The Patrolmen’s Revolt: Chicago Police and the Labor and Urban Crises of the Late Twenty-first Century

By

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Abstract

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My dissertation uncovers a history of labor insurgency and civil rights activism organized by the lowest-ranking members of the Chicago police. From 1950 to 1984, dissenting police throughout the city reinvented themselves as protesters, workers, and politicians. Part of an emerging police labor movement, Chicago’s police embodied a larger story where, in an era of “law and order” politics, cities and police departments lost control of their police officers. My research shows how the collective action and political agendas of the Chicago police undermined the city’s Democratic machine and unionized an unlikely group of workers during labor’s steep decline. On the other hand, they both perpetuated and protested against racial inequalities in the city.

To reconstruct the political realities and working lives of the Chicago police, the dissertation draws extensively from new and unprocessed archival sources, including aldermanic papers, records of the Afro-American Patrolman’s League, and previously unused collections documenting police rituals and subcultures. Archives across the city have also yielded internal police department documents including memos, minutes, training materials, and anti-police union literature as well as decades of correspondence and periodicals generated by Chicago’s rank and file police organizations.

The dissertation follows a rough chronology over the course of three decades. It examines the key results of institutional changes that divided the police rank and file from the rest of the department hierarchy, creating new spaces for dissent by both white and black police. Organized black police launched a civil rights campaign to reform the department from within. Majority-white police organizations challenged longstanding loyalties within Chicago’s Democratic machine. The wives of Chicago’s police also played important roles. They acted as their husbands’ advocates and proxies in disputes with the department and, in what they saw as their own interests, vigorously opposed efforts to establish gender equality on the police force. Police sued the city, picketed the department, called strikes, and eventually unionized in 1980. Having recast themselves as workers with labor rights, police turned their attention to Chicago politics, participating in hotly-contested city elections as voters, campaigners, and candidates.
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Introduction

For anyone who has been keeping track of the crimes committed by the Chicago police over the past century—including the shooting of striking workers and their families during the Memorial Day Massacre of 1931, the violence against protesters during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, the 1969 killing of Black Panther leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, and more recently, the trial and conviction of John Burge, a former Chicago police commander who tortured and abused over one hundred African-American criminal suspects during the 1970s and 1980s—it is easy to see the history of the Chicago police department as one driven principally by violence and racism.¹ Other, more systemic, crimes perpetrated by members of the Chicago police over the past decades have also involved routine theft, extortion schemes, and thousands upon thousands of acts of police brutality.

Yet amidst this violence and criminal activity, the Chicago police also engaged in a drastic, but relatively peaceful transformation in the late twentieth century. During these years the lowest-ranking members of the Chicago police department changed from a force that cracked down on labor uprisings into a group of workers that organized collective action. Police who beat demonstrators in the streets also staged their own public protests over political and workplace issues. The same police who violated the civil rights of Chicago citizens became advocates for protecting their own constitutional rights. Police served as frequent witnesses in court, but by the 1970s they had become the plaintiffs in lawsuits filed against the city and police department. The police who had long acted as the armed guardians of Chicago’s political order became, by the 1980s, active participants in the city’s elections as voters, campaigners, and candidates. Though the Chicago police have been historically, and in many ways accurately, cast as the violent perpetrators of urban America, they also continued to remake themselves as workers, activists, and politicians well into the twenty-first century.

This is not a story that redeems the Chicago police, but one that investigates how the new civic identity and labor agendas of Chicago’s lowest-ranking police can reframe narratives of the post-war urban crisis, the dominance of Chicago’s Democratic machine, and labor’s decline in the late twentieth century. Historians have explored the operations of public and financial institutions like the Home Owners Loan Corporation or the Chicago Housing authority to investigate the roots of the post-war urban segregation, poverty, and failed public housing.² But

there has been less focus on how the internal workings of police departments or the politics of police themselves perpetuated some of the key components of urban inequality, including disparities in police service and the increased threat of police violence in minority neighborhoods.

The development of police politics in Chicago illuminates not only the ways that specific department policies and attitudes among police enabled unequal police protection and persistent brutality against citizens, but also that many of the conflicts of the postwar urban crisis unfolded differently inside the police department than they did in the city at large. Understanding the police as historical actors complicates narratives about their role as antagonists in the urban crisis, and in the case of Chicago, upends their depiction as the henchmen of the Chicago Democratic machine. While police committed regular violent attacks on black citizens in Chicago, a major organization of black police called the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL) mobilized a campaign against police brutality and advocated for victims of police violence. Challenging the department from within, members of the AAPL filed thousands of complaints against their own colleagues while the department and city scrambled to defend police from brutality accusations.

Police forces are often characterized as insular, clannish groups, and though the majority of the Chicago police were demographically homogenous, significant divides between and among different racial and ethnic groups in the department make it difficult to characterize the Chicago police rank and file as though they were a coherent, unified group. By the late 1960s, the police split their allegiances between at least a dozen competing police organizations. In more aggressive displays of intra-police conflict, Chicago police arrested and detained one another, sometimes suing fellow police in court. Even the targets of police brutality reflected internal department divisions as police-on-police violence grew more frequent throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Individual police threw punches at their coworkers, groups of police fought in stationhouses and on the street, and, claiming that they could not recognize their fellow officers, police shot other police.

Police also began to fight against the police department itself, especially after the exposure of a police burglary ring in 1960, the Summerdale Scandal, brought new disciplinary reforms and heightened supervision of the police. Heavy scrutiny of the police department’s inadequacies after the Summerdale Scandal forced the city to update and modernize its police force. Between 1960 and 1962, the infusion of additional tens of millions of dollars into the police budget introduced a number of technological advances, including a centralized phone line for emergency calls, and a vast increase in the city’s patrol car coverage. When patrol cars replaced foot patrols, thousands of police officers who had once been visible on sidewalks disappeared into a growing automotive fleet. The department designed distinctive paint and

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flashing blue lights for patrol cars to make Chicago’s police more prominent, but once inside their cars police became more anonymous.⁵ The increased use of patrol cars at once distanced police from the citizens they served and shrank the boundaries of the police workplace. Officers who had walked miles through the city each day now found themselves covering more ground, but from the confines of a patrol car’s front seats. In the late 1960s, police workplace conflicts began to center around who sat in those front seats and under what circumstances. Patrol car policies became fiercely contested issues that were fought in the context of the emerging police labor movement in Chicago.

That the Chicago police articulated workplace grievances over issues like discipline and patrol cars was symptomatic of a deeper rupture between the police and the institution of the police department. As the department grew more centralized and efficient, police began to rebel against its increased supervision and regulations, developing distinct political identities and priorities that diverged from the central institution of the police department. In 1971, one policeman who had earned notoriety for daring to ticket Mayor Daley, the governor of Illinois, and superior court judges, described himself as a “modern Don Quixote—uniquely against the establishment from within the establishment.”⁶ This officer’s methods may have been considered extreme, but throughout the 1960s and 1970s police who challenged the police department from within were hardly unique. Increasingly assertive and more willing than ever to organize, the obedience and loyalty of the police could no longer be taken for granted.⁷

The consequences of a police force in dissent resonate in what historians are now calling the rise of the American “carceral state,” in which the nation’s penal system expanded at an unprecedented rate and incarcerated more prisoners, most of them African-American men, than ever before. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, a larger share of US citizens were imprisoned than in any other country, making it known as the “world’s warden.”⁸ Through studies of prison workforces and prison guards, historians have begun to unravel the political forces behind this system of punitive governance and its implications for urban poverty and labor movements. Beginning in the nineteenth century and intensifying throughout the twentieth, prison populations provided a new source of unfree labor that competed with unionized workers. The imperatives driving the carceral state also supported the criminalization of urban spaces that overwhelmingly targeted African-American populations concentrated in northern cities.⁹ While

⁷ Supervising the work of police and securing their obedience had been an ongoing problem for urban police departments since the late nineteenth century. Spread out in beats across the city, most police worked alone, or in pairs, for the majority of their time on-duty. In years before the advent of police call boxes, much less radios, police were almost impossible to supervise and difficult to control. Supervisors and commanding officers relied on citizen complaints and other police to monitor police work, but for the most part, rank and file members of urban police forces exercised considerable autonomy on the job. See Christopher Thale, “The Informal World of Police Patrol,” Journal of Urban History 33, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 183–216.
these studies have focused on the political and economic consequences of the dominance of prisons, they also raise the question of how other components of the criminal justice system, particularly the police—who in many ways were the agents operating on the ground floor of the carceral state—played a role in the development of this system of punitive governance.  

Paradoxically, as the United States criminal justice system became larger and more powerful in an era of “law and order politics,” the nation’s police departments began to lose control of their police.  

Beginning with police walkouts in smaller cities like Pontiac, Michigan and Vallejo, California and then spreading to smaller departments in towns and suburbs across the US, police forces demanded higher wages, better hours, improved safety measures, and control over how they policed citizens and how they policed themselves. Collectively, police began to insist that they should have a say in determining police department policies and how much of a city’s financial resources they would consume. This burgeoning police labor movement frustrated local governments and strained their budgets. Police may have been the symbols and guardians of state power, but the reach of state power through this domestic army was far from automatic. Instead it was contested and mediated by the political, civil rights, and labor agendas of the police themselves.

The predominant narrative of labor in the late twentieth century United States has been one of continual setbacks and eventual collapse. In the 1970s, the disappearance of manufacturing jobs and their migration abroad or to “Right to Work” states in the South during a major recession weakened large national labor unions. Big labor had already been suffering from a top-heavy bureaucracy whose leaders offered “corruption and authoritarianism—minus charisma, strategic vision, and rank-and-file support,” and struggled to defend labor’s post-war gains in this new economic and political environment. Decades of anti-union policies and court decisions that favored decertification elections, Right-to-Work laws, and permanent striker replacement weakened labor’s power further, and by 2004 union membership had sunk to just under eight percent in the private sector. Unions in the public sector also experienced major setbacks in the late twentieth century, but proved more durable over the long run with 36% of public workers unionized in 2004.

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In late twentieth-century America, labor organizing in the public sector followed its own trajectory. The rapid organization of public employees officially began at the federal level in 1962 when President Kennedy signed an executive order that allowed federal employees to join unions. But by this point labor organizing among public employees was already well underway. In New York hospital employees, teachers, and sanitation workers launched collective action campaigns under the auspices of the United Public Workers, testing and breaking state and federal laws that prohibited public employee unions and job actions. With Kennedy’s seal of approval, membership in public sector unions at all levels of government doubled by the end of the 1960s. In the 1970s the US government employed 13 million people, becoming the country’s biggest single source of jobs as well as labor unrest. During this period from the late 1960s into the 1970s public employees at all levels of government engaged in confrontational strikes. In what became the biggest public employee strike in United States history, two hundred thousand federal employees staged a nationwide walkout in March of 1970. The strike brought the mail to a screeching halt and in the course of ongoing negotiations, the federal government called in 25,000 members of the National Guard to move the mail. Winning significant pay increases and new collective bargaining rights, the postal workers’ strike signaled a highpoint in the legitimacy and strength of unionized public employees.

Re-examining labor history through the lens of the public sector reveals an alternative narrative where new, and sometimes unlikely, groups of workers secured labor rights and contracts even as labor strongholds crumbled around them. Public workers were not immune to anti-union public sentiment and court decisions and compared to workers in the private sector they often faced steeper legislative hurdles to organizing and collective action. In the 1970s opposition to public employee unions became what labor historian Joseph McCartin has described as major source of conservative anti-statism that blamed organized public employees and their improved benefits, pensions, and salaries for rising tax rates. But many organized public employees survived the hostility toward their unions and givebacks during the fiscally-strained 1970s and 1980s. Some groups of workers like teachers, police officers, and fire fighters emerged at the end of the twentieth century as among the strongest and most powerful unions in the country.

Police initially faced some of the strongest opposition to their unionization, which was bolstered by fears that police would use the threat of lawlessness during a police strike to press their contract demands. Critics of police unions argued that unionized police would become too powerful and that their allegiance would be to their union, not to their municipality or the citizens they served. With their long history as strike breakers and repressors of worker uprisings, the police were also some of the most unlikely new members of the American labor

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movement in the late twentieth century. In other ways, they fit right in, exemplifying what Jefferson Cowie has described as the “dual political strains, one of insurgency and one of backlash,” that defined the new face of the working-class during the 1970s that embraced both labor militancy and cultural and political conservatism.²⁹

For police, labor organizing constituted its own form of conservative backlash, as majority-white officers reacted to affirmative action hiring in police departments, civil rights campaigns, and black power protests. White police who felt threatened by affirmative action hoped that union contracts with seniority clauses would favor longer-serving white police over newly-hired minority police. At the same time police tried to characterize their collective action as its own kind of civil rights campaign under the banner of “blue power.” Police tried to cast themselves as embattled public servants, a victimized minority facing rising accusations of police brutality complaints. In doing so, police developed their own “counter-language” of civil rights and re-framed their occupational identity in ways that obscured the racial and ethnic conflict dividing their police departments and the cities.²⁰ Despite these efforts to introduce a sense of occupational solidarity, collective action for police often proved an elusive goal. In Chicago, police unionization was a drawn-out process that revolved around resistance from the Chicago Democratic machine and the difficulty of organizing collective action in a police department deeply divided by race, gender, and rank.

The earliest labor unrest among the Chicago police rank and file in the post-war years reflected the severity of these divisions after what had been a short-lived period of institutional cohesion within the department. During the 1950s, most Chicago police shared a common identity, one unified by their Catholic faith and their loyalty to a department-sponsored police organization that functioned like a company union. In 1960, however, the Summerdale Scandal and its aftermath fundamentally reordered the relationship between the police and the police department. Opposition from the police rank and file to department reforms broke this carefully cultivated unity and in its place dissenting police organizations competed to represent the rank and file in ongoing disputes with the department.

Over the course of the next two decades, the Chicago police rank and file transformed themselves through a series of major confrontations with the police department and city. One of the most significant challenges included lawsuits brought by Chicago’s major organization of black police, the AAPL, in the early and mid-1970s that sought to end the department’s practice of discrimination against minorities and women. Simultaneously, the majority of Chicago’s white police rank and file launched public demonstrations against the city and police department. Opposition from the police rank and file to department reforms broke this carefully cultivated unity and in its place dissenting police organizations competed to represent the rank and file in ongoing disputes with the department.

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²⁹ Jefferson Cowie, “‘Vigorously Left, Right, and Center,’: The Crosscurrents of Working-Class America in the 1970s,” 77; Cowie, Stayin’ Alive.

²⁰ Dennis A. Deslippe, “‘Do Whites Have Rights?’: White Detroit Policemen and ‘Reverse Discrimination’ Protests in the 1970s,” Journal of American History 91, no. 3 (December 2004): 932–960. There is evidence of white, black, and hispanic police all making claims to a “blue” identity, but “blue power” rhetoric was most frequently advanced by organizations of white police.
The police who protested in the streets for their constitutional and labor rights were, at the same time, conflicted about actually joining a union. Arguments mobilized by critics of police unions also resonated with the police themselves. Some police expressed concern that because they had been charged with protecting public safety, police should not organize or go on strike. It took years until the Chicago police, fed up by the better pay earned by other unionized city workers and carried by the momentum of Chicago’s municipal labor unrest in 1979 and 1980, began to take concrete steps toward unionization. Chicago was a frontrunner in terms of the political leadership of its organized black police, but when it came to police labor organization, it lagged behind. Compared to other cities, the unionization of the Chicago police took place in slow motion. Chicago was the last of the major U.S. city police forces to secure labor representation and a contract. It did so years, and in some cases decades, after police in New York, San Francisco, Baltimore, Cleveland, Miami, and Detroit, organized and secured contracts. Police in other cities also proved more willing to strike than police in Chicago. New York’s police walked out for six days in 1971 to protest a proposed civilian review board. In 1975 New York police who had been laid off in response to New York’s fiscal crisis blockaded the Brooklyn Bridge and “hurled beer cans and bottles at uniformed officers and commanders.” That same year a police strike in San Francisco had the city’s mayor worried that police would bring the “city to its knees.” A Teamsters-led police strike in New Orleans in 1979 lasted for two weeks and included a sympathy strike by garbage truck drivers the cancellation of the city’s annual Mardi Gras celebration. By contrast, Chicago’s police labor militancy, which took place via job actions involving pickets, parking tickets, rallies, and partial walkouts, looked relatively tame.

Still, the stakes for police and the city were high. In 1973, in an expression of the newfound autonomy and assertiveness of the Chicago police rank and file, one policeman authored an article for his police organization’s monthly newsletter that described the political urgency of police demands. “We are presently existing as a sidelight to democracy,” he wrote. “A separate entity created to shadow mankind and protect him from himself. At the same time we are being shadowed by a para-military organization [that] dictates to us where to live, who to talk to, where to go, and what to do!” Arguing that police had been denied the same rights and freedoms as other citizens, the policeman went on to ask, “Why then are we so different? Why are we not entitled to live and work under the basic rights guaranteed to every man by the Constitution. The right of freedom of speech, of the press…and the basic right of freedom of the mind!”

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21 Though the transformation of the Chicago police in the late twentieth century culminates with their unionization in 1980, it is important to note that some of the most significant challenges to the Chicago police department came from groups that were not actually unions. Police wives, who were not allowed to join police organizations or police unions, founded their own women’s auxiliaries which forced changes in the police department and recognition of the wives’ specific agendas years before the police negotiated their first contract with the city. The AAPL, whose lawsuits established national legal precedents and affirmative action hiring policies for minority and women police, opposed police unionization outright and actually joined the police department in campaigning against police unions in the police representation election of 1980.

22 Freeman, Working-Class New York, 251, 262.


Chicago police had questioned their role as public servants and rebelled, first becoming participants and eventually political players in the city. In protest rallies they articulated their demands, in editorials they criticized the police department and city, and in new organizations they re-envisioned themselves as workers and activists, identities that shaped how labor and urban politics would play out in Chicago in the late twentieth century and well into the twenty-first.
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This dissertation could not have been written without the mentorship of my dissertation committee chair, Robin Einhorn. With honesty and kindness, she guided me through many detours and dead-ends, encouraged me to present and publish my work, and then cheered me on to the end. Richard Cándida-Smith has also been a thoughtful and supportive reader, not only for this dissertation, but during my first research seminar at Berkeley.

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David Anixter has believed in this project from the very beginning, before either of us really knew how it might turn out. The dissertation—and graduate school in general—could have made things pretty difficult over the past few years, but David made life so good for both of us that I hardly noticed.
In the fall of 1955 the Chicago police department instituted one of its first new policies of the postwar era: it stopped dumping confiscated guns and ammunition into the waters of Lake Michigan. For decades the department had moved the city’s contraband weapons on barges by the ton, bringing them several miles from the Chicago shoreline before dropping them to the bottom of the lake. As part of its new program, the department decided to melt the weapons down in the massive furnaces of a Wisconsin Steel plant instead. The department celebrated this plan as a major milestone, a sign that it had begun to modernize. ¹ Yet the Chicago police department of the postwar years continued to rely on antiquated systems and procedures, often seeming as though it belonged to the late nineteenth, and not the late twentieth, century. Politics in the police department, like politics in Chicago city-wide, also belonged to an older era of fraternal ties and machine politics. Throughout the 1950s, Chicago’s police districts and ward organizations maintained close relationships while the department did the bidding of city bosses. It would take a series of sweeping reforms in the 1960s to pull the department out of what later became known as its “dark ages.”²

During these immediate post-war years, police were often considered more akin to soldiers of the state than they were to private civilians. They belonged to department-sponsored social and religious organizations that promoted unity among their ranks and allegiance to the city. But after a major police scandal in 1960, this cohesion fell apart. The process of reforming and restructuring the department transformed the police force into a fractured and insurgent group of public employees. Leadership and policy changes weakened the organizations that had once unified the police and opened up a rift between police and the police department itself. Police reacted to department reforms with new labor demands and grievances, as representatives of the rank and file tentatively considered unionization for the first time. Police whose identity had hovered somewhere between soldier and civilian now also began to think of themselves as workers. Beginning in 1960, the Chicago police were no longer simply cogs in the Democratic machine, but dissident groups of public servants that regularly challenged the city and the police department.

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¹ Initially the police department had a difficult time finding a factory willing to melt down the weapons because the brass pieces and fittings of guns damaged industrial furnaces. Wisconsin Steel was a subsidiary of International Harvester—the company whose workers had gone on strike during the Haymarket Affair—and eventually offered to help the police. It paid the department one hundred dollars for the scrap metal. “Chicago Burns its Guns,” Chicago Patrolman, Oct-Nov, 1955, 19-20.

² The president of Chicago’s largest organization of black police remembered that “Before Wilson came we were what you might call a band, a gang with clubs and badges, something out of the dark ages.” Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, “Our Clout Is in the Community,” c 1971, 7, AAPL Records, Box 54/ Articles by Renault Robinson, 1971, CHM.
The Chicago Police and the Democratic Machine

Technically, the Chicago police were full-time civil service employees, not patronage appointees. But even though Chicago’s Civil Service Commission governed hiring and promotions in the police department, it was common knowledge that with the right political allegiances and ethnic identity it was easy to side-step the civil service process. The patronage system of loyalty and clout that opened doors in the police department fueled the operation of Chicago-style city politics, which in the most tightly-controlled wards really did function like a well-oiled machine. Each of Chicago’s fifty wards was divided into roughly one hundred precincts run by their respective precinct captains. As the “foot soldiers” of the Democratic machine, precinct captains distributed basic city services and political favors to ward residents in exchange for votes. In addition to collecting votes, precinct captains also provided visible and financial support for the machine. They bought tickets for Democratic Party events, which they attended in packs, and fundraised for candidates. On the eve of elections they marched through the city by the thousands in torchlight processions. In return, ward bosses appointed precinct captains to the well-paid city jobs that served as the currency of the patronage system. Vito Marzullo, the committeeman and alderman of one of Chicago’s most disciplined wards from 1953 to 1986, denied that he ran a “machine,” declaring, “It's not a machine! It's an organization that functions.”

The Chicago police department operated as a function of the larger Democratic organization, which influenced much of the department’s most basic infrastructure. Until 1960, the boundaries of Chicago’s forty police districts closely matched the borders of many of the city’s political wards. In the police districts that were most aligned with the wards, machine bosses appointed police district captains. Known in the city as “captains’ aunts,” these ward politicians accelerated police careers and sheltered corrupt appointees from investigation. These appointments made police captains accountable to the machine and indebted to its bosses. Because the policy-making ranks of the police department were all promoted from the pool of police district captains, the machine also had a direct hand in selecting the future leaders of the Chicago police.

Like the city’s “army” of patronage workers, the Chicago police of the immediate post-war years were a relatively homogenous and unified group. Men with Irish-Catholic heritage, and Polish, Italian, or Greek ancestries dominated the police ranks. Women and racial minorities, mainly African-Americans, served in the department in small numbers and sharply proscribed roles. The dominance of large, department-wide police organizations also reinforced the cohesiveness of the force. Two of the biggest and most important police organizations during this period, the Chicago Patrolmen’s Association (CPA) and the St. Jude Police League,

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3 Some of these irregularities in police exam scores and appointment dates are apparent in the recordkeeping of the Chicago City Civil Service Commission Eligibility and Promotion Registers that span from 1895 to 1970. These lengthy record books are housed at the Illinois Regional Archives Depository (IRAD) in the Ronald Williams Library at Northeastern Illinois University.


maintained close ties to the police department hierarchy and counted most police as members. Through social activities, fundraising efforts, publications, and public events sponsored by these organizations, police experienced a common sense of belonging and publicly demonstrated their loyalty to the police department and city administration.

While these organizations brought the police together as a group, the unique working conditions and civic identity of the police set them apart from other city employees in Chicago. One of the biggest differences between the police and other city workers was that the police department considered all members of its force technically on-duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Police were required to carry their guns with them at all times, even when they were at home or when they were with their children. If police witnessed any kind of criminal activity, the department mandated that they intervene, no matter who they were with or where they were. Indignant police wives protested that not even doctors were on-call all day every day. Additionally police, along with firefighters, were among the few public servants who could risk or sacrifice their lives while doing their jobs. Police who were killed in the line of duty were (and are) valorized as heroes, but when police betrayals of the public trust came to light in a series of police scandals during the 1950s and 1960s, they quickly became the villains.

The Summerdale Scandal of 1960 brought sweeping reforms and unprecedented levels of discipline to the department. As part of its reforms, the department began to monitor the private lives of police more closely than it ever had before. It scrutinized policemen’s personal finances and held police accountable for their actions whether or not they were at work. These and other reforms instituted in the early 1960s marked a turning point for the Chicago police. During the 1950s, the police department had cultivated loyalty among its employees. It protected them from city investigations and supported the development of police organizations. But reforms in the next decade disrupted these relationships and dismantled the organizations that had bound the police to the institution of the police department. In place of the old allegiances and social clubs sponsored by the department, dissident and independent organizations of rank and file police rebelled against the reforms, discipline, and regulations of the police department.

A Company Union and a Patron Saint

Chicago was a labor stronghold throughout much of the twentieth century. In the first half of the century, local craft unions ruled the city through a mixture of complicated alliances and straightforward violence. After World War II, unions became an even stronger political force in Chicago as labor consolidated its power on a national scale. The AFL-CIO merger in 1955, often identified as labor’s post-war high point, coincided with Richard J. Daley’s first election as mayor of Chicago. In tandem, Daley and the labor unions accumulated power in the city for the next two decades. Daley encouraged the growth of large national unions in Chicago and traded political favors with local craft unions, harnessing labor’s power and collecting votes from the union rank and file. A former state’s attorney observed that “Labor was [Daley’s] natural pal, they’re of the same ilk,” and a Republican committeeman who ran against Daley in the 1967

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7 Some police wives argued that even though both police and doctors saved lives, doctors were treated with more respect and earned more money. Pat James and Martha Nelson, Police Wife: How to Live with the Law and Like It (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), 9, 27; Arthur Niederhoffer, The Police Family: From Station House to Ranch House (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1978).

mayoral election commented labor unions were simply “part of the Democratic Party entourage” in Chicago.9

The Daley administration’s special relationship with labor also included city workers. As part of semi-autonomous city institutions, public school and transit employees negotiated formal contracts, but most other city workers did not have a written contract. Instead these city employees negotiated for special treatment and high wages through “handshake bargaining,” which were longstanding informal pacts with the city. Though these verbal agreements resulted in lucrative deals for some, especially workers in the building and construction trades, handshake bargaining relegated other workers to what they called “collective begging.”10 Even though police and firefighters provided critical city services, they lacked the backing of powerful labor unions and the political leverage to press their demands during handshake bargaining. Chicago’s firefighters had belonged to an AFL local since the early twentieth century, but the city refused to recognize the union while police were not even allowed to join a union until 1975. The Chicago Patrolmen’s Association (CPA), the organization that represented rank and file police in handshake bargaining in the 1950s, was so weak and so loyal to the police department that its own leaders later remembered it as a “company union” that made “sweetheart” deals.11 While the CPA periodically asked for gradual raises and additional benefits for the police, it was reluctant to criticize the department or assert its demands through collective action.

The CPA’s conciliatory approach to handshake bargaining belied both its origins and numerical strength. Rank and file police founded the organization in 1916 as the Chicago Patrolmen’s Social, Athletic, and Efficiency Club, a name chosen specifically because it did not sound like a labor union. Despite this attempt to distance itself from labor, police formed the Club to protest the department’s costly uniform policy that required police to maintain a different uniform for each season. Protests organized by the Club persuaded the department to halve the number of required uniforms, a victory that the Chicago Tribune later characterized as the “first collective bargaining charge” made by the Chicago police rank and file. By 1955 the Club had changed its name to the CPA and counted two-thirds of the police force as dues-paying members. But its membership numbers did not embolden the CPA to make new challenges to department policies.12 Instead the CPA forged alliances with the department’s supervisors and commanders through organizations that included the Chicago Police Sergeant’s Association, the Lieutenant’s Association, and the Captain’s Association. Together these organizations coordinated their efforts through an umbrella group called the Joint Council of Police Organizations in Chicago. The Joint Council promoted a common agenda across the ranks while representatives from the associations met with the mayor as a unified group for handshake bargaining.13 Not only did the CPA work closely with the associations of the upper police ranks, it also depended on the

9 Rakove, We Don’t Want Nobody Nobody Sent, 27, 284.
department administration for financial support. The department paid the salaries and benefits of CPA officials and staff and endorsed the CPA’s magazine as the only “official” police publication in the city.\textsuperscript{14} Counting subscriptions and advertisements as its main source of revenue, the CPA filled the pages of its magazine with messages of gratitude to the city and police department that conveyed “sincere thanks and appreciation” to Daley and the Police Commissioner “for the great interest they have always shown in the general welfare of the members of the Chicago Police Department.”\textsuperscript{15}

Although the CPA expressed “disappointment” when the city refused to meet its “pleas” for better wages and working hours for police, the organization’s loyalty and symbiotic relationship with the department tempered its campaign for better compensation.\textsuperscript{16} Its efforts, bolstered by considerable help from organized police wives, did make slow, but steady gains throughout the 1950s.\textsuperscript{17} Between 1951 and 1956 the CPA and Joint Council won raises that amounted to an overall forty-five percent increase in police salaries. While this cumulative gain outpaced increases in the cost of living, police salaries in Chicago still lagged behind other major U.S. cities.\textsuperscript{18} In its most concerted undertaking, the CPA successfully reduced the police work week from forty-eight to forty hours in an effort that took a total of eight years as the city stalled and deferred its promises.

When Daley eventually conceded to a shorter police work week in 1959, it did not mean that police only worked forty hours each week. In addition to the forty hours they spent on patrol, police spent two-and-a-half unpaid hours each week at roll call meetings. The unpaid time police spent in court could stretch for hours or even days. Police were not compensated at all for court time until 1956, when the CPA convinced the department to “pay” police by giving them compensatory time off.\textsuperscript{19} Police did not earn cash or overtime compensation for their court appearances until they unionized and ratified their first contract twenty-five years later in 1981.\textsuperscript{20} During elections, parades, and special events, police worked twelve and sometimes sixteen hour shifts. They clocked similar hours during blizzards, riots, and famously, political conventions, all without earning overtime.\textsuperscript{21} The CPA helped shorten the work week, but this did not necessarily give police more control over their working and free time.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{14} The official designation was an advantage in Chicago because the CPA’s magazine competed with a number of privately-owned police periodicals with dubious connections to the department. “Carey Granted Police Wages by Patrolmen,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, May 16, 1961, 3.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Chicago Patrolman}, Oct-Nov 1955, back cover.

\textsuperscript{16} “City of Chicago 1957 Budget.”

\textsuperscript{17} For a more detailed explanation of police wives’ involvement in the campaign to improve police wages, see chapter 4.


\textsuperscript{20} Agreement between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, Effective through July 1, 1983, Section 20.5, 13, HWLMRC.


\textsuperscript{22} Working conditions for police in Chicago were better than the long hours and dangerous conditions experienced by other public employees in other cities, such as New York’s transit workers, who for decades labored for long hours in extremely dangerous conditions. Yet Joshua Freeman’s assessment that for transit workers in New York during the Depression years, long hours and management oversight meant that their “lives were not their own” also
Where the department failed to adequately compensate the police, the CPA worked to at least fill in the gaps, especially when it came to supporting police widows with death benefits. By soliciting citizens directly by phone or by mail, selling ad space to politicians and businesses, and selling subscriptions to its magazine, the CPA funded death benefits totaling $74,000 in 1957, $96,030 in 1958 and $123,890 in 1959. The CPA encouraged its members to support magazine sales as a major source of financial support for police widows, explaining that “[e]very member should boost his Official Magazine to his friends and neighbors as it is from the sale of subscriptions to our magazine that the payments are possible.” As it helped police widows, the CPA cultivated an identity as the caretaker and protector of police families. Accordingly, the act of handing over a check to a new police widow became a ceremonial and well-documented event. The CPA also collected donations from thousands of individual department members for the survivors of police killed in the line of duty. Most police contributed a dollar or two, with totals often reaching around $8,000—nearly double the salary of a rookie patrolman and about equal to the salary of a first year police captain in the mid-to-late 1950s. The CPA publicized these fundraising drives and published detailed tallies of donations, posting lists of donors at police stations and reading them aloud during police roll calls. By mediating the relationship between the police and the department, organizing fundraisers, and supporting police widows, the CPA involved the majority of Chicago’s police force in a series of common efforts and activities.

Another force promoting unity across police ranks was religion. Catholicism was so pervasive in the Chicago police department that in 1953 the police commissioner readily described patrol work in Christ-like terms. The job of the policeman was, he said, “to help guard and protect the flock; to help those in danger of straying; to seek out and help to return the lost sheep to the fold.” A Catholic devotional organization called the St. Jude Police League ministered to the Chicago police, creating shared spiritual bonds. The League dated back 1931 when it was founded by a handful of Chicago police and priests from the Claretian missionary order. They chose Jude, the patron saint of hopeless causes, as their spiritual guardian—a choice that critics of police corruption and incompetence also found particularly fitting. By the end of the 1950s the St. Jude Police League had signed up the majority of the police force as members. Through the St. Jude Police League, police “from high department brass to fledgling

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23 *Chicago Patrolman*, Oct-Nov, 1955, Aug-Sept, 1957, Oct-Nov, 1958, Oct-Nov, 1959, back cover. There are no subscription prices or circulation records that indicate how much the CPA charged for these subscriptions or how many they sold.


patrolmen” worked and prayed together in yet more fundraising drives, as well as social gatherings, public marches, and religious services.\textsuperscript{30}

The close link between the police and Claretian priests was not unusual in a city like Chicago, which had developed strong political relationships with the Catholic church. Mayor Daley was himself a devout Catholic, and he governed a city divided into neighborhood parishes as well as precincts.\textsuperscript{31} Many of the St. Jude Police League’s practices emulated the activities of Chicago’s ward organizations. Like precinct captains, St. Jude Police League members made their own torchlight processions through the city that demonstrated their support, not for Democratic candidates, but for their patron saint. In his study of St. Jude in Catholic popular culture, historian Robert Orsi described these League marches as the “most visible and dramatic sign of Jude’s presence in the city,” and emblematic of “Catholic prominence in Chicago civic life.”\textsuperscript{32} During one of these annual processions in 1957, uniformed police made an annual pilgrimage to a basilica on Chicago’s South Side for a special evening mass. Nearly two-thirds of off-duty police marched through the city streets that night. Claretian priests reported that a “grand array of blue-coated policemen filled the Basilica to overflowing” and the CPA joked that on the night of the police service the Basilica was the “safest place in the world.” During the service police worshipped St. Jude and said prayers for colleagues who had been killed in the line of duty. In what was seen as the high point of the service, police raised their candles in unison to the image of the Virgin Mary and sang the Ave Maria as “the whole Basilica resounded…with the sonorous voices of all 1500 policemen.”\textsuperscript{33}

Another public event honored St. Jude with a police march through the center of Chicago. Every year during the Easter season thousands of Chicago police processed in uniform through the downtown Loop and into a cathedral for Sunday mass. Inside the cathedral, police officers in white gloves served as acolytes and seminarians who were sponsored by police scholarships sang as a choir. During the service police took communion together and in some years each officer left the service carrying a miniature statue of St. Jude to carry for protection while on patrol.\textsuperscript{34} Police supervisors encouraged rank and file participation in these events, “urging that their subordinates attend the Mass,” and enjoyed support from city politicians who either watched from reviewing stands or marched with the police.\textsuperscript{35} A month after Daley’s inauguration as mayor in 1955 he walked at the front of the procession, leading two thousand police through the

\textsuperscript{34} The practice of a spring police parade continues in the present day. Through the 1990s the police continued to march to a cathedral. Now they process along the lakefront to a memorial outside Soldier Field. Rev. Donald Gaugush, “Chaplain’s Message,” St. Jude Police League Newsletter, Spring 1967, 3; Eugene V. Moran, “2,000 Police March to St. Jude’s Mass.”
\textsuperscript{35} “Police Overflow Church for Annual Communion,” Voice of St. Jude, June 1948, 7.
city streets and into the cathedral. Daley sat with the police during the service, praying and
taking communion alongside them.36

These St. Jude Police League marches reinforced the bonds and obligations, both holy
and professional, that unified the ranks and members of the Chicago police department.
Reflecting on the Easter procession, a police chaplain wrote to the members of the St. Jude
Police League that “at no other time…are the law enforcement agencies of the Chicagoland so
unitied, so one, as in the moment of your communion in the Faith.”37 Participation in the St. Jude
Police League, its leaders hoped, would also improve the reputation of police as public servants.
During an annual police mass in 1954 the police chaplain told St. Jude Police League members
that “Your attendance here…is proof of the religious atmosphere in the Chicago Police
Department.”38 Yet even as the League cultivated religious devotion across all police ranks, it
was hardly an egalitarian organization. The Claretians limited leadership positions within the St.
Jude Police League strictly to department officers who held “an influential position or
command,” and the League’s organization reflected the hierarchical structure of the police
department, not to mention that of the Catholic church.39

Raising money was another critical function of the St. Jude Police League, which
provided a major source of revenue for the Claretian order in Chicago. The League funded the
construction of a million dollar seminary campus located 50 miles outside Chicago, sponsored
the education of dozens of seminarians, and shored up the finances of Our Lady of Guadalupe,
which was one of Chicago’s poorest parishes.40 Soon after the League’s initial founding police
quickly rounded up the money to purchase 57 acres of land for the new Claretian seminary
campus, their fundraising efforts unhindered by the financial constraints of the Great Depression.
In 1937, just two weeks after the infamous Memorial Day Massacre, Claretians dedicated the
building before an audience of two thousand police in a ceremony that provided a stark contrast
to the brutal police violence of the preceding weeks. Having raised $150,000 for the initial
construction of the seminary, members of the St. Jude Police League inscribed the dedication,
“In Memoriam to our Mothers” on a cornerstone.41 The League and the CPA promoted
fundraising on behalf of the seminary as a “lasting memorial manifesting to posterity the undying
devotion and loyalty of the police membership to St. Jude their Patron Saint,” and over the next
two decades the Chicago police funded the education of forty priests at the seminary.42 They
also paid for the construction of a $200,000 gym, a $35,000 indoor swimming pool, a $350,000
chapel building, and the installation of $15,000 worth of ornamental Italian marble. To top it all
off the St. Jude Police League gave each graduate of the Claretian seminary a new gold watch.43

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Correspondence, 1949, 1960-1969, CMA; “Capt. Lyons Renamed Head of St. Jude’s,” Chicago Patrolman,
February 1958, 15.
41 During the Memorial Day Massacre on May 30, 1937, police clubbed, shot, and gassed striking Republic Steel
workers, their supporters, and families, as they retreated from the police. Police killed ten people and injured 90.
1957, 30.
Patrolman, October 1958, 12.
The strategies the St. Jude Police League used to raise funds resembled the soliciting tactics of the CPA and the city’s Democratic ward organizations. Like the precinct captains and CPA members, the St. Jude Police League sold advertising space to local businesses in an annual League “ad book,” which sometimes totaled over one thousand pages. Ad books were distributed at the annual League fundraising picnic on the seminary campus, another lucrative source of revenue and well-attended police event.

Police also benefited from the relationship between the St. Jude Police League and the department. In return for financial support from police, the League provided spiritual guidance and defended police from public criticism. Until 1960 the League appointed the department’s only police chaplain, a priest who administered the last rites to dying officers, attended scores of funerals and wakes, taught classes to new police recruits, and counseled police while they were on the job. The department treated the police chaplain like an official member of the force, equipping him with a police star, police radio, patrol car, and siren. Police participation in League activities was good public relations for the department. One slogan boasted that “the best police of all meet in St. Jude’s Hall,” and the chaplain told police that their involvement in the League was one way “the public you serve can know better of your religiousness.” The League also cultivated support for the police among Chicago’s Catholic community. The city’s archdiocesan newspaper argued that the police duty to protect life and property was a “vocation greater than that of a nun or priest.” Another Catholic periodical in the city explained that the devotion of police to St. Jude made them morally unimpeachable, arguing that citizens were responsible for tempting the police with bribes (police were advised to repeat a line from the Lord’s Prayer, “and lead us not into temptation,” when approaching traffic violators).

Prominent laymen also cited the St. Jude Police League as proof that police were virtuous public servants. At an anniversary celebration for the League, a justice from Chicago’s Criminal Court went so far as to say that the League made the Chicago police “above reproach.” But while League officials and supporters celebrated police piety, two major police scandals in 1952 and 1960 caused damage to the department’s reputation that proved difficult to repair.

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44 At the end of the 1950s the St. Jude Police League touted its 1,380 page ad book as “Undoubtedly, the most magnificent souvenir that any organization could boast.” See “St Jude Police Annual Picnic Attracts 15,000,” Chicago Patrolman, October 1959, 25.
45 In 1960 the police department added a Protestant minister and Jewish rabbi as police chaplains and in 1980 the archdiocese appointed its own replacement for the St. Jude Police League chaplain. In 1981 the department established a chaplain’s unit where non-Catholic chaplains—four Protestant ministers and a rabbi—outnumbered the only priest. Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting, May 26, 1960, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library; Reverend Walter Mischke, C.M.F. to Superintendent Brzeczek, August 13, 1980, RG 740, St. Jude Police League Correspondence 1980, CMA; “New Chaplains Unit is Formed,” Chicago Police Star, February 1981, 19.
48 “2,000 Police Parade Thru Loop to St. Jude’s Mass,” 25.
49 “Silver Anniversary Pilgrimage Attracts Capacity Attendance,” 23.
Scandal and Reform: Rethinking the Private Rights of Public Servants

Saintly though the police may have claimed to be, it was widely acknowledged that they were longtime partners in Chicago’s legendary history of political corruption and organized crime. Since the early twentieth century watchdog organizations like the Chicago Crime Commission and the Chicago Association for Criminal Justice had tried to uproot police corruption. Their investigative and reform efforts generated a number of reports, but did little to change the department’s practices. It took two shocking revelations of police misconduct over the span of eight years to initiate official investigations and eventually, meaningful reforms.

In 1952 the assassination of a Republican ward committeeman with elaborate ties to a criminal syndicate began a city council inquiry that exposed widespread corruption and incompetence in the police department. A group of nine aldermen, many of them among the minority of politically independent city council members, formed a group called the Emergency Crime Committee to run the investigation. During hearings the testimony revealed that the police department was so thoroughly immersed in bribery schemes that new police recruits could not hope to graduate from police training school without first “tipping” their instructors.

Determined to find and punish the police who took bribes, the Emergency Crime Committee set up a series of undercover stings to catch them in the act. After several years of investigation the Committee also tried a more systematic approach and tried to document police corruption by demanding that police commanders, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and hundreds of patrolmen turn over their personal tax returns. It is difficult to understand why members of the Emergency Crime Committee believed that police would report bribery income on their tax returns, but the Committee, and especially its chair, Robert Merriam, thought that collecting personal financial information from the police was crucial to the investigation’s success. In case police had failed to report bribes to the IRS, the Committee hoped to catch financial irregularities with an additional, detailed form that required police to itemize their personal budgets and household expenses.

The outcry against this financial inquiry came from all ranks of the police department as well as a state-wide organization of civil servants called the Civil Service Protective Association. This lobbying group, originally formed in 1928 for the legal defense of civil service employees,

52 Hearings of the Chicago City Council Emergency Committee on Crime, Box 11/1, 770, 784-5, Box 11/7, 109, Robert Merriam Papers, CHM.
53 As if this strategy was not enough to antagonize the police, it soon came to light that the Committee paid for the operation with $120,000 in city funds that had been earmarked for police salaries. Civil Service Protective Association, “Has the Action of the Emergency Crime Committee of the City Council Restored the Confidence of the People of Chicago in the Chicago Police Department?” 1952, 9, CHM.
54 Robert Merriam was one of Chicago’s few independent aldermen and represented the city’s Fifth Ward, home to the University of Chicago. He was the son of prominent University of Chicago political scientist and one-time alderman Charles Merriam. In 1955 Robert Merriam ran as the reform candidate against Richard J. Daley. Daley’s victory and Merriam’s defeat prompted Paddy Bauler, alderman of the city’s notoriously corrupt 43rd Ward, to make his famous remark in 1955 that Chicago “ain’t ready for reform.” For a detailed account of Chicago’s 1955 mayoral election see Len O’Connor, Clout: Mayor Daley and His City (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1975).
55 To prove how reasonable the tax and income inquiry was, Robert Merriam filled out all of the forms himself. Office of the Special Counsel, Emergency Crime Committee, Chicago City Council, Financial Questionnaire, Box 7/1, Robert Merriam Papers, CHM; “More Cops to Ignore Pay Quiz,” Chicago Daily News, October 26, 1954, 4, CPL Microfilm.
protested that the Emergency Crime Committee’s investigative methods intruded into the private lives of the police. In a lengthy complaint addressed to the mayor and the city council, the Civil Service Protective Association argued that police were entitled to the same rights as other citizens and criticized the Committee’s attempt to “pry into the private affairs of Chicago policemen and their families.” But detailed information about the private homes and family lives of the police was exactly what the committee wanted to know. The Committee’s supplemental forms required information about the income and debts of policemens’ wives, all personal property purchases above $250, any purchases of furniture or a television, life insurance policies, total household expenses including itemized budgets for food, clothing, entertainment, and education, as well as the location and cost of any vacations. By demanding access to these personal details and tax returns, the Committee provoked a debate about where the private lives of police ended and where their working lives began.

To justify its access to the personal financial records of police, the Emergency Crime Committee tried to prove that police did not have the same private rights as other citizens. Chicago’s police commissioner testified that because police were on-call twenty-four hours a day, they lived and worked according to different parameters than other citizens. The rules associated with the constant on-duty status of police only reinforced the idea that police were not entitled to the same private rights. Residency rules required that police live within the city limits without exception. An off-duty officer who witnessed criminal activity but did not intervene faced disciplinary charges and suspension without pay. The department also did not allow police to hold second jobs in their “off-duty” hours without written approval. Because of these rules, Committee chair Robert Merriam concluded that in “the eyes of the department the officer has no private life.” Police could not claim the same rights as other citizens because their identity as public servants in Chicago was “closer perhaps to a soldier than a civilian.”

