owners evicted as part of the cleanup. One Mandala resident described these actions of the state as an attempt to lay claim to the land into which residents had poured their labor and resources to solidify in the first place.

Thus the experience of the state for evictees in Mandala was that of a simultaneously distant and intimate enemy. It was also one where governmental exclusions from resettlement occupation translated into the experience of ethnic and class-based violence. For all of these aspects of marginalization, Mandala became the symbolic and political center of the anti-evictions campaign of the NAPM. Soon after the second eviction on May 17, Mandala evictees, along with NAPM activists and other supporters, began a 30-day dharna (Gandhian sit-in) again at Azaad Maidan in downtown Mumbai. Simpreet Singh, one of NAPM’s principle activists, described the involvement of the movement in virtually all aspects of social and political life of the Mandala evictees. “Committees were formed for everything from political strategy to festivals. Every little decision was made communally.” Mandala has also occupied an important symbolic role for evictees from other slums who have remained active even after rebuilding their homes. “We are all from Mandala,” one of these activists exclaimed at an NAPM rally. With the largest concentration of residents of all

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34 The resettlement never proceeded, as evictees from the Mithi River filed a court case with the help of the activist lawyer, Raj Awasthi showing that the Mandala plot was designated an environmentally protected site according to existing zoning laws that prohibited development in many of the city’s coastal wetlands.
the neighborhoods that were demolished, Mandala evictees indeed presented a formidable force in the movement, but the direct actions they undertook may have also caused a severe backlash by state authorities even though these strategies and the relationship are now changing as I show in later sections of this chapter. That Mandala has occupied this principle role in NAPM must be understood in terms of the movement’s history and evolving ideology.

5.4 The National Alliance of People’s Movements: History and Practices of Resistance

I have already introduced the political space the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA—Save the Narmada River Movement) has occupied in development struggles, especially in relation to the Indian state, the World Bank and rights-based transnational movements. Here, I unpack that space’s ethico-political origins in the NBA in order to understand the movement’s mediating, mobilizing and educative role in Mandala. For my purposes in this chapter, several legacies of NBA remain salient for examining NAPM’s Mumbai’s struggles. First is the critique of large-scale development and advocacy for decentralized village/slum-based forms of sustainable development. While the movement focused on the plight of displaced tribal villages, it also harnessed an overall attack on the economic viability, the unfairly elite-biased benefits and the ecological destruction of infrastructure development projects (Baviskar, 2005). NBA opposed elite, transnational and corporate dominated development with what NAPM activists today refer to as a “participatory eco-socialism.” Mandala evictees found a great deal of strength by aligning with NAPM. However, similar to the Gazi Nagar experience discussed in the previous chapter, Mandala residents’ own interpretations of their struggles and their enemies have not always equated with the ideology and critique of movement leaders.

Second and related is NAPM’s confrontational stance with the state and private local and transnational capital in Mumbai. NAPM’s approach parallels the moral and legal battles with the Indian government and World Bank during the struggles over the dams in the Narmada Valley. Unlike SPARC’s nonconfrontational pro-development politics of accommodation, NAPM activists have protested in the Gandhian style of non-violent direct action and civil disobedience. These political tactics have been bolstered by a discourse of rights in which the movement has drawn on various legal strategies and the support of human rights groups working through the courts to contest the injustices and environmental destruction of redevelopment. The Mandala experience shows that these tactics have not always been sufficient for achieving the immediate housing needs of the evicted. The challenges of securing housing in the medium and short terms have meant that the movement has also engaged in negotiating with politicians and transnational agents. These efforts have centered on promoting the visibility of evictees and their circumstances in governmental institutions of compensation in ways that are similar to the SPARC Alliance even as their ideologies of development differ.

Third is NAPM’s emphasis on advancing the rights of the most socially oppressed—by caste, religion and region in addition to class—a position that has its roots in the political mobilization of adivasi indigenous identity in environmental and social struggles over dam
construction in the Narmada. In Mumbai, NAPM has highlighted the fact that many evictees’ class marginalization is experienced through their ethnic, religious and caste identities. By invoking the history of anti-colonial struggle, NAPM has thus couched struggles over urban space in terms of broader rights to the space of the nation by citizens who have been multiply excluded, displaced and dispossessed, criticizing both state oppression and neoliberal development as forms of neo-colonialism. In rallies held at symbolic city places like Azaad Maidan (a park dedicated to the martyrs of the Indian independence struggles), activists and displaced residents have given emotionally charged speeches on displacement and development as a violation of the rights of the people. In these and other spaces, NAPM’s condemnation of both Hindu Nationalist politics and evictions as exclusion of poor Indians from the space of the nation has emphasized both class and identity-based dispossession. Through these idioms NAPM has vociferously protested redevelopment efforts for their biases toward elites, especially real estate capital and has rallied for more decentralized, small-scale forms of democratic development with an “eco-socialist” political ideology. The aforementioned aspects of the movement are elucidated on the NAPM website:

People’s rights over natural resources, appropriate decentralized democratic development, towards a just, sustainable and egalitarian society, with true internationalism is what we assert. Our ideology is against corporate globalization, communalism and religious fundamentalism, casteism, untouchability and discrimination of all kinds, which are some of non-negotiable tenets of NAPM.

The Mandala case demonstrates how the movement’s emphasis on citizenship rights for the most downtrodden has enabled it to include neighborhoods affected by the most severe forms of state-led displacement and dispossession that have articulated with ethno-religious marginalization. NAPM idioms of activism recast urban evictees as displaced working class citizens whose fundamental rights were violated by a neoliberal, neo-colonial state. The articulation of these experiences of dispossession with NAPM movement ideology gave rise to a distinct set of discourses and practices of struggle among Mandala evictees and neighborhood organizers. Strategies focused more on direct actions and demands for rights rather than more measured forms of negotiations. Such actions included a variety of protest marches as well as the gherao, a form of protest action originating in early 20th-century labor movements wherein workers would encircle and trap employers until their demands were met. In 2005, evictees from Mandala and other Vision Mumbai-affected settlements executed a symbolic gherao around the Indian Finance Minister P. Chidambaram for pushing global-city redevelopment at the expense of the urban poor. This form of protest highlighted evictees economic rights as working class citizens. At organizing rallies and planning meetings, Medha Patkar regularly encouraged such forms of confrontational (though non-violent) resistance and the importance of sangharsh (defined as struggle) over accommodationist politics.

NAPM also helped to encourage the active involvement of women in all of the movement activities and leadership positions. There is of course a long tradition of women standing in
the front lines of various resistance protests including those against impending demolitions. This positioning was often motivated by the belief that there would be less brute force on the part of the police toward women than men—or at least greater moral reprehension for public assault on women’s bodies. This was also the case during demolitions in Mandala, though the tactic did not spare women or men from police beatings, as discussed in earlier sections. With the involvement of NAPM, women were brought into a greater number of organizational activities. Indeed Medha Patkar often emphasized the importance of women’s participation in movement activities and decision-making processes. Others leaders also emphasized the importance of women’s leadership and participation during public rallies and in community organizing spaces. However, unlike the SPARC Alliance discourse of women’s participation as non-confrontational, practically minded housewives, NAPM’s discourse of women’s participation was grounded in the notion of women’s struggles against development as workers.

While NAPM leaders urged for democratic and participatory processes, the centrality of Medha Patkar was doubted by no one. As I recall, when during the chaos of the July 2005 floods residents began to rebuild, they did so at the urging of “Medhatai” (meaning “elder sister Medha” as Mandala residents respectfully called her). During these and other events, I noticed the hesitation to undertake any action or decision without her presence, approval and guidance. I have refrained from passing judgment on the centralization of decision-making power in the NAPM leadership. Perhaps it was necessary given the direness of the situation and the dependency that Mandala residents had on the leverage that Patkar’s involvement gave to their struggle. And indeed there were important positive influences that Patkar’s presence brought to the movement such as the urging of greater gender equality in the movement leadership. Yet, there were moments when evictees clearly disagreed with NAPM leadership strategy but had difficulty being acknowledged and taken seriously. Other NAPM activists also found it difficult to counter the will and ideas of their leaders. These fissures became more evident when the Mandala struggle shifted from immediate and acute clashes with the state to the terrain of longer-term negotiations over resettlement.

While helping to make visible the severe forms of dispossession of working classes in Mumbai, NAPM’s discourses have also underplayed the diversity of experiences and varying degrees of privilege and marginalization that have substantially shaped the possibilities of politics among the groups that the movement has sought to represent. For instance, the movement has attempted to build solidarity among very diverse groups of evictees including those in Gazi Nagar, Mandala and other areas. In the following chapter I address some of the contradictory political implications of the combination of discursive practices of solidarity and rights for the most marginalized in greater detail. Here, I simply flag the fact that NAPM’s mobilization practices in response to demolitions were unevenly received among housing NGOs, slum dwellers’ advocacy groups and activists. Ideologically sympathetic groups initially expressed a positive attitude toward the galvanizing force and moral weight that Medha Patkar, NAPM’s charismatic leader, gave to the anti-evictions struggles in response to the Vision Mumbai demolition drive. NAPM also relied significantly on the housing movements including the Shehar Vikas Manch (City Development Forum)
and the NGO YUVA for institutional support in its protest interventions. YUVA played an important role in organizing meetings with government and World Bank officials, producing advocacy materials and helping to implement surveys. These and other groups in the city were an important resource in the filing of the Public Interest Litigation on behalf of all of the neighborhoods demolished in the Vision Mumbai sweep, including Mandala. At the same time, however, a growing number of activists in the city felt that NAPM had hijacked the mantle of slum dwellers’ movements without the necessary and adequate attention to the various negotiations and strategies that had long been underway. Although these remain salient political questions in terms of the important possibilities of alliance building, this chapter remains focused primarily on the experience of eviction and collaboration with NAPM from the perspectives of Mandala slum residents. Exploring the questions of how and why evicted slum residents have confronted and negotiated displacement on their own and with NAPM elucidates the simultaneously constraining and liberatory possibilities of these political practices.

Even as NAPM and Mandala evictees and organizers engaged in these forms of civil disobedience and direct action, they began a comprehensive self-surveying and memory-based slum mapping project, similar to those undertaken by the SPARC Alliance. During the month-long sit-in at Azaad Maidan, NAPM activists and Mandala evictees worked together to produce politically relevant knowledge about the evicted with a greater emphasis on labor and income generating activities of evictees than in the SPARC case. These practices of self surveying would later be implicated in a complicated politics of negotiations that tried to preserve the class-based critique of the state while also engaging in the governmental processes of making evictees legible to access resettlement.

5.5 From confrontation to negotiation: The governmentalization of land struggle

The most violent run-ins with the state in Mandala have simmered down since 2007, and over the last three years evictees have been in negotiations with the central government for onsite resettlement options. Of course the mediation of NAPM has been and continues to be an important resource for residents, shaping their relationship with agents of the redevelopmental state. As one resident leader claimed, “Medha tai gave us himmat [courage, strength]” to stand up for themselves. She went on to say that today, the state gives them “respect” and offers them chai and biscuits and listens to their grievances. Of course such treatment has not yet resulted in concrete results for the vast majority of evictees in terms of access to land or resettlement. In 2006, for instance, only 56 people were found eligible for resettlement plots offsite but evidence of corruption and insufficient survey data of the area halted compensation (Bhide, 2009).

Furthermore, relations are congenial but less than cooperative with Maharasthra state-level agencies like the MMRDA and the SRA, which NAPM leaders have vociferously accused of corruption and malpractice. Instead, Mandala evictees and NAPM activists have appealed to other state powers in the national government. In 2007, evictees submitted a proposal to the National Urban Development Ministry’s Basic Services for the Urban Poor Program (BUSP). BUSP is the housing, service and resettlement component of the
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), the countrywide city infrastructure and land redevelopment discussed in chapter 2. Slum and urban poor advocates see the BUSP as a cosmetic band-aid for the giant gash of mass displacement caused by the projects and land market restructuring policies embedded in JNNURM. Nonetheless, NAPM’s progressive allies in national government agencies and judiciary—including the late former Prime Minister V. P. Singh—who have helped to facilitate the reception of the Mandala proposal in the Urban Development Ministry. The proposal entry into the JNNURM was ironic given NAPM’s vociferous critiques of the program’s large-scale infrastructure development strategies, reliance on multi-lateral financing and market-oriented policies. Nonetheless, the proposal represented a practical tactic that enabled Mandala evictees to bypass Maharashtra State government policies especially the draconian cut-off date legislation that alienated evictees of Mandala of any rights to their land or to resettlement. The proposal could not bypass the government of Maharashtra entirely, however; the Maharashtra Housing and Development Authority (MHADA) still had to approve the proposal and be charged with its implementation.