But like a well-disciplined army, police presented a united front against the Committee’s financial inquiry. Police across all ranks refused to turn over their tax returns and financial questionnaires. After the Committee attempted to “force a showdown” by having the Police Commissioner order his men to disclose their tax returns, an attorney for a high-ranking police commander filed suit against the Committee, challenging its authority to investigate the private lives of the police. Lawyers for police captain, lieutenant, and sergeant associations all advised their members against turning in their financial information, making it “virtually certain that

56 “Has the Action of the Emergency Crime Committee of the City Council Restored the Confidence of the People of Chicago in the Chicago Police Department?” 11.
57 Office of the Special Counsel, Emergency Crime Committee, Chicago City Council, Financial Questionnaire.
58 Other city workers, like teachers, were also covered under this rule. Chicago Crime Commission, Executive Committee, “Report: Chicago Police Department, August 14, 1952,” Despres papers, Box 148/6, CHM. “Residence Exemption Sought for Park District Policemen,” Chicago Sun-Times, November 19, 1958, 60, clipping, Despres papers, Box 151/3, CHM.
59 This did not prevent many police from defying the rules and it was estimated that at least one-third of the police force secretly held second jobs. Police working second jobs without the department’s approval had good reason to worry about making their tax returns public because it would mean that they would get caught breaking department rules, Hearings of the Chicago City Council Emergency Committee on Crime, 1952, Box 11/2, 1007, 1094, Robert Merriam Papers, CHM; “O’Connor Lauds Cop Who Shot it out in Taxi,” Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1954, A7.
60 Notes on “Private Rights,” Box 7/1, Robert Merriam Papers, CHM.
61 “Seek Showdown on Cop Income at Probe Today,” Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1953, 16.
patrolmen will follow suit.” In the end the police commissioner refused to order police to fill out the forms and even some Committee members began to voice their doubts about the investigation. Internally divided and having spent most of its political capital—and budgetary resources—on lengthy hearings, the Emergency Crime Committee’s investigation eventually folded.

While the Emergency Crime Committee tried to document the money police collected illegally through extortion, the vast and questionable fundraising operations of Chicago’s police organizations passed largely without comment. The city and police department openly endorsed the fundraising of the CPA and the St. Jude Police League and turned a blind eye as these and other police organizations kept up a steady trade in window decals, ID cards, associate memberships, advertisements, and magazine subscriptions. Businesses that placed prominent advertisements in police publications or citizens who purchased associate memberships in police organizations were told they could be reasonably assured of better, if not preferential, treatment from the Chicago police. In this way, police solicitation operated as what was later described by a dissident police leader as a legalized, widespread system of “psychological” extortion. Yet in the reforms that followed Chicago’s second major police scandal in 1960, both the personal and organizational finances of the police were called into question, with results that provoked dissent from an increasingly divided police rank and file.

Reform and Rebellion

The police department escaped relatively unscathed from the Emergency Crime Committee’s investigations of the early 1950s, but after the Summerdale Scandal of 1960 it could no longer avoid reform. While the revelations of the early 1950s implicated the Chicago police in underworld crimes, political corruption, and bribery, these allegations did not evoke the same level of public outrage as the Summerdale Scandal. The story broke when a thief awaiting trial in a Chicago jail implicated a dozen policemen in a burglary ring operating in the Summerdale District on Chicago’s Northwest side. There policemen had been assisting burglars and transporting stolen items in their patrol cars. Daley called the scandal “the most shocking and disgraceful incident in the history of the Chicago Police Department,” and the Governor of Illinois threatened to assume control of the department unless the city made serious and sweeping reforms.

In the wake of Summerdale, Daley hoped to restore confidence in the police and in his own leadership of the city by bringing in an outside expert to overhaul the department. Orlando W. Wilson, the Dean of the School of Criminology at the University of California, Berkeley,

64 In 1961 Chicago’s police superintendent tried to eradicate these practices, sending letters to the city’s businesses and police organizations with the message that “Individuals and firms solicited in the past have been improperly led to believe, in many instances, that they would receive favorable treatment by the police if they contributed to these purely commercial enterprises...and perhaps would receive unfavorable treatment if they did not.” O.W. Wilson, Chicago Police Journal, December 1961, 73; Tom Huse, Chief Steward, “C.O.P. The Modern Organization,” C.O.P. Newsletter, February 1970; “Solicitations,” C.O.P. Newsletter, December 16, 1970, CHM; Renault Robinson to Bernard Carey, May 17, 1973, AAPL, Box 3/7, CHM.
came to Chicago shortly after the scandal and became the new police superintendent a few months later in the spring of 1960. Wilson accepted the position on the condition that he would run the police department without Daley’s interference. In his seven years as Superintendent, Wilson exercised this freedom, introducing new rules and levels of discipline for police, cutting off police organization funding, expanding the police department’s budget, and severing many of the ties that connected the police department to the city’s Democratic machine. Police resistance to the new superintendent and his policies provoked confrontations that tested and eventually broke the cohesion between police ranks and the police department. This fracturing of the Chicago police force in the 1960s created space for new groups of dissident rank and file police to organize and assert their demands.

Immediately after his appointment in the spring of 1960, Chicago’s new police superintendent began to centralize police operations and transform the physical presence of the police, making the force more visible and distinctive as a symbol of state authority in the city. Police redistricting was a key part of this plan and changing district lines began to decouple many of the direct links between the police and ward organizations. Nearly halving the number of city police stations, Wilson consolidated Chicago’s thirty-eight police districts into twenty-one new districts. In the process he redrew district lines largely independently of the city’s ward boundaries, frustrating ward bosses who did not want to lose their control over the districts or their privilege of appointing police captains. As Wilson closed police stations throughout the city, he simultaneously increased the number of patrol cars in Chicago by fifty percent, deploying 600 additional cars in his first few years as superintendent. Boosting the visible presence of police in Chicago meant making the police easier to identify. Wilson added flashing blue lights to the roofs of patrol cars and painted them a distinctive blue and white pattern. It also became easier to identify police uniforms and distinguish them from security guards when Wilson added a checkered band to the hats of all Chicago police in 1967. Under Wilson’s supervision, not only did police begin to look differently, they were also forced to act differently. As Wilson expanded the visible presence of the police, he increased the regulation of their working and personal lives. In his first year Wilson instituted a “Law Enforcement Code of Ethics,” and required every member of the police force to sign the oath as a condition of employment. Each policeman vowed to keep his “private life unsullied as an example to all,” and later that year Wilson codified the expectation that police never truly left their jobs with a

66Another indication of Wilson’s free hand in running the police department was his expansion of the police budget by twenty percent in his first two years as superintendent, Minutes, Board of Police—City of Chicago, September 8, 1960, Part 7, HWLMRC; Frank Carey, “The Last Two Years,” Chicago Policeman, March 1962, 5-6, 9-10; William J. Bopp, “O.W.”: O.W. Wilson and the Search for a Police Profession (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977), 114.

67Bernard James Ward, “Orlando W. Wilson and the Development of his Education and Training Policies while Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, 1960-1967,” 90, 175–178; Patricia Leeds, “Police Wives Irked at All that Sewing!” Chicago Tribune, January 21, 1962, 29. Each time a police officer transferred districts he had to sew a new set of patches onto each of his uniforms. This responsibility usually fell to police wives who also resented police district consolidation. Some police transferred as many as four times in the two year consolidation process.


new rule that was simply called “Always on Duty.”

A 1964 training bulletin reminded police that “as soon as you put on a police uniform, you lose your identity as a private citizen.” This did not mean that police were free to do what they wished even when they were out of uniform. A 1966 article in the police department’s employee magazine, the Chicago Police Star, explained that “[w]hen a police officer sheds his uniform at the end of his watch, he doesn’t shed his responsibility as a policeman along with it.” With almost every reform, Wilson introduced unprecedented regulation of police in both their public and “private” lives.

In addition to Wilson’s extensive series of rules monitoring police conduct, he created new authority to enforce them. Among the new rules, incompetence became a fireable offense and infractions such as drinking and gambling on the job went from minor offenses to serious transgressions. To enforce these new rules, Wilson vastly increased the supervisory capacity of the department, which had gone for over a decade without promoting any new sergeants. In his first four years as superintendent Wilson promoted 873 new sergeants, 226 lieutenants, and 94 captains. Under Wilson the police department became the most top-heavy it had ever been and as over one thousand supervisors and managers flooded the department’s upper ranks, each newly-promoted officer owed his loyalty to the superintendent. In contrast to earlier years, when, as Wilson said, “the sergeants had a tendency to act as shop stewards who were concerned exclusively with the welfare of the men,” the new sergeants were trained to give orders and discipline police.

Patrolmen who had not been promoted were left resentful of the added supervision and concerned that they had missed their chance to move up the department’s ladder.

The Chicago police rank and file discovered more reasons to worry about their jobs when Wilson created the Internal Investigations Division (IID) in 1960, the first internal police agency to investigate rule violations and misconduct within the department. The IID added another layer of supervision in the department and cracked down on police who broke the rules. Once Wilson had created a new system to regulate and monitor police conduct, he tackled the personal finances of police. Unlike the Emergency Crime Committee, Wilson did not suspect that police were making too much money. Instead he feared that they made too little and managed it poorly. Believing that police with financial problems were more likely to accept bribes and steal from the public, Wilson combated indebtedness by giving police the biggest raises they had ever received: a fifteen percent pay increase over two years. In one of the few rules Wilson actually relaxed, he eased the department’s restrictions on second jobs, partly to encourage police to pay

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70 Minutes, Board of Police, City of Chicago, July 5, 1960, HWLMRC.
71 Chicago Police Department, Training Division, “Police Patrol Procedures,” 1.
73 City of Chicago Police Board Minutes, April 4, 1960, 7; City of Chicago Police Board Minutes, August 8, 1960, 4, HWLMRC; Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting, May 19, 1960, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library.
77 The IID was renamed the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) in 1970. Police used IID and IAD interchangeably throughout the 1970s.
their debts and partly because it was more practical to accommodate the thousands of police who secretly held second jobs than it was to try to enforce the old, ineffective rule. 79

The other component of Wilson’s plan to curb police indebtedness was punitive, and the new superintendent brought unique qualifications to the investigation and punishment of police debtors. Before his arrival in Chicago in 1960, Wilson had served as a police superintendent first in Fullerton, California in the early 1920s and then in Wichita, Kansas at the end of the decade. In between these two jobs he worked for the Pacific Finance Corporation in Los Angeles where he conducted background checks of credit applicants and helped repossess vehicles. In Chicago Wilson revived his role as debt officer, arguing that police indebtedness generated so many calls from creditors and collectors to the police department that he was all but forced to discipline police. 80 Wilson characterized police debts as a moral failing and penalized police with “repeated bad debt claims,” through demotions, extra work without pay, and reprimands. 81 Reprimands were reserved for “potentially good policemen,” but Wilson told these police that he doubted “whether your value as a police officer is equal to the time, trouble and dishonor to the department you have caused.” Recipients of reprimands were forbidden from taking on new debt without the written permission of their supervisors. They also submitted household budgets and detailed monthly repayment plans to the department for review. District and unit commanders monitored these budgets and plans, now acting as both financial counselors and supervisors to the police under their command. 82 While the department had refused to submit police to a financial audit by the city council in the 1950s, by 1960 it had instituted its own internal system for scrutinizing police finances.

As Wilson dealt with the personal finances of police, he also turned his attention to the finances of the city’s police organizations. In 1960 he banned all solicitation by police organizations, including any fundraising for charitable causes. Both individual police and their organizations were no longer allowed to sell advertisements or to accept rewards, gifts, or donations of any kind. 83 This new policy quickly drained the finances of police organizations and periodicals. Smaller publications with dubious connections to the department like the Chicago Police Digest and the Chicago Police Journal died off within a few years. Even the most sanctified police organization, the St. Jude Police League, suffered without the benefit of ongoing police solicitation. In 1961 the League reported that police brought in just half of their usual amount of donations. 84 By 1966 the police department shut down the St. Jude Police

79 Minutes, Board of Police, City of Chicago, June 13, 1960, 5, HWLMRC.
82 Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting, June 3, 1960; Minutes of the Staff Meeting, June 6,1960; Minutes of the Staff Meeting June 9, 1960, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library; “Report of the Superintendent to the Police Board,” Appendix C, July 5, 1960, 2; Minutes, Board of Police, City of Chicago, October 10, 1960, 5-6; O.W. Wilson, Memo from the Superintendent of Police, Subject: Reprimand, October 1960, HWLMRC.
83 City of Chicago Police Board, “Minutes,” April 4, 1960, 6. Wilson qualified that the police department would “continue to accept cash bail.”
84 As fundraising for the St. Jude Police League ground to a halt, other seminaries encouraged police to make donations directly out of their own pockets. One seminary explained that sponsoring a priest’s education was a sound “investment” for a policeman, quoting one satisfied “investor” who reasoned in spiritual terms that his donation would yield “high interest as long as I live.” See “Advertisement for Divine Word Seminaries,” Chicago
League’s annual picnic and that year the League ran its first deficit.\textsuperscript{85} Within five years the Claretians began the process of selling their seminary and police attendance at the St. Jude Police League marches steadily dropped.\textsuperscript{86}

In his effort to regulate Chicago’s police organizations, Wilson took special aim at the CPA. Though the CPA’s loyalty to the police department might have seemed like an asset to previous superintendents, but to Wilson the organization belonged to the corrupt, outdated department that he had been called in to reform. Wilson hoped to weaken the CPA by having the department take over many of its functions and cutting off its sources of revenue. In his first year, Wilson assumed control of the CPA-run police blood bank and challenged the primacy of the CPA’s magazine by introducing a competitor published and distributed by the department, the \textit{Chicago Police Star}.\textsuperscript{87} One of the CPA’s favorite slogans had been “Pay Your Dues, Send the News,” but in 1961 the department stopped collecting dues on the CPA’s behalf and moved district announcements (the “news”) out of the CPA magazine and into the \textit{Chicago Police Star}.\textsuperscript{88} Wilson also revoked the CPA magazine’s “official” status. When the CPA refused to remove the word “official” from its front cover, Wilson sought legal action against the organization and launched an investigation into its subscription selling practices.\textsuperscript{89} Once it had stopped collecting dues payments for the CPA, the department also stopped paying the salaries of CPA officials, saying that if the CPA wanted a full-time staff the organization would have to find a way to pay them.\textsuperscript{90}

While these changes left the CPA resentful and financially insecure, the reform that provoked the biggest protest from the CPA was Wilson’s new system of internal department discipline. Before 1960, the city’s Civil Service Commission had decided on punishments in police cases, but Wilson firmly believed that police discipline was an internal matter.\textsuperscript{91} After Wilson created the IID the most serious cases involving police dismissal cases continued to go before the Civil Service Commission, but internal department disciplinary boards tried all other cases of police misconduct and determined their outcome.\textsuperscript{92} These police department disciplinary

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\textsuperscript{86} Another reason for the sale of the seminary was that by the late 1960s the Claretians were experiencing a general exodus of priests and seminarians who were disillusioned by Vatican II. Reverend Walter Mischke, C.M.F. to Reverend Gregory Kenny, October 1, 1975; Gregory D. Kenny to Walter Mischke and Wayne Barron, Subject: Police League Budget, October 7, 1975, 1–3; Minutes, St. Jude Board of Directors Meeting, October 6, 1976, RG 740, St. Jude Police League Internal Claretian Correspondence, 1970-1979, CMA. “St. Jude Police Memorial Services,” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, April 16, 1973.
\textsuperscript{87} When it was first introduced in 1960 this publication was called the \textit{Chicago Police Newsletter}. In 1966 the department changed its name to the \textit{Chicago Police Star}.
\textsuperscript{89} Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting of May 23, 1960, 2, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library.
\textsuperscript{91} Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting, July 15, 1960, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library. The Chicago Civil Service Commission Minutes, 1895-1973 document police hearings and their outcomes, IRAD Depository at Ronald Williams Library, NEIU.
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boards were made up of three captains each, and with 72 captains in the department, the CPA calculated that if Wilson wanted to, he could run 24 disciplinary boards at the same time.\(^93\)

Though the Civil Service Commission technically decided police dismissal cases, the CPA feared that the internal disciplinary boards were part of preliminary plans to fire scores of police. Wilson’s plans for Chicago’s first dedicated Police Academy building also fueled police doubts about their job security. Why else would Wilson establish a new Police Academy, the CPA asked, unless he planned to train large numbers of replacements?\(^94\)

To protest Wilson’s disciplinary reforms, the CPA led six thousand police in a rally in downtown Chicago. Three thousand police packed into St. Jude’s Hall and three thousand more spilled out onto the street where they listened to speeches over loudspeakers. Six aldermen and supporters from the Lieutenant’s Association joined the crowd as did a legal aide from the Daley administration, sent to monitor the rally and defend Wilson’s policies to the assembled police. When Daley’s aide interrupted a speech by the CPA’s president, police physically threw him out of the Hall and onto the street where he was forcibly “escorted” to his car and sent home.\(^95\) The police, the Chicago Tribune reported, were in “open revolt.” Wilson responded swiftly to this act of defiance and soon the CPA’s president, Frank Carey, found himself under disciplinary investigation and facing assault charges. When Carey refused to answer investigators’ questions, Wilson suspended him and urged the State’s Attorney to begin an inquiry into the CPA’s finances. In the course of this new investigation the State’s Attorney subpoenaed the CPA’s books and charged Carey with embezzlement and mismanagement of the association’s funds. Carey spent six days testifying before a Grand Jury before he was cleared of the charges he called an “attempt to smear and harass” him.\(^96\)

Protesting Carey’s suspension, the vast majority of police signed a petition that accused the department of “a direct interference with our right to representation and to have a spokesman to protest for our rights.”\(^97\) CPA delegates and their wives marched in a public procession to City


\(^94\) Ibid., 6. Wilson’s prior record as a police superintendent also raised alarm among the Chicago police rank and file. In his first year as superintendent in Wichita, Wilson fired one quarter of the police force. Wilson made sure that every Wichita police officer was fingerprinted and photographed, mandating that any member of the department found guilty of criminal activity be fired immediately. Wilson’s other reforms in Wichita also made the Chicago police wary of his leadership. In Wichita, Wilson introduced a much-despised system of one-man patrol cars in order to double the department’s patrol capacity. The Wichita police denounced the solo police cars as “suicide” and in Chicago one-man patrol cars would also become a major source of grievance. The CPA also doubted that Wilson’s work in Wichita was sufficient preparation for running a big city police department. Wilson was too inexperienced for Chicago, the CPA’s president declared, “The biggest job that he ever had was leading a constabulary in the little town of Wichita and the last time he did that was about 1938 or 1939.” In the spring of 1961 the CPA’s president, Frank Carey, actually traveled to Wichita in hopes of finding incriminating information about Wilson’s tenure. When details of Carey’s trip became public, it only intensified the ill-will between the CPA and Wilson’s administration. Press Release, Frank Carey, “The Summer of Discontent” reprinted in Chicago Policeman, August 1964, 36; Bernard James Ward, “Orlando W. Wilson and the Development of his Education and Training Policies while Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, 1960-1967,” 24–27; William J Bopp, “O. W.”: O. W. Wilson and the Search for a Police Profession (Port Washington, N.Y: Kennikat Press, 1977).


Hall to deliver the petitions personally to Daley. One of the wives, who was the legislative chairman of the Chicago Police Wives’ Association, explained that in light of the new disciplinary system police needed supporters and advocates more than ever. “Believe me,” she said, “they are not the same as they were. They don’t know where they’re at. They took the job to get civil service protection, and they are fearful now.” The St. Jude Police League also rallied to defend the police who had “been very generous in their friendship,” against the new discipline of the Wilson administration. In “heated debates” Wilson and the police chaplain clashed over the IID’s investigative tactics and the chaplain declared that he had “no qualms about voicing my opinions to the superintendent when I think an ordinary officer is being put through the mill.” But even the chaplain was not exempt from Wilson’s authority. In 1966 Wilson distributed new guidelines for police chaplains that required them to “express their loyalty to the Department” and refrain from discussing department policies with the police. With the St. Jude Police League and the CPA running low on funds and facing a tougher disciplinary system, the CPA began to experiment with the idea of a police union in Chicago.

The CPA called its battle against Wilson’s leadership “the most significant single event of a turbulent two years of so-called reform and re-organization,” but when it tested police unionization with its members, the city press, and the police department it received lukewarm, if not hostile responses. In 1961 the CPA circulated a petition in support of unionization, but few police signed their names, expressing uncertainty about joining a union and fearing disciplinary reprisal if they signed. The next year the CPA’s lawyer confronted skeptics of a police union in a televised debate. After hearing the lawyer’s reassurances that the police would never organize job actions or go out on strike, the critics were not convinced. Police could not unionize, they argued, because police were “extraordinary citizens” with an unusual level of responsibility to the public, asking what would happen if a police union’s demands conflicted with the city’s public safety needs.

But the CPA argued that the Chicago police were entitled to a union precisely because of the dangerous work they did as public servants. One CPA member complained that police “who may have to walk into a dark alley, to face a narcotic-impelled, armed criminal, are denied the legal right to organize—but there is an entirely legal Pretzel Benders Union.” To the CPA it was unfair that police who had to “work all hours of the day and night” could not unionize, while workers in construction and other trades enjoyed the “benefits of a labor union” and “periodic pay raises.” It also seemed like almost every other group of Chicago city workers could join a union while police could not. Even the all-female crossing guards who worked for the police

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102 Frank Carey, “The Last Two Years,” *Chicago Policeman*, March 1962, 5-6, 9-10
103 During the debate one panelist found the idea of a police union in Chicago so ridiculous that he asked if the CPA planned to organize police dogs along with police officers. The CPA’s lawyer managed to keep a straight face, responding, “No, we believe that the dogs will always be independent.” Daniel A. Gallagher, “A Police Union Pro and Con,” *Chicago Policeman*, March 1962, 12-18.
104 John McDonald, “ ‘That Toddling Town’ Fosters a Company Union.”

department organized their own bargaining unit. They turned down the chance to join the AFL and went on to negotiate their first contract in 1958, winning steady pay raises for three years in a row.\textsuperscript{105}

The CPA also believed that a police union would elevate the civic status and reputation of the Chicago police while improving on Wilson’s efforts to insulate the police department from the Democratic machine. “Police need a union much more than almost every other type of worker,” the CPA explained, because “without one, the closeness of the police to the political hustle may vitally affect their futures.” Anyone who doubted the power of Democratic political influence on the police could simply take “a census of all confessed Republicans within the Chicago Police Department.” After the damage of the Summerdale Scandal, the CPA believed that a union would also help restore police confidence and credibility. A union would be a “status symbol, an industrial decoration, which aids morale, and brings a feeling of independence.” In a union town like Chicago union membership carried real value and could be “used like a credit card, to prove responsibility, and trustworthiness.”\textsuperscript{106} But neither the city nor the police department were willing to trust the Chicago police with a union.

Frustrated by the negative reaction to the proposal of a Chicago police union, the CPA responded with threats. In the fall of 1962 the CPA warned that if the city continued to deny its members a union, the police would defect from the Democratic party. The CPA estimated that police, their families, and their friends controlled as many as 87,000 votes in the city, which was more than the 50,000 votes in a city ward and more than enough votes to influence a close election. Reflecting on the 1960 presidential election, the CPA argued that it was police votes, and not the infamous Chicago policy of “vote early, vote often,” that tipped the balance in Kennedy’s favor in Illinois. Without the electoral support of the Chicago police, a CPA official declared, “Kennedy would still be a United States Senator.”\textsuperscript{107} Outside of the electoral arena, the CPA threatened collective action if it did not get what it wanted, warning in 1962 that its members would picket City Hall to demand Wilson’s resignation and bigger raises. Wilson was not moved by the prospect of police insurgency. He saw the CPA’s failure to rally support for unionization among the ranks as evidence that the organization did not represent the majority of police. Police resistance to Wilson’s reforms only meant that, as he said, “I am getting my job done.” For good measure, Wilson issued a decisive rebuke to the police picket threat and canceled the raises that had been planned for police in the city budget. This dampened what support had existed for a CPA-led police union and stopped all plans for future protests. It would be a full decade before the Chicago police rank and file would try to organize another major public protest or job action.\textsuperscript{108}

Daley’s Police?

After this decisive defeat and with its police union proposals losing steam, the CPA became weaker over the next few years. Meanwhile, frustrated rank and file police looked for

\textsuperscript{105} Years before it began agitating for a police union, the CPA sneered at the Crossing Guard’s organizing efforts: “Obtaining agreement on anything from six members of the female sex is considered a major accomplishment; getting 600 to agree was considered impossible; an individual accomplishing such a feat deserves a medal.” “Chicago Crossing Guard Association,” \textit{Chicago Patrolman}, September 1958, 22.

\textsuperscript{106} John McDonald, “ ‘That Toddling Town’ Fosters a Company Union.”

\textsuperscript{107} John McDonald, “Contradictions...”

more effective representation. New organizations stepped into this growing leadership vacuum and adopted a wide range of attitudes toward police militancy and collective action. The first of organization to challenge the CPA was the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), a national organization that established its first “Lodge” in Chicago in January of 1963, about a year after the CPA’s challenges to the department failed and its unionization plans stalled. Signing up 1,500 members in its first few months, the FOP immediately demanded a twenty percent raise for police. The FOP explained that its organization filled a void in Chicago, where “many policemen felt there was no association of policemen…which displayed sincere leadership [or] effectively represented Chicago policemen.”

By the time the FOP arrived in Chicago it was already becoming one of the most powerful police organizations in the United States. Founded in Pittsburgh in 1915 as an underground organization, the FOP eventually made many of its activities public as its membership grew rapidly throughout the 1960s, reaching close to 100,000 police nationwide by the early 1970s. Billing itself as the police version of an industrial trade union, the FOP told members that “What the labor organizations were to the industrial worker, the Fraternal Order of Police became to the policeman.” One major exception to this comparison, however, was the FOP’s official opposition to strikes and job actions by its members. Some FOP lodges found ways to get around this ban. In 1967 FOP members in Youngstown, Ohio orchestrated a walk-out in 1967 where police held a “Continuous Professional Meeting” in lieu of a strike. Other lodges, including Chicago’s, stuck to the rules and avoided collective action for decades.

Despite the opposition to police collective action that made it a relatively moderate organization, the FOP’s racial politics were more divisive. The FOP invited George Wallace, the segregationist Democratic presidential hopeful, to speak at its national convention in 1967. Wallace received a standing ovation from FOP members for his support of a “law and order” agenda. The next year the FOP’s national president officially endorsed Wallace’s candidacy, prompting a large contingent of black police to cancel their memberships in the organization. But the FOP’s racial politics boosted its appeal among majority-white police in Chicago as did its national fundraising drives in support of Chicago police who were tried on criminal charges for their violence in the 1968 Democratic National Convention and the 1969 police raid on Black Panther headquarters. While the FOP made little progress toward representing the police in contract negotiations with the city, out on the edges of Chicagoland it successfully organized police departments and negotiated contracts in the nearby suburbs of Oak Lawn, Cicero, and Calumet City. In Chicago the FOP’s leadership harbored resentment over the inadequacy of

113 Outside of Chicago, police generally faced fewer official restrictions on their fundraising activities. This meant that for legal defense funds the Chicago police often relied on national organizations like the FOP to help pay for legal representation, though plenty of informal fundraising (i.e. passing the police hat around) took place to help police pay for attorneys. “Afro Cops Deny Infiltration Rap,” Chicago Defender, October 7, 1969, 4; John Dineen, “An Appeal to All Lodges,” FOP National Journal, September 1972, 1, 7; John Dineen, “Urgent Appeal from Chicago F.O.P.,” FOP National Journal, November 1972, 4.
handshake bargaining deals with the city. Chicago’s FOP president described these bargaining meetings with the mayor as an exercise in futility:

Many a time I sat in Mayor Daley’s office prepared to engage in collective bargaining. He would call in the representatives of the eight different police organizations and listen to what each one of us had to say. When we were finished, he thanked us most politely. Even so, the Mayor would invariably present what he felt our raises should be to the City Council.115

But in 1980 the FOP ended handshake bargaining for Chicago police when it successfully campaigned to become their first bargaining representative and negotiated the first Chicago police contract in 1981.

The next major group that challenged the CPA was the Confederation of Police (COP) in 1965. As an independent group of rank and file police, COP touted itself as the “Modern Organization with New Ideas,” and a more assertive, effective alternative to the CPA or FOP. During its first week in operation COP reported that it had signed up one thousand new members and within a month it had recruited two thousand more. COP promised these new members that it would demand a thirty percent salary raise for police and bring an end to the residency requirement that mandated police live within the city limits.116 Resentful of COP’s success at recruiting new members the CPA warned police in 1966 that “you are being bothered by a group of frustrated retired men and a fat foxy business agent who think they see a chance to make a fast buck if they can get you to join their Police Union.”117 COP attracted so much support from the rank and file that it became Chicago’s largest police organization by the early 1970s. At the height of its power, COP organized a series of demonstrations and job actions to protest the department’s disciplinary system, which were among the most aggressive tactics the Chicago police had ever used. COP was also the most racially diverse of Chicago’s police organizations, though the majority of its members were white. While its racial politics were not as extreme as the FOP’s, its defense of police brutality and criticism of affirmative action brought accusations that it discriminated against both black citizens and black police.118

By 1968 black police had founded police organizations of their own. That year a group of five black patrolmen started the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL), pledging to reform the department from within while improving the status of black police in Chicago. Through its slogan, “Black Power through the Law,” the AAPL demanded respect for black police while committing itself to working within existing city institutions. The phrase took on a more literal meaning in the early and mid-1970s when AAPL litigation forced the police department to increase its hiring and promotion of minority and women police. As a result at the end of the 1970s the Chicago police department recruited and hired the most diverse group of police in its history. The AAPL’s criticism of the department’s racial policies and its successful litigation won the organization new supporters among young black police, especially those who suspected that a union dominated by white police would fail to represent their interests.

In the struggle to control the police workplace, new police organizations continued to emerge for over a decade. These organizations coexisted uneasily in the department as they vied for the loyalty and membership of the police rank and file. Simultaneously police wives formed parallel organizations to support their husbands’ efforts and other, smaller groups came and went. Despite Wilson’s campaign to rid the department of the CPA, the organization did not disappear completely and survived by forming temporary coalitions and alliances with other police groups. This proliferation of police organizations in Chicago was just one indicator of the internal divisions that fractured the once-unified police force.

Outwardly it often still appeared that the police acted with a common purpose and shared the same allegiances. In August of 1968 the broadcasts of “Daley’s Police” beating protestors at the Democratic National Convention showed the police operating as the army of the Chicago’s Democratic machine. But by 1968 the Chicago police were already divided by rank, by race, and by organization. Without the cohesive forces of the St. Jude Police League and the CPA, no longer bound by a common sense of belonging, and frustrated by years of handshake bargaining, police loyalty to the department and to Daley was no longer certain. In 1967 Superintendent Wilson left the police department and Daley tried to regain his de facto control of the department and the police. He succeeded in taking the reins of the department’s administration by installing one of his friends and political allies as the new police superintendent, but reclaiming the allegiance of the defiant rank and file police proved more difficult. In the late 1960s and early 1970s new dissident organizations like COP experimented with labor protests in the streets of Chicago and the AAPL launched a full-fledged civil rights campaign from inside the police department. The police who battled protesters in 1968 were not the same force they had been just a decade earlier, a time when they had marched and prayed with the mayor, raised money and paid dues together. Assertive, rebellious, and organized, the Chicago police rank and file pursued new agendas that pitted them against the city, the police department, and the old order that had once bound them together.

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2. “Black Power through the Law”:
The Afro-American Patrolmen’s League and the Chicago Police Department, 1968-1976

Among the many internal conflicts, confrontations, and lawsuits that shook the Chicago police department in the late 1960s and 1970s, perhaps the most drastic evidence of the deteriorating relationships within the department were episodes of police-on-police violence. Accounts of police brutality tend to focus on police attacks against citizens, which represent the vast majority of police violence, and overlook the more rare, but politically significant incidents of racially-motivated attacks on other police. In one such instance during the winter of 1971, Lamont Knazze, a black policeman, was shot in broad daylight by John Pappas, a white policeman. Both Knazze and Pappas worked as vice officers in Chicago’s Englewood police district and Knazze had been interrogating a suspect in his station wagon in preparation for a drug bust when Pappas shot him. After spotting Knazze in his car, Pappas and three other white police pulled up behind Knazze’s station wagon and approached the front seat. In the official report Knazze said that he had recognized the other officers even though they wore plainclothes and not uniforms. Knazze waved and smiled at them, but the officers did not wave back. One of them looked at Knazze, who was also out of uniform, and warned Pappas, “He’s got a gun.” Acting quickly, Pappas shot Knazze three times through the passenger window, wounding him in the hand, thigh, and stomach. It was not until Knazze came out of the car with his hands up that Pappas and the other police said they identified him, even though Knazze had worked in the Englewood district for five years, Pappas had worked there for three, and at one point they had worked together in the same small unit.¹

Knazze’s career in the Chicago police department and the circumstances surrounding his shooting epitomized the deep divisions between members of the police rank and file and the grievances that divided the police from the institution of the Chicago police department. Run-ins with systemic departmental corruption and arbitrary discipline punctuated Knazze’s years as a police officer. In 1966, five years before he was shot, Knazze was accused of accepting bribes from a known drug dealer. Convinced of his innocence, Knazze’s wife, like many other police wives in Chicago, worked as her husband’s advocate to protect his job. After Pappas shot Knazze, the organized black police of the AAPL took up his Knazze’s case, demanding that the department take action against his assailants. Although Knazze survived the shooting in relatively good condition, he soon learned that he faced disciplinary charges for failing to register his station wagon with the department. Meanwhile Pappas and the other officers involved escaped discipline for an incident the department officially ruled “accidental,” an

¹ Chicago Police Department, “Hospitalization Case Report,” February 8, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM; “Statement of Patrolman Lamont Knazze relative to an incident wherein he was shot by Patrolman John Pappas. Statement taken at St. Bernard’s Hospital. Questioned by: Sergeant Joseph Norway, Star #663, District 007” Witnessed by: District Commander Julius H. Watson, District 007, February 9, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
outcome that illustrated the prerogatives a disciplinary system that aggressively punished rule violations but often excused, and even condoned police violence.²

Throughout his career with the Chicago Police department, Knazze received numerable honorable mentions for his work as a vice officer, but repeatedly fought against department discipline. Joining the department in 1953, Knazze was promoted to detective within four years and became a key player in the city’s major drug busts.³ But in 1966, after nearly a decade of successful police work, the department transferred Knazze out of the vice unit and sent him back to regular patrol after accusations that he had accepted bribes. As part of the investigation Knazze went to take a police department polygraph exam, but he walked out after seeing that the department examiner planned to ask him three times the usual number of questions. This ensured that his transfer out of the vice unit would become permanent. Without an effective grievance or appeals process in the department, Knazze concluded that there was nothing he could do to clear his name.

Knazze’s wife, however, took it upon herself to appeal directly to Chicago’s police superintendent. Protestizing that her husband had been “unjustly treated, humiliated, and scorned,” Knazze’s wife questioned if police should be “so insecure” about their jobs “that a lie or a rumor can ruin their whole lives.” In her letters, Knazze’s wife criticized the department for intimidating police and leaving them “afraid to make any complaint or speak up when they know that they’re being unjustly accused.” Defiant, she told the superintendent, “Well I’m not afraid.” As proof of her husband’s innocence, Knazze’s wife attached the results of a polygraph Knazze had taken at a private firm and insisted that the Superintendent investigate the department’s accusations against her husband. This strategy, one that initiated rounds of correspondence with high-ranking police administrators, paid off. The Superintendent did intervene on Knazze’s behalf and one year later Knazze was back making drug busts in the vice unit.⁴ By 1970 Knazze had accumulated twelve honorable mentions, one department commendation, and his supervising sergeant praised him as “a credit to the department.”⁵

The Englewood district where Knazze and Pappas worked was a predominately black, low-income area on Chicago’s South Side. From the late 1960s through the mid-1970s Englewood routinely saw racial conflicts between police as well as labor unrest in the form of wildcat strikes and job actions. Often these protests centered around patrol cars and especially the persistent issue of one-man patrols. With a racially mixed, but majority-white force operating within a predominately black neighborhood, the integration and deployment of patrol cars were contentious issues in Englewood.⁶

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³ For example, see “Arrest 5 in Dope Raid,” Chicago Tribune, October 24, 1965, 14; in 1970 Knazze’s supervisor could credit him with a long series of drug busts, see Sgt. John D. Chamberlain to District Commander, 7th District, Subject: Patrolman Lamont Knazze, Star #7816, 7th District, RE: Request approval as District Vice Officer, December 10, 1970, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
⁴ Mrs. E. Knazze to O.W. Wilson, March 10, 1966; Executive Assistant to the Superintendent to Mrs. E. Knazze, March 22, 1966; Carl S. Klump to Lamont Knazze, April 8, 1966; Mrs. E. Knazze to O.W. Wilson, April 11, 1966; Executive Assistant to the Superintendent, to Mrs. E. Knazze, April 18, 1966, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM. Michael Kilian, “Seize $140,000 in Marijuana in S. Side Raid,” Chicago Tribune, October 18, 1967, B11.
⁵ Sgt. John D. Chamberlain to District Commander, 7th District, Subject: Patrolman Lamont Knazze, Star #7816, 7th District, RE: Request approval as District Vice Officer.
⁶ Another indication of the level of racial tension between police in the district was that the most virulent hate mail sent to the AAPL was signed by anonymous policemen who said they were from Englewood. For example, see 20
that patrolling alone made them targets for retaliatory attacks, while black police argued that one-man patrols meant more police cars would go to underserved neighborhoods. But even when the Englewood district deployed two-man patrols, police resisted policies that would require black and white officers to work together in the same patrol car.⁷

The inability of Englewood district commanders to keep a lid on conflicts over patrol cars resulted in the appointment of three different district commanders between 1970 and 1974. The first commander left the district after the embarrassment of a public protest of one-man patrol cars that included a district-wide police walkout and a public demonstration by the police wives.⁸ According to the Chicago Defender, Englewood’s new commander, one of the few black officers to move up the police ranks, stirred up resentment among black police when he transferred dozens of highly-trained white task force police with brutality records into the district. Just a few years later in 1974 another black commander, Fred Rice, was appointed to lead Englewood. Nearly half of the patrolmen in the district openly criticized Rice’s leadership, contending that Rice harassed them and forced black and white officers to work together.⁹

Amidst these conflicts, the shooting of Lamont Knazze only intensified the contentious atmosphere of the Englewood district. As different reports of Knazze’s shooting simultaneously made their way up Englewood’s chain of command in 1971, “numerous contradictory accounts” of the incident made it difficult to get the facts straight.¹⁰ Pappas remembered seeing Knazze “swing around” in the front seat “with a chrome revolver in his right hand,” but the suspect Knazze had been interrogating said he did not see a gun in his hand.¹¹ Whether or not Knazze had actually held a gun, Englewood’s commander wrote an internal report that questioned if “Patrolman Pappas was reasonable in his decision to use deadly force.”¹² Officially, however, the department accepted Pappas’ version of the shooting, and deemed the incident a “tragic mistake.”¹³ Outraged by this decision, the black police of the AAPL argued that the shooting was “more than an accident,” and accused Pappas of “attempted murder,” and the police department of trying to keep the shooting out of the news.¹⁴ With the exception of the Chicago Defender, the

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Black Policemen from Englewood to Mr. Half Wit Robinson, December 2, 1973; Anonymous to Renault Robinson, February 12, 1974, AAPL, Box 7/5, CHM.
7 Women did not join men on patrol until the summer of 1974, a reform that ignited even more controversy about patrol car staffing. The department did not drop the term “policeman” until that year.
10 Julius H. Watson, District 007 Commander to First Deputy Superintendent, “Accidental Shooting of District 007 Patrolman Lamont Knazze by District 007 Patrolman John Pappas”, February 8, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
11 Sgt. John D. Chamberlain to District Commander, 7th District, February 8, 1971; Ptlmn John Pappas to District Commander, 7th District, “Accidental Shooting of Officer Lamont Knazze”, February 8, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
12 Julius H. Watson, District 007 Commander to First Deputy Superintendent, “Accidental Shooting of District 007 Patrolman Lamont Knazze by District 007 Patrolman John Pappas”
13 Ellis Cose, “An Answer Brings More Questions.”
shooting was barely mentioned in the city press. In correspondence with the AAPL, editors at the Chicago Tribune admitted that while articles about the shooting had been written by its reporters, for unknown reasons they had never been published. The Defender interpreted this omission as part of an overall reluctance of the city press to call attention to police violence, observing “how much coverage the press gives to a white policeman shot and killed in the line of duty, and how little is given to an incident involving a black policeman or any Black person who is shot by a white cop.” Both black police and black citizens could become victims of police brutality and Knazze’s shooting demonstrated the vulnerability of black police to violent attacks by white police.

Determined to shed light on the shooting, the AAPL launched a letter-writing campaign that highlighted Knazze’s story and other, related police abuses, reaching hundreds of media members, state representatives, members of congress, as well as lawyers and business owners. In these letters the AAPL’s leader, Renault Robinson, accused the department of a conspiracy to cover up Knazze’s shooting because it “didn’t want the public to know that another white policeman has gone free after shooting another citizen.” Explaining that police-on-police violence was also brutality, Robinson pointed out that in Knazze’s case “the citizen happened to be a black policeman.” Many prominent recipients of the AAPL’s letter, including State Representative Abner Mikva and Senator Charles Percy, an Illinois Republican, wrote to Mayor Daley and police department administrators to demand an investigation of Knazze’s shooting. None other than Roland W. Burris, then an official at a large Illinois bank, pressured Daley to conduct a thorough inquiry, writing “I feel it is my right and duty to speak out on issues such as this.” To handle the influx of letters protesting Knazze’s case, the police department and mayor’s office responded with form letters that insisted “no evidence of criminal negligence or any civil rights violation” had been found in the shooting. Department officials also criticized the AAPL’s campaign with thinly-veiled references to “those among us who continually are at work to plant seeds of doubt, hate, and dissension” and “certain elements…attempting to exaggerate and exploit the Knazze incident.” But Knazze’s shooting was just one among many similar cases. If the AAPL used the shooting to rally support for its organization, Knazze’s case also highlighted a growing pattern of police attacks on other police in Chicago where the perpetrators were both white and black.

As in Knazze’s case, violent confrontations between police often began as cases of mistaken identity, when officers did not recognize (or said they could not recognize) their colleagues. Nearly a year before Knazze was shot, the AAPL had already published a cautionary tale in its newsletter, the Grapevine. The scenario published in the newsletter was loosely based

15 Russell Freeburg to Renault Robinson, May 5, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
16 "Is Cop Probe a 'Brownwash'”.
17 Renault Robinson to Harold Washington, March 24, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
18 Abner Mikva to Renault Robinson, April 30, 1971; James B. Conlisk, Jr. to Charles Percy, April 23, 1971; Roland W. Burris, to Richard Daley, April 23, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM.
19 James B. Conlisk, Jr. to Charles Percy; Charles Finston to Herbert M. Kraus, May 5, 1971, AAPL, Box 7/12, CHM. These letters also admonished recipients for complaining, telling them “You are solicited to express pride in Chicago.” Letter-writers were also reminded that they had no power to influence police department internal disciplinary affairs. “For your information,” one response stated, “the Superintendent of Police has unrestricted disciplinary authority, subject only to the general direction and approval of the Chicago Police Board, as provided in the Illinois Statutes.”
on the case of a black grocer who was beaten to death after being apprehended by police and the *Grapevine* article warned black police that they were as vulnerable to police brutality as black citizens:20

Imagine if you will a black police officer off duty, out of uniform, driving your new Hog down the street on a warm afternoon. You look in the rear view mirror and see a police car following you, the officer motions for you to pull to the curb. You pull over stop your car spring out and start walking toward the officer. Just as you reach for your star in your back pocket you’re hit over the head. You go down. The officer, white, five feet two inches tall, weighing one hundred fifty pounds and scared to death, continues to beat you because he knows what’s going to happen if he allows you to get up.

Next stop, Cook County Hospital. The Doctor fills out your chart. In big red letters—Dead On Arrival. They look in your pocket and find your star—Oops Slippers.21

The AAPL’s message to its members was clear: working for the Chicago police department could become deadly when police failed to identify one another or when disputes between colleagues and snap judgments turned violent.

The campaign to raise awareness about Knazze’s shooting did little to stop police from perpetrating violence against other police. And it was not always white police who beat or shot black police, in some instances black police shot other black police and white police. In an advertisement for a meeting in the fall of 1971, the AAPL recounted a confrontation between a black policeman who shot another black policeman and another where a white policeman beat a black policeman. At the meeting the AAPL promised to discuss the urgent question of “why a white police officer could bring himself to punch a Black police officer and then cock his revolver to his head and threaten to kill him.”22 In one of the most egregious examples of police-on-police violence several years later, a white police captain shot a fully uniformed black policeman in the back while he stood inside the police station where they both worked. The captain blamed his reflexes for the shooting, explaining that he fired because he had seen a black man with a gun standing behind a glass door.23 Here the Defender’s observation that “Black people and Black policemen are both the same in the eyes of white policemen,” rang true.24 But even so, black police grappled with different questions of identity, different obligations, and a different relationship to the police department than most black citizens. Often with one foot in the neighborhood where they lived and one foot in the department where they worked, black police in U.S. cities found themselves stuck in the middle of one of the most controversial, violent problems of the urban crisis in the late twentieth century.