To get the cooperation of the state-level MHADA, the BUSP proposal to resettle Mandala would have to undergo a number of compromises. For instance, of the 50-acre plot that was demolished, only 14 acres would be ceded for resettling evictees according to the proposal. The remaining portion of the land would be offered for whatever purpose state authorities needed. Furthermore, rather than the low-rise structures that the movement initially demanded, the proposal was amended to include high-rise resettlement buildings. This was a significant point of compromise for the NAPM, which had long insisted that slum dwellers’ income-generating activities required ground floor access and that residents would have more control over their structures if they were individual low-rise units. Perhaps as residents of the surrounding still-standing areas of Mandala have begun to undergo the processes of the state’s high-rise slum rehabilitation and redevelopment policy, the hope of ground-floor resettlement has seemed weaker. However, unlike the Maharashtra state Slum Rehabilitation Program, Mandala evictees’ resettlement proposal to the BUSP did not include the participation of private developers.

Private developer profits and manipulation of slum redevelopment has been a point of material and ideological contention that NAPM has firmly maintained. This position may benefit a larger number of evictees (if the proposal is accepted and implemented) than the state scheme because it will not include a cut-off date that would exclude many residents from access to resettlement. A few of the movement’s positions, however, were not always unanimously agreed upon among Mandala evictees. Some residents felt that they should allow private builder participation to ensure that the project would obtain the support of the state Slum Rehabilitation Authority, which operated through the market mechanism. Another small number of evictees felt that universal resettlement would hurt their cause and that only people meeting a new January 1, 2000 cut-off date (an extension of the 1995 date proposed by the state government) or those who were actively involved in the movement should be resettled.
These contradictory positions would materialize in concrete ways. The BUSP proposal required a massive effort on the part of Mandala’s neighborhood leaders to make the land and its evicted population legible for governmental programs even as their eligibility was still under negotiation. Neighborhood organizers with the participation of NAPM activists produced slum maps, resident lists and documents that would either include or exclude Mandala evictees from the resettlement proposal submitted to the central government.

![Mandala map demonstration](photo credit: Saloua Chaker)

These methods of producing legibility among those that the sovereign state attempted to delegitimize and violently erase from the space of the city were also tightly bound with competing (re)definitions of legitimacy and belonging within the community and NAPM. This was nowhere more relevant then during the production of lists of people who would be included in the resettlement proposal of the BUSP. What names were included on the lists of evictees to be resettled and how names and other information appeared on these lists was one of the greatest concerns of Mandala organizers. Not unlike the SPARC Alliance approach of self-enumeration and slum mapping, NAPM and neighborhood leaders had embarked on a process of making legible the structures, inhabitants and livelihoods that had been rendered criminal and invisible by the state. Despite being excluded from governmental programs of resettlement, the movement leadership enacted the governmental practices of inclusion through neighborhood organization and participatory surveying and mapping. With the assistance of NAPM leadership, evictees were organized into about 14 groups called “societies”—a social unit corresponding to the cooperative societies of formal residential buildings—each with a leader who assumed a variety of
responsibilities on behalf of members. One responsibility was to ensure the adequate documentation of key pieces of information about the households within each society. Society leaders were often chosen based on their literacy skills and strong social links to a broad range of residents. With the NAPM leadership’s emphasis on gender balance in participation, several society leaders were women. In addition to attending to lists of residents for whom they were responsible, leaders were responsible for attending all movement meetings and other events and ideally reporting news back to their members.

Mandala’s evicted society leaders distinguish themselves between the two areas of Mandala that were demolished, Jantanagar and New Indiranagar. Although leaders and residents from these two areas demonstrated a united front in protests and negotiations with the state, the antagonism between the factions became evident to me as I spent more time with evictees. Much of this antagonism seemed to be associated with the production of lists and attendance at meetings. Over the course of my research, I attended several meetings where Mandala neighborhood leaders and residents shuffled piles of maps and lists arguing over numbers, missing information and mismatched data. During one encounter during which I spoke with Azizbhai (one of the key leaders of the Jantanagar section), Panditji (one of the key leaders of New Indiranagar section) and another society leader, Samira (aligned more closely with Azizbhai), the tension was palpable. An excerpt of my fieldnotes below demonstrates the frictions I witnessed—and perhaps also triggered—during a visit to the edge of Indiranagar, where Panditji and a few other residents had built shacks on stilts in the mud.

As I asked Panditji questions about the members of his and other societies in Indiranagar and the activities he was undertaking for the development of the proposal, Azizbhai and Samira would interject with statements contradicting him. Panditji would answer my questions recounting the history of Mandala, giving estimates of how many people were members of his society or the processes of settlement in Indiranagar. As he spoke, I would catch a glimpse of Samira seated behind him surreptitiously and almost comically signing to me that Panditji’s statements were untrue. Azizbhai was less discrete, interjecting protests out loud. Panditji explained the painstaking process of organizing residents and pointed to a pile of items in the corner of his hut indicating that the within the cloth bundles were lists that he had painstakingly developed. Azizbhai interjected twice “those aren’t lists, those are your clothes and personal items.” Panditji ignored these interjections and continued on with his explanations. This went on for about a half an hour. I left feeling confounded at how these leaders were able to still work together for a common cause.

Many of the arguments like the one described above concerned how and which names should be added to the resettlement proposal lists. In particular there were disagreements over which sources would be consulted to produce the master list. Multiple and conflicting surveys served as references for lists. One list emerged out of a survey that Mandala residents conducted (with some assistance of activists associated with NAPM) during a 32
day-long protest or sit-in at Azaad Maidan field in downtown Mumbai after the first major demolition sweep in 2005. However, the survey process was riddled with challenges from the start because not all of the evictees were present at the sit-in and therefore some names were left off. Furthermore, when the land was reclaimed in July 2005, there was no longer an exact match between people present on the initial survey lists and those who were living on the reclaimed plot. A second survey took place after the reclamation showing a substantial increase in the numbers from the initial survey at Azaad Maidan. On Sunday September 30, 2007, a tense meeting took place with all of the society leaders and Simpreet Singh, the main NAPM activist involved in the Mandala struggle. The goal was to work through and make final decisions as to how to include names on the list for the resettlement proposal to be sent to the central government the following week. My fieldnotes recall the physically and politically stressful conditions of the meeting:

Simpreet and I arrive at the meeting in the late afternoon, and several society leaders have already started sorting through piles of paper. It is burning hot in the small 12’ X 12’ room and as people continue to pour in we are all pushed toward the back corrugated metal wall which feels as though it is cooking us. It is the month of Ramadan, and I am amazed that even in this relentless heat, most of the people present in the room have not had single drop of water to drink all day. Over the course of the evening, tempers flared and I wonder to myself how on earth is the work ahead to be done under these conditions.

Some questions seemed easily resolved. For instance, all of the leaders agreed that children’s names should be removed from lists as should the small number of people who received plots from the collector. Only married adult sons would have a right to their own place on the list for resettlement units. But as the meeting unfolded, many of the problems that I had heard about in individual conversations came into heated public debate. I began to see the ways in which the different perspectives among the society leaders and NAPM organizers clashed. Two of the society leaders expressed strongly that the original survey should be the basis of the resettlement proposal list. Others disagreed there were too many residents missing and that the increase in numbers was due to the fact that many residents were missing from the initial protest. Still others argued that people who did not actually live in Mandala prior to the first demolition had settled along with the original residents. “The public multiplied” according to Hameedbhai, “in an area where there was once 2 houses now there are 4.” He went on to joke, “we keep striving to be truthful in all that we do but what if we are ourselves ultimately false,” referring to the fact that the lists would never represent the “truth” of the original settlement. Another leader, Azizbhai similarly expressed that it was unwise to keep trying to “dig up” more names because doing so would only make the task more difficult. Simpreet tried to moderate the now confrontational debate. Although he attempted to maintain a neutral status, it was clear that he disagreed with Hameedbhai and Azizbhai, believing that a larger number of evictees should be included. Leaders also complained of the high levels of “duplicates,” names that were represented in more than one society either by mistake or because evictees were trying to hedge their bets on more than one society. In addition, there was the challenge of
gathering all of the information required by the proposal for all of their members, many of whom were scattered all over the city or in distant village since the demolitions. For instance, many leaders were unaware of the fact that the resettlement list needed to include not just the family head’s name but also the name of that person’s father. The various maps and lists could never quite match the changing geography of the area, nor could they account for difficulties reaching a broadly scattered population of evictees. Debates continued to rage among neighborhood leaders and NAPM activists over which list was correct and how to proceed in terms of inclusion in the BUSP proposal.

In her work on evictions, poverty and party regimes in Calcutta, Ananya Roy has written that “the [regularization] list was a critical tool of exacting political allegiance and eliminating competitors” (2003b, p. 208). Competing parties—each claiming lists more genuine than the other—used the list as a mobilizing tool for residents desperately seeking housing security. In this manner, she argues that the “politics of lists” is in fact central to the reproduction of political party machinery in Calcutta, a form of power that reproduces poverty, and gendered politics. In Mandala, however, the politics of lists is not attached to political party regimes. State agents stayed out of the direct work of drawing up lists, surveys, photos and identity cards, leaving the work to evictees and NAPM activists. The low profile of state agents in these processes begs the question of what work was being done in list production, negotiation and conflicts. The production of the list, a process mired in uncertainty and incomplete information, worked similarly in Mandala to include and exclude evictees from the possibility—remote as it may be—of resettlement.

Moreover, the lists indeed represented struggles over ideology and power among leaders and NAPM activists. For instance, NAPM activists maintained that everyone included in the initial survey should be represented in the final BUSP proposal. The disagreements that ensued over these kinds of issues showed how the politics of lists indicated processes of reordering notions of legitimate claims to land.

In this way, I would argue that the battle over lists reflected not just governmental technics unfolding to include or exclude nor political machinations of state officials. Rather, through list production and contestation residents and leaders negotiated a set of counter-narratives of legitimacy and claims to urban space to those imposed by the state. If, as I have shown in the previous section, Mandala evictees and NAPM leaders redeployed the notion of citizenship to counter class and identity-based displacement and dispossession, the concrete processes involved in accessing resettlement worked in the opposite direction, toward limiting inclusion. For instance, one debate that emerged was over whether people on the original surveys and lists who had not participated in the various actions and meetings of the movement should be removed from the list. Medha Patkar and other NAPM leaders vocally disagreed with this position, as did other residents. As Samira Sheikh, a resident and active participant argued, “those who have spent money—be it even one or two rupees—for their homes, have a right to be on the resettlement list.” At a list preparation meeting, I learned that some of these owners may actually not have lived in Mandala before the 2005 eviction but may have purchased a plot after the reclamation. In this instance it is the notion of property ownership through investment in land and housing that defines legitimacy, not just participation in the movement. Ultimately society leaders
chose ownership as the principle criteria for including names on the lists of residents for the resettlement proposal.

Samira argued that excluding people based on their lack of participation was not right because of the many obstacles, including work obligations or distance, that would prevent evictees from attending movement actions and meetings. Another question emerged over whether to include people who had never lived in Mandala in the resettlement list. A few participants of the movement who took an active role in Mandala and other NAPM struggles were either renters or had lived in another demolished neighborhood but expressed hope for accessing a spot on the Mandala resettlement list. These questions were handled on a case-by-case basis among the neighborhood leaders and NAPM activists. It is important to note that participatory labor in movement activities was an important arena of contestation in defining counter-legitimations through lists. Finally, all leaders and residents present at one of organizational meetings that I attended agreed to exclude certain residents known to be involved in organized crime or who had a history of violence in the neighborhood.

Although the politics of lists was clearly frustrating for Mandala leaders and residents as well as NAPM activists, no one contested the need for documentation. As Bhairavi insisted, “whatever the problems or direction we take, we need these lists and maps; [otherwise] there is no record of our demolished homes.” The absolute necessity for visibility in the eyes of the state apparatus that had deemed Mandala residents illegal (based on their lacking documentation proving pre-cut-off date residence in the slum), illegitimate (based on their status as invaders) and outsiders (based on their ethno-religious identity) ultimately trumped all conflicts. The process of producing these mundane documentary artifacts helped to constitute a set of counter-claims to urban space, legitimacy and belonging. Despite evictees’ rejections of the invisibilizing processes of the state, these counter-legitimations necessarily created their own boundaries that demarcated rights and belonging. Indeed, leaders and residents often expressed anxiety over people attempting to access Mandala resettlement by falsely claiming residency in the neighborhood prior to demolition. Among these false claims, the dalal again figured dominantly as a threat to the community by trying to take advantage of the eviction for personal enrichment. Citing this problem, some leaders began to insist on the need for purava or proof of residence. Although a more flexible and expansive range of “proof” was deemed acceptable compared with that deemed acceptable by the state, these requirements nonetheless mirrored governmental practices of linking bodies and populations to place. In the following chapter, I analyze the implications of these boundary-making practices in comparison to similar demarcations in the other two cases of eviction discussed in previous chapters.