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22 Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, “Are We Becoming Victims of Our Co-Workers?” October 1971, AAPL, Box 64/General Meeting Notes, 1971, CHM.
24 “Is Cop Probe a ’Brownwash’.”
Black Police Caught in the Crossfire

After years of race riots where black citizens clashed with police and escalating police brutality against black citizens in the late 1960s, the presence of black police officers on city police departments became a source of fascination to the national news media by the early 1970s. Features and profiles of individual officers and police departments explored the uneasy roles inhabited by black police in the nation’s cities and asked how black police balanced the competing demands of their jobs and their communities. According to a 1970 profile of black police organization leaders in Life, black police were “caught in a crossfire between a traditional law enforcement system and the black community’s hostility toward it,” and were ordered by their superiors, “not to help, but mainly to contain, control, and in some instances, exterminate their own people.”25 In a less extreme reading of the situation, Ebony depicted a black policeman running “a crazy, zig-zag gauntlet...lined on one side with police, on the other with members of the black community...subjected to discrimination by his white superiors, scorned by militants in his own neighborhood.” Ebony also saw violence against black citizens as an inescapable part of the black policeman’s job, one where “the close scrutiny of white cops and the provocative behavior that sometimes emerges in demonstrations may force him to club and beat those demonstrating for causes with which he essentially agrees.”26 The experience of a black police during the riots that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. illustrated this catch-22. A 1971 Reader’s Digest feature told the story of a black policeman who arrested black citizens during the riots and then returned to the police station where he overheard his colleagues making racist slurs. After going home a neighbor told him, “When you're in that uniform, you're the enemy.”27 Life surmised that there was no way for black police to win. “When the black cop identifies with the system, he alienates himself from black people. When he identifies with black people, he alienates himself from the system.”28 An even more recent study of black police in southern U.S. cities echoes these observations, characterizing black police in contemporary America as “a contradiction personified.”29

Contradictions aside, there were compelling reasons for black citizens to compete for jobs as police in Chicago despite the difficulties and disadvantages. The job security and relatively high salaries of city police were major draws for black applicants to the department. Yet even these benefits could exacerbate the problems and thorny questions of identity confronted by black police. While a job in the police department offered a ticket to the black middle-class in the 1970s, black police were often assigned to patrol in Chicago’s most impoverished black communities on the south and west sides of the city. AAPL leader Renault Robinson believed that these assignments isolated black police from the black middle-class while simultaneously estranging them from the low-income communities they served. Robinson explained that a black policeman in Chicago had “committed and been involved in more violence than most of his middle class brothers.” Black police had “a middle income, but what many consider a dirty job,” working in “areas that most middle class Negroes consider themselves above.”30 Black police were also harassed by black citizens who considered it a betrayal to work

for a good salary in a white-dominated police department. The wife of a black policeman in Chicago complained about young black Chicagoans who “think my husband is a traitor to his race” and heckled him in the street for “making $12,000 a year for the white man.”\(^{31}\)

Improving this strained relationship between black citizens and black police was one of the first goals of the AAPL, which was determined to transform the contradictions experienced by black police into advantages. AAPL leaders reported that the department repeatedly told black police how to understand their racial and occupational identities in the city, that they were “policemen first and a black second,” and that their first allegiance was to the department.\(^{32}\) But the AAPL based its agenda on the idea that the race of black police was the key to their success as both police officers and activists. Echoing reports from the U.S. President’s Commission in 1968 and recommendations from police reformers who argued that black police were crucial to improving police-citizen relationships in cities, the AAPL believed that black police could act as mediators between black citizens and the police department. Being caught in the middle between the police department and the black community was, in this way, a potential asset. In the process the AAPL hoped organized black police could reform the department from within while improving police service out on the street.\(^{33}\)

But as the police department tried to restrict the AAPL’s activities and limit its power through intimidation, discipline, and the arrest of its leaders and members, the AAPL began to de-emphasize moderate approaches and focused instead on more litigious and aggressive strategies as the new way forward. When the AAPL protested the shooting of Lamont Knazze, its president told members that the organization empowered them to say, “in a very loud and clear voice, ‘I’m a black man first.’”\(^{34}\) While the AAPL asserted its black identity, its politics never quite approached the militancy of black power groups like the Black Panthers in Chicago. In fact, the AAPL’s activism within the department revealed deep divisions between the city’s black police, some of whom did feel a stronger allegiance to the department than they did to other black police or to the AAPL. From their vulnerable position as employees of the Chicago police department, AAPL leaders and members, none of whom ranked above patrolman, slowly cultivated support among black police inside the police department and with civil rights groups outside it. In 1970 the AAPL launched an aggressive program to help citizens make and sustain complaints against the Chicago police. That year it also filed a lawsuit that challenged the constitutionality of the department’s treatment of AAPL members in disciplinary investigations, a legal challenge that led to broader charges of racial and gender discrimination.

What began as a movement that stressed the importance of black police to the department became a legal campaign to increase their numbers. With varying levels of success, the AAPL enlisted three federal agencies—the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), the

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33 The U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968 and the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Standards and Goals, 1973, also recommended the increased hiring of minorities in cities. While black citizens’ dissatisfaction with city police forces as well as reformer’s calls for more black police on city forces are well-documented, evidence that black police could improve police relationships with black citizens was “sketchy at best,” and studies observed that “the racial identity of an officer may be less important than his or her occupational identity as an officer.” See Samuel Walker, “Racial Minority and Female Employment in Policing: The Implications of ‘Glacial’ Change,” *Crime & Delinquency* 31, no. 4 (October 1, 1985): 555; Scott H. Decker and Russell L. Smith, “Police Minority Recruitment: A Note on Its Effectiveness in Improving Black Evaluations of the Police,” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 8, no. 6 (1980): 387–393.
34 Howard Saffold to AAPL members, c.1971, AAPL, Box 64/General Meeting Notes, 1971, CHM.
Justice Department, and the Office of Revenue Sharing (ORS)—to document and discontinue the police department’s discriminatory practices. As a result federal investigators combed the department’s records, a federal judge issued injunctions to stop all hiring and promotions of police in Chicago, and the Office of Revenue Sharing withheld nearly $100 million in federal funds from the city. The AAPL’s lawsuits and their financial consequences forced the city to change, at the very least, who it hired and to reconsider the process of how it hired them. In the years after civil rights campaigns in Chicago had compelled only limited efforts to desegregate schools and housing in the city, the AAPL was able to increase the representation of black police in Chicago and set a national precedent while doing so. The AAPL achieved its relative victories, though limited in their own ways, by making discrimination in the police department an unavoidable economic issue. By restricting the city budget and threatening increased property taxes, the AAPL framed its civil rights agenda in terms of city finance, pressuring the city and police department where they were most vulnerable.

Civil Rights in Chicago: Education, Housing, and Police Brutality

The AAPL was founded in 1968 after a series of frustrated civil rights campaigns in Chicago. Before and during the civil rights protests of the 1960s, black politics in Chicago involved a reciprocal relationship between black leaders and the Democratic machine. The city’s black voters became reliable supporters of Democratic candidates by World War II. In exchange for limited access to “tangible benefits” like city jobs and city services, the city’s black politicians did not press the issue of the overt and institutional racism that segregated and disadvantaged the city’s black population. Chicago’s six black aldermen were so reluctant to speak out against racial injustices that they were named the “Silent Six.” Another reason for black loyalty to the Democratic machine had less to do with economic exchange and “material rewards” than it did, as political scientist William Grimshaw explains, with the highly limited options for any black political participation in Chicago. Six black alderman, even if they were “silent,” could be seen as better than none. 35

Still, crowded and deteriorating housing, inferior schools, and harassment by city police generated deep bitterness among black Chicagoans. The system that co-opted black politicians could not contain growing outrage among parents of Chicago’s black students over segregated and extremely overcrowded public schools in the early 1960s. Rather than move black students into underused white schools to alleviate packed classrooms, Chicago’s Superintendent of Schools, Benjamin Willis, sent black students to school in two shifts, with half of students in school during the morning and the other half in the evening. As the city waited for the construction of new schools, the Chicago Public School system added mobile classrooms to existing black schools (deemed “Willis Wagons” by angry parents) instead of integrating schools that served a predominately white student body. Black parents from both middle-class and working-class neighborhoods protested these policies in a widespread grassroots effort. The movement culminated in a series of boycotts where nearly 250,000 black schoolchildren stayed home from school. Even these massive protests did not convince the city to take measures to integrate its public schools or to replace the much-despised superintendent. In 1965 a coalition of civil rights groups in the city, the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO) tried a new strategy when it filed a complaint against Chicago with the U.S. Department of

Education. At first the Department of Education responded to the complaint by withholding $30 million in federal education funds from Chicago, but a personal visit from Mayor Daley (who reliably delivered Democratic votes each election year) quickly convinced President Johnson to release the money to the city before the funding freeze could do much damage.\textsuperscript{36}

In 1965, emboldened by civil rights victories in the South and troubled by riots in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) decided to head north in an attempt to spread the civil rights movement nationwide. They made Chicago their first stop, a test case that they hoped would set national precedents. Early in 1966 the SCLC arrived in Chicago’s West Side and formed an alliance with Chicago’s main civil rights organization, the CCCO. This new coalition, the Chicago Freedom Movement, dedicated itself to open housing in the city and vowed to “end slums” by challenging the discriminatory policies of the city’s realtors and the Chicago Housing Authority.

To call attention to the extreme housing segregation that divided the city, the Chicago Freedom Movement led marches straight into Daley’s neighborhood, then the all-white working class enclave of Bridgeport, and other communities that housed the mayor’s most loyal white constituents. The Chicago police played a key role in these demonstrations. Unlike their southern counterparts, police in Chicago did make efforts to protect civil rights protestors from attacks during demonstrations. The police department also devoted considerable resources to coordinating this protection with the Chicago Freedom Movement leaders, which the police superintendent noted came at the expense of police service in other parts of the city. At the same time, the relative peace during the demonstrations kept the protests, and the message of the Chicago Freedom Movement, out of the national headlines.

Over time, however, the constant demonstrations pressured Daley to agree to a summit on open housing. These talks between Chicago Freedom Movement leaders, realtors, and city officials yielded a compromise where the Chicago Freedom Movement agreed to stop marching if city officials and realtors expressed a commitment to open housing, though without any concrete guarantees of action. When it became clear that the city did not intend to make meaningful housing reforms, the Chicago Freedom Movement planned another march. This time Daley stopped the march with a court order, arguing that by protesting the demonstrators would be in violation of the summit agreement. After this disappointment and the unfulfilled promises of the open housing summit, the Chicago Freedom Movement and the CCCO began to fall apart.\textsuperscript{37}

Confronted by the complex web of institutions and policies that undergirded segregated housing, the Chicago Freedom Movement struggled to execute reforms and to mobilize large numbers of Chicago’s black population. Its efforts to build a civil rights movement in the North signaled what historian James R. Ralph, Jr. calls a “decisive and transitional” shift for the movement as a whole that laid important groundwork for future civil rights protests in the city. The Chicago Freedom Movement served as an incubator for new civil rights leaders and organizations in the city, but the next wave of activists faced steep odds. The city had proven


\textsuperscript{37} For a play-by-play account of the summit, see Chapter 1 in Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor, \textit{American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley - His Battle for Chicago and the Nation} (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2001).
unwilling to integrate its schools or housing and by 1968 there was little reason to believe that it would accommodate a civil rights agenda in the police department either.

During the high point of its campaign, the Chicago Freedom Movement attempted to address the issue of police brutality and demanded that a civilian review board investigate cases of police violence. Both police administrators and the white police rank and file fiercely opposed civilian review, and the city had no intention of instituting any kind of external review policy. By the end of the 1960s police brutality had become a bigger problem than ever. In 1960 the police department had screened its recruits for psychological disorders and aggressive personality traits that could make them a liability on the force. But in 1968 the department scrapped its elaborate (and expensive) screening program in favor of a new method: trial by fire. Instead of weeding out unstable police officers before they went out on patrol, this approach sent the most volatile officers into high-crime districts to see if they could withstand the pressure. In the early 1970s the problem of police brutality became so intense that Congressman Ralph B. Metcalfe, once a member of the “Silent Six,” publicly broke with the Chicago Democratic Machine and renewed the fight against police brutality.

It was only after several prominent citizens in Metcalfe’s district were wrongly jailed by the police in 1971 that Metcalfe began his campaign against police brutality in Chicago. One of these citizens was a friend of Metcalfe’s who had been arrested and taken to jail after a taillight on his car went out. Later that year another black citizen from Metcalfe’s district was found unconscious by the police after having had a stroke. Thinking that he was drunk, the police threw the man in jail instead of getting him medical attention. These incidents prompted Metcalfe to found the Concerned Citizens for Police Reform and form a new city committee that held hearings on police brutality. A scathing report on police violence produced by this committee in 1972 publicized the problem further and demonstrated just how far Metcalfe had distanced himself from the city’s Democratic machine. Later that year a series of articles in the Chicago Tribune highlighted the committee’s findings in disturbing detail, but even these exposés could not convince the department to reinstitute its psychological screening program or to begin a program of civilian review. It looked like no amount of pressure could convince the police department to change its stance on brutality, much less its treatment of black officers themselves.

Racism in the Chicago Police Department

Nationally, black police were under-represented in every major U.S. city, and while Daley liked to boast that Chicago’s numbers were better than most, black police were still not hired or promoted in proportion to the black population in Chicago as a whole. During the 1950s black police were rare or nonexistent in the department’s upper ranks. In 1960 the department had four black police sergeants, one captain, and no black lieutenants. Over the course of that


year, however, a wave of promotions under the reform superintendent O.W. Wilson improved these statistics. By Wilson’s last year with the Chicago police department in 1967 there were ninety black sergeants, five lieutenants, and four captains.\footnote{Wilson did not hire any policewomen until 1966. “Policewomen: Class of ’66,” \textit{Chicago Police Star}, September 1966, 17.} When compared to the number of white supervisors these numbers were still strikingly low. In 1968, black officers represented six of 150 police captains, sixteen of 275 lieutenants, and 167 of 1,233 sergeants. While it was estimated that black citizens made up over a third of Chicago’s overall population in 1970, only seventeen percent of the city’s police force was black, and after Wilson’s departure, the number of black police in the upper ranks began to drop. By the beginning of the 1970s there was only one black police captain out of 94, thirteen black lieutenants out of 299, and 126 black sergeants out of a total of 1,335.\footnote{Afro-American Patrolmen’s League Monthly Meeting, “Black Political Clout,” May 27, 1971, AAPL, Box 68/Lu’s Notebook, 1971, CHM; Renault Robinson, “What We are Up Against,” \textit{Chicago Defender}, April 30, 1970, 10. Chicago did have the largest percentage of black police of any U.S. city. In 1971 just seven percent of New York’s 32,000 police were black and San Francisco had less than ninety black officers in a police force of 1900. Of a total of 400,000 police nationwide, between 15,000 and 20,000 were black, see Trevor Armbrister, “The Lonely Struggle of the Black Cop,” 124–125.}

Statistics were not the only index of the Chicago police department’s attitude toward black police. Racism was prevalent at the very top of the police department administration, but there it was expressed in relatively diplomatic terms. Even as Superintendent Wilson made public commitments to antidiscrimination policies in the police department, he was reluctant to take specific steps to promote racial integration, especially in staffing the department’s patrol cars. The difficulty of integrating individual patrol cars in Chicago illustrates in a qualitative sense how racism shaped Chicago police department practices and policies. In 1960 Wilson began his effort to slowly integrate the city’s patrol cars. Originally he and his advisers had hoped to usher in integration quietly and unofficially, thinking that gradual and voluntary integration would prevent backlash from the mostly white police rank-and-file.\footnote{Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting of July 15, 1960, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library.} Five years later, however, few teams of police had agreed to integrate, and Wilson delayed issuing an order that would mandate integration, asking department members instead if it would be possible to “persuade more white and Negro officers of good will to work together as teams in squad cars?”\footnote{O.W. Wilson, \textit{PAX 501}, April 9, 1965.} Finding the police unresponsive, Wilson finally issued a General Order the next year that required the integration of some of the city’s patrol cars. Though police were constantly reassured that this order would not force “incompatible” pairs of policemen to work together, police, especially those in the Englewood district, actively protested patrol car integration well into the 1970s.\footnote{James Murray and Jack Queeney, “Ticket Lull Protests Cop Integration,” 3; Edmund J. Rooney, “Half of Englewood Patrolmen Charge Boss Harasses Them,” 5.}

Among the department’s lower ranks, racism ranged from the subtle to the overt and extreme, as evidenced by the operation of a rogue, but not especially secret, cell of the Ku Klux Klan cell in one of Chicago’s police districts. This discovery of the KKK’s infiltration of the Chicago police department in 1967 brought to light one of the most shocking examples of white supremacy in the department. The patrolman leading the KKK cell, Donald Heath, had worked in the department since 1961 and was considered the “No. 1 Klan” leader of Illinois by KKK
headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. After an undercover operation officially exposed the cell, investigators were stunned to discover that for months Heath had been driving to and from work with the letters “KKK” painted in white on the trunk of his personal car. A subsequent raid on Heath’s home turned up a submachine gun, automatic rifles, and pistols, 200,000 rounds of ammunition, hand grenades, a Confederate flag, and thousands of KKK leaflets. Heath and two other klansmen were fired from the police department while three others who were under suspicion immediately resigned. Surprisingly the department decided not to press criminal charges against Heath, even though it had discovered his plots to assassinate Daley along with several police officials. In fact, Heath was not arrested until left Chicago for Ohio, where he was charged for a conspiracy to assassinate all nine justices of the Supreme Court.

“A Threat to the Existing Bureaucracy”: Founding and Growing the AAPL

The AAPL’s founding in July of 1968 coincided with the decline of the Chicago Freedom Movement and the rise of the Black Panthers in Chicago. Fittingly, the AAPL’s shifting agenda reflected an ideological amalgam that outwardly embraced both black power’s assertiveness and the Chicago Freedom Movement’s commitment to working within city institutions to effect change. One of the AAPL’s slogans, “Black Power through the Law,” encapsulated these competing and often contradictory influences, as did its emblem, which depicted the raised first of the black power salute embedded within a police star. On an ideological spectrum of black police organizations nationwide, the AAPL fell somewhere in the middle, between moderate fraternal organizations of black police that shied away from open confrontation and more radical organizations inspired by black Muslim and separatist groups. At the beginning of the 1970s organizations of black police that had started out as moderate, fraternal organizations like the Guardians of New York, Philadelphia, and Detroit, or the Officers for Justice in San Francisco, became increasingly militant. New militant organizations of black police also started to spring up in cities nationwide, such as the Society of Afro-American Policemen in New York. The AAPL developed and exchanged ideas with the Society of Afro-American Policemen in hopes that this relationship and partnerships with groups in other cities would help create a more powerful national federation of black police organizations. In 1972 the AAPL realized this ambition as a charter member of the new National Black Police Association that was founded in Chicago and continues to operate as an advocacy group for minority police.

Although the KKK had been discovered in the police department just one year earlier in 1967, leaders of the AAPL founded the organization with a relatively moderate agenda in mind. Early on the AAPL centered its programs around community education. A series of free seminars offered by the AAPL at the University of Chicago included a ten-week course for police officers covering subjects like Racism—White and Black, the History of Civil Rights, the Legislative Process and Governmental Structure, and an 8-week course for the general public on Afro-American Police and Urban Problems. In a short-lived expression of support, the department’s director of police training made a special appearance on the first day of AAPL

classes and promised to incorporate some of the AAPL’s course material into the department’s own training curriculum.\textsuperscript{48}

But by this time, the police department’s surveillance and intimidation of the AAPL was already well underway. Even before the AAPL’s founding the FBI had started a file on the organization, continuing its surveillance, and what the AAPL suspected were illegal wiretaps of organization phones, for another five years.\textsuperscript{49} Weeks before the AAPL’s founding was officially announced, one police supervisor warned AAPL leaders that soon they would be “getting dumped,” which meant they would be forced out of their district.\textsuperscript{50} Sure enough, immediately after the AAPL’s founding, Robinson and other leaders were separated and transferred to different districts throughout the city almost immediately, though this had the unintended effect of allowing leaders to circulate more widely in the city and establish an AAPL presence in different police districts.\textsuperscript{51}

As the AAPL organized more black police in more districts, the department ramped up its disciplinary attack. Within two months of the League’s founding Robinson, who had served on the police for four years without incident while accumulating twenty honorable mentions, received his first disciplinary complaint from the department. Before leading the AAPL, Robinson had received high performance ratings, usually in the 90s out of a possible 100. After the AAPL’s founding, Robinson’s performance rating plummeted to a rock-bottom score of fifteen out of 100.\textsuperscript{52} Over the course of two years, the police department transferred Robinson seven times and, in an extreme case in 1973, assigned him to patrol a small stretch of the alley behind Central Police Headquarters. The department tried to use this monotonous assignment to keep an eye on Robinson and to isolate him from other black police, but Robinson still found ways to conduct AAPL business in the alley. Using a payphone at the very end of the alleyway, Robinson coordinated with AAPL staff and lawyers, checked on the status of AAPL lawsuits, and advised other new black police organizations springing up around the country.\textsuperscript{53}

The department’s discipline of AAPL leaders and members caught the attention of black state legislators in Illinois and a year and a half after the AAPL’s founding they held hearings to publicize the department’s discrimination against the AAPL. At the hearings AAPL members described their frequent encounters with police department discipline as well as their everyday experience of harassment by other police.\textsuperscript{54} AAPL leaders and members had their property

\textsuperscript{48} By 1976 the Basic Probationary Officer program included coursework devoting to explaining the workings of the Registrar of Citizens’ Complaints and the Office of Professional Services, both of which handled brutality complaints. There was also a class specifically about police “courtesy” as well as a course named “Self-Understanding,” which emphasized “the need for constant introspection in the law enforcement activity,” but no specific coursework on mitigating police brutality or improving police relationships with black citizens. Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, Board of Directors’ Meeting Minutes, October 5, 1968, 2, AAPL, Box 69/AAPL-Minutes, 1968-1974, CHM; “Black Patrolmen’s Seminar Shows Results,” Chicago Defender, January 13, 1969, 9; Chicago Police Department, Training Division. “Chicago basic probationary police officer training program,” March 1976, HWLMRC.

\textsuperscript{49} J. I. Adkins, “Expose FBI file on AAPL before it began,” Chicago Defender, June 4, 1975, 2.

\textsuperscript{50} Robert McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City, 31.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 44.

\textsuperscript{52} Betty Washington, “Ratings suffered, Says Dissident Cop,” Chicago Daily News, March 11, 1975, clipping, West Side Coalition Newspaper Collection, 15, AAPL/Box 84, CHM.

\textsuperscript{53} Robert McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City, 73–84.

vandalized with racist graffiti and their department mailboxes and lockers filled with garbage. They received hate mail and threatening phone calls at home and Renault Robinson later reported that anonymous callers made death threats against his children. By 1975, a half dozen AAPL leaders had been arrested and locked up by fellow police at least once and in a less aggressive, but still punitive measure, police ticketed cars parked outside the AAPL offices with unusual frequency. Some of the AAPL’s members kept their memberships secret in order to protect themselves. One black policewoman, Lola Wellington, wrote the AAPL to ask for legal help in resolving a disciplinary dispute in the mid-1970s. She hoped that “when the police department finds out I am a member of the League it will not become worse for me,” explaining that “not any whites know about it as far as I know.”

But for the most part the department’s disciplinary campaign against the AAPL focused on its leaders, and especially Renault Robinson. Over the course of the AAPL’s first five years in operation, Robinson racked up a total of seventy rule violations and a handful of arrests for unsubstantiated charges that included drunk driving and claims that he had been “interfering with the work of the police.” By the beginning of 1970 he had been suspended without pay for 107 days, enough to ensure that every one of his paychecks had been docked for over a year. In May of 1970, a dozen policemen showed up at Chicago’s Goodman Theater to arrest Robinson and his wife for disorderly conduct as they sat in their seats waiting for a screening of a film about the AAPL to begin. Once Robinson got out of jail he faced a full year of suspension without pay. The AAPL fought back by seeking an injunction to stop the department’s disciplinary action against Robinson and suing the police department for violating the constitutional rights of police during disciplinary investigations and hearings.

In addition to using discipline to intimidate the AAPL’s leadership, the police department also tried to compete directly with the AAPL for members by co-opting black police into a department-sponsored organization. The department’s highest ranking black commander, George Sims, rallied a group of existing fraternal black police organizations and consolidated them into

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58 Lola M. Wellington (Armstrong) to Kermit Coleman, c1976, AAPL, Box 60/Coleman, Kermit, 1976, CHM.
one organization called the Guardians. Though the AAPL charged that the department used the Guardians to undercut the AAPL, leaders of the Guardians insisted that they “did not organize at the behest of any person to displace or nullify any existing organization.” At first the Guardians worked according to plan by signing up nearly a thousand members in the late 1960s, and quickly outpacing the AAPL. As the AAPL struggled to launch its organization, the Guardians became a visible and active group whose initial success was facilitated by the department’s official support. The Guardians published a newsletter, awarded scholarships, distributed Christmas baskets to the poor—all while recruiting and preparing hundreds of black applicants to take the patrolmen’s and the sergeant’s exam. Once the AAPL began to pick up steam, the Guardians continued to maintain a membership of around eight hundred into the mid-1970s. But the AAPL remained skeptical of the department’s claim that the Guardians, which listed the city’s white police superintendent as one of its charter members, was really an independent black policemen’s organization.

The competition between the AAPL and the Guardians for members was not the only division between Chicago’s black police. Some of the strongest resistance to the AAPL in the Chicago police department came from older or senior-ranking black officers. In 1970 the AAPL reported that 90 percent of its members were young police, with most having served on the police force for less than ten years. “Most of the criticism [of the AAPL], surprisingly enough, has come from our own backyard,” Renault Robinson observed, “Yes, from brothers!...Those with ten years or more experience on the force.” Another AAPL leader reported that it was black supervisors who “accuse us of trying to polarize the department...They are the first to say that you’re a policeman first and a black second.” Pointing his finger at “our own black supervisors,” this AAPL leader declared that “the straw that breaks the camel’s back comes from inside our own group.” The AAPL felt that antagonism from ranking black officers was so widespread that the AAPL’s president told members he was “sure most of you can recall an incident where you personally, or someone you know was subjected to unfair treatment by a black supervisor.”

Chicago’s black police supervisors in the late 1960s and early 1970s sometimes downplayed or denied that racial prejudice was a problem in the police department. The stories of a father-son team of black supervisors in Chicago retold in the oral history, The Thin Black Line (2004), provide an alternative narrative to the grievances expressed by the AAPL. Retired Police Commander Hubert Holton joined the police force as part of the first class of recruits hired under Richard J. Daley in 1955 and worked in the first integrated team of detectives in his area. Holton remembered that his partnership with a white detective was a relationship that “just clicked.” As the first black sergeant promoted to the homicide unit, Holton made a steady climb up the ranks, becoming a district commander by 1983. Holton recalled that “Surprisingly,” he

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64 Guardians, “Membership Drive.”

67 Curtis Cowen, “…and I Am Curtis Cowen.”
encountered “very little resentment” of his success, explaining that police respected him because he was “a no-nonsense man who played by the rules and treated everyone fairly.” Holton could not “recall any outright racial discrimination as a police officer,” and characterized himself as someone who “had good relations with white and black, Hispanic and all.”

Hubert Holton’s son, Hugh Holton, cited a similar experience in the Chicago police department. Like his father, he also reached the rank of commander. In an occupation and department where it was common for fathers and sons to work together, Hubert and Hugh Holton became the first father and son of any race to serve as commanders at the same time. Echoing his father, the younger Holton chalked up his success to his leadership ability and his refusal to tolerate racism in the police department. Hinting at the all-or-nothing dictates of police department discipline, Holton explained that his attitude toward the police was, “I don’t care what you think of me as an individual or what you think of my race…you are going to respect me, or I’m going to fire you.” This approach, Holton believed, was the norm in the Chicago police department, saying, “This is pretty much the way that the CPD handles it. Leave your prejudices at home. Don’t bring them to work.” The only incident of discrimination in the police department that Holton could recall in his interview was an instance when a policeman refused to work in a patrol car with a policewoman.

Off the record, however, Hugh Holton told another story to the editor of The Thin Black Line. Holton first applied for a job as a Chicago patrolman after finishing a tour of duty in Vietnam, earning a high score on the patrolmen’s exam. But after his medical evaluation Holton was told along with sixteen other black applicants that they had been disqualified because of a diagnosis of either a heart murmur or flat feet. Undeterred, Holton went home, donned his military uniform, and went back to the police station that same day. When he returned, a supervisor told him, “Hell, Hugh, I didn't know you were a Vietnam vet. Forget about it. You passed.” Holton was so concerned about keeping this story out of his interview that the book’s editor did not decide to publish it until Holton died the year before the book went to press. Holton’s reluctance to publicly criticize the department testifies to what was perhaps a broader pattern among black supervisors who privately resented police department discrimination but publicly supported the department to protect their jobs, pensions, and professional standing.

Not only were the Chicago police divided along racial lines, but within racial groups they navigated complicated allegiances and divergent experiences. The AAPL realized that black police would not automatically become members or support the organization’s agenda because of their race. There was also no guarantee that black police would treat black citizens any better than white police. Wary of a proposal to hire five hundred new black officers in 1970, Robinson asked, “How can we secure the kind of black policemen that we need?” Arguing that the “wrong” kind of black policeman could make the problem of police brutality worse, Robinson cautioned that “[t]he blue uniform becomes a bomb when we put a semi-psychotic brute in it.”

Membership numbers in the AAPL remained low for its first few years in operation when it had a hard time convincing black police that an AAPL membership was worth the risk to their

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69 Holton, The Thin Black Line, 182–188.
70 Ibid., 192–196.
71 For other practices used to disqualify black police applicants, see Bolton and Feagin, Black in Blue.
72 Ibid., Editor's Note, 7-8.
73 Renault Robinson, “Says City Move to Hire Ignoring Blacks in Area,” Chicago Defender, November 14, 1970, 13. Some studies suggest that black police were more violent in their treatment of black citizens. See Decker and Smith, “Police Minority Recruitment.”
well-paid city jobs and pensions. By mid-October of 1968 the AAPL had signed up 270 members, a little over 10 percent of Chicago’s black patrolmen. The next year the AAPL doubled its membership to 500, which still represented less than a quarter of Chicago’s black police.\textsuperscript{74} Renault Robinson grew so frustrated by the reluctance of black police to join the AAPL that he publicly chastised non-members in his regular column in the \textit{Chicago Defender} as “full of hatred, anger, and false notions of social status.”\textsuperscript{75} Three years later just half of Chicago’s black patrolmen had joined the AAPL. When asked if AAPL membership carried a stigma, Renault Robinson responded, “Of course there’s a stigma!” noting that “[a]ny time anyone in the department gets together for anything other than dancing and singing there’s a stigma attached to it.” Robinson explained that the AAPL was “a threat to the existing bureaucracy,” of the police department, meaning that “[p]olice officials want to break it up.”\textsuperscript{76}

The AAPL tried to leverage the police department’s discriminatory use of discipline to persuade black police to join the AAPL, arguing that police organizations that wanted to unionize would not protect them. Asking black police if they had “forgotten all of the cases involving black and white policemen where the white policeman was wrong and he received no punishment what-so-ever?” the AAPL invited black police to “[c]ompare these cases with those where black officers have been accused of being wrong by white officers,” so they could see how “[i]n every case the black officer was punished and in some cases, fired.”\textsuperscript{77} The benefits of union membership would not be enough, the AAPL believed, to help Chicago’s black police if they ran into disciplinary trouble:

Now lets look at the white boys, they find themselves going to jail for brutality, murder and corruption and they decide that the way to stop this is to form a union for the protection of white officers and they trick foolish blacks into believing that they are working in behalf of all policemen black and white. Please do not be naïve enough to believe this lie. If police receive a raise all policemen receive a raise, this holds true… But what happens when you have a complaint against a white officer and he is a member of COP? What happens when two policemen get involved in a traffic situation and the black officer gets locked up by the white officer? Do you think COP is going to help him?\textsuperscript{78}

While public sector unionism has often been linked to civil rights campaigns, in Chicago the AAPL saw its goals as diametrically opposed to those of the city’s emerging police unions.\textsuperscript{79} The

\textsuperscript{74} Afro-American Police League of Chicago, “Initial Supporting Pledges Received as of 12 October, 1968,” October 12, 1968, AAPL, Box 68/Membership Pledges, 1968, CHM.
\textsuperscript{76} Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, “Our Clout is in the Community,” 3, AAPL, Box 54/Articles by Renault Robinson, 1971, CHM.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Robert Zieger notes that in 1960 one out of every eight employed black workers in America was employed by the government. Zieger explains that these black workers “were crucial to the expansion of union membership in public employment,” and that “the one notable exception to organized labor’s numerical decline” in the 1960s and 1970s” were when “Dramatic strikes of African American sanitation, hospital, and other public workers invoked the liberationist language of the civil rights movement and brought thousands of low-wage service and public workers into the AFL-CIO.” Robert H. Zieger, \textit{For Jobs and Freedom: Race and Labor in America Since 1865} (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 175. For a detailed discussion of how the civil rights movement influenced
AAPL feared that a union hierarchy and seniority rules would institutionalize existing patterns of discrimination and white dominance in the police department. Any contract negotiated by a majority white police union would not, the AAPL predicted, favor black police, nor would a majority white police union enforce contract provisions equally for both white and black police. No union, the AAPL argued, could reform the police department and eliminate discriminatory practices through collective bargaining, telling members that “If you think that this can be accomplished by negotiating with the head of the police department in a fashion similar to labor relations, you are mistaken.”

In other ways the AAPL tried to distance and differentiate itself from Chicago’s other police organizations. The AAPL rejected the fundraising and fringe benefits that were central to the activities of organizations like the CPA or COP. Saying it was “impossible to operate within the framework of existing police organizations,” the AAPL insisted it was not a “money-making organization—not an athletic social club—not a fraternal outfit—not a pressure group—not fighting for promotions or pay raises.” Dismissing the giveaways and gimmicks of other police organizations, the AAPL focused on its agenda for advancing the careers of black police in Chicago. “We could offer insurance policies. Or give away calendars, little memo books or even Plaid Stamps,” an AAPL newsletter article argued, “But we don’t entice you with material things that are here today, gone tomorrow. We’re thinking about the future.”

Police department discipline and the competition to sign up members shifted the AAPL’s attention to the problems of the present as it adopted a more aggressive approach to tackling racial problems in the police department. In 1970 the AAPL established a program to help citizens file brutality complaints called the Police Brutality Complaint Program and Legal Referral Service. With a staff of AAPL members and paralegals, the Referral Service helped victims of police brutality navigate the official complaint process, not a simple job considering that a brutality complaint could be filed with agencies ranging from the police department’s Internal Affairs Division (IAD) all the way up to the FBI. Operating a 24-hour message line to take complaints, the Referral Service rounded up witnesses, gathered the necessary paperwork, and instructed victims to document police-inflicted injuries at a hospital. Because citizens making brutality complaints were often arrested for the “holy trinity” of “disorderly conduct, battery, and resisting arrest,” the AAPL cultivated a network of lawyers in the city who would be willing to defend them. Encouraging victims to “TELL US about your Problems!” the Referral Service sanitation strikes, see Joseph A. McCartin, “‘Fire the Hell Out of Them’: Sanitation Workers’ Struggles and the Normalization of the Striker Replacement Strategy of the 1970s,” Labor: Studies in the Working Class History of the Americas 2, no. 3 (2005).

83 Technically the League to Improve the Community, an entity created by the AAPL to raise money for its outreach programs through grants, operated the Referral Service.
Service’s promotional literature shared insider tips to help complainants strengthen their cases against police, such as how to easily identify police officers by the numbers on patrol cars when police removed their badges and how to differentiate between low-ranking patrolmen who wore blue shirts and their supervisors who wore white. By 1971 the Referral Service had handled four hundred brutality complaints and by 1972 it averaged about sixty-six cases each month.85

Even as the AAPL launched direct challenges to the police department by filing brutality complaints against fellow police, the AAPL still tried to act as a mediator between the police department and black citizens. During meetings with black citizens’ and neighborhood associations, the AAPL challenged long-standing suspicions of the police. When a delegation from the AAPL met with the residents of a predominately black neighborhood facing gang threats, it received only qualified support for sending extra black police patrols to the neighborhood. A neighborhood leader agreed to the plan, but told the AAPL it would work only “if you’re not a standing army trying to contain [neighborhood children] as animals…”86 In 1972 AAPL leaders met with black families who had moved to a white neighborhood and faced ongoing harassment and violent attacks while police failed to intervene. The AAPL’s president explained that the community meeting and others like it were central to the organization’s mission. “We are trying to unite the police and Black people,” he said, even as he admitted that white and black policemen were “pretty much at each other’s throats.” Still, AAPL leaders pleaded with these families not to give up on the police altogether, advising them, “If you have to call the police 50 times a night, call them.” At the end of the meeting some residents remained unconvinced. One woman asked sarcastically, “Why worry when they send you big, fat, greasy, White policemen out here and they come out and give you this nonchalant attitude?”87 In the end, the fundamental problem of too many white police and too few sympathetic black police in the city’s black neighborhoods impeded efforts to improve police race relations. Over the next few years the AAPL refocused its attention, and almost all of its resources, on rectifying the racial imbalance in the Chicago police department.

Black Power through the Law

In the early 1970s the AAPL began to take its motto, “Black Power through the Law,” literally by prioritizing legal action against the city and police department. Civil rights groups had been launching major anti-discrimination lawsuits against the city since the mid-1960s, but with limited success. A 1965 suit against the Chicago Public School system that threatened the city with the loss of $30 million in federal funding failed to force the city to take serious measures to integrate its schools. The next year a lawsuit filed against the Chicago Housing Authority charged the agency with building high-rise public housing projects exclusively in black slums and segregating project residents. It took ten years before the Supreme Court decided the case in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, with a ruling that required the city

87 Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, “Meeting Minutes”, August 10, 1972, 2, 17, 43, AAPL, Box 69/AAPL-Minutes, 1972, CHM.
to provide subsidized private housing to a limited number of minority applicants throughout the Chicago metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{88}

The AAPL’s lawsuits against the Chicago differed from these previous attempts at civil rights litigation by facilitating a rapid succession of federal interventions that included, most importantly, the successful and persistent withholding of desperately-needed federal funds from the city. In 1971 the AAPL filed a complaint with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), a federal agency that provided millions in supplemental funding to the Chicago police department. Because the police department’s failure to hire and promote minority and women police violated federal civil rights law, the AAPL argued that the LEAA could no longer legally provide funding to Chicago. LEAA officials came to Chicago in 1972 and over the course of a three-month investigation, they collected more than enough evidence to support the AAPL’s complaint, some of which even included statistical data compiled by the Guardians that documented the low numbers of black police in the department.\textsuperscript{89} Even with this evidence, the LEAA hesitated to impose sanctions and restrict its funding to the police department. The agency decided that the pervasive discrimination in the police department was “not intentional,” and instead opted to ask the police department for “voluntary” efforts to hire and promote more minority police.

The next year the AAPL tried again when, in 1972, the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Act brought state and local governments under the purview of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Backed by the new law, the AAPL filed its next complaint against the police department with the U.S. Justice Department.\textsuperscript{90} In 1973 yet another team of federal investigators arrived in Chicago to investigate discrimination in the police department. Drawing on evidence previously compiled by the LEAA as well as its own findings, the Justice Department launched a successful case against the city and the police department in federal court. The court stopped the department from hiring police from its list of eligible recruits, ruling that the testing process the department used to generate the list failed to accurately predict future job performance and disproportionately favored white male applicants. This left the city unable to hire any new police or promote any new supervisors until it came up with a better system, creating both a manpower and leadership shortage within the department. Unaccustomed to losing control over police department operations, Daley and police department administrators chafed at the hiring freeze, blaming the court and the AAPL for a looming police shortage. In reply, the AAPL argued that by “shift[ing] the blame for continuing job vacancies from its own broad shoulders, the City hopes to have its citizens hold minorities, who are merely seeking equal job opportunities, responsible for increased crime.”\textsuperscript{91} The court responded to complaints of a police shortage by allowing the department to hire police from its list of eligible recruits, but only according to the specified ratios of 42 percent black or Hispanic recruits and 16 percent women. Following the court’s hiring guidelines would mean that the department would have to hire nearly every minority and female candidate on its list. Rather than hire more minorities and

\textsuperscript{89} Guardians, “Membership Drive.”
\textsuperscript{91} Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, “The Facts about the So-Called Police ‘Crisis in Manpower,’” November 12, 1974, AAPL, Box 63, CHM.
women, the department refused to hire any police at all and continued to hold the AAPL accountable for the city’s lack of police.  

While the police department balked at hiring more minorities and women police, it did make some gradual changes to accommodate women, but not racial minorities, on more equal terms in the department. The Daily News reported that testimony during the Justice Department trial “made top police officials more aware of the need to put more women into spots in the department other than in the youth division and in women’s lockups,” and in the summer of 1974 the department lowered its height and weight requirements to increase the eligibility of female applicants. For the first time in its history that summer a handful of policewomen began to ride in patrol cars with men and the next year the department dropped the distinction between the titles “policeman” and “policewomen” in favor of the gender neutral title “police officer.” But these measures still failed to address fundamental problems of the department’s discriminatory hiring and promotions process or increase the numbers of women in the department. As the police department stalled, the AAPL tried a new strategy of exerting financial pressure on the city. In a precedent-setting case, the AAPL made police department discrimination an economic liability by freezing nearly $100 million in federal general revenue sharing funds earmarked for the Chicago police department. Originally intended to empower state and local governments with large infusions of federal money, the AAPL’s suit used federal revenue sharing funds as leverage to empower the city’s minority police.

A Discrimination Tax

At the beginning of the 1970s, the decade looked like it would be prosperous for Chicago as new revenue flowed in to the city budget from city, state, and federal sources. In 1970, Chicago began to receive a portion of Illinois state income tax revenue and in that same year the state granted Chicago the power to tax city residents without getting prior approval from the State Assembly. For Daley, it was a golden opportunity to experiment with taxes that could help him avoid raising politically unpopular property taxes. Instead of raising property taxes in 1973 Daley started charging the city’s employers of fifteen or more people with a $36 a year “head tax” on each employee. As the decade continued Daley taxed cigarettes and city parking, electric bills and hotel stays. He added a tax on whisky, beer, and wine in 1975, which the Tribune compared to the tax crises of the early Republic and joked would spell the end of the Democratic machine, writing “It took 15,000 militiamen to put down the Pennsylvania Whisky Rebellion in 1794…[n]ot even El Supremo’s vast army of patronage workers will be able to cope with this year’s version.” In these years Daley also developed an appetite for federal grants, a source of funding that expanded rapidly with the beginning of federal revenue sharing in 1972. Critics believed that Daley felt so entitled to the city’s cut of federal revenue that he treated it like a “donation from another planet,” while continuing to “want federal and state taxes for everything.” The AAPL’s lawsuit exploited Daley’s dependence on this money by convincing

95 11,400 of the city’s employers and a total of 1.1 million employees were taxed to generate roughly $30 million a year. “Heading off the head tax,” Chicago Tribune, December 26, 1973, 24.
96 Michael Kilian, “Daley’s had one too many (taxes, that is),” Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1975, A2.
the court to withhold federal funds from Chicago, gambling that Daley would rather remedy
discrimination in the police department than raise property taxes. The AAPL banked on the
“desire on the part of the Department to continue to receive the millions of dollars in federal
money each year,” and planned to hit the city budget where it hurt the most.  

The source of the federal funds in question was Nixon’s General Revenue Sharing
program, which was intended to decentralize federal spending by distributing lump sum
payments to state and local governments with few requirements. Compared with other kinds of
federal funding, this was government money with almost no strings attached. Revenue sharing
funds could not be used to lower taxes, but it was hardly feasible for the ORS to enforce this
restriction in every jurisdiction. With a staff of just fifty people, the Treasury Department’s
fifty-person Office of Revenue Sharing paid out $6.5 billion in annual revenue sharing funds to
38,000 jurisdictions each year. Chicago’s city administration openly flouted the revenue
sharing rules, announcing in the first two years that it had used the money to reduce property
taxes by around $30 million. Similarly, the ORS technically required that State and local
governments spend their revenue sharing funds in compliance with federal civil rights laws, but
it did little to enforce this rule. In 1974 the ORS boasted that “No other Federal agency or
Department has comparable civil rights enforcement jurisdiction over all units of general
government in the United States,” but, much like the LEAA, it asked for voluntary compliance
instead of imposing penalties. Between 1973 and 1974 ORS received a total of 95 civil rights
complaints, but only in the AAPL’s case did it actually suspend the city’s funding and only after
the AAPL sued the Treasury Department first.

As an agency set up to decentralize federal power and federal spending, the ORS was
reluctant to enforce federal civil rights laws. With the AAPL’s case against the Treasury
Department in trial, the ORS called attention to its commitment to protecting civil rights through
voluntary efforts, not revenue withholding. It issued a guide to “General Revenue Sharing
and Civil Rights,” complete with a list of Do’s and Don’ts, and a Discrimination Quiz that asked,
“Could Your Government be Engaged in a Discriminatory Use of Revenue Sharing Funds and
Not Know It?” Case studies showcased the success of voluntary compliance after ORS

98 “There was a Time,” Grapevine, March 1973.
99 Other revenue sharing requirements stipulated that funds had to be spent within eight broad designated “priority
areas”: public safety, environmental protection, transportation, health, recreation, libraries, social services for the
poor and the elderly, and financial administration. Atlanta lost $4.5 million in general revenue sharing funds for
using the money to pay firemen’s salaries and then transferring that money to provide rebates on water bills to
citizens. Atlanta’s mayor and alderman had made the mistake of publicizing the transfer, but if localities transferred
funds in this manner without publicizing it, the ORS had no real way of tracking it.
100 Department of the Treasury, “For Immediate Release,” Office of Revenue Sharing News, April 4, 1975, AAPL,
Box 2/4, CHM.
102 Department of the Treasury, “Civil Rights Guide Issued by Office of Revenue Sharing,” Office of Revenue
103 “There was a Time,” Grapevine, March 1973; Renault Robinson to Andrew Barrett, Executive Director,
NAACP, August 27, 1973, AAPL, Box 2/3; Department of the Treasury, “For Immediate Release,” Office of
Revenue Sharing News, February 26, 1975; Ralph H. Metcalfe to Renault Robinson, March 29, 1975, AAPL, Box
69/Metcalfe, Ralph H., 1972-1974; Renault Robinson to Ralph H. Metcalfe, April 15, 1975, AAPL, Box
69/Metcalfe, Ralph H., 1972-1974; Ralph H. Metcalfe to Renault Robinson, April 25, 1975, AAPL, Box 69/
Metcalfe, Ralph H., 1972-1974; “Brief in Support of Application for Deferral of Funds, Renault Robinson, et al.,
Complainants, v. City of Chicago, et al., Respondents” AAPL, Box 2/4, CHM.
104 “General Revenue Sharing and Civil Rights” (Dept. of the Treasury, Office of Revenue Sharing, 1975), 4–5, 14.
investigations. One city integrated its municipal swimming pool built with revenue sharing funds after the ORS discovered that the pool’s owners had turned away Black and Hispanic National Guard Troops from the Armory across the street. A volunteer fire department that had used $600,000 in ORS funds to build a new facility was forced to accept volunteers regardless of their racial identity.\textsuperscript{105} This approach, the ORS argued, protected individuals and enforced the law without “injury, or cutting off, those individuals at the bottom of the economic ladder.” The director of ORS explained, “Our approach is to eliminate discriminatory practices, not necessarily to find guilty parties,” and reasoned that the many should not pay for the crimes of the few, arguing that “All the citizens of the community should not be penalized for the actions of a few recipient government officials.”\textsuperscript{106}

Chicago proved an exceptional case for the ORS. In the first quarter of 1975 the ORS impounded an overall total of $22.4 million from 8,000 different jurisdictions. $1.3 million was frozen because states and localities had failed to file routine paperwork. The rest, $19.2 million, was withheld from Chicago, which over the course of the year amounted to roughly twelve percent of the city’s general budget.\textsuperscript{107} A journalist for the \textit{Chicago Defender} remembered that losing the money came as a shock to the mayor, calling it an “incredible and totally unexpected kick in the butt” for Daley.\textsuperscript{108} The success of the case against the Treasury Department and ORS also came as something of a surprise to the AAPL and its lawyers, who had not expected that the revenue withholding strategy would actually work.\textsuperscript{109} By 1976, Chicago was on track to lose another $76 million for the year, which brought the grand total of impounded city funds to nearly $150 million. But even this was not enough to compel the police department to meet court’s hiring quotas for minority and women police.