It remains to be seen whether and what concrete resettlement outcomes will result from these efforts. Indeed, despite all of the various documentations and compromises among neighborhood leaders and activists and negotiations with the central and state government agents, Mandala evictees’ wait—now three years since the BUSP proposal submission and six years since the initial demolition—continues. The zoning for Mandala was converted in 2009 from no-development to commercial development, a sign that development plans are
likely under way for the area. Meanwhile, the NAPM’s urban campaigns continue to expand, though with a support base that has waned as the fiery memories of the 2005 demolition sweep have become dimmer and more distant.

5.6 NAPM and ongoing juridified class struggle in the city

While the practices of contention have given way to negotiation and governmentalization of resettlement requests, NAPM members have maintained citizenship-based rights of the working poor as an organizing framework for claims on the state. Similar to the Gazi Nagar case of the previous chapter, the framework of rights was also tightly intertwined with a discourse of state corruption. Yet, corruption talk of the NAPM tended to emphasize class-based injustices more strongly than in the Gazi Nagar case. For instance, NAPM leaders deployed a discourse of state corruption to attack the market-based strategies of redevelopment. Soon after the initial Vision Mumbai demolitions in Mandala and across the city, NAPM filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) writ petition to the Mumbai High Court questioning the legality of the slum demolitions and cut-off date and demanding rehabilitation and a better housing policy. The petition argued that none of the state government’s high-value development schemes—including the Bandra-Kurla Complex, Backbay Reclamation Scheme and Oshiwara District Center—have provided for housing for the workers who have helped to build them.

Although there is no direct connection between evictees of the Vision Mumbai sweep including Mandala and these labor forces, the petition argues that the failure to provide for housing and basic services of the city’s working classes amounts to an infringement of constitutionally protected rights. Furthermore, the petition demonstrates that some development projects, including the famed Atria Mall development site, that officially have been designated for the purposes of low-income housing have in fact served only elite consumption interests. In response to the petition, the court ordered the formation of a committee of 20 prominent people to analyze the state housing policy and propose a solution. In 2009, the State of Maharashtra chief minister announced a decision to extend the cut-off date from January 1, 1995 to January 1, 2000. To many people this was yet another instance of “vote bank politics” to appease slum dwellers in the coming state elections. It remains to be seen what the change in cut-off date will mean for Mandala residents who were settled the area before and after 2000. Some tensions have emerged among these groups of residents, but the official position of Mandala evictees and the NAPM is to push through with the resettlement proposal to the central government’s BUSP which does not have a cut-off date.

Such juridified forms appealing eviction and accessing resettlement seem to also be reflected in Mandala leaders’ decision to proceed with their claims “legally.” As Azizbhai exclaimed once, “We are tired of the police beatings. We now should do things the proper way and get back this land so no one can take it away again.” The motivations are of course myriad and there are conflicting opinions in the community over this strategy. I know that at least one society leader, Sagira, has proposed a reoccupation of the land instead of waiting for the state to honor the project proposal. Of course, doing things “the right way”
has meant sustaining a wait that perhaps not everyone can afford to bear equally. Nonetheless, the decision has remained to not reoccupy the land without undergoing the authorized procedures, and in this way, Mandala’s political trajectory has unfolded differently than that of most of the other neighborhoods evicted in the Vision Mumbai sweep of “post-cut-off-date” slums.

Juridified discourses of rights and corruption (as an infringement of the rights of the poor) have been present in many of NAPM’s urban actions extending beyond Mandala. For instance, activists and evictees have publically accused the state of violating norms and policies meant to benefit the poor to accommodate builders’ interests. For instance, NAPM launched a media and action campaign indicting the “real encroachers of Mumbai,” which they identified as “the nexus of builders-politicians-bureaucrats” working for the urban elite. They exposed the corrupt practices of the state through press releases and public actions at elite developments in the city like the Hirandani luxury complex in north central Mumbai. Built by one of the leading developers in the city, the complex stood on 240 acres of land purchased from the government at the ridiculously low price of 40 paisa (about one U.S. cent) per acre officially on the condition that small units were constructed for lower and lower-middle income groups. Instead, the entire area was converted into a luxury, gated community with 1,800 to 4,000 square-foot units selling for up to U.S. $1 million.

NAPM has also contested these forms of “corruption” and state neglect with the participation of evictees through a juridified set of discursive practices. For instance, NAPM organized events with evictees at which state officials and agencies faced accusations of malpractice and injustice from staged “people’s hearings” and “panels.” I attended two such events, including a “people’s hearing” on the situation of ration cards for the poor and a panel on corruption within the projects of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority.

Figure 5.3: Official on “trial” at NAPM’s Jan Sunvai [People’s Hearing] (photo credit: author)
The ration card event challenged difficulties that the urban poor faced in accessing ration cards, a document officially meant to enable access to basic needs (cooking gas, food staples, and so on) at reduced cost. Instead, the card has served as a way of making legible residence in an informal settlement and is used for accessing services and resettlement compensation after demolitions. During the event, rations office bureaucrats were invited along with media and other activists and officials. The officials sat on stage in front of a large audience of mostly Mandala evictees who charged the bureaucrats with denying them access to cards and failing to provide adequate provisions for the poor to access. At the Slum Rehabilitation Panel, a large and diverse group of slum dwellers (eligible and ineligible for resettlement) affected by redevelopment projects complained about being marginalized by the process. Among the guests present at the panel was a famously left-leaning retired judge who also made harsh criticisms of slum redevelopment policies that favored the interests of developers over the urban poor. Such events were of course not juridically binding, but the act of putting the state on trial for anti-poor, “illegal” and corrupt practices has served to publicize the class biases in redevelopmental governance. NAPM’s support of the MUTP Inspection Panel process and anti-World Bank agitation are additional examples of the deployment of juridical forms of contention. These kinds of tactics are precisely the sort that SPARC has dismissed as middle-class and useless for the poor in terms of outcomes and empowerment. I address the implications of these discursive strategies in comparative perspective in the following chapter.
5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the political trajectory of eviction in the Mandala slum settlement. Located in the Northeastern suburb of Mankhurd, Mandala residents occupied a space designated by state agencies as a resettlement hub for displaced slum dwellers. However, because of exclusions in the State of Maharashtra’s neoliberal resettlement policy and identity-based discrimination, Mandala’s evictees were deemed illegal and therefore ineligible for resettlement. The experience of the everyday state manifest in the betrayal of members of the “public” as well as the violence of the police and bureaucratic state agencies has made land struggles an especially treacherous and arduous process. Residents became closely aligned with the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), a Gandhian eco-socialist, anti-displacement movement that has been highly critical of neoliberal development interventions and disposessions by the state. This political alignment, combined with various other social, historical and geographic forces and conditions, has produced a distinct articulation of eviction politics. I argue that the Mandala trajectory of eviction politics was characterized by a reworking of the meaning and materialities of citizenship and belonging in the nation. Similar to the Gazi Nagar case, Mandala struggles also deployed a discourse of rights and corruption.

Although movement activists have worked through courts and highlighted corruption in redevelopment projects, rights claims in Mandala were contoured less by juridico-economic framings. Rather, citizenship rights and land claims were defined by the compounded marginalization of ethno-religious and class relations. In the process of moving from contention to negotiation, Mandala residents have begun to employ governmental techniques of slum mapping and self-surveying as a means to reclaim land through national state programs, instead of local state agencies. I argue that these practices have reconfigured the ethico-politics of citizenship among evictees themselves, who have debated—often in disagreement with NAPM leaders and each other—the tactics of land claims and parameters of inclusion in lists and resettlement proposals. While criteria for inclusion adopted by Mandala resident leaders were more expansive than prevailing policies, new barriers were erected over who legitimately could claim rights to resettlement. Furthermore, activists and resident leaders have made some compromises in exchange for resettlement, such as the acceptance of a smaller piece of the land and high-rise resettlement on site. But these negotiations have retained a firm ideological commitment to exclude local developers. Such reconfigured strategies and ethico-politics of resettlement may form the foundation of a reconsolidated hegemony. It remains to be seen whether such tactics will lead to resettlement for evictees displaced six years ago.
CHAPTER 6
The Politics of the Evicted:
Redevelopmental Hegemony through Difference

6.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I examined three experiences of displacement and social mobilization as distinct political trajectories. To facilitate analysis, I separated deeply interconnected politico-spatial processes into case studies. In this chapter, I bring these trajectories into an integrated comparison that shows how the boundaries among them are blurred in time-space. Memories from a day of field research helpfully evoke these spatial interconnections. In October 2007, I had spent a day interviewing MUTP-affected residents of Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony. It was close to dusk, and I had some free time before attending an evening strategy meeting of Mandala evictees in a neighboring slum. I took a break, sitting on a curb of the colony’s main thoroughfare eating cold rotis and sabzi prepared by a woman working in my home who lives in a neighborhood not unlike this one, also slated for redevelopment. Looking around, I observed that the public spaces of the area that I had traversed earlier in the day were becoming transformed. The desolate, sun-blasted concrete and asphalt seemed to soften as vegetable and snack vendors sitting on strips of cloth beside the thoroughfare prepared their wares for residents returning home from work. I recalled how one resettled resident who made a living from street vending recounted to me the battle that she faced with local police who attempted to prohibit such “slum-like” informal economic activity from getting reestablished in the resettlement colony.

I departed for a meeting in the neighboring slum soon after a kind but slightly overprotective resettlement office staff member urged me to leave before nightfall for my safety. Despite their proximity to each other in northeastern Mankhurd district, this was the first time that I had travelled by foot between Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony and the slum near the demolished Mandala site (see figure 6.1). This journey, made during the transition period from day to night, gave me an altered perspective on these spaces. Passing through the bustle of vendors, goods and shoppers at the edge of the resettlement colony into the adjacent slum, the transition from seemingly endless rows of resettlement buildings to the neighboring slum seemed less distinct than many proponents and critics of resettlement might suggest. A. Jockin, leader of the SPARC Alliance, had in the past also guided international visitors on a walking tour through the neighboring slum to demonstrate how resettled railway slum dwellers “used to live,” as if the journey across space were also a journey back in time. These slum dwellers could also benefit if the resettlement model were expanded, he argued.

Yet, these practices of “walking in the city,” as Michel de Certeau (1984) might have noted, deceived as much as they revealed. Despite apparent continuities, there were also
disjunctures in the experiences and political positionings of evicted slum residents. As the previous three chapters have shown, resettlement has affected eligible slum dwellers in different ways while others, like the evictees of Mandala, have been deemed illegal and ineligible for compensation. Instead, their land had been slated for building a resettlement colony for qualified evictees of slums in other parts of the city. Thus, contrary to the narrative presented by Jockin, resettlement has not been the foregone future for many of Mumbai’s slum dwellers. These uncompensated demolitions have found little expression in government and NGO narratives of resettlement. In this way, Mankhurd district has represented to me a space of both encounter and distance, where resettlement space has merged with violent spaces of absolute dispossession. This peripheral district has thus been a revelatory space for understanding how struggles over urban land and livelihood are waged through reformulations of subjectivity and rule.

The experience of traversing the landscape of Mankhurd’s slums and resettlement colonies is a concrete expression of the differentiated yet interwoven politics of redevelopment expressed in each case discussed in this dissertation. By examining these three political trajectories—based on reworkings of domesticity, juridico-economic rights and citizenship—I have aimed to demonstrate not only numerous varieties of eviction politics. Rather, it is precisely the differentiated spatialities, subjectivities and experiences of rule that consolidate redevelopmental hegemony. The demands of market-dominated redevelopment and compensation make it impossible to fully redistribute the wealth that has been accumulated in prior rounds of development. Compensation is doled out unevenly
through mechanisms that mitigate disruptive conflict, maintain state legitimacy and facilitate concentrations of wealth. Market-based redevelopment, thus, necessarily operates through difference. Yet, as Hall has argued (1980), the very articulation of power and difference also provides the language and experiential material to “articulate” contestations and renegotiations.

In all three cases, the experience and politics of eviction has operated along three axes of difference: class, gender and ethno-religious identity. By this I mean that though articulated classed, gendered and ethno-religious relations and experiences were significant in all the cases, each trajectory of eviction politics was distinguished by the salience of one of these axes of difference. In the MUTP railways eviction, gendered ideals of domesticity shaped subjectivity and practices of rule to facilitate resettlement cooperation. In the MUTP road eviction, juridico-economic discourses of class marginalization contoured governance and contestations over offsite resettlement. In the Mandala case, dispossession of poorer residents of marginalized ethno-religious backgrounds undergirded sovereign power and struggles over citizenship and belonging in the space of the city and nation. In singling out one strand of an interconnected web of relations and identities, each modality of eviction governance and subjectivity served to challenge and reconstitute redevelopmental state hegemony in different degrees and ways.

In this chapter, I compare these cases by examining three interconnected arenas of social mobilization in relation to land to understand how these articulations emerged. The first focuses on the character of collective subjectivity, specifically the production of community among displaced slum dwellers. In so far as a distinct sense of community articulated with a particular ethos of social being and understandings of claims to land, this social formation has played a central role in the consolidation and destabilization of redevelopmental hegemony. The second arena examines the work of mediating agents—leaders and participants of social movements and NGOs—in translating transnational and translocal development discourses to shape claims to space. The third arena concerns the fractured embodied experience of displacement within and across each case. These disconnected and differentiated experiences of displacement, I argue, are central to understanding the partial nature of each trajectory of eviction politics. In each of these arenas, the three axes of difference that I have highlighted—class, gender and ethno-religious difference—come to the fore to shape how the eviction politics reformulates redevelopmental rule. By highlighting each arena separately, I do not mean to separate connected processes. Indeed, for instance, formations of community emerge from new meanings associated with embodied experience of informal housing and displacement as well as the mobilizing work of social groups. In each instance the politics of the evicted encounter the logics of governmental and sovereign rule and both shapes and is shaped by them.

6.2 Community

Despite fractured positions and practices, a sense of collectivity—albeit unstable—emerged in each case during critical moments. A sense of collectivity was a key constitutive element in the politics of eviction to the extent that it served as the basis for cooperation,
negotiation and resistance to displacement. One such social formation orienting collective subjectivity and animating a sense of solidarity for collective action in each of my cases was community. Rather than a spatially bounded category such as neighborhood or an institutional formation such as a social movement, I find the notion of community useful for its emphasis on shared symbolic and cultural meanings undergirding the experiences and practices of collective identity and action. My use of this admittedly abstract category as an analytical frame is substantiated also in its concrete political discourse in Mumbai. Slum and resettlement colony residents, NGOs and social movements as well as government agents often used the English term community. Imaginations, counter-imaginations, instantiations and experiences of community were a fundamental (though not singular) political arena through which cooperation, negotiation and contestation of eviction unfolded.

The scholarship on the political life of community is legion and varied. Sociologist, Nikolas Rose sees community as a governable space, deriving from Foucault’s notion of productive technologies of power-knowledge known as governmentality. In his reading, governable spaces “are not fabricated to counter experience; they make new kinds of experience possible, [and] produce new modes of perception.” As one such governable space, community can “be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self management and identity construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances” what Rose calls “government through community” (1999, pp. 32, 176). Scholars like Miranda Joseph (2002) have illustrated the deceptive “romance of community” in movements in the U.S., which she argues act as “supplements to capital.” However, such Foucaultian and other conceptions of community and government are based on the particular history of advance liberal societies and may be inadequate and misleading in the postcolonial context. Indeed, in contrast to Raymond Williams’ definition of community as a “warmly persuasive word to express an existing set of relationships ... [that] seems never to be used unfavorably” (1976, p. 76), community in India has long evoked more negative connotations to the secular nationalist register. Here, the term “communalism” connotes the tense relations and often explosive riots between ethno-religious groups. Among liberal and center-left intellectuals, communalism invokes a sense of mourning over the abandonment of modern ideals of cosmopolitanism in urban and national politics. Communalism also refers to the kind of “dirty politics” conducted by the various Hindu-nationalist and Shiv Sena parties, pitting communities against each other to rile up electoral support. Bernard Cohn (1990) has elucidated communalism’s colonial roots in the British practice of ruling through difference and fixing communities of caste, religion, ethnicity and tribe, what Nicholas Dirks has called the “ethnographic state.”

Thus, while struggles over space in the city have often been organized through ethno-religious communalism, romanticized notions of community—understood as modern ideologies that invoke the promise of local democracy, autonomy and the common good—are new to the discursive practices of slum residents, governments and mediating groups involved in these cases. These ideologies of community have been molded and transformed through transnational circuits of development knowledge from a broad political spectrum,
including anti-displacement movements, development NGOs, the World Bank and government agencies, which I discuss in more detail below. In such neoliberal development contexts, scholars have warned of the dangers of localism in the analysis and practice of development interventions and counter practices where understandings of community are overly attached to place without attention to the relations of power through scales that perpetuate social injustice and material inequality (Mohan & Stokke, 2000).

Of particular interest for the study of slum politics in the South Asian context is the work of Partha Chatterjee. Chatterjee argues that community is central to the politics of the governed in postcolonial contexts such as Indian cities. Arguing that post-colonial subaltern subjectivities are fundamentally distinct from bourgeois understandings of citizenship because the latter give primacy to the national community with membership delineated through liberal sensibilities of rights bearing citizenship; most of the governed, Chatterjee notes, are not identified as citizens but as subjects of rule. In countries like India, according to Chatterjee, the poor access their means of life through programs aimed at them as populations—known by a variety of categorical terms including slum dwellers, refugees, backward castes and landless people—to be governed by various state and non-governmental development programs rather than as rights-bearing citizens of the nation. He argues that this lack of citizenship comes from the fact of having to live illegally in informal settlements. At its core, bourgeois citizenship and rights is linked to property rights. The “governed” therefore do not operate in a civil society model of politics.

Instead, according to Chatterjee, the urban poor leverage their votes and political connections as a bloc in the efforts to secure their basic needs. This collective subjectivity is imbricated with a moral sensibility. He writes, “an equally crucial part of the politics of the governed [is] . . . to give the empirical form of a population group the moral attributes of a community” (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 57). In Chatterjee’s case of squatter communities in Calcutta, the metaphor of family became a key pole around which solidarity was expressed despite much internal diversity. While Chatterjee’s discussion of formations of community through “political society” among the urban poor is relevant to Mumbai, what he misses is the geographic and historical specificities through which articulations of community emerge and how differentiated community formations are deeply implicated in whether or how state urban projects advance. In each of the cases of eviction discussed in this dissertation, evictees of a particular area expressed community in different ways depending on their integration and position in historical processes of (re)development and social mobilization. Such histories and practices of community—based on often-competing imaginaries—are crucial to whether and how slum resident engage, negotiate or contest governmental projects of slum clearance. Thus, what I am arguing is that the politics and production of difference—within and across communities—is central not only to governance practices but also to the hegemony of redevelopment. And, in this way evicted slum dwellers in Mumbai are relationally constituted subjects who form the conditions of possibility for and limits to what I have called the redevelopmental state.

In opening up this concept of community, I find the framework offered by Michael Watts particularly useful for the Mumbai case. Drawing on Nigerian experiences, Watts has
argued that community is a quintessentially modern—if not always liberal—modality of politics inextricably linked in history and practice to logics of capitalist development and dispossession even as it ostensibly harks back to primordial ties. Watts’ primary concern is in delineating whether and how community is imagined, identified and territorialized in relation to petro-capitalism to understand the processes, contradictions and limits of rule in oil-producing regions of Nigeria (Watts, 2004). He explores three aspects of community in relation to modern rule that are also relevant to redevelopmental governance in Mumbai:

First, the fact that community-making can fail (often dramatically) because they [communities] may be unimagined or unimaginable; second, that communities typically contain both reactionary and emancipatory tendencies; and third, communities (with their attendant forms of identity, rule and territorialization) can be produced simultaneously at different spatial levels (scale politics) and may work with and against one another in complex and contradictory ways. This claim stands against the communitarian presumption that individuals have fidelity to only one community (Watts, 2004).

Watts’ framework for analyzing the competing political lives of community is useful for understanding how collective identity and action took shape in relation to displacement in Mumbai. In each political trajectory of eviction, there were competing, often fragile articulations of community forging different territorial expressions and attachments. I now relationally and comparatively examine the processes and conditions at the core community formation for each case. Articulations of community among evicted residents at key moments reveal whether and how collective spatio-political actions served to challenge and facilitate redevelopment and neoliberal urban governance. I address the following key aspects of community in relation to redevelopmental hegemony in the three cases: (a) how evicted residents were imagined and “counter-imagined” themselves as members of communities, (b) the specific ethico-politics of community and its relation to territory and (c) how the aforementioned aspects of community emerged out of local histories, neighborhood relations and practices of (re)developmental rule.

The SPARC Alliance’s past and recent negotiations with the state, connections with transnational development agents and processes of gendered slum-based mobilization in the MUTP railways resettlement articulated a gendered and domesticated (re)developmental community. Beginning in the 1980s, during mobilizations in pavement-dwelling neighborhoods, collective actions were directed at systematically countering categorizations of urban poor slum residents in the state and upper-class imaginary as transient and incorrigible invaders who preferred to live in filth. Counterimaginings of community—established through practices self-surveying, mapping and group savings collection—instead positioned slum dwellers as non-confrontational, cooperative and knowledgeable participants of development who were interested in improving their living conditions given the opportunity to do so. This reconfigured community imaginary countered not only the class biases of the state and upper classes but also aimed to bypass
the exclusions of both party politics and xenophobic urban cultural politics that were gaining force in the city at the time. The ethico-politics of moral solidarity rested on women as ideal and non-political guardians of the pro-development community through their roles in social reproduction.

Later, under the processes of the MUTP railways resettlement (1998–2006), community solidarity came to be directed toward facilitating resettlement among the displaced. These processes entailed the deployment of similar techniques of knowledge production and dissemination, feminized participation and pro-development ethos of non-confrontation and patience nurtured in pavement dwelling neighborhoods. Aspirational ideals of the family were central to the reworking of domesticity toward a redevelopamental end. Despite the declarations of Alliance leaders that slum dwellers inherently and uniformly wanted to be resettled and participate in the process, (re)developmental community under the MUTP was anything but natural. Rather, cooperative community solidarity was painstakingly produced over time and subject to all kinds of vulnerabilities and contradictions. In neighborhoods where the demands of rapid court ordered eviction meant that evicted residents could not “voluntarily” participate in preparations for resettlement, conflicts irrupted. Here, community solidarity and cooperative ethos was developed and nurtured through promises of improved life through resettlement reiterated in and solidified through peer exchange events and other social activities in transit camps over five to seven years. In transit camps, the ethos of non-confrontational pro-development community solidarity eschewed the space of the slum as unhygienic and unsafe. Community territoriality was directed instead toward resettlement space in Mankhurd.

Participating evicted residents—especially women—and other members of the SPARC Alliance played a crucial role in establishing a sense of community under highly adverse conditions and a diversity of experience. In some areas, especially in earlier phases of the project undertaken in slums located in the suburbs of Mankurd and Kanjur Marg, organizing slum dwellers’ cooperation drew on a history of working with the National Slum Dwellers’ Federation. Many of these residents were resettled near or in the same area in which they had lived. Neighborhoods evicted in the later phases of the MUTP, however, faced few options to negotiate resettlement. With this diversity of eviction experience, court mandated demolitions and great suffering in transit camps, women leaders and participants in Mahila Milan played a central role in fostering a sense of solidarity through practices of community organizing and improving living conditions. In later sections, I expand on the contradictory embodiments of gendered participation and resettlement. What I would like to emphasize here are the material and educative dimensions of community building and the feminized ethos of patience, progress and cooperation that undergirded and reinforced those practices. Through various community building activities—training meetings with long-time women leaders, savings mobilization, neighborhood festivals, clean-ups and the formation of various committees to communally meet the needs of transit camp residents—women were constantly engaged in the moral work of convincing people to remain patient and cooperative with resettlement processes for improved living conditions for everyone. Drawing naturalized and feminized roles in community and family social reproduction, women participants also nurtured a feminized
ethos of community, one based on non-confrontational cooperation and ideals of improvement through resettlement in formal flats. However, the contradictions of practices of community in the service of neoliberal resettlement and redevelopment would surface forcefully in the Gazi Nagar neighborhood, which was evicted for a road component of the MUTP.

In Gazi Nagar, community was “counterimagined" differently and directed toward the contestation of resettlement. Here neighborhood leaders and residents articulated a sense of collectivity based on shared rights as legitimate informal property owners and project-affected people. This articulation of community was wagered against the state and dominant class representations of residents. As one leader put it, “the MMRDA thought we were poor and illiterate bhaiyas [North Indians] staying silent and ready to be thrown anywhere.” This sentiment, corroborated by other residents and leaders, evoked a rather different kind of counterimagining of community than the SPARC Alliance participant discourse in the railways resettlement case. Although under Slum Rehabilitation policy statutes and World Bank resettlement norms for Project-Affected People (PAPs) Gazi Nagar residents occupied the same legal status as the railway slum dwellers, they distinguished themselves by arguing that railways dwellers were desperate due to their “precarious” status of living on physically and politically marginal lands owned by the railways authority.35 Instead, they positioned themselves as “legal” residents living in informal but regularized lands managed by the City Collector’s Office and organized into societies that paid (very nominal) taxes to the city. The claiming of this materially-backed identity as “legal” tax payers aimed to elevate their status as a community deserving better resettlement. This positioning was further bolstered by Gazi Nagar’s residents’ association with neighboring higher-income informal shop owners in the area who were also contesting resettlement.