The vast majority of Chicago’s revenue sharing money, about 78 percent, went to the police department and the bulk of these funds were earmarked for police salaries.\textsuperscript{110} By the end of 1975, the city scrambled to allocate enough money to pay its police. An emergency ordinance passed on New Year’s Eve day in 1975 enabled Daley to take out $55 million in loans at the last minute to cover police salaries while other city departments agreed to cutbacks to make up the difference. Six Chicago banks provided loans on short notice and Jesse Jackson publicly criticized them as Daley’s “copartners in racism.”\textsuperscript{111} Other critics of the city and police

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 15–16.
\textsuperscript{106} The ORS also defended itself against allegations that it “condoned” civil rights violations, stressing its reliance on civil rights organizations to make complaints and initiate investigations. While civil rights organizations complained that the ORS lacked a systematic review process, or an adequate staff, the ORS argued that its complaint process was designed to empower individuals. Making a complaint was so simple, it seemed to the ORS that anyone could do it. Reports on the use of revenue sharing funds were publicly available, there were no forms to fill out, and complaints did not even need to be signed. “Any person with paper, pencil, envelope, and stamp can initiate a review,” the ORS enthused. Ibid., 4, 15; Department of the Treasury, “Civil Rights Guide Issued by Office of Revenue Sharing.”
\textsuperscript{108} Robert McClory, \textit{The Man Who Beat Clout City}, 175.
\textsuperscript{109} Arthur M. Jefferson to Renault Robinson, October 25, 1973, AAPL, Box 13/3, CHM.
\textsuperscript{111} “Jesse Raps Black Pols on Loans,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, January 4, 1976, 33; “Statement on Police Discrimination and Chicago’s Future by Aldermen Block, Cousins, Lathrop, Oberman and Simpson,” 1976, AAPL, Box 60/City
department’s intransigence included a group of independent aldermen who blasted Daley and the city council for choosing to “jeopardize Chicago’s financial health” rather than address discrimination in the police department. Warning that the persistence of police department discrimination would produce a fiscal disaster, the aldermen made the ominous prediction that Chicago “may voluntarily plunge into the bankruptcy facing New York City,” which was then undergoing a severe budget crisis of its own. In a detailed list, the aldermen itemized each payment impounded by ORS and each expense incurred by the city’s court fight with the AAPL. If the frozen funds were permanently lost, the aldermen projected that taxpayers in Chicago would choose between a steep, twenty-nine percent increase in property taxes or a severe cut to city services to close the gap in the budget.

This was not the full extent of the potential financial damage. The Aldermen also reported that the AAPL was preparing to sue the city to “recapture” revenue sharing funds already spent between 1972 and 1974 because the money had illegally funded a discriminatory city institution. If the AAPL’s most recent case succeeded, the ORS would impound an additional $300 million in funding. Taking aim at Daley’s reluctance to raise property taxes, the aldermen calculated that it would take a whopping 89 percent property tax increase to make up all of the accumulated losses. While the discussion centered on funds that the city might or might not lose forever, some of the city’s money was already permanently lost. Chicago lost the interest it could have earned on the impounded millions while it began paying interest on its $55 million loans. All of this added to the legal fees the city racked up in its six-year court battle with the AAPL, which some estimated had reached the millions. A WGN editorial contemplating these totals at the outset of the AAPL’s case against the ORS argued that “Racial discrimination in the Police is a ‘luxury’ Chicago can no longer afford.” The AAPL did the math too, and its tally showed that by the end of 1975 “more than 10 million dollars have been spent by Daley to subsidize racial discrimination in the Police Department.” To the AAPL this was less a “luxury” than it was a “discrimination tax.” Adding insult to injury, the AAPL pointed out that this “discrimination tax” was “paid by the taxpayers of Chicago, the majority of whom were black, female, or Hispanic—the very groups who the police department discriminated against. The injustice of police department discrimination was both moral and financial. Its effects were not limited only to the minorities and women who worked or wanted to work for the police department. A discrimination tax was a problem that belonged to every citizen in Chicago. Exhausting its options to appeal and discovering that no amount of personal lobbying by Daley, protests, or complaints about a police shortage could release the revenue sharing funds,
the police department agreed to comply with the new hiring guidelines. The results were immediate in the first class of recruits that was hired in 1976. With 32 whites, seven Hispanics, and 65 blacks, this class represented the largest proportion of minorities of any police class in Chicago’s history. As the demographics of incoming police classes changed, the department and the city continued to delay reforming police hiring and promotion procedures. Because the police selection process was so secretive, it was hard to tell if and how the entrance and promotional tests had been substantially re-written. The next year the AAPL renewed its campaign against discrimination in the police department and accused the city of “playing games with the federal court.” In 1980 Renault Robinson observed “deterioration” in the department’s record of promoting minorities, noting that “Fewer blacks and other minorities passed the last two [promotional] tests than when we sued the department.” But by then the AAPL had lost much of its capacity to pursue a new case against the city and police department. In the legal process of threatening the city with financial damage, the cost of the lawsuit and staff fees had, in fact, nearly bankrupted the AAPL. Audits of the AAPL finances in final years of the court battles show its steady drop into the red. A flurry of fundraisers were organized to help the AAPL pay its debts and keep its doors open, but interference with events by the police department and the sheer size of the organization’s debt diminished these efforts.

Despite these limitations and setbacks, the AAPL called its case a “legal milestone” that would “affect hiring in every police department throughout the United States,” especially where discriminatory police hiring practices were already under fire. In 1972 a lawsuit filed by black police in Cleveland led to a hiring quota that required racial minorities comprise eighteen percent of all new hires. Similar suits filed in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and San Francisco required that racial minorities be hired at ratios of thirty percent or greater, but little was done to enforce these hiring orders. Meanwhile Chicago became the first city to experience financial consequences for resisting court-mandated hiring order for police and after its eventual compliance, cities like New York, Detroit, and Seattle all instituted their own affirmative action hiring in order to avoid similar legal challenges. Vulnerable city budgets were the key to civil rights reform in city institutions.

The AAPL’s case also became a valuable resource for black police organizations filing lawsuits against other cities. Howard Saffold, one of the AAPL’s leaders who served as the organization’s president during the lawsuits, explained that Chicago provided the starting point for a systematic legal strategy to attack police department discrimination nationwide:

118 Robert McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City, 205.
All of the successors from that point on had to at least consult what we were talking about because we were filing lawsuits across the country. And where lawsuits were being entered into consent decrees, it was because they were being guided by what we had established here in Chicago in terms of case law. We had to sue the City of Chicago. We had to beat them. We had to hold up revenue sharing money to make the late Mayor [Richard J.] Daley comply with federal orders as it related to that lawsuit. So it wasn’t like we were walking around the country stumbling through this thing.\textsuperscript{125}

In 1977 the AAPL announced yet another national milestone, reporting that in a summit between the Attorney General and the leaders of the National Black Policemen’s Association in Washington, D.C., the Attorney General pledged to bypass lengthy trials and to immediately cut off funds to police departments violating federal civil rights law.\textsuperscript{126} Black police who sued their departments would not face the same prolonged and complicated court battle fought by the AAPL; the Attorney General had given them a direct route to pressure city budgets. Nationally, the AAPL’s precedent-setting case laid crucial groundwork that made the equitable hiring and promotion of black police an economic imperative.

In 1981, five years after the AAPL had won its case, a white sergeant in the Chicago police department wrote a guest editorial for the \textit{Chicago Sun-Times} called “Affirmative Action: ‘Like dying a little inside’.” There he reflected on the AAPL’s court victory, which he wrote had been “shoved down this city’s throat.” After rehearsing familiar backlash arguments about reverse discrimination, the sergeant made a different kind of case against hiring quotas in the police department. He opposed quotas not just because they discriminated against white police, but because the police deserved special treatment as workers. Unlike other workers, he argued, the “guardian class (public servants) should be among the first to be rewarded by merit.” The idea that the police formed a special class of workers motivated a new set of appeals by majority-white police in the same years that the AAPL challenged the department’s racial practices. In demanding protection of their constitutional rights and labor rights, Chicago’s white rank-and-file police defined what it meant to be part of this guardian class and reinvented their civic status in Chicago.

\textsuperscript{125} Larry Crowe, “Howard Saffold Details the Divisions Between Officers and Communities over Race,” June 5, 2002, Session 1, tape 5, story 2, History Makers Digital Archive.

3. If Miranda had been a Police Officer:

In the early 1960s the Chicago police department disciplinary system took charge of punishing the thousands of police who broke the rules, defied their supervisors, or committed crimes each year. Police were transferred, fined, suspended, fired, or in some cases, assigned to dull or unpleasant tasks. For Renault Robinson of the AAPL, this involved patrolling the alley behind Chicago police department headquarters. For others it meant guarding the twelve-foot bronze Haymarket Statue, located a mile outside the Chicago Loop. First dedicated in 1887 as a memorial to the seven police killed during the Haymarket Affair, every year the Chicago police department held services at the statue’s base in memory of police who were killed in the line of duty. These events were filled with both reverence and nostalgia, and a number of police came dressed for the occasion in vintage nineteenth-century uniforms.¹

But the statue had a troubled history in Chicago. In 1927 a streetcar crashed into it and when the statue was restored it was defaced by vandals for decades afterward. Between 1969 and the end of 1970 the statue was blown to pieces twice and completely rebuilt both times.² To prevent future bombings the department installed a round-the-clock police guard and video surveillance that cost roughly $68,000 a year until the department moved the statue into the lobby of police headquarters in 1972.³ That guarding the Haymarket statue, a monument to police who died while repressing a labor rally, would become a disciplinary punishment and part of broader police labor grievances surrounding department discipline, speaks to the many ironies of the emerging police labor movement in Chicago and symbolizes the many connections between rank and file police campaigns for disciplinary reform and labor rights.

The disciplinary system of the Chicago police department operated according to its own rules. It vigorously defended police from brutality allegations, thus protecting the department from outside investigations of police violence. At the same time, the department aggressively punished police for rule violations, targeting outspoken members and leaders of dissenting police


² The Weathermen took credit for the bombings while police organizations ran fundraisers to help pay for the statue’s restoration. After the second bombing, COP published an outraged editorial that condemned the Weathermen, the SDS, and young protesters in general, “The dastardly act of this bombing should strengthen the resolve of the department to stop pussyfooting with demonstrating young radicals and give them the ‘spanking’ they so richly deserve. These young dissidents are nothing more than spoiled and attention-seeking children, throwing a revolutionary tantrum. They are members of Dr. Spock’s generation of mistreated and neglected adolescents. They are insolent guests in the gracious house of democracy.” “Haymarket Square Statue,” C.O.P. Newsletter, November 1, 1970, CHM.

organizations. Summing up his experience with police discipline, Renault Robinson of the AAPL warned, “Don’t come to work with a button missing because the IID will frame you...you will get more time for being late than killing somebody accidentally.” The police department used discipline as both a shield to deflect outside criticism and a lid to stifle growing labor unrest inside the department. In either case, grievances about discipline lay at the heart of the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the Chicago police and the Chicago police department.

For over a decade discipline was the issue that focused dissent among the police rank and file, white and black. The first major police protest of the post-war years was the CPA’s 1961 rally to denounce O.W. Wilson’s strict disciplinary reforms. Before the AAPL sued the police department for racial discrimination, its first major lawsuit in 1970 challenged the constitutionality of police department discipline. By the early 1970s, discipline grievances galvanized the biggest labor organizing campaigns by Chicago’s majority-white police organizations and the most aggressive police job actions the city had ever seen. As the AAPL lawsuit argued and the COP and CPA job actions protested, police department discipline failed to follow constitutional guidelines, even though this internal system was part of the criminal justice system. The department did not provide police with written notice of the charges against them, refused to allow them to appeal disciplinary rulings, and limited their access to attorneys during hearings. Police who chose to “take the Fifth” during department investigations were automatically suspended without pay or fired. If police did not cooperate with internal investigations, they risked their paychecks, careers, and pensions while facing potential criminal sentences.

Police challenges to the constitutionality of department discipline took place during the years that the department began to implement the mandates of the 1968 Supreme Court ruling in *Miranda v. Arizona* that provided new protections for suspects in criminal investigations. While it is often explained that police resented the ruling because it “coddled” criminals and “handcuffed” the police, Chicago police objected to the *Miranda* decision because they believed that police were entitled to the same rights as criminal suspects during police investigations. In their campaign for disciplinary reform, COP and the CPA demanded a specific Police Bill of Rights that spelled out and guaranteed protections for police during investigations and they believed that the only way they could secure a Police Bill of Rights was through collective bargaining. From the late 1960s up to the ratification of a Chicago police contract that spelled out a Bill of Rights in 1981, the campaign by Chicago’s majority-white police organizations and their members to limit the department’s disciplinary system catalyzed a broader attempt to secure labor representation for the police.

As police learned to read four-part warnings to suspects and follow new rules in the interrogation room, a series of federal investigations in 1971 and 1972 into suspected extortion and perjury committed by scores of police added urgency to the campaign to limit the scope of internal investigations. Police who went through both federal investigations and the department’s disciplinary process in high-stakes corruption cases did so largely without the benefit of their own legal representation, an appeals process, or the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The department suspended almost thirty Chicago police during the summer of 1972 because they had violated the rule prohibiting police from taking the Fifth and refusing to testify against

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4 “Report of Proceedings taken of a speech given by Renault Robinson,” February 3, 1971, 27, AAPL, Box 54/Annual Reports, CHM.
themselves in grand jury investigations of corruption in the police department. By the next year, investigations had turned up sixty Chicago police who were indicted for bribery and extortion. Forty were convicted of running monthly shakedowns that exacted monthly payments from nightclub owners that went as high as $1,000 per month. Daley defended the police department by saying, “nobody’s perfect” while the police Superintendent wept publicly over the scandal and stepped down from his position. But meanwhile the majority of the Chicago police, *Newsweek* noted in a story on the scandal, seemed “less distressed by the corruption in their own ranks than by the investigations of corruption.”

In this context, police began to articulate a distinct occupational identity shaped by a sense of victimization and a desire for special entitlements based on their status as public servants. As the rhetoric of “blue power” demonstrated, police had become conversant in the language of minority rights and answered black power criticisms of the police by identifying themselves as a discriminated against group. Asserting a “blue power” identity also provided a new way to address the challenge of collective action among a deeply divided police rank and file while continuing to deny the racism that caused some of the sharpest divisions among the police.

**“Blue Power” vs. “The Pigots”: The Chicago Police as a Minority Group**

Chicago’s patrolmen worked at the bottom of an institution divided along a number of lines that separated management from employees, black police from white police, policemen from policewomen, and veteran officers from rookies. By the mid to late 1960s long-held assumptions about the Chicago police as an “ingrown, clannish” group fell apart as patrolmen split their loyalties between different competing organizations. Divided as they were, most of Chicago’s patrolmen did agree that they had few allies outside of the department and police organizations tried to capitalize on this sense of isolation and victimization. Escalating outrage over police brutality and criticism of police violence during the 1968 Democratic National Convention heightened what had become a siege mentality among the police. In an article published just two months before the convention, police historian Robert Fogelson summed up and anticipated what would become the central psychological problem of the Chicago police. He observed that civilian complaints brought “the deepest anxieties of the police to the surface,” and that this anxiety “stems from their inability to reconcile the public’s ranking of their occupation…with their own more elevated estimate.” Frank Kusch’s sympathetic portrait of the Chicago police during the 1968 convention, *Battleground Chicago* (2004), captures the tenor of these anxieties in interviews with police who confronted protesters during the convention. One officer explained that the Chicago police “had been getting bad press long before the convention, especially for what was going on in the black neighborhoods, so what the hell.” Another remembered, “It was hard to control your emotions—people were so against us; you just wanted to hit them.”

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9 Ibid., 82.
By the early 1970s, members of the Chicago police had begun to identify themselves as a stereotyped and persecuted group. “To some citizens,” COP’s president complained, “police are not police. They are S.O.B.’s and M.F.’s and whatever else an irate citizen chooses to call them.” The result, he concluded, was that the police had become “the despised and hated minority. I repeat MINORITY.” Later that year a series in the Chicago Sun-Times written by the paper’s police journalist, William Braden, echoed COP’s sentiments, arguing that police were “the only minority group that persons who consider themselves liberal would dare to stereotype.” Braden pointed out what he saw as the hypocrisy of liberals who defended minority groups from prejudice but generalized all police as “bullies [who] respond only to rigid discipline.” According to Braden, indiscriminate critics of the police expressed prejudices that made them no different from other bigots, or as he called them “antipolice bigots (or pigots).”

Like other groups of police nationwide, many of Chicago’s white police mobilized what they came to call a “Blue Power” identity to respond to the “pigots,” appropriating the language of Black Power activists while deflecting their criticisms of the police.

The rhetoric of “Blue Power” also enabled police to envision themselves as a cohesive group and, at least imaginatively, to minimize their racial divisions. The insistence that all police shared a common “blue” identity downplayed the racial and ethnic affiliations dividing police and dismissed complaints about racism in the police department by denying that importance of race in police department relationships. COP declared that “as professional policemen, we recognize only ONE COLOR. That color is BLUE.”

When COP was criticized as a “‘WHITEY’ Organization,” late in 1969, the organization responded that it did not “keep any count on nationalities or ethnic backgrounds” in its membership because, it said, the “only color allowed in this organization is BLUE.” As “blue power” rhetoric projected false unity among the rank-and-file, it also helped police identify themselves as a persecuted minority group.

This minority identification cultivated a heightened sensitivity to police department discipline. In 1970 COP’s president reported that the most frequent complaints he heard from police were about discipline. He himself protested that police were singled out as the “only persons left in the entire country...being disciplined.” After the protests and political upheavals of the late 1960s, COP’s president explained that no other group had been scrutinized or punished for their actions like the police: “Children are no longer disciplined by their parents, students are not disciplined by their teachers, employees are not disciplined by their employers.” The embattled sensibility among “blue power” adherents in Chicago made them especially resentful of the activities and expansion of the police department disciplinary system that took

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12 When Chicago police raided the headquarters of the Black Panthers and killed two of their leaders, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, in a highly controversial shooting at the end of 1969, police claims to “Blue Power” acquired an even more hostile connotation. For a collection documenting the rise of the “Blue Power” movement among the nation’s police in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see William J. Bopp, The Police Rebellion: a Quest for Blue Power, (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1971). Other attempts at appropriation included the insistence of police wives that “PIG” stood for “pride, integrity, and guts.” The newsletter of the Wives Association of the Confederation of Police even included a column authored by a police wife called “Sow Says,” and one wife told the Chicago Tribune that her “children sometimes call themselves ‘Piglets,’” see Stephanie Fuller, “When You’re Married to a Chicago Cop,” Chicago Tribune, May 17, 1971, B11.
place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, even as that same system worked to protect them from allegations of police brutality.\textsuperscript{14}

**Policing the Police: The Internal Affairs Division**

In a collection of essays published in 1974 an instructor at the Chicago Police Academy published an essay that crystallized common police feelings about the combination of public criticism and internal department discipline of the police. He wrote that most people, and especially the wives of policemen, “don’t realize there are times when an officer is battling on two fronts: (1) with the people on the street and (2) with his supervisors who work with him.”\textsuperscript{15} Whether complaints against police originated inside or outside of the department, accusations of even minor rule violations or small disagreements with supervisors meant that police would have to navigate the department’s complex disciplinary system.

The point of entry to this system was the Internal Affairs Division (IAD), which acted as a clearinghouse for agencies dealing in specific kinds of police misconduct. Complaints for police violence were first investigated by the IAD and then usually sent to the Excessive Force Section, which specialized in cases of police brutality until the Office of Professional Services replaced it in 1974. Disciplinary cases with penalties of less than thirty-days’ suspension were heard and tried by an internal department Complaint Review Panel. Yet another panel, the Police Board, a five-member body hand-picked by the Superintendent and the Mayor, decided cases involving criminal charges or violations that could be punished by a suspension of more than a month. While skeptics charged that the IAD was a “farce” because it sustained less than three percent of all brutality charges, police still chafed under the oversight of an agency they felt targeted patrolmen for investigations.\textsuperscript{13} With the exception of minor infractions that were punished on the spot by supervisors, each and every complaint against a police officer generated a Complaint Register (CR) number that became part of his permanent file.\textsuperscript{14} Only in extenuating circumstances were CR numbers assigned to police above the rank of patrolman. Frustrated by its failed attempts to file complaints against supervisors, COP was indignant when it told patrolmen that “only you can receive a CR number,” reinforcing their sense that police at the bottom of the ladder were discriminated against from all sides.\textsuperscript{16}

In 1972, the first year the police department published statistics on the IAD’s activities, it reported that the IAD had investigated a total of 6,437 complaints and sustained 1,618 of them for a police force of about 12,000 officers. While most of the police in these sustained cases were punished with reprimands or suspensions from one to thirty days, over two hundred resigned while under investigation or were formally discharged from the department. A series of high-profile federal investigations into police corruption in 1972 likely accounted for many of these discharges and resignations (and for the new transparency of the IAD’s statistics), but the overall distribution of complaints and sustained cases indicated that statistics for 1972 reflected general patterns and IAD priorities that remained consistent throughout the decade.\textsuperscript{17}

Throughout the 1970s, IAD statistics reflected the department’s emphasis on maintaining administrative order and controlling police behavior while simultaneously protecting police from

\textsuperscript{14} Ted Head, “Head-Aches,” *C.O.P. Newsletter*, November 1, 1970.

\textsuperscript{15} In the essay, the police academy instructor was primarily addressing police wives and advised each police wife to become her husband’s “best fan.” William J. Burke, Jr., “The Man’s Viewpoint,” in *Handbook for Law Enforcement Wives* (Chicago: L E Publishers, Inc., 1974), 112.

\textsuperscript{16} “C R Numbers,” *C.O.P. Newsletter*, July 1, 1971.

\textsuperscript{17} Chicago Police Department, *Annual Statistical Summary*, 1972, HWLMRC.
most accusations of brutality. Complaints of police indebtedness, intoxication, and “miscellaneous” offenses, a category reserved for administrative violations, were the complaints most frequently sustained by the IAD. Out of 54 complaints of indebtedness, 39 were sustained, for intoxication the rate was 48 out of 61, and for “miscellaneous,” by far the largest category, IAD sustained 1075 out of 2106 cases. At the same time, in categories that covered police brutality, IAD sustained only three out of 310 allegations of civil rights violations and 57 out of 1151 complaints of excessive force. Over the next few years, these numbers remained roughly the same, though the proportion of miscellaneous allegations sustained by IAD dropped by several hundred in 1974 and 1975. The Office of Professional Services, created in 1974 to handle brutality cases, increased the volume of complaints handled by the police department by about thirty percent, but it continued to sustain brutality accusations at the usual low rates: 123 out of 6,898 cases in 1976 and 174 cases out of 6,258 in 1977. In the meantime, the department reinforced the IAD’s reluctance to enforce discipline in police brutality cases by generating a series of new agencies and policies designed to prevent the investigation of brutality complaints.

Pseudo-Civilian Review

Pressure from civil rights and community groups over police brutality in the mid-1960s and early 1970s only added to the department’s efforts to absorb brutality complaints without actually disciplining police for violent misconduct. In 1969 and 1970, the Chicago police killed seventy-nine civilians and thousands of citizens reported they had been beaten and injured by police. A 1972 study of these statistics by the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group found that 75 percent of the civilians killed by Chicago police were black and the International Association of Chiefs of Police calculated that police in Chicago killed civilians at three times the rate of police in New York, Los Angeles, and Detroit. In 1972 Congressman Ralph Metcalfe launched a major campaign against police brutality that demanded external, civilian review of police brutality cases. But the department responded to pressure over police brutality and Metcalfe’s campaign by building a complicated system to divert citizen complaints to new agencies without investigating them, creating the appearance of civilian review without involving citizens directly in the review and disciplinary outcome of brutality cases.

The series of disciplinary agencies that cropped up in the police department between 1968 and 1974 were staffed by civilians who had little to no ability to override department rulings in brutality cases. The result was a series of overlapping, generally toothless agencies that insulated the department from external oversight. An early experiment in managing citizen complaints against the police began in February of 1968 with Daley’s appointment of the Registrar of Citizens’ Complaints. The Registrar was a civilian whose function was, according to the police department, to “reassure residents of disadvantaged communities” and help them navigate the formal complaint process. Based on the idea that citizens would be more comfortable bringing complaints to a civilian instead of directly to the police department, the

19 The Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group was a research organization sponsored by Northwestern University that represented a consortium of civil rights organizations including the Chicago Urban League and Chicago Commons Association, and the ACLU. Its stated purpose was to “analyze problems in criminal justice and to lay the groundwork for improvements in the system.” See Ralph Knoohuizen, Richard P. Fahey, and Deborah J. Palmer, “The Police and their use of Fatal Force in Chicago,” (Evanston, IL: Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, 1972); Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, Press Release, March 28, 1972, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group (1979-1980), CHM.
Registrar was supposed to round up complaints, send them to the IAD, and then follow up with the complainants—a tall order for one employee to handle, especially given the thousands of brutality complaints filed with the department each year. The Registrar also seemed more concerned with the reputation of the Chicago police than the welfare of brutality victims. In an interview published in the Chicago Police Star, the Registrar argued that “[e]xcessive force and violations of civil rights are more harmful to the Police Department than to the public.”

More drastic seeming measures were taken four years later in May of 1972, when Daley and the Superintendent, under pressure from Metcalfe, called a press conference to announce their latest solution to the problem of police brutality. Once Daley had “spent much time emotionally defending the police,” the Superintendent of police stepped forward to introduce a new plan that required an agency called the Chicago Commission on Human Relations (CCHR) to review all police brutality cases investigated by the IAD. Created in 1946 to respond to deeply-entrenched discrimination in Chicago housing and employment, the CCHR’s staff of fifteen volunteers had done little to solve housing discrimination or reduce black unemployment rates, and they were hardly equipped to tackle police brutality investigations. The AAPL and the Chicago Bar Association condemned the department’s plan to involve the CCHR as yet another Daley attempt to protect police from criticism with a meaningless review process. In its first 260 cases the CCHR questioned the IAD’s findings in only one instance. At the end of the first year of CCHR review, it agreed with IAD’s conclusions in 768 out of 853 cases and returned the remaining 85 cases to the IAD for “more information,” which marked the end of the CCHR’s involvement in the inquiry. Criticizing two years of the CCHR’s review process, the independent Fifth Ward Alderman Leon Despres blasted the “damaging, diversionary, progress-blocking activity” of the “powerless” CCHR. In a report to the City Council, Depres identified the key weaknesses of the CCHR as an investigative body unable to “compel witnesses, to subpoena evidence, or even to pronounce any enforceable judgment,” while reviewing only the cases that the superintendent had “pruned and chose to give to [CCHR] to read.” To Despres, the CCHR acted a lot like the Registrar of Citizens’ Complaints and together these two agencies were so ineffective at advocating for the victims of police brutality that Despres exclaimed, “Woe to any citizen who complains, for he [is] sent right back to the agency he complained about!”

At the same time that the CCHR conducted its “review,” the department also attempted to limit the number of citizen complaints coming into the IAD. After the summer of 1972, the department launched Prompt Conciliatory Hearings, a program intended to resolve disputes between aggrieved citizens and police through an informal mediation process held on the same day as the incident. The department provided clear incentives for patrolmen to participate. Disputes resolved through Prompt Conciliatory Hearings never made it into personnel files or

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20 “Registrar of Citizens’ Complaints—the Man, the Job, the Purpose,” Chicago Police Star, February 1968, 4-5.
22 “The Chicago Commission on Human Relations Police Review Program Report for the Period June 1, 1972 through May 31, 1973,” 8-13, Despres Papers, Box 150/Police--Internal Investigation Division, CHM.
23 “On the Mayor’s reappointment of Peter Fitzpatrick as Chairman of the Commission on Human Relations: Remarks of Alderman Leon M. Despres before the Chicago City Council,” April 17, 1974, Despres Papers, Box 105/10, CHM.
required follow-up investigations. In this effort to “seek an immediate amicable solution” to police-citizen conflicts, the Superintendent explained that the hearings would “encourag[e] a shaking of hands, thereby fostering improved police-community relationships,” and in an optimistic estimation of the program’s benefits.

As the police department worked to protect police from brutality complaints in 1972, that same year it instituted a new agency to expose police corruption among the ranks with a new internal undercover unit. Known mysteriously as the “C-5” unit, this new agency consisted of a relatively autonomous group of police who roved throughout the city to catch corrupt police as well as crooked lawyers and city inspectors. Headquartered in an off-site, undisclosed location (later revealed to be the city’s abandoned Contagious Disease Hospital), the roughly fifty members of C-5 maintained secret identities, surfacing only rarely to testify in court. Details about the unit were kept so secret within the police department that only its members and the Superintendent knew what “C-5” meant. The introduction of the C-5 unit fueled growing paranoia about department discipline among Chicago’s rank and file police organizations. C-5 reminded COP of “George Orwell’s book ‘1984’ in which ‘Big Brother’ always was watching every member of society. It appears that C-5 has rewritten the book and titled it ‘1972,’” warning police to “Be careful what you say, ‘BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU.’” But the early performance of the C-5 unit turned out to be less ominous than COP predicted.

The C-5’s first big sting exposed gambling pools run by police on the city’s South Side. The stakes were small, with officers betting fifty cents each on weekly football games and winners taking home fifty dollars each at most. Despite this, C-5 brought suspected police in for questioning and began formal investigations. One officer complained, “Those C-5 guys are supposed to be after the guys taking money from the mob, not taking cheap shots like this.”

Even as the department worked to protect police from accusations of brutality, additions to the department’s disciplinary apparatus like the C-5 put police organizations, and especially COP, on the defensive. Overall the accumulation of agencies dedicated to investigating and disciplining the police in the late 1960s and early 1970s created the impression among that the department was out to get them, but the department’s real targets were the leaders of Chicago’s police organizations.

The IAD and Police Organizations

While department discipline failed to control police violence, it was used to curb the activities of the members and leaders of increasingly confrontational police organizations. To the AAPL the combination of the IAD’s reluctance to discipline the police attacking citizens in Chicago’s black neighborhoods and its disproportionate punishment of black police and AAPL leaders made the agency a double threat. A 1972 study by the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration found that black police officers in Chicago were disciplined at a rate

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24 James B. Conlisk, Jr., PAX 501, September 15, 1972.
26 “President’s Message,” C.O.P. Newsletter, April 1, 1973, CHM.
27 “Cops Blast C-5 Unit after Bet Pool Quiz,” Chicago Today, December 3, 1972, 80, clipping, AAPL, Box 48/Newspaper Clippings, Unions, 1972, CHM.
nearly ten percent higher than any other group of police. This was all the more infuriating to the AAPL when compared to the department’s relatively protective stance toward white officers. A series of violent incidents in 1968 captured this double standard. For example, the department suspended Richard Jennings, a black police officer and AAPL member, in the fall of 1968 because he had arrested and allegedly beat a white citizen who turned out to be the nephew of a prominent city alderman. Jennings spent 84 days suspended without pay before he was officially charged with battery in criminal court. There he was convicted and sentenced to serve four months in prison followed by one year of probation. Meanwhile, as this case unfolded in court, a white police recruit fatally shot a woman through a closed door with a shotgun. The department ruled the shooting “accidental” and suspended the recruit for one day, without any further investigation or disciplinary action.

Despite the department’s well-documented disproportionate punishment of black police, the majority-white COP also believed that its members were victims of unfair or aggressive investigations by IAD. In 1971, members of both the AAPL and COP faced discipline for passing out literature critical of the department. In late 1970, the department transferred one of COP’s leaders for openly criticizing the department after he had been “given an ultimatum, to shut up or leave the unit.” COP interpreted the department’s reaction as a sign of weakness, that the police department had no other method to handle dissent within the ranks. Warning that the rest of the membership could be subject to scrutiny by IAD, the COP Newsletter declared, “We’re angry because if it can happen to HIM, it could happen to YOU or to ME. ARE THEY THAT SCARED??” When the department suspected COP organizers of running of corruption and extortion schemes, the IAD spent a total of fifty-eight hours interrogating COP leaders in an investigation of the organization’s finances. These marathon interrogation sessions were intended to intimidate COP, but the discipline that COP leaders received was often less severe than the punishments experienced by officers of the AAPL. Leaders of the AAPL were arrested, threatened, and suspended for long periods without pay, while COP’s leaders usually dealt with a few days’ suspension or a transfer to a far-flung district.

This did not stop COP from describing the IAD’s tactics in extreme terms, contending that “an honest try at Russian Roulette would give an accused member a greater chance at winning than the procedures and practices now being used by the IID investigators and our “D” [disciplinary] board.” To prepare COP members in the event they became subjects of IAD investigations, the C.O.P. Newsletter printed and reprinted a popular ten-point set of guidelines that advised police to protect themselves from the traps and deceptive practices of investigators. The first five points instructed police,

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29 Don Mosby, “Oust Black Cop 2nd Time,” Chicago Defender, August 6, 1969, 3; “Chicago Style Justice (Again),” C.O.P. Newsletter, September 1969. Both the AAPL and COP were incensed by this incident and COP offered to find legal representation for the officer and intervene in his case.
31 “Child’s Tactic,” C.O.P. Newsletter, November 1, 1970; Howard Saffold to Black Policemen, February 16, 1971, AAPL, Box 64/General Meeting Notes, 1971, CHM.
1. Don’t believe ANY oral guarantee, that there will not be disciplinary measures taken against you.
2. Do believe that there will be, if you are so much as one inch out of line.
3. Don’t get involved in any emotional appeals from anyone up high.
4. Don’t believe that you can feed your family on “lip service” or the good intentions of the people.
5. You only have one duty, TAKE CARE OF NUMBER ONE and think of your family first.\textsuperscript{34}

Though all of the investigators in the IAD were, technically, sworn police, COP was skeptical that they would still be sympathetic to fellow police. When a policeman was sentenced to jail in criminal court after one particularly aggressive IAD investigation, COP asked with sarcasm, “Isn’t it comforting to know that only Chicago Policemen work in the [IAD]?!! Isn’t it comforting to know that you can look for justice from your own people??\textsuperscript{35}

Other internal police department investigations and arrests of COP members provoked similar resentment and sometimes lawsuits. In the spring of 1973, police arrested a COP leader who also had been running a drug ring out of his apartment, kicking off an intensive C-5 investigation into narcotics dealing inside the police department. As a result, C-5 arrested two additional members of COP on the suspicion that they had accepted a $40 bribe. C-5 forced the two police officers out of their squad car at gunpoint, searched them in public and then brought them back to police headquarters for six hours of questioning. At no point did the police know the charges they faced and it was later learned that the police had not accepted the bribe. Instead, the C-5 decoy pocketed the money. After this incident COP called for a grand jury investigation of C-5 tactics and earned the support of other police organizations and a handful of aldermen who called for the department to disband the C-5 unit altogether.\textsuperscript{36}

In these cases it became increasingly evident that police had few rights as suspects in police department disciplinary investigations. A few months later, COP took more decisive action against the police department’s disciplinary system when the department suspended six COP members for invoking their Fifth Amendment rights and refusing to testify in an extortion investigation. COP enlisted the ACLU to file suit against top police officials for violating the constitutional rights of its members.\textsuperscript{37} The ACLU’s lawyer argued that just because police were public servants it did not mean they had “a watered down version of civil rights…They have a right to defense as any other individual.” Finding the police suspensions unconstitutional, the court ordered the department to reinstate all six officers with back pay. Emboldened by this victory, a few months later another COP member filed an individual suit against the city alleging that the police department had violated his constitutional rights during an internal investigation. The officer had been suspended for a month after he was charged with filing a false report and failing a polygraph test. He had asked to have his case heard before the department’s complaint review panel, but he was not allowed to have his attorney present or to call any witnesses during the hearing. Even by the end of the hearing, he was still unaware of the exact nature of the

\textsuperscript{34} “A Re-Run Worth Reading,” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, October 1969.
\textsuperscript{35} “Chicago Style Justice (Again).”
department’s complaint against him. This time the city did not even contest the suit, and COP celebrated the officer for setting a precedent for successful challenges to the department’s disciplinary process by individual police. These legal successes motivated COP’s protests against what it disparaged as an arbitrary and ultimately unconstitutional system of internal police department discipline and laid the groundwork for what would become a collective action campaign by rank and file police.

If Miranda had been a Police Officer

While Chicago police fought legal battles for their rights during department disciplinary investigations, the police department was simultaneously in the midst of implementing new procedures to protect the rights of criminal suspects that were required by the 1968 Supreme Court ruling in *Miranda v. Arizona*. In the earliest debates after the *Miranda* ruling, legal experts tried to predict how the decision would shape outcomes in criminal justice cases while social scientists conducted a series of studies to determine how the introduction of “Miranda Rights” had changed the practice and attitudes of law enforcement officers on the ground. In city after city researchers asked police what they thought about the decision, observed police as they interrogated suspects, and tried to determine how well police complied with the new rules. Studies in New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Washington, D.C. found that the *Miranda* ruling had created resentment among police while doing little to alter the police practices in the interrogation room. A study of police interrogations in Tennessee and Georgia observed “a wide gap... between their generalized negative reactions and their simultaneous acknowledgment that, after all, things continued to go on pretty much as usual.” Researchers offered a number of explanations for the bitterness of police in these studies. Some police complained that providing evidence to prove that a suspect had been notified of his Miranda rights meant extra inconvenience and paperwork. Many police also believed that warning suspects of their rights compromised their authority in the interrogation room. One officer protested the indignity of having to “apologize” to a suspect before questioning him. More abstractly, interviews with police revealed antagonism toward the Supreme Court justices whom police believed had questioned the integrity of their police work without having any first-hand experience of its daily realities and challenges.

As the research studies showed, convincing police to follow the *Miranda* rules was no small task and judges at all levels of the legal system took up the challenge. They addressed meetings of police and wrote articles for police publications that urged them to at least obey the letter of the law, if not its spirit. The year after the *Miranda* ruling, a judge from the Quincy, Illinois Circuit Court spoke to a meeting of the Policemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois. Referring to police animosity toward the judicial system, the judge joked

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that his appearance before the group of police “was a case of throwing the lamb to the lions.” But he quickly took the offensive, accusing the police of blindly accepting “glib talk” that criticized Miranda. Instead of complaining about the decision, the judge advised police to follow the law because they were in “no position” to change it. After handing out wallet-sized cards printed with the four-part Miranda warning to the police, the judge concluded, “This is the law, gentlemen, and there is no getting around it.” In a 1967 two-part special feature called “Station-House Interrogation and ‘That Warren Court’” in the national police magazine Law and Order, another judge offered similar instructions. Defending the legitimacy of 5-4 Supreme Court decisions like the Miranda ruling, the judge argued that the court had the constitutional authority to mandate new police procedures even when a ruling was a close call. A drawing that accompanied the feature illustrated the main message with an eagle flying over the Supreme Court building and the Constitution. The eagle’s talons grasped a police shield and its beak dangled a banner that read, “Respect the law although you disagree.”

The Chicago police department administration’s response to Miranda both respected and disagreed with the decision. A two-page spread in the police department’s employee magazine, the Chicago Police Star, captured this ambiguity. One side of the page expressed disapproval of the decision by quoting from the dissenting opinions in the case and the other side of the page provided a detailed checklist to help police comply with the ruling. The next year, the Chicago Police Star did not make its own editorial complaint against Miranda, but reprinted one from the Chicago Tribune that charged the Supreme Court with “Playing God: 5 to 4.” Internal communications from high-ranking officers to patrolmen also sent mixed messages about whether police should complain or comply. In one memo to patrolmen the superintendent questioned “the effect of such decisions on the well-being of the whole community,” writing that the Miranda decision made policing more difficult, but “not impossible.” At the same time he called on police to shoulder their “unquestioned responsibility to comply, in letter and in spirit, with the law as interpreted by the highest court of the land.” Publicly, it seemed, the police took careful measures to follow the new law in Chicago. Once the ruling took effect, Chicago’s police found themselves “treading on eggshells” when questioning a suspect in a highly publicized case, whose interrogation was “regulated with such caution that [he] might have been a space visitor from Mars.” To sort out the confusion caused by the new rules, Chicago, like many other cities in the late 1960s, trained and hired lawyers to coach police on how to interrogate suspects and collect evidence that would be admissible in court.

There are no empirical studies that gauge the early responses of rank-and-file police to the Miranda decision in the Chicago police department, a secretive institution that did not divulge information or readily open its doors to researchers. Qualitative evidence, however,

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44 James B. Conlisk, Jr., PAX 501, October 3, 1967.
indicates that within a few years of the decision, majority-white police organizations in Chicago developed a stance toward *Miranda* that diverged from the department’s position. With the heightened scrutiny and increased criticism of police in the wake of corruption scandals, media exposés, and rising accusations of police brutality during the late 1960s and early 1970s, police who were themselves often the perpetrators of crime and violence identified themselves as the victims of an unjust disciplinary system. As increasing numbers of police became criminal suspects and subjects of internal investigations, they became more sensitive to their exclusion from the protections extended by the *Miranda* ruling. In Chicago, police realized that they did not have the same rights that they were legally required to guarantee for the criminal suspects they questioned.

One of the first major events to incite police resentment of the *Miranda* ruling in Chicago was the indictment and automatic suspension of eight Chicago police officers for brutality against protestors during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. COP reacted to the suspensions by accusing the department of resorting to the “old terror tactic of ‘GUILTY until proven innocent.’” Arguing that these investigations made police vulnerable to every accusation, whether or not it could be substantiated, COP asked, “Are we to lose our pay and be suspended for months, while we await trial on what could very well be a false accusation?” COP framed its demand to reform department discipline as a fundamental principle of fairness and equality, declaring, “Let policemen have the same protection under the law as the rest of the citizens of the United States.”

Police facing discipline from IAD investigations, undercover operations by the C-5 unit, hearings before the Police Board, and criminal proceedings charged that the department’s interrogation procedures consistently violated the constitutional rights of the lowest-ranking police. This kind of “rights talk” was not a unique phenomenon in the 1970s when white ethnic Americans used their immigrant heritage to challenge civil rights demands and affirmative action programs that aided African-Americans and other racial minorities. By narrating their own stories of oppression, groups like Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, and Polish-Americans downplayed the plight of African-Americans, while legitimizing their own claims to “white rights” in America. In 1970s Detroit white police mobilized the rhetoric of “white rights” to protest affirmative action plans that required the department to fire white police before it fired black police. Dennis Deslippe’s “Do Whites Have Rights?” demonstrates how the city’s dominant white police organization first “portray[ed] themselves as an oppressed group” and then deployed a “counterlanguage of rights” to frame their opposition to affirmative action as a citizenship issue.

In Chicago, majority white police organizations also made similar claims when they protested department discipline, but they did so within an occupational and legal, though not necessarily an explicitly racial framework. Outrage over the constitutional violations of the Chicago police department’s disciplinary procedure was one of the few issues that most rank-and-file police could agree on, regardless of their race, as both the AAPL and COP challenged

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the legality of police discipline in court. Outside of the courtroom, COP tried to chip away at the problem by providing police with legal representation and advice. While the *Miranda* ruling stipulated that citizens were entitled to have an attorney present while they were under interrogation, the Chicago police had limited access to attorneys during internal investigations. COP appealed to the mayor’s office on this issue, asking Daley to hire a full-time defense attorney for the police, and lobbied for House Bill 2637 in 1969, which would guarantee police “the basic civil right of proper representation.” When it became clear that the city would not consistently provide attorneys for the police in disciplinary proceedings, COP hired its own lawyer, James Demoupolos, in 1970. COP set up a special telephone hotline to make Demoupolos accessible twenty-four hours a day in case of a legal emergency, a particularly helpful benefit for police who found themselves in legal trouble while working early morning or late night shifts. Still, department investigators did not always allow Demoupolos to confer with COP members before questioning began or to join them in the interrogation room. On a rare occasion when Demoupolos was allowed to sit next to COP members during a lengthy fifteen-hour IAD interrogation, COP celebrated it as a major victory.

By hiring its own lawyer, COP began to address the issue of legal representation for police during IAD investigations, but it could do little to change the rules governing internal interrogations. The department’s Rule 51, which prohibited police from “Taking the Fifth” while they were under investigation meant that officers who did insist on their right to remain silent during interrogation could be suspended without pay or fired outright. When the department suspended members of COP for refusing to testify in an investigation into police extortion in 1972, COP accused the department of trying to “see how long [the department] can keep an officer off the payroll due to unverified charges.” Presenting the suspensions as a cautionary tale, COP warned, “If there is a Police Officer anywhere in the city who believes Rule 51 will never affect him, he had better wake up NOW.” COP’s attorney actually advised police to violate Rule 51 and take the Fifth to avoid incriminating themselves in criminal cases. It could be worth risking suspension without pay, especially because it was department policy to suspend most police who faced criminal charges anyway. Arrests of COP members prompted the organization to repeat its warning that police who were arrested should, “MAKE NO STATEMENT” because “suspension in such cases is almost automatic, whether or not you make a statement is immaterial.” As Demoupolos told COP members after a major C-5 arrest, “You must realize there comes a time to decide between this job and prison,” adding that failing to join COP or take advantage of its legal services was a “mistake that could be fatal to your job and freedom.”