This ethico-politics of community was grounded in juridico-economic rights as legal, tax paying (read: legitimate) residents. Although most Gazi Nagar residents were of lower material status than the shop owners with whom they were aligned, it seemed that residents saw themselves in a similar light rather than simply as PAPs and poor slum dwellers to be governed. This is not to say that leaders and advocates did not assume these positions for strategic purposes. Indeed, residents experienced and articulated the need to remain centrally located for their livelihood in communications with the World Bank, Inspection Panel and MMRDA. Still, over and over again in my interactions with residents and leaders, I found that they insisted on a juridical register of legitimacy based on a sense of legal rights rather than social rights. Collective actions reflected this position. Residents and their advocates decried the corruption of the state for failing to adhere to appropriate resettlement norms of the Bank that would place them more centrally in the city. This sense of community found territorial expression in the central parts of the city alongside

35 Slum housing located on Railways Authority land was regularized and provisioned with public services later than other slum plots due to the resistance of the federal agency to encourage residency. With mobilization through party politics and movements like the National Slum Dwellers’ Federation, the status of these areas has shifted to become legal slums eligible for public services and resettlement upon demolition since 1995. Today these areas occupy the same legal status under the slum rehabilitation authority.
globally oriented spaces of commerce including the Bandra-Kurla Business Complex where residents fought to be resettled on the basis of livelihood needs as well as legal rights. In so doing they channeled dissent through the semi-juridical system of the World Bank Inspection Panel investigation.

The divergence of the Gazi Nagar experience of community and rule and the mode through which they articulated claims to space has much to do with geographical and historical specificities. First, being affected by a road project as opposed to a rail project, Gazi Nagar did not face the same kind of court-mandated rapid slum clearance as many of the MUTP railways communities faced. There was therefore some initial deliberation and contestation over the road path and how it would affect the area before resettlement emerged as the only available option. Second, Gazi Nagar alliance with a neighboring and materially well-established group of middle-income shop owners helped to strengthen their juridico-economic rights claims and access to legal representation. These alliances were forged over a long history of neighborhood mobilization within the Congress party, which helped to regularize and establish services in the slum. These circumstances put residents and leaders in a position to reject SPARC Alliance interventions with their ethos of feminized non-confrontational participation and instead contest displacement. They drew on the tradition of rights-based activism of housing groups appealing to the courts. Leadership was gendered masculine with relatively little involvement of women compared to the railways evictees, which I address more substantively in subsequent sections of this chapter. Third, Gazi Nagar residents had the benefit of knowing the conditions that MUTP railways slum evictees faced in the transit camps, which strengthened their resolve to contest and negotiate. The fourth is the neighborhoods’ physical proximity to the Bandra-Kurla Business Complex (BKC), a spectacular symbol of the globalized class biases of redevelopmentalism. Leaders claimed the right to be resettled in this prime real estate, rejecting their positioning as slum dwellers who should be satisfied with whatever they are offered. One leader turned the legal discourse normally directed toward slum residents against the BKC for being built in violation of prevailing ecological zoning regulations. “The BKC is an illegal encroachment,” he challenged. Finally, the Gazi Nagar struggle received additional visibility and support from NAPM leaders who were especially sympathetic and interested in their struggles against the World Bank due to the movement’s own history of anti-dam and displacement struggles against the same forces in the Narmada Valley.

Though juridico-economic community solidarity helped to counter class-based displacement, it nonetheless slowly eroded through a politics of attrition. One group of residents immediately agreed to move out of the fear that they would lose out completely and hoped that their relationship with a key politician involved in the project would allow them to bargain for more preferable units in the Lallubhai resettlement colony. A second group later joined the resettlement colony for similar reasons. For the remaining 300

36 Rail expansion depended on specific location-specific needs and was subject to greater and more widespread pressures for clearance as well as the intervention of a politically distant central government authority.
37 I gathered some anecdotal evidence that leaders were able to secure a few extra units, though this was difficult to confirm.
families who refused to be resettled without having their demands met, the sovereign
power of the state and the market imperatives of the Bank ultimately trumped residents’
claims to global-city space. Prime central city land was deemed simply too expensive for
the resettlement of slum residents. In a symbolic and ironic final blow, the remaining
stalwart Gazi Nagar residents were forced into signing consent forms and were ultimately
shuttled to the city outskirts (though, in a slightly more preferable site than the Lallubhai
resettlement colony flats that they were originally offered according to key leaders).
Ultimately, they were subject to the more violent face of the redevelopmental state. The
association with NAPM brought Gazi Nagar briefly into an Alliance with Vision Mumbai
evictees like those in Mandala.

Mandala slum residents’ mobilizations and claims to urban space articulated a notion of
community in a very different manner than the two MUTP cases, one that I argue was
based on citizenship rights. This formation of community drew on a much more severe
experience of state violence and dispossession emerging from the articulation of the two
political processes of xenophobic communal party and cultural politics and neoliberal slum
redevelopment and resettlement practices. Mandala residents occupied a significantly
more precarious position in state and dominant class imaginaries of slum spaces and
populations being both of North Indian and Muslim ethno-religious backgrounds and being
“illegal” slum dwellers deemed ineligible for compensation according to slum rehabilitation
statutes.

Through struggles to reoccupy the land since 2005, strongly supported by the National
Alliance of People’s Movements, residents have counterimagined a collective identity
articulating their experiences as working-class citizens excluded from the space of the city
and nation. Citizenship rights served as the collective idiom for countering class-based
displacement and dispossession experienced most severely through ethno-religious
relations of exclusion. As one evicted resident passionately charged, “We can’t feed
ourselves in the villages and we are kicked out of our homes in the city where we work.
Where must we go? Pakistan? Bangladesh? We are Indian. We have a right to stay in
Mumbai!” Others reiterated their status as Mumbaikars by recounting how long they had
lived in the city—often well before the cut-off date—and how hard they had worked to
save money while renting in slums in various parts of the city before they were able to
establish a permanent home in Mandala. Their claims to urban space were also expressed
in terms of the labor and resources that residents put into actually producing the land in
Mandala by filling in and solidifying swamp areas. This counterimagining of community
based on an ethico-politics of working-class citizenship deflected state, upper-class and
regionalist discourses positioning them as invading outsiders.

In Mandala, the ethic of community territorialized in the space of the slum, literally through
reoccupation of the land and on-going protests and negotiations with national government.
Ethnographic observation of the processes of mapping and list-making revealed these
practices as key sites in which evictees concretely reformulated the ideal of community. As
residents struggled to reclaim at least part of the land for their own onsite resettlement,
they had to make themselves visible. This was a community still based on the hope of land
reclamation. The knowledge that leaders and movement activists produced was then presented not to the state of Maharashtra but to the central government, thereby consolidating the notion of a national citizenship. While these acts of self-enumeration were implicated in all the pitfalls of governmental power, there was also an ethico-political process unfolding. The “politics of lists” in the Mandala case was as much about deliberating over and determining the moral code for membership in the community. Many questions were debated. Should people be put on the list based on their involvement in the movement? Should it be limited to those who had purchased land, or would renters also be included? It was hard to surmise which ideal ultimately prevailed—the truth was likely a mixture of them. At the same time there were always practical considerations that influenced final outcomes. And, despite the processes of community building, solidarity seemed to constantly be under threat by a divided “public.” Leaders constantly worried about dalals or brokers betraying the community by working with the brute sovereign force of the state to undermine their efforts.

Several geographically and historically specific processes were important influences on community formation. For instance, Mandala’s location in Mankhurd district, a Northeastern peripheral area designated a key resettlement hub in state redevelopment plans for its large tracks of land and relatively cheap land values, intensified struggles. Unlike other slums facing similar circumstances under the Vision Mumbai demolitions of 2005, Mandala residents had a much more difficult, conflict ridden and ultimately unsuccessful experience in sustaining reoccupation of their land. These adverse conditions and scant support from elected officials led to an intensified relationship with NAPM, and Mandala became one of the principle hubs for the movement’s urban anti-displacement activism. As with the other two cases, the ethico-politics of working class citizenship was no doubt influenced by this activist mediation, discursive practices and organizing of key leaders of the National Alliance of People’s Movements. This group has had a long history of mobilizing displaced groups doubly marginalized by class and ethnic and caste identity, deploying Gandhian socialist tactics and symbols. I discuss these aspects of political mediation as they connected with transnational movements critical of development in greater detail in the following section.

In all three cases, collective identity and action were forged through differentiated ethico-politics, territorializations and (counter)-imaginings of community in relation to urban land. The differing extent to which the politics of land and community yielded a cooperative or conflictual relationship with redevelopment projects resulted from distinct but connected political trajectories. Evicted slum residents were (differentially) positioned and in turn positioned themselves in relation to interwoven communal identity politics, (re)development governance practices and histories of land struggle within and beyond the city. The involvement of non-state agents claiming to represent the desires and interests of slum dwellers—the SPARC Alliance, NAPM and legal advocates—guided and constrained the political actions of evictees. I have already discussed their participation in the production of new collective identities among displaced slum residents in the three cases. I will now focus more explicitly on how these non-state groups emerged as key mediators in
global, national and local arenas of (re)development and displacement politics, rearticulating claims to the city and shaping hegemony in each case.

6.3 Participation versus Rights? Mediation and Transnational Development Ideology

With the decreasing influence and shifting role of locally elected municipal officials and distributive party patronage in slum politics in neoliberal resettlement and redevelopment, Mumbai has witnessed the opening of greater political spaces for non-state actors. In the three cases that I present, NGOs, lawyers and social movements have operated as mediators between slum dwellers on the one hand and partnerships of state bureaucratic agencies and local and transnational finance and real estate capital on the other. Yet, practices of mediation have had varied conditions of existence and varied effects. A dictionary search of the meaning of the verb mediate helps to elucidate the work done through such practices: (a) intervene to resolve conflict, (b) oversee agreement, (c) achieve agreement, (d) transfer something and (e) be between. At a very basic level, mediators—the SPARC Alliance, lawyers and NAPM—acted as representatives of the displaced, demarcating a politically porous boundary “between” slum residents and powerful forces of state bureaucracy, local developers, the World Bank and other agents of transnational capital. In each case, mediators were engaged in negotiating compromise and agreement, even if in some instances they helped to articulate dissent before subsequently garnering the more or less tenuous cooperation of evictees. Furthermore, mediation processes included the significant (though not totalizing) work of forging collective identity and shaping new practices of rule, as I have discussed in the previous two sections. Mediators were also implicated in the work of politicizing particular embodied experiences and identities over others, as I discuss below.

Here, I address a different set of concerns regarding how mediation influenced governance and hegemony. I argue that mediators helped to fuse ideological and discursive practices in diverse spatial arenas—from city to hinterland to transnational development circles—shaping eviction politics in significant and divergent ways. In this capacity, mediators served to “transfer something”—in the form of discourses, ideas and strategies—while doing the work of representing slum residents and negotiating displacement.

In particular, the SPARC Alliance, NAPM and local lawyers played a critical role in forging connections between historically sedimented arenas of local redevelopment politics, discourse and practice and transnational circuits of knowledge, debates and expertise on development. Here, I pay heed to Hart’s (2002) and Massey’s (1994) insistence that we not conceive of place as a bounded and passive field of the local in which global politics unfolds. Instead, attention to the production of space through interconnected, meaningful and power-laden practices helps to better understand the limits and possibilities for liberatory politics. I observed two major ideological and discursive approaches to development that mediators embraced and through which displaced slum residents articulated claims to urban space. One emphasized the participation of the poor in a development paradigm that was friendly to neoliberal policy approaches and negotiations with the state. The other was outwardly more critical of state (re)development interventions positing displacement as
antithetical to the rights of marginalized and poor groups. A head advisor of the SPARC Alliance, Sundar Burra, recounted in an interview with me that these were fundamentally incompatible modes of politics, which he called the “participatory approach” and the “rights-based approach.” Through the mediation of the SPARC Alliance, the railways slum dwellers were linked to the former while Gazi Nagar and Mandala became (in different ways) associated with the latter through association with the National Alliance of People’s Movements and legal advocates. Differentiated mediation articulated with divergent spatial claims-making practices and (at least superficially) different balances of cooperation or resistance, and thus had important implications for redevelopmental hegemony. Slum residents in each case aligned with mediators and discourses because of historically sedimented practices of negotiating housing and displacement in the city.