COP also accused the department of violating its members’ right to remain silent by requiring mandatory polygraph tests of police officers when the same tests were optional for civilians. Lie detector tests were first given to members of the Chicago police force in the

51 City of Chicago Police Board Minutes,” June 27, 1974, AAPL, Box 60/Citizens Alert, 1974-1982, CHM.
53 “IAD Procedures,” *C.O.P. Newsletter*, March 1, 1972. Several years later, Demoupolos found himself facing prison time after he was convicted of perjury for lying to a federal grand jury about collecting thousands of dollars in payoffs on behalf of a police district commander. See Richard Phillips, “Lawyer convicted of lying to Austin shakedown jury,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 13, 1974, S2.
aftermath of the Summerdale scandal in 1960 and became an increasingly popular tool in internal department investigations.\(^{54}\) Department administrators, realizing that police resented taking the same test as criminal suspects, tried to promote the polygraph as a helpful tool that could prove the innocence of police suspects as well as their guilt. In 1966 the police captain who headed the Polygraph Section of the department’s Crime Laboratory maintained that lie detector tests “put more people out of trouble than in trouble,” citing statistics showing that seventy percent of polygraph test-takers “passed” the test without lying or giving any indication of guilt.\(^{55}\) Far from convinced by these arguments, COP began calling polygraph tests the department’s own “ouija board,” believing that both produced arbitrary results. In 1970 COP launched a fight to stop IAD from using the polygraph.\(^{56}\) Taking mandatory lie detector tests made the Chicago police “Second Class Citizens,” COP argued, because unlike civilians, police were “ordered to subject [themselves] to the defilement of the polygraph examination without the benefit of legal counsel, harassed by anonymous complainants and suffering the archaic and unfair disciplinary procedures employed by the Department.”\(^{57}\) COP’s attorney recommended that police refuse polygraph exams in addition to refusing to testify in internal investigations. When two COP members were suspended for refusing to take the polygraph without their attorney present, COP responded by suing the department on the grounds that the suspension violated patrolmen’s civil rights.\(^{58}\) COP was not alone in protesting polygraph tests for police officers.\(^{59}\) In 1972 the organization formed a temporary alliance with the CPA, which released an urgent bulletin that complained how “the constitutional rights of Police Officers are being disregarded daily” because “[m]en must submit to lie detector tests on some of the most ridiculous complaints that can be imagined.”\(^{60}\)

Over time, the combination of the polygraph, a growing influx of citizen complaints, bad press, aggressive IAD investigations, and a galling discrepancy between the rights extended to criminal suspects and those denied to the police, made internal discipline the biggest workplace grievance for Chicago’s majority-white police organizations. The CPA observed that police were responsible for helping suspected criminals understand their constitutional rights, pointing out that the “person we arrest on the street, no matter how big or small the crime, is immediately read and made to understand HIS constitutional rights,” but for the police these rights were not automatic. “Why are we so different,” the CPA asked, “Why do we have to be treated as second class citizens! Why don’t we have these same constitutional rights?”\(^{61}\) Along these lines, COP objected to the hypocrisy that violates all laws of society [that] can no longer be allowed to continue unchecked. We who are sworn to protect the rights of the accused

\(^{56}\) “Down with the Ouija Board,” C.O.P. Newsletter, September 1, 1970.
\(^{57}\) “Membership,” C.O.P. Newsletter, September 1, 1970.
\(^{58}\) “2 Police Sue on Suspension over Lie Tests,” Chicago Tribune, August 20, 1970, B11.
\(^{59}\) “When a Cop’s in Trouble.”
\(^{60}\) Joseph P. Pecoraro, “NO CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARD!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!,” Ten-One, c.1972. The name of this Chicago Patrolmen’s Association bulletin, “Ten-One,” comes from the police radio signal for an officer in distress.
\(^{61}\) “Welcome to little America: Chicago, Illinois??????????” The Haymarket Star, March 1973, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, CHM.
offender are not offered the same protections that the courts have felt necessary to make mandatory for criminal offenders.\footnote{"The Disciplinary Board," \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, January 1970.}

From the point of view of the CPA and COP, the justice system operated according to a double standard that protected criminals and persecuted the police. “Had either Escobedo or Miranda been Police Officers,” COP reasoned, “they would most assuredly be in the penitentiary now.”\footnote{Ibid.}

COP predicted that if the police department continued to ignore the issue, resentment of internal discipline would trigger a violent police strike. This was not an empty threat in the 1970s, years when a number of cities were already experiencing police strikes. Montreal’s police went on strike in 1969 and it was considered one of the worst police strikes in history, unleashing “mob action” on the city that left two dead, forty-nine injured, and over a million dollars in damage.\footnote{John H. Burpo, \textit{The Police Labor Movement: Problems and Perspectives} (Springfield, Ill., Charles C. Thomas, 1971).} COP warned that Chicago would experience a police strike like Montreal’s when it asked, “How long can those in authority stand mute to the grievances of their personnel?” reminding readers that “Montreal, Canada stood mute too long.”\footnote{“The Disciplinary Board.”} This was not an empty threat in the early 1970s, years when the majority of the police rank-and-file forged a new solidarity out of their resentment of department discipline and organized job actions to demand a Police Bill of Rights and a labor contract with the city.

\textbf{A Police Bill of Rights}

As COP began to organize its campaign for a police Bill of Rights in Chicago, the national Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) was already taking a gradual, city-by-city approach, securing a police Bill of Rights in each of the contracts negotiated by its individual local lodges. In the thirty-person police department in suburban Chicago Ridge, the FOP’s contract included a Police Bill of Rights that emphasized protections for the police during internal investigations. Its fourteen separate provisions regulated the conditions under which police were interrogated and had clearly been modeled on the language of the \textit{Miranda} decision. According to the contract rules, the department was required to inform police of their rights in writing before interrogations began. Police had the right to have an attorney present during any kind of interrogation and they also had the right to stop questioning at any time. The contract required that the department interrogate police during “reasonable” hours, for “reasonable” amounts of time, and in designated offices. Crucially, the FOP contract stipulated that at no point could investigators threaten police with “transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action,” in an attempt to ease the intimidation of police during internal investigations.\footnote{Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Ridge Lodge Contract, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Police Department--Collective Bargaining, CHM.}

But a contract, much less one that included a police Bill of Rights, was still out of reach for the Chicago police in the early 1970s. Facing a police department administration that refused to reform its internal disciplinary system, COP and the CPA formed a partnership to tackle the problem in the fall of 1972. To kick off the fight for a police Bill of Rights and a contract with the city, three thousand off-duty policemen packed into the parking lot of the West Loop Holiday Inn for a rally sponsored by COP and the CPA in September. The combined memberships of the
two organizations represented three-quarters of the police rank-and-file and with these numbers COP and CPA leaders planned the rally as “a show of strength” for police department administrators and Mayor Daley. As it turned out, the rally became one of Chicago’s first real displays of police labor militancy. At one point COP’s president took the stage, which was the back of a flatbed truck, and addressed the police through his megaphone, “You don’t have any rights!” he shouted. In unison, the police shouted back, chanting, “Strike, strike, strike!”

Afterward COP and CPA leaders denied that they had tried to provoke a police strike, explaining that the chant was just a spontaneous outburst from the rank and file. What followed the police rally, however, was hardly spontaneous as COP and the CPA orchestrated a series of organized, large-scale job actions that were bigger and more confrontational than any police protest Chicago had seen before. One week after the rally, Chicago’s police went on a “ticket blitz,” where they handed out an average of five times the usual number of tickets to citizens. City papers reprinted a flier that circulated throughout the department, calling on patrolmen to support the blitz. “Now is the time for our answer to [the Superintendent’s] indifference to our complaints,” the flier announced, urging police “to show the Superintendent that we can and will stand against him.” During the week-long blitz, police penalized even the most minor traffic and parking violations, flagging windshields across the city with bright yellow citations. One radio commentator noted that it was “remarkable, these past few days, to see just how well Chicagoans will drive and park when there is a crackdown by the police.”

COP and CPA organizers instructed police to focus on specific groups of Chicagoans, telling them to stop “newspaper trucks, telephone, gas, and electric company trucks,” as well as cabs and other city vehicles that usually received special treatment, and therefore fewer tickets, from police because of their connections with city hall. Jane Byrne, Chicago’s first woman mayor and a member of the Democratic machine since 1967, explained that “[i]f a policeman didn’t look the other way when told to—such as not showing up in a court case for a speeding ticket if the speeder had clout—he might find himself walking a beat in some godforsaken spot.” Targeting drivers with clout was an act of outright defiance by the police and they followed through on the plan to pay extra attention to newspaper trucks, CTA vehicles, and cabs, all of which were among the “hardest hit” by traffic tickets. One commentator theorized that this was because these vehicles “deserve it most of the time, but the system says they should get a pass.” This refusal to give certain vehicles “a pass” indicated that police had begun to reject “the double standard of law enforcement” in the city, underscoring a “fundamental problem between the policemen and the city administration.”

Outside of COP and the CPA, other groups took the side of police. Trade unions like the United Auto Workers responded to the job action by expressing their support for a police union in Chicago. The UAW’s regional director wrote to Daley at the end of 1972 to advocate for the

70 Ronald G. Berquist et al., “Police Protest: Launch Ticket Spree to Enforce Demands!” Chicago Today, September 26, 1972, clipping, AAPL, Box 48/Newspaper Clippings, Unions, 1972, CHM.
71 Jane Byrne, My Chicago (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 284.
police right to collective bargaining. A series of editorials broadcast by Chicago’s conservative talk radio station, WIND 560, argued that the Chicago police were treated like “third-class citizens,” without “the remedy that most employees have; namely, the right to strike over proper grievances.” Chicago’s NBC affiliate, WMAQ-TV, issued its own editorial espousing a police union. “There are 13,500 policemen in Chicago and most of them believe they should be granted collective bargaining rights,” the editorial explained, noting that the city’s schoolteachers, “a comparable group of public employees,” already had collective bargaining rights and a contract. But even supporters of Chicago police unionization had their limits, and WMAQ warned that any kind of direct action was an “irresponsible” method for police to use to secure a contract.

As the wave of tickets threatened to clog Chicago’s Traffic Court for months to come, irate citizens and media outlets across the political spectrum condemned the police job action. The AAPL also criticized the ticket blitz, while sympathizing, at least, with the COP-CPA goal to reform police department discipline. Over the radio and in the press, the AAPL pointed out that though it supported the idea of a police Bill of Rights and disciplinary reform, it could not support the tactics of the ticket blitz or the goal of police unionization, fearing that a police contract would not protect black police or improve their working conditions in the police department.

In an attempt to control the situation on the ground, police supervisors in the most active districts in the blitz tried to slow the onslaught of tickets by ordering the police to walk their beats instead of driving in their patrol cars. Police tickets did finally slow almost to a complete stop by the end of the week. Immediately after the blitz, COP and the CPA organized a ticketing slowdown as a second, follow-up job action. This strategy aimed to “hit the city where it hurts” by cutting off the revenue it collected from police tickets. Combining a ticket blitz with a ticketing slowdown, a practice referred to as “whiplash,” was a common practice used by police unions and organizations in other cities, but in Chicago it turned out this was not still enough to force the city and the police department to meet the demands of COP and the CPA.

One month later, the frustrated police rank and file gathered by the thousands for another rally. In the auditorium of Chicago’s sprawling convention center, COP and the CPA devised a plan for police to come down with a collective case of the “blue flu,” and call in sick from work the next week on the upcoming election day. Described by one police sergeant as “a tiring job for the officer on duty…but...a job which has to be done,” election day duty meant manning the

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74 WMAQ-TV Editorial, Transcript, October 31, 1972, AAPL, Box 84/ WMAQ-TV Editorial 1972-1975, CHM.
city’s polling stations from 6:00 a.m. until long after they closed. Police remained on-duty while votes were counted and called in the unofficial returns to the City News Bureau, the agency that collected election results for the local media. None of the police at the polls were paid time-and-a-half for a work day that could stretch to fourteen, sometimes sixteen hours. A Blue Flu strike on election day, then, would call attention to the unmet demands of overworked police while leaving polling places all over the city without police protection. Though grievances over election day duties influenced the timing of the proposed “blue flu,” the focus of the job action remained on reforming police discipline and securing a police Bill of Rights. But at the very last minute, the night before the proposed Blue Flu was to take place, COP and CPA leaders called off the job action, citing concern that a pseudo-police strike on election day would antagonize voters and undermine support for candidates who had gone out on a limb to support the police during their job actions earlier in the fall.

Eventually the combined pressure of the ticket blitz, the ticket slowdown, and the threat of blue flu on election day did get the police department’s attention by November. In a major concession, department commanders agreed to meet with leaders of COP and the CPA to discuss revising the department’s disciplinary procedure and to hammer out a tentative police Bill of Rights. Praising these meetings as “a major achievement,” COP and the CPA put their plans for future job actions on hold to demonstrate their commitment to negotiating with the department. That month, COP also prevented a walkout by its members who had threatened the strike when participants in the ticketing blitz were disciplined with transfers to far-flung districts across the city. Using the police radio to plead with members to stay on the job, COP averted a wildcat strike that it feared could become a major liability in negotiations.

In meetings with COP and CPA representatives, the department began to make small concessions and by the fourth meeting it agreed to investigate citizens’ accusations before investigating police officers. The department did not end mandatory lie detector tests for police, but it did require that citizens who filed complaints against police to also take a lie detector test. Department commanders also agreed to continue to meet with police organization leaders on a semi-regular basis to discuss disciplinary issues. This was not intended as a substitute for a formal grievance procedure, which the department had never used, but COP and the CPA saw it as a step in the right direction. As the department became more responsive to the complaints of the rank and file, COP and the CPA backed off their demands for collective bargaining and a contract. In the end, the Superintendent accepted a proposed police Bill of Rights for consideration, but did not enact it. The department meetings did acknowledge police

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80 One of these candidates, Roman Pucinski, was vying for a seat in the Senate and had been an outspoken advocate for collective bargaining for the police and their proposed Bill of Rights. Calling off the Blue Flu seemed to be of no help to Pucinski, who lost the election. “Help! Help! Help!,” C.O.P. Newsletter, October 1, 1970.
83 Jeff Lyon, “Police Protest Leaders Accept ‘Half a Loaf’.”
grievances, but the compromises made by COP and the CPA deferred their broader agenda for police labor rights.

With some of the immediate needs for disciplinary reform met and the prospect of collective bargaining for the police still a distant goal, the COP-CPA partnership eventually lost momentum and fell apart. One year later, in 1973, the organizations found that they had made little progress in their ongoing conflict with the department. The CPA’s president complained that the department operated according to the rule, “EVERYTHING for the BOSSES, NOTHING for the PATROLMEN!!” and protested, “We still haven’t got a BILL OF RIGHTS and the rules remain the same—their way!!”84 Later that year a highly publicized arrest of police by the C-5 unit provided to COP “further proof of the need for a Policemen’s Bill of Rights as well as the bargaining rights and security provided by a contract.”85

Attempts to limit the power and reach of the department’s disciplinary system and to secure a Police Bill of Rights continued in fits and starts for the rest of the decade. The arrival of another police superintendent, James Rochford, in 1974 brought more setbacks for the police rank and file. In his first act as superintendent, Rochford required seventy-two commanding and supervising police officers to take lie detector tests as part of an effort to expose corrupt police practices. Sixteen members of the department failed at least one question on the test and seven failed all of them.86 In response to these unsettling results, Rochford developed yet another disciplinary agency to add to the IAD. Unlike other agencies, which either supplemented or monitored the activities of IAD, Rochford created the new Office of Professional Standards (OPS) to take all brutality and corruption cases out of IAD’s hands. And, unlike IAD investigators, the staff members of OPS were not police officers, but civilians. The AAPL dismissed the OPS as just another “pseudo-civilian” disciplinary agency, but to police who feared that the department had inched closer to the oversight of a civilian review board, the OPS represented a troubling development.87

The OPS also proved to be more powerful and more industrious than other agencies that had been added to the department’s arsenal since 1968. With the ability to send serious cases straight to the Police Board or to criminal court, the thirty-four investigators of the OPS collected over five hundred new cases in their first six months of operation. In a typical Chicago Police Star feature that promoted the new disciplinary agency to wary police, OPS leaders explained that their investigators were not police officers, the staff had made serious efforts to understand the unique pressures and difficult judgment calls involved in police work. OPS training included five weeks of course work at the Police Academy and ride-alongs in police squad cars and investigators tried to put police at ease with reassurances that “we will never try to second guess a judgment situation on the part of a police officer. We realize, that often, a police officer has to react very quickly to protect both his life and the lives of others,” and emphasizing that they had the “utmost respect for the judgment of any officer faced with that situation.”88

It was not until 1975 that COP and the CPA saw any significant results from their campaign to reform discipline when the department released new “Complaint, Disciplinary, and Summary Punishment Procedures,” which it said would provide a balance between the need for police discipline and the imperative to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens, including

85 “Ware’s Wonders Strike Again.”
87 Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, Annual Report-1974, 1, AAPL, Box 54/Annual Reports, CHM.
the police. For the first time, the department agreed to provide police under investigation with a written copy of the specific allegations against them. Police were granted the right to confront their accusers and the department promised it would no longer base the outcome of some investigations solely on the results of a polygraph exam. But these changes still did not add up to a police Bill of Rights, and without a contract to guarantee the new policies, police organizations worried that the department would be free to rewrite the disciplinary code with less favorable rules whenever it pleased.\footnote{James M. Rochford, \textit{PAX 501}, November 14, 1975.}

As efforts in Chicago stalled, groups of police elsewhere in the United States were busy writing and enacting Bills of Rights either through legislation or as part of newly-negotiated contracts. The first police Bill of Rights legislation passed in Maryland in 1974 and two years later a similar bill became state law in California, banning mandatory lie detector tests for police and promising officers under investigation the automatic right to an attorney “during any type of questioning about internal matters.” By the end of the decade, police Bills of Rights became a growing trend nationwide. Twenty-six percent of all police labor contracts negotiated in 1979 contained a police Bill of Rights. Two years later, in 1981, fifty-five percent of all police contracts included one and state laws enacted a Bill of Rights for all police in New York, Virginia, and Florida.\footnote{Michael A. Chiuchiolo, “The Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights, Panacea or Problem?” \textit{Police Chief}, December 1981, 70; “California Police Get Bill of Rights,” \textit{Police Labor Review}, October 1976, 6.} Meanwhile in Chicago, a 1978 revision to the department’s disciplinary code granted police the right to have counsel present during internal interrogations. Notifications of CR numbers also included warnings to police that their testimony could be used against them in internal disciplinary investigations, but that it would be kept separate from related criminal proceedings. Still, the department continued to remind police that they had, “no right to remain silent.”\footnote{Chicago Police Department, Administrative Proceedings Rights (Statutory), 1978, AAPL, Box 64/Hill, Wendell, Charges and Allegations, 1978, CHM.}

In Illinois the FOP kept up its momentum by including a police Bill of Rights in each of the seventy contracts it negotiated in the state throughout the 1970s.\footnote{Sally Saville, “The FOP: It’s Neither a Union—Nor a Patsy,” \textit{Crain’s Chicago Business}, October 27, 1980, 1.} The FOP lobbied for state legislation in 1979 that would cover all Illinois police with a Bill of Rights, organizing a letter campaign in support of the proposed law.\footnote{Fraternal Order of Police Form Letter, March 1979, AAPL, Box 1/Chicago Police Department Correspondence, 1980-1984, CHM.} At the end of the 1970s, when police Bills of Rights became increasingly common features of police contracts, it looked like the Chicago police might negotiate a contract of their own when the city agreed to a police representation election in the fall of 1980. As police organizations and unions competed to represent the police at the bargaining table, the FOP campaigned on its success in enacting Police Bills of Rights in other cities. Though the FOP had a much smaller dues-paying membership, less than half the numbers of COP, it won the representation election.\footnote{FOP relied on its experience,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, October 17, 1980, 18.} Immediately after winning, the FOP’s president identified a police Bill of Rights as its number one contract priority.\footnote{Bob Wiedrich, “Police Union Can Pose a Problem,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, November 13, 1980, B3.} Sure enough, when the first police contract in Chicago was ratified the next year, Article Six of the agreement spelled out a Bill of Rights. The ten-point Bill was devoted entirely to limits on internal investigations and closely resembled the provisions in other FOP contracts. It guaranteed legal representation to
police, reasonable interrogation times, and prohibited investigators from threatening a police officer’s job during questioning. Significantly, the second to last provision required department investigators to read police suspects their Miranda rights under certain circumstances, stipulating that if there was a chance that an internal investigation might turn into a criminal proceeding, the officer must “be given the constitutional rights concerning self-incrimination prior to the commencement of interrogation.” In the end, the first Chicago police contract required the police to read the Miranda rights, not just to criminal suspects, but to each other.

96 Agreement between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, Effective through July 1, 1983, HWLMRC.
Police Wives, Policewomen, and Gender Politics in the Chicago Police Department,
1950–1984

In the summer of 1974, roughly eighty years after Chicago hired its first policewoman, the police department announced that policewomen and policemen would patrol the city together for the very first time. It was a pivotal moment, one that challenged longstanding gender divisions in a police department where patrol duty was identified as men’s work and policewomen worked in their own separate division. Chicago introduced these “co-ed” patrols in response to the federal anti-discrimination lawsuit brought against the city and police department several years earlier by the city’s leading organization of black police, the AAPL. Founded in Chicago in 1968 and representing several thousand black police, the AAPL suit charged the police department with both racial and gender discrimination. At the time women made up less than one percent of the police force. By including them in its case, the AAPL only strengthened its argument that the police department’s failure to hire and promote women and minorities violated federal civil rights laws.¹

While most of Chicago’s policemen responded to the prospect of working with policewomen as their partners with a mixture of confusion and resentment, the wives of Chicago policemen responded with open hostility. In contentious meetings police wives confronted police department commanders and policewomen, protesting the new gender policies and questioning the ability of policewomen to work on equal footing with their husbands. One journalist who witnessed a shouting match between police commanders and police wives sneered that the wives made “an effective pressure group” because, as women, they had “mastered the art of a certain kind of shrill noise that male lawmakers and administrators can’t stand.”² But what made police wives an effective pressure group in Chicago had less to do with the pitch of their voices than it did with the strength of their own organizations and the importance of marriage in the Chicago police department.

More than 85 percent of the twelve thousand-man Chicago police force was married throughout the 1970s, making police wives a sizable and powerful group in the city.³ In years when the majority of Chicago’s white police rank and file struggled to win labor rights and

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¹ Overall, police department statistics provided clear evidence of discrimination against racial minorities as well as women. In a city where an estimated one-third to 40% of the population was black, black police made up just 17% of the police force and only one percent of the police force was Hispanic. Minorities and women grew even more scarce farther up the police department hierarchy. Out of Chicago’s 94 police captains in the early 1970s, just one of them was black. Afro-American Patrolmen’s Monthly Meeting, “Black Political Clout,” May 27, 1971, AAPL, Box 68/Lu’s Notebook, 1971, CHM; Guardians, “Report,” c. 1975, AAPL, Box 69/ Miscellaneous Publications, 1968-1975, CHM; Robert McClory, The Man Who Beat Clout City (Chicago: Swallow Press, Inc., 1977), 136.
³ This proportion was slightly higher than the estimated 80 percent of city laborers who were married, Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, Actuarial Statement, 1977; Laborers’ and Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Actuarial Statement, December 31, 1977, HWLMRC.
unionize, police wives had already organized themselves by the thousands. Beginning in the 1950s with the founding of the Chicago Police Wives’ Association, police wives were active participants in a series of organizations that grew to include the Ladies Auxiliary of the Fraternal Order of Police, the Women’s Auxiliary of the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, the Wives’ Association of the Confederation of Police, and the Concerned Police Wives of Chicago. Much of the wives’ power came from the police department’s recognition that stable marriages were critical to supporting the work of policemen on a daily basis. Accordingly the police department made special efforts to cultivate a relationship with police wives and catered to their organizations’ demands. Even when city administrators and department commanders avoided meeting with police labor organizations and the AAPL, they paid attention to Chicago’s police wives. With more than twenty years’ experience lobbying on their husbands’ behalf, Chicago’s police wives honed their position as activists in the police workplace and developed an agenda that made police safety their top priority and policewomen’s equality their principal grievance.

Workers’ wives had played an integral role in U.S. labor movements since the late nineteenth century, thriving especially as supporters of workers in unusually dangerous occupations, such as mining or police work, and during crises when workers struggled to win strikes or union recognition. Beginning in the 1890s the wives of skilled workers organized to defend their husbands’ labor rights following the collapse of the Knights of Labor. Decades later, miners’ wives played a critical role in the major strikes of the Great Depression and post-war years. One miner praised the organizers of the National Miners Union because “they don’t leave the women out.” Even one of the most well-known songs of the American labor movement, “Which Side Are You On?” was written by a miner’s wife during the Harlan coal mine strike of 1931. Similarly, the wives of the International Ladies’ Auxiliary to the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters played an instrumental role in the union’s campaign to win recognition by the Pullman Company during the 1930s. “A union is not only for the men, but also for their wives and families,” declared the Secretary-Treasurer of the Ladies’ Auxiliary, who believed that ultimately, “it was the women who made the union.”

From the early twentieth century through the 1950s, millions of working-class women belonged to labor auxiliaries in the United States. Auxiliaries became some of the country’s biggest and most powerful women’s labor institutions, which included the American Federation of Women’s Auxiliaries of Labor and the CIO National Auxiliary. Overall nearly as many women belonged to labor auxiliaries as labor unions in the 1940s and 1950s. Often auxiliary women supported union initiatives, but they also pursued broader agendas informed by what has

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been called “labor feminism.” This feminism grew out of Progressive Era efforts to protect women in the workplace through specialized accommodations, restrictions, and specific occupations that recognized their family roles as mothers.  

Chicago police wives’ protests against policewomen’s equality in the mid-1970s took place amidst a broader clash between the labor feminism that defended women’s special treatment in the workplace and the feminism of women’s liberation and equality. The 1960s saw the rise of a feminist movement that advocated equal opportunities for women in the workplace, an effort bolstered by the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964 and campaigns by the National Organization of Women. But supporters of women’s equality soon encountered a conservative backlash fueled by debates over the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 and controversial court cases such as Roe v. Wade in 1973. These conflicts took place within a national context of rising divorce rates, an increasing number of two-income earner households, and a pervasive anxiety about the state of the American family. Opponents of the women’s movement for equality, many of them women themselves, positioned themselves as defenders of the family and insisted on the importance of the women’s traditional domestic roles at home and special protections at work.

Prizing their own domesticity, the majority of Chicago’s police wives reiterated these backlash arguments in their opposition to policewomen going on patrol and supported policies that restricted policewomen to working with young women and children. As in most other cities nationwide, policewomen in Chicago worked in a separate Women’s Division where they were expected to treat young and female citizens as though they were their “municipal mothers.” Although police wives believed that policewomen were uniquely qualified to work as “mothers,” they objected to policewomen working as partners with policemen—a situation where they feared policewomen might begin to act as though they were wives, tempting policemen and threatening police wives’ preferential status.

The police wives’ opposition to policewomen defies easy categorization in the conflict between the feminism of equality and the feminism of difference. Even as Chicago’s police wives opposed gender equality, they used their standing as wives to make a series of demands on the police department. When police wives tried to keep policewomen out of patrol cars, they did so not necessarily to safeguard policewomen, but because they feared that policewomen were too weak to patrol with policemen and would endanger their husbands. The converging histories of police wives and policewomen in Chicago demonstrate the centrality of gender and family relationships to the unfolding of labor conflicts inside the police department and to the development of law enforcement policies in the city. Though it may have looked like the domain of men, throughout much of the late twentieth century the politics of the Chicago police department were in fact negotiated and shaped by women, both as police wives and eventually as police officers.

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“Your Role: No Women’s Lib”

No other group of municipal employees in Chicago had an organization of wives with the strength and power of the city’s police wives. Believing that happy marriages made for better policemen, the police department made efforts to build a relationship with their wives. The department addressed personnel memos directly to police wives and reserved higher-paying, training-intensive positions for married men, because “a married man would be more apt to remain with the Department.” Police department administrators sponsored ongoing seminars to help young police wives adjust to their new lives with policemen and offered free marriage counseling if couples experienced a crisis.10 Patrolmen and department commanders alike agreed that a sound police marriage depended on choosing the right kind of police wife, who would be a subservient, and silent, supporter. One patrolman specified his “ideal wife” as someone who “never interferes with or complains about anything to do with my work, never asks questions as to what time I got home, where I’m going.” An instructor at Chicago’s Police Academy stipulated that a “policeman’s wife should be his best fan.” Chicago’s police superintendent from 1960 to 1967 offered advice for finding a good police wife, explaining that the process for hiring police officers and choosing police wives was similar. In both, he said, “recruitment is more important than training.”11 But police wives took their training for the job seriously, developing their own set of ideas about how police wives should act at home and how they should support their husbands at work.

Advice and self-help literature written by and for police wives proliferated in the mid-1970s. Through essays, columns, and handbooks, veteran police wives tried to prepare rookies for the unique challenges of a police marriage at a time when anxiety about rising divorce rates and fears about an overall “deterioration” of family values reached a political peak nationwide.12 While this self-help literature did not speak for each and every police wife, the general consistency of the advice reflected a shared set of values among police wives that stressed

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10 Sgt. Clarence Erickson, “Open Letter to Wives,” Chicago Police Star, May 1966, 8; “The Department Goes Airborne,” Chicago Police Star, June 1968, 3-4. The Chicago Police Star also regularly featured a column called the “Wives Window.” Chicago’s Police Wives’ Seminar consisted of three weekly 2 ½ hour sessions. There administrators explained department operations and led discussions of marriage problems associated with police careers. The police chaplain, the president of the Police Wives’ Association, a professional psychologist, and a representative from the police branch of Alcoholics Anonymous all made presentations to the thirty wives who attended each seminar. Other cities offered seminars that were considerably more involved. In South Bend, Indiana, the police department taught families to shoot a .38 caliber pistol as well as a 12-gauge shotgun and concluded its spousal training program with a popular self-defense class that taught wives how to throw their husbands across the room. Wives of the Missouri State Highway Patrol spent two nights at their husbands’ training academy where they learned CPR, fired six rounds from a .357 magnum, heading home, as a program spokesman boasted, “a little bit smarter, a little bit happier, and more sold on themselves, their husbands’ abilities, and on the Missouri State Highway Patrol.” See City of Chicago, Department of Police to Police Wife, February 1976, AAPL, Box 1/Chicago Police Department Correspondence, 1976-1979, CHM; Patricia Leeds, “Police program tries to keep a happy family,” Chicago Tribune, June 20, 1976, 5; S. Lawrence Paulson, “Orientation Programs for the Police Family,” Police Chief, March 1974, 63-64; Alvin R. Lubker, “Training Session Program for Highway Patrol Wives,” Police Chief, August 1979, 62-63.


domesticity and emphasized traditional family values. Joining the ranks of powerful political women like Phyllis Schlafly who promoted a social conservative agenda in response to the women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s, police wives celebrated their traditional family identities as wives and mothers. At the same time police wives saw themselves as true partners in their husbands’ police work. Writing in the national police magazine Law and Order, one police wife published “An Open Letter to Police Wives,” that explained how police wives acted as their husbands’ partners on patrol, arguing that “[w]hen a police officer receives a medal or an award for bravery over and beyond the call of duty, his wife should also receive one.” In Philadelphia, members of the city’s police wives’ organization wore “miniature replicas” of their husbands’ police badges around their necks. Chicago police wives profiled in a 1969 newspaper feature titled “A Policeman’s Wife Tells All!” saw themselves as their husbands’ protectors. As one wife said, “he needs someone who’s on his side, someone to assure him,” and another believed that “somehow that extra love will shield him.” These police wives were careful not to overestimate their own importance and recommended a deferential attitude. One police wife ranked her husband’s priorities in an order where “God is first, the public is second, he is third, and she is last.” A collection of essays authored by police wives in 1974 reinforced this hierarchy by advising police wives to “just remember that he is the most important.”

Advice from police wives rejected women’s liberation and embraced homemaking as the best way to support policemen. An essay in a collection called the Handbook for Law Enforcement Wives, “Be His Anchor,” summed up the police wife’s job succinctly with the subtitle: “Your Role: No Women’s Lib,” and instructed police wives on how to placate men who witnessed trauma on a daily basis:

Girls, I hope this doesn’t upset you, but I personally don’t think that women’s liberation has any place within a police department. You need to be a little

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13 Police departments were themselves a bastion of conservatism in U.S. cities. The growing popularity of the Fraternal Order of Police, which endorsed George Wallace for President in 1968, is one indicator of the prominence of the police in a more general political shift to the reactionary and often racist segment of the right wing. For a discussion of how institutions like Focus on the Family and the Family Research Council defined the decline of “family values” as a political issue and moved it to the forefront of public debate in the 1970s, see Matthew D. Lassiter, “Inventing Family Values.” With the exception of a few scattered short articles, for example, “Let Husband Relax after a Days Work,” Chicago Police Journal, November-December 1959, 85, most of the police wife self-help literature appears in the mid-1970s and after. The self-help genre on becoming a supportive wife of a husband’s career was not unique to police wives. In 1974 the wives of the Republican Congressional Committee issued a new edition of their handbook with advice on etiquette for the wives of candidates (“Gum chewing: In one word, NEVER!) and what kind of dresses to wear (“Not too short.”) The handbook, whose cover depicted an elephant wearing a pink dress, lipstick, and hairbows, brought backlash from women in the party who argued that its advice was old-fashioned and sexist. That year the wives and women of the Republican National Committee produced a competing and updated booklet that advised “basic self-confidence,” for political wives and admonished them to “never apologize for the role you choose for yourself,” be it feminist or housewife. See Karen Peterson, “GOP Wives’ How-To Manuals Cause a To-Do on Capitol Hill,” Chicago Today, July 16, 1974, 22, Reel 188, CPL Microfilm.

14 For a discussion of this agenda in the opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, see Marjorie J. Spruill, “Gender and America’s Right Turn,” in Rightward Bound.


happy homemaker…Sometimes you may have a nice meal on the table: maybe it’s two hours after the dinner was ready to serve, but be pleasant when he gets there because there is usually a very good reason why he wasn’t on time. Maybe he has just had to take an injured child to the hospital, or just witnessed a murder. Can you imagine how this man is feeling on the inside?…Girls, your main reason for existing is to keep yourself and your husband happy.19

Another self-help book written by two police wives in 1975, Police Wife: How to Live with the Law and Like It, featured chapter titles like “He’s Going to Need Your Tender Lovin’ Care” and “Make Your Home a Haven” that drove home the book’s message that “Nothing equips a man for handling domestic calls as well as a sound marriage and satisfactory home life.” More practically for police wives this meant that “Housekeeping is not a matter to be taken lightly.”20 Understanding and Solving Your Police Marriage Problems, a question and answer manual written by a different police wife duo in 1982, took a somewhat more nuanced view of police marriage, suggesting that wives “function autonomously—not surrendering her entire lifestyle and identity to her husband.” It characterized the ideal police wife as a woman who could control her emotions, who was “able to handle stress well without overreacting or adding more pressure to an already existing situation.” Still, Understanding and Solving Your Police Marriage Problems affirmed that the best police wives were both “emotionally strong,” and “feminine and attractive.”21

If good police wives were crucial supporters of policemen, disgruntled police wives posed a serious threat. Police administrators routinely identified marital problems as a source of poor performance and misconduct in their police forces. Responding to a steep rise in police brutality and corruption allegations in the mid-1970s, Chicago’s police superintendent blamed “certain rule violations and other misbehavior by Department members” on “domestic difficulties” as well as “serious financial pressure, and human failures.”22 Police departments throughout Cook County recognized divorce as their “greatest morale problem.”23 Chicago’s police chaplain, who offered marriage counseling to policemen (usually in the front seats of their

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22 James M. Rochford, PAX 501, February 11, 1974, 3.
23 Estimates of the prevalence of divorce in police families ranged widely by the late 1970s. Some reports claimed that the police had the highest divorce rate of any profession—a 1976 survey of the Seattle police department reported that two-thirds of its married men had divorced and one police marriage expert was certain that the national divorce rate for police was “well over” fifty percent. More moderate conclusions reached by the Northwestern University Traffic Institute found that one-third of the married men in the Chicago police department had divorced by 1975. A 1978 study published in Police Chief argued that divorce in police departments took place at the same rate as it did in the general population, cautioning that high divorce estimates were “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” See Cissi Fallagant, “Marriage is Often the First Casualty of Cop’s Career,” Illinois Law Enforcer, c.1978-1979, 22, Labor Papers, Microfilm Reel 1, Box 57, CHM; Roger Baldwin, Inside a Cop: Tensions in the Public and Private Lives of the Police (Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press, 1977), 41; James A. Durner et al., “Divorce—Another Occupational Hazard,” Police Chief, November 1975, 48–53; Martin Reiser, ‘The Problems of Police Officers’ Wives,” Police Chief, April 1978, 42.
patrol cars), observed first-hand that police work was a “real hazard to marriage,” and a new crop of studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s confirmed these observations. In a Psychology Today study of police families in California, a police wife complained that her husband brought his work home with him, saying, "Sometimes I feel that if I don't do what he wants, I'll be arrested!" The overlap between the work and home lives of police was a widespread grievance among police wives, common in an occupation where it was “almost impossible for policemen to avoid bringing work attitudes home when they leave the station, however valiantly they may try.” Psychology Today surmised that “a cop is always a cop, even when off-duty.” Police Chief, the leading national journal for police commanders, explained that for policemen, “home life becomes less of a domestic affair and more of an extension of the squad room…As a result, the man begins to enforce his own brand of law and order both at home and on the street.”

In Chicago, where the police department considered its employees “twenty-four hour cops,” it was indeed difficult to tell where the working lives of the police stopped and where their private lives began. City and police department rules dictated where patrolmen lived, monitored their personal finances, and determined whether they could hold second jobs. If off-duty police witnessed criminal activity, department rules required them to intervene. In a visible sign of the department’s round-the-clock presence, policemen carried their guns with them at all times. Police wives often objected to the guns in their homes, particularly when they were left out on kitchen tables or within reach of small children. One police wife wrote to the Chicago Defender in 1974 to protest that police officers were the only members of the city’s law enforcement system who brought their work home with them. Asking if police would ever have “a right to relax,” this police wife pointed out that “judges…don’t carry all their symbols of authority home with them—gavels, robes…” Whether they were ideal domestic partners or unhappy about the demands of a police marriage, police wives were deeply involved in the working lives of their husbands. For some this participation was inescapable, the product of their husbands’ twenty-four on-call duty and police department rules. For others, their involvement in the police department provided a unique opportunity for activism on their husbands’ behalf.

“They Can’t Fire Your Wife!”

As the daily demands of police work reached into the private homes and families of police, police wives made their voices heard in the police department. Policemen risked losing their pay or their jobs if they challenged ranking officers and violated department rules, but police wives were not employees of the police department and they took advantage of the fact that they were immune from police discipline. Police wives openly objected to department policies, publicly criticized their husbands’ superiors, and conducted political and fundraising campaigns where police were not allowed to participate. Acting as an

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organized group, police wives lobbied city politicians and endorsed their favored candidates. Individually, they wrote letters to city papers using their real names while policemen often wrote letters to the editor anonymously. Police wives also tackled the workplace grievances of their husbands. Decades before the unionization of the Chicago police rank-and-file in 1980, police wives were already making effective demands for improvements in police pay, benefits, and working conditions.  

The Chicago Police Wives’ Association was the first and largest organization of police wives in the city. Founded in 1950, it quickly boasted a membership of nearly three thousand wives. Among its principal duties the Wives’ Association supported the families of policemen killed in the line of duty. The wives referred to themselves as “Florence Nightingales” who did “whatever ha[d] to be done!” for police widows and provided ongoing child care and financial support. But Chicago’s police wives did not limit themselves to charity for police widows. At their regular meetings, the police wives hosted aldermanic candidates, judges, police commanders, and Chicago’s highest-ranking policewoman, Chief Lois Higgins, who all came to speak and answer the wives’ questions. During election seasons police wives endorsed candidates, ballot measures, and in 1954 they campaigned for the reapportionment of state legislative districts.  

In their biggest undertaking of the decade, police wives lobbied for a forty-hour work week and pay increases for their husbands. During city budget hearings police wives stood before the city council to deliver speeches and the Wives’ Association’s legislative committee flooded the mailboxes of aldermen with letters demanding raises. Fed up with the city council’s slow progress, the Wives’ Association eventually conducted its own national survey of police pay and hours that proved the Chicago police earned less and worked more hours than police in every other major U.S. city. When the police did finally receive a significant raise in 1957, members of the Wives’ Association shared in the achievement, reporting in their newsletter that their members had been “very, very active in obtaining a raise for their husbands,” and thanked their husbands for “giv[ing] them the night out for the meetings!”  

Over the next decade, the problems of the Chicago police grew more complicated than questions of working hours and compensation. In the 1960s a series of police corruption scandals and widespread police brutality strained community relationships, damaged the department’s  

29 From the Police Wives Committee for Thomas M. Tully, March 11, 1974, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, CHM; “Politico’s daughter to ‘take the heat’,” Chicago Tribune, January 18, 1975, A12.  
30 Mrs. Nick Kategian, “Police Wives Association, Inc.,” Chicago Police Digest, April 1958, 55; Virginia Bloemsman, “Birthday Progress Report,” Chicago Police Digest, September 1957, 65. The Wives’ Association President remembered that in the early years memberships “came so fast we just couldn't keep up with them.”  
credibility, and brought policemen under increasing scrutiny. From the Summerdale Scandal of 1960, when police were discovered operating a burglary ring, to the police violence at the 1968 Democratic National Convention and the deadly 1969 police raid on Black Panther Headquarters, the decade left the Chicago police anxious to rehabilitate their reputation and to assert control over their rapidly changing workplace. A new group of rank and file police organizations emerged from this period and one of the largest was the Confederation of Police (COP). By the end of the decade COP had established its own police wives’ auxiliary. The new Wives’ Association of the Confederation of Police (WACOP) rapidly became the one of the most assertive and active organizations of police wives in the city.

WACOP, whose members pronounced the acronym “wake up!,” dedicated itself to boosting the image of policemen in Chicago. At its inaugural meeting, WACOP leaders authored a poem that praised police work and emphasized its significance to the identity of each police wife. Read aloud to WACOP’s five hundred founding members, the poem declared,

The gold ring around the silver star
Is the symbol of my life
My husband is a policeman
I’m a policeman’s wife.
We’ll take pride in his profession
Make it known by all we do
Our motto says it simply
WE TAKE PRIDE IN BLUE.

This spirit went well beyond WACOP’s first meeting as members confronted their husbands’ critics. For example, during parades and other city events, WACOP routinely turned out roughly 250 wives to march in sweatshirts printed with the slogan, “Pig is beautiful!” But WACOP’s members soon saw themselves as more than police boosters, demanding that the police department respond to police wife grievances about their husbands’ working conditions.

Though Chicago’s police superintendent had refused to meet with the leaders of COP for several years running, he was willing to hold meetings with WACOP leaders within six months of its founding. In a lengthy series of conferences with the superintendent and other police administrators, WACOP wives articulated their agenda. They stressed the importance of police safety and explained that constant discipline and “suspensions for minor rule violations” damaged patrolmen’s morale. After the meetings, COP’s newsletter boasted that the superintendent had “learned that these were intelligent, well informed women, deeply interested in improving their husbands working conditions and promoting the image of the police officer as a professional to the public.”

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34 The Chicago police department had, of course, been riddled with corruption since the late nineteenth century. In the early 1950s a major city council investigation into police corruption publicized the problem, but did little to solve it. See Richard C. Lindberg, To Serve and Collect: Chicago Politics and Police Corruption from the Lager Beer Riot to the Summerdale Scandal, 1855-1960, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998).
accomplishment, in a hierarchical institution like the Chicago police department a discussion between superiors and employees (or even employees’ wives) represented a major concession. When COP did finally schedule its first meeting with the superintendent in 1972, three years after WACOP’s conferences, it was hailed as a “big achievement” that was won through an effort that included petitions, two job actions, and a picket in front of police department headquarters. 39

It was also often easier for Chicago’s organized police wives to publicly raise money than it was for police organizations. Ever since the Summerdale Scandal of 1960, the department had banned police fundraising and solicitation. When police organizations needed funds beyond what they raised through dues, the police wives stepped in. 40 The wives of the city’s largest organization of black police, the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL) tried to address its budget shortfall after the organization spent most of its money on anti-discrimination lawsuits. Wives of AAPL members organized a Women’s Auxiliary and urged Chicagoans to “spiritually and financially” support the AAPL at a time when it was “barely keeping its doors open.” Organizing various fundraisers and “tag days,” the Auxiliary hoped to “be a tremendous aid in helping [the AAPL] survive.” The Women’s Auxiliary also solicited money directly from the wives of AAPL members, writing, “We wives must support our husbands and their organization and, in doing so, help insure that there will be an AAPL.” 41

The AAPL’s anti-discrimination lawsuits proved divisive among police wives. While the Women’s Auxiliary worked to raise money to fund the AAPL’s legal expenses, wives of majority-white police organizations, like the wives of WACOP, mobilized to fight impending court-ordered hiring quotas. In 1974 they helped found what became known as the “1500 Club,” so-named after the number of eligible white men who believed they would be passed over by the police department because it was required to hire minorities and women first. Through the 1500 Club, the majority of white police wives petitioned and appealed the court to throw out the AAPL’s challenge to the police department. 42 Chicago’s different police wives’ organizations participated in many of the same kinds of activities to support the work of the police, but they were consistently divided by race. When the police department began to hire increasing numbers of women in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the AAPL’s lawsuit, the newly-hired policewomen would also find their solidarities tested by questions of race.

For the most part Chicago’s policemen recognized that their wives, both black and white, provided them with critical support and encouraged their participation. COP told its members to urge their wives to join WACOP because police wives could not be punished for insubordination, explaining that the department “can’t suspend or fire your wife!” One WACOP wife argued that this meant that police wives had a special responsibility to get involved,

40 Some police organizations also tried to find loopholes to get around the rule banning solicitation. For example, at one point the Chicago Patrolmen’s Association hired a private company to solicit on its behalf. See “$1,000 Police Show Ticket Sale!,” Chicago Tribune, May 3, 1960, 11; Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, “Telephone Script, New Business,” c. 1972, AAPL, Box 167/Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, CHM.
41 From Paul V. McLaughlin to Patrolman Renault Robinson, April 1, 1974, AAPL, Box 1/Chicago Police Department Correspondence; Women’s Auxiliary of the AAPL, “Founding Document,” AAPL, Box 84/Women’s Auxiliary, 1974-1976; Memorandum from the Committee of AAPL Women to Wives of Afro-American Patrolmen, Subject: The Black Community Awards Dinner, September 1971, AAPL, Box 3/8, CHM.
asserting, “Police can’t picket, but we sure can. Ours is a role where rights become duties.” On the suburban outskirts of Chicago, Skokie’s police wives took these duties seriously when police went on strike in 1975. While Skokie’s policemen stayed home from work, fifty Skokie police wives led an extended sit-in at the Village Hall. For days they ate meals, slept at the hall, and defied a court order telling them to leave. Instead they posted a sign on the door that read, "Under New Management."44

“Police Wives Don’t Want to Become Police Widows”

Police wives acted as their husbands’ boosters in the city and as their proxies in politics, fundraising, and disputes over police working conditions. At the same time they envisioned themselves as their husbands’ protectors, making police safety one of their top priorities. Compared to industrial and manufacturing jobs in the late twentieth century, police work was undoubtedly dangerous. In 1967 the Chicago police department reported 1,311 disabling injuries for a force of about 12,000 and in 1968 the National Safety Council estimated that nationally, police sustained injuries at six times the rate of factory workers.45 Each year throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s about one hundred police died in the line of duty nationwide. On average ten of these deaths happened in Chicago, a city where the agenda of police wives became deeply intertwined with the plight of police widows in the city.46

As victims with “a unique claim on the community,” widows have long stood as political symbols in the United States. The idea of providing aid to “quintessentially blameless” widows promoted the passage of Mothers’ Pensions during the Progressive Era. The struggles of widows also helped guarantee aid for other single mothers who received pensions, despite the stigma of being single women with children.47 Decades later during the Vietnam War, the federal government publicized the struggle of the wives of POWs and soldiers who were MIA, women waiting to find out whether they were wives or widows, to portray itself as a victim and to counter protests of the U.S. atrocities during the war.48 Police widows were also powerful symbols for the Chicago police and their wives. Pervasive images of police widows valorized police work and by extension, the bravery of police wives. Stories featuring the transformation of police into police widows were common and usually focused on the moment when police wives were notified that their husbands had been killed. A 1973 Chicago Tribune feature, “To the Wives of the Men in Blue, Fear is an Ever Present Companion,” described the precarious world of police wives: “It's that phone call at night they fear, the unexpected knock on the door that sets nerves jangling. Her man's at work, her baby's asleep, and she's suspended alone somewhere between their two worlds,” concluding that “Police wives don't want to become police widows.”49

49 David Fortney, “To the Wives of the Men in Blue, Fear Is an Ever Present Companion.”
When police wives did become police widows, they benefited from fundraising by at least a half dozen groups in Chicago during the 1950s and 1960s, when limited life insurance coverage and pension payouts failed to keep up with the cost of living. The Chicago Police Wives’ Association raised money for widows through parties and dances throughout the 1950s, proudly reporting that “Chicago police take care of their own.” The political appeal of police widows also worked in their favor. While legislation to secure disciplinary reform and collective bargaining for policemen frequently stalled or failed to pass, state and national legislation on behalf of police widows passed with relative ease. Police widows won their biggest national legislative victory with the extension of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act to cover state and municipal police officers in 1976, which provided up to $50,000 in aid to the immediate family of an officer killed in the line of duty.

But there was a real difference between the promise of death benefits for police widows and the ability of widows to collect their pensions. Police widows were often caught off guard by bureaucratic and legal procedures. One Chicago police organization distributed blank forms for making wills to its members and urged policemen to inform their wives about death benefits because “a number of the men fail to let their wives know what associations they belong to, or what benefits they have coming to them.” In an attempt to ease the process for future police widows, COP reminded its members in 1972 that “When a police officer expires, benefits ARE NOT paid AUTOMATICALLY to his widow,” and provided a checklist of documents police widows needed in order to collect their benefits. These documents included certified copies of the widow’s birth certificate, marriage license, her husband’s death certificate, and birth certificates for all children under eighteen, as well as “documentary proof” of any divorces. Even the police superintendent advised policemen to prepare their wives for possible widowhood and circulated an itemized list of death benefits the police department offered. It seemed that everyone could agree that police widows needed and deserved support, but fights over police safety standards proved to be the most contentious for Chicago’s police wives.

“Orphan Makers”

Police wives were, of course, less interested in preparing for widowhood than they were in trying to prevent it. For organized police wives, the majority of them white, the most significant threat to police safety in the 1960s and early 1970s came from one-man patrol cars. The number of police in each patrol car mattered deeply, not just to police wives, but to the city, the police, and the citizens they served. For the city government and the police department it

meant controlling expenses and the distribution of police services. In high-crime neighborhoods that were typically underserved by the police, one-man patrol made it possible to put more police cars on the street. While most white police objected to working alone in predominately black neighborhoods where police-community relationships were hostile, Chicago’s organized black police supported one-man patrols as a way to improve police service in high-crime areas. Not only were one-man patrol cars a racially-divisive issue, they were also contested because they were where police spent most of their time at work. A struggle over patrol cars became a fundamental contest to control the police workplace in Chicago.

The Chicago police department introduced one-man patrol cars in 1960 to double the number of patrol cars it could deploy. In its training materials, the department argued that one-man cars were safer than two-man cars because police and citizens would be better protected with more patrol cars on the road. Extra patrol cars meant police beats would be smaller and, department commanders reasoned, officers in danger could call upon other patrol cars close by. “Safety presents little problem,” the department explained, “if the officer is mentally and physically prepared, adequately trained and thoroughly schooled in strict compliance with the one man patrol procedures.”56 But safety did seem like a problem in the first two years of one-man patrol when a sergeant lost an eye, a patrolman was shot four times, another was beaten and slashed, and another was shot and then attacked by a “mob,” all while patrolling alone.57

By the early 1970s, Chicago police organizations like COP openly opposed one-man patrols. COP condemned them as “Orphan Makers,” underscoring the centrality of police families to debates about police safety, and called the police who drove them “Clay Pigeons.”58 But the black police of the AAPL supported one-man patrol, contending that ongoing police brutality, and not one-man patrol cars, increased violent attacks against police. The AAPL accused organizations like COP of trying to limit police service in black neighborhoods, arguing that increasing two-man patrols would have a “devastating” effect on the level of police service in Chicago’s black communities. Instead of fighting one-man patrols, the AAPL advised police to stop brutality against black citizens, telling them, “If your mothers and wives wait in fear, tell them the truth that you aren’t going to change your ways and the next time it might be you.”59

Not all Chicago police wives waited in fear for their husbands to be shot or injured in one-man cars. In 1969 a large contingent of white police wives organized the Concerned Police Wives of Chicago to protest one-man patrols. In an extensive petition drive, they leveraged their fear of becoming police widows to establish moral authority in the debate. Promoting the wives’ petitions against one-man patrols, one city paper endorsed what it saw as the wives’ unassailable position, writing that “Every one of them knows that her husband could be the next to die. Their argument is emotional, but it has solid basis in fact as well.” In a coordinated campaign, Chicago police wives rounded up nearly 100,000 signatures for petitions opposing one-man patrols. COP presented the signatures to Mayor Richard J. Daley during a highly-staged event in the spring of

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56 Chicago Police Department Training Division, “Lesson Plan: One Man Car Patrol,” September 1960, HWLMRC.
1973, unfurling the three hundred-foot-long petition scroll at his office door. By then the department had begun to reduce its one-man patrols. In both 1973 and 1974 it reported that it had stopped using one-man patrols during nighttime shifts. But one year after the campaign against one-man patrols wound down, Chicago police wives initiated yet another struggle to control who worked in the city’s patrol cars, claiming once again that their husbands’ safety was at stake. This time, instead of lobbying for policemen to work with partners, police wives tried to stop policemen from working with policewomen as their partners.

“The Feminine Arm of the Law”

Chicago hired its first woman with police powers in 1893. Holding the official title of “patrolman,” she worked for the department for thirty years before receiving her police pension. In the decades that followed, few women joined the department. Like other police departments nationwide, Chicago hired so few policewomen throughout the twentieth century that until the early 1980s men made up over ninety-seven percent of Chicago’s police force. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the police department employed between 70 and 90 policewomen total, and for twenty-five years, from 1941 to 1966, the department did not hire any new policewomen at all. Of course, this hiring freeze may have had something to do with the fact that in 1941 two-thirds of Chicago’s policewomen were discovered to be “temporary political appointees,” patronage workers who had been hired as a political favor. When the department resumed hiring policewomen in 1966, their introduction to the department marked them as a class apart, and below, male recruits. A Police Academy instructor described policewomen’s training as the “same drilling as the men get but with a little less gusto.” A profile of the policewomen recruits in the department’s employee magazine, the Chicago Police Star, delighted in the fact that the women “who had already purchased guns were required to carry them—even on dates.”

Expectations about policewomen’s femininity and maternal instincts defined nearly every aspect of their training and work in Chicago and other cities. An early pioneer in hiring policewomen, the Los Angeles police department designated a separate “Mother’s Bureau”

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63 In the early 1960s there was a total of 2,400 policewomen in all U.S. municipal police departments, Allan T. Duffin, History in Blue: 160 Years of Women Police, Sheriffs, Detectives, and State Troopers (New York: Kaplan, 2010), 109; Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting, March 25, 1960, Orlando W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library; “Policewomen: Class of ’66,” Chicago Police Star, September 1966, 17.
65 “Policewomen: Class of ’66,” 17. Chicago’s policewomen were in fact issued special purses designed to hold their guns. One policewoman remembers having “big, square cardboard policewomen purses which had a holster built right in. There was a flap on the front with one of those turn buckles. Inside, there was a holster with like a restraining strap on the holster. So you had to open your purse and unrestrain your gun to get it out. They were semilogical, but how can you run with a purse hanging on your shoulder?” Connie Fletcher, Breaking and Entering (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 34.
where policewomen worked exclusively with the city’s women and children until 1966. Similar agencies operated in other U.S. cities and in Chicago the city’s most powerful policewoman, Lois Higgins, championed the idea that policewomen could enforce the law and act like mothers and “ladies” at the same time. As the highest-ranking policewoman in Illinois, Higgins addressed the members of the International Association of Women Police at their annual meeting in Chicago in 1958. There she defined “the feminine arm of the law” as “the hand that rocks the cradle, and sometimes shoots a wicked .38.” It was this combination of maternal instincts and bravery, Higgins argued, that equipped and qualified policewomen for their jobs. But to Higgins, policewomen’s most important asset was their femininity. Impressed by the policewomen in the audience “wearing make-up…the subtlest of perfumes…the newest style hats,” Higgins celebrated them as “smart, attractive, well-groomed, elegant, and—best of all—completely feminine!” It was a policewoman’s gender, Higgins declared, that was “her most powerful and most useful weapon.”

This concept extended to the other women employed by the Chicago police department. Several dozen female police matrons ran a separate women’s prison lockup that processed an average of 1,600 prisoners a month by 1968. Matrons searched, fingerprinted, and fed women prisoners upon their arrival. They made inventories of prisoner’s personal property, which the Chicago Police Star noted was “often a big job, because of the number of items women are prone to carry in their hand bags.” One supervisor believed that an inherent maternal empathy prepared police matrons for their work with difficult prisoners, explaining, “Most of the matrons are mothers…Some are grandmothers. They always keep in mind that ‘this could have happened to a member of MY family.’” Other women worked in the department in larger numbers than both policewomen and prison matrons. These included six hundred crossing guards and a growing group of female clerical workers that continued to expand as more and more police moved from desk detail to patrol duty throughout the 1960s. The nearly all-female staff of the Finance Division handled the police department’s budget and payroll and the Chicago Police

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68 The International Association of Women Police was an organization founded by Alice Stebbins Wells in 1915. Wells was the first policewoman appointed in Los Angeles and was “largely credited with bringing policewomen into the mainstream.” See Higgins, “Historical Background of Policewomen’s Service,” 831. Policewomen in the early twentieth century were caricatured in newspapers as ugly, masculine, and poorly dressed. Decades later, Higgins commended policewomen for proving the old stereotype wrong, saying, “You are not the hard-faced primly costumed characters drawn by the cartoonists.” See also Janis Appier, Policing Women: The Sexual Politics of Law Enforcement and the LAPD, 63.


Star applauded them for literally holding the department’s “purse strings.” Whether women guarded prisoners or balanced the police department books, their work was consistently defined and understood in terms of their gender.

In the summer of 1974 the Chicago police department announced a new program that would send fourteen policewomen out in patrol cars to work with policemen as their partners for the first time. The introduction of co-ed patrol cars in the Chicago police department was part of a nationwide transition sped up by the 1972 extension of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act that prohibited racial and gender discrimination by state and local governments. The prospect of policewomen working alongside policemen as equals prompted a national discussion among police administrators and criminology experts who were initially skeptical about women in law enforcement. In 1970, with minimal research about policewomen available, some experts expressed suspicion of women, especially married women, who wanted to do the police work traditionally performed by men. One criminologist went so far as to question the “motivations and the stability of the married woman who may want to enter the law enforcement profession.” The entrance of women into an occupation understood as fundamentally male was so earth-shaking that a long-time police marriage counselor remembered it as a “radical move that threatened to destroy the very definition of what it meant to be a good cop, which was equated, and mostly still is, with being a ‘real man.’”

With the masculinity of police work at stake, policewomen faced ongoing resistance from their colleagues and supervisors as more and more city departments tentatively introduced co-ed patrols in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Police wives also felt threatened during this transition and argued that gender equality for police was simply impossible: policewomen could not do the work of policemen without endangering themselves and, especially, their partners. In New Orleans the first co-ed police partners went on patrol together in 1968. These were temporary assignments, intended to give policewomen field experience before they entered the women’s division. Women were not considered full-fledged police partners and the New Orleans police department treated the co-ed patrol cars as though they were “one-man cars,” forbidding them from responding to potentially dangerous calls without backup. Despite the limited nature of these patrols, a delegation of New Orleans police wives stormed the conference room of the city’s police superintendent to protest that co-ed patrols were unsafe. Similarly, in New York an experimental program called “Policewoman on Patrol” sent fifteen policewomen out in patrol cars for the first time in 1973. At first, policewomen partnered with other policewomen to “make the situation easier on the officers’ wives.” But once the department started assigning policewomen and policemen to work together in patrol cars, police wives organized a picket outside a central precinct station. Carrying signs with messages such as, “Don’t we have enough to worry about?” the wives demanded that all policewomen return to the women’s division.

74 New Orleans police administrators dismissed the wives as “totally disorganized” and one of the policewomen wrote off their complaints, saying “Good heavens, if a guy wants to play around, he can find other places than on his beat." “Police Wives Opposed to Male-Female Teams,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 1968, A2; Allan T. Duffin, History in Blue: 160 Years of Women Police, Sheriffs, Detectives, and State Troopers, 139.
Speaking for the group, the wives’ leader expressed a shared concern about “getting a call that our husband had been hurt or shot in a situation where it could have been avoided if he had a male officer for a partner,” and dismissed it as “ridiculous to say we’re doing this because we’re jealous.”

Meanwhile in the Chicago police department, opportunities for women remained scarce. Over five thousand women took the separate policewomen’s exam in 1972 and the competition for the few available spots was so fierce that the chief examiner joked that the applicants “might as well be running for mayor.” As for policewomen doing the same work as policemen, even Chicago’s first female investigator in the homicide division disapproved. In 1973 she told reporters, “I don’t like to see women trying to be men…I believe policewomen should be women first. They would be foolish to try to act as policemen.” Feats of bravery did little to change minds in the department about policewomen’s ability to work outside the women’s division. Early in 1973, one of the department’s sixteen policewomen recruits was abducted by an armed man on New Year’s Eve. While held at gunpoint, the recruit broke free and shot her captor once at close range, and then three more times at point-blank. Back at the Police Academy, the recruit’s supervisor took pride in his pupil’s self-defense skills, describing “a very shy, demure little girl with great presence of mind to put her training to work.” Afterward the recruit finished her training and went to work in the Women’s Division later that winter.

But the federal anti-discrimination lawsuit initiated by the AAPL against the department forced it to change its policies, if not its attitudes, regarding policewomen. Under pressure from the federal court, Chicago gradually hired and promoted more women and racial minorities beginning in the mid-1970s. It was a slow and often grudging transition. The policewomen hired, promoted, and integrated into the department during and after the AAPL’s lawsuit faced harassment or total silence from policemen while the department did little to ease the transition. In fact, it took steps to ensure that they continued to look and act like ladies while on patrol. The fourteen policewomen who reported for patrol duty in July of 1974 wore the same uniforms Chicago’s policewomen had been sporting since 1956, with three-inch heels, skirts, and “little beanies like stewardesses.”

A charm school teacher from a modeling agency taught a special class for the policewomen, instructing them on skills like “how to enter and exit a squad car gracefully.” On patrol, policewomen remembered that some of the policemen were unsure of how to act. Either the policemen ignored them or treated them like dates as they opened the passenger-side door of patrol cars and tried to pay for meals. The perception of this date-like atmosphere in co-ed patrol cars, combined with persistent anxieties about policewomen’s

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76 Men and women applicants did not take the police entrance examination together until 1975. Ironically enough, this examiner went on to become chief of personnel for Chicago’s first female mayor, Jane Byrne. “Women Wait in Vain for Police Jobs,” *Chicago Today*, June 4, 1972, clipping, AAPL, Box 48/Newspaper Clippings, Unions, 1972, CHM.


78 Margery McElheny, “Police Training Saved Me,’ 8.

79 Of the original policewomen’s uniforms in 1956, one policewoman said, “I hope everyone has noticed how streamlined we gals are, since becoming uniform conscious—we are not only going to wear them, but we are going to wear them with a flair.” Dorothy Kucala, “Women’s Division,” *Chicago Patrolman*, April-May 1956, 39.

80 Fletcher, *Breaking and Entering*, 55, 156.
inability to work as full-fledged police partners rallied Chicago’s organized police wives behind a new campaign to keep policewomen from going on patrol.

“Sirens with Sirens”

Chicago’s police wives opposed the new co-ed patrol cars almost immediately. Arguing that policewomen posed an even greater threat to the safety of policemen than one-man patrol cars, the wives believed that policewomen could not (or would not) protect policemen in an emergency. Even worse, they feared, policemen might put themselves in extra danger by taking risks to protect policewomen. Claiming that women were too “soft and easygoing” to do a job where they might have to fire a gun or kill someone, members of the Chicago Police Wives’ Association charged that “women cannot provide adequate protection for their male partners in emergency situations.” In addition to these objections, the police wives who had seem themselves as their husbands’ partners on the domestic front, now watched as other women stepped in to become their husbands’ partners on the job.

Police wives worried that co-ed police partnerships would soon lead to romantic affairs. One police wife was frank about the situation: “Either the man is going to have to be half-dead, or some kind of King Kong iron man, and the woman is going to have to be like a wall, or else something is going to happen,” adding that she did not have “a shaky marriage.” A letter to the editor of Chicago Today pointed to male-female police partnerships as another hazard of a new “coed world,” a place where adultery was becoming the norm: “Seemingly these are only jobs to be done, yet wives of husbands may resent or fear a proximity that may very well turn disastrous. There is a man and there is a woman—a biological reality not easily dismissed.”

A Chicago police wife interviewed in July of 1974 felt that an affair between male and female police partners was inevitable because of the intensity of police partnerships. “Five days a week, eight hours a day, in the same car. Year in and year out. They get pretty close to each other. My husband's partner knows him better than I do. Of course something could happen.”

The jealousy of police wives who “did not want their husbands to spend eight hours in an auto with another woman” represented more than pure envy. It reflected the wives’ understanding of the closeness of police partnerships on patrol. In 1980 a Midwestern police wife authored a feature story in Cosmopolitan that described these relationships, writing how “[o]ne officer told me he sometimes felt more ‘married’ to his partner than he did to his wife because the time spent on duty with his colleague was so much more intense. When that buddy left the force, the officer said he felt as though he’d been suddenly widowed.” A police wife who had been married to a policeman before becoming a policewoman herself, thought police wives “should be worried” about policewomen working in patrol cars. Explaining that “partners share a relationship that cannot be shared by anyone else living or dead in this entire world…you put your life in their hands,” this policewoman warned, “if it's a true partnership, you've got to have a very, very strong relationship with your spouse to survive it.” Police wives saw their marriages as a kind of police partnership, but they also understood police partnerships as a kind

81 Jeff Lyon, “Policemen’s Wives Fear ‘Sirens with Sirens’,” 3, 17.
85 Fletcher, Breaking and Entering, 154.
of marriage, making the idea of policemen and policewomen working together all the more troubling.

Responding to the anxieties and objections of police wives, the police department arranged a face-to-face meeting between police wives and policewomen at the city’s Fire Academy. There, over coffee and tea, police wives confronted the policewomen in what one policewoman remembered as an “uproar” over co-ed patrol cars where police wives used arguments about safety as camouflage for their jealousy:

Oh, my God. Oh, God, police wives. The Police Wives’ Association. At the time, they were very powerful. They were very organized and very vocal. They did not like us. We were the honeys that were gonna take their husbands in the bushes. Or, as they liked to say publicly, we would not be able to protect them.

But the policewoman dismissed wives’ objections, scoffing that “they're all married to these slugs that you wouldn't look at on a bad day and they're all worried we're going to seduce their husbands.” The jealousy of police wives was also laughable to Chicago firefighters who overheard the meeting at the Academy. One joked about a situation where “[s]ome cop has got an ugly wife at home and a foxy partner” at work. But the police department took the wives’ opposition to policewomen seriously, and tried to persuade the wives to accept policewomen working patrol. A police commander who was “impatient with the idea that policewomen are some kind of hussies, and that the male-female teams will ignore emergency calls on the radio to do some smooching in the back seat,” reassured police wives that they had nothing to fear from policewomen. The department screened a film for the police wives that featured the eventual success of co-ed patrols in New York City. A series of speakers testified to the capabilities and virtues of policewomen. The Deputy Police Chief told a story about how a policewoman once saved his life and the police chaplain personally vouched for the morality of Chicago’s policewomen, explaining that when policewomen and policemen worked in the same patrol cars, they were not exactly “going to a drive-in movie.”

The department’s attempts seemed to have little effect on the police wives and after the meetings wives reported that they “came away…feeling the same way as when they came in,” and continued to believe that “policewomen will either let down their husbands in a life-and-death situation, or that they are sirens-with-sirens who will lure the men away from home and hearth.” One police wife called the department’s meetings a “farce” that failed to address her concerns. “My husband is in a bad district,” she explained. “He has to break up a lot of tavern brawls. I don’t think a woman is capable of handling a situation like that.”

After the department’s meetings the president of the Chicago Police Wives’ Association, Barbara Hanlon, held a press conference on her front lawn to reiterate that police wives were “not jealous,” calling the accusation “absurd.” She insisted that the real issue at stake was the safety of their husbands. As a police widow herself, Hanlon spoke from personal experience when she discussed police safety. Hanlon was on the scene when her police husband was shot and killed during an off-duty confrontation with car thief in a grocery store parking lot. Reiterating the

86 Ibid., 152.
87 Jeff Lyon, “Policemen’s Wives Fear ‘Sirens with Sirens’.”
88 Ibid.
argument that “a woman is not physically capable of backing up our husbands in a dangerous situation,” Hanlon called for the removal of policewomen from patrol cars, because, she said, “You can’t alleviate a fear of this sort unless you eliminate the source.” Another police wife at the press conference backed up Hanlon with an ominous prediction, speculating that the “bitter end of it…would be if a police officer were ever shot when his partner was a woman.”

While Hanlon maintained that it was safety, and not jealousy, that motivated the Wives’ Association’s protests, the suspicions of police wives continued to surface. At the police department’s seminar for new police wives, the topic of police husbands “working with pretty young policewomen,” was discussed at length and one wife worried about the prospect of her husband working with a woman, saying “I feel threatened and I’d rather he didn’t.” The advice literature written by and for police wives also addressed the issue of jealousy in police marriages. Every article or book for police wives had something to say about the problem more broadly. The third in a list of “Ten Commandments for Police Wives” was “Thou shall not show jealousies either of women or possessions.” Under the heading, “Other Hazards,” self-designated marriage police marriage expert Barbara Webber explained that “the uniform which your man wears will attract girls like flies to honey.” An essay in the Handbook for Law Enforcement Wives warned, “Ladies, as long as your husband is a cop, he will have opportunities.” If policemen took assignments as vice decoys to arrest prostitutes, Police Wife: How to Live with the Law and Like It, reminded wives to be especially careful to resist jealousy and suspicion.

Advice for police wives also tackled specific jealousies of policewomen. The Handbook for Law Enforcement Wives published a testimonial from a woman sergeant in the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department in California who acknowledged wives’ anxieties about her working with a man at all hours of the night. “In the public eye, it probably would appear to the average citizen that things were not always ‘kosher’…a wife could very well resent her husband being in the car with a woman, and sometimes all night long with a woman.” Reassuring police wives, the sergeant admired the decency and fidelity of the men she worked with: “I have sat in the middle of the night, listening to male officers talk about their wives, children, homes and dreams…You

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89 Mark Miller, “Police Women Seen as Danger,” Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1974, 3. Not all police wives thought women police were weak. A midwestern police wife expressed admiration for the toughness of policewomen and explained how her husband was forced to respect them: “Hand-to-hand combat exercises with women trainees made Rusty uncomfortable at first—but a drop kick to the head from one female student and a wrist hold from another he had to bite to break out of, quickly taught him these women wouldn’t ignore the advantage if he chose to treat them delicately.” Elizabeth Philips Herrick, “What It’s Like to Be a Policeman’s Wife,” 178.

90 Ellen Warren, “Not Jealous of Women Cops, Say Wives,” Chicago Daily News, July 20, 1974, 4, Reel 1797, CPL Microfilm; Carol Kleiman, “Policemen’s widows,” Chicago Tribune, November 10, 1975, 9, 15. In 1980 this prediction came true when a policeman partnered with a policewoman was shot. During the shootout the policeman fired all of the bullets in both his and his partner’s gun, while she phoned for help. The policewoman was harangued by her colleagues for over a year before she shot herself with her service revolver in 1982. The Chicago Tribune reflected, “It is one thing to be a policeman in Chicago. It is another thing to be a female police officer.” Patrick Reardon, “A Struggle for Acceptance,” Chicago Tribune, December 10, 1982, 1–2.

91 Patricia Leeds, “Police Program Tries to Keep a Happy Family.”


95 Pat James and Martha Nelson, Police Wife: How to Live with the Law and Like It, 10.
don’t need to worry about men like that.” 96 Understanding and Solving your Police Marriage Problems asked police wives to consider that “if he wanted to have an affair, he wouldn’t need a female partner for an excuse…chances are he won’t pick up his partner anyway, as this is usually against department policy and can lead to disciplinary action.” 97 If policewomen did lure policemen away from their wives, Barbara Webber suggested it was police wives who were to blame, scolding, “If things aren’t right at home, he’s going to get tempted. It’s no different than a boss-secretary relationship or any office romance.” 98

Yet in many ways the traditional working relationships between men and women in the Chicago police department began to change as women moved out of the Women’s Division and out onto patrol. Nationally, objections to women working as police officers also began to fade. In 1974 a think tank called the Police Foundation sponsored a major study of policewomen in Washington, D.C. and funded a National Policewomen Information Center that produced optimistic reports. 99 One 1975 study of Chicago policewomen described an emerging consensus where it was “widely agreed that women can perform police work as competently as men, and perhaps better in some respects.” 100 An article in the Police Chief that year also reported a widespread acceptance of women police. “No longer is the idea of a woman police officer met with derision or disbelief,” it observed, concluding that “being a male is not in itself a bona fide job qualification for police work.” 101 Amidst these studies and facing pressure from a federal judge, the Chicago police department continued to change its policies to officially integrate women into the department as equals. It eliminated the distinction between policewomen and policemen in favor of the gender neutral title, “police officer” and changed its seminars for new police wives into seminars for new spouses. By 1982 women made up five percent of the Chicago police force and 30 percent of all incoming recruits. That same year, for the first time in the department’s history, Chicago’s uniformed women police stopped wearing skirts and high heels and started to wear pants. 102

Still, the gendered elements of unequal boss-secretary relationships persisted in the Chicago police department in many, and often racialized, ways. While the AAPL’s anti-discrimination lawsuit drastically improved opportunities for women and racial minorities in the police department, it exposed how racial divisions could frustrate gender solidarities among policewomen. In the late 1970s an internal department audit found that the police administrators and supervisors assigned a disproportionate number of white women police to desk assignments

97 Hilda F. Besner and Sandra J. Robinson, Understanding and Solving Your Police Marriage Problems, 120.
in an effort to protect them from the dangers of patrol work while black women police often worked beats in high-crime districts where they gained patrol experience but not preferential status. “White women were put on a pedestal, treated like wives,” one woman police officer observed, “They’re high-priced secretaries.”

Hiring opportunities for women in the Chicago police department also grew unevenly along racial lines. At first when the department began to follow court-mandated hiring quotas in the mid-1970s, it counted black policewomen as black police. Because hiring quotas for black police were high, it meant that the department hired and promoted more black women than white women. After a few years of hiring according to the quotas, white women objected to what they saw as an unfair advantage for black women and lobbied for a change to the rules. Within a few years all women competed for the same jobs, regardless of their race, and the department hired fewer black women and promoted even fewer black women police. This, in turn, improved hiring and promotion opportunities for black men in the police department. For its part, the AAPL did not object to the change, agreeing that “it was acceptable to count the black women as women, not as blacks.”

In 1978 the Chicago police department promoted 117 officers to the rank of sergeant. Just one of them was a woman, Jacqueline Thomas, who became the first black woman police sergeant in Chicago. As sergeant she supervised the women police who guarded prisoners in the city’s women’s lockup, once the domain of Chicago’s prison matrons. Even though the presence of Chicago’s first black woman sergeant in the lockup represented a significant set of demographic changes in the department, Sgt. Thomas described women’s work in the department in terms reminiscent of the city’s police matrons several decades earlier. “Up here,” Sgt. Thomas said, “we try to treat people like they’re somebody’s mother or daughter.”

Anxieties about women police becoming too masculine also persisted among the women in the department. In 1984 a therapist who led a support group for women police in Chicago explained that the women were “realizing that they need to learn how to relate to men, that it’s okay for them to be a woman, that they don’t have to become too tough.” One policewoman had worried that she would “lose her femininity” when she started working as a police officer, but eventually realized that it was “up to the individual girl,” saying “I can’t wait to get home and get dressed up. I don’t feel like I’ve lost any femininity. I haven’t had any complaints.” At the same time, women police demonstrated that they could work on equal footing with men. In 1983 Chicago’s

104 A group of black women police later filed a complaint against the rules change, but the judge threw it out on the grounds that it was “not timely.” Howard Saffold, who served as the AAPL’s president during the lawsuits acknowledged the difficulties faced by black women police in the department and in the AAPL, saying in an interview, “You know the strategy for the, for the racist white power structure was to keep us divided by showing that the black officer didn't have any power anyway. So you'd better try to hook up with some white supervisor or some white partner or somebody. And they played that race card to a bust. And the gender part just fell right into it. It became extremely difficult for us to start talking about, what happens when the black female becomes a supervisor. We had to take black males back to school about how much respect they deserved over and above the respect that you might not want to afford a, a supervisor previous to the female because she had to cut the mustard twice to do it. And if she was black, three times, you see. So we, we were cognizant of that fact.” See Susan E. Martin, “Outsider Within the Station House: The Impact of Race and Gender on Black Women Police”; Larry Crowe, “Howard Saffold Details the Divisions Between Officers and Communities over Race”, June 5, 2002, Session 1, tape 5, story 2, History Makers Digital Archive.
highest-ranking woman police officer, the assistant deputy superintendent of the traffic division, commented on women’s progress in the department, saying that the “biggest change…is the acceptance of women in all divisions of law enforcement…our greatest accomplishment is working together. We have proved ourselves as being a coworker, and one who can be a good coworker.” And after all of the protests from police wives who feared that policewomen would endanger policemen’s safety, the first woman police officer who was killed in the line of duty in Chicago was shot accidentally by her male partner during a narcotics raid.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, police wives’ resistance to women police cooled and the power of police wives’ organizations began to fade after the election of the FOP as Chicago’s first police union in 1980. With their newfound powers of organization and the newly-enacted protections of their contract, the police rank-and-file relied less on the activism of police wives and asked more of their union. Ultimately, Chicago’s police wives could not keep women police out of patrol cars, but for decades they helped their husbands fight, and sometimes win, crucial battles in the police department. They expanded the arena in which police workplace struggles were fought and made family issues central to police grievances. As defenders of male privilege in the department and promoters of their domestic partnership with policemen, police wives tried to regulate their own behavior as well as gender boundaries within the department. They opposed women’s equality, supporting instead a sex-segregated workplace where policewomen did their jobs as “mothers.” At the same time they demanded an equal voice in the police department and they made workplace demands for their husbands by drawing on their power and status as the wives of the Chicago police.

106 Manuel Galvan, “City/suburbs.”
5: From Public Servants to Public Employees: 
Organized Labor and the Chicago Police in the Late Twentieth Century

Over the course of a hundred years, the Chicago police transformed themselves from the repressors of labor unrest in the nineteenth-century to the central actors of their own labor movement in the late twentieth century. The Chicago police who walked picket lines and organized job actions in the 1970s could not have been more different from their counterparts from earlier decades. In 1937, during what became known as the Memorial Day Massacre, members of the Chicago police opened fire on striking steel workers and their families who were gathered outside a Republic Steel Plant, killing ten and seriously injuring dozens more. Over thirty years later during the summer of 1973, sixty members of the Chicago police formed their own picket and dared, for the first time, to protest in front of police department headquarters. During these years the relationship between the police and the Chicago Democratic machine also changed. In the early 1960s Mayor Daley had been known as “the policemen’s friend,” but by 1974 relations between the police and the Mayor had deteriorated to the point where members of COP hanged him in effigy from a chandelier in the West Loop Holiday Inn.¹

How did this group of loyal public servants who had once been more effective at crushing worker uprisings than the Pinkertons, become dissenting, and eventually unionized, public employees? The unionization of the Chicago police involved a series of major political shifts by the police rank and file and by the Chicago city government in the late 1960s and 1970s.² First, Chicago’s majority-white police organizations, COP, the FOP, and the CPA, began to articulate labor demands in response to a number of pressures. Affirmative action policies supported by the AAPL, grievances over department discipline and growing safety concerns, added urgency to this new labor agenda. Two police organizations, COP and the CPA, also realized that affiliating themselves with large national labor unions could deliver tangible results and material benefits to their members.

In the late 1970s, Chicago revised its policies governing labor relations with its municipal employees. Since the late nineteenth century the city had determined the pay and benefits of its most of its employees through “handshake bargaining,” an informal process where representatives from different groups of city workers met with the mayor to decide on a verbal “contract” for the upcoming year. Many handshake deals preceded Daley and some had been in place since the late nineteenth century. But handshake bargaining helped some city workers more

² Sam Mitrani, “Order in the Metropolis: The Origin of the Chicago Police Department, 1850-1890” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois, Chicago, 2009) 5, 6, 30. Mitrani argues that unlike the Pinkertons, the Chicago police “never lost an open confrontation with strikers or rioters,” concluding that the “private sector simply could not provide the type of armed institution the city's businessmen required.”
than others. Public employees in the building and construction trades unions were almost always assured that they would earn the prevailing wages paid in the private sector through arrangements that both sides agreed “constituted the essence of collective bargaining.”

Handshake bargaining also enabled Chicago’s thousands of patronage workers to secure good benefits and inflated wages. Police and firefighters, however, faced continual frustration by the incremental gains and limited protections they received through handshake bargaining. Even though the city’s firefighters belonged to Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2, AFL-CIO, the city did not recognize their unionized status and Chicago police were not even allowed to join unions until 1975.

Instead, city officials capitalized on the competition between Chicago’s police organizations in hopes that they could prevent any one organization from becoming too powerful. Leaders of every police organization were invited to meet with the mayor at the same time for handshake bargaining and Daley counted on disagreements and divisions between them to diffuse the collective strength of the police. Outside of handshake bargaining, the police department also found ways to encourage competition among police organizations. It invited representatives from every major police organization to recruit rookies while they were still in training at the Police Academy. As part of its divide-and-conquer strategy, the department purposely scheduled meetings to “enable recruits to hear the presentations of more than one organization,” and by the time recruits became sworn members of the force, many of them held memberships in multiple organizations.

With the death of Mayor Richard J. Daley in 1976, the political relationships that had traditionally shaped labor relationships for city employees became suddenly uncertain—a source of anxiety for workers who had traditionally benefited in deals with Daley and a new opportunity for police and firefighters who saw their chance to finally negotiate real contracts with the city. In the mayoral contests that followed Daley’s death, granting contracts for city workers became a pressing campaign issue. Mayoral candidate Jane Byrne promised police and firefighters a contract as part of her 1979 campaign platform, stipulating that the city needed to legalize public employee collective bargaining before she would negotiate. After Byrne’s election, this public employee bargaining legislation turned out to be easier to envision than it was to enact. Delays in the city council and doubts about Byrne’s commitment to the new law provoked a controversial three-week strike by the city’s firefighters in the winter of 1980. The militancy and danger of the

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3 Letter from Joel A. D’Alba to Martin J. Oberman, Re: Mayor’s Committee on Collective Bargaining, August 29, 1979, Oberman Papers, Box 24, unprocessed collection, CHM; Letter from Bernard Schultz, President, Local 52 Ill. of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen to Thomas J. Nader, President, Chicago Building Trades Council, 15 August 1979, Oberman Papers, Box 24, unprocessed collection, CHM.


5 The police department also offered automatic dues deduction from police paychecks for all of the department’s major police organizations, with the exception of the AAPL, which was not allowed automatic dues deduction until 1976, when it was about to win its anti-discrimination lawsuit against the police department and city. Each police officer was allowed dues deduction for just one organization and once AAPL members were able to sign up for dues deduction, the organization struggled to enroll hundreds of its members because they had already signed up for dues deduction for their memberships in other police organizations. James M. Rochford to Renault Robinson, May 6, 1976, AAPL, Box 1/Chicago Police Department Correspondence, 1976-1979, CHM; Chicago Police Department, “Department Notice: Additional Enrollment Period, Payroll Deduction of Police Organization Membership Dues,” March 8, 1976, AAPL, Box 60/City of Chicago--Personnel Department, 1976, CHM; Howard Saffold to Joseph P. Mildice, April 1, 1976, AAPL, Box 62/Dues Deduction Letters, 1976, CHM; Joseph T. Mildice to Howard Saffold, April 12, 1976, CHM.
firefighters’ strike in Chicago, a city especially sensitive to the destruction of fires, heightened resistance to the police labor militancy and new ambivalence among the police about their own unionization. Opponents to police unions worried that the police, already one of the most expensive items in the city budget, would drain the city’s finances with expensive contract demands. These demands, critics argued, also posed a threat to the sovereignty of the city government if a police contract could override the authority of the police department and city hall. A concerted effort by the Teamsters to organize the Chicago police in the mid-1970s also raised alarm, but the Teamsters received mixed support from the Chicago police. For police, unionization was a difficult decision, one that required them to rethink their civic identities and their relationship to the state. As police struggled to define their relationship with organized labor, they made a complicated, and in some ways incomplete, shift from public servant to public employee.

A Police Labor Movement

Outside of Chicago, police in other cities shared some of this reluctance to identify themselves with unions, even in places where police organizations had the backing of powerful national labor unions. Often, police unions referred to themselves as “Protective” or “Benevolent” associations, titles that reflected that nationwide, police had organized in the long shadow of the Boston Police Strike. In August of 1919, Boston police officers replaced their social club with an AFL-affiliated union in an attempt to address their long hours, low pay, and grim working conditions. To keep the police out of the AFL, the Boston Police Commissioner wrote a rule forbidding police from holding union memberships altogether. In protest, the majority of Boston’s police, 1,117 patrolmen out of 1,544 in the department, walked off the job and violence and rioting spread throughout the city for days afterward.6 While the mayor and police commissioner debated whether they should call in the state militia to keep order, nine people were killed. Finally Calvin Coolidge, then the governor of Massachusetts, stepped in to take over. He brought in the militia, fired the striking police, and made what would become the standard argument against police unions, saying that “[t]here is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time.”7 The memory of the Boston Police Strike established the idea that police unions posed a unique threat to public safety, and fifty years later, a police strike in Montreal seemed to confirm this belief. In Montreal, looting, burglaries, and violence shook the city after 3,700 police officers walked off the job in 1969.8 That same year, police in Vallejo, California went on the first major police strike in the United States since 1919, with a more peaceful outcome than Montreal.9 Both the city’s police and firefighters walked off the job in a dispute over their salaries and working hours. They received unprecedented levels of support from other unionized workers in Vallejo as unionized employees in the building trades refused to work on public projects for the duration of the strike. Ronald Reagan, then the governor of California, admonished the strikers, saying “I don’t believe in the right of public employees to strike because government, unlike a private employer, can’t

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go out of business.”

Ignoring Reagan, the police continued their strike for four additional days and despite the worst fears of city officials, violence and chaos did not break out in Vallejo. The mayor of Vallejo had feared the worst, saying “We thought we’d have serious trouble,” but reported that the city’s rates of crime and fire damage had actually been lower than usual. In negotiations to end the strike, police and firefighters went on to win amnesty for the strikers, a pay raise, better educational benefits, and a shorter work week.

The success of the Vallejo police strike marked what had become a new era of legitimacy for police unions in the United States. Emboldened by the strike, Vallejo police sought an AFL-CIO charter and fueled speculation that police might try to form a national police union. In the late 1960s and 1970s police labor organizing became a national movement. Even the police in Boston secured union representation in 1967 and the Boston Police Protective Association earned a reputation as one of the most aggressive and militant police unions in the country. By 1973, rank-and-file police in New York, Los Angeles, Detroit, Denver, San Francisco, Baltimore, and Miami, to name just a few, participated in job actions, organized unions, and bargained for contracts. San Francisco’s Mayor said that the city’s police strike had the potential “to bring this city to its knees,” and during New York’s police strike the mayor had to bus White House guards into the city to keep order. In 1975 a police lobbyist in California declared that the U.S. had reached “the age of the police job action.”

In Illinois most police organizing centered on small-scale operations through a group called the Combined Counties Police Association (CCPA), which had unionized a quarter of Cook County’s police departments by the mid-1970s including Des Plaines and Skokie. While small police departments organized on the fringes of the city and big police departments went on strike in other cities, the Chicago Police struggled to assert their workplace grievances demands and grappled with their ever-changing relationship to the labor movement.

The Police and Chicago Labor Politics

For nearly a hundred years the police had developed a complicated connection to labor organizations in Chicago. Beginning in the 1860s, the city deployed its police in response to the crisis of labor unrest in the city. Police successfully broke Chicago’s eight-hour strike of 1866, suppressed a series of riots and protests in the 1870s, including the Haymarket Affair, and shut down the McCormick Strike of 1886. In the next century police department special “labor

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10 Reagan repeated this statement as President when he broke the PATCO strike in 1981. Whereas Reagan was able to crush the PATCO strike by firing the strikers and hiring replacements, in Vallejo he was unable to stop the police strike. Joseph Anthony McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike That Changed America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).


detail” continued to function as an ongoing surveillance operation well into the 1980s as police infiltrated union meetings and documented labor activity in the city. At the same time, police also provided key protection and support to some of Chicago’s most high-profile labor leaders. In 1960 four Chicago policemen served as full-time bodyguards for the president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, William Lee, whose security detail was paid for by the city. 

As police both spied on and protected labor unions in Chicago, they worked side-by-side with unionized city employees who, through lucrative handshake bargaining deals, often earned the same or better wages. Police resented the workers who performed less skilled and less dangerous work, but received more pay because of the advantage and clout union memberships gave them during informal negotiations with the city. A survey of historical handshake bargaining agreements revealed that janitors who cleaned police stations had been represented by the AFL-CIO affiliated Building Services Municipal Employees’ Union since 1927 and had earned about the same wages as the police in the 1960s. In 1962 police station janitors working at the lowest pay-grade earned $5,418 a year, while police who worked at the lowest pay-grade earned $5,412. At the central police station downtown the head janitor made $8,112 a year, which was almost more than most new police captains made each year. Sanitation workers also out-earned the police until 1968, when an article in the COP Newsletter sarcastically made an announcement to “congratulate all the Patrolmen in the Chicago Police Department,” with the news that COP’s “statistics department has just come up with the news that we are now earning as much money as the CITY GARBAGE COLLECTORS!”

In addition to earning a better base salary, other city employees also collected cash overtime at time-and-a-half or double rates while the police received straight time that was “paid” in compensatory time off. A particularly bitter moment for the police took place during Chicago’s blizzard of 1979 that dumped a foot-and-a-half of snow on the city in two days. That week, police officers worked through the emergency with city employees who were earning double time and because police were some of the lowest-paid workers on the scene, they were assigned to shovel snow at EL stations. One officer argued that this was especially unfair because it was police who “write the tickets to bring in the revenue that the city uses to pay other city workers overtime.” In response to this injustice, COP successfully sued the city for the overtime owed to 1,200 police who had worked twelve-and-a-half-hour shifts shoveling snow.

COP’s court victory marked the first time the Chicago police department paid its officers time-and-a-half in cash for their overtime hours. Attributing this

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17 City of Chicago, Report of Committee on City Expenditures of September 30, 1953 and Report on The Department of Police, prepared by Griffenhagen & Associates Consultants in Public Administration, Copy of Alderman Leon M. Despres, CHM. Letter from the Committee on Expenditures to Martin H. Kennelly, Mayor of Chicago, September 30, 1953, II-7, CHM.
18 Chicago Police Department, Minutes of the Staff Meeting, March 25, 1960, O. W. Wilson Papers, Microfilm, Bancroft Library. Reputedly the police provided this protection because Lee had offended organized crime leaders in the city by refusing to work with them a decade earlier. See David Witwer, Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), chapter 8.
19 The City Council Committee on Collective Bargaining collected written documentation of these historical verbal handshake agreements with the city in preparation to draft a collective bargaining ordinance for city employees. See Building Service Municipal Employees Union, Local 46, Questionnaire Response, August 23 1979, Letter from John J. Masse, President, Building Service Municipal Employees Union Local 46 to Richard J. Daley, October 11, 1962, Oberman Papers, Box 24, unprocessed collection, CHM.
22 “C.O.P. Wins Time and One-Half Pay for Police Officers Who Worked on City’s Snow Removal Program,” C.O.P. Newsletter, April 1979, Labor Papers, Microfilm Reel 1, Box 57, CHM.
achievement to its recent affiliation with the AFL-CIO, COP explained that its court win proved police could harness the legal resources of big labor for their benefit.\textsuperscript{23} Yet even as the Chicago police enjoyed some of the material benefits that a union could deliver, they still balked at the prospect of becoming union members themselves.

In its ongoing campaign to become Chicago’s only police organization, COP had grappled with the reluctance of police to unionize for years. A decade before its affiliation with the AFL-CIO, COP made its first call for a police representation election in early 1969, citing support for an election from its own (likely selective) poll of members. From this poll COP concluded, “We SHOULD have just one organization, with only one dues.”\textsuperscript{24} No election came to fruition in 1969, but COP continued to promote a labor agenda, with unionization as its eventual goal. Not only did this conflict with department rules prohibiting police membership in unions, but it also tested COP’s own willingness to associate with militant police groups. The same month that COP proposed a representation election for the Chicago police, it refused to form an alliance with the newly-founded Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association because Cleveland’s association was too extreme. “We want responsible professional representation,” COP argued. “Not blowhards and boss fighters. We policemen in Chicago have had enough of radical Police organizations and radical people.”\textsuperscript{25} Even so, COP continued to re-envision itself as a police union over the next few years, a defiance of department rules which was in and of itself something of a radical move in Chicago.

Some of COP’s changes proved to be more semantic than anything. Late in 1969 COP stopped referring to the officers of its organizations as “representatives” and started addressing them by the more labor-oriented title “steward” instead.\textsuperscript{26} COP’s rhetoric also became more confrontational as it argued for a union to reform the police department from within. Rallying its membership, COP declared the bankruptcy of the department’s “old chain of command,” an outdated hierarchy that it believed could “not meet our needs in the last quarter of the twentieth century.” COP demanded police rights to the collective bargaining process as a fundamental entitlement, insisting that “[police] are NOT second-class employees and they are NOT second class citizens.”\textsuperscript{27} In October of 1970, five years before police were allowed to join unions in Chicago and a full decade before the first police representation election, COP presented its roughly 8,000 members with a referendum to officially transform COP from a police organization into a police union.