Human rights and participatory discourse have circulated globally in a variety of arenas (Ong, 1999; A. Sharma, 2008). But, such discursive formations are also always subject to “friction” as they unfold in concrete political situations, as Anna Tsing has noted (2005). Indeed, these ideological positions unfolded in real clashes in the city, not only in slums but also between representatives of SPARC and NAPM, as a conversation with Sundar Burra revealed. Forsaking his normally calm disposition, Burra displayed a palpable sense of agitation when he recalled a confrontation with Medha Patkar, the key leader of NAPM, during a forum of experts on urban housing and development in Mumbai in 2006. He recalled that Patkar had attacked SPARC for being corrupt and working in favor of the builders lobby: “I refrained from retaliating. I could have brought up uncomfortable facts like how many of the Narmada displaced she has resettled—zero! Or I could have brought up when she told farmers that they should commit mass suicide!” The confrontation was representative of longstanding conflicted and interconnected histories of struggles over state-led (re)development, land and representation across and beyond the city.

What is significant about each of these approaches—and thus key to my argument about redevelopmental hegemony through difference—is that each speaks to the political limits of the other. Participatory development, in so far as it accommodates market-oriented processes, fails to account for the contradictory and uneven experiences of exclusion and material dispossession inherent to the market. In Mumbai, this has meant that market-based resettlement operates through either the exclusion of many groups or through displacement to the cheaper urban fringes. These same contradictions in numerous accounts of neoliberal development are seen in other parts of the world. Here, the two rights-based approaches bring to the fore some of the limitations of neoliberal inclusion. Yet, juridico-economic rights discourse has its own limits and exclusions, as does the citizenship approach within a context of violence and needing to meet immediate political needs among the poor. Each necessitates and draws off of the other. I now discuss how the two discursive approaches connected to transnational forces and ideas (sometimes only partially) with each eviction struggle.

In Mandala, the mediation of the National Alliance of People’s Movements led to a political positioning that was explicitly against displacement and state-led projects and critical of developer (and other capital) involvement and profits in redevelopment. This was a
discourse of rights and working class citizenship which derided elite-biased state development projects, material dispossession and class and identity-based exclusion from the nation. NAPM discursive practices of struggle grew out of the organization’s history of leveraging transnational networks against the large-scale development ambitions of the state and the World Bank in the Narmada Valley’s Sardar Sarovar Dam Project. The movement continues to be closely aligned with a diverse set of activist groups and leaders in India and other parts of the world who have eschewed state development projects geared toward supporting neoliberal globalization through deregulation, reorganized governance structures, privatization and market liberalization. NAPM’s mediation in Mandala deployed Gandhian-inspired (though not quite Gandhian) anti-colonial, eco-socialist idioms of struggles, indicting the state and its non-governmental agents as the handmaidens of both international and local capital. They deployed a discourse of rights in confronting marginalization based on both class and ethnic/caste identity. In addition to clashing with the state through marches, reoccupations of land and direct actions, NAPM also made claims in the legal system by filing a public interest litigation petition (PIL) on behalf of slum residents including those of Mandala affected by the Vision Mumbai demolition sweep. This was a strategy with a significant history in Mumbai and was shared by residents in Gazi Nagar.

Although Mandala resident leaders did not emphasize their ethnic, caste or religious identities (mostly poor North Indians, Muslims or Dalits) in public discourse, NAPM’s discourse of citizenship for people most marginalized by class and caste or ethnic identity certainly resonated for residents. NAPM’s nationally and transnational rights talk thus articulated Mandala residents’ spatial struggles and experiences of violence, displacement and disenfranchisement from both bureaucratic-governmental state resettlement and the political party machinery of vote-based patronage. The more conflicted the struggle with the state became after clashes over reoccupation and multiple demolitions, the more closely aligned evictees became to NAPM. Mandala became the symbolic center of NAPM’s anti-displacement campaign in Mumbai. Thus, Mandala and NAPM leaders continue to lay claims to the land for all residents, regardless of state eligibility criteria, eschewing the participation of developers in resettlement building construction. Mandala thus faced ongoing clashes with the local state—in a scenario of conflict and “ungovernable” resistance—until a shift in strategy. In 2007, NAPM began approaching and compromising with the members of ministries in the central government in an attempt to bypass the violence and exclusions of the local state. In the process, Mandala leaders and NAPM activists began to engage governmental interventions of self-enumeration, slum mapping and list making. Although these practices resembled the work of NGOs like the SPARC Alliance, NAPM leadership retained a firm commitment to highlighting aspects such as labor activities and minority demographics. Thus, despite the governmentalization of struggle, movement leaders stayed true to the NAPM citizenship-rights discursive strategy.

Although conflicts in Gazi Nagar unfolded initially independently from NAPM, the movement’s leadership—most prominently represented by Medha Patkar—would later embrace struggles in Gazi Nagar and other groups contesting the road component of the MUTP. That their struggle targeted the Bank and the state spoke strongly to NAPM leaders
because of the organization’s history of dealing with the same forces. Gazi Nagar’s alignment with NAPM was brief but strategic for both. For Gazi Nagar, NAPM leveraged the transnational activists’ network support, putting greater pressure on the Bank to resolve the issue. For NAPM, which has depended on resisting state oppression through exposing its transnational linkages, the alliance with Gazi Nagar helped to draw attention to other demolition struggles in which the ramifications and connections with neoliberal and global dispossession were less direct and definable. The movement has found that the state on its own is an insidious force to reckon with. NAPM and SPARC Alliance leaders and members alike acknowledged that with all its short comings, the involvement of the World Bank meant that MUTP was implemented in a much less harmful way for evictees than if the state had acted alone. Because of how difficult it is to fight the state, one key NAPM activist admitted that the movement has had to create an enemy of the World Bank when the reality was more complicated. "If they make up an enemy in us, why can’t we?"

The Gazi Nagar struggle, though directed at the Bank and connected to NAPM’s anti-neoliberal positioning, drew on a different history of political practice. The mediation of a lawyer, Raj Awasthi, articulated juridico-economic claims established through histories of both party-based politics since the 1970s and court-based activism in Indian cities since the mid 1980s. Gazi Nagar residents, like most slum residents, had engaged in party patronage politics to gain tenure security, funds and permission for infrastructural improvements. In fact, several of the key leaders with whom I spoke had been actively involved in Congress party mobilizations since the mid-1980s when the area was first settled. The advocate Raj Awasthi had himself taken a leadership role in the citywide youth wing of the party. The result of these political mobilizations over 20 years was the regularization of the slum, which afforded residents a sense of rights and legitimacy in their claims to land. Their sense of legal entitlement stemmed from the fact that they paid nominal taxes and prospered on and improved the land over these years. When initial appeals to local representatives in the Municipal Corporation and state parliament failed, Gazi Nagar residents rejected the mediation of the SPARC Alliance to draw on histories of court-based activism and associated discursive political traditions of rights-claims also emerging in the 1980s. This history included the Olga Tellis trial of 1985, wherein housing activists challenged the constitutionality of evictions of pavement dwellers. Linking urban housing to livelihood, advocates argued that demolitions violated the right to life guaranteed in the Indian constitution. People lived in slums and on pavements to be able to live close to their workplaces. Evictions meant a loss of livelihood and therefore a loss of life. The rights-based claims made by Gazi Nagar residents and their lawyer borrowed many of the concepts and phrases from statements made in the Olga Tellis trials but were directed to a different semi-juridical arena, the World Bank Inspection Panel. This process connected Gazi Nagar to histories of struggles against development in India and around the world.

To the contrary, SPARC Alliance leaders eschewed both the rights-based approach and the politics of party patronage in favor of pro-development negotiations and participation. They have explicitly criticized the rights-based approach as a strategy dominated by middle-class activists who attempt to speak and act for the poor without their substantive
input or participation, thereby delivering little real change. They also draw on a different set of global networks than the NAPM. In the effort to show global connections of the Alliance, Appadurai has theorized the importance of “horizontal” transnational exchange among slum dwellers’ groups for producing deeper democratic processes in the SPARC Alliance’s work. Such linkages have brought urban slum groups from various countries around the world into contact through an organization called Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI). SDI strategies and philosophies of operations are termed as “rituals” aimed at empowerment and improvement in living conditions. Most prominently these rituals emphasize grassroots involvement of the urban poor—“a voice of the poor not a voice for the poor”—through practices such as women’s participation, information collection, horizontal exchange, land identification and community-based shelter-focused activities—an approach to “incremental” housing improvement based on negotiating and dialoguing with local states rather than contesting interventions (Shack/Slum Dwellers International Website, 2009).

It would be inaccurate, however, to say that SDI and the SPARC Alliance promote community participation to the complete exclusion of state responsibility. SPARC leaders like Celine D’Cruz have argued that the rituals of savings and exchange build community, knowledge and capacity to negotiate with local governments to urge them to “do their part in releasing land for the purposes of housing.” This partnership of the state thus consists of land transfer and formalization, which the Alliance has worked on since the earlier pavement-dwelling struggles of the mid-1980s. The approach rejected the rights-based interventions in the courts as a futile middleclass strategy that could never result in gains for the poor because it failed to enroll them as participants. The focus on the state’s role in land transfer and formalization adopts a legalist approach made famous by Hernando de Soto; the approach has gained popularity in a number of international development circles (Roy & AlSayyad, 2004).

Before discussing the accomplishments and limits of each discursive approach, I would like to review them in relational comparative perspective. By focusing on each in comparison, we can see that each discursive approach did not emerge independently of the other or spatial, material and historical conditions. To the contrary, the conditions of existence of each of the two sets of discursive practices relied on the contradictions inherent in its “other.” For instance, the SPARC Alliances’ non-confrontational participatory interventions were founded on market-oriented resettlement policies and negotiation with discriminatory state practices that inevitably fell short of providing adequate housing for the city slum residents. The Alliance also of course implemented resettlement policies that derived in part from prior struggles in places like the Narmada Valley. Similarly, it was the Alliance and its participatory approach that set the precedence for governmental interventions such as the surveying and mapping that NAPM also ultimately adopted in its efforts to transforms rights talk to concrete claims. Thus, I would argue that although neoliberal “participatory development” and anti-globalization “rights” represent two transnational political positions that found expression in Mumbai, they were not simply “global” discursive struggles unfolding in the passive “local” container of the city. They were actively forged through multi-scalar struggles that have constituted the city as a
dynamic differentiated social space and through hegemonic state redevelopmentalism itself.

Despite seemingly divergent political strategies and ideological positionings, there were also surprising convergences in the assumptions and practices resulting from each mediation. One was that each claimed to represent slums, the poor and their desires in an undifferentiated manner. While SPARC highlighted the role of women, there was little discussion of how gendered experiences of eviction were inflected by relative wealth or poverty among evictees. Furthermore, in claiming that rights-based activism was a strategy of the middle-class and not truly poor slum dwellers, they elided the choices and experiences of Gazi Nagar residents as well as railway slum residents who did not want to be resettled offsite. Instead, all resistance was categorized as dissent on the part of wealthy and greedy shop-owners with whom Gazi Nagar residents’ had aligned. NAPM’s rights struggles relied on building solidarity among groups of evictees as diverse as those in Gazi Nagar and Mandala as well as in other areas of the city. In their effort to show that neoliberal capital and state redevelopment processes were uniformly badly received, they failed to acknowledge that NAPM members were in fact differently situated. Members sometimes simply wanted to be included in neoliberal projects with developer involvement but on more favorable terms.

The divergence between slum dwellers’ understandings and the ideological positioning of the rights-based approach was most evident in the Gazi Nagar case. Displaced slum dwellers adopted a rights-based discursive strategy to make claims in the semi-juridical space of the Inspection Panel. Their request was received along with a letter of support from Medha Patkar of NAPM. However, residents and leaders themselves did not share NAPM’s ideological position against the involvement of such agents as the World Bank and neoliberal strategies such as the inclusion of developers and market mechanisms in resettlement implementation. Similarly, some Mandala evictees admitted that they would have considered conceding to the slum rehabilitation policies of high-rise buildings constructed by private builders awarded with incentives. Ultimately, NAPM leadership agreed to a compromise of accepting the possibility of receiving a portion of land smaller than the original site in exchange for high-rise resettlement but remained firmly against the involvement of private builders.

Thus, in all three cases mediators’ representations of the desires and choices of slum dwellers were sometimes uncorroborated by the expressed desires of slum dwellers themselves. Such representations were part of the strategic compromises or unintended limitations of the discursive approaches and political ideologies adopted in each case. However, in so far as the participatory and right-based discursive practices helped to advance a politics of either accommodation or dissent with state redevelopmentalism, they also faced key contradictions, limits and unintended consequences. The lived practices and meanings of claims-making revealed through ethnographic evidence exposed the contradictions and limits of each mediating discourse.