These steps toward unionization however, were tempered by resistance from COP’s rank and file membership. To allay members’ misgivings about union bureaucracy and corruption, COP promised that it would not seek the backing of a large, national trade union and proposed a police union contract that would include a no-strike provision.\textsuperscript{28} In an attempt to dispel rumors and anti-unionism among rank-and-file police, COP described a police union as a tool that could level the distribution of power in the police department and confer new dignity on the work of patrolmen. Writing in an article that asked the question, “A Union is What?” COP’s leaders explained that “Unions are not first of all far reaching clubs to pound employers

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\item \textsuperscript{23} “Why C.O.P. Endorsed Jane Byrne,” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, April 1979, Labor Papers, Microfilm Reel 1, Box 57, CHM.
\item \textsuperscript{24} “Speaking Out!” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, February 1969.
\item \textsuperscript{25} “Patrolmen Reject Union,” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, February 1969.
\item \textsuperscript{26} “Changing Times (and Terms),” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, May 1969.
\item \textsuperscript{27} “The Eleventh Hour,” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, March 1970.
\item \textsuperscript{28} “Dues, Goals, Benefits, and RETIREMENT REFUND!!?” \textit{C.O.P. Newsletter}, October 1, 1970.
\end{itemize}
senseless...Unions simply mean the employer is no longer God...Yes, Unions are pry bars that allow workers to work up-right."

But this moderate vision of a police union did not seem to satisfy everyone. After the introduction of the union referendum, some COP members threatened to leave the organization if the referendum passed. COP’s president tried to reason with the potential defectors, telling them,

I know what some are thinking; unions are crooked, the executives are usually money-hungry outsiders interested in no one’s benefit but their own...C.O.P. is interested in forming an independent union (not affiliated with any trade unions, etc.) and working for the benefit of only Chicago policemen.

These arguments were not enough to help pass the referendum, but COP continued to make the case for collective bargaining rights for police and for a contract with the city. Ignoring police department rules, it pushed ahead, rounding up authorization cards from its members to try to certify COP as the sole bargaining representative for the police and encouraged rank and file unity. COP pleaded with the police to overcome their divisions and in November of 1970, the COP Newsletter warned readers that the “Administration smiles when they look down from their ivory towers and spot dissent among the rank and file.”

Observing in 1971 that “[a]id and support for your ‘brothers in blue’ crosses all social, ethnic, racial, religious, and supervisory within the organization,” COP echoed labor refrains when it preached, “In unity there is strength...Unity is progress.” That year during the annual handshake bargaining session, COP made a new proposal to the mayor and city council that included a demand for a contract.

COP was not the only organization trying to unite the police around a collective bargaining agenda in the early 1970s, and this competition only made it more difficult for one organization to unify the police. In 1972, one of COP’s main competitors, the CPA, reinvented itself. As the oldest police organization in Chicago, the CPA had been known as the department’s “company union” in the 1950s. This history combined with more recent allegations of corruption and embezzlement against the organization’s leadership had cast doubts about the CPA’s ability to lead the rank and file. But in the early 1970s the CPA tried to distance itself from its older reputation by focusing on political messages and activities instead of social events and fundraising. It changed the name of its magazine, the Chicago Policeman, whose finances and subscription selling practices had been the subject of city investigations, to the Haymarket Star, and adopted an illustration of the Haymarket statue as its new emblem. These changes were intended to connect the CPA to symbols that commemorated and honored police sacrifices in Chicago, but they also had the (perhaps unintentional) effect of linking the CPA to the Haymarket Affair, historically one of the most violent anti-labor attack by the Chicago police.

As police organizations in Chicago and police unions in other cities became more assertive, they tested the limits of Ronald Reagan’s assertion that government could not go out of business. The fiscal crises and tax revolts of the 1970s tempered the rhetoric and ambitions of

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34 “New Business,” CPA telephone script, c.1975, AAPL, Box 167/Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, CHM.
police labor organizations as they faced growing backlash to public employee unions. At the end of the decade COP made a much less strident case for a police union than it had at the beginning of the decade. In 1970 COP had tried to persuade its members to unionize when it defined police unions as “pry bars” to use against the department. At the end of the decade COP described a police union as a defensive, not an aggressive, group. In 1979 it asked the question, “Why a Union?” but this time its answer had changed:

Why do you need a union? Not for strikes; not for gigantic pay raises; but to hold onto those benefits you have, plus a cost of living adjustment. A sad reality is that with the Proposition 13 fever spreading across the country, many departments are being hit with layoffs, cutbacks and reduced benefits.

The purpose of a contract, COP explained, was not, as it had argued in 1969 to “allow workers to work up-right,” but was instead to “keep [cutbacks] from hitting us.” Even as COP toned down its confrontational stance, it began to look to the AFL-CIO as a new potential resource, and large national labor unions began to take notice of the Chicago police as a potential organizing foothold among the city’s public employees.

**The Chicago Police and Big Labor**

After police organizations had formulated their grievances and demands, experimented with different methods of direct action, and made calls for collective bargaining and a contract, organized labor vied to become the bargaining representative of the rank and file police. In 1975, a local of the United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO, took the Chicago police department to court and won police the right to officially join labor unions in 1975. That the Paperworkers took an interest and fought a court case on behalf of the police, a group that was so incongruous with its occupational base, was symptomatic of a larger shift underway within the labor movement as unions looked to the public sector as their new source of members. Labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan observed that by the late twentieth century the public sector was “the only place where unions can organize without getting maimed” and the Paperworkers lawsuit was part of a pattern where unions facing declining private sector membership fought to, as Geoghegan put it, “organize the same little clusters of public workers, battling like eagles over the same little nest of birds.” Promoting itself to the police as the “World’s Most Democratic Union,” the Paperworkers argued that the department’s rule prohibiting police from joining labor unions was unconstitutional and violated police rights to free association. In 1975, a judge in the Federal District court struck down the rule, affirming, as many justices had in previous legal challenges to police department discipline, that “public employees do not waive their constitutional rights by virtue of their status as public employees.” This ruling opened the gates of the Chicago police department to the AFL-CIO-affiliated Paperworkers as well as the

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38 Local 1975—AFL-CIO “Be an Informed Voter,” AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.
39 Mescall v. Rochford, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, 92 LRRM, 2710 in Oberman Papers, Box 28, unprocessed collection, CHM.
politically powerful Teamsters. With organized labor added to the mix in the mid-1970s, the competition to represent the Chicago police intensified.

Now that police could join union, the prospect of a Teamsters’ police union raised the political stakes and surfaced public anxieties about police unions. The power of the Teamsters had been feared in Chicago ever since a violent Teamsters sympathy strike in 1905 shut down the city’s streets and commerce while 21 people were killed and hundreds injured. In the post-war years the Teamsters seemed as strong as ever. Local 705, which represented truck drivers, and Local 714, the union of the city’s convention hall workers, dominated labor politics through the might of their central organizing body, Teamsters Joint Council No. 25. With a membership of over 140,000 members from thirty local unions spread throughout Chicago, the Joint Council was led by the most powerful Teamster official in Chicago, Louis F. Peick. By the end of the 1970s Peick was the ranking officer of both Local 705 and Joint Council No. 25, as well as one of 21 International Vice Presidents of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Peick also enjoyed considerable political clout in the city as a longtime ally of Mayor Daley, who appointed Peick to the five-member Chicago Police Board in 1971. Although the Police Board was considered one of Daley’s puppet committees, Peick technically still had a say in police department policy-making, major appointments, and the outcomes of serious disciplinary cases through his Board membership. In this way, even before the police were allowed to join unions or the Teamsters considered attempting to organize the police, there were longstanding administrative connections between organized labor and the Chicago police department.

The Teamsters’ in Chicago proved no exception to the notoriety the national union had earned for corruption, especially after the highly publicized findings of the McClellan Committee in the late 1950s. In 1959 Peick was indicted along with five other Local 705 officials for the extortion of gas station owners in Chicago. He was again charged with overseeing a similar operation in 1973, in a scheme that forced gas stations owners throughout the city to sign contracts with the Teamsters that charged exorbitant delivery fees or have their gasoline deliveries cut off by Teamster truck drivers. The National Labor Relations Board condemned the tactics as “sheer racketeering,” and the scandal raised objections about whether Peick should keep his position on the Police Board. Renault Robinson, president of the AAPL, demanded that Peick be fired in light of the allegations, but Peick kept his post. Five years later he and Local 705 were accused of committing violent attacks against members of Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), a growing dissident movement within the union. Reports alleged that Peick stood silently at the podium, microphone in hand, as the Teamsters beat TDU members after they had tried to hand out literature critical of Local 705. Police who were at the scene, presumably as part of the department’s “labor detail,” stood by and watched, and faced

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40 David Witwer, *Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union* (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003), chapter 2.
41 In return for holding these three positions simultaneously, Peick collected a salary of $145,765 a year. “Louis F. Peick: A Report” in Martin Oberman Papers, Box 44/Collective Bargaining, CHM.
42 For more on the McClellan Committee hearings, see Witwer, *Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union*, chapter 8.
criticism later for their failure to intervene.46 Once the attacks on TDU members stopped, the police arrested both Teamsters and TDU members and brought them all in to the police station for questioning. As both parties were hauled away, witnesses reported that Peick stood at the front of the meeting hall and declared, “As far as I’m concerned, you can shoot the shit out of all these commies and dissidents.”

Even with someone like Peick at the union’s helm, in 1975 it looked like the Teamsters had a realistic shot at representing the Chicago police. Already the union had organized police departments in Miami and New Orleans and it started its organizing strategy in Chicago by forming an alliance with an existing police organization, the CPA. After the Paperworkers’ success in court, the CPA worried that Paperworkers would dominate police unionizing efforts and cut out existing police organizations, especially smaller groups like the CPA. Recognizing the Teamsters’ clout in Chicago politics, the CPA worked out a tentative alliance with the union in 1975. Announcing its new partnership with the Teamsters, the CPA cited its “repeated failures” to convince Daley to agree to a written contract with the police and its belief that the Teamsters had the power to sway the Democratic machine. The CPA’s president explained that the organization had been “banging our head for years in trying to get collective bargaining and a written contract with the city, so we decided to go out and get a big stick. Now, with the Teamsters, we’ll have a big stick.” Soon afterward, leaders of the CPA and the Chicago Teamsters were ushered into a closed-door meeting with Daley.48 Because police organizations had always met with Daley together, crowding into his office to make their budget demands and grievances known all at once, this private meeting signaled that Daley might favor the CPA and the Teamsters and that he might even give them a contract.

In his two decades as mayor, Daley had opposed a police union or any formal public employee collective bargaining in Chicago, but he appeared more willing to support a police union if it was backed by his long-time Teamster allies. After his meeting with the CPA and the Teamsters, Daley agreed to the possibility of a police contract for the first time in mid-September 1976, as long as the contract included no-strike and compulsory arbitration clauses. Daley still reiterated his cautious attitude toward public employee bargaining, explaining that police unions in particular were “too close to the public” to have union obligations compete with their duty to protect the public. Besides, he reasoned, the police already had a “contract” with the city by virtue of the fact that, as Daley said, “They have a job and get paid.”49 After the meeting with Daley the CPA’s president was quick to affirm the overwhelming support of CPA members for the Teamsters alliance, but other police organizations in Chicago voiced their suspicions about the partnership.50 The Combined Counties Police Association (CCPA), then the largest police union in Illinois and the organizer of most police departments in the state, thought it detected a

46 Affadavit by James Carpenter, c. 1978, State of Illinois, Cook County, in Martin Oberman Papers, Box 44/Collective Bargaining, CHM.
48 James Strong, “Police and Teamsters Chart Union Organizing,” Chicago Tribune, September 16, 1976, 5; Mike Dearham, Chairman of the Membership Committee and Joseph L. Saccomonto, Vice Pres, CPA to “Brother Police Officer,” c. 1975, “We Want You as a Member of our Team and with You We Can Have Whatever We Want!!” AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, CHM.
50 Ibid.
conspiracy between Daley, the Teamsters, and the CPA. Arguing that Daley had orchestrated the alliance between the powerful Teamsters and the police department’s former “company union,” the CCPA accused Daley of trying “to deliver the police officers because of his political relationships,” with the result that “any contract will be a sweetheart deal.”

The president of the International Conference of Police Associations, an organization of 225,000 police nationwide, and the president of COP also denounced the Teamsters’ attempt to organize the police for similar reasons. They called for Peick to step down from the Police Board because if the Teamsters represented the police at the bargaining table and represented the city on the Police Board, then, as COP’s president alleged, “Management seeks to represent labor.” The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) echoed COP’s accusations and dismissed both the Teamsters and Paperworkers as outsiders unqualified to represent the police. “We do not need the Teamsters, Paper Workers or any outside Police Group coming into our profession,” the FOP contended. “We the Police Officers of Chicago can best represent ourselves.”

The city press also questioned the Teamsters as police organizers. In one editorial, the Chicago Tribune asked, “If the purpose of an alliance with the Teamsters is to gain some power of coercion over the city…how does this affect the working policeman’s concept of his own job?” The Tribune predicted that a unionized police force that would only “enforce the law under suitable conditions, as determined by the leaders of his union, and in line with contract policies either established or planned by them.” Even worse was the prospect that police might “become tools in the hands of national organizations whose interests may conflict with the community.” But these objections faded when an internal power struggle between the CPA and Teamster leaders dissolved what turned out to be a fragile alliance. Daley’s death at the end of 1976 brought an end to at least some of the Teamsters’ preferential treatment and stalled preliminary police union talks. The death of the mayor also created new uncertainty among the city’s public employees who could no longer be sure about their handshake bargaining status under a different mayor. This uncertainty brought calls for contracts for city workers and ushered in a new period of municipal labor unrest in Chicago.

“No More Handshakes”: A Collective Bargaining Ordinance for Chicago Public Employees

The collapse of the CPA-Teamsters deal in 1975 and Daley’s death in 1976 slowed the campaign for a police union in Chicago, but the mayoral candidacy of Jane Byrne revived it a few years later. As part of her campaign platform, Byrne promised to legalize collective bargaining and agree to contracts for most of Chicago’s 42,000 city employees, including police and firefighters. This promise affected groups of Chicago city workers differently. Some

51 James Strong and Robert Davis, “Daley Charged with Deal to Give Cops to Teamsters,” Chicago Tribune, October 1, 1976, 8; Combined Counties Police Association, “Mayor Daley Asked Me,” AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.
53 Letter from John Dineen to membership of Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 7, c. 1976, HWLMRC.
56 Exceptions to the ordinance included “elected officials, executive heads of City departments, members of boards and commissions whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the City Council, supervisors, managerial employees, confidential employees, seasonal employees with no reasonable expectation of continual employment, casual employees, student interns, hearing officers and independent contractors.” See “Collective Bargaining Ordinance of the City of Chicago: Definitions” January 7, 1980, Oberman Papers, Box 28, unprocessed collection, CHM.
groups of city employees, especially those who were part of the Chicago and Cook County Construction and Building Trades Council, benefited from handshake bargaining and the absence of a public employee collective bargaining ordinance. Because of high union wages in the private sector, workers in the building trades enjoyed favorable handshake bargaining deals. Other city employees, like teachers and transit workers, engaged in a more formal bargaining process with the city that resulted in a contract. By the end of the 1970s, however, teachers and transit workers grew increasingly dissatisfied with their contracts as their salaries failed to keep pace with inflation. Chicago public school teachers went on strike in 1980, a year when they earned an average of $18,270. Like the police, who were then earning an average of $21,528 annually, Chicago’s teachers saw themselves outpaced by the city’s electricians and plumbers, who both earned around $31,000 a year. Public employment no longer meant secure or particularly well-paying jobs and by the end of 1980, the Chicago Tribune’s labor editor observed a “change in the concept of public employment among city workers.”

In the post-Daley era, other city workers also looked for new ways to secure their salary and benefits. Representatives from the Independent Voters of Illinois wrote in to the Illinois Law Enforcer to explain that “with the passing of Mayor Daley, city employees no longer feel secure that their ‘agreement’ is a handshake and the few mumbled assurances. Now they want it in writing.” Police and firefighters, who did not receive preferential handshake deals or negotiate contracts, felt as though they were treated as a class apart from other city workers.

Once Byrne promised to extend collective bargaining and contracts to all city employees, Chicago’s rank and file police and firefighter organizations rushed to support her candidacy. For COP, “[t]his, and this alone, was the basis for the endorsement.” But at the top of the police department hierarchy, commanders and supervisors ignored department rules that prohibited overt police participation in partisan politics and pressured the police rank-and-file to support the incumbent mayor Michael Bilandic instead of Byrne. These efforts proved unsuccessful and Chicago’s majority-white police organizations continued to back Byrne, who ultimately won the election in 1979.

COP celebrated Byrne’s election because it believed that its “goal of a contract for Chicago police officers became a reality” and Byrne gave COP every reason to think that this was true. As Byrne delivered her victory speech, COP’s president stood with city officials on stage behind the newly-elected mayor. At one point during the speech, Byrne looked over her shoulder and smiled at COP’s president, saying “I’m gonna give you that contract you wanted.” Soon afterward, Byrne took concrete steps toward enacting public employee bargaining legislation in Chicago. She appointed a Mayor’s Committee on Collective Bargaining chaired by the alderman from Chicago’s 43rd ward, Martin Oberman, and set the committee to work drafting the city’s first collective bargaining ordinance for public employees.

Byrne insisted that it was essential to have the ordinance in place before she would negotiate any new contracts with city employees, but the work of the committee was painfully slow. As months went by it began to look like Byrne was using the ordinance to delay, and not facilitate, bargaining with Chicago employees. The committee’s membership seemed

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59 “Why C.O.P. Endorsed Jane Byrne.”
60 Lawrence Muhammad, “Supt. O’Grady isn’t only Cop who’s worried,” Chicago Defender, March 3, 1979, 1, 3.
62 Lawrence Muhammad, “Supt. O’Grady Isn’t Only Cop Who’s Worried.”
deliberately chosen to create conflict and slow down the process of drafting the ordinance. Members of the committee included a manager from the Standard Oil Company in Indiana, the president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, William Lee (the same labor leader who had four police bodyguards in 1960), and Chicago’s city budget director. Before the Committee had even completed its first draft of an ordinance, another committee member, Alice Puerala, the president of Local 65 of the United Steelworkers of America, quit in frustration over the committee’s lengthy negotiations and compromises. On the day she resigned, Puerala distributed a scathing memo that accused city and corporate representatives on the committee of trying to create a collective bargaining ordinance that made it “virtually impossible for city workers to have a union and bargain collectively as equals.” The memo concluded with a call to arms for Chicago’s public employees. “If I were a City worker, I wouldn’t wait for an ordinance,” Puerala urged. “I would organize now!” When the committee did finally submit its first draft of the ordinance to the city council months later, the council promptly buried it in the Finance Committee to await hearings.

As head of the ordinance committee, Martin Oberman issued public statements and open letters in an attempt to shame Byrne for the delays, but it was beginning to look like no amount of diplomatic pressure could speed the ordinance’s enactment. While promising to deliver the collective bargaining ordinance had helped Byrne win the mayoral election, it was also becoming clear that it could also alienate key groups of her supporters. If the city ceded control over the hiring, firing, pay, seniority, and working conditions of city employees to unions, then machine Democrats in city hall stood to lose control over the tens of thousands of members (and voters) in its patronage army. Other key players in Chicago’s Democratic party took care to warn her that negotiating contracts with city employees meant relinquishing some of her control of critical city services. Byrne remembered that Richard M. Daley, the late mayor’s son, advised her that the police and fire departments were the mayor’s “two front lines and I should want to control them.” Demonstrating her shift in attitude toward public employee bargaining, Byrne hired a

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63 Mayor’s Committee on Collective Bargaining membership list, Martin Oberman Papers, Box 28, unprocessed collection, CHM.
64 Memo to Mayor’s Committee on Collective Bargaining from Alice Puerala—President Local 65, United Steelworkers of America, September 14, 1979, Oberman Papers, Box 28, unprocessed collection, CHM. The first woman president of a major steel mill local, Puerala was a legendary figure in Chicago labor politics. Thomas Geoghegan remembers her as a “kind of a Mother Jones, or Emma Goldman, in the early eighties, in the battles on concessions. Soon she was dying of cancer, in good South Chicago style...But she was tougher, dying of cancer, wearing a wig, than anyone else in the local, and everyone was after her, U.S. Steel, Mayor Byrne, Vrdolyak, Pittsburgh, the Department of Labor, shrieking at her: to the moment she stepped into the grave,” Thomas Geoghegan, Which Side Are You On? Trying to Be for Labor When It’s Flat on Its Back, 176.
66 Over the course of three separate rulings from 1972 to 1983 the Shakman Decrees chipped away at the patronage system in Chicago for years before a collective bargaining ordinance was drafted. See Anne Freedman, “Doing Battle with the Patronage Army: Politics, Courts, and Personnel Administration in Chicago,” Public Administration Review 48, no. 5 (October 1988): 847–859.
67 Jane Byrne, My Chicago (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 284.
law firm well-known in Chicago for its union-busting expertise to advise her on implementing the ordinance and negotiating with city employees.68

A public employee collective bargaining ordinance also threatened to disturb the historical handshake bargaining agreements that covered the city’s custodians, landscapers, elevator constructors, inspectors, brick layers, roofers, bridgertenders, electricians, and window washers, to name some of the 17,700 city workers in the construction and building trades. Under the new ordinance these workers feared they would have to renegotiate their agreements with the city, and on potentially less favorable terms.69 The new ordinance proposed to lump many different kinds of workers together into thirteen broad occupational categories, forcing them to bargain as an undifferentiated group while destroying any preexisting agreements worked out by individual trades. This meant that all of the different building and construction trades workers employed by the city would bargain as one big “Craft” unit.70 In response, the Construction and Building Trades Council argued that handshake deals should be “preserved” in the collective bargaining ordinance, and introduced a “grandfather clause” that would exempt employees with a pre-existing bargaining relationship with the city from the ordinance.71 But the ordinance committee ignored the objections of the Trades Council and kept its broad-based bargaining units in place.72

While the ordinance committee debated and Byrne stalled, the city’s firefighters grew impatient with Byrne’s failure to deliver on her original campaign promise of a contract. The day the committee delivered its first draft of the ordinance to the city council, the leader of the firefighter’s union, Frank Muscare, set up a wooden table outside across the street from city hall and invited Byrne to sit down and start bargaining immediately.73 When Byrne refused to bargain, over three-quarters of the city’s firefighters went on strike on February 14, 1980. That day, the hotline for the Firefighter’s AFL-CIO Local No. 2 greeted callers with the taped message, “We wish you a Happy Valentine's Day, Jane.”74 Union president Frank Muscare announced that the strike marked the end of handshake bargaining for firefighters. "No more handshakes, baby,” he said. “We want it on paper.”75 Within days the City Fire Commissioner published a two-page spread in the city’s papers that condemned the strike and reassured firefighters that the city would eventually give them a contract if they would only return to their jobs.76 Chicago labor leaders William Lee and Louis Peick tried to broker a deal between Byrne

70 Chicago and Cook County Building and Construction Trades Council, “Proposal for Bargaining Unit Determination City of Chicago Collective Bargaining Ordinance,” August 1979, Oberman papers, Box 24, unprocessed collection, CHM; “Possible Outline of Bargaining Units,” Oberman papers, Box 28, unprocessed collection, CHM.
71 Letter from Joel A. D’Alba to Martin J. Oberman, Re: Mayor’s Committee on Collective Bargaining, August 29, 1979, Oberman Papers, Box 24, unprocessed collection, CHM.
72 Letter from Richard W. Laner to Edward B. Miller, Chairman, Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry Labor-Management Relations Committee, July 9, 1980, Box 28, Oberman Papers, unprocessed collection, CHM.
73 Byrne, My Chicago, 295.
74 "A Message from the Fire Commissioner to Our Firefighters and to the People of Chicago," Chicago Defender, February 16, 1980, 8.
76 “A Message from the Fire Commissioner to Our Firefighters and to the People of Chicago,” 8.
and the firefighters, but agreements quickly collapsed and Frank Muscare landed in jail after refusing to comply with a back-to-work order.77

As the strike wore on, Byrne threatened permanently replace the firefighters who did not return to work and looked for new sources for replacements. At one point the mayor suggested that ward committeemen, the traditional distributors of patronage, submit eligible names to fill the posts—an unsettling idea to many who were familiar with the work ethic of patronage employees. The wife of a Chicago firefighter who feared for her husband’s job wrote to the Chicago Defender to warn black Chicagoans, “Don't trust a doorbell ringer with your family and life's possessions.”78 Others saw a worker-replacement strategy for the strike as a “golden opportunity…to make a dent in a hard-core racist department with new hires.”79 Seizing this opportunity, Jesse Jackson intervened and spearheaded a new round of mediations, insisting that the fire department institute new affirmative action hiring policies. Finally, after three weeks, twenty-two fire-related deaths, and with help from the concerted diplomacy of Jackson, the firefighters ended the strike and Byrne agreed to a contract with amnesty provisions. Byrne signed their contract along with a short-lived and pared-down version of the city’s first public employee bargaining legislation.80 The firefighter’s strike gave Chicago its initial taste of what it would be like to bargain with its public safety workers. Given the human cost and, more nominally, the political damage of the strike, the city proceeded to treat organizing police with extreme caution.

The chaos of the firefighter’s strike resurfaced anxieties about a police union and the possibility that it would go on strike in Chicago. These fears were well-established, and even in 1978, well before the firefighters strike, the Chicago Police Star reprinted an editorial from the Chicago Tribune that shamed police officers in other cities for pledging their allegiance to unions. While “criminals have continued raping and pillaging America like Attila the Hun,” the editorial argued, “policemen calling themselves professionals have repeatedly gone on strike.” All over the country “[i]n Youngstown, Oklahoma City, Kansas City, Tucson, and San Francisco, men who demand the respect of their communities have taken a walk on their responsibilities over salary disputes.”81 The Tribune criticized police for choosing higher salaries and better benefits over their duty to the public. Critics of a police union among the city’s elite told similar horror stories from other cities. In these cities, they reported, police unions had held city budgets, and public safety hostage while demanding sky-high wages and control over police department operations. The consequence of recent strikes by Teamster-backed police unions in New Orleans and Miami were hard to ignore. For example, during the ten-day strike in New Orleans, the police picketed garbage dumps, prompting a sympathy strike from the city’s Teamster garbage men. As garbage piled up around the city, official Mardi Gras celebrations were cancelled, and 650 members of the national guard and 200 state troopers were called in to

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78 Marilyn Garr, “Firefighter’s Wife Speaks out on 19th Day of Strike,” Chicago Defender, March 4, 1980, 4. Most of the recipients of Chicago’s best patronage jobs were precinct captains who canvassed city wards and rang doorbells to turn out the Democratic vote on election day. For a much more detailed analysis of the work of precinct captains, see Milton L. Rakove, Don’t Make Ho Waves...Don’t Back No Losers: An Insiders’ Analysis of the Daley Machine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
80 “Can Jackson Mediate the Strike?,” Chicago Defender, March 8, 1980, 1; Byrne, My Chicago, 307-308.
reinforce the dwindling police ranks. A periodical for Chicago business executives cited the experiences of people living in cities that had faced public employee strikes including the problems faced by a “merchant from New Orleans who saw his business go to pot while striking police workers sabotaged the Mardi Gras,” or the grievances of “anyone from Detroit, Cicero or several other cities who found their lives and property put up as stakes in a grim poker game between municipal unions and city officials.”

The Chicago business community feared that the stakes could go even higher and in the early phases of the development of the collective bargaining ordinance, one editorial explained that binding arbitration was “undemocratic,” because with “wages and fringe benefits accounting for about three-fourths of Chicago’s billion-dollar operating budget, arbitrators will wield a tremendous influence on Chicago’s tax levies.” In addition, the editorial asked who would “elect the arbitrators?” The Chicago Tribune echoed the fear that “[u]nder the Oberman ordinance, the powers of city executives and of aldermen would be much reduced.” Urging resistance to the ordinance, the Tribune argued that “government cannot be wholly turned over to union officers.” The Chicago Crime Commission, a watchdog organization that monitored police department activities, criticized the ordinance for putting “the power of decision regarding government cost and tax increases in the hands of the arbitrator, thereby removing the voter-taxpayer even further from these political decisions.”

Inside the city council, an alderman from the 15th Ward, Frank Brady, opposed the collective bargaining ordinance on similar grounds. In May of 1980 he made a lengthy speech to the city council arguing that if the ordinance passed, “Chicago citizens will experience a substantial diffusion of their voting power” and public employee union members would gain disproportionate political advantages because,

Some Chicagoans [would] vote twice—once on election day and again at union headquarters. Voting for public union leadership and issues has an impact on City services because of the collective bargaining process. It is this “double-vote” effect, inherent in formalized collective bargaining, which must be recognized and fought by us elected to preserve the constituent vote.

Brady also warned that a collective bargaining ordinance would give public employee unions too much power because of an article in the proposed Ordinance that allowed collective bargaining agreements to supersede city ordinances. City ordinances, Brady predicted, would drop “like flies against the superceding [sic] winds of bargaining agreements,” meaning that public employee collective bargaining in Chicago had the potential to create a “NEWLY established

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86 Frank J. Brady, Alderman, 15th Ward, “Proposed Labor Relations Ordinance, an impact statement,” May 1980, 1, Martin Oberman Papers, Box 28, unprocessed collection, CHM.
system of government” and disrupt the system of political representation. Who, "should…elected officials be answerable to?" Brady asked, citizens or public employee unions? Chicago officials and business leaders may have feared a police union, but in the end, city hall was willing to risk it in order to avoid another public employee strike.

The political crises brought about by the series of strikes by teachers, transit workers, and firefighters in 1979 and 1980 made it clear to Jane Byrne, who had been nicknamed “Calamity Jane” after bungling negotiations with all three groups, that the city could not withstand the financial or political damage of yet another public employee strike. In this context, Byrne became more receptive to police demands for a representation election and a contract, opening the door to renewed pressure from the Teamsters. In their second major attempt to organize the Chicago police after its failed alliance with the CPA, the Teamsters urged a police representation election and the union vowed to bring democracy to the police department. Refuting characterizations of the Teamsters as a corrupt, bureaucratic autocracy, union leaders promised that the Teamsters would empower the Chicago police, saying that “by the votes of the rank-and-file will have a democratic organization, conduct their own meetings and develop their own programs.” The reemergence of the Teamsters in the campaign to unionize the Chicago police inspired COP to seek its own backing from organized labor with an AFL-CIO charter in 1979. It hoped that its affiliation with the AFL-CIO would counter the Teamster’s organizational power and “ward off attempts by the Teamsters to represent police officers.” Criticizing the failure of the Teamsters to support police legislation over the years and their relatively late arrival to police labor politics in Chicago, COP argued that “truck drivers have nothing in common with police officers.”

In its second effort to unionize the Chicago police the Teamsters strategized ways to overcome this criticism. It created a Police Officers’ Committee for a Teamsters’ Contract, which recruited one hundred new members from the police ranks to rove through police districts and persuade patrolmen to support the Teamsters. The committee met with police at all hours of the night to accommodate round-the-clock shifts, an arrangement the Teamsters hoped would demonstrate their understanding of the specific demands and circumstances of police work. Like other organizations advocating police unionization, the Teamsters also championed police unity, pitting themselves against “[t]hose who split Police Officers by rumors and false charges,” and declaring that “[a]s long as Police Officers are divided, they are operating against a stacked deck.” The Teamsters posted bulletins that disparaged COP for what it called an “opportunistic” affiliation with the AFL-CIO and collected union authorization cards from police that endorsed the Teamsters as their collective bargaining representative. As the Teamsters explained it, there was a correlation between police support for the Teamsters and the ultimate success of a police union. “The more cards…the sooner the election…the larger the majority…the better the contract.” By the summer of 1979 the Teamsters had collected over 3,300 authorization cards, well above the minimum number required by the National Labor

87 Ibid., 2.
89 “Here are the facts…” Teamsters Roll Call, AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.
91 “It’s about Time!” Teamster Roll Call, AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.
92 “Jack and Joe, Why Does Your President!! Want Our Pension Put in Social Security?” Teamsters Flyer, AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.
93 “Here are the facts…”
Relations Board to hold a representation election in the private sector. The Teamsters hoped it would be enough for Chicago to agree to a representation election “on behalf of a rapidly growing group of Police Officers who want an open election to decide their collective bargaining agent.”

This pressure from the Teamsters and the political fallout of a season of public employee strikes pushed Byrne to call a police representation election in the late summer of 1980. When the “surprise announcement” was made, the Teamsters jumped to take credit for the upcoming election. The International Teamster crowed that it had literally “more than enough cards to put on the table,” to call an election, while a Teamsters’ chairman claimed that the “Teamsters are responsible for getting police officers the right to vote for their own bargaining representatives.” With the election just months away, the Teamsters were confident they would win, but getting the police to sign authorization cards turned out to be easier than persuading them to actually vote for the Teamsters in the election. In the very moment that the Chicago police claimed their labor rights in the city, they balked at the chance to join a large, national labor union and voted for the FOP, a police organization that claimed it was not a union, instead. For police, the transformation from loyal public servant to unionized public employee was complex, and in many ways, incomplete.

Beginning with their rejection of the CPA’s earliest calls for a police union in 1961 and 1962 police had remained ambivalent about their relationship to the broader labor movement in the United States. This reluctance continued throughout the late 1960s and 1970s as COP and eventually national labor unions tried to persuade the rank and file to unionize. Police were not completely convinced that they should join a union, not only because they feared discipline or losing their jobs in a strike, but because they too could see the conflicts between public service and public unions. The campaign for a single bargaining representative for the Chicago police brought these conflicts to the surface in the fall of 1980 and forced the police to decide how they would identify themselves as workers in the city.

94 “They’ll Get their Chance to Go Teamster,” International Teamster, September 1980, 12, AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM, “It’s in the Cards…” Teamster Roll Call, AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.
96 “They’ll Get their Chance to Go Teamster.”
It was election season in Chicago in the fall of 1980 when police gathered at polling places around the city. Normally, when the Chicago police went to the polls for an election, it was to provide security detail for twelve to sixteen hour shifts. But on October 16, 95 percent of the Chicago police rank and file went to the polls to vote in their own union election. At polls located in every stationhouse in the city, police participated in an election that would determine, for the first time, whether they would choose one organization to represent them at the bargaining table. After decades of antagonism between the police and the police department, the aggressive anti-union campaign of the department in support of “No Single Representative,” underscored the deep rifts between police administrators and the rank and file. A parallel, though not collaborative, anti-union campaign by Chicago’s organized black police tried to preserve the gains won for minority police in the previous decade. Meanwhile, a set of policies enacted by Mayor Jane Byrne seemed calculated to undermine the anti-union campaigns and provoke police to vote for a labor representative.

As these shifting relationships and competing campaigns divided the police department from city hall and police from one another, a consensus emerged from the majority of the Chicago’s white rank and file police. In two rounds of voting Chicago’s patrolmen elected the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) as their bargaining representative, a choice that reconstituted the rank and file as a relatively unified group. After winning the representation election, the FOP negotiated and enforced Chicago’s first police contract in a process that fundamentally reordered the rank and file’s relationship to the police department and the city itself. The department’s supervisors, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, supported the FOP in this effort and scrambled to include themselves in the contract, or at least in some of its benefits and protections. Next, the FOP worked to dismantle the department’s affirmative action policies and to push black police members of the AAPL into the ranks of the FOP. The department’s commanders and administrators both assisted the FOP in its lawsuits against affirmative action hiring and promotions in the police department and eventually mandated disciplinary action against black police who refused to pay dues or join the FOP. Outside of the courtroom Chicago’s organized black police and the FOP also confronted each other when police became increasingly involved in Chicago’s heated mayoral contest of 1983. As police and their organizations campaigned and then voted three times in as many years—for representation, for a contract, and for a new mayor—they redefined themselves as workers and political actors in Chicago.

The Police Campaign

For the ten thousand Chicago police who turned out to vote in the first round of the representation election in October of 1980, the candidates for bargaining representative could not
have looked more different.\textsuperscript{1} The ballot included three police organizations, two large, international unions, and the department-sponsored, anti-union option of “No Single Representative.” These choices ranged from the politically powerful Teamsters to the Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, a small organization that had served as the police department’s “company union” in the 1950s. While other groups of city employees like teachers, CTA workers, and firefighters were organized and actively negotiated contracts with the city, in 1980 the police remained divided between different organizations. One leader of the police rank and file observed that when it came to bargaining with the city, “Some groups have their act together, but that is not the case with police officers.”\textsuperscript{2}

In the days leading up to the election, the police seemed more uncertain than ever over which organization or union to support. A traffic cop in Chicago’s downtown Loop observed that to the police it felt like any outcome was possible in the election, saying, “FOP, COP, CPA, CPO, the Teamsters—who knows? Nobody’ll know till the counting is done. You can talk to 10 different cops and get 10 different versions of what’s going to happen.”\textsuperscript{3} But it was possible to predict how certain segments of the police rank and file might vote. The police who sided with the department and favored “No Single Representative” tended to be older patrolmen looking forward to their retirement. These were employees who wanted to preserve their existing pension benefits with the city instead of turning decisions about the pension fund over to a new organization.\textsuperscript{4} Minority police, especially those in the AAPL, also supported the choice of “No Single Representative,” arguing that the seniority provisions of a union contract would erode, if not ultimately undo, recently-won affirmative action policies that governed hiring and promotions in the police department.\textsuperscript{5} But among the majority of the Chicago’s white police rank-and-file the question of representation no longer concerned whether police should elect a single bargaining representative, but which union or police organization they should choose.

A divisive candidate in the election, the Teamsters had made their first attempt to unionize the Chicago police in 1975, when they formed an alliance with the CPA and pressured Daley to give police a contract. In 1979, the Teamsters leaned on Jane Byrne, one of Daley’s successors, to hold a representation election for police. When Byrne eventually agreed, the Teamsters ran the most involved and aggressive campaign of all of the contenders on the ballot. In addition to the usual practices of handing out union paraphenelia, pens, and jackets outside

\textsuperscript{1} Five organizations collected a required minimum of one thousand signatures to appear on the ballot. They were the Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, Chicago Police Officers Local 1975, UPIU, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Paperworkers), Confederation of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, and the Law Enforcement Division, Teamsters Joint Council No. 25. Other would-be contenders included the Combined Counties Police Association, which represented a number of smaller suburban police departments throughout Illinois and one individual, George Gannon, who was a police officer of twenty-five years, a captain of the city’s Fourteenth Police District, and a Pension Board Trustee. Gannon organized and chartered an organization, the Police Pension and Contract Council of Chicago in an attempt to qualify for the election. See George L. Gannon, “Important Message…Read Carefully, To all Chicago Police Officers,” AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM; Chicago Police Department “No Single Representative” Campaign Committee, Fact Sheet, October 11, 1980, HWLMRC.
\textsuperscript{3} “CPO,” as opposed to COP, is most likely a reference to Chicago Police Officers, Local 1975 of the Paperworkers International Union, “What All the Cops Are Talking About,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, October 15, 1980, 5.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5} Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, “Meeting Minutes,” June 16, 1980, AAPL, Box 69, AAPL-Minutes, 1973-1984, CHM.
district stations, the Teamsters set up picket lines at Navy Pier the week before the first round of voting in October. There Teamsters members protested the city’s “union-busting” tactics and accused the police department of a “conspiracy” to rig the election. A small poll of about two hundred police in August of 1980 showed the Teamsters in the lead, but not by much, carrying an estimated twenty percent of the police vote. Still, the pollsters interpreted the results to mean that other police groups were “leagues behind, lacking the solid, committed following enjoyed by the Teamsters,” who were “perceived by many officers as the only group with enough muscle to secure a favorable contract at City Hall.” Some police did share this perception. One officer who planned to cast his ballot for the Teamsters declared, “As long as we’re going to have a union, let’s have the big one.”

The Teamsters benefited from their size and strength in Chicago, but they also tried to demonstrate that the union could provide concrete help for police-specific problems. In October, just two weeks before the election, the Teamsters held a series of fundraising drives to benefit police who had been fired from the department on serious brutality charges. Additionally the Teamsters hired the ousted police to work union jobs as package handlers at Chicago’s convention center. But not all police appreciated the Teamsters campaign. Smaller ethnic and fraternal police organizations objected that the Teamsters invaded their privacy and violated election rules when they sent union authorization cards and campaign literature directly to their private homes instead of delivering materials to department mailboxes. Some police also remained wary of the Teamsters’ reputation for corruption. Overlooking roughly a century of scandal in the Chicago police department, one officer declared that “Cops and mobsters don’t mix.” This officer went on to pledge his support to the FOP, whose president, John Dineen, had served as a Chicago police officer for twenty-five years.

On the other end of the police representation spectrum from the Teamsters, the “low-key” Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) entered the race at a seeming disadvantage, counting a dues-paying membership of less than half of Chicago’s largest police organization, the Confederation of Police (COP). While COP tried to drum up media attention by calling “frequent press conferences,” John Dineen conducted a “moderate” campaign largely out of the media limelight. Characterized as “well-liked throughout the department” and an “outspoken” man who did not “mince any words,” Dineen instead made personal appeals directly to the members of the police rank and file. Focusing on issues that had long been priorities to police, including a police Bill of

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8 “What All the Cops Are Talking About.”
9 These fundraisers provoked backlash from some of the Teamsters’ own membership. Clerical workers from the University of Chicago who were represented by Teamsters Local 743 protested outside of the fundraising events. Juana E. Duty, “Anti-Racists Picket Dinner for Indicted Transit Cops,” Chicago Sun-Times, October 6, 1980, 54, Reel 1404, CPL Microfilm.
Rights to reform department discipline and an official grievance procedure, Dineen and the FOP counted on rank and file voters to “recognize the organization’s experience in police collective bargaining,” which had won representation elections and contracts in over seventy police smaller departments throughout Illinois.  

As representatives from police organizations and unions worked their way through Chicago’s twenty police districts, making presentations during roll calls and talking to police outside of district stations as they went to and from their shifts, the department launched its own anti-union campaign. Two months before the election, the department established a hotline and information center it called “Rumor Central,” to dispel, as it said, “baseless pieces of information” spread by unions and police organizations during their campaigns. The department also reassigned five high-ranking commanders to the department’s “No Single Representative” campaign committee, where they turned out an extensive series of anti-union material to persuade the department’s supervisory ranks to join the anti-union campaign and to convince patrolmen to vote for No Single Representative.

The recruitment of sergeants, lieutenants, and captains to the anti-police union cause was a special concern to the department’s No Single Representative campaign, because police supervisors were a direct line to patrolmen. Even though sharp divisions between the ranks of the police hierarchy had emerged in previous decades, especially when it came to issues of police discipline and compensation, significant ties between the lower ranks of the department persisted. Most police supervisors worked closely with the rank and file on a daily basis and, because the department always promoted from within, many sergeants and lieutenants had only recently been patrolmen themselves. The No Single Representative campaign groomed sergeants, lieutenants, and captains to use their authority as supervisors and their influence as colleagues—and even friends—of patrolmen to become “informal opinion molders” as well as formal spokesmen for the department. The department carefully scripted anti-union arguments for supervisors to repeat and distributed a list of “do’s and don’ts” that advised against intimidating patrolmen in order to persuade them. Instead, the No Single Representative campaign committee instructed supervisors to just “Be Yourself.”

To rally the support of supervisors, No Single Representative literature warned that a police union would make supervisors’ jobs more difficult. Arguing that a police union would mean extra work, No Single Representative literature estimated that a police union would create “20-30 extra hours” of unpaid work each week for supervisors bogged down by union paperwork and lengthy grievance procedures. Plus, the No Single Representative campaign cautioned that if the Chicago police unionized, then they would probably go on strike, even if the union agreed to a no-strike clause in its contract. Citing examples of police strikes in Baltimore and New York in the 1970s,

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14 Only rarely did the police department hire outside candidates, and usually only for high-level administrative or commanding positions. The most notable example of this was the hiring of the criminologist O.W. Wilson from the University of California, Berkeley, as police superintendent in 1960.
15 T.M. Walton and P.M. Clark, “‘Do’s and Don’ts for Supervisors,’ Attachment #3, Chicago Police Department, Labor Relations Information Campaign, ‘Re: October 1980 Election(s).’” 39, HWLARC.
department administrators explained that a strike would mean even more unpaid work for supervisors covering the shifts of police who walked off the job.\textsuperscript{16}

The No Single Representative campaign also told supervisors that a police union would erode their managerial authority. Scolding skeptics, the campaign committee warned that, “for those of you who feel that unionism has no designs on management prerogatives, no desire for power, no intentions to covertly or overtly control organization, forget it.” Reports from other cities where police had unionized seemed to confirm the arguments of the No Single Campaign. According to the department’s campaign committee, union leaders in those cities told police, “It is with us who you will deal, we will make the policy!” A police captain in New York reportedly declared, “The Union runs this department, management doesn’t.” With a union in the Chicago police department, the No Single Representative campaign predicted that police supervisors would experience an ongoing “loss of control.” First a “Willful disobedience of order” would take hold in the ranks as a police union assumed authority over the department’s disciplinary process. Next, supervisors would lose their say in departmental policies big and small, including dress codes and haircut requirements, the assignment of one-man patrol cars, scheduling and district assignments.\textsuperscript{17}

If a police union would cost sergeants, lieutenants, and captains their time and authority, the No Single Representative campaign argued, it would cost patrolmen big cuts in their paychecks and maybe even their livelihoods. Ten days before the first round of voting, the department distributed a “Fact Sheet” that listed both the starting and current dues collected by police organizations that included the FOP in Cleveland, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association in Buffalo, and the Los Angeles Police Protective Association. In each case the department documented dues increases that amounted to at least double the initial rate and in Buffalo annual police union dues increased from $12 to $146.80 over the course of seventeen years.\textsuperscript{18}

Questioning if these union dues were worth the cost to police, the department asked “if what you pay for is what you get.”\textsuperscript{19}

Even if police did not belong to the union, they would still pay union dues. A flier from the No Single Representative campaign described union fair share rules that required non-members to pay a portion of regular dues to cover the cost of bargaining and administering the contract. Unions used fair share clauses to prevent a free-rider problem, one where all of the members of a bargaining unit benefited from representation and a contract, but only dues-paying union members paid the cost. Under fair share clauses, employees who failed to pay their fair share dues could be fired. The department asked police to consider the consequences of a fair share clause through a series of sample questions they could pose to representatives of police union candidates:

(A) Will I get fired as a police officer if I don’t pay union dues if we get unionized and a contract occurs?;
(B) If so, aren’t you really more interested in my money than in me?