The adoption of a rights-based approach in Gazi Nagar was grounded in a claim to legitimacy, a discourse that excluded residents of Mandala as well as renters in Gazi Nagar.
itself. Gazi Nagar leaders’ and residents’ sense of entitlement to land was bolstered by a higher perceived material standing than in the case of the railways. Although the World Bank honored informal property rights in its resettlement criteria, it ultimately ceded to the state’s market calculus of providing offsite resettlement on the cheap. Residents’ juridico-economic claims also exposed the limits to the solidarity-building work of the NAPM. With each of its members positioned so differently in relation to the redevelopmental state, solidarity was hard to maintain. In Mandala confrontational struggles over rights could not be sustained without compromise. The resulting processes of self-ex numbering and community slum mapping were almost identical to the governmental interventions undertaken by the SPARC Alliance. Ultimately, NAPM and Mandala residents compromised with federal officials by agreeing to resettlement on a smaller area—though without developer participation and profits. As of 2010, however, resettlement had yet to materialize for residents.

Another key contradiction of the rights-based approach was its adoption of the discourse of corruption to attack the state and its non-governmental partners. Rights talk in both Mandala and Gazi Nagar tended to converge on a discursive indictment of the state (or SPARC, understood as its contracted agent) in terms of corruption. Although corruption had a different connotation in each case, the discourse of corruption was in fact present in both the Gazi Nagar and Mandala cases, where claims were expressed in the idiom of rights. The juridical vocabulary of rights has easily lent itself to an understanding of infringement as stemming from corruption, even when legally defined misconduct has not been found. In Gazi Nagar, Raj Awasthi and resident leaders saw the “corrupt” state and SPARC (as its non-governmental agent) as the target of their struggles. In Gazi Nagar this meant that transnational capital, particularly the World Bank, and local developers were deemed faultless in the eyes of Gazi Nagar residents and leaders compared to the state. Medha Patkar’s attempt to malign SPARC as “corrupt” was similarly unfounded and tended to distract attention away from key issues of local and transnational class biases in development and resettlement policy exclusions and inadequacies. Corruption charges received media attention but achieved limited efficacy because they were ultimately unfounded.

In the railways resettlement case, the SPARC/SDI participatory resettlement approach’s embrace of de Soto-style legalist perspectives has failed to account for the political struggles that must necessarily ensue for a true redistribution of land. As a result, the discourse elided the politics of housing location and its connection to livelihood. Land was conceived merely as a site of social reproduction; therefore, location mattered less in the SDI discourse. As the Mumbai case demonstrates, centrally located, high-value land has been reserved for real estate development interventions providing the greatest profits. In addition to these political-economic contradictions stemming from labor and property relations, SPARC’s focus on non-confrontational dialogue and solution seeking neglects the implications of compromises at the scale of the city. For instance, pro-development non-confrontational negotiations in which SPARC had engaged resulted in a resettlement policy that increased inclusion of some categories of urban poor residents (particularly pavement dwellers and women) while conceding to much greater benefits for developers and the
exclusion of other categories of slum residents (particularly residents who could not furnish proof of residency after the cut-off date of January 1, 1995). It was precisely these material inequalities and exclusions embedded in negotiated slum redevelopment policies and practices that fueled anti-displacement dissent in Mandala and Gazi Nagar. Similarly, the SPARC Alliance dismissal of rights-based activism as “middle class” and therefore irrelevant for the urban poor advanced middle-class ideals of domesticated womanhood by highlighting women’s social reproductive roles without addressing working class spatial politics of resettlement. These cases suggest the importance of understanding subjectivity in terms of embodied experiences and the differentiations through which such experiences are constituted and made intelligible.

6.4 Embodiments of Difference: Gender, Class and Ethno-religious Identities

This section begins an exploration of embodied subjectivity as a political site of hegemony. Under conditions of ongoing structural violence of poverty and dispossession, thorny questions of differentiated embodied experience and desire in the production of governable spaces remain trenchant. I aim here to briefly introduce these complex ideas to be explored in greater depth in future work. Feminist geography and transnational feminist theory, in conjunction with the cultural Marxism of Stuart Hall and Antonio Gramsci, offer tools—if not clear-cut answers—for grappling with these issues. All of the cases considered in this dissertation have shown evidence of either facilitating or thwarting redevelopment processes though the binary of “resistance” and “consent”, which offers an insufficient analytical framework for understanding these politics. This conclusion echoes Saba Mahmood’s argument against the imposition of liberal biases onto the consciousness of the Islamic feminist subject. Yet, post-colonial critiques like that of Mahmood fail to account for linkages between such situated knowledges and practices and processes of capital accumulation (through displacement and redevelopment in my case). There is no reason that material practices and relations of power should be limited to bourgeois liberal consciousness and projects of rule. As Hall (1980) has argued, such articulations of ideology and practice and power and difference are in fact the basis of capitalist hegemony. I approach embodiment, desire, governance and hegemony by focusing on gendered difference as evidenced in three arenas: sedimented embodied experiences, bodily labor and actions and the shifting meanings attributed to these. In particular, feminist geography and feminist theory, with the focus on fractured, multiple and contradictory subjectivities of gender, ethno-religious identity and class, offer important tools for understanding bodily experience and desire in relation to land. Gender analysis of the three cases serves to disrupt singular understandings and mediator narratives about desire, interests, resistance and consent in slum clearance.

In the MUTP railways case, body of the slum dweller became politically intelligible in its feminized form as the non-confrontational, participating woman concerned with housing improvement for herself, her family and the community. The slum residents involved in the MUTP railways resettlement have either been represented as participants who desire resettlement or as forced evictees at the mercy of the powerful. However, reading slum dwellers’ subjectivity through the narrative lens of SPARC Alliance advocates and critics
alone leads to an incomplete and even false reading of desire and agency. Ethnographic evidence presented in chapter 3 reveals that between force and desire lie differentiated and fractured subjectivities. What is critical here is that gendered participation in resettlement drew on a subjectivity of women as embodied in their social-reproductive laboring roles, practices and needs. It harnessed women as subjects through real material concerns such as toilets, shelter security, savings, environmental safety and water access. Such subjectivities were cultivated over time through the political mobilization activities of Alliance groups, SPARC, National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan, as I have discussed. Practices of negotiating with the state in earlier Alliance mobilizations—the politics of patience and accommodation as Appadurai has famously called it—were redirected in MUTP processes, especially under the dire conditions of several years in transit camps. In the transit camps, Mahila Milan participants and leaders encouraged community cooperation through a variety of mobilizational activities harnessing participation in meetings, community clean-ups and water provision. Here, patient cooperation with resettlement processes over several years of suffering was consolidated through what I have called a gendered politics of persuasion, where Mahila Milan and other SPARC Alliance participants and leaders helped to stem potential social volatilities. While participation offered honor and status to active participants and even material wealth to top women leaders, for a great number of women and men, embodied experiences of suffering were given new meaning through aspirations of community progress (via housing improvement) and feminized enactments of patience and persuasion. In other words, the experience of suffering became articulated to a gendered praxis of patience, persuasion and participation in improving housing and environmental conditions, processes that helped to mobilize a cooperative political stance with redevelopment and resettlement under conditions that may have caused an irruption of dissent. Such social reproductive requirements and practices were privileged over other embodied experiences and needs, especially for wage-laboring women who were often affected by distant offsite resettlement in Mankhurd district. Thus, in the MUTP railways resettlement case, embodied subjectivity was ironically rooted in the naturalized trope of the middle-class housewife concerned with the house. It harnessed a feminized non-confrontational rendering of care-giving work in the domestic space of the home and the resettlement colony. This idealized subjectivity elided not only many women’s wage work outside of the home and immediate community but also the conflictual struggles over land in which slum dwelling women can and have participated. I show these struggles clearly in the case of the Mandala eviction.

In Mandala, the bodily experience of displacement, suffering and state violence was articulated and politicized in a contrasting manner. Evictees’ positioning in state discourse as illegal invaders of the city and in public imaginaries as illegitimate North Indian and Muslim outsiders to the space of the city and nation was countered through a of number claims to land grounded in residents’ embodied experiences as working class persons. Class-based claims were concretely legitimised in terms of the labor and resources that residents put into filling in swampy land to make it habitable as well as the multiple forms labor that they provided to the city. I have already shown how these class-based claims helped to consolidate community solidarity and emerged in part through the mediation
and mobilization of NAPM leaders. What I would like to show here is how these embodiments became articulated with gendered relations and subjectivities. Women were very active in direct actions, movement meetings and evictee mobilization although women’s roles were not limited to the household. For instance, when I asked women why they took part in movement activities, they responded in two ways: (a) NAPM’s charismatic leader Medha Patkar encouraged them to participate, helping to build their confidence and come out of their shyness and (b) because women are hard workers (work pertaining to a variety of roles and arenas), they know what is necessary for the movement and can help it to move forward. Women’s knowledge based on their gendered roles was emphasized as it was by the SPARC Alliance. However, distinctions among social reproductive labor, community work and wage labor were not so sharply divided. Gendered participation did not emerge from domesticated meanings of women’s work as housewives and non-confrontational, non-political community care-givers, as in the case of the SPARC Alliance railways eviction but as laboring women (and men) actively engaged in political struggle for rights to land.

Women residents in Mandala also described the embodied experience of state violence in facing police beatings on the frontlines of resistance against impending demolition of their homes. On several occasions women described resisting the police and receiving baton beatings. Some women described these acts of encounter as a strategy to protect men who would ostensibly be handled more harshly. In relationship to the embodiment of work, women who identified their husbands as the primary bread earners described their actions of standing up to the police to ensure that their husbands would not be injured and lose earnings. Placing women in front of men in confrontations with police forces is a longstanding tactic of resistance based on the belief that women are treated less harshly than men and can protect men and mitigate more fatal forms of violence. Interestingly, the SPARC Alliance’s earlier work with pavement-dwelling women in the 1980s also drew on this practice although its symbolism was reworked to represent, again, a feminized, non-confrontational stance. In this case women were positioned as helping the police to dismantle their homes only to rebuild at the same location again until they could be resettled more permanently. Mahila Milan women leaders reiterated this legendary story to MUTP-affected railway slum residents and others to reproduce and expand the non-confrontational strategy into new arenas. The shielding body of the woman was imbued with meanings in both the Mandala and MUTP railways resettlement cases; the former was imbued with the meaning of active resistance and the latter as an act of non-confrontational negotiation and cooperation. Still, the bodily experience of state violence and conflict for MUTP railways residents was not entirely subsumed. Although the fact was omitted from the official Alliance narrative, some women and men who were evicted without warning or preparation described the confrontation with the police and direct actions of stopping the trains (train roko) as a resistance tactic. Several participating Alliance leaders in the Mankhurd Lallubhai Compound resettlement colony also spoke of the hardship in transit camps in terms of gendered violence and suffering. However, they recast this violence in support of cooperation and pro-development and resettlement actions by either decrying confrontations as wrong behavior on the part of slum dwellers
who were later reformed or by describing how residents patiently endured without complaint in order to progress toward a better life through resettlement.

In Gazi Nagar activism was more masculinized; there was very little participation of women in the public arenas of resistance to resettlement. Male leaders collaborated with a male legal advocate and male business owners affected by the project in adjacent areas. The goal and site of contention in Gazi Nagar centered on rights to land or at least nearby resettlement based on arguable legal status and quasi-legal norms of World Bank resettlement policy. These rights were legitimated by the need to remain close to business centers and other livelihood concerns. The struggle articulated the embodied spatial experience of class inequalities; Gazi Nagar residents exposed the hypocrisy of a development process that privileged extremely wealthy elites by questioning why they could not be resettled in the city center. Although the loss of women’s home-based income sources were cited, the emphasis in struggles over resettlement was placed on men’s income sources. Among the residents with whom I spoke, there were no women who worked outside of the home. There was little participation of women in public arenas of resident activism despite some indication that at least one woman had participated in local campaigns for local Congress party officials. The domesticated bodies of Gazi Nagar women were thereby rendered invisible in the public sphere of resistance outside of a brief interlude with NAPM officials, who encouraged one or two women to speak up in rallies. In speaking with some of the women of Gazi Nagar, they claimed that most families practiced purdah with few women working or interacting outside of the home. The practice seemed to be honored due to a combination of adherence to North Indian and Muslim custom but also as an indication that many were financially stable and thus had less need for women to work outside of the home. Women who needed to earn extra money did so by doing piecemeal home-based work assembling garment accessories.

The World Bank and MMRDA conceded that 118 middle-income businesses located in the area would need to be resettled in the nearby higher value areas of central Mumbai including in the Bandra Kurla Complex. The 400 remaining Gazi Nagar residents and smaller-scale shop owners, however, could not leverage their income needs to their advantage in resettlement as the Bank and MMRDA asserted that the need for resettlement housing was greater than the need for work. Use of the law and rights-based discourse afforded residents who fought the battle in the Inspection Panel some bargaining power to choose a more preferable site, though not in the prime area that they sought. Despite the Inspection Panel process, ultimately, Gazi Nagar residents were left in a position of bodily vulnerability. With the imprisonment of their legal advocate Raj Awasthi on false charges of criminal conduct, they were faced with the brute force of the state. Out of fear they signed consent forms and were resettled on the same day. Leaders claimed that they would have “had the courage to continue fighting” if they had the backing of their lawyer. Reliance on the semi-juridical system and rights-based discourse embodied in a single activist lawyer proved to have limited efficacy.

In the Mandala, Gazi Nagar and Railways cases, embodied experience and subjectivity became politically salient and mobilized in different ways under processes of eviction and
displacement. Subjectivities were constituted in part through governing practices and institutions operating through the production of difference. Embodied subjectivities reinscribed relations of redevelopmental power but also exceeded practices of rule in ways that exposed the fragility of hegemonic state practices and governmental technologies of differentiated displacement. Displaced slum residents became political subjects out of historically sedimented, spatialized experiences and struggles over land and livelihood, grounded in governance practices that accommodated (some) of the demands and needs (of some) of the poor but always privileging elite national and transnational material interests. Contradictory relations of capitalist development have simultaneously relied on cheap reserve armies of labor and squeezed them out of basic social reproductive needs in the form of housing and services. Thus, the contradictory relations of redevelopment practice and governance are also implicated in processes of subject formation wherein slum dwellers negotiated and contested their displacement in ways that continue to challenge and reconstitute class power and material inequalities at various scales. The ideas that I have presented on embodied subjectivity in this section are preliminary and will expanded upon in future work.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I bring the three cases of eviction discussed separately in this dissertation into comparison to examine the differences and similarities among them. I show how each trajectory is inextricably linked to and informed by the others and by hegemonic redevelopmental state practices which fundamentally operate through the production of difference. I title this chapter “the politics of the evicted” not only to highlight slum residents’ subjectivity—as others have also done—but also to interject the importance of the moment of eviction. Eviction is what all of these cases have in common, yet difference in the experience of displacement is absolutely central to whether and how redevelopmental hegemony is challenged, reworked and reproduced. I examined three interconnected arenas through which hegemonic state praxis was challenged and reworked. Partial politicizations of experiences of gender, class and ethno-religious difference constituted the ethico-political basis of subjectivity within each of these arenas. The first political arena was forging of collective subjectivity through productions and counter-productions of community. The moral foundations and territorializations of community solidarity—based on gendered domesticity, juridico-economic rights and citizenship—made salient partial experiences with significant implications for the possibilities of collective action. Next, I explored the arena of NGO mediation, which I argue fused transnational development debates and practices with local eviction politics. Specifically, I explore how the oppositional discourses of “participation” and “rights” reveal the interconnected politics of exclusion and inclusion at the core of markets and neoliberal (re)development practices. Finally, I examine the arena of embodied experience, where again key axes of class, gender and ethno-religious difference become salient and politicized in divergent ways in each of the cases. Thus, when I argue that there is no singular “politics of the governed” and instead point to the differentiated political trajectories of eviction, I am not simply giving voice to the varieties of politics that concern me. Rather, I show that it is precisely difference in the spatial, embodied and collective
experience and in the practices of representation that serves to reformulate and 
reconsolidate state power and its capacity to advance the cultural politics of belonging and 
the political economy of global-city redevelopment.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Right to the Slum? The Global City and State in Flux

In this dissertation I attempt to unravel a central paradox concerning spatial transformation in Mumbai today: How global-city redevelopment interventions entailing the mass displacement of the urban poor are made politically feasible in an ostensibly democratic city with strong working-class movements. I argue that the answer lies in examining the state through a Gramscian lens of hegemony understood not only as the apparatus of local and transnational capitalist class interests but also as the site of symbolic and material struggles operating in multiple arenas. Introducing the concept of the developmental state, I showed how practices and structures of rule have fundamentally changed to politically facilitate neoliberal redevelopment and mass slum clearances. While the state deploys bulldozing forms of authoritarian might, it is important to understand that the agency of slum residents in the moment of eviction matters significantly for practices of rule. The state is the product of historically sedimented negotiations and ethico-political struggles through which it legitimates and garners consent for its projects. Central to these hegemonic processes is a politics of difference whereby capital accumulation is enabled through differentiated displacement. I conducted an in-depth ethnographic analysis of eviction politics unfolding in highly divergent ways in three case studies.

The politics of the evicted, I show, consists of both symbolic and material struggles that are fundamentally shaped by differentiated experiences of redevelopment and by mediating groups including NGOs, lawyers and social movements. These intermediaries shape collective subjectivity by drawing on local histories of struggle as well as globally circulating development and human-rights discourses. I examine three trajectories of eviction politics in ethnographic, relational comparison to unravel how slum dwellers and mediating groups articulate claims to space. Each of these articulations has had distinct political implications for the reworking and reconsolidation of developmental rule. Although processes of dispossession and displacement were complex and interconnected, each trajectory turned on the politicization of particular axes of difference: gender, class and ethno-religious identity. Differentiated eviction politics was central to the reconstitution of state power under volatile processes of displacement and dispossession that might have posed a crisis of legitimacy for the state. Put more simply, the developmental state and the global city itself, I demonstrate, is a socio-spatial process rife with contradictions.

In this conclusion, I return to my discussion of the Urban Age conference introduced in chapter 1 to briefly consider some of the recent conflicts and changes in developmental governance. These changes and conflicts illuminate the dynamic and fragile nature of
redevelopmental state formation and reveal global connections and lessons that Mumbai has to offer in relation to Euro-American scholarship on “the right to the city.”

Mumbai was one of a diverse set of global cities—New York, London, Shanghai, Johannesburg, Sao Paulo, Istanbul and Chicago—to have hosted the Urban Age Conference. Experts, NGO leaders and mayors of cities ranging from Bogota and Sao Paulo to Lahore and London presented their ideas and experiences of urban transformation. Mumbai’s experiences and concerns were exchanged with interlocuters of other global cities with different relationships to Mumbai. Among them was Darren Walker, an African American Vice-president of the Ford Foundation. Walker, who introduced Jockin as a friend and an inspiration, appealed humbly to the audience as a New Yorker interested in learning from Mumbai to come to terms with the plight of displaced people of color in the gentrifying Harlem neighborhood of his own hometown. Walker was also indirectly referring to a redevelopment project spearheaded and presented at the conference by Mukesh Mehta. Mehta, a Mumbai-born developer residing in Long Island, New York, has been seeking to remake Dharavi, an area infamously known as Asia’s largest slum, into an upscale residential and commercial complex in the heart of city. Walker’s introduction set the stage for Jockin’s unapologetic indictment of Mehta’s project. Jockin and his colleagues at the SPARC Alliance urged for participatory surveying and mapping processes developed in numerous “best practice” projects in partnership with the state, developers and the World Bank.

The clash at the Urban Age conference has been significantly surpassed by conflicts among slum groups, intermediaries, developers and various agents of the local state. The Dharavi Redevelopment Project is one of two major projects—that have encountered a slew of highly public protests and criticism over the displacement of hundreds of thousands of informal residences and businesses. These conflicts have become ever more visible since Dharavi has achieved global recognition in films and publications ranging from Slum Dog Millionaire, National Geographic and the Los Angeles Times. It has become the global symbol of poor Mumbai and a contrast to the glitz of Bollywood and global business. On-the-ground conflicts in Dharavi and around airport lands center on various issues.

Informal businesses and factory owners have argued that the 225-square-foot residential resettlement flats offered in compensation are simply insufficient to maintain their livelihood. Others are concerned about being resettled to peripheral and unsustainably cramped colonies. Some factions of slum residents have aligned with local politicians to contest the projects. In this scenario, the SPARC Alliance has also changed some of its positioning and rhetoric, making alliances with local politicians and taking a more confrontational stance against the state and developers (personal communication with Sundar Burra, 2007).

In a public letter to the Government of Maharashtra circulated to hundreds of media outlets, Jockin presents a stance that differs starkly from SPARC’s earlier position of non-confrontation. Other public figures from around the world have written similar letters of indictment. Jockin writes:
The slum dwellers in Dharavi and on the airport lands are not being involved in the redevelopment plans, but they offer both the private companies and the government agencies involved in these plans a real partnership. The involvement is not just agreeing with what the government wants but a real partnership to produce what works for communities and gives the government solutions that are sustainable and viable. . . . If this offer of partnership is ignored, it often forces slum communities to resort to the usual and easier option of protest. The slum dwellers have some easy ways to make their opposition felt. Two of Mumbai’s main railway lines run along Dharavi’s borders. These can easily be blocked—and this would bring chaos to Mumbai. . . . The airport runways can also be blocked—and the slum dweller federations will inform all the airlines that operate there as to when and where this will happen. We do not want to resort to this; we want a partnership in making both these development plans and other plans in Mumbai a success. . . . We have the right to benefit from city development plans, too. (Patel & Arputham, 2007, pp. 505, 508)

This promise of conflict harks back to the movement’s history of more confrontational claims to urban space, a position vastly different from that of the case of the MUTP and other resettlements. In the letter Jockin also chides the government for limiting the numbers of people to be re-housed and offering cheap peripheral resettlement to minimize costs at the expense of the evicted; the group had previously compromised on these questions. In fact there have been demonstrations in Dharavi, and new committees have been set up to ensure more-transparent processes (Arputham & Patel, 2010).

Meanwhile, scholars and activists from around the world have increasingly converged on the paradigm of rights in relation to urban space. Drawing on the French sociologist Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, for instance, has taken the U.S. housing crisis and the onslaught of foreclosures as a rallying cry for connecting processes of development-induced dispossession in the Global North and South. At the 2009 World Social Forum in Brazil, he proclaimed:

> The right to the city is not simply the right to what already exists in the city but the right to make the city into something radically different. When I look at history I see that cities have been managed by capital more than by people. So in this struggle for the right to the city there is going to be a struggle against capital. (David Harvey, 2009)

Cities like Mumbai are being remade in the interest of finance capital at the expense of the poor and working classes. It is also true that life in informal slum settlements has long represented a lack of full citizenship; people exchange votes for the most basic of needs, and eviction proceeds on highly unequal terms (Castells, 1983). As Jockin has himself famously exclaimed, “It is no human right to live in shit!” At the same time movement leaders like Jockin are now returning to the more confrontational style of protest, demanding inclusion and accountability from authoritarian redevelopmental rule. This
activism has stopped state projects in their tracks. The state has already begun to reformulate its practices, remaking itself to compromise and facilitate redevelopment.

These recent conflagrations thus beg the question of whether right-to-the-city arguments from the Euro-American urban context apply to struggles over slum displacement in cities like Mumbai. Has the “right to the city” waged through struggles over the “right to benefit from city development plans” finally emerged as a viable and just political paradigm in Mumbai?

One indication that rights-oriented struggles have gained ground is the evident fragility of state power. Ward politicians sidelined by projects are now making new alliances and stepping up their efforts to confront the bureaucratic authoritarian state (Kumar, 2008). Such internal conflicts demonstrate the internal incoherence of the state as a site of internal struggle and social process. While the state is indeed remaking itself, there is indication that attention to the politics of difference and its role in the reconsolidation of projects of rule at the heart of this dissertation is still of critical concern. For instance, while the SPARC Alliance has made indictments over class exclusions, it has still conceded the need for developer involvement and market-based financing in projects. It pleads that it is not “against development.” Furthermore, SPARC also continues to focus on its role in participatory surveying—citing the success of its past endeavors such as the MUTC—without recognizing that such processes have in fact often produced inequalities among resettled people despite the best of intentions of leaders (Arputham & Patel, 2010; Patel & Arputham, 2008; Patel, Arputham, Burra, & Savchuk, 2009).

Attention to difference is ever more necessary as hierarchies have already emerged among occupants of Dharavi. For instance, the most powerful group by far is the business community, including food processors, garment factories, recycling and potters among many other units of production that require large amounts of cheap land (L. Weinstein, 2009). They have the political power to contest the exclusion of their economic activities from the new imaginaries of global-city redevelopment that states, developers and transnational finance capital seek to implement.

On the other hand, among the most vulnerable groups are informal renters in the area (Bharucha, 2009). They are excluded by longer-term residents, who deem themselves the rightful owners of the space. Renters themselves do not protest because they concede that they have no rights to the property. Their political position is ironic in light of Mumbais’ history of tenant activism. Furthermore, ongoing evictions throughout the city go quietly unnoticed and become justified because they, unlike Dharavi, are considered “new” slums, the bastion of migrants who do not belong to the space of the city. Here, the “right to the city” may only in fact be realized through ongoing struggles over “the right to the slum,” with all of its inadequacies and power-laden dynamics.

These differentiated abilities to claim space and their linkages to processes of redevelopment illuminate the fundamental contradictions of the global city and state as processes, constantly in flux, eroding and remaking themselves under pressure. Furthermore, by unveiling how the production of difference perpetuates the processes of
accumulation and dispossession, social movements may begin to forge more powerful alliances and a more inclusive ethico-politics—one that can lead the global city and state toward justice.
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