\textsuperscript{16} Chicago Police Department, “Union/No Single Representative—General Briefing Booklet for Exempt Members, Captains, Lieutenants and Sergeants” Attachment #1, in T.M Walton and P.M. Clark, Chicago Police Department, Labor Relations Information Campaign, “Re: October 1980 Election(s),” 20-25, HWLMRC.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 13-14, 19.

\textsuperscript{18} Some of these increases can be attributed to the inflationary spiral of the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{19} Chicago Police Department “No Single Representative” Campaign Committee, “Fact Sheet,” October 5, 1980, HWLMRC.
(C) If not, then why would you, the union, have me fired for not paying union
dues, are you saying that I won’t have to pay union dues?

The No Single Representative campaign also pointed to the Union Security clause of the
recently-negotiated interim agreement between Chicago Fire Fighters, Local No. 2, AFL-CIO
and the city, which required all of Chicago’s firefighters to pay dues or lose their jobs. Unlike
members of the fire department, the campaign committee argued, “No members have ever had to
pay anyone for their jobs here.”

Describing unions as insatiable, money-hungry machines, the No Single Representative
campaign explained that a police union could rack up virtually limitless costs in the form of
salaries, operating expenses, and campaigns. Police unions, it told patrolmen, existed solely to
collect dues and spend money:

Unions do not produce products or services to satisfy customers or taxpayers. Their main goal is to increase membership. Dues from this membership are needed to pay union officers…and to maintain their large administrative staffs and buildings…Only time can tell how much it will cost.

Union-sponsored job actions could prove costly too. In police went on strike they could pay fines
and lose their wages as well as their jobs, but a strike would cost a police union, as the
department declared, “NOTHING!!!!” Some patrolmen sided with the department on these
points. One officer patrolling his beat on the North Side on the day before the representation
election told a *Chicago Tribune* reporter that “all the unions have been waiting outside the
station vying for us. They want our money, lady. That’s a lot of money, $11 a month from
10,000 guys.” In addition to annual dues or the personal financial costs of a strike, even more
money was at stake for patrolmen in their police pension fund. In 1980 police pension fund
assets amounted to nearly $480 million with estimated growth of up to $700 million by 1985.

One policewoman believed that anxiety over pension funds would influence police votes because
the “old-timers are probably going to vote ‘no’ to any union. They don’t want anything to
happen to their pensions.”

According to the No Single Representative campaign committee both police paychecks
and police benefits were at stake in the representation election. Shortly before the first
representation election vote, the No Single Representative campaign circulated statistics showing
that of the 549 Chicago police officers who resigned between 1977 and 1980, 376 returned for

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21 Ibid.; “Information Sheet for Police Officers and Investigators Concerning the Upcoming Union/No Single Representative Election,” in T.M Walton and P.M. Clark, Chicago Police Department, Labor Relations Information Campaign, “Re: October 1980 Election(s),” HWLMRC.
23 Ibid., 44.
24 “What All the Cops Are Talking About.”
reinstatement, most of them to regain the salary and benefits they had earned as police.\footnote{Chicago Police Department “No Single Representative” Campaign Committee, “Fact Sheet: Police Officers’ Reinstatements,” October 12, 1980, HWLMRC.} If police voted the “right” way, they could secure these existing benefits permanently with the promise of future salary increases. A few days before the election, Chicago’s police superintendent announced that if the majority of patrolmen voted for No Single Representative, the mayor promised to introduce a City Council ordinance that would “lock in all of the benefits which you are currently receiving and continue to make it possible for you to receive additional benefits.” But if police voted for a union, then there would be no guarantees about what might happen to their benefits.\footnote{Richard Brzeczek, \textit{PAX 501}, October 13, 1980.} Protesting these threats from the police department and city, a patrolman who wrote anonymously as “The Man in Blue” sent an open letter to the mayor, the city’s press, and Chicago’s police organizations to complain. The Man in Blue reported that a police commander in the first district “informed us that we would lose all benefits we now possess, if we vote in favor of union representation,” and asked Mayor Byrne, “is this correct or is this an attempt to coerce [sic] a non-union vote?” The larger issue at hand, the Man in Blue explained, were the labor rights of police as city workers, asking “whether the Mayor, the City, the Police Department, or any concerned citizen will allow its police officers, (who are presently without union representation), to be intimidated and wrongfully manipulated by this unethical and deplorable type of management.”\footnote{The Man in Blue to the League, Re: Letter Sent to Mayor, September 1, 1980, AAPL, Box 6/2, CHM.}

In addition to threatening police with the loss of benefits, police department administrators also took practical steps to redress some longstanding rank and file grievances during the campaign. Less than a week before the first round of voting, one department-wide memo promised to fix the department’s constant delays and failure to pay medical bills for police who were injured on-duty. For years, late payments or nonpayment of these medical bills had left injured police in debt and damaged their credit ratings. To solve the problem, the department reorganized its methods for Injured on Duty Bill Processing, cut turnaround times in half, and pledged to pay all backlogged medical bills by the end of the year. This promise was proof, according to the No Single Representative campaign, that “THE DEPARTMENT DOES CARE,” and that the police did not need a union to solve their workplace grievances.\footnote{“Benefits Available to Chicago Police officers under Federal Employees’ Compensation Act,” \textit{Chicago Police Star}, March 1976, 13–14; Chicago Police Department No-Single Representative Campaign Committee, “Fact Sheet: Injured on Duty Medical Bills Processing”, October 10, 1980, AAPL, Box 77/Police Labor Unions, 1975-1980, CHM.}

While the No Single Representative campaign argued that police did not need union representation, before the election the department offered police approximations of some of the benefits and resources that unions offered. One week before the election the police superintendent proposed a “Policy Advisory Committee” to represent patrolmen in lieu of a police union, telling police that through the Committee, “You can speak for yourself; not pay some labor organization dues to speak for you.” Though the department feared losing its managerial control to a police union, it told police that it envisioned the Policy Advisory Committee as a “system whereby police officers could participate directly in policy planning” in labor-management forums where “the Superintendent will encourage the free exchange of ideas.” Promoting this plan, the departmental literature repeated its message, “Do you think you need representation? So do we, But, Why pay a Labor boss to speak for you? Speak for
yourself!!” The department also proposed an expansion of a related Liaison Officer program, a plan where police in each district would elect one representative to attend monthly meetings with commanding officers. In these meetings, the Superintendent promised that the “voice of the police officer is not only welcomed, it is solicited. It should be heard: it WILL be heard.”

Critical of the department’s threats and skeptical of its promises, police organizations, disgruntled members of the rank and file, and the mysterious Man in Blue rejected the department’s anti-union campaign. Meanwhile, an unlikely ally joined the police department in supporting No Single Representative: the AAPL. The AAPL denied that its support of No Single Representative meant that it sided with the police department on a critical city issue, telling members that “the City of Chicago happens to fall on the same side of the tracks for a change.”

Concerned that a police union dominated by white police would dismantle the department’s affirmative action policies and fail to represent Chicago’s black police, the AAPL mobilized its own campaign against police unionization in the summer of 1980. Even before the city called the police representation election, the AAPL held a series of meetings with its members, city aldermen, and state representatives to discuss the consequences of collective bargaining for Chicago’s minority police and to develop strategies to try to prevent rank and file police organizing. As the Chicago police prepared to vote in October, AAPL leaders rallied their membership in opposition to a police union, writing, “we caution you…to watch this issue very vigilantly and let us not be taken for granted by anyone,” adding that members “must also be prepared to collectively rise to the occasion if a union is suddenly heaped upon us.”

As the election neared, the AAPL’s president announced an alliance with the Guardians, another smaller organization of black police in the city, and plans to turn the combined memberships of about two thousand black patrolmen into a “tight voting bloc.” In its own No Single Representative campaign, the AAPL warned black police that a police union meant “Discriminatory Practices” and “No Job Security (Especially if you are low on seniority lists).” Reminding police that none of the choices on the ballot had supported the AAPL during its federal anti-discrimination lawsuits against the police department and city, one AAPL flier asked, “Where were these organizations who allege to represent Black and White police officers when minorities needed support in our efforts to stamp out racial discrimination?” During the years the AAPL had fought the police department and city in court, police organizations like COP and FOP fought for a police Bill of Rights to protect police from violations of their constitutional rights during disciplinary investigations. But the AAPL pointed out that this proposed Bill of Rights did not protect black police from racial discrimination on the job and questioned why these groups had not “sat down with the leadership of the AAPL and the

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30 Ibid., Howard Saffold and Sherman Williams to Officers, October 1980, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Police Department--Collective Bargaining, CHM.

31 For example, the AAPL proposed the passage of an affirmative action ordinance in the City Council that would ensure that hiring and promotion quotas would trump seniority rules in a union contract. Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, Meeting Minutes, June 16, 1980; Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, Minutes--Collective Bargaining Meeting, June 30, 1980, AAPL, Box 69/AAPL-Minutes, 1973-1984, CHM.

32 Howard Saffold and Sherman Williams to Officers, October 1980, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Police Department--Collective Bargaining, CHM.

Guardians Association in order to fashion a true Bill of Rights for All police officers?” It was clear to the AAPL that if the majority of the police rank and file voted for labor representation, that black police would still not be adequately represented at the bargaining table.

The Police Vote

In the first round of voting in the police representation election, the Chicago police rank and file were pulled by deep divisions and united by unlikely alliances, just as they had been since 1960. Though hardly unified in their voting, the police did register their support for representation independent of the police department. No Single Representative received the most support of any option on the ballot with 26 percent of the vote, but 74 percent of police voted for a police organization or police union to represent them and were split closely between the candidates. After No Single Representative, the FOP came in second with 22 percent of the vote, and the Teamsters were close behind with 20 percent. The Paperworkers took 17 percent of the vote and COP, once the largest organization of the Chicago police rank and file, came in last with just 9 percent. Even though the FOP led the Teamsters by just a few hundred votes, the Tribune interpreted the FOP’s lead as a clear sign that police had retreated from the job actions and confrontational stances of the previous decade. By voting for the FOP, which was known as “the least militant, least strike-prone organization in the field,” the Tribune explained that police demonstrated support for a leader like the FOP’s president, John Dineen, who believed that “few Chicago policemen are so extreme as to be willing to paralyze the city for the sake of an extra dollar.”

Because none of the choices on the ballot won a clear majority in the first round of voting, the city scheduled a run-off election between the top two winners, No Single Representative and the FOP. Heading into this second election, police administrators were confident that No Single Representative would win, believing that the FOP was not strong enough to unify the police. The FOP, however, banked on the support of police who had supported other organizations in the first round of the election. After decades of competition and failed alliances between Chicago’s police organizations and unions, the FOP’s leader, John Dineen said he was certain that “the majority will vote for us in the runoff…Everybody agreed to back the winner, and I expect them to.” This would, of course, require an act of sacrifice from every other group on the ballot, because as the Tribune predicted “A victory in the runoff for FOP would be a death sentence for the four losers in the first voting.” It turned out that in the weeks leading up to the second round of voting, the unions and organizations that had lost in the first round were not, in fact, ready to back the winner. COP’s president insisted that the FOP was “not a union” but was instead a weak “social club.” Teamsters’ officials, who had been making insider deals with Chicago city politicians and administrators for decades, now accused the FOP

35 If the AAPL and Guardians did succeed in turning their membership into a voting bloc, and most of their 2,000 members vote for No Single Representative, then the election returns would indicate that the department’s anti-union campaign did little to persuade the majority of white police to forgo union representation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is true, but because the ballots were kept secret—and separate from demographic information about police voters—a definitive count is unknown.
38 Douglas Frantz, “City Won’t Give up Fight Against Police Unionizing,” N3; Editorial, “The Police Vote Returns.”
of being the first choice of City Hall, telling police that a vote for the FOP would be “just like a vote for the city.”

But the AAPL and Guardians opposed the FOP’s candidacy in the second round of voting precisely because they feared the organization would be able to work well with the city in negotiating a contract. Not only would the seniority clauses of a contract threaten newly-instituted affirmative action programs for minorities and women, the AAPL also cited the FOP’s recent court challenges that repealed the department’s minority hiring quotas from 40 percent to 25 percent. What would happen, the AAPL asked its members, if “the FOP had Sole Bargaining rights for all police officers?” The Guardians echoed the AAPL’s arguments, telling black police,

We are fighting the battles for affirmative action and this is not the time to quit. Do not vote for F.O.P. [who] have fought against the discrimination suit and all steps of affirmative action, even to the point of using money from their treasure [sic]…If you don’t want them to use your own money against you than you have better [sic] vote “No Single Representative.”

That organized black police supported No Single Representative did not mean that they opposed any kind of police labor representation. The AAPL and Guardians advocated an alternative coalition of representatives from each of Chicago’s police organizations, both white and black, that would negotiate pay, discipline, and work assignments with the police department. While this plan looked similar to the police department’s Policy Advisory Group, the AAPL argued that it “would be more feasible than hoping that a sole bargaining agent would not succumb to the dictates of sophisticated organized labor.”

As competing police organizations and unions worked to undermine the FOP’s campaign, it seemed as though the mayor had been plotting against the No Single Representative campaign for months. Byrne had promised the city’s police and firefighters representation elections and contracts during her mayoral campaign in 1979, and she celebrated the police election for bringing Chicago’s “labor relations out of the dark ages of the handshake and into the mainstream of modern labor relations prevalent in most other major cities.” During the No Single Representation campaign and police representation election, Byrne antagonized the rank and file in a series of what looked like calculated blunders intended to provoke police into voting for a union. Byrne had dragged her feet on enacting a collective bargaining ordinance for public employees, but after the municipal labor unrest of her first year in office, she seemed more predisposed to regularizing labor relations with the police through a union, especially if police agreed to a no-strike provision in their contract. But if Byrne did support a police union, she devised a roundabout method for doing so. Before the first round of voting, Byrne announced the formation of an independent citizens’ panel that would investigate cases of police brutality. To

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40 Howard Saffoldt to members, c. 1980, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Police Department--Collective Bargaining, CHM.
the police this new panel looked suspiciously like a civilian review board, which had been a hot-button issue since the late 1960s. Shortly after introducing the panel, Byrne began to backpedal as she and the police superintendent tried to control the damage. Addressing the “suspicion and confusion” surrounding the brutality panel, the superintendent denied that the panel was a civilian review board and emphasized his own opposition to outside civilian review. In interviews Byrne explained that the police department’s Office of Professional Standards would continue to have the final say in brutality cases and in a memo distributed throughout the police department she asserted that the “new Commission is not a civilian review board. I am opposed to civilian review boards and will continue to be opposed to civilian review boards.”

As it turned out, Byrne’s police brutality initiative was hardly a civilian review board and closely resembled many previous versions of toothless civilian review agencies in Chicago. A WGN editorial commented that the panel “merely adds a layer—another agency—in trying to deal with the situation.” And the new panel proved to be just as weak and ineffectual as its predecessors, if not more so. Three months after the panel’s founding, every member had resigned and reports revealed that the group had operated “Without office, staff, or money,” and “could do little more than talk to itself, without investigating a single alleged grievance.” This fueled speculation that Byrne had timed the panel’s creation to coincide with the first round of police voting in October to “steer backlash votes toward the Teamsters, job-providers for policemen recently suspended on brutality charges.” The Tribune commented, “Whatever the mayor’s motives may have been she certainly hurt the chances of the no-union option favored by the police superintendent and nominally by herself.”

Before the second round of voting in November, Byrne made yet another move that looked like sabotage to the No Single Representative campaign when she announced that the police superintendent and other top administrators would receive an 86 percent pay increase in the following year. This would increase the superintendent’s salary from $51,036 to $95,000, while rank and file police could expect a salary increase of only 6.5 percent. Byrne’s budget proposal provoked outrage from the police and exasperation from the city’s conservative press. “Whatever the arguments for paying the superintendent a salary comparable to private-sector executives,” observed one business periodical, “the day before the cops voted on a union most definitely was not the time to talk about them.” The Tribune lamented that “With her rare talent for doing the wrong thing at the worst possible time, Mayor Byrne guaranteed a landslide of votes for FOP.” When police went to the polls on November 10, “many went angry,” with “money on their minds.” A Sun-Times journalist who visited a police district during the election reported that police had shouted things like, “Six and a half percent! This department doesn’t give a ---- for us.” When asked if Byrne’s salary proposal had changed the mind of fence-sitters before the vote, another police officer told reporters that the raise for the superintendent had, “just crushed the fence.” There were even accounts of black police who switched their allegiance

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45 Richard Brzezek, PAX 501, September 24, 1980; Chicago Police Department “No-Single Representative” Campaign Committee, “Fact Sheet,” October 3, 1980, HWLMRC.
from the AAPL and the Guardians’ and voted at the last minute for the FOP in anger over the new pay disparity. The police superintendent confirmed that he had heard reports of police changing their votes at the last minute and the deputy superintendent believed that the FOP win reflected “officer dissatisfaction with their conditions, particularly economic.”

Months before the police vote Chicago’s police superintendent was skeptical that the rank and file really wanted a labor contract with the city. “Certain leadership has talked about a contract,” he said, “but I don’t know if they are echoing the rank and file.” But the results of November’s run-off election were definitive, with the FOP winning 7,244 votes compared to 1,744 votes for No Single Representative. Roughly one-third of police who had voted for No Single Representative in the first election voted for the FOP in the second election as “the city’s claim to the allegiance of police officers eroded like the dunes along Lake Michigan.”

Reflecting on the last few weeks of the campaign, the Tribune concluded that the “FOP didn’t win last week’s election. The City handed it over.” But the rift between the police and the city was wider and deeper than just police reactions to Byrne’s new policies. The Tribune’s labor reporter observed that the police “had been rattling their chains since the death of Mayor Daley,” and that “most sources agree policemen feel that they are being harassed in performing their duties and that they have been abandoned by City Hall,” which made “union membership more attractive.” This resentment had been brewing since the early 1960s, not just the few months before the election. Another editorial explained, “for three decades Daley and Bilandic treated the police department as a corps of vassals to be manipulated for political ends... it’s no wonder the rank-and-file became estranged from police management.” The grievances that had fueled much of this resentment, police discipline and police salaries, became priorities in the upcoming negotiations between the FOP and the city as police tried to work benefits like a Police Bill of Rights and overtime pay into their new contract.

The Police Contract

The day after the FOP won the run-off election in November, it began preliminary talks with the superintendent and city officials in preparation for official contract talks in January of 1981. John Dineen thought that the representation election was “minor compared with the anticipated battle with city officials for anything resembling a contract,” but the police officials seemed more optimistic. Chicago’s police superintendent went so far as to deem 1981 the “Year of the Employee” for Chicago’s city workers. “By improving their lot,” he said, “we feel the employee will perform better. It translates into better service to the citizen.”

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52 Editorial, “Unionized Cops: Whose Fault?”.
54 Editorial, “Unionized Cops: Whose Fault?”.  
initial gusto, bargaining Chicago’s first police contract was a difficult process. Hammering out the agreement between police and the city took eight months and what the superintendent described as “many arduous bargaining sessions.” The final document was predictably mixed, with both major achievements and compromises for the FOP. Among its gains, the contract included the long sought-after “Police Bill of Rights” that ensured basic protections for police during internal disciplinary investigations, and the contract both guaranteed and improved on many existing police benefits. These included time-and-a-half pay in cash for overtime, holiday pay, personal days, a $400 dollar extra uniform allowance, a family dental plan, a seniority system, and a guaranteed twelve-month medical leave plan for which, John Dineen stressed, the “City shall pay.” At the same time, the contract compromised on three key points, leaving the right to strike, binding arbitration, and guaranteed salary increases out of its provisions. John Dineen dismissed the idea that police needed the right to strike, saying, “I do not know very many police officers who want to or feel we should strike,” but he was less satisfied with the issue of police pay. The disparity between the salaries of patrolmen and their supervisors remained a sore point even months after the run-off election in November. Immediately after the election, the city had told the FOP that it would not negotiate pay raises for the police because it was too late to make any new budget appropriations for 1981. At first, Dineen accepted this, saying in mid-November that “we did not hold out the hope of any Christmas present.” But a few days later, Dineen called the city’s planned 6 ½ percent wage increase “ridiculous” and threatened job actions or even a police strike if the city refused to agree to binding arbitration or a larger pay increase in the contract.

Dineen eventually backed down from these threats, but even without the cost of additional police raises, the expense of the FOP’s contract cause alarm. The Tribune worried that the contract would turn the police force into a “patronage army 10,500 strong that gobbles up dollars without regard to productivity,” and others called the police contract a “blank check.” City officials were, in fact, unsure of how much the FOP contract would actually cost. One alderman from the 40th ward who had once served as an aide to the police superintendent estimated that the contract would cost the city an extra $60 million in its first year. The police superintendent himself calculated that the additional cost of overtime alone could reach $30 million in 1982. Other estimates put the contract’s total cost in the first year as high as $100 million. Having only recently felt the financial strain from the AAPL’s lawsuits that had nearly $100 million in federal funding withheld from Chicago in the mid-1970s, city officials feared that a newly-empowered police union representing the majority of the rank and file might exert even more pressure on the city’s budget.

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58 John Dineen, “Vote Yes This Is Your Contract,” AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Police Department--Collective Bargaining, CHM; Agreement between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, Effective through July 1, 1983, HWLMRC.
While the city grappled with the projected expense of the FOP contract, the AAPL believed that the contract’s cost to the city meant the end of the affirmative action hiring and promotions guidelines that it had won through long court battles. One of the AAPL’s leaders protested that “The city can’t afford this agreement and what will happen is the same thing that has happened in other cities—they’ll lay people off...And, according to this agreement, it will be last hired, first fired. That means that minorities and women will suffer.” The contract also meant new costs for individual AAPL members. Just as the No Single Representative campaign had warned, the contract included a fair share clause that required all members of the rank-and-file to pay dues to cover their “fair share” costs of bargaining, whether or not they were members of the FOP. To the AAPL, this meant its members would be forced to financially support an organization with a “reputation nationally for practicing racism and filing reverse-discrimination lawsuits.”

The AAPL thought the FOP contract was too aggressive, but the police organizations that had been defeated in the representation election criticized the contract for its weaknesses. Without binding arbitration or the right to strike, the CPA believed that police were “better off with a handshake” and told them, “You had nothing when you started, and you still have nothing, only now it is in writing, signed and sealed by ordinance.” In an attempt to salvage its dwindling numbers as police switched their memberships from COP to the FOP, COP insisted that it remained a relevant and vital organization that could plug the gaps in the FOP contract. COP wrote to members urging them to “Maintain your protection, retain your membership in COP,” because, Until the final steps of a contract, containing an agency shop clause in it, is signed, the need for COP is as important as ever because the need for legal and legislative protection still exists...Even if all of the desired results of a contract were to become a reality, you still need a voice to protect you against job-related lawsuits, suspensions, and firings, probably even more so.

The CPA tried to keep its organization alive by making a similar case. Even with a Police Bill of Rights in the contract, the CPA’s president argued there was still a “need for public promotion to combat accusations of brutality and insensitivity towards police work,” adding that the CPA could be “a back up organization, keeping our sole bargaining agent on their toes.”

Dissenters within the FOP’s own ranks also voiced their objections to the police contract before it was ratified. In a bulletin distributed within Chicago’s tenth police district, an FOP field

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63 Howard Saffold to members, c1980.

64 The CPA called the contract a return to the Chicago police department’s the “company union” days of “sweetheart deals,” an ironic assessment given that the CPA had served as the police department’s “company union” in the 1950s. See Joseph Pecoraro, “A Report by the Chicago Patrolmen’s Association”, c 1981, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Patrolmen’s Association, CHM.

65 Jack R. Hawksonen to Members of Confederation of Police, Local 5, October 31, 1980, AAPL, Box 58/Chicago Police Department--Collective Bargaining, CHM.

representative criticized the contract’s failure to improve police salaries or to secure binding arbitration. Pointing to the limitations of the police Bill of Rights in the contract, the district representative questioned the FOP’s ability to reform the department’s internal investigations system, asking members, “Do you have a good Bill of Rights? Can the Department keep a secret file on you without you viewing it?” and urging them to “vote NO for ratification of this contract agreement. Again, I say VOTE NO!” But this level of internal opposition seems to have been relatively rare, and in the summer of 1981 most FOP members voted to ratify their first contract with the city.

Whatever reservations Chicago’s patrolmen may have held about the strength and quality of their new contract, these were not shared by the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who outranked them. Although these supervisors had been carefully instructed to help the department oppose a police union during the No Single Representative campaign, within a few weeks of the contract’s ratification, the upper ranks of the Chicago police department scrambled to share in its benefits. In a memo delivered to the superintendent and other police department administrators, the associations representing Chicago’s 806 sergeants, 200 lieutenants, and 162 captains expressed their “membership’s concern about not being included in the economic benefits accrued to patrol officers as a result of the ratification of the recent contract.” These supervisors demanded that they receive the same benefits as the workers they supervised, including the same number of paid holidays, a family dental plan, disability income, overtime, a pay differential of twenty percent between all ranks, and the passage of a city ordinance to officially include the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains in the FOP contract. Soon after, representatives of the associations of the upper ranks held their own separate negotiations with the mayor and police superintendent and secured a compromise. As a result, police sergeants, lieutenants, and captains received some of the same non-economic benefits and medical and dental coverage as patrolmen, as well as an improved pay differential, but they did not receive the holiday pay, uniform allowances, or the overtime that their subordinates earned.

As the upper ranks of the police department worked to include themselves in the benefits of the FOP contract, the AAPL fought against the forced inclusion of their own members. The AAPL’s ongoing challenge to the FOP contract in its first few years raised questions about how the new agreement, and its enforcement, would reshape the relationship between the police and police department. Would it cause new rifts between patrolmen and their superiors or would it force them to form new partnerships in order to implement the contract? Shortly after the contract’s ratification, the AAPL revisited a familiar protest strategy when it filed suit against the FOP. The AAPL argued that the fair share clause of the contract deliberately ruined its finances and violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of AAPL members by denying them their freedom of association. Because the department now only granted automatic payroll dues deduction to the FOP and not to all qualifying police organizations, the AAPL explained that it had lost a “principal source of funds,” which limited its “effective advocacy of affirmative action relief for victims of discrimination.” Without automatic dues deduction, one AAPL official testified, “We have had to tighten our belts, dig deeply into our pockets and make do with what

68 Sergeant Daniel Scalia, Lt. John Fee, and Captain Fred Rice to Superintendent Richard J. Brzeczek, August 27, 1981, AAPL, Box 6/6, CHM.
we have.” In addition, the AAPL accused the FOP of trying to “stampede police officers into resigning from the League and joining F.O.P.,” citing statistics that in toward the end of contract negotiations, “approximately 120 police officers have switched from the League to F.O.P,” which amounted to nearly ten percent of the AAPL’s total membership.

The AAPL also charged that provisions of the FOP’s contract dismantled the department’s affirmative action hiring and promotion program, in violation of the federal court ruling the AAPL had won four years earlier. Seniority provisions in the contract, the AAPL argued, would only “build discriminatory effects on the hiring discrimination of the 1970s,” while using “membership dues and other resources to conduct litigation and public campaigns attacking League-endorsed affirmative action programs.” The FOP’s success at reducing the required percentage of minority police hires and promotions in court from 40 to 25 percent and its ongoing attempt to reduce this figure to seven percent made it “plain to all of us that the F.O.P. used the dues from other Blacks to fight against our best interest.”

Once the AAPL’s attempt to secure an injunction against the contract failed, it began a boycott of the FOP that encouraged Chicago’s black police to cancel their memberships and stop paying fair share dues. The AAPL’s open defiance of the new contract tested how far the FOP and the police department would go to actually enforce the new agreement. At first, the AAPL demanded access to the FOP’s financial records to determine if “fair share” dues really only covered the cost of bargaining and administering the contract, but the FOP refused to disclose its financial information. Planning a dues boycott, the AAPL wrote to FOP officials and police department administrators to find out what the penalties would be for police who withheld their dues. The FOP responded to the AAPL’s inquiry to say that, “In the event you do not comply with your fair-share obligation, Lodge 7 will continue to process the enforcement of its contract rights,” but in their own response police department administrators equivocated on the issue. Reasoning that the “exact implication of this contract language has not been determined by the parties of the contract,” the department described its labor status and relationship to the FOP as ambiguous, “neither a ‘closed shop,’ nor is it exactly a ‘union shop.’”

This hesitancy from the police department encouraged the AAPL to move forward with the boycott. AAPL officials instructed members how to complete the bureaucratic process of cancelling their FOP memberships and provided copies of the paperwork members would need. Encouraging its members to follow templates for writing the letters that would announce their withdrawal from the union, the AAPL suggested statements such as, “I consider the alternative

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72 Ibid., Howard Saffold to Members, December 1981, AAPL, Box 1/Chicago Police Department Correspondence, 1980-1984, CHM.
73 FOP dues for members were $10 a month. Fair share dues were $8 a month. James Strong, “100 Firefighters Hit Union Payment,” *Chicago Tribune*, February 26, 1982, A20.
74 John Dineen to Officer David M. Rozell, January 3, 1982, AAPL, Box 7/1, CHM; Howard Saffold Letter to members.
75 This bureaucratic language explained that the FOP would force the police department to fire police officers for their refusal to pay dues, John Dineen to Officer David M. Rozell.
76 Lt. Daniel E. Waldhier to Officer Johnson, July 13, 1982, AAPL, Box 7/2, CHM.
77 Afro-American Police League Meeting Minutes, March 1, 1983, AAPL, Box 69/AAPL-Minutes, 1973-1984, CHM.
of paying dues to FOP to be a denial of my rights, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, to elect not to associate with FOP,” and “neither FOP nor the Police Department has made any effort to show that the fair share represents only the cost of the collective bargaining process and contract administration.”

Member after member followed the League’s advice and wrote the FOP. One letter asserted, “I have no intentions of forfeiting the gains the Afro-American Patrolmens League have made through affirmative action,” and another contended that the FOP “did not have the best interests of all department members at heart,” and concluded, “P.S. A refund of dues will be expected immediately.” It is difficult to tell just how many police officers withheld their dues because of the AAPL boycott, but by 1982 the FOP counted 477 police who failed to pay their fair share dues and demanded that the police department take action against the violators. If the police department did not discipline these police, the FOP said it would consider this inaction “a substantial breach of our contract.”

The FOP, which had campaigned largely on the promise that it would protect police from the department’s internal disciplinary system with a police Bill of Rights, now relied on this same disciplinary system to enforce its contract and collect its dues. Despite its initial reluctance to define its relationship to the FOP or to interpret a precise meaning of the contract’s fair share clause, the police department eventually agreed to use its power to enforce the contract. It notified police who did not pay their dues that “if the allegation is sustained charges will be filed with the Police Board seeking their separation from the department.” Backing up this threat, the deputy superintendent brought all of the department’s commanding officers up to speed on the consequences for police who failed to pay their FOP dues. Each commander also received a list of every violator in his unit, with the instruction to personally notify each officer on the list of the official reprimand and punishment. In at least a few documented cases, the police department did initiate disciplinary action against AAPL members and leaders who withheld dues as part of the boycott. Early in 1982 the police department filed an official complaint against an AAPL leader, Officer Edgar Gosa, who refused to pay the FOP $128 in fair-share dues. After undergoing questioning by his supervising sergeant, Gosa agreed to pay the dues “under protest,” because his attorney advised him that if he did not pay, he would lose his job.

78 “Officer” to Dennis F. Nowicki, Form Letter, December 13, 1982, AAPL, Box 7/2, CHM.
79 Officer Michael T. Ray to Fraternal Order of Police, August 10, 1981, AAPL, Box 1/Chicago Police Department Correspondence, 1980-1984, CHM.
80 Johnny Odneal to The President of the Fraternal Order of Police, John Dineen, Subject: Withdrawal of Membership, August 11, 1981, AAPL, Box 1, Chicago Police Department Correspondence, 1980-1984, CHM.
81 John Dineen to Richard Brzeczek, July 19, 1982, AAPL, Box 240/Security Planning Committee, CHM.
82 Dennis E. Nowicki to Officer, November 24, 1982, AAPL, Box 7/2, CHM.
83 Dennis E. Nowicki to Commanding Officer, Subject: Dues Deduction/ Fair Share--Fraternal Order of Police (F.O.P.) Bargaining Unit Members, November 24, 1982, AAPL, Box 7/2, CHM.
84 Records also show that other police who refused to pay FOP dues did so for religious reasons, for example, in the case of Officer Sidney R. Sharif, who withheld dues because, as a Muslim, he could not “join or support any exclusive fraternal orders.” Sharif was required to pay the amount he owed in dues to a pre-approved charitable organization in the city or lose his job in the police department. Detective Sidney Rahim Sharif to John Dineen, December 7, 1982, AAPL, Box 240/Security Planning Committee, CHM; John Dineen to Sidney R. Sharif, January 3, 1983, AAPL, Box 240/Security Planning Committee, CHM. John Dineen to Edgar L. Gosa, January 3, 1982, AAPL, Box 240/Security Planning Committee, CHM; Statement taken and typed by Sergeant Thomas J. Leonard of the Internal Affairs Division, “Statement of Officer Edgar L. Gosa, Star 8367 of the 3rd District Relating to the Allegation That He Failed to Comply With the Agreement Between the Fraternal Order of Police and the City of Chicago, Article #3, Section 3.1 in That He Failed to Become a Member of the Lodge or Participate by Paying a
The Police Candidate

In the early 1980s, the FOP did not limit its reach to the institutional boundaries of the Chicago police department. As it consolidated its organizational leadership among the police rank and file and harnessed the department’s disciplinary system to enforce its contract, the FOP turned its attention to Chicago city politics. Police department rules had long forbid overt partisan activity among the city’s patrolmen, but in the 1980s changes in Illinois state laws permitted “law enforcement officers to engage actively in political affairs.” On a practical level this meant, as John Dineen explained to the Chicago police, “Now you can put campaign signs in the windows of your home and bumper stickers on your car.” The changes in the law coincided with the FOP’s rise to power in the police department and provided new opportunities for the union to support its political agenda. In 1983, the FOP began to circulate Political Action Reports among its members that articulated the FOP’s position on city issues and informally endorsed mayoral, aldermanic, and judicial candidates. Specific FOP reports identified judges who were tough on crime and sympathetic to police and listed each alderman who had voted to support the FOP contract. In addition to advising its members how to vote, the FOP campaigned for its own members who were on the ballot. With seven candidates running for alderman in as many city wards, the FOP boasted that “On February 22, 1983, the City Election will probably have the greatest number of Chicago Police Officers, who are also members of the Fraternal Order of Police Bargaining Unit, that have ever run for Alderman in the history of the City of Chicago.” By April, two of the FOP’s own aldermanic candidates made it to the runoff election.

But in April of 1983 the aldermanic runs of FOP members were overshadowed by the mayoral contest between Republican Bernard Epton and the Democratic candidate Harold Washington, who was poised to become the city’s first African-American mayor. During the mayoral primary, Chicago’s police superintendent had appeared in a commercial to endorse Jane Byrne, signaling to the police rank and file, as the Chicago Tribune said, that it was “OK to use the police uniform for electioneering.” The involvement and campaigning of Chicago police and their organizations in the election also recapitulated the racial politics that had divided the Chicago police department for decades. Some police tried to deny that race was the issue in the campaign, like one white lieutenant who insisted, “This is not a racial thing…I worked with blacks for years and I’m no racist.” But even when interracial working relationships among the


88 These were not the first police candidates to run in a Chicago city election. In 1974 the AAPL ran an independent candidate and former police officer, Frank Lee, for alderman of the 28th Ward. Police had also found ways to get around rules that limited their political activity, or just broke the rules altogether. Police wives endorsed candidates and raised money for campaigns on their husbands’ behalf and in the 1979 mayoral election, “In disregard to department rule 42, which forbids police involvement in politics, many district commanders openly encouraged their officers to vote for Bilandic.” “Erect Frank K. Lee, Independent Democrat, Alderman, 28th Ward,” 1974, AAPL, Box 68/Lee, Frank--Campaign,” CHM; Lawrence Muhammad, “Supt. O’Grady Isn’t Only Cop Who’s Worried,” Chicago Defender, March 3, 1979, 1, 3, CPL Microfilm; “Chicago Police Running for Alderman,” F.O.P. Political Action Report, February 1983; “Police Aldermanic Candidates,” F.O.P. Political Action Report, April 1983.
89 “Mr. Brzeczek’s Legacy,” Chicago Tribune, April 7, 1983, 18.
police were relatively strong, the upcoming mayoral election proved divisive. Racist messages infused the Epton campaign. One of the unofficial slogans of white ethnic Chicagoans was, “Vote Right. Vote White,” and Epton’s own official campaign slogan read, “Vote Epton. Before it’s too late.” Among the police, one officer explained, “We can joke with each other about being black or white. But every black officer knows every white officer hates Washington’s guts.”

A supporter of affirmative action in the Chicago police department, Harold Washington’s candidacy threatened white police with the prospect that the police issues that were AAPL imperatives would become city priorities if Washington became mayor. In 1983, the department had only slowly improved the overall percentage of black police from 17 to 23 percent since the AAPL’s federal lawsuits in the mid-1970s. If elected, Harold Washington promised to quickly bring the total to 40 percent, in proportion with the city’s estimated black population. In addition to pushing the controversial topic of affirmative action in the department, Washington argued that police brutality cases should undergo external scrutiny and his “call for a civilian review board has made his name a household obscenity among white police officers.”

One police officer observed that the “bitterness” of white police toward Harold Washington was “mind-boggling.” Meanwhile, Republican contender Bernard Epton developed a platform that seemed to cater to the priorities of the majority of Chicago’s white police. In a position paper he promised to double the city’s free life insurance coverage for public safety workers killed in the line of duty and officially opposed civilian review boards to investigate complaints of police brutality.

Police participation in the mayoral campaigns became so heated that in the month before the vote the police superintendent intervened with a reprimand directed at every member of the department. At first the superintendent affirmed that the city’s police had a right to civic engagement, explaining that “Police officers, as citizens, do not surrender any rights under the First Amendment because of their occupational status. They retain their rights, among others, to discuss political issues and support a candidate of their choice.” But the superintendent reminded police of the limitations of those rights: police could not wear campaign buttons while on duty or post campaign signs or literature in department buildings. Especially, he scolded, police were prohibited from the “circulation of scurrilous or vile materials degrading any candidate,” whether they were in or out of uniform. But this kind of public reprimand did little to keep the mayoral contest out of the city’s station houses, where one South Side paper reported that the election had

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93 However, in a public address to the Chicago Crime Commission Epton did vow to crack down on the most extreme cases of police brutality and corruption through independent investigations of police conduct, explaining that “What we seem to have here is brutality not simply motivated by racial prejudice but brutality at the hands of equal opportunity sadists.” Bernard Epton for Mayor, “Issue Paper Number Three: Public Safety”, March 10, 1983, Bernard E. Epton Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, UIC Special Collections; “Police Prefer Epton,” F.O.P. Political Action Report, April 1983; Bernard E. Epton, “Statement by Candidate Bernard E. Epton to the Chicago Crime Commission”, February 10, 1983, Bernard E. Epton Papers, Box 1/1, UIC Special Collections.
become “the only topic.” The steps of police station houses actually became the sites of Epton rallies and white police could be seen wearing “Police for Epton” buttons as they headed to and from work. Off-duty white detectives even mobilized their expertise to assist the Epton campaign, challenging 2,500 black voter registrations, with half of the challenges upheld by the city’s Board of Elections Commission.

Adding to the efforts of individual police, the FOP rallied behind Epton and its executive board endorsed him by a vote of 23 to 1, with the lone dissenting vote coming from the board’s only black member. The FOP distributed campaign materials that urged all police to “VOTE to protect your ability to perform as a competent effective Police Officer,” and cast their ballots for Epton. Throughout the campaign, the FOP conducted “mayoral preference polls” among its members that clearly demonstrated the strength of the FOP’s support for Epton. Before the mayoral primary, the FOP received 1,825 responses to its mayoral preference poll. 70 percent of the respondents chose Jane Byrne, 26 percent chose Richard M. Daley (successor to the late Richard J. Daley), and just 4 percent chose Harold Washington. Before the final election, the results were similarly decisive. Out of 3,574 responses, 92.5 percent supported Epton and just 6.6 percent supported Washington. As the FOP publicly broadcast the support of its members for Epton, the leadership of the AAPL worked closely with the Washington campaign itself. At the outset of the campaign, former AAPL president Renault Robinson, then the Commissioner of the Chicago Housing Authority, served as Washington’s interim campaign manager until Al Raby, a civil rights leader who had been active in the Chicago Freedom Movement, took on the role. Next, Robinson joined the campaign steering committee and directed AAPL efforts to fundraise, and support Washington’s successful grassroots organizing among black voters in Chicago until Washington won the election in April of 1983.

Police tested the limits of their political participation and influence in the early 1980s, demonstrating a shift in their civic identity that had been in the making over the course of three decades. During the mayoral campaign the Tribune observed that “the police seem to see themselves as having an important political role and have been making maximum use of it.” A scholar of police labor politics observed that in Chicago “Historically, a police officer was truly a second-class citizen and was almost disenfranchised through departmental regulations and control,” while the “city administration was able to force its position regarding law enforcement matters on the General Assembly without the police membership being able to respond

95 Mark Kiesling, “Mayoral Election Dividing Black, White Policemen.”
97 Mark Kiesling, “Mayoral Election Dividing Black, White Policemen.”
98 “Police Prefer Epton.”
100 In both instances the results were counted and reported by the FOP, and less than half of the ballots were returned. “Police Prefer Epton.”
103 “Mr. Brzeczek’s Legacy.”
adequately.” But as the 1980s continued, a transformation took place, as the “police membership per se now constitutes a strong and recognizable political entity,” one capable of “strong political lobbying, making financial contributions, and even running for political office.” Indeed, by the end of the decade, two Chicago police officers took their political careers all the way to the Illinois General Assembly, where they served as state representatives.  

In the early 1980s members of the Chicago police department rank and file reconstituted themselves as a newly, if imperfectly, unified group during the police representation election, creating new links between former members of competing police organizations and between different ranks of the police department hierarchy. The FOP’s contract also forged a partnership between the union and the police department as the department aided FOP efforts to dismantle affirmative action policies in court and mobilized its disciplinary system to enforce the FOP contract. This relationship was a sharp contrast from the No Single Representative campaign just a few years earlier and an echo from an earlier era when the CPA and the police department worked together in close partnership. In those early days in the 1950s, defining the civic identity of the Chicago police had revolved around the question of whether the police were more soldier than civilian. But three decades later, after protests, lawsuits, and collective action, the question had changed. Now city officials, the police department, and the police rank and file themselves, asked how the police, as both citizens and workers, would wield their newly-won rights and their new-found power in the city.

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Conclusion

The Chicago police, already unlikely labor organizers, also negotiated their first contract during what turned out to be an inauspicious period for public employee unions and the labor movement in the United States. The FOP ratified its contract in mid-August of 1981, just weeks after Ronald Reagan announced his plans to break the national strike of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) by using permanent striker replacements. In what labor historian Joseph McCartin has called “the most significant single event in accelerating the decline of organized labor in the United States in the late twentieth century,” the broad scope and success of Reagan’s strategy had devastating consequences for labor over the next few decades.  

After the PATCO strike, the growth of public employee unions slowed and then stopped, the yearly number of worker walkouts in the US dropped by 70% and employer use of permanent striker replacements skyrocketed in both the public and private sectors.  

But throughout labor’s more general decline in the 1980s and 1990s, Chicago’s police union continued to grow more and more assertive.  

In the three decades after the FOP ratified its first contract, the union sued the city repeatedly, threatened work slowdowns, and delivered no-confidence votes to a series of police superintendents. It refused to endorse the candidacy of incumbent Richard M. Daley during the mayoral race of 2007, and in 2010 FOP members picketed City Hall to demand the removal of their police superintendent—an official who had been hand-picked by Daley.  

The FOP also persisted in its campaign to end affirmative action hiring and promotion policies in the department, even though most of the department’s three thousand black police had become FOP members and formed a sizable dissenting bloc within the union by the mid-1990s. Additionally, the FOP antagonized black citizens as well as black police. In 1993, it designed a float for the South Side St. Patrick’s Day parade based on the theme “Travesties of Justice.” The float paid homage to five white police, including John Burge and two of the detectives in his unit, who had been recently fired from the police department for their abuse of black citizens. Organizers banned the float from the parade, but by then the FOP had already made its point, saying that the float “represent[ed] the sentiments of a substantial number of our members.”

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2. Ibid., For a much more detailed account of the rise of anti-unionism, the PATCO strike, and its broader consequences for labor in late twentieth century America, see Joseph Anthony McCartin, *Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike That Changed America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
The FOP’s relationship with the city of Chicago was an uneasy one, marked by floundering negotiations and expired contracts. But the FOP continued to find ways to shape the policies and parameters governing police work in the city. It prevented the department from using civilian staff to fill clerical and administrative police positions, won extra compensation for police who performed work along the lines of “off-duty police dog care,” and in 1997 began a multi-year campaign to keep police from removing dead bodies from crime scenes and transporting them to the city morgue in police wagons.\(^6\) In 2003, the police department agreed to find another city agency to transport dead bodies, “slowly phasing out” this duty in districts across the city. One of the last police officers left moving dead bodies was Martin Preib, a rookie policeman and former labor organizer for the union of Hotel, Entertainment, and Restaurant Employees (HERE) in Chicago. In his memoirs, Preib described hauling corpses as “the most degrading job I have ever undertaken” and as work that quickly disabused him of the idea “that joining the police will be a move toward a career, away from the menial jobs that have comprised my life in other uniforms: doormen, waiter, bartender.” Preib saw the city’s lackluster commitment to negotiating, (“the city barely even believed it had to sit down and hammer out a contract with us,”) and its “increased oversight of the police” through the years as confirmation that the Chicago police had the same diminished status and minimal labor rights as other unionized workers in the service sector.\(^7\)

But elsewhere there has been evidence that four decades of police labor organizing nationwide had re-categorized the police as a special, protected class of unionized workers. Last year’s state law limiting public employee collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin and the proposal of a similar law in Ohio, exempted police and firefighters from their provisions. During demonstrations in February of 2011 to protest Wisconsin’s new law, firefighters joined the rallies of public employees in Madison in a show of sympathy. While firefighters marched into Madison’s Capitol building to a hero’s welcome from other public workers, the Madison police could not join them. Instead, the police were on duty and responsible for keeping order during the demonstrations. Watching silently at the protests, and monitoring protesters who occupied the Capitol like “chaperones at a mass sleepover,” the police stood in between unionized public employees and the government that employed them.\(^8\) There the police seemed to embody their unique, conflicted position within the labor movement and their special, uncertain role as the enforcers of the state.

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